Transcripts For CSPAN3 Joint House Hearing On Biological Security 20240712

A hearing jointly mosted by Foreign Affairs committee, Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence and emerging threats in capabilities. In a moment mute all participan other than chairman bar a. All participants are asked to keep themselves muted when not actively engaging in the discussion which should help limit echoes or other disruptions. Do not remember to remute themselves, the host will do so to limit background audio. Members and witnesses are responsible for unmuting themselves any time they wish to be heard. It may take a few seconds for your microphone to unmute. Please keep that in mind when speaking. A timekeeper will monitor the time for this hearing. If you are on the computer, review the time by switching your personal view in the upper right corner of your screen to grid or active speaker and thumbnail view. You can also pan the timer by right clicking or hovering you cursor ore the timer and pressing the thumb tack icon. With that, we are ready to begin. Chairman barra, please count down from five so that the system dis plays your video, then please paugs for five additional seconds. Then start the proceeding. Five, four, three, two, one. This joint subcommittee meeting with the house Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence and emerging threats and capabilities will come to order hchlt without objection the chair is authorized to declare a ve success of the committee of the committee at any point and all members will have five days to submit statements, extraneous materials and questions for the record, subject to the length, limitation in the rules. To insert something into the record please have your staff email either subcommittee clerk. As a reminder to members, please keep your video function on at all times, even when youre not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with 965 and the accompanying regulations staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise. We have a quorum and we will now recognize myself for opening remarks. I will then be followed by the acting Ranking Member, mr. Perry, chairman langevin, and then Ranking Member ste phonic. I will then recognize members in order of seniority, alternating between democrats and republicans, and Foreign Affairs and Armed Services members. You know, before we get started and before i do my Opening Statement i think it would be remiss for us not to, you know, mention the president and the first lady and, you know, know that theyre in our thoughts and prayers and, you know, hope for a speedy recovery. And also the tens of thousands of americans that test positive every day for this virus. You know, theyre in our thoughts and, you know, it does underscore that this is a virus. This is a viral threat. It doesnt know if were democrat or republican, dont know what god we worship, what our country of origin is, its a virus. And it does underscore, you know, the importance of this topic that were talking about today. It does underscore that this is naturally occurring event. But what bad actors may see as they see a threat like this that really has brought the entire world to its knees and certainly has wreaked economic havoc domestically and internationally. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and both having the department of defense and the state department again underscores the importance of this. And my focus as subcommittee chairman under the guise of nonproliferation, we spend a lot of time talking about Nuclear Threats what were seeing is the real vulnerability to buy logic threats and to put that into context. Weve not had an Aircraft Carrier brought to its knee by a kinetic force, a missile or anything like that but we saw in this past year an Aircraft Carrier brought to port because of a virus. And that really does underscore what i worry about. And when i think about this, i think about it, you know, in a couple different ways. Its very difficult to obtain Nuclear Capabilities and Nuclear Technology. Yet we dedicate hundreds of personnel and International Organizations like the iea and others to reduce that nuclear threat. Thats totally appropriate. You know, we want to make sure Nuclear Technology and weaponry doesnt end up in the hands of bad actors but if i put any doctor scientist hat on the availability of technologies to alter viruss and do genetic editing, the know how and the capabilities are rapidly increasing and that is something that keeps me awake at night. Again, we know there are bad actors out there, certainly post 9 11, many of us prepared we saw anthrax and other threats, we worried about smallpox and so forth and that is something that i think in a bipartisan way, you know, Congress Working with the administration, should really think about, you know, what are the things that we have to do to move ahead . I look forward to the witness testimony, and, you know, theres several areas that i think about and, you know, going to be curious about from the witnesses, you know, as we defeat covid19, and spend the billions of dollars and build the infrastructure to defeat this virus i also think we should strategically be thinking about how we use those resources to also prepare for bio surveillance to be ready for the next whether its a naturally occurring virus, or biologic threat but also think about how we have those dual use capabilities, to for manmade threats. As we move forward, weve got the biological, the bwc, but i think we need stronger multilateral organizations with like minded allies that we can work with. And, again, id be curious how dod and state are thinking about creating those multilevel institutions and then lastly, you know, when i think about the ethics of gene editing and where thats going and the technology, we really havent created the standards and norms that say, you know, this is appropriate for advancing of science but this really is a little bit dangerous and you probably ought not to be playing around with genes in this particular way and creating those standards and norms and what that would look like. Again, i think thats an appropriate place where, you know, the scientific community, congress, again working with the administration, ought to put those standards in place, not just for the United States, but for the International Community. So, you know, again our thoughts and prayers are with the president and first lady and those thousands of americans and, you know, id be remiss if i didnt just put my doctor hat on for a second as we enter the fall and winter, lets do what we can to keep everyone safe. Lets wear face coverings. Lets continue to practice physical distancing. Lets continue to wash our hands and practice good hygiene. Lets avoid large indoor gatherings that we have seen really act as superspreading events. And the most important thing that we can do right now as we enter the fall is everyone go out there and get your flu shot. Please get your flu shot. So with that, let me recognize the Ranking Member, mr. Perry, for five minutes of Opening Statements. Thank you, chairman bera, and thank you to our distinguished panel for offering your counsel today. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for increased bio security threats and what can happen when irresponsible actors disregard International Agreements for the sake of selfprevention. A Strong International biosecurity regime only works when its constituents agree to make it work. We need to assess the shortcomings of multilateral engagements and determine where improvements need to be made. The 2005 International Health regulations went into force in 2007 and called on all nations to be compliant by 2012. However, by 2012 only about 20 of all countries were compliant and even today most countries have still not complied with the 2005 regulations. ThiS Administration has taken a significant amount of criticism for questioning u. S. Engagement in institutions like the world health organization. Let me be clear about this. The World Health Organizations complicity in spreading the coronavirus should not be rewarded with the United States indifference to its failures. The w. H. O. s strong affiliation with the Global Health security agenda also raises significant questions about ghsas longterm efficacy. There is an obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the International Community. Different levels of investment in biosecurity lends itself to a permanent condition of moral hazard where select communities like the United States are compensating for the lack of investment from other states. Despite our best efforts to stymie the spread of biothreat theres only so much we can do alone, key programs like the state departments Biosecurity Engagement Program cannot use funds in countries like china, cuba, iran, north korea, sudan or syria, despite the fact that several of these countries have experimented with biological weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses, countries like north korea have a clearly offensive biological Weapons Program with no end in sight. How do we confront the fact that we have a biological weapons control regime. More importantly in measuring success against the spread of biothreats what exactly does success look like when china dominates several key institutions . As it stands china has