Transcripts For CSPAN3 Yalta - The Conference In Crimea 20240713

Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and josef stalin. Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen for our next event. Its more or less the keynote of the day because it is the talk on the yalta conference though all of the programs, all of the sessions will be wonderful. We have Serhii Plokhii here from harvard. Hes the professor of ukrainian history and director of Ukrainian Research institute at harvard. As i mentioned the morning hes been on our list for a longtime and we have finally found the right time to bring him down here to enlighten us. His many titles include the last elm pmperor, the cossack myth and forgotten bastard of the Eastern Front. Ladies and gentlemen, dr. Serhii plokhii. [ applause ] thank you very much for this introduction. Thanks to the organizers of the conference for bringing me here, and i also want to thank all of you because coming from boston and thinking that the weather is like today decided to come inside and listen to presentations like mine, i really appreciate that, that sacrifice. Thank you. The organizers really couldnt find a better time to have a conference like that, given that we are really having this, our symposium 75 years almost daytoday to the conference that took place in crimea back in february of 1945, and the conference thats still with us on many levels. On february 4th of this year, that was exactly the anniversary of the conference. I checked the Media Coverage and, of course, the conference was not forgotten. There were pieces online on the anniversary of the conference coming from russia. There was an oped in the new york times. There was bbc, a major expose on the conference. Its interesting that an issue of the conference the titles were different and the emphasis were different. So the conference is important for all of these countries but for different reasons. New york times oped it was the title was about Something Like we still live in the world made by stalin. And in germany it was about the conference making the postwar world. In russia what a wonderful time it was and maybe the founders of the United Nations should gettogether and Start Talking again. Well, yalta is the conference that is remembered not just on the anniversaries like february 4th of 2020. Its the conference that is there [ laughter ] whether it is february or april or may it doesnt matter because of its symbolic importance. [ laughter ] and if you think that this is just a one time, one particular situation where someone wants to make fun out of any of this that you see on the screen, this is not exactly the case. Every president ends up to be in a photograph that would be adjusted in an appropriate way. There would be chinese leaders, german leaders, depending on the situation, and the question is really why. I dont think theres more iconic image that exists there of diplomacy as such. Diplomacy of world war ii and diplomacy in general and in that sense yalta keeps coming back again and again and in this country yalta was very much part of major debates and discussions in history but also in politics in the late 40s, 50s, 60, through most of the cold war yalta was there and the question that certainly one has good reason to ask why yalta. We talked about and in the excellent presentation by professor Gunter Bishop there were conferences that led to yalta. There was also mention of potsdam. Yalta is a conference that is happening still very muchg middle of the war but itddzdc still considered as a conference, as a peace ii. S64o yo yalta. So . ,hphn de. I cuif1 o mlx lox loi that were. Qfnp r itbcqgw ymn e 1w 1 iahp hc hahp hc 19;mhc  anniversay or ni;p0m r t hahp hc 9m zh tra 8r . 1nally. Zlsdz clt eeee tcoun lkbay that. Ueny8h afz7v[5rt hahp hc o[. ahp hc urm÷ xcoge n of th rouqd6 40 ill be more thancak a bpo bcs answer questiocynw[]kt y kpi6e so,deah let me0g1 ap 27 cvacns inm would spend ten years to work for a worst place than yalta they would not find one. And if you think that he was lying frling from the mediterranean and fdr was flying i dont remember now maybe virginia, maybe not they were coming from much, much warmer places. And thats the take over by the workers and peasants of the czar palaces at the beginning of the 1920s and then destroyed by the nazis and had to be rebuilt by josef stalin in time for the conference. There was a question whether it was stalins choice and whether he wanted to show the destruction of crimea. Stalins preference was the bigger town, bigger city where it was logistically easier for him to organize the conference and still relatively warm, but he had to get fdr to come all the way to the soviet union and it was Harry Hopkins who was very influential to roosevelts Foreign Policy who knew that fdr read mark twain and mark twain traveled to the crimea and thats where he met the russian czar. So there was this crimea was at least on fdrs map somewhere, because of the crimean war, because of mark twain and fdr wanted to go to the places he did see before. That didnt sound right but crimea fit the bill and eventually thats what happened. What the western leaders saw in crimea was not just a destruction done by the fight and done by the germans. A few months before the yalta conference, 200,000 crimean settlers were forced to resettle from that area by stalin so that added to the devastation and depopulation of the area in crimea where the conference was taking place, along the sea line. Theres a good he question, why if it was such a devastating place, if