Grateful. Please join me in thanking john and christine. applause i dont think that will be a problem but i will direct you. Also thank you for those who have supported todays activity. They have done it in a way that is exemplary for the way a policy discussion should do so to set up a conference so there is no responsibility for what we say but but it is an issue of significant broad interest we are grateful for the support. Looking at what has happened in the gulf there is a broader National Debate if the us should be digging in or pulling out. Iran is perceived to be a threat. Even within the chump Administration Even how the us should deal with that threat the us increasingly has been facing asymmetrical threats and responding with conventional tools that has been expensive and affected limited effectiveness quite delighted to have everyone on the stage tonight. It seems to me, the last panel kind of kicked it all to you guys. So this is a fundamentally diplomatic problem. One of the unexploded diplomatic opportunities that were not were not addressing. Im not just talking about the low hanging fruit, is interesting just to talk about those, but diplomatically, what are the big things that we need to do that we are not doing. I wanted to pick up where the last panel left off, im going to leave the other people to discuss the key issues about iran and saudi arabia what we are going to do about that. Id like to make a few introductory remarks about the state of american diplomacy, and about the middle east generally, and what are the implications of this that we dont know what is going on out there, and key areas. It is not just about, sending a person out to bust heads, and that has happened in some cases, but we just dont get about likely used to and i suspect relevant to the gulf, but this is particularly true in saudi arabia where we do not know what is going on with the clerics, we dont know whats going on with the royal family, we dont know whats going on with the major cities, although many many people are visiting. There this is a truly destructive, result of what took place, but in all fairness it has been going on for years after the beirut bombings in the bombings of our embassies maserati is. Closed, our embassy in libya is closed, after the attack, who had to saudi arabia, east of the three or four years, what are the implications of this in addition not knowing what is going on where in diplomacy can succeed. We look afraid, and aggravates me enormously, the sense of withdrawal on the ground, when u. S. Somebody to come to your embassy, instead of going to their office, the signal is you are afraid to engage with the local population, and the sense to withdraw as much more dramatic. First thing is to build up diplomatic capacity in the middle east, we have to have people who speak the language, people that are there for longer than a year. For the opportunities, theyre still opportunities, the first i would say is to do everything we can to heal the rift, among the gcc countries. Ill be the first to say the people in the administration have worked on this, but it was almost perceived as a second tier event, it really had very little to do with iran, and certainly nothing to do with israel security, it really didnt affect what was happening, it was not relegated, i think it does have implications, really serious implications and thats what i would call a spill over effect because what we have seen is this rift has been weaponized in places like libya and places like the horn of africa there certainly potential for it to be weaponized with the peace deal with the taliban and of course the russians in general theyve taken an enormous advantage of this i think we need to do everything we can the u. S. Needs to do everything we can, to work on this. I think it is unfortunate that the gcc is collapsing i know that Security Architecture was always sort of a myth, but the fact that the u. S. Was there and working on this there were i think modest, successes overtime. There were certainly successes on the economic side, and theyre pretty boring like immigration, and economic immigration, but there were things worth doing. I want to mention one more reason we should work on the golf and the gcc, and that is the imf report they came out about two weeks ago. What the report said and i know many of you in the audience would sort of poohpooh this, because scholars and others have been predicting a fall of the house of saudi four years, but it basically said, without massive fiscal improvements, the countries in the gulf would have problems in 15 years. Saudi arabia and particular, kuwait and qatar, they have been insulated because of their sovereign wealth funds. But there was an interesting article about the implications of this would be that they would turn on each other. Assistance to jordan, and lebanon and palestinians withdraw, and very critically because i think this issue has been under studied by scholars, he will be set sent home to already struggling countries, so in other words i would think that given our longterm strategic objectives in the gulf, we need to do everything we can to encourage security and energy and integration no matter how hard it will be, i dont think it will be all that hard if we concentrate on it. And to work on this for a long term objectives. Finally on the opportunities there is yemen. And i know doug well talk about this as well for years ago five years ago when it started i think it wouldve been a lot easier to get the iranians out because they were ready to stick it to the saudis and there is no real strategic