Transcripts For CSPAN3 U.S.-Iran Relations 20240713

An amazing crowd. We had to turn away a good 50 people or more. There is a briefing on u. S. And it is part of a National History center bringing historical perspectives to Current Issues that have confronted congress. It is a political position. It is nonpartisan. It is intended to inform policymakers in public about the sorts of finishes theyre dealing with. I want to give a few thanks to the melon foundation. I also want to thank our assistance jeffrey who is outside of this room for helping make the arrangements. I want to thank the off the of gerry connolly. I want to explain why there was index cards on your seats. We will get questions, answer questions, but we would like you to write those questions on the index cards. So keep them ready and jot down questions when they come to mind. Everyone out there that supports the National Historic center and thank you for coming to the event. We have to get you information about professional organizations like schaffer. Panel rooms are faculty like this every june when that meets. With this National Relationship as with history as a matter of one defines it. For some, we need to understand why Thomas Jefferson had booked about about the work and education and the Public Health they continue to do through the mid 20th century. Some would contend they were displaced by the third presence in iran, can and it came in the form of tens of thousands of troops. Others would point to dates like 1953 when they overflu a democraticly elected government at the height of the cold war. Still others are interested in the more contemporary past that started in 1979. The monarchy was replaced with the republic of iran. So we have the deep past, the cold war period, and the more contemporary era. It is an exciting time to be studying the relations and today we have a range of methodologies to help us understand the past. They have continued to unfold through the continued declassification of documents. Through the lens of race, culture, gender, and emotion to name a few. Others help drive it, they come from the iran and middle east studies. One could borrow from other disciplines besides history as well. Political science for instance always helping to move the relationship forward. We have two speakers today. Someone a professor in department of political science. Ly not read it to you here, you have plenty of information on the program, but many of us have probably read u. S. Foreign policy and the shaw. Our second presenter is the associate director of the middle east center at the university of pennsylvania. He also has a very long list of public indications in the comes months, in the coming year or so. When it is published. With that, i will turn the floor ov over. Thank you for inviting me here. I am talking about the revolution 40 years ago. The u. S. Has really shifted a lot and cycled back and forth through different approaches for iran to simplify things a little bit. I would say the policy has cycled through three main postures toward iran in the 40 year revolution. First a posture of engagement in which the u. S. Uses primarily third parties to reach a comprehensive setmentment. And also engagement usually is aimed at bringing about some kind of domestic change in iran, but certainly peacefully, mainly encouraging moderates. The model for engagement is say u. S. And china in the 1970s when the u. S. And china fwrent being extremely hostile toward each other toward a more cooperative relationship. Secondly, cosergs. Economic sanctions, various levels, iran backing down across the board, but really what the preference is using these hostile measures to carry out regime change in iran to try to bring down the islamic regime or to change it for substantially. Thirdly containment. There is possible containment toward iran where they limit irans objectionable behavior. Sometimes they have made limited transactional agreement thats are mutually beneficial, but contain suspect mainly aimed at contained iranian influence. Limiting its geographic spread. Throughout the cold war. So im going to very briefly stretch through, since the revolution, the early ones im going to skip through pretty quickly. You have written about johns forth coming book that will be very good. So ten periods in u. S. Policy toward iran. The u. S. Really bounced back and forth between different approaches. The Carter Administration before t the administration. Before then the Carter Administration made efforts to try to encourage moderates and try to, you know, swing the iranian revolution in a moderate direction. But the Carter Administration was consumed with trying to get the hostages released and iran was in the process of rapid radic radicalization and it was just made im possible to achieve change with iran. So the Carter Administration was a time of engagement and this was entirely frustrated by growing radicalization in iran. The second time period, you might think this was a period of hostility and coercion, but this was not a faze of coercion. I would score this as a faze phf containment toward iran. Especially lebanon in the early 1980s. They were backing groups that were precursors, and they did a lot of very nasty things. Killed sever they took about 15 american civilians. Some were tortured to death. There was a lot of severe hostility and attacks by iran. Despite that they were really restrained. So the early reagan period i would score as containment. And relatively effective in this regard. Iran became rapidly isolated. The second is the contra affair. 