it was so cold and unpleasant, why then it was yalta . The main reason was that stalin as already was mentioned refused to go anywhere else. He was afraid of flying after flying to tehran, he had some problems with his ear and he decided not to do that. He also, as many dictators was quite paranoid in the sense that he didnt want to go anywhere, where he was not under the protecti protection. And tehran was also a place which was partly occupied by the red army. Potsdam was completely occupied by the red army and yalta was not an exception from that. So thats also he bought the premises which helped him in his negotiation. But why did the leaders of the western world decide to go through all that trouble and travel, and travel so far as yalta and professor bishop already mentioned fdr couldnt fly above a certain level, and those were conditions, those were really unpressurized cabins, so it was very difficult especially in view of his health, his Health Condition at that time. Why did they do that . Well, the reason was that they actually needed something from stalin. They were there to negotiate with him not just the end of the war but also the peace after the war before the soviets were in berlin. Before the soviets were solidifying their control over eastern europe. Thats why churchill flew to moscow in october of 1944 to make that agreement because he saw how fast the red army was moving and he thought if i can get anything from stalin in terms of the agreement this is the right time. So, fdr really puts his life on the line. He could very well not return from that trip. Either just dying in the plane, or they had to fly over the german positions, they were shooting at them. So thats very important to keep in mind about the yalta conference. The place where it takes place also tells you something about the disposition of forces at that time. Who meets whom in that negotiation and who has the trump cards and this is josef stalin and his minister of foreign affairs, and they are portrayed here this, is one of the photos from the soviet archives that became available after 1991. They are waiting for fdr and churchill before that famous photograph was taken that i started this presentation with. So that would be 20 minutes before that they are waiting in the court of the palace. That is president roosevelt after landing in, at the airfield in the crimea. You see that hes tired. You see that hes sick. You can see here that he doesnt have much time. And thats a photo, in my opinion, also stresses the point that i tried to make a few minutes ago about who needed whom and the kind of sacrifice that fdr and what he prepared to undertake, what risks he was prepared to take. He told his son where his wheelchair was, but he decided to go to yalta. Now let me be more specific what does fdr wants and needs. Why does he go there . At the very top of his agenda is the creation of what became known as the United Nations. Creation avenue world order. Liberal institutions. The world knows influence and world which would fit very well both pragmatically interests of the United States, politically in terms of business but also would look like, southern lind york ideologically right from the perspective of the United States that comes into existence in revolt, in a revolution against an empire. Thats very important to understand for the mindset of 1945. Also very important to understand in terms of tensions that would be there between the british and the americans because the americans would be very suspicious that what churchill is trying to do is this going through the soft underbelly of europe, into the central of europe. This is about british imperialism. This is not about the common goals. This is not the best way to defeat germany. The russians are trying to secure control of Central Europe, trying to secure control over the mediterranean. So theres a lot of tensions of that kind there. So United Nations is at the top of fdrs agenda and thats pushed by the state department and people in the state department. Then there were other generals. Generals want fdr to go to yalta to negotiate for participation in the pacific war. The estimates are that if the war actually, if the battle starts on the main islands per se, the losses can get up to 57,000 of american soldiers. So they need allies. They need the soviet union there. Nobody knows what the bomb is, whether it would work or not. Whether it would blow up half of the United States or being something that can be delivered somewhere. Its a bigger unknown. You need a lot of imagination. A lot of imagination to think that the atom that you cant see and you can split it and it can create a major explosion. So from that point, what becomes obvious by the summer of 1945, by the time of potsdam is not obvious at all in february of 1945. You can you could be laughed at if you suggest Something Like that to the average person in 1945. Thats okay. Thats the thing you can see. But it can blow up half of the world. So this is two main points on fdrs agenda. Another photo from the soviet archive and here you see churchill who is not happy. Hes not happy for a number of reasons, and my colleague professor bishop probably will be talking about both happiness and unhappiness, but one of the reasons why hes not happy is that he realizes for the first time that britain becomes a third rate power. Literally third rate. So at the top would be the soviet union and the United States and number three is still not bad, pretty good, especially by todays standards. But britain would be there. It wasnt