Back to in subject. So im glad to have a chance to talk about it. I wish it was in person again in kansas city. And i wish we were able to do this facetofaceba well do the best that we can. The key thing here that i want to return to is shown by this photograph here of churchill, truman and stalin smiling and shaking hands. And the point that i want really to reiterate here is these three men and most of the advisers around them did not believe what they were doing at potsdam was laying the seeds of a cold war. We know from the scholarship of the 1960s, 70s and beyond, a lot red potsdam backwards, as start of the cold war. But these three membn came to potsdam to celebrate the end of the war with germany, figure out what the post war world was going to look like and plan for the final victory over japan in the Pacific Theater. This photograph very much reflects the spirit of potsdam which ill talk about a little bit more in just a bit. Which was happy. Which was victorious. Which was joyful. Which was celebratory in the way that they were looking at the postwar world. Although they had suspicions about one another and the countries did not share all interests, very few people left potsdam believing that relations were going to be very difficult Going Forward. That illusion is going to get shattered very quickly. I would argue within weeks or months of the end of conference. But the mood at the conference is very different. Mostly what theyre trying to do and this is the second theme that i want to talk about tonight. Most of what theyre trying to do is avoid what they believe had been the mistakes of their predecessors 25 years earlier. They wanted to avoid the mistakes that the treaty of versailles has committed. And ill talk about what those were. What they really want to do is leave europe in a Better Foundation and better position than Woodrow Wilson and george, and the generation of 1919 had done in paris. They did not know the future, of course, but they did know the past. And another theme that i was n interested in in writing this book, is the way that these men of 1945 and they were all men looked back at 1919 and what they saw and why it matters to them. And my favorite example of this is what happened to harry truman on june 28th, 1919, the day the treaty of versailles was signed, harry truman was not thinking about international rell aigs very much because it is the day that he got married. And this is a reminder, too, that these leaders are people. I wrote in the book and i think i would state to this, while one could imagine Joseph Stalin in 1919 or Winston Churchill in 1919 believing they might one day head the government is hard to believe that this guy thought on june 28th, 1919, that he would one day lead the government of the United States and yet there he would be down the road. At the moment of the treaty of versailles, the world is in the same kind of flux that it is in in 1945. The same level of confusion. The same Great Power Competition. There is the same question of whether an alliance that won a war could also function in the peace. And ill also cover in the lecture, with the argue of the one major big exception of the atomic bomb, all of the issues they discussed at potsdam would have been quite familiar to those that attended the paris treaty conference in 1919. And this is something that they were all aware of. And the other thing i want to stress before we go any further, with the exception of harry truman. Many of the senior people who attended the potsdam conference have had been at versailles peace treaty for the paris peace conference. They contained james burn who might have convinced Woodrow Wilson to go to paris in person and they included churchill who was there and disappointed with the treaty. And they include the Great British economist john maynard kings who was at both potsdam and at the paris peace conference. So to these people the paris peace conference is not something they read about in history books or something they have a vague memory of. These were fundamental shaping events in their own lives and their political careers and they believe they were here fighting a Second World War is because of the mistakes at the end of the first. And all of them understood this when they came to potsdam in 1945. The very first thing harry truman said in his role as president of the United States at the conference was a warning to everybody seated around the table that ill show you in just a minute, not to repeat the mistakes of 1919. Before going to potsdam stalin said the same thing to joseph davies, that the one thing that they had to do was make sure they didnt make the same mistakes. So what mistakes did they make . This is again one of those things that to me was very interesting. Because virtually everybody who came to potsdam had their own view of what they thought had gone so badly wrong a generation earlier. To john may yard kings and james burns, the big mctake was imposing reparations on germany and they proved unable to pay and that disrupted the european economy and that forced the United States in james burns view to money into the europe system so some other would benefit in the 1920s. There was also the argument that shaping the borders that you see here, this is a map of europe in 1919, after the paris peace conference, that putting a map like this together had already been a mistake. That trying to draw lines around people where they lived had produced states that were either economically unable to feed themselves, unable to contribute to the overall security of the continent and in some cases creating countries like poland and ugyugoslavia. And a third argument and this is a particularly a soviet one, is that the big mistake made in 1919 was to take into account the views of all of the people who lived on this map. Stalin was fond of saying that states were not virtuous simply because they were small or new. So in his view, what had to happen is the great powers simply had to take control of this