Transcripts For CSPAN3 Yalta - The Conference In Crimea 20240713

Place at a crimean resort in ukraine. This talk is part of a World War Ii Museum symposium marking the 75th anniversary of the yalta talks between winston churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. For our next event, it is more or less the key note of the day because it is the talk on the yalta conference, although all of the sessions will be wonderful. We have Serhii Plokhii here, the director of the ukrainian history and director of Research Institute at harvard. As i mentioned this morning, he has been on our list for a long time and we finally found the time to bring him down here to enlighten us. His titles include the last empire, thethe cossack myth, and the forgotten pastors of the Eastern Front, and yalta for peace. Ladies and gentlemen, dr. Serhii plokhii. [applause] mr. Collins, thank you very much for this introduction. Thanks to the organizers of the conference for bringing me here. I also want to thank all of you because carmen from boston the and thinking what the weather is like today and decided to come inside and listen to presentations like mine. I really appreciate that sacrifice. Thank you. The organizers really couldnt find a better time to have a conference like that given that we are really having this symposium 75 years almost day today to the conference that took place in crimea back in february of 1945. The conference that is still very much in many levels. On february 4th of this year, that was exactly the anniversary of the conference. I checked the Media Coverage and of course the conference was not forgotten. There were pieces online on the anniversary of the Congress Conference coming from russia. There was an oped in the New York Times. There was on bbc a major expose on the conference. It is interesting that in each of these contexts, the titles were different on the emphasis was different. The conference is important for all of this country but for different reasons. The New York Times oped was the title about Something Like we still live in the world made by stalin. In germany, it was about the conference making the post world war well. In russia it was about what a wonderful time it was and the founders of the United Nations should get together and Start Talking again. Yalta is the conference that is remembered not just on the anniversary like february the 4th of 2020, its the conference that is there whether fulfill it is february or, april or may, it doesnt matter because of its symbolic importance. If you think that this is just one particular situation where someone wants to make fun of and me that you see on the screen, this is not exactly the case. Every president ends up to be in a photograph that would be adjusted in an appropriate way. There will be chinese leaders, german leaders, depending on the situation. The question is, why . I dont think there is more Iconic Images that exist there of diplomacy as such. Diplomacy of world war ii but diplomacy in general. In that sense, yalta keeps coming back again and again. In this country, yalta was very much part of major debates and discussions which were on history but were in politics in the late forties, fifties, sixties, seventies, through most of the cold war. Yalta was there. The question that certainly one has good reason to ask, why yalta . We talked about in the excellent presentation by professor finish off, there was a discussion of the conference that led to yalta. There was mention of podesta. Yalta is a conference that is happening still very much in the middle of the war but it is still considered as a peace conference to a degree there was any after world war ii. If you think about this conference why all to . For one of the reasons for that is that you all to really is important decisions were made. Some of them were prepared by previous conferences that were other finalized. Another reason was that that was happening to be the last conference of president roosevelt. That was really his last and major, major move accomplishment or failure depending on how people were looking at that in the International Arena and conditions of the forties and early 50s. As you know, issues of history can become very political. The discussions and debates between republicans and democrats, that conference was there more than any other conference at the time. There was little interest to go after truman. No one believed that he would last for so long but certainly the legacy, democratic legacy, was associated with president roosevelt. Both politics are not politics of the moment, politics of the year. Our decade is not the only reason why yalta was so prominent. Another reason was, when it comes to world war ii, the image emerged for some very good reasons that it was a good war in the sense to a degree that worse can be good. In a sense, the war was fought for right reasons. Biologically and otherwise and also the war that actually brought, on the certain level, resolve that were expected. You can compare the occupation of germany and then later the occupation of iran or iraq, sorry. There were attempts to somehow model it and what happened in germany or japan and it didnt happen that way. That also explains maybe one of the reasons why it is world war ii and not korean war, vietnam and so on and so forth that grew prominently in american and historical