provided a gift to nonstate actors that wish us harm. Theyve shown us and the world the impact that a potential bioweapon can have on the American Economy as well as our society. Threats to our way of life have multiplied exponentially as a result of the coronavirus. And this timely hearing will be confronting that uncomfortable truth. I am also grateful to have our witnesses before us today as they speak more about Synthetic Biology, and gene manipulation. We need to find out more about the National Security implications that Synthetic Biology can pose to the United States, especially in light of the fact that several countries are working with extremely hazardous pathogens and subpar laboratory settings. All that being said i do also offer my prayers and best wishes to the first family, to hope hicks and to anybody thats been affected by the virus, whether theyve contracted it or whether it has occurred in their family members, loved ones and community, were all dealing with it one way or the other. I thank the chairman for the time and i yield the balance. Thank you, mr. Perry. Let me now recognize the chairman of the intelligence and emerging threats and capabilities subcommittee, chairman langevin. Thank you, chairman bera. I want to begin by also acknowledging and saying that the president and the first lady and the first family are in my thoughts and prayers. I know theyre all in our thoughts and prayers right now and the people around the president S Administration who may also be experiencing effects of the virus. We pray that they all have a quick and a full recovery. Mr. Chairman i want to thank my colleagues, the house Foreign Affairs subcommittee on asia, the pacific and nonproliferation. And particularly you, chairman bera, and Ranking Member yoho and i know mr. Perry is standing in for the Ranking Member right now. I want to thank you all for hosting this timely joint hearing on biosecurity. I recognize Ranking Member this is a topic which as we have seen of late is vital to our nations security and im very pleased were holding this very important joint hearing. Emergi emerging biological techniques, gene editing and Synthetic Biology are changing the scope and scale of biological threats and could lead to an increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge biological threats are easier to create than other weapons of mass destruction used in concert, cyberweapons and biological weapons enable a rogue actor to inflict major damage on a military power. Just last month the republic of Georgias Health ministry suffered a cyberattack from abroad on the database that stores medical documents and national covid19 Pandemic Management information. We know Russian Hackers have targeted organizations involved in covid19 research and vaccine development, including those in the u. S. , the uk and canada. So these attacks and the current Global Pandemic underscore the import of collective Scientific Research preparedness and security across the interagency. And with our allies. And for national and economic security. In a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a novel, highly infectious pathogen we must ensure the interagency is working together to respond to the current pandemic and advance the collective effort to strengthen biological security across the range of threats. The defense Threat Reduction agency, through its execution of the department of defenses cooperative Threat Reduction, biological Threat Reduction program, and its technical reachback analysis, has been receiving foreign partner requests for preparedness and detection, including providing biosafety, biosecurity, and biosurveillance support in aid to aid detection. Diagnosis, reporting and modeling related to the covid19 outbreak. There have been many good examples of the btrp trained local professionals in countries like guinea, liberia, cape verd, jordan and thailand. They diagnose and confirm the first cases of covid19 in their countries. Yet, in the face of known and emerging biological threats and the impact it could have on our National Security and economy, and as a pandemic that could arguably present the single biggest threat to our country, were starting to spread across the globe, the president s budget request was delivered to the hill in february with a 36 cut to the cooperative Threat Reduction programs funding from last years enacted level. At a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a highly infectious new virus we are alarmed by the departments significant reduction in the budget request for a mission of detecting and confronting biological threats to the United States. Thankfully the house has acted in our fiscal year 2021 National Defense act, hr 360 added back money, 89 million for additional fund. The department of defenses chemical and biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in the fight against covid19. Its medical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop medical, countermeasures, vaccines, therapeutics, and pretreatments. Its physical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop surveillance and detection technologies. Diagnostics, personal protective equipment, and decontamination systems. To prepare against potential unknown threats cbdp build expertise and capabilities to address novel pathogens making it an ideal program to deal with the emergence of Novel Coronavirus. We are interested in hearing today whether the program was quickly and efficiently directed to participate in the National Response to the covid19 pandemic. So these are obviously challenging times and we need to double down on these programs and we need to make sure that we are, in fact, prepared for the next biological or chemical event that could affect the country and make sure that we have all the tools and resources in place to respond effectively to keep our country and perhaps the world safe. We look forward to hearing more about the many efforts of both the departments today, what we can do to help ensure your organizations have the authorities and resources needed to prepare for the emerging threats both today and tomorrow and how we can ensure that your departments are ready and able to act swiftly and decisively in the next crisis. I join the host in thanking all of you, especially our witnesses, for joining us today and i now yield back to chairman bera. Thank you, chairman. Let me recognize the Ranking Member of emerging threats Armed Services committee Ranking Member stefonik . I want to echo my colleagues, our thoughts and prayers with the first family, the white house staff and all the American People who have been impacted by the covid virus. Id like to express my appreciation to you chairman bera, and my colleague mr. Perry for hosting this hearing and thank you for the members of the two subcommittees. Thanks to the witnesses if the department of defense and state for being here today. The issue of biosecurity is one of national importance. As ive stated previously while the department of defense faces urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose sight of the critically Important Mission of countering weapons of mass destruction, and in particular biological threats. The unpredictable nature of these threats requires that we continue to adapt our approach and it rate our response. We must learn from the Current Crisis and adjust our strategy to more effectively and proactively detect and respond to the next event. This will surely not be the last biological crisis this nation and this world faces. Im particularly interested in how your organizations and the federal government writ large can more effectively use new data sets and Artificial Intelligence to truly modernize our biosurveillance efforts. We must mature our capacity to anticipate and monitor when and where a biological event may occur and model you a pathogen, either naturally occurring or manmade is most likely to spread. This obviously must be a global effort and the partnerships that the department of defense and department of state have developed will be critical Early Warning beacons to inform our collective, domestic response. Programs like the cooperative Threat Reduction and specifically the biological Threat Reduction program are essential to maintaining our global footprint and the building of the relationships that protect our deployed Service Members and national interests. The current covid crisis has served as an aftermation that it requires a whole of government response. The inclusiveness of health and human services, Homeland Security and our state and local officials. The strength of the partnership between your organizations and the quality of these relationships you develop with our foreign partners and domestic agencies will underpin the effectiveness of our future biosecurity efforts. Thank you again to our witnesses and i yield back to the chair. Thank you, Ranking Member stefanik. Before i introduce the witnesses i ask unanimous consent that noncommunity members be allowed to participate after all to be asked questions. Is there objection . Without objection noncommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time. Let me go ahead and introduce our witnesses. First is Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, mr. David las ter. Mr. Laseter oversees policy issues at the department. This includes preventing