From the center for strategic and International Studies this is just under 45 minutes. Welcome to csis online event. Today were going to be talking about russian influence in the United Kingdom. This is part of a broader report that csis just produced that looks how to counter russian and chinese influence. So last thursday we held a conversation with former australian Prime MinisterMalcolm Turnbull that looked at chinese influence in australia. Part of the report examined japan and australia and how chinese influence works there. Todays conversation is to look at how russian influence works in the United Kingdom. As part of that broader work we also looked at germany. The reason Malcolm Turnbull was so important is because we use his framing of influence activities. We looked at covert, coercive and corrupting influence factors. Many reports have certainly examined the supply of influence activities, but very few look at the demand side. How democracies use and accept these influence activities. So our report focused much more on the demand how did democratic governors in societies internalize that influence activities . This report was made possible by the state Departments Global Engagement Center through the Information Access fund and administered by the vt institute, and were grateful of course for their support. But these views of course are the authors and not of the state departments. So if i may let me briefly go over some of the key findings from this report. Russia and china certainly have different objectives in how they use their influence activities but they share one commonality. They both try to divide the United States from its most important allies and certainly the United Kingdom is americas most essential or one of the most essential allies. Tay do this by using their influence activities to look at how democracies how they divide society societies. So we looked at stoocietal cohesion, we looked at the economic interconnectedness. That was a big key. How does money corrupt or capture elite . And then of course we looked at the media. How social media was interacting and regulating the types of influence activities that russia was perpetuating within the United Kingdom. The scope of this report fell outside the coronavirus pandemic, but of course near the end of our reporting we saw a more disturbing trend. That was china emulating russias tactics. Whereas russia tries to divide society and basically degrade democracy and faith in Democratic Institutions china attempts to coerce and try to suppress any criticism of china. But all of a sudden were starting to see china take on the appearances of more russian influence activities. So those are the overriding key findings of the report we invite you to take a look at that time report. So now lets dive deep into the u. K. We could not have put together a more fantastic group of colleagues to speak about russian influence activities in the United Kingdom. Let me first introduce the ambassador to the United Kingdom. Ambassador pierce arrived earlier in the spring and of course we went into lockdown, but we welcome you to washington ambassador pierce. Formerly British Ambassador to the United Nations and former u. K. Special representative to afghanistan. We also have with us luke harding, a Senior International correspondent for the guardian and author of a new book entitled shadow state, murderer, mayhem and russias remaking of the west. Its now out, and we thank luke for joining us from london. And then of course we our very own Deputy Director of the Europe Program at csis and senior fellow, the author of the u. K. Chapter for their support, and no one is better at helping moderate this conversation. They say timing is everything, and i believe this conversation couldnt be more welltimed because were told tomorrow the intelligence and security committee, the committee of the u. K. Parliament will be releasing its much anticipated report on russian interference in the u. K. And perhaps we can use this conversation as a good framing for when that report is released tomorrow. So with that thank you to our colleagues. Please read the report. Again, im Heather Conley from csis and were grateful youre here. Rachel, over to you. Thank you, heather. Ill just offer some brief remarks ability what we saw in the u. K. Case study and then turn it over to you, ambassador pierce, before we go into a discussion. But when we looked at the u. K. Case study we saw two russian objectives in particular. The first was to weaken the u. K. Internally. So this was magnified in things like accentuating existing divisions between leave and remain, rural and urban divides, even those in scotland who preferred to separate from the United Kingdom rather than remain. So the first objective was to weaken the u. K. Internally. The second was to diminish the u. K. s place in the world. So the activities that fell in this bucket were related to nato, the European Union and the relationship with the United States. So clearly russia recognized that the u. K. Is made Even Stronger by its membership in nato and recently the European Union and its uniquely close relationship with the United States. So those were targets of the influence activities as well. But what we found in looking at the study is that it wasnt so much the objective or tactics in either the russia or china case that made the real difference in terms of influence and impact. Rather it was what happened on the receiving end, how resilient was the society