conference and not allow the voices of people from all over the world to play a role. So unlike the paris peace conference, which involves people from literally every corner of the globe, in potsdam the faces will be 95 either soviet, british or american. Now as i mentioned earlier, all of the issues that theyre dealing with in 1919 come up again in 1945. What to do with germany . Whether the great powers should reconstitute germany or whether they should access heavy reparations against germany that they become economically barren in the end of the war. How to handle the ethnic map of the world and what role should multilateral organizations play. All of these questions come up in 1919 and again in 1945 and i would argue in many cases in 1945 they will take a 180 degrees opposite tact to the one they took in 1919. Another thing that is very different of course is the condition of germany itself. This is a photograph taken, two photographs taken from roughly the same angle. The picture on the right, the building on the far left of the righthand picture is the new u. S. Embassy outside of the gate on the side that had been east berlin. The kind of canopy looking thing in the background there is potsdam place. The picture on the left is taken at about the same place in 1945. So one clear difference between the germany of 1919 and the germany of 1945 is that in the 1919 case german nationalists could argue they had not really lost the First World War, that they had been undercut at home and the army returned as one german politician undefeated in the field. It is impossible to make that argument in 1945 for the reasons that you could see here. This is done on purpose. The soviets wanted the germans, especially the berliners to feel the pain of this war. The devastation that is created here in berlin is so intense that there were Many Americans and british observers who came to potsdam who believe that it could never be rebuilt, that it might be better to bulldoze the city and move the german capital someplace else. There were people, including the american treasury secretary henry morganfeld who wanted that future for germany. He wanted to take so much money out of it that it could not rebuild the economy and turn it into a federal system where power would be in the german states and very little power would be in the central government. The socalled morgan plan. There are legitimate questions being asked in berlin in 1945. Could the germans live better than the russians, the french, the polls, when they invaded. How could they be allowed to live better than the jewish that were wandering europe with no place to go. Fundamentally the other question that involves history here that was very interesting, what do the people of 1945 think caused this war. Is it something that is fundamentally wrong with the germans themselves . If it is, then long occupation is going to be necessary. Is it simply the bad legacy of the depression, then reparations are a terrible idea. Was the problem a problem of the balance of power in europe . Did it simply get to the point where nobody could contain or encircle germany. Each understanding comes with a different understanding for what you might want to fix Going Forward in 1945. What youre going to have to do, of course, is make clear to everybody that this time germany is completely and utterly defeated an they will do this at potsdam, not merely by holding the conference in the suburbs of berlin but ensuring there are to german faces whatsoever. Potsdam is emptied of germans by the red army as another symbol this is over and the german power is over and potsdam is quite symbolic because frederick the great is there and where he signed the order to take germany to war in 1914 is also in potsdam. So to the conquering allies, potsdam has symbolism. It is the place where german militarism began and where the First World War began and now the place with the Second World War in europe will come to an end. And i cant prove it but i think the russians arrived at the conference late to make sure they saw berlin for themselves. President wilson in 1919 had not toured the battlefields because he did not want for his heart to grow hard. What stalin wanted was to see berlin for themselves, as much as germany for themselves as they could. And again, this produces different reactions, depending upon ones definition of history. Should the allies, should the british, french and soviets put money into germany or leave it as one soviet observer put it at the margin of subsistence for a significant period of time. Now this is downtown berlin. This is potsdam, the lovely elegant suburb in which this conference is going happen. Potsdam has the old tradition of being the home offaristock rassy and the german Film Industry had their headquarters and it is the hollywood. And those watching babylon berlin, the Second Season takes place in potsdam and the great movie studios hosted several of the parties that the attendees went to here in 1945. So it has an image of old central german power an the new bowe jaw central power. The United States did try to get this conference in alaska or washington, d. C. Because roosevelt had to make the trip to yalta. The soviets were insistent it would only happen a place where the red army could guarantee secret. The building was built in the middle of world war i which i find kind of incredible for the crown prince and his wife. They were to move into it at the end of the First World War and this was to be their home. So even while germany is fighting the First World War and trying to win that war, it build this is massive palace to the crown prince. This building will become the center, really, the conference. It is relatively modern, it has electricity and modern kitchens and enough space that the delegations could all set up offices which ill show you here in just a bit. When the great powers came to the conference, they saw what you see here. It is still there. That gigantic red star of geraniums that the soviets