1985 and 1986, they tried to get hostages released. And it was aimed at trying to initiate talks with iran that would snowball to change and moderation on the part of the iranians. This of course didnt work. Radicals torpedoed this initiative. I would score them as an effort as engagement, but it, too, did not work, just like carters efforts. After iran contra, the last two years of the reagan administration, basically this was a period of reversion to containment. There was a lot of tension between the u. S. And iran in this period. And the last couple years, the iranianiraq war. Not really coercion, but far from engagement. So the first ten years cycling back and forth. Engage want and containment, nothing really working very well. The First Bush Administration coming into office in early 1989 at least initially gave a look of pursuing them with iran but it never really got anywhere. It was good will be gets good will. If iran shows good will to the u. S. And getting friends in lebanon to release the remaining american hostages, if they show good will, we will reciprocate. It took three years for them to be released and that changed things quite a bit. And secondly u. S. Priorities shifted rapidly after the desert storm war. The bush the First Bush Administration was very invested in that, pushed it very hard, iran was very p much an opponent, and that really soured the prospects for better relations. So i would score the First Bush Administration as a period of containment even though there was talk about engaging in pursuing engagement but that never really got off of the ground. The early clinton period continued this. They were pursuing many of the same goals as the Bush Administration in the u. S. Particularly the process. And also, in the early clinton years, iran was carrying out a lot of terrorist attacks assassinating iranian exiles and also a couple of argentina and elsewhere. Iran is really being schizophrenic. But on the other hand, carrying out very, very nasty attacks. All of this culminated in the bombing of 1996 backed by iran. Certainly not carried out by iran, in which 19 u. S. Air force personnel were killed in a very dramatic terrorist attack. There was suspicion immediately. But they didnt get concrete proof of this for quite some time. So the Clinton Administration chose to wait until they had strong evidence. By the time they had strong evidence things changed a lot. And the Clinton Administration never retaliated with military force. But they retaliated with a fascinating operation called operation sapphire. I guess the more important time peer today comes in may of 1997 yen he was elected, and he quickly started making overtures in the United States. And they realized there was an important change afoot here and started to reciprocate. Maybe in the beginning of 1998 the Clinton Administration was trying to strengthen, take advantage of the change that occurred in iran and see if they could make something of it. Nothing really came of it, certainly not in the remainder of the clinton term. The george w. Bush administration inherited this from clinton. In some ways conditions were even more fruitful having to do wa. Wendy what is going on internally in iran in 2001. The Bush Administration never really formulated their iran policy. But more soft line people wanting to continue obamas approach of endagment. But once they wanted to overthrow the taliban government and wipe out Training Camps there, and then iran was very helpful in setting up the new government and the Bush Administration certainly took advantage of this good will by iran, but did not reciprocate. Pretty quickly the Bush Administration started to reveal its new approach toward iran in general. It was a global war on tr terrorism. Iran was brought in, and iran as well. And so in early 2002 bush made a speech, i think it was a state of the union speech at that time qualitying iran an access of eefl. It was basically a period of coercion. Gradually tensions letted up. There ethnic forces, carrying out terrorist attacks in iran, and iran backing militias in iraq that carried out many many attacks in u. S. Forces. So you could say there was a low level secret war with hundreds killed on both sides. Fingerprints on the weapons, and hundreds of iranians killed and this is kind of murky. So certainly the last seven years or so were a period of cosergs. And the model for cosergs that is out there today. Finally that brings us to the Barack Obama Administration with the failure of the Bush Administration to achievement, obama came into office wanting to pursue a different approach and engagement. He made a series of speeches in his first year calling for better relations with iran and he tried very hard. So gradually they started to further ratchet up the sanctions, and iran really started to scream. The economy went into a tail spin. So in about 2013, the Obama Administration launched an initiative toward iran to negotiate, and john will be talking about that in a little bit, and that lead to the jcpoa, the obama people hoped this would lead further to a broader engagement effort, but nothing came of that. And he did agree to limit its future lar program and has been providing to that recently, but nothing came of it. So in this sense, obamas endagment was very much a failure. So that bricks us up to the Trump Administration. I would say that the Trump Administration as has not fully revealed their inattentions, but i would say it is not at all out of the question that President Trump might decide to do with iran what he has been doing with north korea, which has been pretty bizarre, but it is not at all out of the question. And he hinted about that, talked about that. It is really too early to say. So what conclusions can we draw from this