Symposium. Okay. Im very pleased to introduce our last speaker for the afternoon. Jeffrey william hunt is the director of the texas museum in mayberry and adjunct professor at Austin Community college where hes taught since 19 8, got bless you. Mr. Hunt is an author of the last battle of the civil war and a contributor to the central war. American civil war. His last work is from the final stage of the Gettysburg Campaign to 1863 and the final volume is due for publication coming out next year. So lets give a welcome for jeffrey hunt. [ applause ] thank you. Its a real pleasure. I appreciate jerrys invitation. Its always fun to stand before a group of people who have the same passion as you do. You dont get looked at as strangely when you talk to other people, and im going to break precedent apparently today and have a powerpoint demonstration. And im doing that for several reasons. Jerry did it last night. I dont want him to feel all weird doing that alone. Second, pamplin spent a lot of money to put it in. One thing, i guarantee you will not have to get a new puppy at the end of my presentation. So i came to become interested in this story about what happens in the Virginia Theater after the battle at gettysburg and before the battle of the wilderness. Before a conversation i had with one of my favorite mentors, dr. George forgi, he taught a class that i took. We knew each other very well. We were always falling into conversations about the war and issues and one day we were talking about the battle of gettysburg. And the opening of the overlaying campaign. You can find a paragraph here and there or a page here and there, and it will get mentioned in a biography for a few pages or regimental history here and there. There was nothing that i was forced to go to the official records and started reading and ultimately newspapers and going through the archives to find the answers that i wanted. What i discovered is contrary to the way history is treated the second half of 1863 in virginia, which is to say nothing of importance happened, they maneuvered around each other, there were a few small battles, but there was essentially a stalemate. Nothing happens and you get the overlaying campaign. Hit the fast forward button from middle july until early may of 1864. If you Pay Attention to anything thats going on during that period of war, youre going to Pay Attention to chattanooga and chickamauga out west. Thats where the smoke and the dra drama are, and thats the easiest way to sell books. When i look at the period and the men who served in the army of Northern Virginia and the letters they wrote, the regimental histories, that sort of thing, lo and behold a lot of things happened. This is not a quiet period. It has enormous consequences for whats going to happen in 1864. It really sets the stage for the 1864 campaigns. Its also importantrich. If you read about the first few days in july and the great victories at gettysburg and vicksburg and hudson, there are a lot of people who feel like this is it, its over, you just have to push harder, both on the confederate side of the line. You hear its a tottering cause, you know. This is almost over and you fast forward a year and you get to the summer of 1864, and the north seems to be facing its darkest hour. The horrific casualties still made in front of atlanta, vicksburg, early on the outskirts of washington, and the confederates have a reasonable hope if they hold out, lincoln is going to go down in the defeat of the election and mcclellan will win and hell make it impossible for the north. Whether thats right or not, thats what the southerners believe. How do you get from early july when the north was inevitably going to to end a year later when the north is on the verge of going down on the defeat and the south is on the verge of establishing the independence. There has to be something that bridges the period and theres the sixth month between lees retreat across the powe powe mick and the end of the campaign of 1863. It also marks the only interval in which george meade is in solitaire command of the army of the potomac. We know once grant shows up, hes looking over meades sho d shoulder and treating them as a second in command. So if you want to try to get a handle on how good george meade was, this is the place to look, at least if youre evaluating him as an army commander. And so the story begins where most people end the gettysburg stoor. That is lee retreats across the potomac july 4 of 1863. Thats where most books about the Gettysburg Campaign comes away. Lincolns furious, hall is furious, the great chance to turn it into a warwinning victory has been lost. If you look, theres something very interesting. They dont conclude until the first day of august, 1863. They end the gettysburg story two weeks later. Thats because it didnt end on the banks of the potomac. And it doesnt end in july. Theres a lot of operations following lees retreat across the potomac. Although thats not the focus, its important to understand how we get from here to the run at the end of november. So from meade today, youre not going to get one small battle but a fistful that has a cumulative effect of how the war unfolded in 1864. Lee crosses the potomac. He rests his army to see what meade is going to do. What meade would really like do is follow George Mclellands example and recover from the gettysburg. He believes he should leave the army alone until he can replace the losses, get ourselves reorganized, and we have a reasonable chance of going out and fighting another battle and winning another victory. Although general meade knows thats not in the cards. One, after he attacks, hes in trouble with the administration and lincoln has expressed his dissatisfaction and stuck in meades craw. He got the army three days before the battle. He wanted the decline the command, he couldnt decline the command. Hes fighting the battle. He believe hes done everything hes being asked to do and now the president is being did satisfied. As far as meade is concerned, thats a sin s cincher. You cant replace him two weeks after the triumph p. So he very quickly changes his dissatisfaction to disappointment. He said no censure was appointed and were not leaving you. Your job is to follow the federal army wherever its gone. He crosses the potomac where he does. Thats a very good strategic move. It puts him on the strategic flank of lee and if lee plays his cards right. He might trap lee in the Shenandoah Valley and perhaps create the opportunity to do it on the south banks of the potomac what he had just missed a chance to do on the north bank of the potomac river. What we get is a week and a half long chess match, a game of cat and mouse between lee in the shenandoah, meade in the loud n loudoun, and the shenandoah river. It means moving dow the loudoun. He thinks he has to get back to Culpeper County, richmond area. Lee begins to move and just at the moment when meade pushes things, there might be a great opportunity. He halts his infantry. The reason hes halted his infantry is hes read in Southern Newspapers meade has been reinforced which after the losses would make sense to do if he had anything to reinforce it with, which he doesnt. Lee had hung around in the lower valley. Instead of rapidly retreating south and getting across the mountains. So meade is trying to understand why lee stayed where he schl now it all makes sense. Hes going to go back over to the offensive. This is the moral dominance that robert e. Lee has over the minds of the generals that after gettysburg he might resume the offensive, recross the potomac, cut it off from washington, d. C. , and then, of course, disaster will ensue, and although meade is not 100 certain this is going to happen, when part of his army lunges toward the army that crossed the potomac, yes, that seems to be a real possibility. When he figures out whats going on 35 hours later, its too late. Meade has already missed