Transcripts For CSPAN3 The Yalta Conference The Ending Of World War II 20240713

Much if we didnt have armies in the field. So our next session will look at how yalta affected the execution of the closing months of world war ii. To do this, weve asked our very own rob citino. Dr. Citino is from the institute of war and democracy, swlt the Museum Senior historian at the National World War Ii Museum, and ill beat him to the punch scompline say hes got the longest title on staff. Hes an awardwinning military historian. Hes published 10 books, primarily on the german army. Hes taught for three decades, including stints at west point, u. S. Military academy, and the u. S. Army war college. He first came to the museum in 2012 for our International Conference. Then he came in 2013 for our International Conference. Then he was one of our featured tour historians at the 70th anniversary of dday cruise. Then he came to our 2014 International Conference. But as he always reminds me, did not come to our 2015 International Conference because we didnt invite him that year. Better yet, in 2016, we invited him to join the staff as the museums senior historian, and we couldnt be luckier to have topnotch scholar who guides our content, but also a great guy whos in charge of the institute, so ladies and gentlemen, our friend, rob cri tino. [applause] i mean, what was up in 2015 . What did i do . You sit at home, and theres this big Party Happening in new orleans, and youre wondering what happened. Thank you very much for those comments, and thanks to all of you for being here. I remember the first time i spoke at the museum in 2012, the International Conference. I was at the friday morning 8 00 a. M. Slot with the eminent historian. I remember walking into that room, and it was jam packed, and there was electricity in the air, and you had an audience who came to play. Folks who know a lot and who have good questions to ask. I suddenly realized the National World War Ii Museum is a place where tow bring your agame. Ive been trying to do that ever since. But thank you all for attending this symposium. You never know how timely something is going to be when independents the 75th anniversary. We knew that was going happen. But who can predict just how timely these things are going to be, and this one on yalta certainly is. Jeremy has asked me, and jeremy is my boss, so i do whatever he tells me to do, has asked me to speak on the role that yalta played with regards to the end of world war ii. To take us out of the realm of diplomacy and put us back out to the battle field and talk more about military operations and strategy, and thats what im going to try to do here. And, of course, ill try to leave time at the end for questions as well. As youve heard so far today, we usually view the yalta conference, i would say, through a single lens. The way in which it determined the postwar order, the order in which we still live, the postwar order seems to be fraying, and we may be living in the postpost war era now. But thats how we usually see yalta. Determining the postwar order, especially in europe. Let me just say, that makes perfect sense. The soviet occupation and communization of eastern yureng the iron curtain, the cold war, you can make a case that all of these facts of postwar life kind of flow naturally out of the negotiations among the big three at yalta. Im still reeling from that first slide he put up on yalta. It was the modern face. I have nightmares for the next three weeks. Now, seen in that light, as the lens that this is about determining the postwar order, you can make verse assessments of who sort of say won at the yalta conference. For much of the time that ive been alive and been working in scholarship, stalin usually gets the laurels. Now, i know this from personal experience. If youll indulge me for a moment. I grew up in cleveland, ohio, beautiful cleveland, ohio, on the west side, and thats a town with a Huge Population of east european ethnic groups. We used to say, and i have no way of determining whether this was or is actually true, there were more slovenians in cleveland than there were in the actual capital of slovenia. Probably not true today. It may well have been true when i was growing up in the 1960s and 1970s. Every february there was a mountain of mail to the cleveland plain dealer. The morning newspaper in cleveland, castigating the allies, and f. D. R. In particular for having sold poland, yugoslavia, take your pick, for having sold one of those countries down the river at yalta. That was the phrase that was always used. F. D. R. Sold poland doubt river or yugoslavia or hungary at yalta. In the 1970s, and i was a teenager, one of the biggest diplomatic issues was the return of the crown of st. Steven to hungary. So theres st. Steven is the founder of the hungarian nation traditionally. Theres a crown that is traditionally associated with him, the cross is off kilter, because supposedly it was hit by a musket ball. Those are the legends about the crown. But it was being held in the United States, some hungarian patriots smillinged it out, and president carter wanted to give it back. To improve relations with hungary. Thaffs his