cycling back and forth between three postures with iran. Iran just doesnt really respond either to, you know, friendship or hostility from the United States. Engagement, there has been four major efforts of engagement. None of them produce anything other than small agreements here and there. Mainly because forces are continuing to torpedo these efforts. So you know engagement has not really played it has not been successful so far and i think the prospects are limited. Secondly is coercion. It was the george w. Bush administration. This got nowhere. Hundreds of personnel killed with iranian fingerprints and not a stopping to Irans Nuclear program in that area. Coercion has also not worked in that past. This brings us to containment. I would say it has also not worked very well toward iran, maybe better to engagement and coercion. They have expands their presence in places like lebanon, iraq, syria. On the other hand, they are pretty isolated in the middle east. The only government friendly with iran is syria. They have a few friends here and there like hezbollah. And there is small specific transactional agreements reached in the various containment initiatives that we have seen most importantly the jcpoa of 20 15. I think containment is about the only thing to hope for for the for seeable future. And the fundamental problem remains internal political forces. Ov overwhemingly. The one ray of light, the one piece of good news that i can mention is that he is now 80 years old. He is ailing, he has prostate cancer. He lasted a long time, one of these days he will exit the scene maybe in five years or so that might possibly bring about change in iran they should be prepared for this possibility, but there is no possibility that they will be any better, so probably containment for the for seeable future. So that is probably the best we will see. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me, and thank you so them, it is an honor to be able to share the stage. Were excited to see so many people here. Can someone give jim a seat, she a former hostage in iran. Someone could give him a seat. I think that is important. I will try to be as brief as i can. Mark saying im going to great the Nuclear Issue. I am happy to talk this through in the q and a. But it will be my as a historian, i have been working on this book now, and when you tell people what youre working on, i remember a few years ago when the jcpoa was being negotiated, what do you think of the nuclear deal, is it good or bad . And i would surprise people saying it is a good deal. Anyone that hooks losely would say that but i think it is irrelevant. But it is an entire Nuclear Crisis that is largely a distraction and it is difficult to engage with in isolation from the larger issue of the u. S. And iran ri laces. Im not sure if i entirely agree with that and i think you understand that if you look at the iranian Nuclear Program. Im hoping that i can make that argument here. But in the chance of an constructive diplomacy, there is not much point in talking about isotopes and fuel rods and enrichment and centrifuges. And i think it is a larger atmosphere than was constructed. That nuclear deal was negotiated at a great, great time and energy. And in the end, it all kind of disappeared in a different political climate. So i think thats what we really have to address and mark, of course, has laid out very nicely some of the broader outlines of this political climate, but im going to talk about the history in about ten minutes and hopefully get us up to the current moment were in so we can understand better why it is that maybe this isnt quite as important as we think it is. The takeaway message i have today is its not really about the Nuclear Program, all right . Its not really about that. So as an historian, lets start at the beginning. Im curious by a show of hands how many people actually know when or well, when the iranian Nuclear Program actually began. Raise your hand if you know. Not the panelists. Okay, one john lindbergh, basically. Present at the creation. It actually begins in 1957, 58 and begins with cooperation, actually very vigorous cooperation from the United States. It is the Eisenhower Administration that had its flagship adams for peace program. This is an attempt after some horrors of hiroshima, nagasaki, to prove that Nuclear Power could be used for peaceful purpose, atoms for peace program. To help them develop peaceful, Nuclear Energy for their civilian purposes. So the United States gave iran its first many of you may not know this. The United States gave iran its first batch of enrichedure anian in 1958. Under the johnson administration, helped to build its Tehran Research reactor. This was, you know, isotopes for medical purposes. And this continued throughout the late 60s and 70s. It wasnt just democrats, its important to note. Some of the most vigorous advocates of iranian Nuclear Program in the 1970s were people like henry kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld and dick cheney in the Ford Administration in the mid 1970s. Look at some of the documents, youll see how vigorous they pushed this. They felt it was important for iran. You often hear the talking points from opponents, vigorous opponents of iran. Why does iran need Nuclear Power . No one can take seriously the idea they would need Nuclear Power, theyre such an oilrich nation, right . The United States actually felt that iran needed Nuclear Power and the basic reason for this i dont want to get into too many details about this, but if you have oil it doesnt make sense to build complicated refineries to then use that oil to for domestic power purposes. Its kind of