the prolimb ration of wmd related materials, cooperative Threat Reduction program and chemical, biological, next we will hear from mr. Val oxford, leading dtras mission to safeguard the u. S. And its allies from weapons of mass destruction. Dtra spearheads the defense departments biological Threat Reduction program. From the state department we will hear from acting assistant secretary in the bureau of oceans and environmental Scientific Affairs, mr. Jonathan moore and finally we will hear from the Deputy Assistant secretary at the bureau of National Security, mr. Philip doloff who oversees a range of programs, including cooperative Threat Reduction, export control programs which work to reduce nonproliferation threats worldwide. I will now recognize each witness for five minutes and without objection your prepared written statements will be made part of the record. I will call on mr. Lasseter for his testimony. Good morning, chairman langevin and bera, and all committee members. I too want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the president and first lady mr. Lasseter is your microphone on . Yes, sir, its on. Can you hear me better now . First want to also extend my thoughts and prayers to the president and first lady and all those impacted by covid19. Thank you for the opportunity to present on behalf of the department of defense and highlight the critical work were doing to encounter biological threats and i want to acknowledge appreciation for support of our Threat Reduction mission. As the Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for encountering weapons of mass destruction i have the privilege to work alongside my colleagues here today. Our Strong Partnership enables the broad u. S. Government effort to reduce wmd threats, including biological threats worldwide. Dods biothreat mission aligns with the objectives in the National Security and defense strategies, as well as secretary espers priorities, namely to increase the lethality of the u. S. Military, build alliances and improve dods efficiency. We also draw guidance from strategies such as the National Biodefense strategy and the Global Health security strategy. Dods focus on protecting the health and readiness of u. S. Forces, countering the destabilizing effects of outbreaks on u. S. Interests, and ensuring that dod remains focused on priority defense objectives to meet Emergency Needs during an outbreak makes this a complimentary tool in the u. S. Threat reduction arsenal. We work daily to ensure dod is positioned to address the full range of wmd threats to include the constantly changing biological Threat Landscape. This shifting dynamic includes naturally occurring outbreaks and accidental or deliberate release of biological agents. Threats posed by state and nonstate actors, international and domestic incidents and concerns with existing and emerging technologies. Covid19s global reach and destabilizing influence has further altered the Threat Landscape, potentially inspiring nefarious actors to replicate covids impacts through a deliberate use of a biological agent. My team developed strategic guidance spanning the prevent, detect and respond continuum to mitigate the impacts of such threats, regardless of origin. We work closely with other dod stakeholders and coordinate through groups such as the covid19 task force. Dod also works with key interagency and International Partners as we develop priorities for countering biological threats. These partnerships allow us to leverage each others capabilities and lessen the security burden on dod. Pooling resources and working towards common objectives is vital to ensuring the greatest Threat Reduction impacts are achieved. Since 2004 ctrs biological Threat Reduction program has provided equipment and training to over 30 countries to improve their ability to detect, diagnose and report biological incidents. In the current environment we know that partner nations have leveraged previously provided ctr capabilities to bolster their abilities to detect and diagnose covid19. To close i want to thank the subcommittees again and i look forward to your questions. Thank you, mr. Lasseter, ill now recognize mr. Oxford for his Opening Statements. Chairman langevin, chairman bera, Ranking Member stefanik, and mr. Yoho, thank you for your continued support to dtra, im proud to report with my colleagues to update you on our collective efforts to protect the u. S. National interests in a rapidly evolving globalized threat environment. Its an honor to represent the work force whose commitment to our mission and strong relationships with our partners here today makes our organization successful. Today we find ourselves in unprecedented times as we respond to the Global Pandemic. As we reflect on the loss of over 200,000 of our fellow citizens we must think about the future Threat Landscape where gene editing and dna sequencing and Synthetic Biology offer adversaries the opportunity to to capitalize on observed Lessons Learned from our response and they could launch future attacks with little warning. As we capture our Lessons Learned we have to accept the fact that others will also be learning and that the very nature of the biological Threat Landscape has changed forever. One of the lessons we have learned over the course of the last six months is that partner nations have benefitted greatly by the training and equipping they receive through the dod, ctr program and specifically btrp. Btrp facilitates the protection and reporting of diseases caused by dangerous pathogens, whether deliberately released or naturally occurring, including diseases such as covid19. Btrp works with over 30 foreign partners to reduce biological threats by enhancing biosecurity, biosafety, and biosecurity. Health security and a critical part of National Security. Countries need an effective system to detect, diagnose and report outbreaks of dangerous pathogens. The u. S. Relies on the biosurveillance systems of other nations to provide Early Warning of an outbreak before it reaches the homeland. Some recent examples of btrps success in responding to the pandemic, in partnership with usaid, btrps efforts enabled local officials in thailand to detect the first case of a Novel Coronavirus outside of china on 13 january 2020, only days after its initial discovery, in wuhan, china. Within a month of a request from the u. S. Ambassador fisher in morocco, btrp transferred a supply of ppe to the National Institute of health and hygiene in morocco. The equipment went directly to protect moroccos Frontline Health care workers in the fight against covid. Ambassador fisher stated the Equipment Transfer is part of over seven years of close cooperation between dtra and the government of morocco. This partnerships focus is on saving lives and mitigating threats to ensure the National Security of both countries. Our report to date, morocco has reported 126,000 cases with 2,200 deaths. In georgia btrp trained scientists and the constructed richard louver center developed a testing capability for covid, enabling georgia to implement extensive testing to inform outbreak control. The center was lauded by the government as being integral in the covid19 outbreak. They have reported 7,100 cases with only 46 deaths. Btrp receives foreign partner requests for support related to covid. As of september 18th, btrp fulfilled 40 requests from 18 countries plus the African Union for disease control. In summary, by building a partner nations capacities and capabilities it builds their sense of National Pride and increases their willingness to work with the u. S. In other ways. By providing partners with better selfsustaining solutions, the u. S. Demonstrates that we are the partner of choice rather than our strategic competitors. These partnerships ask us act as force multipliers in the competition for influence and reenforce the strategic messaging that the u. S. As their nations interests in mind. Thank you for your time and i look forward to your questions. Have thank you, mr. Oxford. Ill now recognize mr. Moore for his Opening Statement. Good morning, chairman bera, chairman langevin, Ranking Member stefanik. Its an honor to be here with you today and other distinguished colleagues. I look forward to discussing how our bureau, the bureau of oceans environment and Scientific Affairs plays a role in this process, our normal portfolio ranges from the depths of the oceans to the vastness of state mr. Moore, could i have the microphone a little closer to your mouth . Sorry, thank you. We also host the state Departments Office of International Health and biodefense, and that is the capacity in which im here today. I will focus my remarks on our efforts to prevent, detect and respond to Infectious Disease outbreaks. Covid19, which as we see has had an impact even on the president and the first lady and millions of americans highlights the importance of u. S. Leadership to advance Global Health security and pandemic preparedness. This is crucial to stopping outbreaks at their source, and protecting u. S. Health and safety. Economic pros perty and defending interests. Were working through and on covid19 together with interagency partners, advancing u. S. Government priorities through diplomacy. Beyond covid19 oes combats other Public Health threats, including ebola, influenza, and other microbial resistance. Its a Global Challenge and the department of state remains committed to working closely with our partners for a global response. Were using our means to slow and stop the pandemic. It has two primary areas of effort, promoting transparent information sharing and disease surveillance. And encouraging multisector approach to building Global Health security capacity, including other nations, nongovernmental organizations, International Organizations, and the private sector. We deeply appreciate congresss appropriation of over 1. 