clear and obvious at tehran when most of the soldiers on the western side that were on the front lines, they were british. Not the americans after dday they outnumber the british. The british are junior partner in this Alliance Work in the west and when you bring in stalin that diminishes the british negotiation power. And he want as lot. He wants really to he gave balkans away to a degree to stalin in 1945 but hes not willing to do the same with poland. So the future of germany, the role of france as a great power which britain, an ally in the future and help to keep western and Central Europe away from the soviet union, very important for him. Theres a long list. Thing that he wants to achieve. But his negotiation power is actually diminished in yalta compared to what is happening what happened before that at tehran. And this is the map that helped us to understand why those two western leaders are at yalta and also help us to understand the first day of the discussions that was dedicated to the situation on the front. If you read Time Magazine and its a nice way to present allies are working together but as you can see only one ally is on the fence. And the reason is conference is taking place after. The u. S. And british are still recovering from a major surpr e surprise. They are not prepared to continue their advance. The soviets are advancing. They started their major offensive on january 12th, 1945. And by the time of the yalta conference they are 40 miles away from berlin. They already established bridge hats on order. So when fdr and stalin meet, who will be First Americans in manila or soviets in berlin. So theres no question the soviets will be there first. Whoever has more divisions on the ground and more successes to show has the louder voice in the negotiations. That brings us back to something we keep forgetting whether we want that or not. Yalta is not a peace conference. This is a war time conference. Whats happening on the front line at that particular moment matters a lot and gives a lot of power or takes a lot of power from the negotiator. This is an illustration to what we had already started to discuss in terms of who contributed what to the defeat of nazi germany, which is a separate question than the defeat of japan, right . When we talk about contribution of Different Countries to victory in world war ii, we have to be there are two major theaters and we quite often talk just about europe. But thats the number of people who died in world war ii. As you see, of course, the soviet union is at the very top but did you expect china to be there as well . We dont hear very much about china. Look where poland is. And the United States and you can United Kingdom are here. They help us understand the situation but dont really contribute much to the question about the overall, overall impact, overall contribution because, again, the chinese there, poland and indonesia but we dont argue because indonesia more people died, made a bigger contribution to this or that. But thats a good way to start and think about world war ii in a little bit different ways from how we imagine it here. In terms of the impact that it had on every day life, on regular families, on destruction of life worldwide. Regarding the situation on the front in february of 1945, there is approximately between 12 and 13 million of men and women in the red army, on the Eastern Front. And somewhere around from 4 to 4. 5 million of american and british soldiers. So its anywhere between two to three times more soviets there. And that is more or less would be reflected also in the number of the divisions. But even more important than number of divisions is the dynamics of what is happening to yalta. Soviets are about to take berlin. They are in fully control of poland. They are fighting in budapest and the western allies are stuck. Issues that were discussed, the conference apart from the military coordination of the milita military, on the western front and Eastern Front was the future of germany. We talked about that earlier. The question was whether there would be several small germanys. Roosevelt at some point saying when i was a student and i traveled and everything looked so wonderful and peaceful and there were all this, the german states. So he has no real problem with dividing germany into a number of states. Churchill was also excited about that. Germany, but in yalta he was the one who was pushing for that. And fdr and churchill were champions of that idea and they were in a position where they were not prepared to commit, and the main reason for that is they advised they brought from their state department to a foreign office. And the advice was if you try to introduce Something Like that you would have to keep troops on the ground and there would be a real occupation because there would be german resistance unless there are moments from below that could be supported, that those regions, those lands would go independently, imposing that from above would mean actually the occupation and insurgency. And then counter insurgency. And the british were not prepared to do that for financial reasons. The United States government believed that what happened, what would happen after world war ii is actually what happened after world war i, the United States would go into isolationist mode. There is no way to keep american troops in europe for more than two years. Congress would never allow them to do that. So the idea pretty much dies in yalta despite the fact that the documents that are signed there still suggest that situation could