imagination. The good war ended with not something that most people expected it to end. It ended in cold war. There were high expectations, with the United Nations, victory in germany, there will be a very different kind of International Order that would come into existence. A very different International Order came to the floor but that war was surely divided into two war camps. The main adversary was the former world war ii ally, the soviet union. First stalin and under his successors. There was a need to explain what actually happened. From that point of view, yalta happen to be an easy explanation. Either its the fdr bad health or its the presence who was later put in prison and the documents supported the argument that he was spying for the soviets and there was also mr. White that professor mentioned who is working with in the American Administration while working on stalin. It was easy to explain that the start of the cold war, the fall of the grand alliance. To a degree that was the result of certain decisions, wrong decisions that were made in a very particular time, very particular place. The time was yalta conference foes yalta. Over the period of time after the conference in the forties, fifties, sixties, the thinking in writing and researching about the conference came through a number of stages. The debate started very early on with publish of memories from the participants of the conference on the american side like the secretary of state burns and his predecessor, secretary of state edward, who wrote a book, roosevelt in the russians, the yalta conference and the issues that were there was exactly the issues that i just described. To what degree, the world that we got at the beginning of the cold war was the outcome of mistakes or unprepared on the part of fdr. That was the argument that happen at the yalta conference. In some parts of europe and in particular in poland and poland itself a polish immigration. In eastern europe, he also became a symbol of betrayal. Taken to a degree the place munich has been taken. Western betrayal of allies and smaller countries. Forties and fifties run to mostly under the understanding of yalta as the bad conference that ends good war. As a result, we get not Perfect Piece after that. The sixties bought to the floor of his geography the revisionist of all sorts and all kinds and the result of the rear evaluation of yalta came in the book published in 1970 by the young clemons, which is call yalta. Her take on the conference was there was no betrayal. If you look in terms of real politics, what goals had the soviet union, what goes have the United States of america. The outcome was not bad at all. What critics of claimants interpretation and saying yes its probably true but this is truth based on Research Done in the american and british archives. We know that they are maneuvering and we know that they were negotiating positions and long term strategies and so on and so forth. The soviet documents and soviet position look like a black box because there are no access to the soviet archives. They were surely trying to create stalin not only as good or as bad as the western politicians but also to a degree that their argument is there and that stalin was eruptive in victory by the western maneuver. Then in the cold war, brought access to the soviet archives. That allowed us to look at the yalta conference, not just from the perspective of the source that we have from the western side but also from the soviet side. Not to surprise, many found out that stalin was quite dishonest in the position that he was taking in the way he was playing the game. The fact that the premise was bogged, that all of this information was reported to human so on and so forth. I cant cover probably everything that was discussed after all, it took them eight days to do that. I got roughly 40 minutes. I will try to do my best but i will try to touch upon the major themes associated with the start of the conference and major blocks of the issues, questions that were discussed there. I promise you that whatever i try to do, it will not be comprehensive, i would not be able to cover everything but i will be more than happy to answer questions after that. Let me start with the location of the conference and that is something that there was a number of questions related to that and it was discussed. This is the photo of the palace in in yalta and it looks like a really nice place to come there. It is one of the warmest places back then on the territory of the soviet union or. There is one one problem with that. This photo was taken during summer months. Fdr and churchill and stalin, against alan was an easier trade but fdr and churchill were traveling from far away to this day palace in crimea. Churchill was saying if they would spend two years looking for a worse place then yalta, they would not find one. If you think that he was flying from mediterranean fdr was flying from i dont remember now. They were coming from much, much warmer places. That is a takeover by the workers and peasants of the sars palace in the beginning of the 1920s. They were destroyed by the nazis and had to be rebuilt by Joseph Stalin in time for the conference. There was a question whether it was stalins choice and whether he wanted to show the destruction of crimea. Stalins preference was odessa, which is the bigger town