interest in yemen, i think its a lot harder now but im not sure, this is an issue that just cries out for sustain u. S. Engagement, to try to reach some kind of settlement, because of humanitarian costs are so high, and secondly the real cost, as my colleague mr. Fire so would say it is ruined the saudi relationship with the u. S. That has strategic implications as well. So we need to do everything we can to repair that, and that would be the next place i would go to. Thank you. During the crisis in early january at one point, i was on fox news, talking to a couple of their anchors and they played for me the clip from senator rand paul when they said this is the death of the diplomacy. So mister ambassador how do you react to that. And i said ive been a diplomat for 35 years and i cant believe that diplomacy will ever be dead. And i think when you heard from me there are really lots of opportunities for diplomacy, its just that that is not the priority either of the academic community, or the administration to identify right now. The final question we had that came over here, about the growth is where i wanted to start my discussion. Looking at the middle east in particular now, in my new job as i was in riyadh and abu dhabi last week, ive been all over the gulf, the United States is no longer the only game in town in the gulf for the middle east, and that means back the saudis the kuwaitis other people are looking for other alternatives for commercial goods, and to purchase their 5g infrastructure, from china interstates or europe but what also struck me is looking around the region, there is no other country that is able to pull together the different regional powers, the Different International powers, like the United States. Some people want to draw a parallel between the british withdrawal from empire after world war ii when britain physically gave up colonies. The United States is not doing that. First of all we are not a colonial power in the traditional sense. We do not occupy countries and run them around the world. What we have is a number of cooperative agreements where we have soft economic power, u. S. Military presence, and in most cases guided with an embassy with a very broad representation of u. S. Government. Even though the United States is going to be relatively less powerful militarily and economically in the near term, we are not actually losing much of our were influenced, power or deployment unless we choose not to use it. Looking again specifically at the golf. There are a number of things that need to be done. There are a lot of opportunities given the very quick escalation that happened at the end of 19 and beginning of 2000. What i saw was conscious decisions by both washington and to run to walk back from a war between the United States and iran. I actually disagree with evaluation of the first panel, whether there would be iranian escalation after the killing of soleimani. I think because the United States took direct responsibility for killing soleimani, iran felt it had to respond directly as iran. Therefore the missile strikes on the iraqi basis that had u. S. Holders were irans parallel strike to even the playing field. But after the escalation and near war, both sides went back to the status quo. You saw secretary pompeo with the iranian secret with secretary mnuchin doubled down on sanctions. You saw iranians say were not going to do things for now. A whole host of iranian proxies, especially in iraq, said we have not yet taken our retribution for the killing of soleimani hoop. And the Iraqi Militia leader. What both sides have done is walk to the brink, decided they did not want to jump off and gone back to their areas of comfort. For iran, that support for proxies and attempting to put pressure on the allies of the United States to reduce the impact of u. S. Economic sanctions. For the United States, its to doubled down on economic sanctions and pick out individuals who might have where the individual impact could impact iranian policy. These are more for this discussion. I think there is a real role for american diplomacy, but its american diplomacy to build International Alliances with our european allies. With our gulf allies. With israel. Potentially even with china. In some cases. First of all, jcpoa two point oh. Its pretty clear the Iran Nuclear Agreement is not coming back in the way it was negotiated before. Its also pretty clear that iran is willing to move in that direction. Over the course of last summer, laid out on three different occasions, slightly different visions of what iran might be able to accept including accelerating the Additional Protocol by a couple of years. Seemingly in a way when that President Trump could claim he got a better deal than obama had gotten. That seemed to be the direction. If you look at the use of the reigning in Ballistic Missiles against u. S. Forces in iraq, you can also see to a large extent that irans strategic projection is going to be more easily done with missiles than Nuclear Weapons. Thats because one, it does not have the same International Implications if you are using those warheads, and iran were able to use Ballistic Missiles to strategic effect. If you look at the attack on the base, it was Ballistic Missiles. It appeared to be cruise missiles gutted by drones. Again a huge technological leap by iran. Iran might not be as concerned about keeping its Nuclear Weapons program as it might have been in the past. That brings us to the second issue. How do we work with our allies in the gulf and partners in europe and the International Community to reduce