And the exhibits of what would have happened on the ground didnt matter the closing months of world war tii. To do this we asked our own rob citino. She among the seniors, i will beat him to the punch line and say he has the longest on staff. He is a Award Winning historiah. He taught for three decades including stints at west point, the u. S. Military economy, and the war college. He came in 2013 for the International Conference. He is one of our featured tour historians. He came to our 2015 tour, but he did not come to our 2015 International Conference because we did not invite him that year. We invited him to join the staff as the Museum Senior historian and we could not be luckier to have a topnotch scholar to guide us, so ladies and gentlemen, our friend george citino. What was up in 2015 . What did i do you sit at home and there is a big party in new orleans and youre wondering what happened. Thank you for those comments, ger my. I remember the first time i spoke at the conference. I was at the friday morning 8 00 a. M. Slot. I just remember walking into that room and it was jam packed. There was electricity in the air. Folks that know a lot and have good questions to ask, and the National World war two museum is a place you have to bring your a game. We worked out, you never now how timely something can be, but who can predict just how timely these things are going to be. So jeremy asked me, and he is my boss so i do whatever he does, the role that yalta played, so to take us out of the realm of diplomacy and talk more about military operations and strategy. I will try to leave time at the end for questions as well. The way it determines the post world order. It seems to be fraying and we may be living in the post post war era right now. Well have to determine if that is true how things play out. Determining the post war order, especially in europe. And that makes perfect sense. The soviet occupation and communeization of Eastern Europe. You could make a case that all of these are a fact of post war life and they flow kind of naturally. I am still reeling from that first slide with the modern face super imposed,ly have nightmares for the next three weeks. Now seen in that light. You can make various assessments of who, so to say, at the yalta conference, i know this from personal experience, so if you will indulgences. We used to say, and i have no way of determines if this is true or not, there was more s slovenians in philadelphia than in the capital of slovenia. Every sunday there was a mountain of mail for castigate ing the paper. They sold them down the river. Fdr sold poland down the river. In the 70s, it is the return of the founder of the hundrgarian nation. It was hit by a turkish musket ball. Those are the legends, but it is being held in the United States. And president carter wanted to give it back. You know to improve relations with hungary. Mary rose okar didnt even give it back. So that the yalta talk about the captive nations in Eastern Europe. Now what im going to try to argue today is there is another lens through which we can and probably should look through yalta. I think it is one that is less used. I will try to go into more detail on it here. And i think in this light we could judge it a remarkable success. On the strategy of the allies, and in the wars, but were talking about a conference in 1945, and a war that came to an end in europe, or in may, or in the pacific in august and september. How did they impact the battlefield in those months. So let me begin with, i think, a fairly obviously point and well stair at this map for awhile. The big losers at the yalta conference were not the earn europeans. As horrible as their sufferings would be, the real losers were the germans, yalta rammed the final nail in the coffin of jerman strategy for the war game. Sum marriz summarized briefly, they made it as expensive as possible through fanatical based resistance of the der man people. I think a french revolution style, a big call up of the entire population, a German National uprising. So the plan had been followed since late 1944. It was to call up last ditch levees of troops. These were made up of manpower combed o out of area areas. Administrative troops, even lightly wounded turned out of their hospital beds, giving training, formed into a division. A big chunk they were holding extremely larger septemberments of the front, you have taken every desk jockey and they would return comprised of the class c troep trope of a grandfather and grandson in the same group. You see pictures late in the war of some ger man soldiers. They really do look like sophomores in high school. In many cases thats what they were. When those were exhausted, you run out of old men and boys, there is last second partisan resistance in germany. People standing up against the invader in the east and west. That these would be partisan and fight gorilla warfare against the invaders. According to this scheme, eventually probably in britain or the United States firth, moral would crack. You