The First Mission where in apollo now, where we had been flight directors on gemini, we were coming back together again. So you had probably the three most experienced people at the counsel, and it was a question of who was going to get to do what. Lonnie had been to the moon a couple times. Charlesworth had launched saturns. I had the lunar module experience. You had no driver that said this person ought to be doing this phase of the mission. I was division chief at that time and kraft had been really on top of us to nail down who is going to do what until finally after the apollo 9 mission we all managed to get together, and charlesworth as lead had to make the calls. I called him and said cliff, we got to make a decision on which flight director is going to cover which phase of the mission. This is probably the most anticlimactic meeting ive ever had in my life. He looked me straight in the face, and he said, well, im going to launch it, and im going to do the eva. So that only leaves the landing and the lunar liftoff. I think glenn is going to do the lunar liftoff, so you got the landing. And it was all over in about sixtyseconds, and each flight director i dont think theres any question, everybody wanted to do something for the first time. And the beauty of the Apollo Program was there were enough firsts to go around for everybody, but when it came time for the first Lunar Landing mission, i really got to respect cliff for saying hey, you take the job instead of me. And i think he gave me the job principally because i had spent most of my time with a lunar module people, and i happened to have just a little bit more experience in the lunar module than any of the other guys. And it was totally an unselfish decision. I think this is the way the flight directors always worked. Were always trying to figure out the best chemistry between flight director, team and mission to give an assurance the job gets done. And it worked. But it had to work, didnt it . Yeah. There was no question. Every mission in apollo had a large number of firsts. And every mission had a very visible profile from a standpoint of the media feud, and if you missed the slightest thing, there was always this question, somebody asked is the Lunar Landing in jeopardy. Fortunately as we went through these Early Missions and we only had a single shot at each one of these. They all had to work. You could look them straight in the eye and say no, were on track. Were going to get the job done. By the time you got to apollo 11, however, the media coverage, the external pressures were incredibly high, but again, this is one area where cliff charlesworth, again, as lead flight director, one of their roles was to try to provide the external focus. So he covered the majority of the Mission Briefings of a technical sense. He covered many of the media briefings. So basically, he kept the pressure off myself and lonnie so we could get ready for the jobs that we needed to do. But there was no doubt as we were approaching july 20th that we were doing something no one had ever done before. You feel a lot of pressure . Did it worry you . Again, in retrospect, i would say yes, but when you start feeling the pressure, what you do is you find some way to keep your focus so that basically the pressure moves into the background. And there was so much to do to get ready for this first Lunar Landing that you just immersed yourself in the job, and the pressure faded into the background. The only time i ever felt pressure during the i mean felt intense pressure. Maybe i can say this. We had had it was as a result of our training, and the council hear in Mission Control, there used to be a phone directly behind the flight directors, and routinely during training runs, the Program Managers and chris kraft, Division Chiefs throughout the center had a too small squawk boxes in their offices. And if they ever wanted to hear what was going on in Mission Control, they turned on the squawk boxes and they could hear the crew talking and hear the flight director talking to his team. It was reasonably customary that you would turn up these squawk boxes and its always going along in the background while you were having your meetings or making telephone calls or whatever. And training, the first month of preparing for the Lunar Landing went pretty well. It seemed we had a hot hand. We had come off the apollo 9 mission. Wed achieved all our objects. The Lunar Landing people did well in apollo 10. We proceeded into the training process, and it seemed that boy, every time the training focus was a problem, throw us a curve, wed pick it up, run with it, come up with a right conclusion, et cetera. And then sim soup, a training boss, dick kuse must have looked at us and said that team is too cocky. That team needs to get a few lessons. And he called his team up and lets put the screws to these guys. We ended up now in our second month of training, and were really only training roughly about one day a week. Second month of training we had a particularly bad day where we couldnt seem to do anything right. We would crash, and learning to land on the moon, you have a time delay of about three seconds. So anything you see and by the time you can respond and voice up instructions to the crew, youre three seconds behind whats happening on board the spacecraft. And