happen. But the big iraq that is being discussed is about the zones of occupation. And that is where churchill tries to get the zone of occupation for france. He needs to build up the france as a great power. He also tries to bring france into the Security Council of the United Nations. He needs allies in europe. He doesnt think britain actually would be able on its own to keep germany down. Stalin doesnt believe the soviet union on its own could do that as well. It is very interesting, we are all, when we think about the future, our vision is based on what happened in the past. We base it on experience. And these are people who just 20 years earlier thinking about the year 2,000, right . From their perspective world war i anticipate thats where they are now and its very recent in their mind. They think the United States will not stay in europe but they also know that germany, no matter how much it has destroyed to date will be back in 20 years. That is their thinking and we know it will be a very powerful force. So stalin agrees to the froenen zone of occupation but says you can give them zoechbs occupation from your own zones of occupation from british and from america and that is eventual what happens. And now the big issue is dealing with germany is reparations. Stalin wants 20 billion. The british and fdr are very worried about that. Especially the british. The british look at germany eventually and they think doing reparations like that, restoration of germany that was suggested in yalta that idea is not its half dead but still people promoting it fdr liked it personally because of the publicity he was forced to abandon it. So with all of that germans would be starving. British dont resoursces to supply support millions and millions of people. So the british are against reparation. The u. S. Is against reparations because the u. S. Public is against reparation. After world war one germans were supposed to pay reparations. They took loans from the United States and never returned them so it was a mess and fdrs position was we can talk about whatever but we cant put a dollar number to those reparations because i will have backlash when i come back to the United States. Eventually stalin gets his way and theres 10 billion in reparations that is attributed to the soviet union. So if you look at germany as a battleground between these Different Countries it looks like stalin gets reparations, churchill gets zone of occupation for france, and fdr, you remember, fdrs main objectives, United Nations and war in the pacific, this is not something that is really very high on the american agenda. A big issue in poland. Yalta is a very interesting conference. I already was talking about that. War time conference was perceived as a peace conference. This is also the conference where they spend on poland more than they spend time combined on germany and japan. Thats how oriented they are. And thats how poland is important for them in particular for churchill but also for fdr. There are two sets of questions with poland. The first one is the borders. Prewar poland was really the country, probably the only case in history that was lifted up and then moved westward. The movement of the country and you had to negotiate eastern borders which meant basically stalin wanted, insisted on the borders that he got with hitler. Western ukraine and western belarus going to the soviet union. Then western border of poland which means turning dansk and so on and so forth. So out of the german population from eastern germany, and establishing the polish state there. Very big and complex issues. The eastern border with the soviet union is negotiated at the yalta, the western border would not be decided at potsdam but basically the soviet union would get its way on poland. And with poland, another big issue was the government and democratic elections there and again, stalin got his way. So poland was a major defeat especially for churchill and major victory for stalin. Fdr decided, again, i dont think that even he would predict how important the document would be, but he proposed to sign a declaration on the liberated europe, and during the entire cold war was the one document where it was very clear that the soviets actually didnt do what they promised to do in yalta. But that was a declaration. That was Nothing Specific again. It became a major factor in the cold war but at that time that was something that they spent maybe 15 minutes on going through that and signing it. But it would become an important issue. So churchill went to stalin on poland. The pacific. One of the key reasons why fdr risks his life to go to yalta to get commitment from stalin to participate in the pacific war. And he knew already from his ambassador in moscow that what stalin wanted in return. He wanted japanese territories. Part of the korean islands. And he wanted the seaports to create soviet sphere of influence there because stalin wanted also control over the railroad that was leading to those ports. That is on this map what actually happened in terms of the creation of the fact of the soviet sphere of influence in china. I just mentioned they spent more on poland than any other subject in yalta, but on the far east they spent 30 minutes. It was a meeting on the margins of the conference between stalin and fdr. They spent so little because so much time went into preparation of that meeting and they already knew each others positions and fdr knew what stalin wanted. And fdr felt very uncomfortable to pay for the soviet participation in the war with the territories not