cant find over every village. Eventually it would crack. And in the clip rations, okw, it was almost always assumed it would be britain or the United States first, and that would splitter the grand alliance. And that would free german troops to mask in front of the soviets. There was a strategy that was discussed all of the time in the Upper Echelon of the german high command. Im not really a fan of that point of view, but you do see it argued in the literature from time to time. Now, saying there was a strategy is different from saying it was a good strategy. Whether or not that was realistic or not, it is hard to argue if there was much there that was going to work. That entire perspective was smashed to pieces by presented a united front to the enemy. Simply by restating the commitment to unconditional a bn at yalta. So implicitly restating unconditional surrender. Simply by alaying stalins fears that somehow the west was going to do a deal against him, yalta laid the groundwork for the endgame in europe. That would end, we all know spoiler alert in the total destruction of German Military power. Sure. That seems inevitable to us today. Hey, its february this war is going to be over in three months. But hard fighting was going on all across the front while the yalta conference was taking place. Nobody was driving forward at top speed against negligable opposition. A long, long way from where they wished to be. So, victory seems inevitable. Were all guilty of it. If you have a class, University Professor or lecturer and you have limited time and youre behind on the syllabus, believe me, well, water was over in two months. If youre in charge of fighting that war, it looks a great deal more difficult from that perspective. And if the study of diplomacy and history tells us anything, its that nothing is inevitable, but theres nothing less inevitable than the end of a war. When it happens its always a relief. And in that sense, im arguing that yalta was a kind of guarantee of all ied victories since, by this point in the war, victory probably was guaranteed as long as the grand alliance held together. So, the german folk storm, these battalions made up of boys who were not yet of draft age and men who were well, well past it, the motto was a people rises up, a people stands up. But, you know what . In the face of these vast forces by the allies in the face of a grand firm alliance, the german people stood up and the vast majority of them sat right back down again. And, hence, the mass surrenders at the end of the war and the lack of any real guerrilla resistance. By saying there would be no room for that sort of thing, yalta probably did good work bringing about german surrender in may. Hitler shooting himself helped, but hitler shot himself because of what happened at yalta as well. I think thats also part of what we want to say. The second impact of yalta at the end of the war has to do with the shape of alterations in europe in the last few months. So once again, in my era, ive already revealed 1958. I grew up in the middle of the cold war, maybe at its coldest. People can always argue about what were its worst moments. In my era, historians often spoke of a race to berlin. This is how they characterized the end of the war. And they castigated the western allies for having lost the race to berlin, making this mistake, that mistake, this blunder and that one, thus surrendering a big chunk of post war germany and Eastern Europe to the soviets. Now, there were always big problems with this thesis. By march 1945, the beginning of march so immediate post yalta, defenses had smashed their way already into the reich itself and came to rest along the line of the rivers. Just about 50 miles from berlin. At the time, western allied forces under allied commander eisenhower were still stuck on the rein, 300 miles away from berlin. This is where we are at the time and here is where the soviet sorry, i dont mean to sounds like the home team. Here is where the western allies were at the time and here is where the soviets were. A real discrepancy in who is closer to berlin. But soviet defenses had smashed its way into the reich itself, overrunning east prussia here and the coastal province of pomerania and came to rest here on the rivers. Seizing the german Capital First was unlikely for the western allies but also a highly risky operation that was foreign to eisenhowers sober sense of strategy. Eisenhower does take his share of risks in the war but by and large the operations on the map are not what you could consider napoleanic in the chances they take, in the risks theyre willing to court. Thats a little 1967 book by Steven Ambrose of sainted memory. Steven ambrose, of course, is one of the fathers of this museum, along with our own nick mueller. He wrote a book called eisenhower in berlin in 1945 the decision to halt at the albaa, where the americans would eventually stop. He was one of the first, i think, to make a sustained argument in favor of ikes decision not to go for berlin, not