bigger city worry was logistically easier for him to organized the conference and still relatively warm. He had to mueller fdr to come all the way to the soviet union. It was Harry Hopkins who was really when it comes to roosevelts foreign policy. Who knew fdr red mark twain and twain traveled to crimea. It was on his maps somewhere because of the crimea war, because of mark twain, and fdr wanted to go to the places that he didnt see before. So does so didnt sound right but crimea fit the bill and eventually that is what happened. It was not just a destruction that was done by the fight that had been done by the germans. A few months before the yalta conference, 200,000 crimean fathers were so forced to resettle by stolen in that area. That added to the devastation and to the d population. In particular, the areas of crimea where the conference was taking place along the sea line. There was a good question, if it was such a devastated place, if it was so cold and unpleasant, why at the end was a delta . The main reason was that stalin refused to go anywhere else. He was afraid of flying after flying to tehran, he had some problems with his ear and decided not to do that. As many dictators were quite paranoid in the sense that he didnt want to go anywhere where he wasnt under the protection. Tehran was also the place which was half occupied by the red army. It was a territory and completely occupied by the red army and yalta was not an exception. He also bump the promises, which helped him with negotiations. Why did the leaders of the western world decide to go through all of that trouble and travel so far that professor bishop already mentioned that fdr couldnt fly above certain levels and those were conditioned to really on pressurize for cabins. It was very difficult for his Health Condition at that time. Why did they do that . The reason was that they actually needed something from stalin. They were there to negotiate with him, not just the end of the war but also the piece after the war before the soviets were in berlin. Before the soviets solidified their control over eastern and Central Europe. That was also one of the reasons why churchill flew to masako in 1944 in october of 1994 to make the percentage agreement because he saw how fast the red army was moving and he thought, if i can get anything from stalin in terms of the agreement, this is the right time. Fdr really puts his life on the line. He could very well not return from that trip. Either just die in the plane or they had in the minutes radiant to fly over the german position for and they were shooting at them. They were five fired. That is very important to keep in mind about the yalta conference. The place it takes place also tells you something about this position at that time. Who needs whom in that negotiation and who has the trump cards . This is Joseph Stalin for. The minister of foreign affairs, Commissariat Foreign Affairs and they are portrayed here. This is one of the photos from the soviet archives that became available after 1991. They are waiting for the fdr and churchill before the famous photograph was taken that i started this presentation with. That would be 20 minutes before they are waving the court of the palace. That is president roosevelt after landing in crimea. You see that he is tired, you see that he is sick, you can see here that he doesnt have much time. That photo, in my opinion, also states the point that i tried to make a few minutes ago about who needed who and the kind of sacrifice that fdr and what he prepared to undertake, what risks he was once prepared to take. He left his well actually. He told his son where his well was when he was when he decided to go to yalta. Now, let me be more specific, what exactly fdr wants and needs and why he goes there. At the very top of his agenda is the croatian creation of what became known as the United Nations. It is a creation of new world order with liberal institutions. The world where there is no spheres of influence and the world which would fit very well both dramatic interests of the United States, geopolitically, in terms of business but also look like, sounds like, ideologically from the perspective of the United States. As a country that comes into existence, and revolution against an empire. That is very important to understand for the mindset of 1945. It is also important to understand the tensions that would be there between the british and the americans. The americans would be very suspicious that what churchill is trying to do is going through the soft underbelly of europe into Central Europe. This is about british imperialism. This is not about the common goal. This is not the best way to defeat nazi germany. That is the british trying to secure the control of a Central Europe. They try to center the control of the mediterranean. There was a lot of tension of that kind there. United nations is at the top of fdrs agenda and that is pushed by the state department and people in the state department. There were other generals. The generals want fdr to go to yalta to negotiate and participate in the pacific war. The estimates are that if the war do if the battle starts on the main islands, per se, the losses can be up to 750,000 american soldiers. They need allies, they need the soviet union. Nobody knows what the bump is, whether it would work or not, whether you will