just of japan, potentially in the future defeated enemy but ally of nationalist china which was at that time. So he was postponing this meeting with stalin as the conference was moving ahead but he was guesting one memo after another from the chiefs of staff saying the soviet commander refuse to discuss anything related to the pacific war before the political issues are resolved and eventually those issues are resolved. One more big issue that was discussed, yalta was the composition of the Security Council. So the go ahead for the creation of the United Nations was also given at yalta. The United States, the fdr eventually got stalin to commit to be part of the United Nations, and accept the veto power and the way how the p procedural matters for the council. Stalin insisted the soviet union have more than one vote which was and anathema for fdr and the American Public because when the United Nations was created thats what britain was insisting on giving rights to be members of the United Nations and from that point in the United States there was a strong, very strong opposition that any country would have more than one vote. And fdr eventually agrees and he gets also Something Back from stalin. Where stalin says that he wouldnt mind if the United States would have also more than one vote. And there is a discussion that there would be alaska and hawaii that would join the United Nations and half and half. Once that information was leaked to the American Public, there was major scandal. People were prepared actually to forgive stalin for insisting and breaking that rule one nation, one vote but not prepared to forgive or to accept that from their own president. So were not supposed to behave like that. Its very interesting. And as you know alaska never became a member of the United Nations. Im pretty sure im running out of time, so i will try to wrap up my presentation. I miserably failed to cover all aspects of the yalta conference, but i tried to deal with the most important ones and the big question is, after this very short overview, whether or not the histography of the 60s and 70s was right or wrong. Was it a failure or a betrayal. Did it start the cold war or maybe it was an unqualified success for the United States and for the western allies. Well the answer to all of these questions may be more nuance than the questions themselves and one thing thats very obvious that yalta immediately after the agreements were signed was perceived as a Great Success for all three powers. The reason for that was that they actually got what they want, what was at the very top of their agenda, all of them. United nations and participation of the soviet union in it. The soviet participation in the pacific war. It turned out it wasnt necessary. Truman then was trying to stop that. At that point from the perspective of february 1945, that was a big success. Stalin knew he would get away doing whatever he wanted in poland but there was also a formal agreement to support a democratic process so there was a hope for churchill and fdr. France was not only given occupation of germany but also sit on the Security Council so there were some modest reasons for churchill to be happy as well. And stalin, basically, got to keep his booty in eastern europe, the red army would take over, would be his to decide. So there was this euphoria to a degree. There was one exception when it comes to the americans who were not participants in the conference per se but there on the margins. The group of americans were the american airmen and also the ground specialists of the u. S. Air force that was stationed in 1944 and 1945 at the three american air bases in todays ukraine. They are the main characters and heroes in my book which is written now on the basis of open kgb archives because americans were under surveillance there. They knew when they were already close to one year of being under the soviet control, they were aware about the fact that what had been said and signed by the soviets is not exactly necessarily has to happen. They knew about the major differences that existed between the allies, especially when it comes to questions of political culture, democracy and authoritarian regime, and one of them, palmer myra, a farmer from illinois left memoirs about that and he crow something that i wholeheartedly accepted in my book. He said that, you know what, what we witnessed back then on those air bases in 44 and 45 was the start of the cold war and that was very, very interesting assessment from someone who was not sitting at the negotiation table, was an insurgent in the u. S. Army at that time. Those underlying intentions not geopolitical but in terms of politics and political culture eventually brought the unraveling of the grand ideas and start of the cold war. Yalta was an important part of that story but i dont think can it be fully credited or fully blamed for what happened late. It happened when it happened and it was an important defeat of germany and japan. Thank you very much for you attention. [ applause ] thank you dr. Plokhii. Well get to a question in the back in just a minute. You just referenced the kgb archives and gunter talked about it in his talk. Openness, closeness and what was the status and how did you achieve access to those archives . Well the kgb archives are not as closed as they used to be on territorial russia today and thats where the major, major documents are and sources are. The kgb archives are probably now the most open after divers that exist in ukraine today, so theres an openness of archives including the