will planted to greet the great powers as they showed up. Inside of potsdam and a neighboring city, they doddfrank ided it into the sectors to house the great vips that had come. This is the back of the palace. It looks out on to a lovely lake. No expense was spared to make this conference the best that it could be and one of the things that i enjoyed going through were they werent very extensive of a woman named joan bright who was the protocol director and all of the efforts that she want to to make sure that this conference went just right from the british side. The soviets brought in the heads of major hotels to make sure all of the hospitality was there. Absolutely no expense spared. Milk was brought in from the united kingdom. Hands were brought from in yorkshire when harry truman didnt like the sheet music in the palace, he had a u. S. Air force bomber fly to paris and bring him back sheet music. So whatever they wanted, they could have. They were the conquerers to rule over and no german faces to be seen here in potsdam. This is the room that stalin used as his office. For most soviets, both archives are not open and even they are, theyre in russia, but from what we could tell from the primary sources and there are quite a few primary sources, the fund. Al problem that the russians saw in the paris peace conference and the treaty of versailles was a failure to build states on the border of russia to act as buffers. So this time the soviets want stable reliable countries that will suffer as a buffer between the soviet union and germany and a west that is still seen as a potential Security Threat to the soviet union in the postwar world. The second thing it seems that the soviets wants were reparations. They wanted to take as much money and assets they could out of germany and eventually theyll take anything they could get their hands on. They turn entire Infantry Division 20,000 men strong and taking everything they could get their hands on and they did this in potsdam, they took books and light fixtures from the nearby houses and village. What they didnt want, they would throw it away. So the germans wont get it at the end of the war. They are most concerned with making sure that another invasion does not happen. This is the office or the study that harry truman used. And truman is a particularly sympathetic figure to me because when he became president of the United States in april of 1945, despite the bad health that president roosevelt was in, truman is kept almost completely in the dark on what american policy is. And, in fact, when he became president , he asked to see the transcripts of the yalta conference so he could figure out what the United States had agreed to do at yalta, only to find that those transcripts apparently didnt exist. So truman is having to figure out what america agreed to at yalta by talking to people who were there and getting contradictory information and reports. Truman as a senator had found a gap in the u. S. Defense Department Budget that he challenged the u. S. Army on, the challenged the secretary of warm allen stimson and he understood that true plan was a senator but he could not share what that was for. It is after truman became president that stimson pulled him aside and explained what the Manhattan Project was. That is what truman had stumbled on early on in the war. So one thing that harry truman is certainly interested in is trying to get a handle on what his new responsibilities are. Hes interested in what we would today call a reset of rel relations with the soviet union. Truman thinks if he could look the soviets in the eyes he could cut a deal with them. He was soviet help in defeating yaip in the Pacific Theater and be sure that they will participaty in the United Nations an the other organizations that the United States is trying to build and create a balanced europe that will mean that the United States does not have send an army back to europe for a third world war. It is for this reason that true moon tried to delay the potsdam conference as long as he could. To give himself time to get up to speed on all of the issues and to give the scientists in new mexico more time to work on the Manhattan Project. The weakest of the three great powers is undoubtedly the british. And i love this photograph. Because it is taken at a rather silly moment when they lay out three chairs, as you see here, for the press to take pictures. The original, churchill was supposed to have the middle chair. When the photographers told him he had to move to the chair you see occupying our left, he did so quite grudgingly and then in the photograph he began to move his chair closer and closer an closer to trumans when he wanted so send a message and this is not the only time that there is an Anglo American unit here and the United States and britain are on the same page and you could see the look in Harry Trumans eyes that hes having none of it and so he moved his chair closer to the center. The interests were beginning to diverge. Britain would have to spend resources to rebuild the empire. Something the United States under both roosevelt and truman said they were not interested in doing. Britain wants to be sure that the United States will, in fact, commit to europe at all. At potsdam truman said that he does not want the United States to have a longterm presence in europe and then wants the United States to go back to our side of the atlantic ocean. It is also the case that truman knows that there is a war still to be won with japan and that American Military force will have to be diverted to do that. So as i mentioned in the book, it is stalin who decides where this conference will be. It is truman who decides when the conference is going to be. The only thing that churchill is able to decide is the code name of the conference which he decides is code name terminal. It is true that churchill tried everything that he could go tote truman to come to london first before going to potsdam and truman refused. At one point he said