or the country that was on the receiving end of these tactics and objectives . And in many ways the u. K. Was very resilient. The government is accountable. Its highly trance parent. Theres a good balance among the different branches of government. The remedial landscape is very resilient. I was impressed to see 50 of u. K. Citizens are getting the majority of their news from the bbc and the community which can often be a vulnerability was very well integrated and welloff and did not present as a vul nnlt vulnerability in the case. We did find two of concern. The first was regulatory gaps. In particular the Campaign Finance law created some loopholes that possibly led to more foreign money coming into the campaign. Of course weve got no proof of that, but that is essentially where some of the trails led us. The u. K. Also has a very interesting structure with the crown dependencies and some of the overseas territories. So even when these regulatory gaps were fixed in the u. K. Proper they manifested themselves, and the legislation was implemented later in those two instances. The second vulnerability were societal vulnerabilities which i alluded to in the beginning. So a polarization whether its political or ideological that we see across the United States and europe. But certainly those were the two vulnerabilities that jumped out in the u. K. Case, and smartly i think in the u. K. Response they tried to address those vulnerabilities through changes in the Campaign Finance law, for example. Through efforts to increase Media Literacy or the ability to identify disinformation and misinformation. So while i think were on a very positive track certainly the tactics continue to change, and so the response has to evolve. And with that i think id like to turn the floor over to ambassador pierce to give us your impressions of, you know, essentially when did the u. K. Become a target of russia, why did they become a target of russia, and what are you generally seeing both with regard to influence activities in the u. K. As well as the u. K. s experience watching influence activities overseas. Thank you, ambassador pierce. Thank you very much, heather. Thank you, rachel, and thank you for inviting me to join this very interesting discussion. I think the first thing to say is that the u. K. And russia actually have a very long history, and at points in this history we have had very good relations. One goes back over 300 years, peter the great, and that was a stage of the relationship that for those times was very productive. We admire the russian people, and we recognize the enormous sacrifices that the russian people made in the Second World War. And we appreciate the fact that that Second World War was won with soviet assistance and the soviet union was an ally at that time. And weve always made it clear that we want a productive load bearing relationship with the russian government including the current russian government. And i went with Boris Johnson when he was foreign secretary to moskow to deliver that last message, which seemed at the time to be appreciated by our russian hosts. However, three months after that saw the giu poisonings in salsbury and eventually led to more than 150 Russian Diplomats being excelled across europe and the United States by the u. K. And its partners. And so i think the fundamental question has to be why does russia reject these overtures that countries like the u. K. But there are others make in terms of a load bearing relationship . Were never going to always agree with russia. But were often never going to agree on a huge number of subjects, but we are both members at the security council, and we do have certain interests in global stability. And that ought to be a Good Foundation for some productive even difficult conversations. But we dont see russia behaving as a permanent member. We see russia doing all the things you just described and more in georgia and other countries besides the u. K. And we also see that condoning if not abetting the use of chemical weapons in syria, chemical weapons are a universal universally prohibited weapon. So why does a permanent five member want to allow one of its client states to use such an awful weapon . And i think the russia of the cold war, if you like, the soviet union of the cold war would have seen that as crossing a line in terms of stability. So i think this comes to your question of how long has this been going gone, and im not a historian. I havent looked into it in detail, but i think antecdotally all these things are synonymous with the rise ofpute mchb theres something about this n mantra that the russians have of the end of the west. Theyre out to show that western values dont count anymore, the western approach to trade doesnt count anymore, the western approach to International Treaties and International Laws and standards doesnt count anymore. And theyre putting a lot of effort into undermining with that. And then as you say we come to the United Kingdom and all the things that youve described. We try in the United Kingdom to be resilient against those attacks. Weve set a number of programs like defending democracy and countering disinformation to make us more resilient and use all the parts of british institutions. But as you also say some of these arguments by the russians are pernicious. We all know how they affect opinion polls, and i come back to my first point why does russia want to behave like this . Why not just have a more productive relationship with the