the regional threat of irans missile programs . Again, a lot of experience in the u. S. Government, the state department, the d. O. D. , d. O. E. And elsewhere about how you can walk into and effective arms control agreement, especially missile control. Im not sure anyone is going there now. When i am in the gulf, the big elephant in the room is not Nuclear Weapons or Ballistic Missiles its actually support for proxies. The gulfies, apologies for the term, those in the gcc countries are very concerned about continued iranian interference with groups in their societies that oppose their policies. This is now more prominent in iraq and syria than it has been then the gulf. I think the maximum Pressure Campaign has reduced the amount of money the iranians have to fund some of these external activities. Again, this is something maybe all the can address. We have heard indications that the iranians are tiring of, specifically, support to the houthis in yemen. It has done nothing much but prolong a war. It is expensive. The houthis are not very good iranian allies. They are too disunited, theyve not always used iranian weapons and training the way iran has intended. There might be an opening throughout through the un potentially for discussion to deescalate in yemen as an opening to the discussion of other Security Issues. Its also possible, alien i agreed a few weeks ago, there was a larger discussion about missile programs, support for proxies, the number of u. S. Forces in the regions, numbers of allied forces, all as bargaining chips with iranians to have them reduce their support for groups. Again i lay out these issues not just because a lot is happening on them, but i see opportunities for the United States to grab some of these diplomatically and move forward. We cannot do it unilaterally. Well have to do it with our allies, get past this growing multi polarity in the world. Well have to bring together the most powerful nations and most affected nations to tackle these issues. Thank you very much john. A great pleasure to be here at csis. Now youve taken credit for my education i hope youll take the blame for whatever mistakes i make today. I thought it might be useful to shed some light on the iranian strategy. The first panel did a good job discussing confusions around the u. S. Strategy. Iranians as you know, for the first year of the Trump Administrations maximum pressure strategy adopted a policy of maximum patients. They decided to stay in the nuclear deal to the extent possible, be careful in the region, sit on their hands. Israel targeted iranian assets in syria hundreds of times, the iranians basically did not respond. In the hope that they could isolate the u. S. And thereby neutralize u. S. Sanctions. The policy did not really work at the end. Europeans and others could not say the iranian economy so as of may 2019 when we pushed for basically bringing irans oil exports to zero. The iranians decided to adopt a policy of maximum pressure of their own. This took two different forms. One in the nuclear realm, every 60 days, they took a step back from their obligations under the jcpoa. In the region, we saw a string of attacks starting from mines on tankers in the port of fudge era in the uae to tax on tankers in the gulf of oman, to shooting down the drone, to the very brazen attack on saudi wrong core. This culminated in the killing of general soleimani and iranian retaliation. I agree that for the iranians, taking a direct strike on a u. S. Military installation somewhere in the region was crossing a psychological threshold. In the same way that killing an iranian general, by the u. S. Was crossing a line. The iranians want to establish, that this cannot happen again. The iranians have deterrence of their own, and if you talk to u. S. Military officials, and id be interested to see what general patel would say about this, from what ive heard everybody agrees that what they did was quite risky. It was sheer luck that nobody was killed in the attacks, in iraq. But in any case, now there is a debate in iran, whether they should go back to maximum patients, for the remainder of President Trumps first term, and then reassess after the november elections, or to stay where they are, or doubled down on the maximum pressure strategy. There are arguments on both sides, i can guess who is advocating for what within the iranian system, the more moderate forces forces of iranian politics want to go back to maximum patients, and irgc, and the hardline elements are quite content with what they have done. In terms of regional pushback, because they believe it has demonstrated irans capabilities, a lot of people in the region, were concerned afraid impressed, by accuracy of the missiles that iran used, and the attack on them or the missiles the Ballistic Missiles that were used on u. S. Bases in iraq. It has demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the other side. The fact that we didnt have a single patriot missile, basically protecting the bases in iraq, or not a single missile was fired, at the low flying cruise missiles that were coming to hit them, finally to a certain extent they wanted to thrive a wedge, in this anti Iran Coalition that the Trump Administration has put together, their view is that that has been a relative success. We saw some shift in the uae position, maybe not a one 80 but released us some is deescalation, but with the u. S. By september, we came pretty close to a potential deescalation package, that president macron of france was trying to mediate. You put all of this together, and look at the costs and benefits