blow up half of the United States or it will be something that can be delivered somewhere. It is a big no. You need a lot of imagination, a lot of imagination to think that the adam that you can see and split it, it can create a major explosion. From that point of view and what becomes obvious by the summer of 1945, by the time of pods does, is not obvious at all in february of 1945. You can be laughed that if you would suggest Something Like that to the average person in 1945. That is the thing that you can see but it can blow up half of the world. Two main points on fdrs agenda. Another soviet another photo from the soviet archive. Here you see churchill who is not happy. He is not happy for a number of reasons and my colleague professor will be talking about both happiness and non happiness. One of the reasons why he is not happy is that he realizes for the first time that britain become third rate power. Literally, third rate. At the top would be the soviet union and the United States and number three, still not bad, especially by today standards, britain would be there. It wasnt clear in obvious to tehran when most of the soldiers on the western side that were on the front lines, they were british. Now the americans have to outnumber the british. The junior partner already in this alliance that is working to the west. When you bring in stalin that actually diminishes the british negotiation power. He wants a lot. He wants and gave away a certain degree to stolen in 1984 but he is not prepared to do the same. The future of germany, the role of france as a great power with which britain can actually ally in the future and help to keep western and Central Europe do a way from the soviet union is very important to him. Theres a long list of things that he wants to achieve but his negotiation power is actually diminished in yalta compared to what is happening what happened before that in tehran. This is the map that helps us understand why those western leaders are at yalta and also help us understand the first day of the discussions that was dedicated to the situation on the france. It seems from Time Magazine and a nice way to present allies working together, but as you can see, only one ally is on the defensive. The reason is conference is taking place after. The u. S. In the british are still recovering from a major surprise. They are not prepared to continue the advance when the soviets are advancing. They start their major by the time of the yalta conference they are 45 miles away. They already established bridges on water. When fdr and stalin meet, they have this bad who will be first . Americans in manila or the soviets in berlin . There is no question that the soviets will be there first. Whoever has more divisions on the ground and more six sets to show house allowed a voice in the negotiations. That brings us back to something that we keep forgetting, whether we want that are not. Yalta is not a peace conference, this is a wartime conference. What is happening on the front lines at that particular moment matters a lot and gives a lot of power or takes a lot of power from the negotiator. This is an illustration to what we had already started to discuss in terms of who contributed to what to the defeat of nazi germany, which is a separate question from the defeat of japan, right . When we talk about contribution of Different Countries to victory in world war ii, we have to remember that there are two major theaters. We quite often talk about europe. Do that is the number of people who died in world war ii. As you see, the soviet union is at the very top. Did you expect china to be there as well . We dont hear very much about china. Look where poland is dead. But thats help us and the United States and the United Kingdom are here. The deaths help us understand the situation but they dont really contribute much to the question about the overall impact, overall contribution because, the chinese are indonesia but we are arguing because theyre in indonesia more people died and made a bigger contribution to this or that. That is a good way to start and think about the world war ii in a little bit different way for how we imagine it here. In terms of the impact that it had on every day life, regular families, on destruction of life worldwide. Regarding the situation on the fronts in february of 1945, there is approximately, between 12 and 13 million of men and women in the red army on the Eastern Front. Some more around four to 4. 5 million of american and british soldiers. It is anywhere between two to three times more soviets. That is more or less what would be reflected on the number of the divisions. Even more important than the number of divisions is the dynamics of what is happening to yalta. The soviets are about to take berlin. They are fully in control of poland. They are fighting in budapest and the western allies are starting. That is the context for the conference. Issues that were discussed in the conference and activities on the Eastern Front in the western front was of course the future of germany. We talked about that a little bit and the question was whether there would be 17 small germanys. Roosevelt at some point saying, when i was a student and i traveled and everything looked wonderful and peaceful and that was all this german states. He has nothing, no real problem with divide in germany into a