west . The west is no threat to russia, so why not take a different euroatlantic route as in the late 1990s it seemed possible that russia might do . So i think thats an important question which we should keep confronting russian representatives with. I think the second point of russia i think these are very interesting and intriguing. I doubt very much its a partnership of two equals, but at the same time i do wonder if the russians are more manipulative with the chinese than perhaps the chinese realize . And the whole disinformation thing where the chinese are copying russian disinformation including visa vi u. K. Policy i think thats an interesting area to explore. Ill stop there so you can ask questions or move onto luke, but very happy to elaborate on any of that. Thank you. I think thats very insightful about, you know, your analysis that russia feels it has more to gain from being disruptive than from engaging and trying to think about why that might be the case. Certainly there are certain rules and norms that are inviable, but beyond that i think their scope for thinking about how we change that calculus. And certainly russia is not alone in that. A number of other countries heather and i looked closely at turkey, and turkey is making its same calculation in its region it has more to gain from acting unilaterally and pushing its agenda rather than engaging with eu and nato partners for a collective end state. So i think thats a very sharp observation. Before i turn it over to luke maybe just one more question to keep the flow going. I mean, russia really has doubled down on these efforts that fall below the threshold of our conflict. We looked at the brexit referendum, the Scottish Independence referendum and possibly even the u. K. Elections. When you observe these in retrospect do you really think these efforts have had impact . We struggled with this in the study very much. We could see influence but we really couldnt necessarily say because there was this point of influence or involvement it led to this outcome. In your experience maybe even looking at the u. K. s engagement in Central Europe do you think that these efforts have impact . Oh, i think thats a really good question. As you say its quite hard to measure, and it may be were all too close to it to know if it would have had impact. So i think if one wanted to look at impact the east europeans have more experience of the russian government, if you like, than anyone else. And they certainly worry about the cumulative effect as well as individual decisions. So there may be something quite important in russian attempts to destabilize over time that we cant quite discern yet. I do think it was well said of the russian government that they put the saber in until they hit steel. And i always thought in the u. N. That the russians have as good chess players at least two strategies for any given ven venture. One is incremental and the other is much more dynamic, and they will pursue either of those depending on circumstance. So theyre very adept at jumping from circumstance to circumstance and advancing their agenda as fast as their circumstances allow. And i think the consequence of that or the implication of that is that to halt them we have to be very firm early on. They have to hit that steel with the saber early on, and i think thats where sometimes collectively the west is not always as forceful with russia as we might be. And i do think a bigger conversation about russian tactics in this regard would be helpful because i think if we arent alert to the russian strategy of riding two horses we end up with the risk that we inadvertently let something happen that then has consequence we werent expecting. So thats definitely worth conversation. And in many ways i like to have these conversations because thats where collective security resides, but on the whole i think the their news from more objective, independent, but well renowned outlets like the bbc and the national press. Theres a healthy skepticism, i think, in the british public, which is useful on these occasions. And i think the russian message is so obviously antidemocratic that it goes against a lot of traditions, so people, again, are skeptical. I think it interesting going back to the first point, the russians obviously cant get their message across by democratic means. That ought to tell them something, theyre irrational, clever people. But in terms of actual impact versus influence, i come back to the point i think were just a bit too close to it to know if that will be the case. Thank you. Well, luke, you have looked at a lot of these issues of impact and vulnerabilities and what makes an influence activity more or less successful, in quotes, if you will. What, in your experience, should we be studying . How can we reduce the likelihood that well see these influence activities occurring in the future, and if they do, how do we go about making sure the impact or influence is reduced . Yeah, well, thank you. Thank you, rachel. Congratulations on a terrific report. Its been a pleasure to read and very timely. Just listening to the ambassador, i was put in mind of a conversation i had with a british diplomat soon after i got kicked out of moscow, after four years there as a guidance correspondent in 2011. It was a pretty dispiriting experience, which followed breakinned at our apartment and harassment. The diplomat said the problem with the russians is they dont think the way we think they should think. And that really goes