as you get down close to the surface of the moon, theres what you would call a dead mans box. Every airplane landing, theres a point no matter what youre going to do, you can pick the throttles, youre still going to touch down before you come off the ground again. We really had not defined very well this dead mans box, as youre coming down to the surface of the moon, because its a very complex geometry you have to define. Its tied into how fast youre descending, what kind of altitude are at at this rate. It has many parameters. If you add on top of this this lunar time delay, it can get pretty bad pretty quick. We went through a bad, bad, bad day. We had crashed and we had crashed. And then to avoid crashing wed become unnecessarily conservative and wed abort when we could have landed. By the end of the day, we felt pretty bad, and about that time chris kraft calls up on the phone, and from his initial comments, i knew he had been listening to the simulations, and i knew he was watching us struggle. And he said is there anything i can do to help you . Well, there wasnt anything he could do to help me. I mean, it was my team had to find the right answers. We had to find the right timing, the right chemistry right on down the line. For the first time in this entire process, i felt the pressure that hey, maybe our bosses were starting to lose confidence in this team that they had signed to do the mission, and thats when i felt the pressure. My response was very straightforward. I put a switch on this phone so it wouldnt ring anymore so he could call all day and hed just get a busy signal, but we proceeded to dig ourselves out of the pit that we had somehow dug for ourselves. We set a different set of parameters in defining the dead mans box. We biassed the times we would use to make the calls. We became more conscious of the clock, but piece by piece, we started putting it back together again until we felt not only were we going to get the job, hell yes, we were going to get the job done. There was no question we would get this crew down to the surface of the moon, and the training process then, i mean, we seemed to be on top of everything until the last day of training. And this was, again, a, i think a fateful exercise that to this day i thank kuse for giving it to us. We have a game plan that we call the mission rules. The mission rules are basically preplanned set of decisions where the controllers will sit down and take a look at all the things that could happen in the spacecraft or on the trajectory. Mission by mission, on a phase by phase basis throughout the mission. Theres a lot of phases to the lunar mission. You end up with a book of Mission Roles thats about four inches thick. Thousands of rules. But the controllers have come to the point where we exercised these. Weve proved them right. The training people looked, and they saw one entire area that wasnt treated in the rules. And it was associated with various alarms that are transmitted from the spacecraft computer down to the ground. On the final day of training, which i would i had expected would sort of be like the graduation ceremony, theyd give us problems, tough problems, but they wouldnt give us anything that would kill us. Well, that wasnt their approach to doing the job, and in the final training exercise, they gave us a set of problems on board the spacecraft. We started off high. On the way down, we started seeing a series of alarms coming from the spacecraft. There are two types of alarms. One type said hey, im too busy to get all the jobs done, so im going to revert to an internal priority scheme, and ill work off as many things as i can in this priority scheme until a clock runs out and then ill go back and recycle to the top of this priority listing. Its going to get the guidance job done. Its going to get the control. It may not be updating displays. It may not. And then if these type alarms continue for a sustained period of time, it goes now to a much more critical alarm which we call pudu where the computer goes to halt and awaits further instructions. If this happens up and away, youre not going to land on the moon that day. They gave us these series of alarms. Wed never seen them before. My guidance officer steve bails was absolutely flustered, it seemed. He calls the abort. I feel weve executed the right decisions. And in the training debriefing, soup comes back and says no, we dont think you exercised the right decisions. We think you could have landed. We think you should have looked beyond that alarm to see if you could find out what was happening. You acted prematurely. We didnt believe it. But steve bails, the guidance officer, you never leave anything untested. He says, hey, flight, im going to look at this overnight and call together a bunch of people from mit, draper labs, and well find out what we should have done here. Well, i got a call about 10 00 that evening that said the training people were right. We had made the wrong decision. And they wanted to do some more training the next day. So these were two episodes associated with the training for the mission. One where management got involved when we were really struggling. When i felt pressure. The second time was when i found out we didnt have things wrapped up as well as we should have, and now the crew was going down to the