his chance. You dont give robert e. Lee 35 hours. Knows what to do with 35 hours. He begins to cross the river and the mountain at chester and manassas. Lee is sending most of his army through chesters gap. At the same time his army is going through chesters gap, meade belatedly is trying to shove his forces through maness sass g manassas gap. Though he knows hes going through, he believes the corps. Are still in the battle. If he can fight his way through the manassas gap, he can fight twothirds. Meades intelligence is all messed up. Its actually hill and longstreet that are going through chesters gap. Meade tries to shut it off by sending the third core backed up by the fifth core and second cord through the manassas gap of 1963. This leads to the first importance of the small battles and thats the battle when wrights brigade holds back a federal corps. Theyre held by the rugged terrain and general french, who well talk about more in a little bit, is very cautious. He doesnt like coming into this Mountain Pass with great big mountains looming up. Hes seen too many of those old 1950s westerns when the indians show up on the horizon when he goes to the box canyon. Hes really afraid of an ambush. Every little trail coming down from the mountains has to be defended. He really doesnt want to move until the fifth corps gets behind him. He takes most of the day. At the end of the action the excelsior brigade comes forward. They manage to push the confederates off the high ground. Its taken so long the rest of the corps has shown up to block the exit of the manassas gap. Meade believing he still has the opportunity, 35,000 troops on the manassas gap on july 23rd, the next morning he promises halak hes going to destroy it. You want the disease uive victory, heres going to be a decisive victory. Yule having kun what he need dodd, the rebels are gone. Whats worse, the army is almost out of supplies and so he has to pivot to the east and hurry toward warrington where he can connect with the Alexander Railroad and buy the supply dumps around washington, d. C. Lee at the same time has headed to the southeast and reoccupied a position in the culpeper v, and this is the v made by the upper rappahannock which closed the northwest to seevgs and the rap a dan river which basically flows west to east and the two converge at the southeast corner of culpeper where it goes down to fredericksburg and chesapeake bay. Lee is resting his army here, but hes not certain this is where hes going say. The v at the rivers is a problematic riddle for both sides. Its a good place to tack into but a horrible place to defend. The reasons for that are fairly straightforward. First theres no real good defensive terrain in culpeper. Its beautiful countryside and its usually militarily worthless. Its pretty, its open, slightly open. Theres no real anchor for a defensive position. Mo moreover, this is a narrow county. If you follow the line from rappahannock station where it enters Culpeper County, take it to the courthouse where tit turs south, thats only 23 miles. As you go east, its much, much more narrow. If the army fights a battle in the culpeper v and it gets beaten, it gets crossed against the rapadan river. That can change in the blink of an eye. The name rapadan comes from the fact that the river can rapidly expand. The ford is a funnel that can slow down the movement of the army. Get forced against a river in retreat, its a recipe for disaster. Moreover, the curious thing about Culpeper County, the land inside the county is lower than the land to the south behind the ra rapadan and the north behind the rappahannock. What that means is if you get in control of the fords, you can get attacking columns and strike with verilile warning. So if lee loses control of the forts, hes blinded to what the army of the potomac is going to do. Burnside had done exactly that to him. He had seized the forts, used the high ground and rapidly sidled to the southeast to get there. He could be across the river before lee could react. Lee, of course remembers all that. Culpeper offers no field for battle, and hes lingering here for a while, but hes probably going to go back across the r rapadan. Lees army is very beaten up and hes unlikely to make a stand. Now, the one thing that meade doesnt know is if meade backing up is the result of his army being weak or the result of lees strategy. Well get to that in a moment. But for meade, one of the most important things hes got to do when he tries to cross the rappahannock is control the station where it crosses the county across a 500footlong railroad bridge. That is it crossed into rappahannock county. Hes got have that bridge rebuilt. And until he seizes the south bank of the Rappahannock River, he cant rebuild the bridge. So meade is preparing to launch this push. He sends word to washington, d. C. , still following my orders from two weeks ago, pursue the rebel army and cut it up wherever its gone. But when i cross the rappahannock, if lee doesnt retreat, theres going to be a big battle, and i sure would like to be reinforced before i fight the big battle. Neither one of these armies has begun to recover. At that point the rug is pulled out from under meade so to speak. Halak passes his message on to lincoln and he says, wait a minute, im not telling you to cross the Rappahannock River and go fight the confederates, thats okay, but dont you dare do it and say i told you to do it. Lee has his back against the potomac. How in the world is it going to be safe to attack in Culpeper County. Lincoln is being realistic here. Lee has the ability to maneuver again, and so dont push a battle if the odds are in your favor. Theres Something Else to remember. There are congressional elections. If they say we fought that battle because lincoln pushed us to fight it before we were ready to fight it, thats very handy ammunition to give to the Democratic Party during a critical electoral cycle, and so lincoln tells halak and meade, if you guys want to go fight, go fight, but dont do it because im telling you to. Now meade is in a little bit of a quandary. Technically the pressure has been lifted off of him burke he knows the government would like him to go out and destroy the army of virginia, so he intends to go ahead and cross the rappahannock. But as hes about to follow those orders, halak sends him a message. He says, were going to take troops away from you to enforce the draft. Remember the new york draft riots on july 13th. Theres been draft resistance in other places. Led the administration to suspend the draft and thats a bad thing because the north is in serious manpower trouble. Theyre used to the confederates having manpower issues. The north has dried up. Conscription is extremely unpopular, its unwieldy. The first batches of recruits its creating are desserting in droves. Youve got the bally jumper who gets the instructions to enlist, decemb deserts, comes back. Some are discharged for physical disability and reenlist to make some money some of theyre worthless to the army and meade believes this whole drafting this is a disaster and theres no way the draft is going to give him the kinds of soldiers that he needs or the numbers of soldiers that he needs. And so that said, the draft is the only way youre going to strengthen the union army. The administration is certain the only way to resume the draft is to do it at that point. Ultimately they have to take almost 6,000 troops from meades army and send them north to enforce the draft. At the same time, theyre going to take the First Division of the 11th course and send it to reinforce the effort against charleston, not because the effort against charleston needs to be reinforced, but because its in very ill repute after the debacle. Its First Division in particular is seen to be a problem child. Theyre talking about breaking the 11th corps up and being done with it. They dont go that far, but they take a good chunk of it and send