a waste of time and money. If you have huge amounts of oil youre much better selling it on the international market, using that money to develop a domestic and much more Sustainable Nuclear much more Sustainable Energy program that will last for many years after the energy has run out. The u. S. Government funded studies in many cases in the 1970s, stanford and so on. That was the case they made. U. S. Government funded studies continued to make that case. That basic equation hasnt changed for iran. The fact that its an oilrich country doesnt mean it doesnt need Nuclear Power. There is and always has been a genuine need for Nuclear Power. As you know, Nuclear Technology is a dualuse technology. It can be used for medical research, radio isotopes, Energy Production but also building a Nuclear Weapon. Thats where the concern comes from for iran. In the 1970s this is not much of a concern. Henry kissinger said in an interview about ten years ago, i dont believe the idea of proliferation actually came up. We trusted the shah this close american ally enough that we believed whatever he said when it came to Nuclear Program. That doesnt mean we gave him cart blanch and, obviously, there were limits. But there wasnt this same atmosphere of distrusts that exists today. 1979 revolution breaks out, of course, and Irans Nuclear program is completely abandoned, not this is very important to point out. Not because the United States put this huge amount of pressure on iran to abandon its Nuclear Program, but because iran chose to ban done its Nuclear Program after 1979. Ayatollah khomeini felt it was another example of the shahs excessive fascination of shiny western objects and western technology and things that were not islamic, that were not authentic to an Islamic Republic and it should be abandoned. And this is not just the idea of Nuclear Weapons. This was a Nuclear Program completely. Ayatollah said again and again weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and biological, were a sin against islam and cited texts against these kinds of weapons of mass destruction but said even the Peaceful Nuclear Research Going on, Energy Production, all of that was kind of the newfangled western technology that iran could do without. And he mothballed the entire program. When khomeini died in 1989, a new somewhat more Pragmatic Group of people came to power, and felt that iran could not be quite so complacent about either its energy needs, its medical needs, but also its security needs. The feeling was, okay, its unislamic to build a bomb but is it unislamic to do some research, build centrifuges . Theres nothing in the koran against that. There was also concern about Saddam Hussein. Thats whats also missed about conversations in the u. S. What can the u. S. Do, carrot, sticks, levers, et cetera, to get iran to do what we want. We often forget that iran, despite all the rhetoric and the heated nature of u. S. iran relations, iran is often less concerned with what the u. S. Is saying or doing, than what it is with what its immediate neighbors are doing. Lets not forget the 1990s, western intelligence, Global Intelligence was very convinced that Saddam Hussein was pursuing weapons of mass destruction, right . You all know about that. It led up to the 2003 war t wasnt just the u. S. Who was concerned about that. Who would be more concerned about that than iraqs neighbor that, by the way, had just fought a devastating eightyear war with Saddam Hussein . No one was more concerned about saddams ambitions of wmd than iran was. After khomeini had died, do we continue to maintain the strict islamic stricture against research and development of a Nuclear Program or do we say, okay, look, were not going to build a bomb but get as close as we can to that, build the technology that might make Saddam Hussein think twice before developing a Nuclear Weapon or unleashing it against us. That was the calculation that they made. Irans Nuclear Program in the 1990s, therefore, was brought out of the moth balls and reinvigorated but it was largely rudimentary. In the 1990s, its something thats tha to this day has been uninclusive, to what degree was it r d and first generation centrifuges and to what extent was it something more than that . Its an open question. But one of the most interesting things about what happened in the 1990s, right, is how was iran going to build a Nuclear Program . It was easy in the 70s. Picked up the phone to washington and you got the help you needed. How was iran going to do that in the 1990s . In the 80s it abandoned its program, in the 90s, they reinvigorated it. I hate to be the boring historian but you have to look at nonproliferation. The whole issue that we sort of danced around and havent actually got to yet in terms of the legal infrastructure behind this was the 1968 nonproliferation treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty. Very briefly for those who are not familiar with the mpt, again, it was sort of the cold war. It was at the part of this Global Initiative to try to avoid nuclear catastrophe, right . The idea behind the mpt was to get as many countries as possible to sign it. There were three there are and were three basic principles behind the mpt, right . Disarmament, nonproliferation and cooperation. The basic of the mpt, five countries in 1968 that have Nuclear Weapons, United States, recei soviet union, great britain, france and china. The idea is that you dont want any more countries to get Nuclear Weapons, so there are three basic principles beyond the mpt. The five countries that have weapons agree to a gradual process of disarmament, reducing their stockpiles. Thats still ongoing and in