cape. We were weeks from launch. These were the two times that i really felt the pressure during the course of this mission, but i didnt feel anything externally. Finally they launched. They were coasting out toward the wall. Crew were still operating, getting ready for the big event. What was happening during that time . Yeah. Several interesting things. This is my First Experience with the translunar phase of the mission. I worked 7 and 9, but we never had this continuous communication. It was absolutely marvelous to sit in Mission Control now and see the spacecraft 24 hours a day throughout this entire transit period. So from my standpoint, we used this to continue binding ourselves together as a team. I would go over through every one of the telemetry measurements and talk to the controllers. Lets go through the Mission Roles one final time here. We started dusting off all the loose ends. So the translunar phase of the mission is the final period to pull all the pieces together to go over any of the little items that maybe you didnt close out as well as you should have to. Maybe go through the final discussion on the mission rules. Will we really do this if this happens . Its a time to continue to build this chemistry that must exist between flight director and team and crew when you have to make a very shortterm rapid Time Critical type decisions. Because once we got to the surface of the moon, i mean, once we got to the point where were getting ready to land on the moon, there are only three options that day. Youre either going to land. Youre going to abort, or youre going to crash. Those options are pretty awesome when you think about it that hey, were not only in this particular mode of operation now. Were going to be doing it in front of the entire world, and its now to the point where you look to each other for this confidence you need to work through any times when you might have just the slightest tinge of doubt. And generally, the slightest tinge of doubt comes when youre tired. What you got to do is continue and help each other up. That is the magic of this Flight Control team that we have here. It is so selfsupporting. You know in Mission Control when a person needs a little bit of help, a little bit more time to make a decision, and this team is so totally focussed. Its marvelous. Marvelous experience to leave with. All of this paid off eventually, because that landing was not a piece of cake. The landing, i dont think there was anything that really prepared us for the intensity of the landing. If id back up a little bit, one of the Mission Roles, im talking about game plan, that was given to me exclusively where i had to make a decision is in the preparation for the mission. Headquarters people, the Program Managers as well as chris kraft was concerned that if we would crash and not have enough data to figure out why we crashed, wed be in jeopardy of not only losing the lunar goal, but maybe the entire program. So everybody wanted to make sure that there was some formula that would be used by the team to say okay, we got enough data to continue. I fought this particular rule, because they wanted numbers with this thing. And i fought this rule all the way through the process of building the rules, going through the reviews, the mission reviews, et cetera. And i wanted very simple one that says the flight director will determine whether sufficient data exists to continue the mission. Thats i just wanted that that simple that it was a subjective call by the flight director. That was batted back and forth until very close to the mission, and it was not resolved. So i wrote into mission rules that exact statement. The flight director will determine if sufficient data exists to continue. Going back to the landing day, now, this adequate information means voice information and telemetry. As soon as the spacecraft cracked the hill and we were now silently coasting down to the 50,000 foot mark above the moon, the telemetry was broken. The voice was broken. We couldnt communicate. It seems nothing was going right. And immediately that rule came to mind. Do i have sufficient information to continue . But then wed get a bit, and id say ahha, we can look at the spacecraft. There were a couple times when i would make calls for the go point of saying okay all Flight Controllers, use the last valid data points that you saw. This might be 30 seconds old. Theyre making decisions based on stale data. We kept working, trying to figure out what was the problem with the communications, and this turned out to be Bad Information on the attitudes used in the spacecraft. We were getting some reflections off the skin of the lunar module. But again, this is too late. We had to try to solve the problem in realtime, and again, go back to the teamwork. Charlie duke, who was my spacecraft communicator was looking at the signal strengths. He saw the signal strengths vary, and he had seen he had also worked the apollo 10 mission. He suggested to don putty, who had the responsibility for the communications but also the life support, electrical system on the lunar module. He said don, do you think we could have made an altitude change. Would that help . He tried it. Fortunately in training we had also worked in relaying voice information from the ground to mike collins back down to the lunar