Test. Test test. Test test test. That is more or less reflected in the number of the divisions. But more important than that is the dynamics of what is happening. The soviets are about to take berlin. The western allies as well that is the contest for the conferenc context for the conference. Issues that were discussed, the conference apart from the military coordination of the military, the activity on the Eastern Front and the western front, was of course the future of germany. And we talked about that a little bit earlier. The question was whether or not there would be small germanys, roosevelt saying when i was a student and i travelled and everything was wonderful and peaceful, and the german states he has no real problem with dividing germany into a number of states. Chur churchill was also excited about that. Germany, but in yalta he was the one who was pushing for that. And fdr and churchill were champions of that idea and they were in a position where they were not prepared to commit, and the main reason for that is they advised they brought from their state department to a foreign office. And the advice was if you try to introduce Something Like that you would have to keep troops on the ground and there would be a real occupation unless there are moments from below that could be supported that those regions, those lands would go independently imposing from above would mean the occupation and insurgency. And the british were not prepared to do that for financial reasons for the United States. The government believed that what happened what would happen after world war ii is what happened after world war i, the United States would go into isolationist bode. There is no way to keep american troops in europe for more than two years. So the idea pretty much dies in yalta despite the fact that the documents that are signed there still suggest that situation could happen. But the issue that is being discussed is about the zones of occupation. And that is where churchill tries to get the zone of occupation for france. He also tries to bring france into the Security Council of the United Nations. He needs allies in europe. He did you want think that europe would be able on its own to keep germany down. Stalin doesnt believe the soviet union on its own could do that as well. It is very interesting, we are all, when we think about the future, our vision is based on what happened on e in the past. We base it on experience. And these are people who just 20 years earlier thinking about the year 2,000, right . From their perspective world wawar 1 ended and it was very recent in their mind. They think the United States will not stay in europe but they also know that germany, no matter how much it has destroyed to date will be back in 20 years. That is their thinking and we know it will be a very powerful force. So stallen agrees to the zone of occupation, but says you can give them gones of occupation from your own zones of occupation. From britain and from america, and that is what happens. And now the big issue is dealing with germany is reparations. Stallen wants 20 billion. The british and fdr are very worried about that. They look at them as their sphere of influence, and they think that with reparations like that, the idea that yalta is half dead, but fdr liked it personally because of the inquiry. And the british dont have resources to supply to support millions and millions of people. So theyre against reparations after world war one germans were supposed to pay reparations. They took loans, they never returned them, it was a mess and fdrs position is we can talk about whe whatever, but we can put a dollar number to those because i will have backlash when i come back to the United States. Stalin gets his way and they make reparations, so if you look at germany as a battleground between this different countries, it looks like he gets reparations. And fdr, you remember, his main objective, United Nations, and war in the pacific, this is not something that is really very high on the american agenda. A big issue in poland. They spend more time in poland, and thats how important is important for them. And there are two sets of questions with poland. The first one is the borders. Because poland prewar poland, was probably the only case in history that was lifted up and then moved west ward. And you had to negotiate earn borders. Stalin insit sted on the border. And it means turning and so on and so forth. So out of the german population from eastern germany, and establishing the polish state there. The eastern border with the soviet union is decided and basically the soviet union would get its way with poland. And with poland not a big issue was the debates there. So poland was a major specichur, and stalin did not even predict how important the document would be and he proposed to sign a declaration on the liberated europe. Which in the cold war was the one way that was clear that the soviets didnt do what they promised to do, but that was a declaration, that was nothing specific. It became a major factor in the cold war, but they spent maybe 15 minutes on that. But it would become an important issue. So loss to churchill, win to stalin. The pacific. One of the key reasons why fdr risks his life to go to yalta to get commitment from stalin to participate in the pacific war. And he knew already from his ambassador in moscow that what he wanted in return. He wanted japanese territories. He wanted the southern part, and he wanted the ports. The soviets have influence there because stalin wanted control over their railroad that was leading to those ports. That is on this map what actually happened over the sphere of influence over in china. I just mentioned they spent more on poland than any other, but on the far east, they spent 30 minutes. Which was on