of continuing along this path. The biggest question is how do we change trumps way and if he is there for another four years, we are talking about mueller for five years of iran under sanctions, which thereon do . I think the majority view is that iran should not become another cuba, that just gets to live under sanctions for years and years and years, or another iraq, that is basically significantly weakened under sanctions, and then coupled easily with a push, my own sense is that given the results of the elections last friday, that the more moderate forces of iranian politics are more isolated, so if i wanted to bet, and its a risky thing to bet, in washington in front of a crowd, but i will do it anyways. And cspan as. Here and cspan, but i think the iranians will probably slow down with probably slow down the nuclear escalation, because on that front we have ended on an implicit less situation, the iranians are doing less in regards their obligations for the nuclear deal, theyre also getting less out of it, but i do not think they want to escalate any further out of fear that they would push the europeans into the arms of the Trump Administration, and there is a major milestone coming up for the iranians, which is the lifting of the Un Convention of the arms in barr go in october, and i think the iranians really care about this, thats what they want to do and in the first time in many years that they would be able to buy conventional arms. And maybe narrow the gap, in conventional capabilities in the region. They are keen on keeping the deal alive, until october, and then obviously between october and november, we are only talking about a full, weeks to get a sense of who the next u. S. President will be. On the nuclear front, i think we will see a slowdown, but in the regional front, i think that the hardliners will get the upper hand, but they would do it in a way that is comfortable for iran, iran has a lot of experience operating in this great zone of asymmetric warfare, but what they would try to impose a cost on the u. S. , in places that doesnt work well, like targeting u. S. Assets, like a lot of rockets fired near facilities, near u. S. Companies like exxon in the south of iraq, just make life difficult in u. S. For u. S. Forces, but without killing americans, in hope it would result in some kind of draw down in u. S. Forces in iraq, which would mark a political victory for the iranians. But in places that there is deniability, i am afraid they might go after the americans. One of those places, that is of particular concern to me, but not a focus of our discussions today, but is afghanistan. If this deal with the taliban falls apart, the iranians might and they have ties with the taliban, they might try to go after u. S. Forces enough ghana stan. Where plausible deniability works much better than in a place like iraq syria or lebanon. That is a major concern. One question that i hope that we can answer in this panel or the next, which is fundamental to resolving this dilemma, and you shifting towards the Brand Strategy priority of the great power competition. Is to answer these two questions. One what question of iranian influence can be tolerated in the region, because there is a ceiling to their influence, as a persian nation a wrong among arabs in turks, but also theyre part of the region, there of the region, we cannot exclude them from the region. And all the coalitions that we have tried to put together in the past few years, from the middle east strategic alliance, to sentinel, to the Maritime Security forces in the region, and to the warsaw conference, all of it has been aimed at excluding iran. These are not inclusive mechanisms that could bring about some sort of a regional modus operandi. So what degree is tolerable to, us and also does iran have legitimate security concerns. And if you agree that they do have those concerns, what is the solution to them. One has to understand for the iranians, the Ballistic Missile program, and their forward defensive policy, which is basically this policy of hiring partners around the region, to deter a direct strike on their own style, they are not going to give it away, especially under pressure or threats from the outside. The only way that they might compromise on it, is that we change their. This is also things like putting out there for discussion. Thank you very much to all of you. One of the troubling problems in on time this not of the u. S. Presence in the region, is in many ways the measure of iranian success, and survival. Is a pretty low bar. The measure of u. S. Success, to resort to diplomacy, diplomacy is never done. There will always be further engagement, further effort, further effort to shape iranian behavior, there is a way that we are set up, so that the iranians will almost perceive themselves, as long as they survive. To being successful, and we will always see our diplomacy as being on the way to being successful, but not arriving there yet. How do we deal with that, that problem of defining success in order to encourage a continuation of the process. Oh boy thats an easy question. What i usually tend to say especially to younger diplomats, as they enter and come up to the service is, the job of the diplomat is seldom to solve a problem, you occasionally get the opportunity to negotiate, but arms control agreement that solves a piece of the problem, but never ended the tensions between the two people stevie freshen one didnt do that, most of what we do is diplomats is managed difficult situation so that they do not get out of hand, and lead to violence, and or