it as far away from virginia as they can conveniently get it. And for me, that means that hes got manpower problems. Those manpower problems are going to be foremost in his mind for the rest of the year. He also has orders, dont advance, no battle, dont do anything rash, but keep up a threatening attitude. Look scary, but dont do anything, right . So meade says, all right, well, seizes the bridge over the rappahannock is the scariest way i know, so he crosses the rappahannock and that leads to a battle that were going to see, and that battle is bufords cavalry division, crosses the potomac, drives all the way toward Culpeper Courthouse, pushing hamptons brigade under lawrence baker, almost back to that railroad junction, and then the confederates are sending them and throwing them into reverse. This is your second battle of brandy station, august 1st, 1863. Its a nasty little fight. Fought in 90 degree temperatures with the heat index in the hundreds. A lot of the cavalry horses so are weak for want of grain they collapse as riders get on them. They are to be sent to the rear. None of the horses are ready for a fight. Its a fight the confederates technically win. And after a weeks pause, they rebuild the railroad bridge some of if meade wants to advance once washington unshalks him, he has this Critical Link in the o a as the supply line. Heres the thing about the o a. Meade doesnt want to advance down the o a. It goes in the southwest. The opposite direction of richmond. The only thing it points to of value is an important link that connects the Virginia Railroad ultimately to richmond, but thats 60, 70 miles away, and the worst problem about operating on the orange in alexandria, the one that troubles me the most is from the rappahannock to washington, its about 30 miles, and all of that singletrack railroad goes through confederate territory, through mosebys confederacy. He has to do that job, 5,000 infantry thats already been shot up at gettysburg, reduces his combat power, and meade is looking at the recent past and looks at the fact that every battle they get worse and weaker. Look at the 120 burnside hadded a fredericksburg, the 100,000 joe took into chancerville. I took 80,000 into gettysburg and i lost more than 23,000 of them. If i go and have another battle with lee, the rebels are probably going to dig in. In a strong position, i have to asiem the tactical offensive, im going to suffer things commensurate with that. Win or lose, my army is going to be weaker afterward. If lee retreats or he retreats of his own volition and i follow him, my supply line gets longer and longer and longer, i attach more and more troops to defend it, my combat power gets weaker and weaker and weaker and lee is amount to continue playing that game until he can turn around and hit me with superior numbers, and that could absolutely lead to disaster. So lead would rather abandon the o a completely. What he wants to do is take it back to the landing and cross the rappahannock at fredericksburg. If he goes to fredericksburg, hell have to abandon the rappahannock and the rapadan. Then i can go down to richmond, fredericksburg, and the railroad and lee will have to go back down to the south in order to fight me, and so ill gain this enormous advantage without spending a drop of blood. As far as meade is concerned, its militarily common sense. And hes right. Militarily common sense. But this is savl war and they are inhaernltly a political thing. They veto this proposal for two reasons. You cant take it back. Do you want to know what the Democratic Party is going to do to us if we send them back to fredericksburg six months after that bloodbath . Secondly this seems to indicate that richmond is meades objective, and lee and halak have been saying for almost year, lees army is the objective of the army of the potomac. It doesnt matter where you fight it. If youre a general, you have to fight a campaign. Its not as simple as that. Meade knows that. This thoroughly irritates him. As a consequence, theyre incredibly dysfunctional. They dont trust each other. Meade and halak are going to forgive meade for striking but theyre never going to forget he failed to strike at williamsport and thats going to affect everything he does for the rest of the year. Whats more, when they hear meade talk intelligently and correctly and logically about the difficulties of supply and fighting his way across rivers and geography, the administrations willing to concede, thats all true, but what theyre really hear is George Mclelland in their ear and all the excuses he had for not getting anything done and this seems suspiciously familiar. So meade doesnt get permission to change his base. He can make whatever Operational Movement he wants, but strategically, theres not going to be any great shift. For me this is exceptionally disgusting because he believes if theyre not going to sanction his plans, then they need to tell him what they want done and they wont tell him beyond vague, go fight lee. And if you cant fight lee, cut off a piece of his arm. Force him back. None of this is very helpful. This is vague advice. And meade writes most of his letters have been published. They were published by his son in the 1880s and they were heavily edited and not all meades letters were in that book. Theres one letter he wrote around that time in his wife whos a very close confidante of his and he says the administration would love for me to go out and fight and win a battle. But theyre keeping their finger prints off any deneat because they set me up to be a scapegoat if theres a disaster. Theyre not going to do it to me. Im not going to let them do it to me. So its a very troubled and dysfunctional relationship. So august 1st, 1863, they push back. For lee, thats evidence. Hes going to take his inventory back behind the Rappahannock River, and when he takes his infantry behind the Rappahannock River, he leaves stewart, occupying Culpeper County using it as a buffer. If lee wants Culpeper County, he can take Culpeper County. He says stay here, but dont risk your troops. Lee is above the rappahannock and under orders of washington, dont do anything. Dont do n. So for five or six weeks, youre going to get a lull. The two armies both deal with desertion problems by firing squads that turn out to be very effective. Lee offers to resign because of gettysburg and Jefferson Davis says, i wont hear of it. Within six weeks, the army of virginia is up to 66,000 men and the other army, 88,000 basically using the strength it had. So the wound of gettysburg heals numerically very quickly. Its mostly convalescence to those ranks returning from both armies. Theres conscripts, some recruits, but its mostly convalescents coming back. Lee regains his strength and says early in august if meade doesnt move, i wish to strike him. Gettysburg has no tactical epiphany in robert e. Lee. He Still Believes aggressive action and defeat as rapidly as possible is the only way the south has got to keep the superior numbers off and hopefully wreck union moral and convince them you might as well give up the effort. This six weeks is very important to both armies, but its not the only thing thats going on. Because out in tennessee, rosecrans is on the move. Hes advancing toward chattanooga. Burnside is advancing toward knoxville. Theyre grocery outnumbered. And its clear that a crisis is looming. And so as Early September dawns, the confederate high command finds itself in the same spot it was in in may of 1863. Theres a crisis out west. It looks like the Confederate Forces are not equipped to deal with it houchlt do we respond. In may its vicksburg. And then chattanooga. We take troops from lees army, which is the ohm real source of rein forcement and we send them west to try to redeem the situation or lee launches an offensive in West Virginia to try to wreck the army of the chute, threaten washington, panic the north, pull troops from the westing defend