explanation. It roiled politics in cleveland for the better part of three years. A Cleveland City councilwoman at the time, leading the charge not to give it back to the communists. And so that was yalta talk for five years growing up about the captive nations of Eastern Europe. Now, what im going to try to argue today is theres another lens through which we can and probably should look at yalta. And i think its one that is a little less used. The doctor certainly referred to it enough times, but im going to try to go into more detail here. He did set me up nicely. I think in this light, we could judge it a remarkable success for everyone concerned. And that is to gauge yaltas impact on the end of the war itself. On the strategy of the allies and on the actual course of military operations in the wars last months. Were talking about a conference that happened in february of 1945, and talking about a twhar came to an end in europe in may, and then in the pacific in august and september. So what happened in those months, and how did yalta impact what happened on the battle field at the front, so to say, in those months . Let me begin with i think a fairly obvious point, and well stare at this map for a while. The big losers at the yalta conference were not the east europeans, as badly as they may have been treated and as horrible as their sufferings would be. The real losers were the germans, and germany itself. Yalta rammed the final nail in the coffin of german strategy for the wars end game, such as it existed. Now, summarize briefly that strategy ran Something Like this. Germany intended to make allied victory as expensive as possible, through fan at cal ideologicallybased resistance of the german people. I think a french revolutionstyle, a big callup of the entire population, a German National uprising. So the plan had actually been followed since late 1944, the plan was to call up lastditch levees of troops, like folks divisions. Theerps made up of man power combed out of rear areas, supply troops, administrative troops, even lightly wounded turned out of their hospital beds, thrown back to the front, given a rudimentary training, formed into a division. A big chunk of the German Fighting strength is the battle of the bulge. And they were holding extremely larger significant ams of the front going forward. As the point that those reserves were andaustd, you know when youve taken every desk jock and i turned them into an infantry men, at the point when those reserves were exhausted, they would turn to other battalions, andrilesed of the classic trope of old men and young boys, grandpas and grandsons in the same unit quite literally, given a single shot antitank weapon, sandk sent out to do or die against the invaders. Youll see pictures late in the war of some german soldiers, soldiers i use loosed, captured on the eastern and western front. They really do look like sophomores in high school. Because in many cases, thats precisely what they were. Now, when those were exhausted, you run out of old men and boys eventually. Then there would be lastsecond partisan resistance all over germany, a nation in flames, a people standing up against the hated invader in both east and west. Often going under the general heading of the werewolf movement, these would be partisans who would fight grail warfare against the invaders. Once again, the idea was to force the allies to fight hard, over every inch of ground, against a population that was fired by National Socialist fervor. Enemy ng to this scheme, morale would crack. Its just too expense sism you cant fight over every single village in germany until the eastern and western invareds meet in the middle. Eventually morale would crack. In the deliberations in the high command of the arm forces, it was almost always assumed that would be britain or the United States first. And that would splinter of grand alliance, and that would free german troops to mass against the soviet foe driving in from the east. There was a strategy, and it was discuss all the time in the upper echelons of the german high command, and that more or less was the strategy. I read sometimes that hitler had no strategy, he was just trying choreograph a dramatic downfall for himself. Im not really a fan of that point of view, but you see it argued in the literature from time to time. Now, saying there was a strategy is different than saying there was a good strategy. Whether that was realistic or not, and frankly, its hard to argue that there was much there that was actually going to work , that entire Strategic Perspective was smashed to pieces at yalta. Simply by reaffirming the unity of the grand alliance. Simply by presenting a united front to the german enemy. Simply by implicitly restating the allied commitment to unconditional vendor. It wasnt really a point of discussion at yalt, but it had never been rescinded. So implicitly restating unconditional surrender. Simply by allaying stalins fears that was west was going to somehow do a deal against him. Yalta laid the ground work for the end game in europe. One that would end, as we all know, spoiler alert, in the total destruction of German Military power. Sure, that seemed