6 billion u. S. Dollars in covid19 supplemental funding to the state department and to the u. S. Agency for national development. We have used these funds to provide a broad range of assistance, specifically aimed had the helping governments, International Organizations and nongovernmental organizations fight the pandemic. The assistance is saving lives by strengthening Public Health education, improving the quality and cleanliness of health care facilities, and increasing laboratory disease surveillance, and Rapid Response capacity in more than 120 countries, as well as providing humanitarian economic support to mitigate impacts of the pandemic. Additionally the United States has invested more than 10 billion to bring safe and effective vaccines to the Global Market faster. Oes helps develop state department messaging including global Public Health, encountering malign influence. As the first to know about the coronavirus, the chinese no, maam communist party had a special responsibility to inform the rest of the world about this threat. Instead they withheld information and censored medical professionals, scientists and journalists. Its furthered the political agenda by highlighting donations of masks and other supplies to reshape the narrative and distract from its role in this crisis. Both russia and the ccp have made grandiose and irresponsible claims about the creation of vaccines, raising serious questions about quality and efficacy that we are addressing through active public diplomacy. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is a proverb thats as familiar as it is true. If we prioritize Health Security investments we can contain outbreaks before they become pandemics and mitigate and prevent second and third impacts. Oes plays a key role in prevention, including support for the Global Health security agenda, ghsa, still a work in progress, is a partnership of nearly 70 nations, International Organizations, and nongovernmental stakeholders that uses a whole of government multisector approach to address outbreaks. Oes annually coordinates u. S. Expert implementing agencies to provide carefully targeted programming in priority countries to make Global Health security improvements along specific metrics. Its approach to combatting outbreaks is reflected in the 2017 National Security strategy, 2018 National Biodefense strategy and the 2019 Global Health security strategy. Oes leadership has been fully engaged in coordinating interagency investments, helping 19 partners prevent, protect and respond. These are just a few examples of oess wide ranging engagement on disease risks, crucial to encountering buy logic threats. Wee look forward to your questions, thank you very much. Thank you, mr. Moore. Let me recognize mr. Doloff for his Opening Statement. Good morning, chairman bera, chairman langevin, Ranking Members and honorable representatives. We appreciate the leadership youve shown on these important issues. Thank you for inviting me here today to share how the department of States Bureau of interNational Security and nonproliferation or isn works to address some of the most urgent and challenging biological threats to u. S. National security. Im honored to appear before you alongside my colleague from the oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs bureau, and by my colleague from the department of defense. Through diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs the interNational Security and nonproliferation but owe works to prevent rogue states, terrorists and other malign actors from obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. The interNational Security and Nonproliferation Bureau has been working hard for nearly 20 years to address challenges posed by the full spectrum of these threats, whether they are deliberately spread, accidentally released or naturally occurring. The covid19 pandemic is a grim reminder of how much damage a single pathogen can cause to u. S. National and interNational Security. Through diplomacy our interNational Security and Nonproliferation Bureau strengthens multilateral frameworks including the biological Weapons Convention and the Australia Group and i note the chairman made remarks on this very issue. This year, as the president of the g7, we are leading the International Community in making significant progress on biological issues, including issuing g7 statements on the international covid19 pandemic. And response. Similarly, in the Global Partnership we have led efforts to launch a dedicated biosecurity Capacity Building initiative. For decades isn has invested significant resources in the combatting the full range of wmd and related Delivery System threats, including over 450 million over the past 15 years toward mitigating biological threats. We have a long and rich history of biosecurity Capacity Building where we have trained thousands of foreign partners on biosecurity in over 50 countries. These wmd Threat Reduction investments long preceded the pandemic, yet they are contributing to slowing its spread. We recognized early on the threat to the pandemic posed to our interNational Security and we began to quickly incorporate covid19 topics in our trainings, leveraging remote and Distance Learning platforms to deliver critically needed help in a timely manner. Were also in the process of programming an additional 18 million via our nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund towards controlling this pandemic and preventing future catastrophic biological events as well as adding additional experts to our efforts and expanding the offices we have working on these issues. Representative perry noted moments ago that there are limitations to our authorities, and i will note that we did propose a Broader Authority to invest these limitations. Of course we are not alone and we are deeply grateful for the decades of very Close Partnership weve enjoyed with our department of defense colleagues to coordinate our mutually reenforcing efforts. In looking to the future we are also working hard to keep pace with the rapidly evolving changes in biotechnology. And i note that several of the members indicated concern about this very issue. Let me assure you, the full range of u. S. National security departments and agencies are focusing on, and analyzing these efforts. Our interNational Security and Nonproliferation Bureau is using our diplomatic and Capacity Building tools to prevent the application of dual use technologies to do harm, such as the development of biological weapons. For example, chairman bera noted moments ago the importance of standards and norms to address this issue. And we are, indeed, working in this area and have had multilateral dialogues on this very issue. In conclusion, we are very proud of the work we do to combat Infectious Disease threats using our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools in support of u. S. National security. We deeply appreciate the support of the congress to provide us with the necessary resources to carry out our Threat Reduction mission, and we recognize that our work is far from over. Thank you, chairmanb bera, chairman langevin, members of the committee. I look forward to your questions. Thank you for your testimony, mr. Doloff. I will now recognize members for five minutes each and pursuant to house rules all time yielded is for the purposes of questioning our witnesses. Because of the hybrid format of this hearing i will recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between democrats and republicans and between both subcommittees. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. If you seek recognition, unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally. I will recognize myself for five minutes. Both mr. Oxford and mr. Doloff talked about the advances in technology, as a doctor, you know, i look at what weve been able to do with biologics, you know conditions, cancers that we would have to treat palliatively. We now actually have therapies and Precision Medicine to often cure some of these cancers. And other ailments. And i think the vast majority of scientists are pursuing and cruising the technology for advancement of common good but i also know those same gene editing techniques and so forth can certainly be used to cause us harm, as well as inadvertently a scientist that may be looking for a cure may inadvertently create something that unintentionally causes harm. Mr. Doloff, you touched on, as i said in my Opening Statement, you know, how do we create these norms for and standards for ethical use of this technology, in a multilateral way, and then also working with our corporate sector as well, because obviously, you know, our pharmaceutical sector, and others, are looking for novel therapies and, you know, right now i get the sense that there really isnt the standard norm, and maybe you can start off, mr. Doloff, and then from the dod perspective, how we do this in a multilateral way. Thank you, chairman bera, for raising this important success of questions. I take your point, medical technology is, indeed, advancing very quickly, especially in some parts of the biosector. And, you know, weve faced this challenge across the board with technologies, almost all technologies have applications, as you point out, for enormous good and can cause substantial harm. We have been working on the issue of norms and standards for over a decade, and what we have done is tried to work through, amongst other instrumentalities, the National Academies and cooperation with National Academies in other countries. Weve engaged other International Organizations to try to address this subject and weve also worked in partnership with other governments. We have included working with the corporate sector. And we for example, we work closely with partners in india. And in those outreach and trainings that we do in india, we include both the government sector, and the corporate sector, as well as ngos as we try to build biosecurity, including through building norms. I will note, i think building norms all is challenging and its probably at least as challenging at the moment in the midst of the pandemic. But i take the chairmans point that this is a particularly important area, and well continue to increase our efforts in this area. Great, and, you know, mr. Moore touched on the billions that weve already provided, in Global Health security funding in some of the covid19 supplementals, and no doubt, as we look to defeat this virus, both here domestically, through vaccine distribution, and development, but also globally, you know maybe ill look at some of the dod colleagues or mr. Moore if you want to answer this, as were spending that, how can we do that in a very strategic way that allows us to Start Building the surveillance tools and who should those tools like that . Maybe mr. Lasseter . Thank you, mr. Chairman, very important. I would add on the biotechnology front that we view it as a promise in peril scenario. Theres a whole lot of promise in the u. S. Bioeconomy is strong and we must keep it number one and there is a lot of power, which you all have described. From a vaccine standpoint, as youve asked, its vitally important that we continue to work as an interagency together. Weve also got to provide information, flow information across International Organizations, those that have been mentioned previously. You know, but its incumbent upon us to share the information. So we work with our partners and allies, and we expect, you know, dependable, you know, clear information to come back. And thats vital. If were not sharing the information, and if were not doing it effectively and clearly, then we run the risk of having, you know, more severe outbreaks as the Technology Advances and as globalized economy increases. Mr. Oxford, do you want to add . Thank you, mr. Chairman. As an implementing organization were in position to help train, educate and enforce some of the norms that would be created. In the biological threat world its hard to distinguish their proxies in terms of whos responsible for these actions. In a past where we had mostly nation states where wed worry about this now we have a much bigger Playing Field to try to figure out and that complicates not only norms and standards it complicates attribution and accountability for these kind of things. Its a noble goal but its much more complicated in the kind of diverse world were facing. Great. Thank you. I see my times up. Let me recognize the Ranking Member, acting Ranking Member, mr. Perry. Thanks again, mr. Chairman, and to our panel. Thank you. My question is for mr. Oxford, just mentioned some of the nonstate actors and im going to talk about some of the nonstate and the state actors. So as you know in 2018 russia, russian agents used the soviet developed novachok, and early this year it was used against opposition figure alexei navalny. Its hard to prove, right, were pretty sure, but its hard to prove. Kind of like the coronavirus and the Wuhan Institute of virology. How can we enforce accountability for state actors who do such things . Mr. Perry, thats a really tough question, as you know. I mean, just getting to the accountability on this case, and thats why i mentioned accountability in my previous comment, a lot of this can be denied. The actual scientific evidence, you know, wasnt necessarily shared immediately with us. We have people in the country that have been provided the samples so were able to get in there and do the assessment. As mr. Lasseter said a lot of this is on agreements about information sharing so we rapidly come together as allies to be able to put the blame where its necessary. But its a very hard problem. Weve given that we havent spent enough time and effort in this country on bioatry buks bugs. We watching what happened to skripal and now navalny and others, quite honestly, you know, we tend to think that that happens over there, so to speak. But the uk is obviously a close friend and an ally. And i find that exceptionally concerning. And i understand. I just im sure youre thinking about it. I just dont know if you have any answers, if you have some, did you have something to add there, mr. Lasseter . I would just say that, yeah, the further use, obviously a chemical weapon, but the further use and seemingly acceptability across the world has to be confronted as director oxford said theres significant effort being put into this particular incident across the u. S. Government and across the International Community. So efforts are under way to at least work on the International Norm piece or response. You know, i would say that, you know, you mentioned threats. And from the biological threat perspective, although much information would be required at a higher level, we can say at an unclassified level that russia, at least the state department has said that theres no way to confirm their adherence to the biological Weapons Convention. Pretty certain that china is not adhering to it, from an article 1 and article 2 perspective. So it grows and grows in concern. And the help of congress and across the interagency is vital to get after these threats. Okay, so and i appreciate, you know, look, i know its difficult and thats why were here. We appreciate your efforts in this regard and any help that we can offer. On the nonstate actor side youve got anything from a recently arrested canadian woman crossing into the United States and mailing the president of the United States and a sheriff in texas a letter containing ricin. Weve seen similar things in the past but weve seen the Islamic State procure there was a mustard gas attack in iraq. When i was in iraq it was prevalent. Should be no surprise how they found that. But in those two instances, im just wondering what the status of the illicit chemical weapons trade or bioweapons trade or the availability of things like ricin and how you guys are working with either overseas counterparts or among each other to, you know, i mean, maybe not even overseas, across the border. What are you guys doing with those type of things and whats the status of the trade . Mr. Perry, i can tell you in the middle east, through counterterrorism activities weve been able to take the chemical expertise off the battlefield. Theyve tried to resurrect periodically. But theyve not been. Ricin has been attempted multiple times but its never gotten to weapons grade. Maybe we dodged a bullet but there is the need to look across the spectrum. The terrorist groups have had this intention but they havent had the expertise and we need to make sure they dont gain the expertise. Mr. Doloff. If i could add to that a little bit, on the diplomatic side we have worked very closely with International Partners against this particular threat. We also have program attic elements working in key states to address this specific state, the specific set of nonstate threats. We have diplomatic efforts, weve integrated our concerns about wmd and to broader International Diplomatic discussions about counterterrorism. With regard to your question about trade we do strengthen international controls on chemical and biological precursors but i will say that in general i believe the evidence is that much of these efforts uses chemicals and precursors that are procured within a state so we will continue to tighten up in that area. But most of it appears home grown. Thank you, my time is expired. I yield. Let me go ahead and recognize chairman langevin. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay . Yes, we can. Very good. Well, thank you, mr. Chairman, i want to thank our witnesses again for their testimony, the important work that youre doing in this area on behalf of the country. I want to go back, in my Opening Statement i talked about the concerns i had about the significant cut to the Threat Reduction program. Compared to the 2020 levels, the cooperation the cooperative Threat Reduction program was cutly 135 million in the president s budget request this year and within that program the cooperative threat the cooperative biological engagement effort was cut the most, by over 55 million. So given the pandemic, which we find ourselves, were alarmed by the department of defenses significant cut to this mission of detecting and confronting biological threats in the United States. I want to begin, director oxford, this is a program that congress clearly supports. What additional work would dtra be able to perform if congress is, in fact, able to restore the funding to the fy 20 enacted level, and especially what other work would you be able to do under the bioThreat Reduction program, which was cut the most . And to mr. Lasseter, i want to know how the departments perspective of the importance of the biological Threat Reduction program evolved over the past six months of the pandemic and how is the department served to support the covid19 fight. Start with director oxford. Weve looked at the programs, wed be able to restore activities in 22 countries with the entire mark, in addition 15 of those would be within the btrp program. We can provide the committees with the specific examples of what countries would be restored. Plus wed be able to restore activities on a regional basis, as well as africom. So wed be able to restore the regional emphasis in this area which gives us broader coverage across those regions in question. But we would be able to restore activities for btrp in 15 countries as well as those regions i mentioned. Very good. Obviously were going through obviously the competence process in the senate and also were dealing still with the appropriations. But it is our intent to restore that funding. Mr. Lasseter, on the question of the six months of the pandemic and how the work has evolved. Mr. Chairman, if i could add that, you know, it is we do want to give the appreciation, i know the witnesses have long standing support that this committee, these committees, on both sides of the hill, both sides of the aisle have given towards cooperative Threat Reduction program. And i would say that, you know, the biological Threat Reduction program as you know has been operating for over 16 years in over 30 countries, doing great work. And, you know, as far as the last 16 months, so the dod effort, you know obviously the International Effort is led by our colleagues in the state department. From a dod perspective managed through the stability and humanitarian affairs office, they manage it over the course of the last six months, and nearly about 100 million in dod support to over 100 countries. As it relates specifically to btrp, as you know most of the support is historical in nature so, you know, a lot of the training, a lot of the lab support, has been over the course of this to these willing partners. That information flow is whats most vital. Ky say specifically, you know, for btrp, you know direct funding to in response to covid, its around 7 million, much of it is ppe. But a lot of it is training and it goes back to the historical relationships with these countries. You know where we provide robust training and information flow. And so that has been the focus, is making sure that he has partner countries, you know, know they have the reachback resource to and that we can and director oxfords team can provide that information to those partner nations. Director oxford, we go back to you, we all, of course, appreciate all of dtras efforts to lean forwardon ebola pathogen was declared as a threat pathogen by cdc which allowed dod to expand its resources. Covid19 considered a pandemic and a disease, prevented us from using bioDefense Program money but we have used our expertise in several ways using cares act money, weve been able to benefit from that. We have a program under way that is looking at Rapid Assessment of environments. We call it the rate program. In this case, using wearable technologies, were looking at identifying the on set of symptoms and illnesses, not specifically covid, but it would give us advanced notice that illness may be on the way 48 hours earlier than projected. So that appropriate testing can take place. Expertise has been applied but not specifically the biodefense funding. Thank you. We obviously have work to do in these areas to strengthen the authorities, you should be able to use these r d funds at a time like this and well work with you to make sure that that happens. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i yield back. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Let me now recognize my good friend, gentleman from washington, mr. Larson. Thank you, mr. Chairman. So first question, i think its probably for mr. Oxford. Just wondering if you can help us understand with regards to the biological threat, kind of what that role is for dtra for a response and then what that role is for dtra in terms of contributing to the future thinking about what to do. Are you strictly responding to requests, or do you have a role in planning ahead and proliferating that information about what to do when you plan ahead . Ahead, and we play two roles in the ctr program. Not really in a response role, but in the covid environment, the years worth of work we have done, they needed some infusion the ctr program, so with 100,000 worth of ppe. There is not really a Response Program in that regard, but we are able to benefit from what we have done there is cutting edge of the registration and development. We are looking toward to reference to things like synthetic bio. What the ways are how it can be used. They are making detectors better able to resolve things better. On that point, two approaches. I noted in your system, in your written testimony, getting a roll to the cooperation can you discuss that a little bit . And second, i dont know if this is for mr. Lastier, but the combination of where emerging technologies meet, i think that is mr. Lasiters testimony. Could you touch on that and what we should be thinking about in the future . Thank you, i appreciate the question very much. Very important. We are spending quite a bit of time and resources across the department. So i mentioned research and end nearing. Theyre vital to the effort ss insurance that we have what we need going forward. The Defense Program is fial in that. The department is right sides and fitted to respond to them. So the way we organize across the interpride, quite robust, a number of organizations as you imagine from the joint staff, from our policy perspective, from the combat and command services. We come together fairly regularly. The unity of effort council. Three star level council. We participate in that. Nanny that forum were able to flow these issues up for discussion and decision. It is an area that we can get full information across the department. And in this setting, it is harder to get into some of those issues. I know you recognize that, but we are resourced properly and rightsized to go after those threats, sir. If i could just follow up on part of that, you dont run the d. O. D. Research and engineering, that is another division, that is high up in the Organization Chart at the pentagon. Do you have has rne come to recognize this as a higher priority now, or is this something that you have to battle out with Research Engineering and their list of priorities that they already had . Well, yeah, i speak fairly regularly with dr. Michelle rosa that covers down on this issue set. As you recognized a lot of tremendous talent that flows us information, on a daily basis, if not hourly basis. So if we need to frengs, and that is one thing that mr. Oxford did, they are very agile. If we need to adjust to go after a threat we can do it. We welcome the interest of congress in doing so. We welcome giving you the support and the interest in doing so. Thank you so much. Thank you, let me recognize the gentleman from the commonwealth of massachusetts, mr. Keading. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. As a member of both Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, thank you for having this joint hearing. I want to address, you know, how the sharing that was the information that was critical. So i want to ask as the covid19 pandemic progressed, and military intelligence followed it, and saw that escalation, just from a time frame, what kinds of levels of alert occurred in january and nebraska that period . Was there a change in the level of alert based on military intelligence in that period. And did it occur in january or february . Thank you for that question. What i can tell you is that in february secretary identified three priorities to combat covid. First being able to protect our people. Second to maintain mission readiness, and three to ensure that we were spotting the whole of government effort. With that game, least internally with dod, different help protection levels. Pretty early as you will probably call in march. As it relates to the department of defense, we were put in a situation that reduced the number of folks present at their jobs. So with that information low did happen and it does happen. I think we pointed out, all of us here today, that information flow is vital. While they do collect information, and to include congress. There must be a flow of information across the entire globe and it must happen from all parties and all countries. We cant expect just the United States get to the point. Just get to the point, there was a level of alert change . That corresponded with that . As early as february . Sir, as early as february. In march is when, i believe, i would have to go back from the exact date, but thats when the