the margins of the conference. They spent so little because so much time went into preparation of that meeting and they already knew each others positions and fdr knew what stalin wanted. And he felt very uncomfortable but also the ally nationalist china at that time. So he was postponing this meeting, but he was getting one memo after another saying the commanders refuse to discuss anything related to the pacific war before the issues are resolved. And eventually those issues are resolved one more big issue that was discussed, the go ahead for the United Nations was also given at yalta. The United States, fdr, got stalin to commit to being part of the United Nations. And to accept the power and the way how the measures are for the Security Council. In exchange for that, stalin insisted that the soviet union have more than one vote. From that point in the United States there was a strong opposition that any country would have more than one vote. And fks dr agrees and he gets also Something Back from Stalin Stalin says he would not mind if the United States also had more than one vote. There is a discussion that there would be alaska and hawaii that would join the United Nations. But once that information was leaked to the american public, there was a major scandal. People were prepared to forgive stalin and for breaking one nation and one vote, but not to forgive or accept that from their own president. So were not supposed to behave like that. So that is very interesting. And alaska never became a member of the United Nations. Im pretty sure im running out of time, so i will try to wrap up my presentation. I miserably failed to cover all aspects of the yalta conference, but i tried to deal with the most important ones and the big question is, after this very short overview, whether or not the hi srstography was a failurr not. Maybe it was an unqualified success for the United States and for the western allies. Well the answer to all of these may be more nuanced than the questions themselves. And one thing that is very obviously is that yatla was perceived as a Great Success for all three powers. They got what they wanted. What was at the very top of their agenda, all of them, it turned out that it wasnt necessary. Truman was trying to stop that, at that point from the perspective of february of 1945 that was a big success. Stalin knew he would get away with whatever he wanted, but there was a formal agreement to support democratic processes, so there was a hope for churchill and fdr. France was not only given occupation in germany, but there was modest reasons for churchill to be happy as well. And stalin got to keep his booty in eastern europe. The red army would take over and it would be his to decide. So there was a euphoria to a degree. There was one exception when it comes to the americans who were not participants, per se, but theyre on the margins, and that group of americans were the american airmen and also the ground specialists of the u. S. Air force that were stationed in 1944 and 1945 at the three american air bases in todays ukraine in the region of poltava. They are the main characters and heros of my book. It was written on the basis of now open kgb archives. And they knew when they were close to one year being under soviet control. They were aware of what was being said is what necessarily has to happen. They knew about the major differences that existed between the allies, especially when it comes to questions of political culture, democracy, and authoritarian regime. And one of them, a farmer from illinois left memoirs about that. And he wrote something that i whole heartedly accepted in my book. He said you know what . What we witnessed back then on those air bases in 44 and 45 was really the start of the cold war. He was in the u. S. Army at that time. And that, and those under lying intentions, not just geopolitical but also in terms of political culture, they brought an unraveling of the grand alliance. Yalta was a very important part of that story, but i dont think it can be either fully credited or fully blamed for what happened late. It happened when it happened, and it was an important step for defeating germany and japan. Thank you very much for your attention. Thank you, dr. Plokhy. You just referenced the kgb archives, what is the status and how did you achieve access . Well, the kgb archives are closed as they used to be on the territory of russia today. That is where the major documents are. They are probably the most open archives that exist in ukraine today. There is an openness of the archiv archives. Because of those three air bases that im talking about, that was the only case where the americans were side by side. The british and the americans were together, but the Soviets Union were fighting in france, so those air bases were the only exception to that rule. Those materials are based in kiev. Theyre accessible. I was in touch with mostly families and sons of some of those people who were there, exchanging that information and also trying to get memoirs. Going back towards the end of the room in the center there. Two questions, first of all, the ten billion that stalin requested, what did he get in reparations. Second i understand your original there was a proposal for a line running could you expand on that, please . Sure, i will start with the american proposal. The original headline was really when they started to discuss that, the soviets were surprised and the british were surprised. And theyre projecting that given that at that time, it is what was very early days that just happened. And the american negotiators had no explanation of why they argue that. This is something that i wrote on the napkins when i was flying. Eventually those things were renegotiated and the british insisted let me get to the