number of states. Churchill was also excited about a bad idea. Stalin was a late arrival to the idea for a petition of germany but in yalta, he was actually the one who was pushing for that. Fdr in churchill, before 1945, were champions of that idea. It took a position where they were not to commit to a putt partition in germany. The state department a foreign office. That advice was, if you would actually try to introduce Something Like that, you would have actually to keep troops on the ground and there should be a real occupation because there wouldnt be german resistance unless there are movements from below that can be supported that those regions, those would go independently and impose them from would mean occupation and insurgency and counter insurgency. Of course, british were not prepared to do that for financial reasons. The United States government believed that what would happen after world war ii what exactly what happened in world war one, the United States would go into isolationist mode. Churchill or fdr is saying it is yalta. There is no way it can keep american troops in europe for more than two years, the congress would never allow me to do that. The idea of the participation in march dies and yalta. Despite the fact that they are assigned and still suggest that that situation can happen. The big issue that is being discussed is about the zones of occupation. Thats where churchill tries to get the zone of occupation of france. Because he needs to build up france as a great power. He also needs to bring france into the Security Council of the united nation. Because he needs allies. He needs allies in europe, he doesnt think that britain would be able on its own, to keep germany down. Stalin doesnt believe that the soviet union on its own will be able to do that is well. Again it is very interesting, we are all, when we think about the future, our vision is based on what happened in the past. Based on experience. And this is the people who just 20 years earlier, when we think about the year 2000, from their perspective, the world war one ended, and that is where they are now, its very recent in their mind. Not only think that the United States would not stay in your but they also know, that germany, no matter how much it is destroyed today, it will be back in 20 years. Or maybe earlier. That is their thinking, and they know that it will be a very powerful force. So at the end stolen agrees to the french zone of occupation, with says we can give france its own zones of occupation. From britain, glossary from american, and that is eventually what is what happens. In other issues dealing with germany, its reparations. Stone wants 20 billion. And the british and fdr are really very worried about that especially the british people because a british look at germany and their influence, and with reparations like that, the restoration of germany that was suggested, but it is half dead but still the people who promote that. Good and have gotten elected, because the publicity was forced to abandon it, with all of that germans would be starving. And the british dont have resources, to supply and support millions and millions of people. So the british are against the reparations, the u. S. Is against the reparations, because the u. S. Public is against reparations, after world war ii one, germany was posed to pay reparations they, took loans from the United States, they never returned, them so it was a mess. And fdrs position, was that you can talk about whatever, but you cant put a dollar number to the reparations, because i will have backlash when i come back to the United States. Eventually, stalin gets his way, and there is ten billion dollars in reparation. Attributed to the soviet union. If you look at germany, as a battleground, between this Different Countries, it looks like, stalin gets reparations, churchill gets a zone of occupation, for france, and fdr, you remember fdr his main objective, United Nations, and where in the pacific, this is not something it is very high on the american agenda. A big issue in poland. Its an interesting conference, i was talking about that, wartime conference, which was perceived as a peace conference, this is also the conference where they stand on poland, more they banned time combine in germany and japan. So that is how oriented they are towards this, and thats how poland is important for them, in particular for churchill. But also for fdr. And there are two sets of questions with poland. The first one is the borders. Because poland, prewar poland, was really the country, in the only case in history, that was lifted up, and then move westward. The movement of the country, and they have to negotiate eastern borders, which are meant to basically stalin insisted on the borders, that he wanted with hitler, with western ukraine, and western belarus going to the soviet union. Then there was a question of the western border of poland, which means turning dense ink, and kicking out the german population from eastern germany and establishing a polished state there the eastern border is negotiated the western boat or not decided in potsdam but the soviet union would get its way with poland got with poland another big issue is the government and elections there. And also stalin got his way poland was a major defeat for churchill and a major victory for stalin fdr decided again i