economic deprivation. And its hard to define complete and total success, when you are looking mostly at, keeping the status quo, or slightly improved status quo. Its also hard to get credit for things that dont happen, because people said they wouldve happen anyway. Exactly, if you look at the jcpoa, and can talk to this a little bit more because she was choose more involved, it seems to be to have been a pragmatic attempt by the Obama Administration to deal with one of the Serious Problems of iranian threat and potential Nuclear Weapons program. It did not deal with Ballistic Missiles really. It did not deal with support for proxies. It did not touch on human rights inside iran, religious minorities, political opponents, all things others might have want to have seen included in the deal. I assume the Obama Administration decided it would not be able to include all of these things into one agreement and have a successful conclusion. They necessarily pulled back the scope to have success where they thought success was possible and where there was international consensus. You saw what happened. We broad perception in parts of the u. S. Political structure that this was a failed agreement. I dont think it was a failed agreement because it was a good application of internationally coordinated economic sanctions on iran. It was an incomplete agreement that only dealt with part of the perceived problem. Thats the problem we have to deal with. I think thats right. I think the, this is not the official bomb explanation, but i thought of the jcpoa as a bet. It was going to take the Nuclear Issue off the table. In the next ten years the old boys would die off. There would be openings and the Obama Administration towards the end of its tenure explored and talked about some of those openings with iran. Whether it was counter narcotics, some kind of scientific exchange, whether there was some things you could do to bring them into the international fold. There was never any illusion. There was supposey to address the proxy or missile problems. Those were seen as way down the road. I want to Say Something on the jcpoa experience. Theres some valuable lessons i think for the path forward. There were mistakes both before and after the jcpoa. Before incense that we started these secret negotiations in oman which were critical to the success of the Iranian Nuclear deal later on. But i think that already burned the bridges to the gulf countries and also to israel to a certain extent. They thought we were trying to deal with the iranians behind their back. But this was going to come at their expense. So now we have tried difference in areas of trying to either encourage the gulf countries to negotiate with iran on their own, or two negotiate with iran behind their back, or to stop them from negotiating with iran. Which i think is the case right now. I think the lesson of the jcpoa is that these two processes should happen in parallel. You cannot have a separate arms control negotiation and a discussion about the region and subsequent steps. Told these things need to happen in parallel. Any narrow transaction with iran will not survive in the context of the broader in an immediate it exists. An amity. What do we do with the other gulf countries . We sold them billions of dollars worth of arms. That access rebated irans sense of conventional weapons a symmetry in the region. It forced them to double down under support of proxies in the region and the Ballistic Missile program. Trump then used that as evidence that it was the jcpoa was a bad deal. Like the self licking ice cream cone. If the u. S. Were. To try and engage the iranians and aspects of missile development, regional behavior, to provide a pathway out of the maximum pressure. What should the regional priorities be . Should it be about the iranian presence in iraq . Should it be about yemen . Should it be about afghanistan . If the u. S. Were to try and take this pathway on the regional picture. Or even the relationship with saudi arabia. Who needs to be reassured and what kind of reassurance when they find reassuring . The questions do not get easier. But i think the gulf countries have sort of been schizophrenia or something. Because i think what they wanted was for the u. S. To sort of keep iran in a box and poke at them periodically and stand up. What they didnt want but and this is what scare them, they did not want a real shooting more. But we didnt respond to add cake and to our response was inconsistent and incoherent. That precipitated them some of them running off, allegedly, to toronto cut their own deal. Some of these countries have longstanding relations with iranians anyway. I do think they need i think they are in a state of great anxiety about what our policy is and they dont know what to do with it. Some of it is our own fault of course but im interested in with the other panels thought. I was in riyadh and abu dhabi last week. I was speaking to the Diplomatic Institute in riyadh and the National Defense college in abu dhabi among other meetings. In both places, there was a lot of interest in the topic that and mentioned earlier, the gulf cooperation council, and whether or not it is an effective mechanism to pursue golf policies or how it can be made more effective. Many of the questions were about what can we do to bring them back in because the system in the gulf and qatars search for strategic depth anywhere outside the region, more specifically with turkey, is causing competition as and mentioned in other parts of the region. There was a beginning of an idea of how we can how can we reunify the