the east to bring them to the capitol. We no what happened in may of 1863. As lee said, we cant get men to the western time. If we get them out there, they wont be used properly, so the smart thing do is an offensive in virginia. Watch in september. Exactly the same thing. Exactly the same thing. Davis decides to go with lees advice to attack meade. The problem is just as soon as lee issues the orders to prepare for an offensive, chattanooga and knoxville fall and when they fall, davis changes his mind and he orders that longstreets corps from lees army be dispatched to reinforce it. The brigade is going to be shipped to charleston. Longstreet feels hell have a real desertion problem, but the rest of his corps will go west to reinforce. They ask meade has lee senl any troops west and meade says, well, i dont think so, but i cant really tell you because theres a whole county between me and the rebel army and its occupied by rebel cavalry. And so halak says you need to find out. So on september 13th the federal cavalry corps launches a fullstrength drive. You see Culpeper Court hours where the cavalry and others are handled very roughly. Confederate horsemen are driven back to rappahannock. Then longstreet is gone. Youre behind the rapadan but longstreets gone. Where has he gone . Nobodys saying where hes gone, but hes not here. So meade has to decide what to do. He asks washington do you want me to advance to rapadan. Its up to you. He finally enters the culpeper v, which makes him very nervous because he understand as what a week defensive spot that is. And getting to the culpeper v he advances his army to the rapadan. This is going to be his problem for the rest of the year almost. How do i get to the rebels on the other side of the river. Every fort is heavily defended. The ground on the other side of the river is higher than the grun on my side of the river f. So a frontal attack is suicide. So i either have to go east around lees right or west around lees left and of course the union army is off. Its never off to the west. One of the interesting things is despite being at war in virginia for two years, theres still huge swaths of the old dominion that they only have the vaguest ideas of the roads, the forts, the topography. On september 22nd, they send buford and kill patric. The two rival cavalry forces fight three major actions against one another in a sevenweek period of time, which is unprecedented outside of a major campaign. The second one, the battle of the courthouse. Stewart responds aggressively. He managed to chase the yankees out of culpeper, so he believes the reconnaissance gives general meade ultimately the information he needs, which is he dont want to go west. Thats not the quay to get at the rebels. Of course, at the same time all this business is happening in Madison County out in georgia, the battle of chickamauga and longstreets divisions have arrived in the nick of time. Against longstreets advice he doesnt try to flank him but lays it under siege and now the crisis is on the other foot so to speak. In early cement it was the rebels desperately figuring out how do we save chattanooga. Now its the federals saying how do we save chattanooga. Grant is plucked out of basically cooling his heels and doing virtually nothing after his vicksburg victory and told to go to chattanooga, fire rosecrans if you want. He really wants to fire rosecrans and is happy to do it, but thats not enough. It seems like more needs to be done some of the federals now have to make the same kind of decision davis and lee were making a few weeks ago. Do we do what stanton, chase, and wells are suggesting and take troops from the potomac and send them west to reinforce chattanooga or do we want lee and halak and launch them to virginia. If lee senlsd a corps to the west, hes weak. Hes weaker than hes ever been. Meades as strong as he was at gettysburg. Stanton, chase, and wells say, youve got to be kidding. You know were talking about lee in the potomac, right . Lincoln is not going to be rushed. He has halak send a message down to meade and says do you have any definitive plans for an immediate defensive and meade kind of suspending why theyre asking says, well, bufords just getting back from his reconnaissance, but, no, i dont. And lincoln says, not good enough. So the 11th and 12th corps are detached from the potomac and theyre september out to the chattanooga. Just as they head north they come back. So the army of the potomacs strength basically stays the same. Lees army is down. Now hes outnumbered by almost 35,000. So the odds have shifted very badly against him except for this. All meade can seecyve lost two of my seven corps and i still have to send 7,000 men to guard the railroad and i dont want to go down this railroad blind anyway, and therefore, im no longer capable of offensive action. It turns out that stanton was right, that meade wasnt going to take advantage of these circumstances. In fact, he still has it in his head that lees army is as big as his own. So 11 odds, hes not going to go over to the offensive. Robert e. Lee is of a different mindset. When he learns they have disappeared, he goes over to the offensive and on october 9th of 1863, he swings his troops out of orange county, into Madison County, trying to get around the flank of the union army and come down on it from the west and hit it in culpeper. The federals pick up hints of the confederates moving from their signal stations, but its not definitive enough and theres a possibility that the rebels might actually be retreating, which would make sense, right, if you send a whole corps to the west, backing up to richmond would be logical and prudent, and so meade doesnt really know, is lee retreating or is he advancing, and meade decides to prepare for both possibilities. So he throws part of his army into a defensive position to the west, but he sends the larger part down to the rap a dan. And bufords division crosses with orders to go up the south bank of the river, uncover the fort so the fifth and sixth and first corps can cross the river and pursue the rebels if they are retreating. The one thing meade is very conscious of, he let lee get away with the manassas gap. Its going to look bad if he retreats and the union army is not in hot pursuit. Lees gut tells him hes going over to the offensive. Meade whos an extremely confident general is a smart guy, doesnt go with his gut because washington is looking over his shoulder. All of the back and forth between he and the administration and halak have basically put him on edge. Weve all been there, right . Were really good at something until somebody says i want to watch you billion b really good at it and then youre like, oh, wow, im being watched and then you mess it up. This is sort of what meade is doing. And its late in the day of october camp and hes finally figuring out what the rebels are really up to and he orders a general retreat, and he begins to pull his army out of the culpeper v, and that is a cautious move but a prudent move, a bad place to find. Its a surprise to the troops who are ready to tangle after gettysburg. But it makes sechbls get yourself north of the river and meade is especially worried the rebels may might not be trying to get to culpeper. He may be trying to get a wider march. If youre north of the rappahannock, youre prepared for the possibility. When meade gets north of the rappahannock he loses sight. He was very active on the 11th. He kept them completely engaged so they cant tell meade anything about where lees infantry is. Understanding that lee could be doing one of two things, hes gone to culpeper and hes willing to stop there or hes outflanking me and trying to cut me off from washington, meade deploys the cavalry division, Sulphur Springs and waterloo and jefferson. Nothing comes from greg for half a day. Bad luck for the federals. They dont see that lee is moving in their direction, going where meades afraid