dont think he would even predict how important the document would be but he was supposed to sign get the declaration of the rated europe but the one document way that was very clear that the soviets didnt do what they promised to do but that was a declaration guy, that was Nothing Specific again it became a major factor in the cold war. But maybe they spent 15 minutes going to then signing it, but it wasnt a big important issue. So churchill went to stalin on poland. The pacific, one of the key reasons why why fdr wrist his life to go to yell to, to get commitment from stolen, to participate in the pacific war. And he knew already from his ambassador what stalin wanted risked in return he wanted part of the japanese islands, he wanted any wanted warm sea ports, and the soviets fear of influence there, because stalin wanted control over the railroad that was leading to those warm ports. That is on this map what actually happened in terms of the creation of the fact of the soviets influence and fear, in china. I just mentioned that they spend more on poland than any other subject, at yelta yelta. Between stalin and if the are they spent so much time went into preparation, and they already knew each others positions, and fdr knew what stalin wanted, fdr felt uncomfortable, to pay for the soviet participation in the war, with the territories, not just of japan, and eventually theyre defeated enemy in the future, but china at the time. He was postponing this meeting, with stalin, as the conference was moving ahead, but he was getting one memo after another, from the chiefs of staff, saying the soviet commanders refuses to discuss any through way for the pacific war before things are result. And eventually those issues are resolved. I one more big issue, that was discussed, yelta was the position of the Security Council counsel, to go ahead and have the creations of the United Nations, was also at yelta gun. United states, fdr eventually brought stalin, to commit to be part of the United Nations. And accept the veto power, and the way how the matters went for the Security Council, in exchange for that stalin insisted, that the soviet union had more than one vote. Which was difficult for fdr and the American Public, because when they were league of nations was being created, and from that point, in the United States, there was a strong very strong position that any country, would have more than one vote. And that fdr eventually, and he gets Something Back from stone, stone says that he wouldnt mind if the United States, would also have more than one vote. And there is the discussion, that there would be alaska and hawaii, that would join the United Nations, and have that, once that that information was leaked to the American Public there was a major scandal, people were prepared actually to have one nation one vote, but they werent going to accept that from the president. So we are not supposed to behave like that, it was very interesting. And as you know alaska never became a member of the United Nations. Im pretty sure, im running out of time so i will try to wrap up my presentation again i miserably failed to capture all aspects of the conference i try to deal with the most important ones. The big question is after this very short overview, whether the historiography of the forties and fifties and then seventies and eighties was right or wrong, whether yalta was really a failure in diplomacy or was it a betrayal . Did it start the cold war or maybe it was unqualified success for the United States and for the western allies . The answer to all this is maybe nuanced in the questions themselves. One thing that is very obvious that yalta immediately after the agreement was signed, was perceived as a Great Success for all three powers. The reason for that was they actually got what they want, what was at the very top of their agenda, all of them. Fdr got United Nations and participation of the soviet union, the soviet position in the soviet war turned out it was a necessary. Truman was then trying to stop them but at that point from the perspective of february 1945, that was a big success. Stella knew that he would get away with doing whatever he wanted to do in poland but there was also a formal agreement to support democratic processes. There was a hope for churchill and fdr. France was not only given the occupation of germany but also sitting on the Security Council. There were some modest reasons for churchill to be there as well. Stalin basically got to keep his and eastern europe. The red army would take over and would be his to decide. There was this euphoria, to a degree, with one exception. When it comes to the americans who were not participants in the conference per se but were there on the margins, that group of americans were the american airmen and also the ground specialist of the u. S. Air force that was stationed in 1944 in 1945 and the three american air bases in todays ukraine in the region a poll tasha. They are the main characters and heroes of my book, which is written on the basis of the now kgb archives. They knew when they were close to one year of being under the soviet control, they were aware about the fact that what was being said and the soviets were not exactly what necessarily have to happen. They knew about the major differences that existed between the allies, especially when it comes to questions