inevitable to us today, and i know its february, this war is going to be over in three months. But hard fighting was going on all across the front while the yalta conference was taking place. Nobody was doing a victory lap. Nobody was driving forward at top speed against negligible opposition. Virtually every building was being fought over. Well talk about the position still in the rhineland, a long, long way from where they wished to be. So victory seems inevitable. And i know were all guilty of it. If you have a class, your university professor, and you have limited time and youre behind on the syllabus, we were just talking about this, believe me, you say, well, the war was over in two months. But if you happen to be there or those who were in charge of fighting that war, it looks a great deal more difficult from that perspective. And its a study of dim scommeas history tells us anything, its that nothing is inevitable, but theres nothing less inevitable not that end of a war. When it happens, its always a relief. And in that sense, im arguing that yalta was a kind of guarantee of allied victory since, tpwhi point in the war, victory probably was guaranteed as long as the grand alliance held together. So th so, the german folk battalions overseen by the party and not the army, made up of boys not yet of draft age and men well past it, their motto was a people rises up. In the face of these vast forces arrayed by the allies, the german people stood up, and the vast majority of them sat right back down. Hence, the mass surrenders at the end of the war and the lack of any real guerrilla resistance. I think by stating a firm front and saying there would be no room for that sort of thing, yalta probably did good work bringing about surrender in may. Hitlers shooting himself probably helped. But he shot himself because of what happened at yalta. The second follow on impact of yalta at the end of the war has to do with the shape of operations in europe in the last few months. Again, i grew up, in 1958, the middle of the cold war and historians often spoke of a race to berlin. They castigated the western allies for having lost the race to berlin, making this mistake and that mistake and this blunder and that one. Thus surrendering a big chunk of postwar germany and Eastern Europe to the soviets. Now, there were always big problems with this thesis. By march, 1945, immediate postyalta, communist offensives had smashed in and came to rest at the oder river, 50 miles from berlin. Western allied forces under allied commander eisenhower were stuck on the rhine, 300 miles away from berlin. This is where we are and heres where the western allies were at the time. And heres where the soviets were. There is a real discrepancy in who is closer to berlin. The soviet offenses had smashed their way deep in, overrunning exposed provinces of eight east prussia and the coastal province of pomerania. Seizing the german Capital First was thus extremely unlikely for the western allies, short of a miracle. But it was also a highly risky operation that i would argue is foreign to eisenhowers sober sense of strategy. Eisenhower does take his share of risks in the war, but by and large the operations on the map is not what you would consider pulley on it napoleonic and the chances they take and the risk they are willing to court. Theres a 1967 book by stephen ambrose, one of the fathers of this museum along with nick miller. Eisenhower in berlin, 1945, the decision to halt at the elba. Not driving for berlin but halting here, where the americans would eventually stop. He was one of the first to make a sustained argument in favor of ikes decision not to go for berlin. Not to risk 80,000 or 90,000 or 100,000 men in a senseless fight for a city that was going to be divided among the allies anyway. That is the contour of ambrose argument in eisenhower in berlin, 1945. Like everything Steve Ambrose wrote, it is well worth reading, but the strategic context for these developments was laid again at yalta. After this show of interallied unity against the german, a lunge for berlin would have been difficult. Among the people who would have a hard time understanding it would have been a lot of americans. Stalin was paranoid about this possibility. Has paranoia was a way of life. Feeding his paranoia was probably not a Winning Strategy for the allies at this point in the war or at any other point. That was the background for the march 28 note from eisenhower to stalin, telling the soviet dictator that allied forces intended to drive east toward the elba river, with the aim of cutting germany and half north to south, not to detour northeast to try to take berlin. My point. Instead of a messy top speed race to berlin, and a subsequent bloody urban melee, which is what the proponents of going for berlin are asking for, yalta insured the war in europe would and with the meeting of allied and soviet troops in 1945. I have to say it is probably a better option. I hope people in the room would agree with me. What did that decision lead to . Deciding to forgo a risky, longdistance strike at berlin allowed the u. S. Army to focus on a juicy operational target of its own, the encirclement of