module. We were using every conceivable way to communicate. In the meantime, time is marching down to my go, no go points. We then have an anomaly on board the spacecraft where buzz aldrin calls down. Hes not seeing what he expects to see on the ac electrical. From the standpoint of voltage indications. This is a critical measurement. And again the controllers said okay, its looking good. By this time my guidance officer, steve bails has tracking information and the spacecraft isnt where it should be. Its that straightforward. Now, he didnt know whether the data he was getting was bad, whether it was just bad navigation or we had a problem with targeting in the spacecraft, but the problem was he really got my attention. He says flight, were out on the radio velocity which is the vertical velocity, and were halfway to our abort limit. Well, boy, when you havent even started down to the moon and some guy comes and says were halfway to the abort limit, it gets your attention. He continued and said ill keep watching it. So all of a sudden now youve got communications problem. Minor electric problem, a navigation problem and youre trying to struggle into meet all the windows for making your decisions as youre now saying hey, were ready to ignite the engine. We got down to the go no go for a power deset. This is done about four minutes prior to the landing point. Again, theres no reason i had to wave off. The team was working well. We made the go to continue. As soon as we did that we lost communication. We couldnt even call the crew. Again, we relay charlie duke relays through mike collins to the lunar module theyre go to continue. Here were getting ready to go to the moon and we cant even talk to the crew directly. Anyway, we keep working through this problem until its time for engine start. Weve had data intermittently. Engine start. At the time of engine start, we need to capture the telemetry so we know the exact quantities of propellants in the tanks. Theyre being settled by the acceleration of the spacecraft as the engines start up. As soon as the engine starts, we miss a valuable point, and we continue on down, and now from the time we start until the time we land on the moon, it should take about between eight and nine minutes, and this becomes a very intense period where again steve bails, a guidance officer, has been trying to figure out whats with this navigation problem that were halfway to our abort limit. He gives me a call that really has now a bit more confidence. He says were still halfway to the abort limit, but its not growing. And he tends to believe that something happened upstream. It might have been a maneuver execution where the engine didnt shut down perfectly where it was. In retrospect, we found out after the mission that the crew had not fully depressurized the tunnel between the two spacecrafts. And when they separated the spacecrafts, it was like a champagne cork popping out of the bottle. It gave the spacecraft a little bit more speed than it should have. Like performing an extremely small maneuver. Over the period of time of a lunar orbit, this maneuver has placed the spacecraft in a different position than it should have been to start the descent. But we didnt know that at that time. We had to figure it out. Now were in the process of going down, and were making the calls. Everything seems to be going right for a change. You never quite relax during this process. Weve learned to work around the broken communications, but it seems to be getting better. And were now at the point where were starting to evaluate the landing radar data. This is an extremely important junction, because the lunar module is now using the altitude we gave it based on the tracking data and our knowledge of the position of the moon. We now have to update that altitude by the real altitude measured by the landing radar. If theres a very large difference between the altitude weve given it and what the radar is seeing, they have to find some way to smooth it out, because you cant make that correction instantaneously. Were now in the process of determining whether the landing radar is acceptable to enter into the computer. When we get a call from the crew theyve had a Computer Program alarm. And for a few seconds, its just total silence. Nobody has commented on this thing. Weve all heard it. And then the crew comes down, gives a reading on the alarm. Well, its sort of like coming to a fork in the road. Half of my team. In fact, most of my team is trying to decide whether to accept this radar, and steve bails is an important part of that decision, but now hes got to answer to this Program Alarm kind of thing, and its for a period of time half the team was moving in this direction. The other half starting to move in this direction. I got to pull these guys back. And charlie duke makes the call, can we give them a reading on the alarm. Again, steve bails now has studied these alarms as a result of this training exercise. So now he goes back to his back room controller. Tommy gibson says these are the ones that basically we reviewed and i dont see any problems. Do you see any problems . Rapidly we got a go to continue. So now weve worked through this. Now were starting to accept the landing radar data, and these Program Alarms are continuing intermittently through the descent, and one