to risk, oh, i dont know, 80,000, 90,000 or 100,000 men in a senseless fight for a city that was going to be divided amongst the allies anyway. Thats essentially the contour of ambroses argument in eisenhower and berlin 1945. Its still a book, like everything Steve Ambrose wrote, its still a book well worth reading. But, in fact, the strategic context for all these developments was laid again at yalta. After this show of interallied unity against the germans, a lunge for berlin that snashed the big prize from under stal stalins nose would have been difficult to justify, i might even say difficult to explain amongst the people who would have had a hard time explaining would have been a lot of americans. Stalin was, of course, paranoid about this very possibility. Stalin paranoia was a way of life. And feeding stalins paranoia was probably not a Winning Strategy for the allies at this point in the war or, frankly, naat any other point. That was the background for the march 28th note from eisenhower to stalin, telling the soviet dictator that they tended to drive east with the aim of cutting germany in half, north to south, not detour northeast to try to take berlin. So, my point, instead of a messy topspeed race to berlin and a subsequent, very bloody urban mele, which is what the proponents going for berlin are really asking for, yalta ensured that the war in europe would end with the meeting of soviet troops on the alba river april 25th, 1945. And i have to say, having weighed the pros and cons, pluses and minuses, its probably a better option. And i hope a lot of people in the room would agree with me. Well, what did that decision then lead to . Deciding to forego a risky, longdistance strike at berlin allowed the u. S. Army to focus on a juicy operational target all its own. The encirclement of the main german force in the west. Let me go to now there was a stroke of luck on march 7th, as u. S. Forward units ninth Armor Division seized an attacked railroad bridge over the rein river just here at the bottom of this little map. You may know the story. Troops rushing forward. Theres a german bridge that hasnt been blown yet. German troops on the bridge and on the opposite side of the river, to blow off the charges that will destroy the bridge. American troops are already on the bridge. They press it. It blows. It lifts up in the air and it comes back down to rest intact. Its one of the most amazing moments in all of world war ii. Naturally, you know, its rather freakish, by all accounts, the bridge should have gone into the river. And the nazis reacted nazi command reacted as you would expect, rounded up all the troops responsible for it, gave them a courtmartial and had them shot. Bad luck from the german perspective but at any rate the americans seized the bridge over the rein. Getting over the rein, its not crossing the little stream in your backyard. Its a major mississippistyle river and was going to be difficult to have any kind of a crossing operation. By the end of the month, massive allied forces were driving over the rein heading east. Including a gigantic air drop, the allies encircled an entire German Army Group here in the ruhr, germanys industrial heartland, 30,000 troops of army group b, marching into captivity, nearly in toto. So many pows that the u. S. Army had a hard time processing them all and kept them out in camps, openair camps along the rhine, socalled rhine meadow camps in horrible conditions, open air elements. There were too many pows to do anything with them at the time. The battle of ruhr, a caldron battle or battle of encircling. The battle of the ruhr pocket was nothing less than the greatest u. S. Military victory of all time. The german commander of army group b, seeing the writing on the wall about the future of the german war effort, took his own life in the aftermath of the debacle, shot himself. Youre here and drive over here to berlin while this force is on your flank is impossible anyway. Thats so many reasons the berlin option is not realistic in terms of operations or strategy. Two or three months it was going to be a colossal logistical challenge. So two or three months. Didnt get much more definite than that. Stalin lied and cheated his way through his career as a miserable human being, i think. He kept that promise at least. On august 9th, 1945, about three months after the end of the war in europe, the soviets launched a great invasion of japaneseoccupy japaneseoccupied mincheria i was admiring it, and realized it was in spanish. Ill be willing to talk anyone through it who needs that. Graphics are beautiful. August 9th, 1945, soviets launched tremendous invasion of japaneseoccupied manchuria. In the soviet way theres always these long titles, the manchurian Strategic Offensive operation. But it has become customary to call it operation august storm. The soviets never used that. But he called his book august storm in 19 3. Its my understanding thats why we refer to this operation as august storm. If the manchurian Strategic Offensive operation is the alternative, maybe we are better off with august storm. Whatever you call it, it was one of the wars most massive and successful blows with three fronts, the soviets used the term front in the way that we or the germans use army group. We use front in sort of an indefinite way. Soviets have a technical use for it, army group. Three great army groups or fronts array around the arc of the great manchurian bulge. Here. The second far Eastern Front and the first far Eastern Front. Getting precise numbers is never easy for a soviet operation because the soviets were always all over the place in their numbers. It was often part of disinformation campaigns about how big these operations had been. But let us say roughly 1. 