he would not allow the conference to be a continuation of Anglo American discussions. So churchill is trying to, as his foreign minister Anthony Eaton said, win on the power of his personality and that is going to be difficult for a country that will come out of the war victorious, but knows it is going to come out of the war in a relatively poor position. This is a picture that i also waned to show just because of the smiling faces. Everybody is with chip pollen, there in the dead center, hes the russian translator and the two men on the right are molotov and james burns, and this is genuine. I dont think they are mugging for the cameras. They are generally delighted they have defeated nazi germany together and there is a suspicion that all of the loveliness and friendship and hugging and kisses might not last forever but at this moment in potsdam they see themselves as hunkering heroes together and the three great powers have decided theyre the only people that will be here. France does not get an invitation. Harry truman was furious with du gal and he told james burns aide, i would send for him. Poland is not invited to the conference except to give a brief statement on one day of the conference. To present their various positions. So it is the great powers who are going to run this and make these decisions. This is the table in the main Conference Room inside of the palace. It is intentionally kept small to limit the number of people who could attend. Only the people who are sitting at table are allowed really to have a voice. The people that you see in the back are there to be advisers. Theyre there to be translators and several of them who left memoirs say they spent an awful lot of time cleaning those ash trays. So you could see that the room is red. That is also by design. And you could see the way that theyre starting to think about what they want, when push comes to shove, in setting the future of europe. The treaty of versailles allergy analogy is not the only analogy they talk about. Some of the american and british hardliners talk about the munich analogy, that they need to be careful and what they do with the soviets is sufficiently strong so that the soviets dont take advantage of the generosity of the west. They dont want to be in a position where the soviets come out too strong and ill talk more about that. Anybody who wanted to make that point could use the dreaded word appeasement, a very loaded word in 1945. A word that remains quite loaded. The big question for the United States has to be what do we think the soviet union wants . What are they . What can we expect them to do . Before becoming president of the United States, truman noted he had never even met a russian. The first russian that he meets is molotov, the soviet foreign minister whose nickname is stone because of his ability to just sit there stylentilently with n remotion on his face when he didnt want to reveal anything. He must be difficult to play poker at. So truman assembles the russia team and there is very little agreement among even his senior soviet adviser as and the three most important are sitting right there. Hairyman is the not in this photograph. Hes the hardliner of the four there are at least three ways of thinking about what the soviet union will do in the postwar period. One way of thinking, which is compressed by Robert Lovett and the soft liners that includes joseph davies, is that what the soviets want is no different from what the czar wanted in 1914. That is to say the problem isnt really ideological, but just like the czar, what stalin will want is security on the western frontier and access through the darst and el straits in the south to renegotiate the convention of 1936, to allow soviet ships to pass through the straits unblocked, unhindered. Unhindered is the word i wanted. Sorry. So by this lodge. This logic you dont need to worry about giving an opening into places where theyre unlikely to go. The second way of thinking comes from chim bowman and Avril Harriman is that what youre seeing is not like the czar system because this is a different ideology, that the soviets will not be safe until most of the world agrees with them or until they fully control. So in bowlens mind they have to deal with the soviet expansion and prepared for the soviets to test the limits of what the west is willing to do. The third one, and i have to say im still, when i read george cannons writings im amazed by both his ability to look backwards and forwards. He wrote to truman that the problem what the soviets system is that while the United States and the british will come out of the Second World War feeling try um fants, the soviets will come out despite being the victors, with their paranoia vastly increased. Cannon argued that the problem that the soviet union had was not so much its geopolitical one, the problem that it had is that its system doesnt work in peace time. That it wasnt working in the 1930s and once Economic Conditions of the postworld war came back, it wont work in the 1950s and 60s either. Nevertheless, he argued, because the soviets came out of the Second World War so paranoid and because they have the balance of power in their hands, any military attempt by the United States or Great Britain to force the russians into doing something they dont want to do will be met with force. So if the United States wants to try to push the soviets around in europe, vef to expect that it is going to be done with full military force in place and that the United States cant do. So cannons argument later known as the containment doctrine, his argument is that the United States should try to limit soviets influence as much as the United States can in places where it could do so relatively cheap. Contain the soviet union and allow the internal contradictions the soviet union to work against it. Wait for the soviet people themselves to realize that this system is not workable. And cannon was aware this could take decades to achieve. So what hes arguing to truman