hes going to go. So about noon meade gets nervous. I backed up and didnt fight and lees not trying to cut me off from d. C. Wow, thats going to look bad in the papers. Thats going to look bad to the administration. Maybe i should if lees going to be in culpeper go fight him. So he sends two corps under john sedgwick, the fifth and sixth with the second in support, bufords cavalry in front. He takes half of his army back into culpeper and see if lees army is there and willing to fight. All thats there is the cavalry brigade under pierce young who has a very bad half a day who tries to hold back the union avalanche. Hes like, theres nothing in front of me, lees not here. By dusk, lees not here. Hes not in cull pep eric but greg hasnt reported the rebels tried to outflank me, where did they go. Hes like, they know what theyre doing. This is a fake. Theyre pulling back closer to richmond. Lee doesnt know. He leave s his army where it i. And, of course, bad news for general meade, lee with stewarts cavalry and a. P. Hill and yule are slamming their way across the rappahannock and Sulphur Springs, and by nightfall stewarts cavalry is almost there and hes on meades flank and closer to the alexandria and the warrenton junction than the army of the potomac is itself. Meade doesnt find that out until 10 00 that night when a message arrives from the upper rappahannock with the horrible news and meade has to order his troops out of Culpeper County and put his troops in Rapid Retreat toward centreville to get out of the way whatever blow lee is about to land and as he retreats to the railroad bridge thats only six or seven weeks old goes up in flamings. Theyre always going there will be some interesting action around auburn. No time to talk about that. I have 100 pages on it in my second book. There is a scare for the federal second corps at auburn but it manages to get away. Most of the federal army is going to get out of their way. When hill comes down, he sees the tail end of the federal debt corps and thinks it is the union rearguard. The second corps comes up from the south. It is a very fluid situation. The leading brigade commanders say there is something dangerous to our right. We union rearguard. The second corps comes up from the south. It is a very fluid situation. The leading brigade commanders say there is something dangerous to our right. We ought to Pay Attention to it. Hill says stop everything. Lets try to figure out what is going on. He pauses for 10 minutes. He sees andersons division coming up. He says go ahead. Those 10 minutes allow the federals to get behind the railroad. The confederates make an impromptu attack. Just a response to the tactical situation. They get shot to pieces. Lee tries to concentrate his army before dark to attack the isolated second corps, but it doesnt happen. The federals managed to get away. Meade has escaped. Lee knows that his campaign has done what it can do. It is late in the year. His troops are going to quit for the winter campaign. If he outflanked meade again, he will just call back into the defenses of washington, d. C. Northern virginia is a wasteland. Lee orders a retreat. As he retreats, he destroys the orange and alexandria railroad. He does a sherman job on it. Burns the rails, ties, melts the rails, chops down the telephone poles. He literally obliterates the railroad all the way back to the rappahannock. Without it, meade cannot follow him. Any pursuit happens at the pace of railroad construction. That mightthat might take the rest of the campaigning season. Meade slows down. He has fear that lee will outflank him and try to get to washington. Meade does not resume his pursuit until october 18 back into culpepper county. The federal cavalry eventually pursues. That leads to the fight at buckland mills. Custer saves the day because he had lingered in the rear. The confederates managed to miss a chance to destroy the Third Cavalry Division of the union army. They routed all the way back. This becomes known as the buckland races. This is the counterbalance to the debacle at bristoe station. Kilpatrick has been embarrassed. He has to explain what happened. He will not explain it in a way that makes him look bad. They both say, they got beat at buckland because they were supported by a line of infantry two miles long. Its not warranted. Meade says thank god, at last, i know where the rebel infantry is. I can go and fight them. He goes storming down to new baltimore. There is no one there. Meade has landed a mighty punch into the clouds. The railroad is destroyed. He figures that is it. The campaign is over. I cannot do anything else. Even lincoln agrees with them. Its obvious this has hurt his his reputation. He things he has done the right thing. The smart thing. But the papers are lambasting it. Meade is a modest fellow. He has no vanity. But he cared deeply about his reputation as a soldier. To see that reputation trashed by people who did not understand what happens, that wounds deep. So, as his men rebuild the railroad he creeps south. By the end of october he is around basically on this line the confederates are around the first of november you were where you were in july. The confederates are behind rappahannock. And at the end of the first week of november, youre right where you were at the end of july. The confederates in culpepper. Meade to the north. This time lee has decided to defend the culpepper v. He learned something about meade. Hes not daring. Lee comes up with a daring strategist. Hes going to stay in the culpepper v. How do you counteract the problem with the Higher Ground above the rappahannock . He is going to keep a bridgehead at rappahannock station, which is a springboard for a potential offensive. As meade comes down and sees that bridgehead, he realized that lee could attack out of it and potentially sever the o a railroad. If meade wants to push south, he will have to shield the position and send the rest of his army where high ground makes. It very easy for the federals to get across and lees willing to let him do that. Lee would love for him to do that. If he keeps half of his army containing rappahannock station, i can throw my entire army against that portion of the aop and shove it against the river and destroy it. This is a very clever trap. When meade gets to the river he recognizes a very clever trap. He tells lincoln, i should not walk into that trap. We should take the arming and cross the river at fredericksburg. In fact, i am issuing orders. I am going to do it. He very quickly says, no, youre not. I thought we had this conversation, mister. So, against his better judgment and with great anxiety, meade walks into lees trap. And so, on the morning of november 7, 1863 he has let third corps and second corps storm across the river at kellys ford. There is the ford down there. The advantage they have. Ythe advantage they have. They get across the river. What happens at rappahannock station is one of the greatest feats of the arms in the entire ward, courtesy of David Russell who organizes a daring dusk attack on the confederate entrenchment. And this is sort of where the third book starts. We dont have time to talk about it here is but it is one of those stunning small battles. When the confederates lose that bridge had head,. The louisiana tigers are lost here. Lees plan of defense and in culpepper county is shattered. He is asked to order a Rapid Retreat into orange county. So we get to the middle of november, and we are where we were at the middle of september. Meade rebuilds the railroad bridge. Brings the railroad into culpepper. But now hes under enormous pressure. He knows time is running out. Winters coming on. Elections have already happened. Doesnt have to worry about that anymore. And so, theres an expectation of offensive. And meade, having studied this problem two months ago in september, is ready to make a decision. He cant go around reavesleft. He is going to go right. Hes