the main german force in the west. There was a stroke of luck on march 7, u. S. Forward units, ninth Armored Division seized and attacked a railroad bridge at the bottom here of the map. You may know the story of troops rushing forward. Theres a german bridge that has not been blown yet. Pressing every button they could to blow up the bridge. American troops are on the bridge. It lifts up in the air and it comes back down to rest intact. It is one of the most amazing moments of all of world war ii. It is rather freakish. By all accounts the bridge should have gone into the river. The nazis reacted, not command reacted as you would expect, rounded up the troops who were responsible and gave them a Court Martial and had them shot. But to me it is nothing more that a horrible stroke about luck from the german perspective. The americans sees the bridge over the rhine and that was getting over the rhine, not crossing the little stream in your backyard. It is a major mississippi style river and it was going to be difficult to have any kind of crossing operation. By the end of the month, massive allied forces were driving over the rhine, heading east. In concert with an attack across the rhine by general Marguerite Montgomery to the north, and that is operation plunder varsity which included gigantic airdrop behind german lines, the allies encircled an entire German Army Group here in germans industrial heartland. Nearly 400,000 troops of army group b surrendered. That is the fifth panzer army and 15th army marching into captivity nearly all, nearly a half million prisoners. So many pows that the u. S. Army had a hard time processing them all and kept them in camps, openair camps, along the rhine, socalled rhine meadow camps under horrible conditions, under the elements but there are too many pows to do much more with them at the time. The battle of the pocket, the germans had a term, a cauldron battle. The battle was nothing less than the greatest u. S. Military victory of all time. The german commander seeing the writing on the wall about the future of the german war effort took his own life in the aftermath of the debacle and shot himself and it seems to be a fitting ending since German Military power in the west have been broken. Youre here and driving here over to berlin. With these big forces sitting on your flank is probably impossible. There are all sorts of reasons i think the berlin option is not realistic in terms of operations or strategy. As you have heard, one other decision had been taken at yalta that is important to this narrative. This had to do with the wrap up of the pacific war. Stalin promised to enter the fight versus japan in two months or three months after germany surrendered and the war in europe was terminated. So, in two or three months it was going to be a colossal logistical challenge to get across the Transsiberian Railway and ready to fight in east asia. Stalin lied and cheated his way through a career as a miserable human being i think but he kept that promise at least. On august 9, 1945, the soviets launched a great invasion of japanese occupied manchuria. It was not until i was admiring it i realized it was in spanish. Taken from a spanish source and i will be happy to talk anyone through it needs that. The graphics are beatable. Are beautiful. So on august 9, 1945, the soviets launched an invasion of japanese occupied manchuria. They called it the manchurian Strategic Offensive operation or august storm. A retired colonel and expert on all things soviet military called his book august storm from 1983. It is my understanding that is why we refer to the operation as august storm. Whatever you call it, it was one of the wars most massive and successful blows. With three fronts, the soviets used the term front in the way that we or germans use army group. We use it in an indefinite way, i am being sent to the front. The soviets have a technical use for it, army group. Three great regroups arrayed around the ark of the manchurian bulge. The transbaikal, the second far Eastern Front and the first far Eastern Front. Getting precise numbers is never easy for a soviet operation because the soviets were all over the place in their numbers. It was often part of disinformation campaigns about how big his operations had been. Lets say 1. 5 million men, 20,000 guns, 3000 aircraft. The Japanese Force defending manchuria, the army, referred to as the great guandung army. Its best units, its elite unit had been bled off for the fight in the pacific by august, 1945. It was far below its authorized strength. The ranks were filled with raw recruits and conscripts with light or obsolete equipment. So the soviet assault on august 9 blew it away. That is not a technical military term. The soviet army smashed the japanese army. Thinking back to 1944, not only dday, but also the anniversary of the belarusian offensive. Utterly vaporized in about two weeks of ape teresa fighting. In two weeks of fighting with hundreds of japanese prisoners falling into soviet hands in two weeks of fighting. Note that date august 9. The u. S. Dropped an atomic bomb on august 6 on hiroshima and nagasaki on august 9. A series of strategy meetings of japanese