hpcon changed. The course of information was flowing and the resources were applied to analyzing that. There was a change to a level one alert in february . That would have been the first time in our history that a pandemic raised itself to that level. Did that occur . Sir, i cant tell you the exact date. I would need to go back and get that information and provide it to you and the committee, please. Lets assume that would you transfer that information immediately to our state agencies and our saagencies of state, state department, and congress . As you know the Intelligence Community is quite large. All of the organizations today have an intelligence portion to them. And so that information is shared across the intelligence committee. Inform gener information generally is shared across the community, so we do that on a daily basis and we flow information back and forth. I see, my concern is that congress was not notified in as timely of a fashion to those changes. So if you could go back to the respected committees, tie down that date, and and it is my unts in terms of what is publicly access able that there was a change. It is my understanding that it was historic in terms of the first time that a pandemic was addressed with that level of change. And im concerned about the sharing of information which was slow to congress. Whether or not it was also slow to our other agencies, and the agencies appearing before the committee here today. Because if were going to do this, what you said as witnesses, placing the important on sharing that information is critical. So if you get back to us, i would appreciate that and with that, mr. Chairman, i yield back. Let me recognize by good friend, mr. Sherman. Thank you, there has been discussion, i believe, by the first Ranking Member to the complicity of the wfo. It is a coordinating organization. It is not an intell organization. It has no way to know whether or not what china is saying is complete, true, transparent or not. You know who does have an Intel Organization . The United States government. Our intelligence is designed to know when china is not telling the truth. In fact the president was informed that this was breaking out in wuhan for mar than the Chinese Government indicated. He chose to ignore that intelligen intelligence. Just as he seems to have ignored much to the unfortunate harm to himself and his wife, ignored the best advice on how to avoid getting this disease and misled millions of americans as well into not wearing masks. We spend many hundreds of billions of dollars defending ourselves from threats and very little on defending ourselves from anything else. We have we did not have Civil Defense designed for either a deliberate or a naturally occurring plague. We did not have stockpiles of ppe. We didnt have the education. The ventilators. But we quickly made some. And we didnt have the capacity for tracing. This is all inspite of the pact that the National Security agency recognized the potential to cause catastrophic loss of life, and the threats are growing whether or not it is an attack, accident, or natural outbreak. And that raises the question of, and i know were not in a classified setting, what is the administrations operating assumptions or likelihood, how do we assign percentage likelihoods as to the four possibilities of how it began. Were told it came from perhaps the wet market. And it may have come from the wuhan lab that might have been engaged fful activities that had a tragic release. It could have come from a lab engaged in military activities but had an unintentional release, and i think least likely of all it could have been deliberately. Do we have operating assumptions or all of those possible they are highly, highly likely. Where does the administration think is the cause of this . Thank you, congressman. It is an important question. I, you know, i think we are, we as an International Community, but the u. S. Government are still working, right now, presently to respond to this crisis. So youre saying any one of those possibilities is possible and the u. S. Government doesnt have much of an opinion on which is the cause to the other witnesses mr. Moore . Thank you for the question. You mentioned four possible scenarios. And certainly in discussions in an open forum. There is a there is varying levels of possibility. What we know is that the virus described as covid19 was described in academic research. Published several years ago, including in the peoples republic of china, identified as existing in animals. It is a virus, but as you say, sir, there are multiple the idea that it was engineered is probably dismissed by that. And i will ask normally when there is a catastrophe, the first thing anyone does is close the barn door. China said this came from a wet market. There are wet markets all over china. Has there been a massive change in how animals are sold for consumption throughout china . That is extremely important, and something under the per view. Wildlife photographicing is a huge problem. The peoples republic continues to be the largest market . Has there been a big change to now late 2020 in how the markets operate . There has not been a fundamental permanent change in blocking illegal wildlife trade including in the sale at wet markets. It exists in other countries as well and were working to end it. Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from michigan, mr. Levin. Thank you so much, mr. Chairman. For convening this super important hearing. It is no credit to the rest of the world that the covid19 pandemic was allowed to spiral out of control in the United States. Many americans died, case counts are around the same amount of cases as when the new york city cases were skyrocketing way back in march. The whole world could see it happening including those that wished to do harm to our country. Let me pose this question. Do you believe there will be heightened interest on the part of state and nonstate actors in developing and deploying b biological weapons. And if yes, how will they prepare for that possibility . I apologize, sir, the transmission was a little imprecise. What exact question would you like me to respond to, sir. Sorry about that. My question is do you think there will be a heightened interest on the part of state and nonstate actors in developing and deploying biological weapons, and how will they prepare for that possibility . With regard to the development of biological weapons, i think that would better for my colleague from the ism bureau. Okay. I this is a difficult question to address in an unclassified context. I guess what i can say is that we continue to review these issues. We had a discussion two days ago with our colleges who are experts on these issues. I think i take your point that the pandemic, as i testified to, poses a substantial, enormous challenge, to interNational Security, and it must be the case that our adversaries, terrorists, or states, will take that into account in considering how to evolve their weapons systems. All right, let me ask another question. January of 2017, the cdcs presence in china has decreased from about 47 personnel to 14. With professionals getting cut. The National Science foundation, and usaid also cloeds their beijing officers in this time and the department offing a culture transferred the disease monitoring program. So in the past four years we have gotten rid of a bunch of people who, it seems to me within would have been epful to have in place. At the very least, i would think it would be helpful to have reliable sources of information about what was really happening on the ground. Mr. Objectixford and mr. Moore, are there experts in other countries and how does it help to defends us against biological threats. As an implements organization, were not responsible for where cdc and others operate over seas. I would have to yooield to the state department or go back to the other departments that do those kind of things. All right, lets hear the state perspective. Thank you, sir. We would be pleased to offer more detailed time line of who was assigned under the sport of the chief and at what time. I think the context for individual agencies, sending staff there, or reducing their staff there has a lot to do with both their needs, their budgets, and of course the viability of the work they can actually do. One of the constraints we face with regard to the peoples republic of china is that we have still not received all of data that we would need to receive for initial samples of the virus that have been sought since the beginning of the pandemic even at the end of last year. That is extremely problematic as work of the people of china. A Public Health emergency of international concern. When it originally came up with regard to the specific agencies with apologies i would have to take that question. All right, mr. Chairman, let me close by saying i think it is extremely problematic for us to talk about what the w. H. O. Should do. I think it is the expertise in china and around the world. During a globe pandemic, and with that, with great thanks, i yield back. Thank you, since there are no republicans in the room right now, the chair recognizes fanberger for five minutes. I think miss fanberg sere have g i think miss fanberg sere har ig technical issues. She either okay, well im told there is no other members