going to cross the river at jacobs ford through culpepper mine ford. Hes going to swing around to the west. Hes going to bring his columns in and tried to destroy yules corps before ap hillscorps which is 20 miles away can come over to reinforce. A chance to destroy the rebel army in detail. You have to move fast. Speed here is of the essence. Unfortunately for meade, he tries to launch the offensive but theres rain. And the roads becomes muddy. And he has to call the whole thing off. Enough of his troops had gotten close enough that stewart calvary had seen them. And lee has been anticipating that meades going to go around. Hes going to cross the river here. Not anticipating he will turn west to attack the army of northern version. He anticipates of Northern Virginia. He anticipates a march south into Spotsylvania County in an attempt to get between lee and richmond. Lees answer to that is the same answer he will have in may, march down the orange turnpike and plank road and hit the federal columns and stop them in their tracks. For the federals when they finally get their advance going, things are not going to go well. So, the movement finally is launched on the 26th of november, thanksgiving day. The federals begin to move. And the rapid dam is still up. But the real problem comes on the federal right flank, which is the third and the sixth corps. The two strongest corps are on that side of the advance, and leading the advance is Major General william f. French, who has commanded the third corps since the aftermath of gettysburg. He brought the division in to reinforce it after gettysburg and he gets the job by seniority. French, west point 1837. Good mexican war record. Service in the war. Helped write an artillery manual way to general henry hunt in charge of the aops artillery. At the beginning of the war, he was commanding troops in texas. He refused to surrender his garrison upon the demand. Marched it all the way down the rio grande. Put it on boats and took it to key west. Impressive stuff. He gets a for date. A brigade. He gets a division. He gets to attack the sunken road at antietam and the stonewall at fredericksburg. And chancellorsville. None of this goes well, as you can imagine. And it has an impact on the man. And this is something we always forget when we are examining civil war history. We tend to look at most of its characters as static. What they are at the end and the beginning of the war. We fail to take into account how what they are experiencing is affecting them. A lot of generals are drunks. There is no aspirin. Pain is a bottle. And ptsd was a real thing in the civil war, too. If you have ordered your troops to attack the stone wall at fredericksburg, isnt that going to have an effect on you . Some differently than others. Its injected caution into frenchs character, led him too heavily to the bottle. Nonetheless, he is in charge of the right wing of the union army. His corps moves late that f morning and when he gets to jacobs ford, that is on private land. As most of you are seeing it for the first time. This is to the north. Over that ridge. You come down to the river. This was taken last december. Theres the ford itself. This is a horse ford. You can wade horses across but not wagons. Two army corps have a lot of wagons and artillery pieces. The real problem is even once you build the trestle to complete the bridge, you have to get up the opposite bank, and federal troops said that was the worst possible place they had ever seen. This river. And pictures never do elevation any justice, but this gives you some idea. This is almost a shear cliff down here to the bottom. Its muddy, because it has been raining and the more troops that go over it, the muddier it gets. You probably have to cross to the right. We went up and down that in an atv,. Its so bad that the federal artillery is trying to double and triple its teams to get up. Its barely managing to do it. So, this is taking a long time. French has fallen behind schedule. When he hears that, he is furious. But, because hes behind schedule, he not only sends were to french demanding to know, why are you behind schedule, which seems unhelpful at the moment. laughs he orders the other two columns to suspend crossing the river. For me, this is meades great blunder in the campaign. In a campaign were speed matters more than anything else. The two columns crossing furthest from the rebels are told to stop crossing the river till french can get across the river. Meade was a guy who once he made his plan wanted to execute his plan. And, moreover, he is absolutely convinced if hes got to fight a battle and suffer the casualties of a big battle, the battle has to pay off. The only way the battle pays off is if i land one massive blow with the entire army. And the goal is to get across the river, swing west, get the army centered on robinson tavern and move the force against lee and hit hard. And so, there is a pause. And that pause lasts till night. At the end of november 26, only the third corps is across the river. Although warren has got across not all of the first corps has gotten across. Your half a day behind schedule. Of course, lee knows whats going on and he is shifting yules ford down to block the federal dance. The federal advance. He Still Believes they are going to try to go towards richmond. And hill is coming up from the south, but he is going to be almost a day behind what yule can do. Now, for the federals, the real problem is truly just beginning, because they are in the wilderness. And this area is virtually in penetrable. There arent any roads between the plank and the turnpike and french is moving along trail and his orders are every intersection, they are to the left. When a guide is sent to french. Henry prince is talking to a southerner. The southern unions. Ebenezer mcgee, who is one of the spies for george sharp, in charge of the federal Intelligence Service for the army of the potomac. Mcgee knows that route. But that is all he knows. He scouted the route. Prince says, where does this road go . Mcgee cant tell him. I know how to get to my house. I never go there. Prince says, youre no guide at all. Get out of here. I dont want anything to do with you. He goes blundering into the wilderness. Great. Uncertainty every intersection becomes a quandary. And, as a result, he is going to eventually blunder into confederates. And youre going to get a better in a place where there was never a battle intended. The rest of the federals are going to run into rebels around robinsons tavern. Sykes is going to run into gordons calvary. Then the lead element of hills corps which is hesss division and far earlier than meade intended, his columns are in action. That slows everything down. The chance to hit the rebel army while divided has been lost. The biggest s fight is going to be the battle of paynes farm. Faught between the third corps and allegany johnsons division. And this is an accidental battle. So, this is prince coming down on the wrong road. He should be going this way. He is coming down toward the road that links robinson tavern and raccoon ford. Hes got cavalry in front of him who blunder into johnson and open fire. That leads johnson to halt his troops and form a lienne of battle along the road. And the federals begin to deploy to counter that. It takes a long time to do this in these dense woods. Lines of battle. So, this is going to burn up even more daylight. And, eventually, the federals who are deploying in an l shape are attacked by johnson. Johnson does not know what is in front of him. But your line of battle is longer than whatever is in front of you. For johnson that is good enough. Unlike the federals the rebels are willing to attack at the first opportunity. And so, they attack at paynes farm. This open field here which is what is in this picture, is the top of a hill. This is lower ground. This is on the same plain. And the confederate swing into the open field