fits and starts and has not been fully accomplished, right . Nonproliferation. The countries that dont have the bomb will promise not to have it. Right . Well, if youre a country that doesnt have Nuclear Weapons in the late 1960s, how are you going to respond to that . That doesnt seem very fair. Thats where the third principle comes in, the cooperation. This is basically the Nuclear Haves saying to the havenots look, youre going to stay havenots but well cooperate with you, give you all the help you need to build a peaceful, civilian Nuclear Program so youre not being held back scientifically or in any other way, right . Those are the three basic principles of the mpt. If youre astute, youll immediately realize the key is it only works if everyone signs up to it, right . If youre a country if your neighbor has not signed up to the mpt, why would you, right . Let them go ahead and build a bomb while you dont, right . From the very beginning, getting countries to sign up was the most important part of it. A lot of countries that didnt have Nuclear Weapons were very resistant to it. Not so much the small countries, right . Not the countries like you know, its interesting. There was an interview a few years ago with the shahs nuclear chief and he said, you know, we never should have signed it. We never should have signed it. Iran was one of the very first signatories of the mpt. It signed it the first day it was open for signatures. None of the major countries signed it. Countries that mostly signed it were like fiji, nicaragua, that were never going to build the bomb. Argentina, so on, midrange countries, they stayed out. They said no, were going to develop the technology, then well sign the mpt, right . Thats exactly what they did. By the late 1990s, pretty much every country in the world had signed the mpt. A couple of dozens of them had only done it after they first developed the technology, right . But iran didnt do that. So by the late 1990s, you have only four countries three countries, excuse me, still refusing to sign the mpt, india, pakistan and israel. All three of those countries, inltdly, had refused to join the mpt, not just so they could develop the technology but build actual bombs. India, pakistan got Nuclear Weapon in 1998. Israel has been vague about this, but some time in the 60s, 70s and has 200 nuclear warheads, right . We are running out of time. But this was the situation that iran found itself in the 1990s. We want to restart the program but how are we going to do that . Members of the mpt, so cooperation is part of that, right . Guess what, they werent able to get much cooperation. No big surprise there, right . Every time they went out and tried to buy fuel, uranium, what have you, from argentina, china, russia, they put a huge amount of pressure not to cooperate with iran. They said this was a violation of the mpt and so on. No one listened to them. What are they going to do . Well, they started to have to go to more elicit channels to be able to get what they felt was their rights under the mpt, the rights to civilian Nuclear Energy. If youre iran in the 1990s and you start going to more elicit, secretive channels to build your Nuclear Program . Of course, it will immediately increase the suspicion of the United States and others of what youre actually doing. Within the mpt, everything works great, you get the cooperation you want. One of the key provisions is that you get inspections all the time from the iaea. If they think youre doing anything suspicious, that cooperation ends, right . So thats sort of where this dispute began in the 1990s t became almost a self fulfilling prophecy, right . Fast forward, and i guess we are out of time. Maybe ill stop. But thats sort of where we ended up in the nearly 2000s where this dispute really kind of became much more front page news. I want to leave lots of time for q a. I was going to talk more about the early 2000s and how we got here but thats the deep history of the iranian Nuclear Program. You dont have to sympathize with the iranians, be a big fan of their government but you should probably understand historically how we got here. Its not, perhaps, as simple as some of the headlines often suggest. Thank you very much. [ applause ] all right. At this point, if you want to just take one minute and write down a question on the card that was on your seat when you sat down, we can then proceed to collect them and ill ask some questions that appear on those cards. If your question doesnt get asked, you can always stay after and we can talk a little bit. But i actually have one question that i would like to ask while you all consider your questions. So, if you could, kind of keep the room quiet. My question is this. Its one question directed toward both of our panelists, and it deals with the joint comprehensive plan of action, jcpoa, iran nuclear deal. My question is this. John, you made the statement that without trust theres no reason to talk about centrifuges and aspects of Nuclear Technology. My question is this. Does Irans Nuclear program, which as you demonstrate, has been around for many decades, does it provide a vehicle for the United States and iran to have discussions . Is it a vehicle for engagement and an issue that can be discussed in ways that perhaps domestic issues and iran or kind of regional proxies cannot . And then my question would be to mark, how you respond to this question. Is the Nuclear Issue a genuine path to engagement that provides each sides with acceptable risks and necessary leverage to reach some broader or are there inequities as john makes clear in the International System or asymmetries in domestic policies that makes such