to the heart of it. To your question. Putin, in my view, ultimately, unfortunately, is not interested in mutually beneficial solutions. He is a classic zero sum guy who would rather have kind of lose lose than win win. And in addition to that, he really sees the world, he sees geopolitics, he sees International Alliances through a kind of kgb prism. And even though the soviet union is gone and communism is gone, his thinking almost genetically is very kgb, and in this kind of world view, which is paranoid, conspiratorial, sees russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by nato and other hostile enemies, the United States is the main adversary in russia, and the uk is kind of a lesser main adversary, and i think what putin has done with some success in recent years is to take this old soviet playbook of disruption of undermining the enemy, of taking advantage of weaknesses in western society, and hes sort of shined it up for our age of facebook and twitter and social media. And i think its important that we dont exaggerate how powerful and omnipotent Vladimir Putin is. He isnt. Hes not a villain sitting in a cave, pressing buttons and making things happen in d. C. Or in london or in berlin or wherever. But what i would argue is that he is a sort of classic kgb adventurest and opportunist, and he tries it out. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesnt. The problem is that his two most successful operations, i would say, both took place in 2016. They were both related. One was the push by russian spy agencies to sort of systematic sweeping operation to help donald trump win the white house, and the other was to actually launch a set of comparable pretty multifaceted operations to support the leave campaign in the 2016 Eu Referendum and some degree, the Scottish Independence referendum as well. Its hard to say. I wouldnt argue that putin caused these results. There were numerous other factors, but the point is, we have a very narrowly contested result, a sort of 50 50 scenario and a troll operation by social media bots sitting in st. Petersburg. You have a sort of russian Intelligence Officers based in london running around, leazing with senior figures of the leave campaign, and also the unanswered question of financing. All sides deny wrongdoing, but theres a genuine question raised by mps, british mps and other about the covert funding of the leave campaign. It was a pretty potent combination. I would just say one other thing, which is that my frustration isnt as a investigative journalist. The ambassador is right. Its perhaps too early to tell how much influence there has been, but in britain at least, we have not had a kind of proper reckoning. We havent had a full interrogation of what happened in 2016. Were expecting with great curiosity this russia Court Tomorrow from the security committee, but to be honest, the way i see is theres been denialism from a lot of politicians but particularly the current government, which really brexit is their project, and theyre pretty reluct ntd kctan acknowledge the russians did anything around brexit. And lastly, there thing about putins influence operations, whether its hackers or trolls or whatever, is hes an equal opportunity meddler. The factor in communist times was far left parties, communist parties in france, uk, italy, and elsewhere. Now his partner is the far right. So euro skeptic forces. He welcomes brexit. If youre a politician, you have to acknowledge what may benefit you today may hinder you tomorrow. Its everybodys problem and we all need to address it. Thank you, luke. I think thats an important point you have made. When we looked at the germany case, certainly one of the parties the russians were courting was delinka, and what they were trying to do was play on those margins to gain influence, but in the german case, at least, the problem was there may have been influence, but the people they tried to influence didnt hold seats in parliament, so it never really carried over. Its important to follow those chains of influence of logic. I also appreciated your point about not thinking that russia is under every rock. Because certainly, one of the objectives of influence activities is to undermine or paint as uncredible our media and our judiciary. In many ways, im hopeful the report will shine a light on what is or is not russian influence activities. If i may ask a question to the ambassador briefly, you made an important point about the importance of the fact that russia pushes until it hits steel and then it backs off. In your experience, have we seen examples in the uk where there has been a response thats been forceful enough to make russia think twice . And how can we leverage those best practices in the future, if we do see another incident . Oh, thats a tricky question to answer on an open in an open environment. Not least because it might alert the russians to the way we go about these things. But let me try and answer. So i think they were surprised by the strength of the skripal response. Not just from the uk but also from other countries, as i say, over 150 Russian Diplomats were expelled across a number of countries. Sanctions were put on russia. The u. S. In particular increased its sanctions. And i dont think the russians expected the hard time they got at the u. N. And in the security council. And of course, i was involved in that. And they didnt expect to be exposed for stealing the data later. Thats something we and the dutch uncovered. And they didnt