m map. It got to germany, they would be there. The british insisted, the zone of occupation, but they, the u. S. Started really with basically asking for the line that was supposed to go like that and all of that was claimed by fdr. But not without any kind of a consultation. But i think there was good negotiation. They go to the occupation, and the occupation was not just jdr, but also all of this. So the soviets got good part of germany, and what was decided was demarcation lines for the question able prague and so on and so forth. And the expectation was that if the mesh or the british troops would cross that line, they would be that is what was actually happening. Now the question on the reparations. Asked for 20 bill, they got ten. And then it was the start of the cold war. The creation of western germany and the soviets lost access through the equipment and other things that were in other areas. And and they said okay, we cant keep taking more and more. For the soviet union, it became impossible to keep taking money, resources, and everything else. But the equipment, and the u. S. Was less interested in the reparations, but once the documents were signed, it was a signature to reparations as well, and roosevelt said he didnt need any property. That he didnt need any assets. The only things he was interested in was the ger man know how nap is the irony for that story. So they got part of those ten billion. To what extent is the yalta failure and u. S. China debate. Very much so. The major publications, i mentioned in the late 40s, just fighting that battle, then comes the loss of china. And the states the department of state official Charles Bolan who was at yalta was an advisor to fdr. She going through the congress for their appointment to be ambassador to the soviet union. It is available. So it was big. That was an important part. It is exactly then after 1950 where you see it. A quick question with a quick answer, did the western leaders know they were being bugged . They didnt know, but they suspected and fdr at some point said i dont remember any more if that was in the context of yalta. That he didnt mind letting them listen. We have nothing to hide kind of approach. Dr. Carey here to your left. Thank you for the nice talk, at the yalta conference, they decided to recognize the partisans and give them direct as much direct support as they could, how did this come about and does this have any amifications for the post war events in the balkins . Thank you, it was discussed, but it got very little attention on the highest level. The decision really took place at the socalled bosco conference of 1944 and that is when the agreement, the per sen substantial agreement, was 50 50, and by yalta, he knows he is being treated or whatever. They want to. And i should im pretty sure there are no major decisions, so the give on yugoslavia was 50 50. One final question here to your right. Thank you so much, two quick questions. To what extent did roosevelts frailties affect his ability to negotiate effectively, and how much of the information was given to truman also knowing the frailties of his situation. Well, truman was very much forced on fdr as his Vice President in 1944. So there was maybe two meetings there between the two leaders, but once fdr died, the it was a key figure. He got on the lane and he flew to washington to advise truman on the yalta fwreemts, and that was a time when they come to the first founding convention. And he also came to washington. And he convinced truman that they were violating the agreements at yalta, and the first meeting was quite dramatic when he said no one has talked to me like that, and truman said just stick to it and no one will talk to you. That was really the beginning, kbu up until 1947, truman was really unprepared going from one extreme to another. He was very har much. The advisor was the ambassador to moscow. Last name davis, first name escapes me now, he informs moscow during the show trials and believed everything he saw there. He became a cold wor your now. And whether or not that was the question. This is a great question. And now for a number of years, kun after t and one of the students wrote a very good question asking that. He approached that by e looking at the at the yalta discussion. And did they correspond to his vision or the vision of the state department. And the conclusion was that clearly he was in that state. His country fusions for the discussion and the discussion was fewer, but he actually never, never really waivered from the position that he wanted to take. Very often, more often than not, that position was different from the position of the state department. But it doesnt mean that he just didnt know what he was doing or that he didnt understand what was going on. He had strong opinions. At that point he was the secretary of state, he was not allowed in his discussion with stalin on the far east. Said that he didnt meet him there. Ladies and gentlemen, dr. Serhii plokhy. Thank you. Weeknights this week were featuring American History programs as a preview of what is available this weekend. The battle of fort fisher which occurred in december of 1864 and january of 1865. Then civil war psychologicschol. Here is part of champion hill, followed by jeffrey hun detailing the movements of union forces as they follow confederates through virginia. Tonight at 8 00 p. M. Eastern. Next, National World war two expert Robert Citino talks about how the decisions at the yalta conference affected the ending of world war 12. This is part of a day long symposium. Welcome back to the Madeline Paul hilliard conference center. I hope everybody enjoyed their lunch. We spent this morning doing some pretty high Level Analysis of the political and strategic situation that existed among the leaders