efforts difficult to pursue . So is the jcpoa as a nuclear deal legitimate path to engagement or does it actually obstruct the type of dialogue we might want to see down the road between the two countries . I can answer this very briefly. That was exactly obamas philosophy. I think obama came to power genuinely believing that he wanted a much more broad relationship with iran, that he wanted to rewrite the map of u. S. Alliances in the middle east. I dont think he initially was that interested in the Nuclear Issue, but because that was the hot issue of the day, he saw it as a way in to a broader conversation with iran, but immediately saw, and we all saw in the first obama term how quickly that became, that fell, by focusing only on the Nuclear Issue, that allowed those who are opposed to the idea of closer u. S. iran relations, particular in those days israel, to basically make a lot of noise around the Nuclear Issue and to sort of, i guess, encourage ways for the u. S. To get more and more bogged down in some of the nuclear, specifics of the nuclear negotiations. So, we saw how that went. Eventually obama got his nuclear deal, but in a way, opponents of the u. S. Relation ran out the clock on him. He got it about a year to the end of his second term and there wasnt much energy or time left for serious u. S. iran. I agree entirely with what john just said. Also on the iranian side there was no appetite for following up on the jcpoa in these past four years and now, of course, with whats been happening the last year or so in u. S. iran relations, the water is much, much muddier than it was even back then. Im not at all optimistic. We have Great Questions coming in. Please keep them coming. One question deals with the united kingdom, its position in the middle east, and i think the core of this question speaks to the nature of american allies. Are there historical insights that we can gain that can help us understand how the United States could manage its allies, allies it might not have the same interests as United States, visavis iran, but nonetheless allies that the United States deals with . How do they figure into the u. S. iran relationship historically or today . Thats a big question. Yeah. Ill take a quick crack at that. I dont think that u. S. Allies have really been important players toward iran in these kinds of big diplomatic issues for 60 years or so, since the british bowed out in the early 50s. Europeans, both individual countries and collectively as the eu have engaged in negotiation with iran, pursuing a different path with iran today. But its not really amounting to an awful lot. I dont see them being able to make some kind of an agreement with iran that will be very fruitful without the United States. I dont think they have the desire to, and im not sure that they have the power capabilities to do so. I think this is really an american show. I would just say it depends on which allies youre talking about. Its a big and complex question. Since the uk was brought up, i will say this. For at least 15 years now ive been saying despite all the sort of chicken little rhetoric out there that ive never felt there was much likelihood of a u. S. War with iran, and i actually still dont. I have to say for the first time im genuinely a little concerned about a british war with iran for a number of reasons. It was very obvious with that ship taken in gibraltar. They said this is not in violation of eu sanctions, its a violation of u. S. Sanctions and british took the bait and impounded the ship i do worry now with Boris Johnson in power with brexit looming, the uk much more isolated than it has been, needing allies. The u. S. Is an obvious ally. I think you can expect the uk to draw much closer to the u. S. Position and i can see that, you know, Boris Johnson is clearly motivated by instincts and sees himself as that sort of leader. What better than to unify the country as sort of a bit of a bringing out the gun boats potentially, or in churchills phrase, splatter of musketry. Thats what i worry about, the general brexit atmosphere. From allies to advisers. One question reads how do you feel about john boltons influence on the Trump Administration and, in parenthesis, other advisers. President s and their advisers, were starting to read not just about National Security advisers but iran Desk Officers and iran point persons on the National Security council in a way that midlevel folks in midlevel bureaucracy can influence policy. Is there anything you all could tell us about the relationship between president s and their advisers in the formulation of iran policy you could address bolton and pompeo today or perhaps historical moment that speaks to this question . Okay. I mean, yes. I could say a lot of things. I mean, going back, i think mark and i both spent a lot of time looking at sort of midlevel advisers. I think that dennis roths role is an important one. Ill answer the pompeo question. I actually think that despite the socalled war mongering instincts of someone like bolton, the goal is not war and it is not a war to bring about regime change. Pure speculation, and im an historian that probably shouldnt be wading into these waters but i think they actually genuinely believe if they put enough pressure on iran that iran will somehow come to the negotiating table. I actually believe their goal is to talk to iran and negotiate a much more comprehensive, broader deal with iran than obama did, so we could say, see, we did a better deal with iran. I like the Bolton Pompeo approach. I like that they are looking at a much broader range of issues. However i think where theyre going to find themselves disappointed is that