expect to use the subsequent votes in the Chemical Weapons Organization about future investigations. Thats called opcw. So i think all of those have caused a little bit of a retreat. Its only buying time, i think. Theyre very good at regrouping, as luke was explaining, and using lots of different tools. As you know, we have Just Announced that we believe russian actors, that doesnt mean the russian state, were involved in the last general election campaign. We believe theyre responsible for leaking the papers on the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. And we have attributed to the Russian Intelligence Services the work they were doing to try to steal vaccine information. So im hoping that all of those will have set them back. I fear but this is speculation, that they will divert their attention to other countries whose internal systems might not be quite so robust. It was well said of the Russian Intelligence Services that they would rather steal the Weather Report off the newscasters desk than wait two minutes until it was broadcast to the world, so there is something in their psyche about the importance of secrets. But hopefully, with all these things and with much greater airing of the problem, including through sessions like this, hopefully that provides some counter to their ability to have any successes. Thank you, ambassador. Luke, do you want to pick up on that . Because as an investigative journalist, im sure you have been an astute observer of what works in terms of pushback, and also in terms of anticipation. I think Going Forward that thats something that the uk government has tried to be better at, is anticipating what the next event may be. Could you share your observations with us . Yeah, no, its fascinating. Its interesting because i think london is kind of uniquely placed to do something about russian misbehavior, and the reason is theres a tremendous amount of elite moscow money, which is hidden in the uk or incorporated through British Companies or stuffed in crown dependencies or the British Virgin islands and so on. When you think about maligned russian behavior, its too easy to fall into the trap that these are kind of far away baddies about whom we know not so much. And the problem is actually the corruption is on our doorstep, and this is one of the more contentious aspects i think of the russia report, which we get tomorrow, which is some of the evidence which was submitted by bill brouder, sort of a well known American British financier, he complained to this committee about what he called a western buffer network. By that, he meant very rich russians, quite often with crowning connections who hire pr people, who hire real estate people, lawyers, can be formation agents, and essentially are able to steal, to call it how it is, in moscow. And then really kind of launder this money by western finance networks, through london and launder their reputations as well. Now, its been a problem thats affected all governments. It didnt begin last year. Its been going on for some time. I think this regime, this sort of regime of Vladimir Putin is uniquely vulnerable in a way that its soviet predecessors were not. If youre a bureaucrat, back in the late 1970s, you had an apartment in moscow with a slightly higher ceiling. You had a chauffeur driven car, and you went to holiday on the black sea, and that was it. The people around putin are all multibillionaires. They have a wine collection in switzerland. They kids are studying in london. And while, i mean, i would personally welcome what the foreign secretary, the British Foreign secretary did last week with the magnitsky list and designating human rights abusers, but we could go so much further. We need to recognize that russian influence isnt necessarily done by generals wearing olive military uniforms with epaulets. Its done by rather charming people who speakfluen fleuent e, who read the same novels that you and i read. And its deceptive. The goal is the same. I think london could do an awful lot more. And just lastly, i would say, i worked on a lot of quite important investigations with the New York Times and other international partners, i did the panama papers. We found so many people in putins circle who had offshore structures, but being helped by british professionals to set them up. And if were serious about stopping, deterring rogue kremlin behavior, then actually conventional diplomatic response isnt necessarily the answer. Its a good first step, but the thing they really care about, despite their hyperpatriotism at home and their talk about crimea and all the rest of it, is their offshorep bank accounts. Once you target those, that is the steel that ambassador pierce is talking about. Thats a wonderful response. You know, at the risk of plugging another csis report, heather and colleagues did look at did a comprehensive report called the kremlin playbook, and there was a second version. The second version looked specifically at enablers. Countries that enabled russian money, however it was achieved, to go into bank accounts. Real estate purchases. Companies that were incorporated under sort of shell ownership arrangements. So certainly, that exists not only in the uk but across europe. I am reassured the uk is on to this, particularly with the unexplained wealth ordinances its trying to issue, how did you come by all these chalets and houses across the world . I think uk is going on the right track. Madam ambassador, did you want to respond to that . Then