of political culture, democracy and authoritarian regime. One of them, a farmer from illinois left memories about that. He wrote something that he whole heartedly accepted in my book. He said, you know what, when we mitt witnessed back then in those air bases in 1944, 1945, was really the start of the cold war. That was very, very, very interesting assessment from someone who was not really sitting at the negotiation table. He was a sergeant in the u. S. Army at that time. Those underline intentions, not just geopolitical but also in terms of politics and political caution and understanding how the world should hope, eventually it brought the unraveling of the grand alliance and the start and beginning of the cold war. He often was very important part of that story. I dont think a can be fully credited or fully blamed for what happened. It happened when it happened. It was an important step to defeat germany and the defeat of japan. Thank you very much. applause . Think you doctor, we will get to a question in the back here in a minute but the first one will come from online, you just referenced the kgb archives and counter had talked about his top, openness, closeness, what is the status and how did you achieve access to those archives . Well, the kgb archives are not as closed as they used to be on the territory of russia today, and that is where the major documents and sources are. The kgb archives are probably the most open archives that exist in ukraine today, after the revolution of dignity. So there is an openness of archives. And because those airbases that i am talking about, that was the only case where the americans and soviets were fighting sidebyside. The grand alliance was a strange alliance. The british and americans were together, but the soviet union was fighting on a different front, so those airbases over the only exception to that rule. And because it was in ukraine, those materials of military counterintelligence, surveillance of the population, they are based in kiev and they are accessible. There are volumes and volumes of documents. And i was in touch with families and sons of some of those people who are there, exchanging information and also trying to get either memoirs of their correspondence or photographs, and i included those in the book as well. Toward the back in the center. Two questions, first of all the ten billion that stalin requested, what did he actually get in reparations . The second question is, my understanding is the original participation of germany was going to be further east, there was an american proposal for a line running, could you expand on that please . I will start with the american proposal. The original line was really to the u. S. Was supposed to go not just west but also central germany. When the three part tied commission started to discuss that, the soviets were surprised and the british were surprised and on what basis you ask is surely a projection given at that time, it was very early days and militarily it was impossible to discuss that. The american negotiators had no explanation why they were arguing that. Eventually they went back to fdr and fdr said, dont read this seriously, this is something that i wrote on the napkins when i was flying from casablanca or Something Like that. Eventually those things were renegotiated and the british insisted that they would get, let me get to the map, that they would get this part of germany, which was much easier to supply. The american proposal was originally that they would be there. Again the british insisted. The u. S. Zone of occupation and a good part of it went to france was in the area where it was not easy to provide supplies and so on and so forth. There was no access. The u. S. Started with basically asking probably the line was supposed to go like that in all of that was claimed by fdr, but not without any kind of consultation on syrias thought of Something Like that. I think that was a good nato negotiation strategy. One of course helped the soviets to give this part of germany to poland was it went to the soviets occupation. The soviets occupation was not just gdr but also all this part. The soviets got a good part of germany and again, what was decided, there was a line as to the question of prague and so on and so forth. They started from 1944 and the expectation was that if the soviet troops, the american, british troops would cross that line, they would withdraw. That is actually what was happening. There were withdrawals. Now the question on the reparations, they were asking for 20 billion and got permission to take ten billion. He couldnt take all of that because of the start of the cold war. The fact that the creation of western germany in the western occupation and eastern germany here, the soviets lost access to the equipment and other things that were in rural and other areas which were in the western part of germany. They ended up in mostly agricultural areas. When the martial plan kicked in, they said the we cant keep taking more and more from the occupation, because we have to keep them at least to a degree competitive. With the u. S. , and foreign money who are pouring money in. The soviet union it became a political impossibility, to keep taking money resources and other things out of germany. But they got a lot that was also a major drop for them because thats slowed down their own