gulf . What is it that riyadh or abu dhabi has to do to bring the qataris back in and begin to form a unified position on iran. They dont want to do it separately, they want to do it together. One that might be an intermediate step of continuing continuing with this administration has done to help members of the gcc unified themselves. There is a new kuwaiti secretary general of the gcc who seems quite energetic as he starts his diminish mission. Literally two weeks in. I think there is a mechanism that can help but we can provide a political push that might provide us a more effective way to canvas the countries of the gulf and get them on the same page as us as we look at these other strategic questions that we have to address. I know the two diplomats did not identify any iranian regional behaviors that we should prioritize. Thats easy. From my own view that would be yemen. I think of all of lebanon, iraq and the other places, its probably still the easiest because the iranian strategic interest is the least. Theres also argument that our strategic interest is the least. Not for the saudis. But its like i think thats where we should start. Again im not in government anymore and the street he jake picture might have shifted in the past two years. But our discussion with our european allies in the Security Council and with the gulf states and with israel, how could we get back into negotiations or discussions about a Nuclear Weapons agreement . A jcpoa two point oh. The fact that zarif has laid out options for moving forward is a good one. I also however think that in this discussion its going to be pretty clear that israel and the gulf states are going to want to move quickly as part of that or on a separate track towards Regional Security issues. Support for proxies, Ballistic Missile programs and maybe it as was suggested, theres two separate paths there. But i think yemen as president michael was pushing for in the summer may be away into some discussions that can then be broadened where there is international consensus. And again, i think the United States should be working with our traditional friends and allies in europe and asia, in the gulf and with israel to develop that consensus. We can help shape that consensus if we put an effort and begin to define a longer term goals. You think that the iranians are willing to have these discussions about proxies whenever i talk to iranian officials, about the regional activities, that they just support political parties, that they are deported supporting democracy, because the shia support hezbollah, it is not the scorching of the iranians, but it is of us trying to put down lebanese citizens. Can you have a serious discussion with the iranians about this. I always say the iranian mentality is not it is a bizarre mentality. It depends what they get maternal. We are talking about the proxies, not our proxies are the same especially the ones that are very close to iran for we have the kind of alliance you have between two nato allies, it all depends on what kind of Security Issues were willing to provide. For instance ill say that this is counterintuitive on almost lastly if you say it out loud in the vicinity, i would argue if the iranians are able to back them from russia, it would actually reduce the reliance on hezbollah. When you think about the proxies, as irans weapons system you see this problem, in a totally different way. But if you look at it from a perspective of many countries in the region, but they see it as an expansionist policy right. Iran wants to restore the persian empire now, in the shia form this time. But i agree that yemen is a low hanging fruit, yemen is not a major strategic priority for iran, and the iranians have signaled in the past that they are willing to be more helpful, on yemen the question is what would they get out of it. If we define this the way that the saudis had to find it right now, i think is problematic, as a way of removing a card from irans hands, that iran cannot use it against the saudis or the iraqis or the americans, i think the iranians are going to try to be the spoiler here. But if it is resolved in a way that it would, help the iranians also either get a ceasefire with the u. S. , and the current exploration path that we are in, or some type of economic rip eve, or not a lot but enough to get let them keep their head above water for the next few months, then maybe that is something that they would consider. But again if we devise even we think about diplomacy, we still think about it in zero some terms its going to backfire. One of the themes that has run through this panels, is that its the core of a lot of this, is saudi iranian animosity. I dont think any of this is expected. The saudi iranian animosity rivalry, can be completely resolved. But i think it is an important question, of how much can we expect it to be mitigated, can it be a sort of a working relationship. What is the sort of, i dont want to say the floor but, what should our realistic aspirational goals the, for the nature of saudi iranian ties. Well, for decades it really wasnt for the two two pillars,. It was a different iranian government. Thats right it was not inconceivable, that you could to me its not inconceivable that you could go back to some kind of, live and let live scenario, but you certainly cant go back to it under the current scenario that we have, which is it simply have the question for all reasons, that weve outlined. I think you could get to some kind of, and again the Obama Administration sort of explored it, and talk to this, and had some type of confidence