of the things that steve comes up with that he says hey, it might be related to some of the displays the crew is using. We tell the crew to back off the very high utilization on board displays on altitude and altitude rate. And we tell them well provide the readups for them during this period. So this team now is faced with i mean, were going to the moon for real. This is not a simulation anymore. And its faced with incredible problems that nobody had ever really anticipated. We thought everything would be clear cut, but its far from clear cut, and the team seems to be tighter. The more problems they got, the more effectively theyre working. And this almost makes me happy, because a Flight Control team is always best when theyre working problems. All of a sudden theyre now focussed on something. From a back room loop, we were never able to identify who said it. A voice comes across and it says hey, this is almost like a simulation. And i sort of snicker. I mean, its sort of a mental point where you back off now. The intensity still is there, but all of a sudden you say hey, we licked these problems before. Were going to lick them again. And we continued down the process. Now, communications were about to the point where were powered pitch over. Were about five minutes off the surface. The communications have improved dramatically. So this worry that was in the background festering that i might have to make a call because we didnt have adequate data is now out of the back of my mind, and now were working focussed activities. And again, the communications gets tight. You can now feel the crew has got their landing point identified. They can see it. They can see that if we continue this automatic guidance, were going to land in the boulder field. So we see neil take over manual control, and he uses an input with his hand controller that redesignates the landing point. Hes got a grid in the lunar module window thats like a gun sight. Throughout the mission its oriented if i dont do anything different right now, this is where im going to land. Basically hes redesignated. We see as a result of this error where were further down range, were going to land about two and a half miles, i believe, from our designated landing site. And this is rocky boulder, crater field area. Now neil is working into this area, and all of a sudden you start becoming intensely aware of the clock. It says in most of the training runs, we would have landed by now, and we havent landed. And i say uhoh, its going to get tight. This is reinforced moments later when my propulsion guy, bob karlton says a low level. We dont have a fuel gauge. Once youre in the round part of the tank at the bottom, theres a sensor that says okay, if the crew is at a hover throttle setting, hes going to have two minutes to go. But now in the back room, this is where some of the magic in Mission Control comes in. The crew when theyre actually flying or hovering is above the hover throttle setting and below. Say its 30 . Maybe its 30 or 40 or maybe down to 20. The crew is throttling up and down as theyre scooting forward across the surface of the moon faster than we expected and i have a controller in the back room looking at the squiggles on an analog recorder. Hes mentally thinking theyre three seconds above 30 , four above, two below. Hes trying to integrate how many seconds are remaining of fuel. He got to the point where he could nail it within about 10 seconds. We put a 10 second certainty. Whatever number he gave us, we were always on the safe side. Then karlton calls 60 seconds. We have 60 seconds before were either going to land or going to abort. And charlie duke at this time says wed better be pretty quiet in here right now, and this has been a mutually agreed on point that our job is to get the crew close enough to attempt the landing. And from then on the only calls were going to make is fuel remaining. Well, weve just told them its 60 seconds and theyre not down there. Between 60 and 30 seconds we get a call the crew says kicking up dust. About the time they say that, we get the call 30 seconds. Now were down to 30 seconds remaining. Were watching the clock. Counting down, and about the time the clock hits 17 seconds, it took a few seconds for me to realize this, we heard lunar contact. Theres a probe under each one of the feet. When it touches the surface, the crew will hit engine stop and it will fall in the last few feet. You hear that lunar contact, and then i hear the crew going through aca out of detent. Its going but it takes seconds to recognize that theyre going through the engine shutdown. We must be on the surface. And then the only thing that was out of normal throughout this entire process that we had never seen in training was the people behind me in the viewing room start cheering and clapping and stomping their feet. Instructors are over in the room to the right of the room again, behind a glass wall and theyre all cheering and you get this weird feeling. Its chilling that it soaks in through the room, and i said, my god, were actually on the moon. And i cant even relish that thought because i have to get back to work because we have to make sure almost instantaneously whether the spacecraft is safe to leave on the surface of the moon or should we immediately lift off . We go through what we call the