they actually believe somehow iran is going to capitulate on every single issue in the way they presented it and thus give the u. S. This kind of sweeping victory like the u. S. Had over the cold war, the cold war and so on. Its not going to happen. And i think thats, you know, what were going to find out. Close to four decades prior to the revolution to perform in early 60s, and Chris Kennedy is very important in the words that have kennedy says are important, but people like robert comer figures kind of 1961 and 62 that are driving the policy conversation about iran before the issue really reaches the desk of the president for executive action or the drafting of a new National Security memorandum. This question, i think, we can see parallels in the past with the present situation. Im reminded of the the key moment for me is the 2003 socalled grand bargain shot down by cheney and rumsfeld and made sure it never reached the president s desk. A lot of people disagree about what exactly was involved, but iran supposedly sent this document proposing a sweeping negotiation of a broader range of issues with the United States and the Cheney Rumsfeld sort of response. Colin powell was hoping that people that it would get a serious hearing, instead of the response was sort of we dont talk to evil. Why iran would or would not enter into negotiations with the United States, the important context for this is kind of irans rights within the International System and kind of under the mpt regime. This often gets lost and kind of conversations that happen very quickly and are often covered in brief news stories, but what rights does iran have within the International System, within the context of International Law as they are dealing with the rest of the world . What recourse does iran have in these dealings . They certainly have a right to develop a civilian Nuclear Program and a right to free trade and things of that sort. The Trump Administration doesnt really seem to care much at all about that, but nor have previous administrations cared very much. I think this is much more about exercising power. I think the key issue is whether irans economy will withstand the sanctions or not, and the jury is still out on that. But well know within a year or so, year from now irans economy may be screaming and that may be triggering domestic unrest in iran. Its hard to say. Thats the key instrument that the u. S. Is whooelding these days, are the sanctions. The key part of that is, number one, whether the europeans will go along with or work cross purposes to the u. S. Sanctions and then secondly whether other players, especially china, but also russians and maybe some of the other east asians, whether they will sort of, you know, violate the sanctions or spirit of the u. S. Sanctions. I think thats the key set of issues, how will the economics of this play out . Its too early to say. Rights . Who cares about rights anymore . Not the Trump Administration. Thats for sure. Well, with how about the history that, mark, you discussed succinctly, taking us through ten stages . We have a question about the iran iraq war and its impact on u. S. iran relations. And you made a comment that some of the developments of the 80s we were, you know, ancient history or it was in the past. How do we make sense of an event like the iran iraq war that has such a Lasting Impact on iranians, nation of iran, everything it experienced in that war . How do we consider these historical hangups between the United States and iran or major conflicts that result in death, loss of life, transformation of society . How do they affect conversations today, or do they . Theres probably not a familiar in iran that didnt lose somebody or have somebody wounded. So many people in iran cough from poison gas or have limbs amputated or loved ones lost. It remains still a big factor inside iran. Iran iraq war. Above all, the impact of the iran iraq war is to make iranians very careful about their security, as john was mentioning, this is a major i impetus for iran reviving its Nuclear Program in the 1990s, eventually maybe a Nuclear Weapon we can use to deter an iraqi attack. Of course, theres a friendly regime in power that, we put in power in baghdad, which iran is pretty happy with. But the iranians are still very concerned about their military security. Of course, we shouldnt forget that the u. S. Participated in the iran iraq war in some ways, particularly enabled clashes in the gulf in the last year or two of the war. So, iranians look at iran iraq war as also a reason to fear American Power and theyve taken all kinds of measures to prepare themselves to retaliate against the United States, and theyll use them. So it certainly did have a big impact, as much as world war ii did on the United States, i would say. The other really critical aspect of that, when you think about the Nuclear Program, actually, another point thats often lost in the debate in the u. S. , whether you choose to believe iran or not, when it says its not interested in a nuclear bomb, there is something you need to take into consideration, iran is a victim of very significant attacks during the iran iraq war. That has shaped the mentality of the country much more than we appreciate. This was the first major use of chemical weapons, warfare since the first world war. You still have iran iraq war veterans walking around, feeling the physical effects of this. Perhaps no country other than, perhaps, japan, more sensitive to the issue and to the danger and the hardship and the suffering brought about by weapons of mass destruction. This often plays into the discussion in iran about the Nuclear Program, much more than i