Building Measures, because one of the things we havent talked about with the them and the shia populations, in the gulf he could get to some kind of confidence Building Measures that would get a process started, but i think its impossible under the current situation. One of the arguments now is a way to reassure the saudis, is to have the u. S. President in saudi arabia, but the u. S. Is trying to send the opposite signals, trying to reduce it. That was the obama strategy, we let the region come to its own equilibrium, but the question is what is that journey what does that journey look like, and does equilibrium get strong. Is it one that we fine desirable or even acceptable . One of the issues that we have to deal with thats difficult is the fact that iran could ducks policy on two different levels, it certainly could not conduct a state to state negotiations, but also policy through proxies and support for non governmental groups in many parts of the world, including flatten america, and asia, and across the globe. One of the things i think has to happen, from the standpoint of the gulf, maybe israel, and probably the Trump Administration, if you draw this question into the discussion in some way. To a large extent i think that the decision to kill soleimani, with a drone strike was to show iran, that there were actual consequences for iranian for officials to their unofficial proxy led policies, at least in iraq. To some extent the killing of soleimani, has ripped the bandaid off this idea that we will, in our policy separate between what iran does and what iranian supported groups to. That is going to be one of the biggest problems in terms of addressing security, unless iran can be brought into the discussion, through a broader Regional Security, new paradigm, for something that can see use of a role for iran security, and does not produce a Regional Security arrangement, that is aimed at limiting iran. Which is the current step. That is very difficult for this administration, i think that would be difficult for the gulf states, i dont know enough about israeli policy towards iran in the gulf to know whether the israelis can accept it, but i think that is a big leap, because it is not a first step. It has to come further down in the process. But maybe yemen, is a first step into that much longer discussion. Look i would make two points, one is that i think if you look at, around saudi a relations, i dont think theyre bound to be enemies forever maybe rivals but not enemies. Weve seen this before in other regions of the world, its a cliche but you look at friends germany, and europe, and brazil argentina, and latin america, its not an unusual setting, and it has a solution, and the solution is the ultimates ultimate solution is what you are talking about, a Regional Security in which both sides believe that they are their interests are being preserved. The question is how do we get there. And i would argue this the same way, that some of the conflicts that just impossible to resolve, like the Israeli Palestinian issue, when we put our figure on one our finger on one side of the scale, the fact that we put our finger on the sunny side of the gulf, is part of the region reason that this cannot be resolved. Again we have tried to, bring about some type of balance, like the Obama Administration didnt second term, it is been raised and and it actually has exacerbated the situation. I did stage i think its very telling to think that the only deescalation that has occurred in the last few years in the region, has been as a result of the uae thinking the u. S. Is unreliable. That is very telling the only positive thing that is happened because of that, but that the u. S. Isnt. The question is, john and i read the security conference, and they mentioned that the saudis have sent to message, i followed up later on, apparently the message was sent through them, maybe there should be a security dialog, and saudi arabia and pakistan. The iranians responded positively, but the saudis did not follow up, the iranians presentation was because of u. S. Pressure, but i think its in the u. S. Interest without any doubt, to try to push both sides, not just the iranians and the saudis but also others, into some kind of dialog. Even if it doesnt result issues immediately, they have to start somewhere. If you look at the helsinki process, it didnt happen it took. Years but let it happen. In thinking that the u. S. Has nothing to do with this, it would still do its own diplomacy with the soviets, but let these other countries have their lilacs. And you see countries like oman, kuwait, they really tried hard in the last few months to figure out a way of deescalating, but i think the real obstacle is the Trump Administration. Why dont we go to the audience for a couple of questions. Wait for the microphones. Right here in the front. Im wondering. Please identify yourself. Im with penn state on the advisory board. My question has to do with recent changes in iran and what do you think the administration or the government and iran is getting ready to drink the poison . The reason i say that is, going back to home a knee and his drink poison and make a deal. The past election last friday utah, all the candidates were conservative. There was no doubt that the conservatives would have a take over of everything. That gives the government the capability of making a deal without having to explain anything. Sort of like nixon going to china. Im wondering if you think that is at all a possibility and if it is, what should the u. S. Policy be to address that . Thank you. Pass the