to try and break the union line. They are shot to pieces in the attempt. Then the federals try to cross the field and the confederates shoot them to pieces. You get a stalemate and they blaze away at each other for the rest of the night. Over here on the left flank, however, maryland stewarts brigade launches an attack that breaks the federal line and drives deep down that road before it runs into wards division and yankee artillery and they are stopped and forced to pullback. This battle of paynes farm goes on well into the night. It cost the federals about 940 casualties and the confederates 545. Although after the battle was over, its the confederates are going to leave the field, this is the decisive check for the federals. A confederate division has basically stole two federal corps for most of the day. And when the rebels pull back, meade, who now is getting very nervous about what has happened and decided to consolidate his army. So, he brings the first corps up and he orders cederick over from his right. He gets his army in line. Then he advances toward the confederates on the morning of the 28th, expecting the rebels to still be in front of robinson tavern and new hope church. Hes pointed hit them. But during the night lee has pulled back behind mine run, which he considers to be a temporary position. He intends to pull back even further, but it takes him a while to get his troops here. Hes going to pause. Meade advances the entire army of the potomac through the wilderness in a very cold rain. A fronts come through. The roads are disappearing. It has got to be 28 degrees that night. Waters going to freeze in canteens. Moving the troops, batteries becomes exceptionally difficult work. And, by the time that meade gets his army into position, confronting the rebels, daylights just about gone. But the federals come up fast enough to dissuade lee from retreat because he considers that too dangerous. He puts his men to digging in. He saw some of it a few weeks earlier after the retreat fall in rappahannock station. For the first time in the war, you get the phenomenon of an entire army entrenching. This is going to become the dominant theme of the war going forward. When the federals get up on the morning of the 29th, the confederate positions behind mine run look impenetrable. Overnight. The, one soldier said the bridge works rose as if by magic. The terrain was more open than it is now. And the federals are going to spend the day reconnoitering. They are going to come to the conclusion that this is worse than fredericksburg. We cant attack here. But meades determined we are going to attack somewhere. We are not turning around and going home. So, gentlemen, you need to figure out some options. And the guy who comes up with the option warren, hero of little round top. It was warren who administer that sharp rap to lees knuckles at bristow station. They are very Close Friends and warren says, let me pull my corps out of line, and ill go down and i will threaten lees flank. Ill threaten lees flank. Hell pull out. We wont have to attack this position. Warrens not suggesting outflanking lee. He, in fact, as he makes his march, makes it ostentatiously. Lets let he rebels know we are coming. And if we get down there and maybe there is a chance to watch to launch the attack, then we launch it. Lee is very aware of what is going on. Stewarts calvary does a great job of giving lee intelligence. Warrenshas been reinforced with the sixth corps. As he comes down on the rebel flank, although this is taken them a long time, there is an opportunity. Weve got troops, but he does not have a lot and they are not heavily entrenched. As warren approaches the road that would allow them to turn into the confederate flank, there is a railroad cut and old railroad that had never been built. Can see it there through the woods. Their confederate cavalry skirmishers in front of it and warren sees that. My god, entrenchments. Those are rebel entrenchments. They knew i was coming. I dont know how many rebels are behind it but i have i bet a lot. He used Railroad Embankment to hurt lee. Now Railroad Embankment at mine run is going to hurt meade, because there are not any rebels there. Warren takes 2. 5 hours deploying the division and artilery to attack the Railroad Embankment. The calvary scampers away, fires a few shot and then warrens mwen are on top of the embankment. Theres nobody here. Thats. Awkward. Warren gets above mine run. They are entrenched but nothing like further north. And so, warren sends back word to meade, im beyond the confederate flanks. Reinforce me. And tomorrow morning, i will land a blow. That will perhaps destroy the army of Northern Virginia. Meade had already decided that on the morning of november 30, he was going to send the entire army forward in a frontal attack. Now hes got a better option. Daring form meade. He denudes his centers. He settles the fifth corps and one sixth Corps Division off to his right. He gives two divisions to warren. 26, 000 men. Warren has 2 3 of the army of the potomacs infantry to launch this massive attack at dawn on november 30 of 1863. And hour an hour after warren hit, if this attack had been launched it would be the singersle largest attack against the army up atomic. For the potomac. Grant will never come close to pulling off Something Like this. Overnight, the confederates have shifted in front of warren lee has settled the troops often once again the confederates pull off their magic and they dig in like beavers. The next morning when the federal troops wake up and they are cold and hungry, meade had left his supply wagons north of the river to speed it up. Carried 8 days rations. No campfires because that will give away our position. So, even though the temperatures are freezing, nobody has got coffee, or hot food. Everybody is getting hungry. And they wake up getting hungry. They look across the valley of mine run, and the rebels are there. They are there. Youve got almost a half a mile to a quartermile of open ground. Youre going to have to come over the hill, cross the creek, climb the next hill. The rebel position is such that they can take you under fire every single step of the way. In a a lot of places there are felled trees in front. Even the skirmishers are entrenched. The confederates were so confident, there were sitting on top of their earthworks daring them. Come on, yank. Come on over. All the federal troops to sneak forwarding get a look at this say this is going to be worse than fredericksburg. In fact, the only thing we can hope for is the first waves will be enough of a moving earthwork that us getting shot down will allow the followup to get close. And now the men begin to write their names on their pieces of paper and pin them to their uniforms so their bodies can be identified. Everybody is certain this is a disaster, but the disaster does not happen because warren, looking at this understanding his reputation is at stake, does an incredible thing. Said, i cant do it. I cant waste these men. This is suicide. So, he sends word back to meade. Im not going to attack. Just as the courier heads towards headquarters, the bombardment has begun. Everybody along the union line is tense. Here it comes and then nothing. Nothing. And when meade gets warrens message, he cries, my god he has got 2 3 of my army. Races down to warren furious but when he looks where warren has looked hes forced to concede, youre right. We cannot do this. For my money, this is perhaps after gettysburg, the greatest contribution that george meade makes to the union cause. He could have launched that attack. Even though he would have been beaten, he wouldve gotten credit for two for being brave enough to launch the attack. His standing in the administration wouldve gone up and in the press, too. But he would have killed or wounded 10, 000 federal troops for no gain. After another fredericksburg style debacle, when april and may show up in those