leaders, news arrived of the japanese devastation in manchuria at the same time as news of the bomb on nagasaki. Without refighting the entire scholarly battle over the bomb and its impact on the japanese decision to surrender, because there has been a scholarly fight, i think it is reasonable to say, the smashing of an entire japanese field army in manchuria played some role in japanese strategic deliberations. So august storm along with hiroshima and nagasaki helped to end the pacific war. That meant no operation olympic, the American Invasion of kyushu. And no invasion of honshu, the main japanese island. No bloody campaign to fight to the japanese home islands, fighting that would have generated monstrous casualties, once likened to an okinawa from one end of japan to another, which harry truman said first. Without refighting the entire scholarly debate over casualty estimates, lets say truman was correct. An invasion of japan would have been very bloody indeed. But, while we are talking about japanese surrender, let me make one more point. Even if you say to adam bombs two atom bombs did it by themselves and the invasion of manchuria did nothing on the decision to surrender, you can make the argument, the allies had no way of knowing that when they were begging stalin in february at yalta to join the war against japan. I like what the earlier speaker said about the adam bomb. The atom bomb. They are invisible. It requires an active imagination for anyone who is not a Nuclear Physicist which is 99 of us. The allies did not know they were going to have a atom bomb. They were spending a lot of money on it and there were assurances from the scientists. But nobody knew there going to have an atomic bomb. They knew they would need soviet help and we need to negotiate with stalin to get it. I think this is a good point to end and open the floor to questions. As a blueprint for the postwar world which is how we look at yalta, im not sure i like it. Maybe im still a kid reading irate letters from hungarians and polish people in the plain dealer. Perhaps the u. S. Could have driven a harder bargain with stalin even with stronger words and gestures. You are smarter than i am. But as a roadmap for the military endgame in europe, yalta was the most successful of all that wartime conferences. Perhaps unintentionally but nevertheless it was the blueprint for allied victory. Thank you very much. [applause] thank you, rob. An online question. One of the historians favorite, a hypothetical. [laughter] dr. Citino then the answer is yes. [laughter] what if the western allies had moved to berlin, not so much giving up the territory eisenhower had argued against, how would that battle have played out differently than the soviets battle for berlin . Dr. Citino in some hypothetical man in the high castle alternate history style battle for berlin, in which the western allies have managed to move main force units to the western outskirts of berlin. There are so many what if that play into exactly how you do that. The allies were talking that it would be more like the battle dropping airborne positions forward and then rushing into relieve them. If you can force the germans to defend in a ring around berlin and you have powerful forces coming in on both sides, the germans have lost berlin, maybe even quicker. But that kind of is what happened. The soviets surrounded berlin. They attacked it from all sides. It was a concentric attack. Until the sector z, the center fortress, the citadel in the heart of berlin, when it got down to that point and then one mile separated to soviet spearheads. It took a week of fighting to cross that final mile. It bears in mind who the defenders of berlin were at this point. There was an ss division, norwegians and danes, there was units of charlemagne french fascists fighting hitlers cause and dutch fascists. The germans were in norway and hungary. Their capital was been depended was being defended by the dutch. Even that motley collection of defenders held out for a week and inflicted massive casualties. Virtually all died. In their attempt to defend someone elses capital. If the American Army went up against the russians in 1945, this was a favorite pastime of my generation growing up, our fathers would say often we should have listened to patton. If that had been fought the soviets had far more divisions and manpower at the point of impact, more mechanized and tank divisions, or tanks in general. The western allies would have had airpower of a sort the soviets had not imagined in their wildest dreams. The vermacht cannot imagine it in normandy in 1944. The most complete inability to move on the roads during the day. You hunker down and moved at night and that was slow and you never got where you are going. Both sides what had advantages if the americans had an atom bomb, that is another story. I love hypotheticals. My lifes work is to sit around and answer this kind of question. You assess probabilities and discuss the strategic situation. Im not ready to declare a victor in the war between the red army and the western allies in 1945 unless nukes come into play. We will go to bill. Was there ever any serious consideration by