t1 stations, so that within the 60 seconds of getting on the moon i have to tell the crew its safe to stay on the moon for the next eight minutes and i dont have any voice. Im clanked up and at this time charlie duke is saying we hear Tranquillity Base here and the eagles landed from armstrong and duke says you have a bunch of us down here about ready to turn blue. Okay. It started my t1 stay, and this all happens in seconds. And finally, i wrap my arm on the console and break my pin, and i finally get going and get back on track again, and in a very cracked voice, all Flight Controllers stand by for t1, and we go through this, make the stay, no stay. Then we go through a t2 stay no stay. And everybody else is celebrating and were intensely focussed to make sure its safe to stay here and then we have to go into a t3 stay no stay which is the final one after almost two hours that were safe to be on the moon for an extended period of time and in the meantime, the pressure of gas we use is Super Critical helium has had some again and this was something we didnt anticipate from the design. We got some heat soaked back from the engine. So this tank of very cold gas is warming up very rapidly, and we dont know whether its going to explode or if the release valves are going to fire and we know we have to stay on our toes through this whole process and were in a crisis mode down here while everyone else is still celebrating until finally, we see the pressure start to decrease rapidly and we believe its vented the relief valves and what they should have done and for the first time we can power down. It is only after the t3 that we can really i wont say pat each other on the back, but we can say we did it. Today we just landed on the moon, and walking over, i walked over to the press conference with doug ward, and all i really wanted to get back to Mission Control and wed made sort of a Mission Design decision and nobody believed it that once we get down in the surface well put the crew to sleep. Well, we knew and the crew knew and the world knew that the crew wasnt going to go to sleep. They wanted to get on the surface and start the exploration. At the time i was doing the stay, no stay, i had charles worth wandering around the room, and midler trying to figure out who was in charge at that point. The adrenaline in the control room is building up. You can feel it. It was palpable. It was almost like a heavy fog that it was so real and and the controllers got a break while we, during the loss of signal period and when they came back into the room now, these guys were going to be here and there was only three options. We were either going to land, we were going to crash or we were going to abort, and the room goes through almost a ritual through battle short condition where we physically blocked the Circuit Breakers in the building because now we would prefer to burn up the building rather than let a Circuit Breaker open inadvertently at a critical time and we locked the control room doors, and i really didnt realize until after the mission when a couple of the controllers talked about how it was sinking in that they were now not going to get out of this room until wed gotten our job done. Steve bales was probably one of the most vocal about it of saying, you know, you dont really know what youre doing when you have a 26yearold kid in this room and basically youre going to write in the history books whatever happened today and then you locked those doors and i realize i dont want to do this job. Its too much for me. And i felt i had to talk to my people, and i called him up on the assistant flight director loop and this is a secret loop that we use only for debriefings. People in the viewing room cant hear it with people training and its just tied to the people in this room and we use it only when we debrief and we got heavy duty talking and somebody knew the right thing and it was very private and very personal and i called the controllers out of the loop and told them how proud i was of the team and the job wed chosen to do. I indicated that from the day we were all born we were destined to meet in this room this day and at this moment and that from now on, whatever happened, we would remember this day forever, and we then proceeded to give just a few coaching tips, and i said whatever happens i will never second guess any of your calls. Now lets go land on the moon. And terminated the loop and all of the people in the viewing room were probably wondering what the hell we were talking about, and thats a blank in the tape, but again, steve bales, the guidance officer came up and he said how important this settling down process was not only to him, but actually to his people in the back room and since he was such an intense part of the job, steve was a very interesting guy. He was what i would say the prototype of the nerds or the geeks that work in the computer world today. He was the first guy working with this data making absolutely irreversible, timecritical decisions and about four years out of college hed grown up in the business and steve, you we would poll the room, i didnt need an intercom loop because steve, you could feel all of this going and it ricochetted and in fact there was one time as we were actually almost to the surface, when we did our final go, he was so go that