in the room right now, so i would suggest is mr. Chairman waiting to come back after voting . And should we recess right now . We are waiting to hear back from Committee Staff . This is representative larson, im the only member in the room, and representative barrett is voting and were trying to get staff to answer your question. We dont have to recess, maybe just give us a few minutes. I will ask another question we have, but until we get that clarified, i will yield to her. But in the meantime, we are facing spending on the covid19 fight. Which troubles me in it is true. Therapeutics, and pretreatments. What do you need from us to ensure that you have the authorities and the resources that you need so the department is prepared for the emerging threats. And is there work you could be doing now to help the country in the covid19 fight that you dont currently have the authority or permission to do. Thank you. For your first question, or your statement, there is no Department Prohibition i would say the focus is on statutory requirements, they want to ensure the ability to fight and win. The covid19 support provided to the services and inner agency is a combination of expertise, leveraging contracts, are and as example assisting with testing and valuation. From helping to create detection, diagnostics, and treatment. A bioDefense Program continues to collaborate with a whole of government partners in industry and academia. It is important to note it is a Research Development and Acquisition Program and not a response capability. But i will say to your follow up question that the congress has been exceptionally helpful. Over the last number of years. So the support that we ask for is continued support for the program. We appreciate the information flow between our department and i think i can say the same for the state department. And between our staffs, it is okay exemptional and we look forward to continuing that communication flow. Thank you, sir. No additional authorities that youre asking for right now, would it enhance your work . I think at the moment were good. I know that our staffs have communicated historically and i hope they can continue to do that, pardon me, and if we do identify an issue, or an authority that is necessary we will be certain to bring that to you and your team. Okay. That concludes my question for right now. As anyone from the minority returned yet or miss fanberg. Yes, mr. Chairman, this is rick larson again, still the only member in the room. Okay, thank you mr. Larson. I will yield now to miss f fanberger if she has returned. Okay, i understand that she is not on. Can you hear me . Yes, yep, i have you now. Youre now recognized for five minutes. Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. I appreciate your time and your presence. I have a question about staffing related issues. As a former cia case officer im aware of the important of detecting threats before they actually harm americans. We have to get in front of buy logical and Health Security risks before they can do significant damage like what we have seen with covid19. We have to work with our partner sos no matter where our threat arises we can contain it. And if officers are understaffed it is hard to get ahead of this problem. So u. S. National security agencies have long suffered from high rates of vacancies for the past two years. And given how long it can take, were likely to see ripple effects of this for years. In your view, how can state and d. O. D. Reform hiring practices to ramp up to the needed can passty. In a call out there. They need to focus on buy logical security threats. It is full of professionals from career civil yians to government personnel. We are all on the lookout for talent. And we will continue to do that and we will continue to, if we can find talent, to bring them in the doors. I will defer to my other colleagues. Miss fanberger, we operate a highly technical organization. Our recruitment strategy is healthy. We continue to look for additional talent as education in, but so far our atry bugs rates are ratts going steady. Our health and welfare is very sound. On behalf of the oes bureau we have a outstanding, active and expert team. Civil service, long term colleagues, Foreign Service colleagues on usually two year assignments. In recent months we have been able to add to our staffing and bring on a number of colleagues including fellas from the advancement of science. We have a long standing cooperation with aaas. We benefit from their technical and professional expertise. They do a great job dealing with covid on the home front and working on it professionally. Thank you. This is phil from state. I echo the remarks of my colleagues. I think that vacancies have not been a substantial challenge in our department on this issue. As i testified we have been increasing our staff. We added experts using a special authority, and we added to the staffing of the offices that deal with buy logical issues. I think in general we dont have staffing challenges. We have a Great Partnership and fellowship, i think that rerouting a technical specialist is a challenge. It has been a bit of a challenge for us. I hope that the committee can get to the Staffing Levels that are necessary. Im going to ask for the next portion because it will direct what my follow up question is. By a show of hands do your teams participate in a war game exercise to train and prepare for potential biological security risks. If you could just raise your hands if you do because my follow up question depends very much on if it is divided or so i see two and two. From here, three okay. So im curious then. With you participating in war games, do you draw upon the modelling and the simulation analysis to think through what the changing throughth could look like. What have you learned from these exercises recently as it relates to covid19. One of the things that we do is a sus sustained capability. We do exertions to make sure theyre main maintaining readiness, but we are understanding that the retention is there. Thank you for the extra time, i yield back. Seeing that there are no additional members who have questions, and it is always difficult in this virtual. And im going to just see if chairman lang would like a statement as well. Or maybe a closing question. The issue of buyer surveillance is something that i have thought a lot about. And thinking about how but use some of the naturally occurring technologies out there. All of a sundayen you see a judge in searches, some of that can be earnly warning systems. Were thinking about how both in the midst of the dan temperatureic. It is an exceptional question. It is an all of the above approach. We have all talked today about the information sharing, and that fundamental if were going to detect, interdict, and detecting threats and flowing that information at this point globally. If is working with our inner agency colleagues like we do here. It is also working with our International Friends and partners. I know fill mentioned the Global Partnership for the spread against weapons of mass destruction. That is a perfect champ. It can provide information flow to dozens of countries around the world. It has to require information flow. As you recall, i talked about regional approaches. The regional approach allowing for sharing across the regional boundaries, and it enhances the overall protection. It really does help in the broader understanding. I think that the chairman raises a very good point that we have a whole set of emerging tools that can add to information sharing and bio surveillance. We wonder in the pandemic about how to expand the tool set that we have to additional tools. For example, in africa, a whole set of cell phone based tools that we had not priestly used to the degree we do now. So were trying to take advantage, i think the chairman noted the great infrastructure being built to deal with this pandemic and new technologies that are being integrated and this is a good example of how we need to build out our capabilities and data flows for all of the information that is available. Great, i want to thank all four of our witnesses for their service to the country. Make shush everyone is safe and we will get through this but lets get through it in a stronger way and in a way that we can protect against the next pandemic. I dont know if the chairman is still on and if he wants to make any closing statements. I am here, thank you for your joint collaboration and putting this hearing together. I enjoyed working with you on this. It was an important and timely hearing. I want to thank our witnesses and the worst in your portfol s portfolios. And our other witnesses see are essential capabilities that you bridge to the table that are close closest. We want to make sure the plans and the procedures are in place to proceed appropriately. And we want to make sure that we are as prepared as possible and can we respond with the speed and agility that is necessary to protect lives. So i thank you for the work youre doing. I know that members may have additional questions and i ask that you respond expeditiously. I have no further questions and i need back. Thank you, again, our thoughts and prayers are with everybody around the world. And with that, again, i want to thank the witnesses for being here this morning. And the hearing is adjourned