5 million men. Im going about 500,000 per front. 3,000 aircraft, tavengs for a single operation. Japanese force defending manchuria. Usually in japanese propaganda terms, the great guandong army, counterinsurgency for over a decade. Best units, elite units had been bled off for the fight in the pacific by august 1945. It was far below its authorized strength. Ranks were filled with light or obsolete equipment. Soviet mechanized assault on august 9th simply blew it away. Im trying to think of some other way to thats not a technical military term. The russian offensive that smashed German Army Group center. If you could use it as a vertebra, the great guangdong army was. Utterly vaporized in about two weeks of fighting with hundreds of thousands of japanese prisoners falling into soviet hands. So, in other words, the Japanese Forces at manchuria simply dissolved. Note that date, august 9. The u. S. Dropped an atomic bomb on hiroshima on august 6th and another on nagasaki on august 9th. News arrived of the devastating japanese impact in manchuria at about the same time that the news arrived of the second atomic bomb dropping on nagasaki. Without refighting the entire scholarly battle over the bomb and its impact on the japanese decision to surrender, because there has been a big scholarly fight over it, i think its reasonable to say that the smashing of an entire japanese field army in manchuria played some role in japanese strategic deliberations. They would be utter fools if it hadnt. So, august storm, in other words, along with hiroshima and nagasaki helped. What percentage i wont say, but helped to end the pacific war. That meant no operation olympic. The allied invasion of largely American Invasion of the southern island. It meant no operation cornet, the American Invasion of the big japanese island of honshu, in tokyo where most japanese still live today. No bloody campaign to fight through the japanese home islands, fighting that would would have generated monstrous casualties, once likened fromtoan okinawa from one jap end of japan to another. Lets just say truman was correct on some level, invasion of japan would have been very bloody indeed. Im sure there are people in the room who would say manchurian didnt matter. Allies had no way of knowing that when they were begging stalin in february at yalta to join the war against japan. I like what he said about the t atom bomb. Invisible thing. Then you ram them into one another and they blow up. It does. It requires an act of imagination for anyone who is not a nuclear physicist, which is 99. 9 of us in this room. Any Nuclear Physicists in the room . I feel like i should ask before i Say Something really stupid. Okay. The allies didnt know they were going to have an atomic bomb. Roosevelt knew they were spending a lot of money on t there were assurances from the scientists it would work but no one knew they would have an atomic bomb. At the time they believed they were going to need soviet help and were willing to negotiate with stalin to get it. Well, i think this is probably a good point to end and then throw open the floor to questions and im happy to stand here as long as youll have me. As a blueprint for the postwar world, which is how were looking at yalta today, im not sure i like it all that much. Maybe im still that kid in cleveland reading irate letters from ukrainians and poles in the plain dealer. Perhaps the west could have driven a harder bargain with stalin, even with stronger words and gestures. Youre all a lot smarter than i am on these points but as a road map for the military end game in europe, yalta was the most succe successful of all the wartime conferences. Perhaps unintentionally, but nevertheless it was nothing less than the blueprint for allied victory. Thank you very much. I can survey the crowd to see the hands. The first question is one of a historians favorite. Hypothetical. What ifs. The answer is yes. What if the western allies had moved to berlin, not so much giving up the territory that eisenhower had argued against, how would that battle have played out differently than the soviets battle for berlin . In some hypothetical man in the high castle alternate historystyle battle for berlin in which the western allies have managed to move main force units to the western outskirts