i actually i almost chuckled that he was so intense in doing the job, but this is a group of young people who had signed up to do a job and it was the first generation in their entire family who had gone to college. Most of these people were midwesterners. Their work ethic was absolutely spectacular, and i had no doubt that this team was capable of doing a job. They were young . They were young. The average age was 26 at this time and i have a picture and it almost looks like some of these kids you saw flying the bombers in world war ii where theyd have the these troops outside their b17s and their b24s. You just feel so intensely proud of these people. In the after we had completed the t3 stay no stay i made one final trip to the Training Area which is right in the corner of the room because i wanted to thank all of our instructors for the job they did in getting us ready, and i was concerned because the one before we started the shift i started in and kuz wasnt there, and when i went down this time, however, i found out that in his haste to get into Mission Control, the day of the Lunar Landing my lead trainer had rolled his car. He had fortunately, emerged unscathed and without a Second Thought about the car he continued to get a ride in here and reported to his console in Mission Control. Walking over to the press conference with doug, and doug and i talked about the fact that not only had we landed on the moon, but i almost felt cheated of the emotional content of that landing where everybody else was out celebrating and to this day i sit down there. In Mission Control you have to stay so intensely focussed that other than just a very brief cheer, sort of a hoop from the team at the time of landing and realizing how close this thing was, we immediately had to get back to work, and it was i would have liked to have found some way to get some of the feelings and the emotions of the other people. I know chris and dr. Gillrith were behind this, and it was just a it was a marvelous time, and it was a time of pride within the nation. It was a time of turning young people loose and giving them their head and seeing what they can do and for a very short period of time, i think we united not only our country, but the world, and its marvelous what could be done by such an event. I just wish we could recreate it and do it again today. Perhaps some time in the future, maybe on a mission to mars or something similar there might be such a moment again. Do you think that might happen . I sure hope that my children and the youth of america can find this this kind of a dream that we were driven by president kennedy because it was a dream we lived. We were so fortunate and proud to be americans and to be living and be challenged by such a magnificent set of galls. I dont think anyone ever considered themselves overworked or underpaid. The pay was the job that we were doing, and it was an unbelievable time and we were privileged and proud to be born and a part of that very violent decade, however. Youre watching a special edition of American History tv airing now during the week while members of congress are working in their district due to kfr pandemic. The last card inside george wishs decision to surge inside iraq. This will air tuesday night at 8 00 eastern. Center of president ial history at Southern Methodist university hosted the event. American history tv now and also watch over the weekend on cspan 3. Every saturday night American History tv takes you to College Classrooms around the country for lectures in history. Why do you all know who lizzy bord borden is and raise if you heard of this murder case . The true cause of the revolution was in this transformation that took place in the minds of the american people. Well talk about boston thes both of those sides of the story, right. The tools, techniques of slave owner power and also talk about the tools and techniques of power that were practiced by enslaved people. Watch history professors lead discussions with students on topics ranging from the American Revolution to september 11th. Lectures in history on cspan 3 every saturday at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on American History tv and lectures in history is available as a podcast. Find it where you listen to podcasts. Up next on American History tv, former nasa astronaut fred haise recounts his experience as the lunar module pilot on what was intended to be the third moon landing. An oxygen tank explosion two days in the flight of apollo 13 preventing the crew from completing the mission. He spoke about how the crew coped with a crippled spacecraft, limit the power and freezing temperatures and reduced oxygen. I enjoyed last night with the number of you, i know, who are in the audience, to actually watch the full hollywood movie. I cant hardly see out there but i assume a lot of people out there have seen this movie. And i was a little worried when they were going to make this. You worry about what hollywood may do. And they were there were some things i might have done different. They had some language that i would not have used. That wasnt ours. It gave it the pg13 rating. But the one thing that i thought carried very well in this movie, glenn howard did a good job, was to tell the basic story of people that were in trouble and we certainly were in tr