i think well turn to questions from the audience because we have quite a few. Thank you, rachel. Just quickly, i think luke is absolutely right. As you say, we have done a number of things. We have switched the burden of proof in the unexplained wealth order so people have to explain how they have got the money. We have got these human rights sanctions that also allow for assets freezes as well as travel bans. Its much harder now to launder money through things like property, precious stones. We have got a special Economic Crime center within our National Crime agency which looks at things like this. Were trying to do more on transparency of overseas ownerships, and we have helped crown dependencies and oversees territories to get their registers and legislation in order. So its a huge task for the reasons luke was explaining. But we are trying very much to get on top of that and share Good Practice with other countries. But i think its also a case of ceaseless vigilance. We cant let up on doing any of this. Thank you. I think that highlights that were at the beginning and we have a lot of good initiatives but quite a lot to go. Turning to some questions from the audience, im trying to group them as we talk into different categories. And there is a lot of interest in what the uk and other democracies can do to help spread the stop the spread of russian influence in the balkans, in ukraine, and theres a couple of questions asking specifically about influence in bosnia, montenegro, and north macedonia. In your experience, ambassador, are there things that the uk has done or should continue doing to curtail that influence . And then luke, maybe, if you have looked at this from a european angle, are there things that the European Union could be doing to address this, this influence in third countries . Im very concerned about this idea of a back door, that if you meet resistance in the uk or germany, youll just try another nato ally or eu member state. Over to you, ambassador, and then luke, just pick up quickly from there. Great. Thanks. Yes, i think the russians are resurge ntd in the balkans, notably in serbia. They tried this coup in montenegro that failed. They tried in macedonia, that failed. Thats all good, and you have seen both the eu and nato move to help though countries be more resilie resilient, including through expanding their own programs en route to membership for them. Serbia, i think, because of its history and its links to the soviet union, is genuinely quite ambivalent about russia versus the west. This is a massive generalization, but in general terms. Bosnia, i think, is very vulnerable. And thats because of the fragility of the bosnian state in so many ways that were familiar with. But how do we counter it . I think weve got to keep strengthening eu and nato and osc ties with those countries. We have got to help them be very transparent in their own legislation and the ways they tackle the Money Laundering and the interference. That means, i think, giving them more military training, more security training, more economic training. And probably more governance support so they find it easier to resist some of the pernicious things that the russians do. I think it also means us all calling it out when we see it. If you remember the coup in montenegro, the failed russian coup in montenegro, got a lot of publicity, and i think thats probably an important deterrent. And i think there is something about sharing best practice and making sure we all come together to talk about these issues behind closed doors so that we can map out what sorts of measures might help countries be more resilient. And then, you know, i would like to add talking to the russians themselves about this, but they are very hard to have conversations with at the moment. Yeah. I would just add two quick points. One is that the playbook, whether its in montenegro or bosnia or wherever, tends to be the same in terms of kind of russian ingress into countries. And one route is to buy distressed assets. You buy media and flip them, you buy Strategic Industries that were in trouble and make in roads into the political class. Thats been happening all over the place. So i think in what investment we need to be a little bit cautious of sometimes and i would echo the ambassadors point about the gru. Its a very Secretive Organization behind the soviet poisoning, and it exists in the shadows, or at least it did. Its been very stunned by recent revelations and wonderful reporting by the open source investigative outfit, but what we now know is pretty distressing. We know since salisbury, theres been an undercover gru diversionary unit based in the french alps traveling all over europe, going to swiss and to the balkans, going to bulgaria, going to uk for the skripal operation, of professional assassins. And the more we can reveal their activities, the greater one would hope that they think twice before doing Something Like that again. Thanks, luke. I recognize were coming to the end of our time, but if we could just take one more question. And maybe end on an optimistic note. I put this to both of you. We have noted that right now russias calculation is it has more to gain from this disruptive behavior, maintaining this zero sum mentality, but are there certain prerequisites for deconfliction. Are there steps we could take on either side to start to get the relationship back on a more productive path whereby russia doesnt feel the need to take these covert steps . Do you want me