of berlin theres so many what ifs that play into that. Exactly how do you do that . It was going to be more like the battle of arnem, dropping them forward and then relieving them. It would have been very chaotic. If wha i just outlined, its great, if you can force the germans to defend in a ring around berlin and powerful forces coming in on both sides, germans would have lost berlin. Maybe it would have even be quicker of the that kind of is what happened. Soviets surrounded berlin and attacked it from all sides. It was a concentric attack. The sector, which the germans called central, sector z, the fortress, the citadel of berlin. It took a week of solid fighting to cross that mile. There was going to be difficult fighting, no matter how you do it. Who the defenders were at this point, there were norwegians and danes, charlamain french fascists fighting in hitlers cause, dutch fascists. Where were all the germans . Norway, hungary, but their capitol was being defended by the dutch. They even managed to hold out for a solid week and inflict massive casualties on their soviet attackers and all of them died in the attempt to defend somebody elses capitol. If the question is sort of patent question if the American Army went up against the russians in 1945, because this was a favorite past time of my generation going up. We should have listen to pateto. Thats what our fathers would say, very often, after a driveng or two. If that hypothetical war had ever been thought, soviets had real strength, far more divisions, far more manpower, a lot more mechanized on tank divisions, a lot more tanks in general. The western allies would have had air power of a sort that the soviets could not imagine in their wildest dreams. When it first came up against it in normandy, the most complete inability to move during the day, at least on the roads. You hunkered down, moved at night and that was slow and you never got to where you were going. Both sides would have had advantages if the american hadnt had an atom bomb thats a different story all together. I love hypotheticals. My lifes work is to sit around and answer this kind of question. But really i think what you do is assess probabilities and discuss the strategic situation. Thats why its valuable to do. Im not ready to declare a victor in the war between the red army and the western allies in 1945 unless nukes come into play. Well go to bill to your right here. Hey, bill. Was there ever any serious consideration by shafe to make a move on berlin . Sorry, walking away. I guess it depends on what you mean by serious consideration. Theres all kind of staff studies done, just as there were all kind of staff studies done in cicesi sicily, some kind of stroke. U. S. Airborne troops were in their planes and engines revving up. This is how i can say with some assurance, this would not have been a lunge by the whole u. S. Army. It would have been a strike forward by airborne divisions, lighter units, mechanized units so they could more more lightly. What that would have meant is a very difficult fight in the city itself. City fighting im able to say these things because we can read the studies. City fighting requires heavy weapons to knock down buildings. Thats kind of what youre doing, going block by block. Serious consideration, if yalta was february 4th and the bridge over ramaggen seized in early march and briefly it looked like whoa, maybe the pathways are open to berlin. There was a flurry of planning. It would come to an end by middle of march when eisenhower squashed it and when eisenhower was still hearing that stalin suspected it, eisenhower sent a note to stalin unusual if you stop to think about it. Theater commander sending a note to the enemy general and political it all depends what you mean by serious planning but theres paperwork to back up the contentions that the allies were considering it at least. Well go to the audience here with jim, please. You raised a slightly intriguing question. Eisenhower sent stalin a note. Did his bosses know about that or did they tell him to go do it . Its like being the executive director of the institute of want to make sure everybody is in the loop. Certainly one person who didnt know about eisenhowers letter in advance was churchill and he was fairly burned about it. Eisenhower churchill relationship, which we dont talk about it enough. I think were interested in eisenhower and roosevelt and maybe excuse me, churchill and roosevelt and were interested in eisenhower and montgomery, general to general. But the Churchill Eisenhower relationship is crucial and probably bears a little more attention, too. Chuven hill is the one who was more upset about it, but that washington certainly knew some representation was going to be made. So the next question comes from mike online. And im going to ask a followup to it. Maybe best for the panel to discuss this, but is there any evidence they discussed the seizure of german scientists and research . And my followup is does the halting at the elb allow them to