think we appreciate. In addition to the religious concerns about weapons of mass destruction, you know, iran has felt firsthand the consequences of weapons of mass destruction. And it would be very difficult for any iranian government to seriously gain major public support for the idea of building, let alone using a Nuclear Weapon. I couple of other questions came in after i asked the last one, that demonstrated we had good history students in the room. Questions about the shootdown of the iranian plane in the 1980s and even a question that goes back to the coup of 1953. I just wanted to acknowledge those questions that are asking for the deep historical context. Ill ask one more before we break for the day. I guess this is directed toward professor gaskarowski but could be fielded by nef any of us. Have all three strategic approaches failed because the United States switched between them so much . Could the United States build trust and succeed with engagement, containment or the other if the u. S. Proved to be consistent, trustworthy, pick an approach and stick with it . Is it a question of strategic flaws or is it a question of strategic consistency . This is a good point. I still think that the most important set of obstacles is the nature of iranian domestic politics, who is in power today. Theres a lot of deep hostility toward the United States among irans leaders. Not so much among the iranian people. But this is a good point. The inconsistency, shifting back and forth. Most dramatically, the Trump Administration abandoning not just the jcpoa but the whole engagement approach of the Obama Administration, and that severely, severely undermines trust. How severely, how adversary that would affect prospects in the coming years, hard to say. Ive been surprised to see iran actually, you know, make some noise about wanting to have some discussions about the United States or renegotiate the jcpoa in the last few weeks or so. I think theyre probably a little more pragmatic than i usually figure them to be. Of course, these are just words. You cant really tell how serious they are about it. But this is a real big problem. Hoping that their economy can hold out until President Trump loses the election in 2020. Democrats seem pretty much on board to going back to the obama approach. Beyond that, who knows . Dictatorship hasnt really changed much. Downside to democracy, i suppose. Its an extremely astute question. I agree with most of what mark says. I would actually also point out its not its true that the changes in u. S. Administration are relevant, but sometimes its even with the course of a single administration, there are changes and that is significant. You mentioned the bush sr. , the goodwi goodwill. This is not to blame the United States for this. A vow on marble steps, something along those lines. Someone can fact check the exact quote. Well keep our promise if you can get the hostages free. The cold war, the calculus changed but fundamentally, they did bend over backwards to get the hostages freed in lebanon. They dont always have a Straight Line to hezbollah. They went to lebanon and convinced them to release the hostages and they didnt get rewarded for that. Even when obama came and made these lovely speeches and televised appearances, unclenched fists, they thought can we really trust them . They had seen nice words before. To them, that was a reference to 1989. Weve heard that before, but what about action . We want to see action. They didnt see that over the next few years. And even when it came to the final, final stage of jcpoa negotiations, the Supreme Leader was skeptical but said, you know, lets try this. Heroic, lets kind of have heroic flexibility and so on. But he kind of said, im not sure this is going to work out. Most of the hardliners felt youre going to see. You cant really trust america. And its unfortunate, you know, that and i dont think that thats just the change of administration thats proven that point of view. Its made it easy for hardliners in iran to say see, you cant trust america. You dont have to agree with or love the iranian Islamic Republic to see from their perspective often negotiations and engagement have turned into a game of ropeadope. Sure, you know, well but actually theyre just seen as yet another way for the u. S. To try to get us to do what they want. A iranians have often said well talk, negotiate, engage, but not if youre just trying to use negotiations as yet another tool to win a victory or to kind of try to dismantle the Islamic Republic or to bring about regime change through the backdoor. And to be honest, unfortunately, thats a lot of what theyve seen. So, you know, thats where i part a little bit with mark. Its not always about changes in administration but its about a fundamental mentality we have in this country, that the goal should be to bring about the complete surrender and capitulation of the Islamic Republic. Im not sure thats a useful goal for us. It may or may not happen. If it does, its not going to be because of anything the u. S. Has or has hasnt done, to be honest. Thank you all for the questions and for the discussion. [ applause ] we can stay and have discussions with anyone who would like to have them. American history tv programs as a preview of whats available on cspan3. Smithsonian associates with kermit roosevelt, law professor and great great grandson of theodore roosevelt. His talk is titled the constitution and declaration of independence a contrary view on how failures and reinvention of a country have led to our modern core values American History tv this weekend, every weekend on cspan3. 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