kgb after divers. Because those three air bases that im talking, by the way the only case where the americans and soviets were fighting sidebyside. The grand alliance was a very strange low pressure system. The british and the americans were together. But the west and the soviet union were fighting on different front. So those air bases was the only exception to that rule. And because it was in ukraine those materials of military counter negligence, of surveillance of the population and so on and so forth they are based in kiev. Then they are accessible. There are volumes and volumes of those documents and i was in touch with mostly families and sons of some of those people who are there. We exchanged that information and trying to get the memoirs, their correspond and photographs and they are included in the book as well. Go towards the back of the room in the center, please. Two questions. First of all, what stalin requested what did he actually get in reparations. My second question is my understanding there was a proposal on germany. Could you expand on that, please sure. I will start with the american propos proposal. The original line was really to the u. S. Was supposed to go not just west but central germany. And when the threepart commissions started to discuss that the soviets were surprised and the british were surprised. On what basis you ask is projecting, given that at that time it was very early days, dday just happened. Militarily it was impossible to discuss that. And the american negotiators had no explanation of why they argue that. Eventually they went back to fdr and he said, just dont sorry dont read th seriously. This is something i wrote on the napkins when i was flying from, i dont know, casablanca, Something Like that. Eventually those things were renegotiated and the british insisted that they would get let me get to the map that they would get the this part of germany, which was much easier to supply by the the american proposal is that they would be there. But, again, british insisted, so the u. S. Zone of occupation and good part of it went to france was in the area where it was not easy to provide supplies and so on and so forth. U. S. Started really with basically asking for the line that was supposed to go like that and all of that was claimed by fdr. But not without any kind of a consultation. Or serious thought or Something Like that. But i think that was a good negotiation strategy. Now what, of course, then held the soviets to give this part of germany to poland was that it went to the soviet occupation. The soviet occupation was not just jdr, but also all this part. So the soviets got good part of germany, and what was decided there was demarcation lines, thats to the question about the general and prague and so on and so forth. Already demarcation lines from 1944, and the expectation was that if the soviet troops or the american or the british troops would cross that line, they would withdraw. Thats what actually was happening. Now the question on the reparations. Asking for 20 billion, got permission to take 10 billion. They couldnt take all of that because with the start of the cold war. And the factor the creation of western germany, western sphere of occupation and eastern germany here, the soviets lost access through the equipment and other things that were in rural and in other areas, which were in western part of germany. They ended up occupying mostly agricultural areas. And when the Marshall Plan kicked in, molotov said, okay, we cant we cant keep taking more and more from our sphere of occupation because we have to keep them at least to a degree competitive with the u. S. Pouring money in for the soviet union it became actually political impossibility to keep taking money, resources and other things out of east germany. They got they got a lot. That was also a major drop for them, because that slowed down their own modernization of the equipment and the u. S. Was the less interested in the in the reparations. But once the documents were signed, u. S. Was signature to reparations as well. And roosevelt said that he didnt need any property that he didnt need any assets. The only things he was interested in was the patents and german know how and so on and so forth. And in the long run, the u. S. Benefited the most from that compared to british to the soviets. Which is an irony, irony to that story. So, yes they got part of those 10 billion, but they didnt get all of that soviet union. The next question to your right, halfway back. Thank you. In terms of the historiography or speaking of, to what extent is the yalta as failure an echo of the who lost china debate in the 50s in the u. S. . Very much so. Very much so. The major publications, i mentioned in the late 40s, just fighting that battle, then comes quote unquote loss of china. The ambassador the state department of state official Charles Bolen who was at yalta, as one of the advisers to fdr, he was going through the adherence in congress for the appointment to be ambassador to the soviet union. And it is available, it is on lon, all the discussions, the questions were about lost china. So, yeah, it was a big we cant explain that just by the lost china that this very, very negative attitude toward yalta conference, but that was important part. And it is exactly then after 49, 1950, you see one publication after another, it became not a battle between the former diplomats, but it was a much more public affair. Well get to the for a quick question i think has a quick answer, did the western leaders, churchill and