focus on hunting the nazi scientists . I love when im able to do this. I really dont know. I dont know the details of the protocols that was discussed at yalta. Dr. Plokii does. Lets save that one for the panel. I dont see why the halt at the elb would affect that because were processing the population. Probably halting at the elb probably meant we missed a lot of scientists who we might have picked up and went into soviet captivity. I dont think there was a long i dont think those two things are related, ill put it that way. To your left in the front row here. Go easy, joe. Your planted question. The final months of the war saw scherner and other Party Leaders killing civilians left and right. In the book promise me youll shoot yourself shows a fractured and suicidal german population. Great book. It is. Fantastic. But at what point do they just have to admit that its over . Is it at yalta, is it the collapse of the reichs, the defeat of the where do you have to throw in the towel . Of course, dismissing the fact that youre led by a mad man thats refusing to throw in the towel . Thats a good question. Ive had to think about it a lot in my own books and my own research. After the war, german generals were writing off those very popular memoirs, gudarian, and on and on. Theres a pile of them. They were all saying real early, like i knew the moment i met hitler this was going to be trouble. I knew the moment he decided to invade poland. Operation barbarosa, what a nutty idea. Thats what they said after the war. Thats not what they were saying at the time. So loyalty whether you are a convinced national socialist, i dont know whether you read all of alfred rosenbergs racial treatises or not, at some point it boiled down to loyalty to hitlers person. And thats why his suicide was so crucial to the ultimate and final collapse of german resistance all across the front. Look, if motel not a good example because he shot himself before the end of the war. After the war, ruschstedt the attack in the ardent, led to the battle of the bulge, i knew it wouldnt work. They wanted us to go to antwerp. We should get down on our knees if we get to the muse. Im going to say this, try to lay my cards on the table f he knew that operation was senseless, he got 100,000 german soldiers killed for no reason at all. Its a bogus concept of loyalty that only goes up. Generals have some loyalty to the men under their command as well, and so i dont know when did most germans realize the gig was up . Perhaps for many of them, it was hitlers suicide and you would be better off admitting that. I was loyal till the end rather than saying i knew this operation was stupid. Thats not what he said in his order of the day. Forward for the fuhrer for victory. On and on and on. Sorry to bum everybody out. I get off on these tangents at times. To your left here. Sure. In the decision of the japanese to surrender, how much did manchuria represent in terms of the resources left for the support of the army . Thats a good question. I hesitate to give percentages. Manchuria is a resource region, which is why the japanese seized it in the first place in 1931. It is not resources that is really at issue here. There were still those in Japanese Foreign service who were holding out some hope that the soviets could work could serve as an intermediary between them, the japanese and the western allies. The reason for this is they were not at war. The japanese and soviets had signed a nonaggression pact. There was a faint hope. You could say thats the craziest thing i ever heard. Youre probably right. People hold all kinds of ideas that prove to be silly and wrong. Thats whats at issue here. Its not that they invaded manchuria and seized a particularly wealthy province. Its that they violated the nonaggression pact and now had come into the war against japan. If that was your final hope then its now xloelt gone. I think thats the issue, much more than the resource issue. One more thing here, even the resources of manchurians, its difficult to get them to the home islands. Its merchant marine has been torched by u. S. Submarine attacks. Not so much the resource issue. I thought i saw a young lady with her hand up. All the men just put their hand down. This is not the hand i saw but tom has a question for you, rob. Sure. Hey, tom. Historians occasionally engage in retroactive moral judgment. So heres one. Okay. Good. Lets say that roosevelt and his assistants entered into a quid pro quo agreement with stalin. Well give you poland, yugoslavia, chezechoslovakia an hungary, what do you think . Are you suggesting thats what happened at yalta . Are you saying thats what happened at yalta . I just want to know. Im not agreeing or disagreeing. Kind of sort of, yeah. I dont think theres any doubt that yalta, much of what was discussed at yalta, but not all, can be qualified or characterized as reale politic. You give us men to help invade japan, that was precisely what was done. Its very honest about human nature. Itst says people wont do things