is patience, build untp the wes and arguing for creating a by polar world one led by the United States and one led by the soviet union and they want to build up the democratic systems of the post world war world and to build up through the marshall plan. That is an outcome that is perfectly acceptable to kenyan. The litmus test is how the soviets come to potsdam on poland. What will they want to do on poland. If the soviets push for poland pushed further to the west and if they insist on shutting the democratic polish government, in exile, a group called the london pols, if they insist on excluding them then there is indications that the soviets are willing to play hard ball. If they are willing to open up to fair and free elections, that is a different case. But if they dont do what they want to do, what choice does the United States really have on poland. If poland is a reason for britain and france to go to war in 1939, is it a reason for the United States to go to war in the soviet union in 1945 and all four men have the same answer, no, it is not. One more thing about potsdam that was fascinating and i could talk about it more in the question and answer if anybody is interested, i was trained as a social historian not to think that individuals are terribly important to the course of historych it is larger patterns and structures that are more important than individual decisions and bits of contingency, most of the time. And potsdam offers a fascinating insight here. Truman became president upon fdrs death in april and he brings a new National Security team in with him including secretary of state james burns and in the middle of the potsdam conference, the votes are tabulated in the election, led by clement atly, the british go back to london in order to monitor the results of the election, famously number ten in downing street they take down the battle maps of western europe and they put up the lectoral maps and atly wins. So however do the policies change when they replace fdr and churchill. And in my view and in the view of People Living through it at the time, the answer is were really not very much. Anthony eaton who is replaced as the british Prime Minister was very attentive to this and eaton was worried because the foreign minister had little experience in foreign affairs. Eaton is very concerned theyre going to flub this up and mess up britains. Andali at the end he writes in diary that the tone might have been a little bit different but atly and bevin did the same things that churchill and he had done, mostly because they were in the same strategic position of not having any money. The United States is going to do something a little bit different. Truman and roosevelt before him had already planned on this. Unlike Woodrow Wilson in 1919 who went in trying to win with the power of ideas, true plan wants to come in with a bunch of really good cards in his hand. One of them is having the United Nations charter already signed before truman went to potsdam. That occurs here as you could see in late june, 1945. And with the United States senate having already approved american membership. So there is no fight over the league of nations like there was in 1919. The difference, of course, is that this time the United States will have one of five Security Council vetoes so that the u. N. , unlike the league of nations, could never do harm to the United States. Because it has that u. N. Security council veto. The United States was careful to make sure that the conference was held in San Francisco and that the International Headquarters of the United Nations would be built on the east side of new york city. The United States also created monetary institutions, this is john maynard kings here in the middle that are today known as the breton woods agreements and include what became the world bank, and they include currency set to the u. S. Dollar and backed by american gold so that Exchange Rates are fixed and they include the United States taking control of the Global Economy and moving it from london to new york. John maynard kings in the middle here, the famous economist of this age called this system a swindle. He knew the United States was using its military power and diplomatic power to undercut britains economic power but he also was perfectly aware that britain had no choice. Famously he said that britain could not possibly police half of the world while remaining in debt to the other half. The officials of the bank of england said this was the only thing worse than losing the war. Because under the brettenwood situation, all of it would have to be open to the United States on fair and eek wat trade terms which, in effect, meant the end of the British Empire at some pointch the irony here is that is that britain being the least powerful ended up making similar arguments that they rejected when france made them in 1919. In effect, we know were out of money, we know we dont have the military power that we once had but we sacrificed and bled on the battlefield with you, isnt that worth something. They reject that argument when they make it 1919 and the soviets rejected it in 1945. So kanes is a extremely perceptive people able to look backwards and forwards. He believe thats the Economic Conditions that the Second World War had created might well lead to another great depression, that is largely averted by the marshall plan, some good luck and some very good thinking about european economists. But he also was aware as i mentioned earlier, that this likely means the end of Great Britain as a great power and the end of the imperial system as the british had known it. The last card in trumans hand that i want to talk about is of the atomic bomb that is detonated in new mexico as the pots dam conference is going on. The american secretary of war slips truman a note to kind of, poorly coded that lets him know how successful this had been and how far away the explosion could be heard and how far away could the explosion be seen. Truman got that note. He