shafe to make a move on berlin . It depends on what you mean by serious considerations. There were staff studies done. As in a bold stroke by airborne forces. U. S. Troops were in planes and the operation was called off. I can say with assurance this would not have been a lunch by been a lunge by the whole u. S. Army, it would have been a strike forward by airborne divisions, lighter units, mechanized units stripped of their heavy weapons to move more rapidly. That would have meant when they got to berlin is a very difficult fight in the city itself. I can say these things because we can read the staff studies. City fighting requires heavy weapons to knock down buildings going block by block. If yalta was february 4, the bridge over ramagan, seized in early march. Maybe the pathways are open to berlin . There was a flurry of planning. It came to an end by the middle of march when eisenhower quashed it. And eisenhower was hearing stalin suspected it. That is when eisenhower himself sent a note to stalin. Thats unusual, a theater commander sending a note to the generalissimo and political jefe. Theres paperwork to back up the contention that the allies were considering it. Jim . You raised an intriguing question. Eisenhower sent stalin a note. Did his bosses know about it or did they tell him to do it . This is like being the executive director of the institute for the study of war and democracy. I want to make sure everyone is in the loop. Certainly washington seemed to know about eisenhowers letter in advance. But churchill did not. He was burned about it. The eisenhowerchurchill relationship which we do not talk about enough. It is also a crucial one and bears more attention. Washington knew that some representation would be made. A question from mike online. May be best for the panel to discuss this. Is there evidence they discussed the seizure of german scientists and research. My followup is, to stop halting at the elbe allow them to focus on hunting the nazi scientists . I do not know. I do not know the details of protocols discussed at yalta. Lets say that for the panel. I do not see why the halt at the elbe what effects that because we are processing a population. That probably meant we missed a lot of scientists who went into soviet captivity. I do not think those two things are related. To your left in the front. Go easy. Your planted question. The final months of the war saw Party Leaders killing civilians. The book promised me you will see yourself shows the fractured and suicidal german population. A great book. It is. At what point to they have to do they have to admit it is over. It is that all yalta or the defeat of the ok w . Where do you have to throw in the towel, dismissing the fact that your led by a madman. Dr. Citino ive had to think about that a lot in my book and research. After the war, german generals were writing popular memoirs. They were saying earlier, the moment i met hitlers eye knew this was going to be trouble. I knew the moment he decided to invade poland, this is not going to work. Operation barbosa, what a nutty idea. That is what they said after the war. It is not what they were saying at the time. Whether you were a convinced National Socialist, at some point it boiled down to loyalty to hitlers person. That is why the fuhrers suicide was critical to the collapse of resistance along the front. Another officer after the war said when i heard the outline for the attack in the ardennes, which led to the battle of the bulge, i knew it would not work. They wanted us to go to antwerp and i said if we get to the muse river we should get on her knees and thank god. Im going to lay my cards on the table, if he knew that operation was senseless, that he got 100,000 german soldiers killed for no reason at all. It is a bogus concept of loyalty. Generals have some loyalty to the men under their command as well. Why did most germans realized the gig was up . For many it was perhaps hitlers suicide. You would be better off admitting that i was loyal to the end rather than saying i knew operation this or that was stupid. That is not what he said in his order of the day. Forward, to victory, on and on. That is the most despicable aspect of the german officer corps as a cast. Sorry to bum everybody out. [laughter] your left. And the decision of the japanese to surrender, how much did manchuria represent the resources left for the support of the army . Dr. Citino a good question. Manchuria is a resource rich region which is why the japanese seized it in 1931. There were those in Japanese Foreign Service Holding out hope the soviets could serve as an intermediary between the japanese and western allies. They were not at war, the japanese and soviets had signed a nonaggression pact. There was a faint hope. It is not that they invaded manchuria and seized a wealthy province, it is that they violated the nonaggression pact and had come into the war against japan. If that was your final hope, it is now completely gone. I think that is the issue more than the resource issue. The resources of manchuria, it is difficult to get them to the home islands now. Japan is almost completely blockaded. Historians engage in retroactive moral