threeyear enlistment are running out, the men who have just been through a repeat of fredericksburg reenlist. And i think the answer is most of them probably say to hell with it. No way. And they go home. You have a very Different Army going into 1864, than you got going into 1863. So, meade hopes to find some way to redeem this but try as he might there is no answer. He shifts his troops back around. Lee, however, is anxious to attack. Here are the yankees. I so badly want to hit them. His officers say, no, no. Another fredericksburg. Think about it. Wouldnt that be nice . Let the enemy come to us. After meades army digs in, throughout december 1, lee says, ok, they are not going to do another fredericksburg. Im going to do another chancellorsville. And so, he shifts two divisions, anderson and will cox, down below the federal flank. Although carys division has refused, they are still beyond the federal line. Lees plan on the morning of december 2 with all of the daylight available he is going to replicate what jackson did at chancellorsville in may. It doesnt happen, because during the night, while lee is shifting into position, meade is going backwards. There is a very stiff wind. The federals arent heard. Lees own movements help to obscure what they are doing. When the confederates go forward on the morning of december 2, the enemy is gone. Lee lands a blow on thin air. And the federals managed to get across the Rappahannock River. The consequences of the six months are monumental. First off, there is a real chance that after mine run meades going to get fired. Lincoln says if i fire him, who will i replace it with . Meade keeps his job because lincoln knows he can hand that problem off to somebody else. The guy being talked about as a replacement for hallock and that is ulysses s. Grant. What do these six months mean . They rob gettysburg of all of the strategic fruit whatsoever. Gettysburg becomes one more big battle that inflicted massive casualties, full of drama, but takes you back to the stalemate in virginia you have had since the peninsula campaign. Because of gettysburg certain things that might have happened did not happen. Can we not say that of fredericksburg, of chancellorsville, of second manassas, of gains mill . It is a negative not a positive, right . So, the failure of meades army to land a blow at williamsport and manassas, and at warrenton and land at blow at mine run, mean the second half of the year has passed away. You still have a stalemate in virginia. The confederates at very little cost, the six months, 4000 casualties per side. The confederates have held the line in virginia without the casualties of a big battle. They maintain this daily. The stalemate. The stalemate will be and the same place when the campaigns of 1864 start. For the confederates this is a huge victory even if tactically they are the ones who twice come off on the short end, strategically, this is a success. It also shows us that lee has not changed because of gettysburg. He still wants to fight the same way. He Still Believes in the same strategy. It shows is that george meade is not Ulysses S Grant but he is not joe hooker or john pope or ambrose burnside. Hes clearly the best general the union has had, even if he is prudent and cautious, lee said it, he will not make a mistake. And, although meade does make a few, he does not make a catastrophic mistake whatsoever. Bigger picture. What happens in september and october of 1863 . And november and december . Set the stage for what is going to happen in 1864. In the tactical operational sense literally because when grant comes in to supervise the army of the potomac in the spring of 1864. Its two armies are where they were when the mine run campaign had taken place. Meade tells grant if we cross the rappadan. When we cross there, lees going to play the same game and back up to mienne run. What we should do is get out of the wilderness and then turn up and attack them, and grant says, that is our plan. So, grants plan of campaign at the beginning of overland operation is to refight mine run better. Lees plan of campaign is to do exactly in the spring what he did in the winter. Let the federals cross the river, were going straight up this road, hit them as hard as they can. They did to the battle of the wilderness. The consequences of that battle are such as they are because grants there. Why is grant there . Because in september the confederates, unintentionally, and quite reasonably made a huge mistake. And that mistake was sending long street to georgia. At the time, it made perfect sense. Shifting troops east to west is a lot of something is something that confederate leaders and generals have been saying we should have done all along time ago, instead of going into pennsylvania and fighting gettysburg. So, that decision was bold and daring. It bore fruit at chickamauga. But what kind of fruit . Not the kind the confederates wanted. Before long street left to go to georgia, he met with lee. It was a very emotional parting between those two men. As long street got on his horse, lee said, you must be those people out west. And long street said, if i live but i will not give a single man in my command for a fruitless victory. And chickamauga was a fruitless victory. Perhaps it need not have been is they had done things differently afterwards. Lets take it at face value what actually happened. The and who is sent to rescue jet nikkhah grant. Who was basically unemployed until that moment. With one intention . One of the things i found in researching allegories a letter to rose grams and meet in september. He says the reason the rebels are concentrating against rose grants its because they know that if you meet and rose grounds can hold their ground in virginia and tennessee wild banks and grant clean out the trans mississippi the rebel causes doomed. Sounds very much and halifax mind, grants next job was in the trans mississippis and if it wasnt that it would be an advanced on mobile. Nobody is talking about making grant generalinchief until after chat to new gun. After that victory there suddenly lets make rent general and chief. So chatter new gosh elevates grant to supreme command looks over meets shoulder and gets gross grants fired sherman in charge of all the army heading towards atlanta. If there is no federal victory and should an idea which third would not have been theres no seethrough chat new gutter idiom it means that in 1864 rows grants takes on the drive towards atlanta and needs left alone to assume the offensive in virginia and grant is either in arkansas louisiana are moving against mobile. Ultimately what does that mean . We do not know. We cant know. It doesnt happen. A counter factual history is fun, and the first step weve taken to it is on solid ground but everything after that is quicksand. But we do know things would have been different. So at the end of the day, counter intuitively, and is easy to understand why the south did what they did and i wouldve made the same decision its a temper. But if you look back now, it probably wouldve been far better to leave long street in the hands of lee. Let lee assume defensive with equal odds against meet in virginia. Where that takes you nobody knows, but it certainly wouldve wound up with ulysses f grant in 1864 and we do now how that turned out. So it is not a boring six months, and a lot happens that is really important and it doesnt deserve the dark whole of history it has been shoved into which is why i was happy to write the books and continue to write the books to shed light on this important passage. Thank you for your attention. applause officers. This event was part of pamplin historical parks big battles, small battles, big results symposium. Our first speaker today is james morgan. Hes a life long civil war enthusiast and current president of the new fort sumter civil war roundtable in charlston and recently joined the border of the fort sumter