was perfectly well aware. They had discussed what they would do. How they would present it to the soviets and open this discussion and the decision they made was that truman would go up to stalin after the end of one of the sessions and mention it without using the word atomic and in low key as a way as it was possible to do. What truman and championshurchit know, is the soviets knew how close the United States was to an atomic bomb. They discussed how stalin should respond if churchill and truman mentioned the experiment to him and they had agreed that he would try to downplay it as much as possible and woe try to make it seem as though he didnt fully understand the consequences of what theyre saying. And to me this is another thing that as a historian was very interesting. I would have thought that everybody would remember that moment when truman pulled stalin aside because everybody knew it was coming. And peoples recollections do not overlap terribly well which i find very irning. The consensus is that trueman mentioned the new superweapon that was developed, avoiding the word atomic and stalin saying Something Like thats good, well use it against japan or that is good and wonderful and walking away. And they thought that stalin had no idea what had just been told to him. Now, again, we know that is not true. And as it turns out, the conversation that they had just had was a conversation over the future of poland that had it some tense exchanges. Stalin red that as he told one of his advisers as atomic blackmail. So the nuclear age is just about to begin. Truman made the decision that the United States should not drop the bomb over hiroshima until he was already back in sea on the way back to the United States. He wanted to be at sea when it was first used and in a position where he would not have to discuss this with st with stan in any way. And what did they decide at potsdam . They decided on the boundaries of germany. They divide three countries. They break through countries into pieces here. It is an after thought. It is almost done by lower level loofls. One of the decisions is made by a colonel back in washington, d. C. Named dean rusk who is later the secretary of state. He will divide the Korean Peninsula and divide indo china into two. What they do here in germany is break, first they break it into three occupation zones. And you could see it here from the map. The french zone is carved out of the american zone. That is the soviets are okay with the french having their own zone of occupation as long as it is not coming out of the soviets zone. The same thing will happen with berlin. And the decision they reached is that each side will take out or put into its zone whatever it wants and the reason theyre doing this is the American Fear that if germany is treated as a single unit, if it is treated as a single thing for occupation reasons then the soviets will take advantage to take everything they could to take everything out of germany and forcing them to put money into germany. So the u. S. Will be putting resources into germany while the recei sovietss take them out. This is the scenario from 1919 and doesnt want to see repeated here in 1945. Now they dont envision that this will become two different states. We know they do. With the United States, britain and france putting resources into the western zone of gathery, and the soviets taking everything they could find that isnt nailed down out of the eastern sector and this, of course, those of new germany or who travel to germany, will know this remains an issue in germany where the Economic Development of the east still lags a bit in many ways behind the west. The United States gets what it wants. It is a system where it doesnt have to put money into a reparation scheme while the soviets pull the resources out. The second decision they make and this is mostly a soviets one that the United States has to acquiesce in and the decision is rather than draw lines around countries exclusively, what the red army will do is force people to move into new ethnic areas. So if you are german, living in what will become poland, the red army will encourage you to leave. And this is going to happen to millions and millions of people. At potsdam the United States knows that the soviet union is doing this. They know that in that shaded area that you see that becomes part of poland, they are taking away lutheran churches and sackfying them as catholic ones and for all intents and purposes taking those regions and making them polish. An the soviets expectation is that this is the way that you end the problem of what to do with displaced persons and what to do with the boundary lines here. The big problem is what to do with the jewish survivors of the concentration camps and this will lead to the decision to see palestine as a solution. But here at potsdam, i was surprised about what they dont talk about and the main thing is what to do with the jews and the future of palestine. The key thing, i think, is that for the people of 1945, the problem of germany had been solved as they understood it. The occupation lines had been decided even if it was believed that those would be temporary. That would give them an ability to monitor germany, the size of germany is made smaller, mostly as poland grows a little bit more. And ill show you that in just a second. And also the ability to make sure that the economics of germany are going to work at least in the western zone, the way that the United States and britain want them to work. Now the people that pay the price of course are the pols and this map is the poland sliding to the west. So the map on the left is the dark part of that map, is the polish boundary of 1921 at the end of world war i. The light color that is there, you could see the line that is built there is the new the new n 1945, and supposedly Winston Churchill demonstrated this in malta with three matchsticks and moved it to the left. So the phrase thats always been used is poland slides to the west. And