organization, there equipment and the u. S. Was less interested in the reparations. Once the documents were signed the u. S. Was a signature to the reparations as well, and roosevelt said that he didnt need property, he didnt need the the only thing he was interested in was patents and german know how, and so on so forth. And in the long run, the u. S. Benefited the most from that compared to the british and the soviets. Which is an irony, to that story. They got part of the ten billion, but they didnt get as much as the soviet union. The next question is here right, halfway back. Thank you in question of his geography, to what extent is yelta a failure as in who lost china debate in the fifties in the u. S. Very much so, the major publications, i mentioned that already in the late forties they were just fighting that battle and then the loss of china. The ambassador the department of state official, charles baldwin, who was at yalta as one of the advisors to fdr, he was going through the hearings in congress to be ambassador to the soviet union. It is online all the discussion. It was about the loss of china. We cannot explain it just by the loss of china, this very negative attitude toward the yalta conference, but that was an important part. It is just after 1949, when you see one publication after another. So it became not a battle between the former diplomat, but a much more public affair. We will get to the quick leaders know that they were being bugged . They did not know, but they suspected. And fdr at some point said, i do not remember anymore whether it was in the context of yalta, but that he did not mind, let them listen. We have nothing to hide kind of approach. Dr. Caray to the left. Thank you for the nice talk. At the yalta conference, the western allies decided to recognize the yugoslavians and give them as much as they could. How did that come about and it did it have ramifications for the postwar events in the balkans . Thank you. Yugoslavia was discussed itself, but it got little attention on the highest level. This the meetings between the principals. The key decision took place in moscow in 1944. That is when the agreement was that yugoslavia was 5050. By the time of yalta, churchill already knows he is being outgunned or cheated or whatever, that the soviets actually want to have full control over yugoslavia. And in that context, the negotiations in poland would also be affected by what happened in yugoslavia. And again, i am pretty sure that there were no major decisions made at that level, but on the lower level there could be some technical issues decided. But the 5050 of yugoslavia was decided in moscow. Right. Two quick questions to what extent did roosevelts frailties affect him to deliberate due to discuss and debate a equally truman was very much forced on fdr, as his Vice President , in 1944. So there were maybe two meetings that were there before fdr died,. But once fdr died, the first thing that the ambassador in moscow was a key figure in the negotiations, on the pacific the first thing that he did he got on the plane and he flew to to washington, to advise truman to advise truman on the yalta agreements. And that was the time to when molotov was traveling to the first Founding Convention of the United Nations in san francisco. That he also came to washington. And they convinced, that the soviet use of union was violating the agreements, and this first incident between truman and molotov was dramatic, there were saying no one it will talk to me like that. And truman was fighting back saying, just stick to the agreement and we will no longer talk to you. That was really the beginning, but up until 1947, truman really was going he was unprepared, he was going from one extreme to another. He was very harsh, with molotov in april of 1945, then he goes to potsdam, go and he was the former adviser to moscow, he was actually in moscow during the show charles, and saying what he saw, there he was at a soviet file, he was the main advisor of truman, so truman before we came into the cold war era, it was 45 or 46, he was really looking for position. So that was on truman, and the first question sorry . Or that was a question . House right. Did his physical a situation impede him. Yes this is a great question, i teach for a number of years, a seminar on the yalta conference, at harvard, and there is a student who add a paper who asked exactly that question. And the way how he approached it was, was that he looked at the minutes of yalta the discussions and the discussions they had and how often fdr would intervene, or participate, and to what degree they corresponded with his own vision or, the vision of the state department, and the conclusion that he came to, and i agree with, it that the back conclusion, was that clearly at yalta he was in a bad state in terms of his health, his contributions to the discussion and participation, was fewer than but he never left or was wayward from the position he wanted to take. But often his position was different than that of the state department, but it didnt mean he didnt know what he was doing, or will he didnt understand what was going on, he had some very strong opinions himself. At that point, it was just a point he was the secretary of state, he didnt allow him to participate with the discussion with stalin, so thats it. Ladies and gentlemen doctor plucky