to go first, rachel . Yes, please. Sorry. I should have directed that. You say russia doesnt feel the need to take these covert steps. I think my contention would be that she doesnt need to take them. Theres enough going on in the world in all of these fora, and with all these World Leaders that we could get back to a much more constructive path if the russians wanted to take it. I fear reenforced by what luke has been saying that president putin just doesnt want to take it for the reasons luke gave. But i think permanent five membership is a good forum. I would like to see us all do even more in the p5 space. I think its very difficult at the moment, and its not a panacea, but i do think its a very good forum for discreet discussion of some very serious issues. Those issues include nuclear. You know, its no coincidence that the p5 of the worlds permitted nuclear powers. But it also enables us to have discussions about fundamental other things going on in the world, eg syria and libya, and cyber. I do i do worry, as i said, that the russians might just not want to come into that discussion, but i think we should be able to discuss things like chemical weapons at p5 and hopefully use that in a sensible way. And then i think it would be nice to think that there would be more people to people exchanges. There were a number of those, but i think at the moment, when we are seeing the russian state inbeagle itself by all these routes into illegitimate activity, i suspect that might be a hard one. But i think Global Health effort is quite a good issue, as with the chinese, to put scientists and experts in direct touch with each other so you try to take government out of the equation. You try to reduce the temptation. And we have all got some very serious Global Health problems to think about in addition to covid, there are things like antimicrobial resistance, so i think, again, if the russians wanted to come into those discussions, we would be pleased to see them. I would just say very briefly, ill say the depressing thing and then a slightly more uplifting in the. The depressing thing, i think, is that despite the ambassadors optimism, which is perfectly kind of reasonable, i dont see putin changing any time soon, and more than that, we now know following this kind of constitutional referendum that essentially what always looked to me like a dictatorship has become a dictatorship, and putin will stay in power potentially until 2036, well into his early 80s. I imagine that donald trump and Boris Johnson may have left the stage by then, and putin will be the last man standing. The last person standing. And therefore, i think we have to go back to 1947. We have to go back to george can canon, to containment or neo containment, where if russia is not going to be a rational actor on the world stage, then im afraid its going to be kind of pragmatic containment until things improve. I mean, my positive is that we do have to separate this particular regime of 65yearold or 60something kgb men who have become very, very rich from the russian people. Russia was a great country with a wonderful theatrical, literary, artistic, intellectual tradition, and actually, the big victims from all this are not americans or brits. Theyre the russians themselves. And there are very many Young Russians who want something different. They want something more democratic, more modern. And i suspect their day will come. I mean, putin may wish to rule forever. But he wont, and he cant. And at some stage, there may be an intrizzicly russian russia, but a more reasonable and productive partner down the road. Well, luke and madam ambassador, i think thats a fantastic note to end on, recognizing that we do have difficult times here in monitoring and responding to influence activities, but that behind these are real people just trying to live out their daily lives. So its upon us to be discerning in calling out those influence activities, to be honest about our own vulnerabilities, and to Work Together to push back when lines are crossed. So i just wanted to thank you both for your time, and heather, for the opportunity to work on this report. Its been really fascinating to look not only in transatlantic space but in the Asian Pacific and compare what is happening to take away meaningful essence. I take away from the conversation were only at the beginning and we have a lot of work to do to get better at responding to activities in this space. With that, thank you both so much for your time, and everybody, please check out our report. And let us know what you think. Tonight, on American History tv, our series landmark cases, produced in cooperation with the National Constitution center, we explore the issues, people, and places involved in some of the most Significant Supreme Court sk cases in our nations history. We begin at 8 00 p. M. With katz v. United states, a case that expanded americans right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment and changed the way Law Enforcement officers conduct their investigations. And then at 9 35, brandon burg v. Ohio, a case in which the Supreme Court overturned the hate speech conviction of clarence brandenburg, an ohio ku klux klan leader. The court issues a unanimous decision up holding his right to free speech even if offensive. Watch tonight on cspan3 and any time at cspan. Org. American history tv on cspan3. Exploring the people and events that tell the american story every weekend. 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