roosevelt know that they were being bugged . They didnt know, but they suspected. And fdr at some point said i dont remember anymore whether that was in the context of yalta, that he didnt mind let them listen to what we we have nothing to hide, kind of approach. Dr. Kerry to your left. Thank you for a very, very nice talk. The yalta conference, the allies, the western allies decided to recognize the yugoslavia partisans and give them direct as much direct support as they could. How did this come about at the yalta conference and did this have any ramifications for the post war events in the balkans . Thank you. Yugoslavia was discussed at yalta, but it got very little attention on the highest level of this of this admittance between the principles. The key decision really took place in the socalled tolstoy conference of 1944. And that is when when the agreement percentage agreement was that yugoslavia was 50 50. And by that time of yalta, churchill already knows that hes being outgunned or cheated or whatever, that the soviets actually want want to have full control over yugoslavia and in that context, the negotiations from poland would also be affected by what happened in yugoslavia. And, again, i pretty sure there were no major decisions made at that level of the principles, but on the lower level, there could be some technical issues decided. But the key thing on yugoslavia was 50 50 was october 44 moscow. One final question here, to your right, dr. Plokhii. Thank you so much. Two quick questions. To what extent did roosevelts physical frailties affect his ability to negotiate effectively, and how much of this information was then given to truman also knowing the frailties of his physical situation . Yeah, thank you. Well, truman was very much forced on fdr as his Vice President in 1944. So there were maybe two meetings that were there before fdr died of any substance between the two leaders. But once fdr died, the first thing that avril harman, the ambassador in moscow, it was a key figure in negotiation in negotiations on the pacific the first thing that he did, he got on the plane and flew it to to washington to advise truman on yalta agreements. And that was in time when the time when molotov was traveling to the to the first founded convention of the United Nations in snaenan francisco and he als came to washington. And harman convinced truman that the soviet union was violating the agreements that were reached at yalta. And this first meeting between truman and molotov was quite dramatic when molotov was saying, no one has talking to me like that. And truman tried to move back saying, just stick to your agreements and no one will talk to you. That was that was really the beginning, but up until 1947, truman really was going really unprepared. She was going just from one extreme to another. He was very harsh with molotov in april of 1945. Then when he goes to potsdam, his closest adviser was the former ambassador to moscow. Last name davis, first name escapes me now. Was in moscow during the show trials and believed everything what he saw there. So he was a soviet, the main adviser of truman. Truman, before he became truman cold war era now understanding this 45 foot, he was actually really looking for position. So thats thats on truman and the first question that was the question . Health. Did his physical yes, yes, yes, thank you. This is the great question and i teach now for a number of years a seminar on the yalta conference at harvard. And one of students wrote a very good paper asking exactly that question. And the way how the approach was that he looked at the minutes of yalta, discussions and discussions at tehran. How often fdr would participate or intervene and make comments and how got comments were, to what degree they corresponded to his own vision or to the position that was taken by the state department and the conclusion that he came to and i agree with was that conclusion was that clearly at yalta, fdr was in a bad state in terms of health. His contributions through the discussion and participation is fewer than at huron, but he actually never, never really wavered from the from the position that he wanted to take. Very often, more often than not, that position was different from the position of the state department. But it doesnt mean that he just didnt know what he was doing or was too ill to understand what was going on. He had some very strong opinions himself and at that point, the secretary of state, he didnt allow them to participate in his discussion with stalin on the far east said he didnt need him there. Ladies and gentlemen, dr. Serhii plokhii. Thank you. Thank you. Week nights this week, were featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan3. On wednesday, civil war scholar rod gragg discusses the battle of fort fisher which occurred in december 1864 and january 1865. Then civil war scholar Timothy Smith explores the 1863 battle of champion hill, that was part of the vicksburg campaign. Followed by jeffrey hunt, det l detailing the movements of general george mead and union forces as they followed confederates through virginia. American history tv, wednesday, beginning at 8 00 p. M. Eastern, on cspan3. Next, National World War Ii Museum Senior Historian Robert Citino discusses how decisions made at the february 1945 yalta conference affected the ending of world war ii. This talk is part of a day long symposium marking the 75th anniversary of the pivotal meeting between british Prime Minister winston churchill, president Franklin Roosevelt, and soviet leader josef stalin