for altruistic motives but they will do things for a quid pro quo. You do something for me and ill do something for you. If thats all yalta was, then why all the talk about the United Nations . Thats not the sort of reale politique. Its that people cooperate with one another and sometimes theyre willing to surrender their sovereignty in the interest of the broader Global Community or regional community. What youve said is essentially a pretty good characteristic. The western allies wanted some stuff. They got some stuff. Stalin wanted some stuff. He got some stuff. Im deliberately talking kind of silly, but thats what reale politique is all about. I think a good Foreign Policy im just going to opine about all sorts of things i know nothing about right now. I think a good Foreign Policy has to have elements of both. It has to have elements. You have to be a horse trader and say im not getting everything i want but im going to get something i want. You have to be willing to give up things. I think thats necessary for good Foreign Policy. I think to sell that Foreign Policy in a democratic society, elements of altruism and idealism are probably also important. I think thats where roosevelt was so successful as a statesman. Im a roosevelt fan, i dont mind stating that. I think he had both. Rob, to your right, please, with bill. Thank you. With the hey, bill. European war over may 8th and this not happening with the manchurian investigation until august 9, didnt liar cheater uncle joe have plenty of time to have done this long before the 9th and did he, in fact, wait for hiroshima before he pulled the trigger . No, he didnt wait till hiroshima before he pulled a trigger on the manchuria operation because its too big. You dont just turn it on. It required a great deal of preparation and, again, a great deal of transfer, number of troops and tanks, tens of thousands transferred across the entire eurasia land mass. Whether stalin was waiting to be certain that power was smashed, it may well have been how he thought it. It does not appear i will tell you 100 , dr. Plokii can probably answer this better than i can. I dont think an operation as big as august storm, were calling it, can just be plugged in at the last minute. They dropped a bomb. Lets attack manchuria. Too much planning is necessary. Months. Actually, three months. Three months and a day, as it turned out. Stalin was one day late on his promise of two to three months. Although that was left deliberately, i think, approximate. To your right here, rob, dr. Molette. Oh, boy. I was going to come to your defense but now ill sit down. Theres an element to the manchurian operation that gets overlooked. At this point the soviets regard whatever they get in manchuria as reparations, hundreds of thousands of japanese soldiers will go into slave labor camps for years, japanese industrial developments, developing nuclear weapons, all kinds of Industrial Infrastructure that the russians wanted to get. They didnt want to destroy it, they just wanted to take it. And that makes a lot of difference in how you design a military operation. Yeah. This one was done for maxim packet at the point of contact. Maximum early impact, front loaded. Overrun, smash the military opposition so youre not fighting your way through any of the other cities on the manchurian heartland. Rob, to your right, back of the middle. Do we know what stalin knew about the atomic bomb when he planned and launched this operation . He must have had some intelligence on such developments, and everyone was working on the same scientific bed of knowledge. The announcement at pottsdam is pretty famous. Truman says we have this bomb of enormous power, whatever words he used. He was deliberately underwhelmed, probably to give the idea well have a few thousand of those coming up in our own production as well. I dont think the atomic bomb was as much of a secret as its often portrayed of being, just because the science was international. The science was international before the outbreak of world war ii. All right. Ladies and gentlemen, round of applause for rob citino. [ applause ] week nights, this week, were featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan 3. Tonight, civil war scholar rod graig successes the civil war. Then civil war scholar Timothy Smith explores the 1863 battle of Champion Hill that was part of the vicksburg campaign, followed by civil war scholar jeffrey hunt, detailing the movements of general george mead and union forces as they follow ed confederates through virginia. American history tv tonight, beginning at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan3. Michael bishop is the former director of George Washington universitys National Churchill library and center. Next, he looks at the february 1945 yalta conference between allied leaders Winston Church l churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and josef stalin. Mr. Bishop focuses on churchills role at the meeting and how yalta impacted the british Prime Minister personallan