microphone to the gentleman their pleas. Im an Intelligence Analyst and former diplomat. I believe in the weapons evolution but i dont believe in Quantum Leaps and weaponry. So i have to ask, whos helping out iran with these drones . Should we be chatting with that nation as well . I didnt hear the second one. So on the domestic political scene in iran. Again its one of those counterintuitive things. I do not think the system is becoming more monolithic. In fact, once you get the conservatives and in control of all power. Thats the move we saw in 2004 when irans negotiations with the e3 failed. There was political apathy by the middle class, they did not go out to vote. The system used that context to disqualify a lot of the moderates knowing the backlash would be limited. The parliament was taken over by the hardliners and then the the presidency was taken over by ultraconservatives. That created a lot of infighting within the iranian government. It did not turn into a monolith. I think what is happening right now is the system is hunkering down and closing down because it feels it is on siege from all sides. Maximum pressure from their perspective is not only economic, its multi faceted. Theres a cybernetic dimension and cultural dimension. Survival is victory to them and they are trying to survive. Trying to close down the circle of elites that our decisionmaking. That does not mean they would not want a deal. In fact i think they wanted to deal with trump back in september. But there is a misconception about drinking the poison chalice in this time. People do not understand that when we homeini drank the poison. You do not compromise on the principles of the regime. He ensured the survival of the regime. The Trump Administration is signaling to the iranians that the only deal that is acceptable is a deal that would come at the cost of the Islamic Republics survival and that will never happen. It does not matter who is in charge into run. As long as they believe that they cannot get into a mutually beneficial deal with the Trump Administration, i do not think theres a serious prospect for diplomacy. On the question of external help. The iranians have proven over the years that theyve had some help from the outside for Ballistic Missile programs. They had help from syria, north korea. They have some cooperation with russia. Some transfers from china. But overall, this is a nation of 80 million. It has top notch universities. And it actually has been able necessity has no rule. It has been forced to develop some indigenous capabilities. Again, that has created some degree of deterrence. You talk to israeli officials for instance after the attack on saudi aramco. When there was some rethinking we on the balance of deterrence in the region. This technique of using low flying cruise missiles and swarming tactics by with cheap drones. Theyre like ten or 15,000 dollar drones. If these are used against israeli critical sites. Like the Chemical Plant in haifa or the Nuclear Plant in des moines, it is a major gamechanger. It creates all sorts of dilemmas. This israeli officials address this now when hezbollah might have a few or do you address it later when they might have many more. And the risk of a major backlash if you take action now. On the iranian side for instance, how far do you push without the risk of getting yourself or your military leaders vulnerable and susceptible to retaliation by the u. S. Or its allies in the region . Again, that is why im saying we are in a pattern that is constantly evolving. We but we should not expect the weaker party which is iran in this case to unilaterally, either capitulate or give away capabilities that it sees as critical to its national security. Back to your question about the hardliners taking over in iran. I think ali is basically right. As long as there is only pressure to pull down the regime, it will not amount to much. One of the things that i would like to see is a better articulated and more consensus u. S. Foreign policy on iran itself. What i saw in the administration and still see is divided opinions. Some people are hoping that economic pressure on iran will cause a collapse of the regime. The Islamic Republic will fall and Something Else will come in its place but it cannot be as bad. Others are looking for specific changes to iranian policies which are amicable to u. S. Interest. Nuclear weapons, Ballistic Missiles and cruise missiles, support for proxies. The strategies for these two are entirely different. I think we are mixing this all up together. I am not confident. Every once in a while i wonder how easy how iran will be to negotiate with, i pull up my copy of the iranian constitution and read the preamble. Its anti american. It talks about exporting the achievements of the revolution. Supporting against the oppressors. Theres a lot in the basis of the Iranian State which supports and expansionist more radical iranian policy. The question in my mind, im not an iran expert, its can a more conservative harder line iranian government soft pedal the revolutionary ideology in exchange for some sort of economic or security benefits . I think at this point it is unknown because it has not really been tried since the jcpoa. What general votel is waiting. We will take a brief break as we set up a podium for his top. Please join me in thanking ali, and doug and and for an excellent discussion. Ahead of the u. S. Agency for international development, testifies on the project but the president s 2021 budget request. And how they were are responding to the coronavirus outbreak. This hearing is two hours