then the part of east prussia, that is kind of the heartland of old germany becomes pardon of poland. The city of posen becomes the city of posine, as poland begins to move to the left. The americans are aware theres not a heck of a lot they could do with this. They had hope to put some faith in a democratic government of poland to at least decide what kind of government poland would have. It becomes perfectly obvious that the soviets have no intention of allowing anything that would remotely resemble free elections. This is one, along with the atomic bomb, one of the two issues that does begin to create difficulties and suspicions between the United States and the soviet union. Poland pays the price. It remains of course under soviet dominance under the 1980s, early 1990s. I loved what George Kennen had to say about this, instead of mum bim words of official optimism. We had had the good taste to bow our heads in silence, for who we cannot save from our friends. The American Ambassador wrote a book with this table can i saw poland betrayed. We have a remarkable word in 2020 where both germany and poland are full members of nato, the European Union that if they doesnt design it at potsdam, they would not have been terribly surprised, in fact i think most peeve outside the soviet bloc would have been pleased with the outcome you see here. This is a reminder both that history is always moving, it is always changing, it is always dynamic. It is never done with us. It is always a facto in the way we have to think about the past, the present and the future. So if the leaders of 1945 did not yet know the contours of the future they were trying to create, i would argue, they knew at least the past they very much did not want to repeat. Thank you very much. I will be happy to take notice questions that you have. Thank you, michael. If you have a question and havent added it to theq feature at the bottom of your screen, please do so now. You can also like a question thats already been submitted that you would like to see answered. All right. Our first question is if truman needed information about yelta, why didnt he go to meet with churchill before going to potsdam . I dont think it was possible for him to go. There was simply too much that he had to do, too many people he had to meet, too many things to organize. There was a question of churchill coming to washington for roosevelts funeral. That would have been an opportunity for leaders to sit down. One day churchill just told his staff im not going to washington. Were not going to do that. When churchill decided not to come to the funeral, that opportunity i think for a large gathering of sort of meeting of the minds would not have happened. I also think its true that the new secretary of state burns, who is very close to truman they have a represent further later was trying to make sure whatever truman did, he didnt get his information from british sources. So burns was at yelta. He was physically there. He and roosevelt had had a falling out that was kind of burns life there was no real opportunity to do that instead burns really starts to take control, this is what i remember from yalta, and this is what we agreed to do. Did. Truman express my regrets. He did. In his major speech to the american people, he comes right out and says it, that the polish part is the part i was most uncomfortable with, but he in effect says to his advisers, look, theres nothing we could have done. The only way to force of soviets to do anything different would have been to threaten military action, and thats just not in the cards. From those of you who know the movie patton this is allegedly what the general was saying, prevent some border like this one being created, but its, a, unrealistic, and b, not the job of a general to make those decisions. Why did they not address the issues of jewish refugees. The truman briefing book is at the Truman Library. You can see the same exact book he was reading. I think theres two reasons. One, is that palestine was still a british mandate at that point, still technically belonged to Great Britain. If you open up the issue of palestine, you have to open up a lot of issues about the internal affairs of the great powers. I dont think anybody wanted to cross that line at this kirs conference. When you read the initial reports of the liberation of camps, the word jewish is not used very often. Edward r. Murrow, dorothy thompson, martha gelhorn, their reports do not specifically refer to jews. Theres a sense im not sure how much of this is getting back to jewish suffering is no different from the rest of the suffering, to churchills great credit, they soon woke up to the reality and truman assigns Earl Harrison to come to europe and write a report, the very famous report that harrison writes back to petroleuming that says were treating the jews that the nazis did, except were not killing them. Largely it was the unwillingness of truman to open up what they saw the internal affairs of the great conference, and palestine is considered part of the internal affairs of great brita britain. Our next question it seems the true takeaway for Great Power Competition is that force or the threat of force decides diplomacy. Would you agree . Thats a great old saying. Where we teach, we use a simplified thing, called it the dime. Ideally you want all force of those things to work together. The official motto of where i work is not to not to prepare for war, but to promote peace. The ultimate idea of where i work is to teach senior military officers the way that ones can use military force in exactly the, to pursue state interests short of violence. This has been part of the challenge that i think were dooling with in the 21st century, the tools of statecraft are differently than in 1945. I think bad actors have figured out how to exploit societies because of their openness. Military force, the folks i work for, will say that it is the ultimate things that you want to hold back, so without military power, the