judgment. Heres one. Dr. Citino ok. [laughter] lets say roosevelt entered into a quid pro quo with stalin. We will give you poland, yugoslavia, czechoslovakia, and hungary, and you will give us something. Dr. Citino are you suggesting that is what happened that at yalta . Kind of. Dr. Citino i do not think there is any doubt that what was discussed at yalta can be characterized as realpolitik. Poland for men to invade japan. People will do things for a quid pro quo. If that is all yalta was, than why all of the talk about the United Nations . Because the United Nations is not the sort of realpolitik or the realistic view of foreign relations. It is that liberal view of for an relations that people cooperate with each other and are sometimes linked to surrender some of their sovereignty in the interest of the broader Global Community or the regional community. So what you have set is a pretty good characteristic. The westerns allied wanted some stuff. They got some stuff. Stalin wanted some stuff. He got some stuff. I am deliberately talking silly. I think a good Foreign Policy has to have elements of both. You have to be a horse trader. You have to be willing to give up things. To sell that Foreign Policy in a democratic society, elements of altruism and idealism are probably also important. I think roosevelt had both. Bill . With the european war over may 8, and this not happening with the manchurian until august 9, did it lie or cheat or uncle joe have plenty of time to have done this long before the ninth . Did he wait until hiroshima before he pulled the trigger . Dr. Citino no he did not wait until hiroshima until he pulled the trigger on the manchurian operation because it is too big. You do not just turn it on. Required a great deal of preparation. A transfer of troops, equipment, transferred across the eurasian landmass. Whether stalin was certain japanese power had been smashed, he was going to pick up an easier victory, it may have been how he thought it that it does not appear. I do not know the soviet documents on this but i do not think in operation as big as august storm can be plugged in at the last minute, they have dropped a bomb, lets attack manchuria. It would be too much planning. Months, three month and a day as it turned out. Stalin was one day late on his promise. To your right . Dr. Citino oh boy. [laughter] i was going to come to your defense but i think i will sit down. There is an element to the manchurian operation overlooked. The soviets regard what they get in manchuria as reparations, hundreds of thousands of japanese soldiers go into slave labor camps for years. Japanese industrial developments, they thought were developing nuclear weapons, all kinds of infrastructure the russians wanted. They did not want to destroy it, just to take it. That makes a difference in how you design a military operation. Dr. Citino this was done for maximum impact at the point of contact. Maximum early impact frontloaded, overrun, smashed the military opposition so youre not fighting your way through. Do we know what stalin knew about the atomic bomb when he planned and launched this operation . Dr. Citino he mustve had some intelligence on such developments. Everyone was working from the same scientific bed of knowledge. The announcement at potsdam is famous. Truman says we have a bomb of enormous power. Stalin was deliberately underwhelmed. I do not think atom bomb was as much of a secret as is often portrayed. The science was international before the outbreak of world war ii. Ladies and gentlemen, a round of applause. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] American History tv is on social media. Cspan history. Medal of honor winner reflects on his experiences and the sacrifices made by american soldiers throughout our nations history. Heres a preview. Ago, at this moment sn time, thousands of marine ayingavy corpsmen were lin toir lives on the line capture a very small piece of as youthat we now know would you iwojima. Involveds who were wondered why so many marines . To capture this a very small piece of rock. Its significance at the time. Im sure that those in charge did. Because of the future planning that they had for the island. Ranks had no lower concept of what the purpose veryy was to take that small piece of ground. Thead just finished takings july and august the island of guam back from the japanese that had taken it from us in 1942. 19 miles from one coast line to another. And this one, this was five miles from one end of the island to the other. The only thing we knew we had to win. From world war ii veterans this sunday at 6 p. M. Here on American History tv. Professor Amira Rose Davis examines the history of africanamerican women in sports, including women who played baseball in the negro leagues in the 1950s and women who participated in various olympic sports. This interview was recorded at the annual American Historical Association meeting. Steve Amira Rose Davis is a professor of history and africanamerican studies at Penn State University in state college, pennsylvania. Shes also working on a book. The title, cant eat a medal the lives and labors of black women athletes in the age of jim crow