rest you dont have a plan b with anything, but it should never be plan a. You should always let the others work their way out first. Our next question comes from james you state that the allies at potsdam were optimistic and buoyant, but surely if this was true, the relations between them rapidly disappeared, did it not . What specific important agreements were made at potsdam rather than being differed as they were to the council of foreign ministers, because they were not agree on much at potsdam. Themed to avoice is potsdam does not produce a treaty. For that rhine there are aide memoirs, they dont produce a formal treaty. Thats by design. That is 100 by design. So the council of foreign ministers, as you mentioned, they are there to kind of massage this process Going Forward. The specific points of disagreement for the United States especially are soviet treatment of poland and the general sort of blackout, the inability of american and british officials to move through the soviet zone of jenny. So the idea, to the americans, the notion is the soviets are not plays fair. Theyre treating it as to countries for the soviets, it really is the use of the nuclear bombs, and the timing of the way that truman did it, so theres no opportunity for negotiation, no opportunity for discussion about whats going to go forward . The third issue that is really of great concern is the chinese civil war thats ongoing at the same time, so if you think of the world as a bipolar, sovietled pole and americanled other pole, obviously the future of china is going to be incredibly important. Other, of course, emerge as well. But i think i would still hold to the fact that they left potsdam, everybody that left a report of it at the time, everybody that wrote something down in august 1945, all wrote, look, we understand this is not going to be all champagne and strawberries, but we think we can work with these guys, and then by 47, even white 46, that mood is starting to change. All right. I think we have time for a few more questions. The next question is from philip. It says how long did it take for president petroleuming to learn of the success of the Nuclear Bomb Test in new mexico and tell stalin and churchill. It was churchill. Petroleuming is told one of the first briefings he gets after being sworn in as president. Hes fully read into what the Manhattan Project is. I dont remember the exact date, but its early in the conference, yeah, it worked. The memo if any soviets on that memo, they would understand exactly what it said. Its the most poorly coded thing in all the years in working in archives that ive ever seen. Its no great surprise, which tells me the americans thought they didnt have to encode it all that much, because they didnt think the soviets would understand it even if it were encoded. I think they made the decision met quickly and said what should we do about about this, so it all appears very, very quickly. Again, the key thing to me is the americans didnt think the soviets had fully grasped what had happened. The soviets had fully grabbed what had happened and it is something that greatly increases that paranoia that George Kennen had talked about. Our last question comes from claire. It says how much influence do you think burns had on trumans immediate thinking at potsdam and the earliest days of the emerging cold war. I think burns is the secondmost important person that truman is talking with. The most important is probably george marshal. Truman revered george marshal. James burns is the only man in americans history to be on the Supreme Court, the house of representatives, the senate, the cabinet and a governorship, though the governorship comes after the war, governor of south carolina. He knows everybody. He knows where the bodies are buried. He now how to get things moved through the various parts of government. Everybody those burns was going to be the vice president. So hes the guy thats whispering in trumans ears. The legend goes hes the last person in washington to start calling him harry and start calling him president. They knew each other so well, they had an informality between them. Burns assistant talks about the two of them on the trip back, sitting over a bottle of bourbon every day, and talking about things every single day. The relationship is really close. It will break down quickly, but i think burns is the most important voice talking to truman, he had been at yalta. And iroan. Hes just everywhere, and like truman, never went to college, very much a selfmade, selftaught man. Hes the last Supreme Court Justice Without a law degree. Just and a very unpleasant guy. I should say an accomplished, interesting guy, but a diehard segregationist u. Youre watching American History t history tvmt. Cspan3, brought to you today by your television provider. Weeknights this month were featuring a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan3. Tonight a look at the 100th anniversary of womens suffrage. Tennessee bake the 36th and last state needed to ratify the 19th amendment. On the eve of the anniversary, we feature a conversation hosted by the womens suffrage cent tenial commission. That would be followed by a forum on the 19th amendment, chet inclusion Speaker Nancy Pelosi and former secretary of state condoleezza rice. Watch tonight beginning at 8 00 eastern. And join us every weekend on cspan3. The u. S. Dropped atomic about how many times on hiroshima and nagasaki 75 years ago this august. Japan surrendered shortly afterwards ending ward war 2nd, up next mark adams shows items in the Truman Library and Museum Collection that tell the story of president trumans decisions to use the bombs, including white house documents and a sketch of a test explosion. Well also see mr. Trumans recorded announcement and hair him explain years later why he used the news weapon. The Truman Library institute provided this video. What i would like to do tonight is show you a number of article i facts,
comparemela.com © 2020. All Rights Reserved.