Silence our conversations, please silence your phones. With yalta being an eight day conference, we have almost made a full eight hours. [laughter] the last session is often one of our favorites and that is a roundtable discussion where we get all of the speakers up together to talk about themes, to ask each other questions, and to give you all one last time to pepper one, some, or all of our panelists with your own questions. I would ask if you have a question, if it is or specific panelist, please name that panelist, or if you want to throw it open to some or all. We are going to ask dr. Gunter bischoff to chair this panel. Thank you for filling in on short notice. [applause] before i lead the desk leave the podium i would like to introduce our panelists. Mr. Michael bishop, dr. Rob bischof. R. Gunter thank you very much, jeremy. The issue came up and it was raised in an Opening Statement by rob about his growing up in cleveland. It is what scholars call the yalta myth. Keep in mind, there was a very good question from the audience is this the same thing as the selling out of Eastern Europe, the same thing as the selling out of china . That big debate in american postwar politics, keep in mind the context is that republicans had been out of office since 1932. They had one big in the 1946 election they wanted to win the white house, and this seems to be the issue where you could blame the democrats. Selling out china. Meaningselling out china. Out Eastern Europe. That is how yalta became a bad word in the immediate postwar. Jeremy talked about it. Yalta myths, as rob told us echoed all the way into , the 1970s in cleveland, about Eastern Europeans being sold down the river as the saying went. I think that is an important part of that long life of yalta particularly in american politics. Gaulle was not invited to yalta and was smarting about that for a long time that he was not there representing france and he made yalta a bad word as well. In 19 six date when the soviets value did check was a bach yeah, when the soviets invaded czechoslovakia, Charles De Gaulle blamed yalta. That is how long it was working inside history. I think the yalta myths are important topics we ought to be talking about. Rob made a good point, if you will recall, his conclusion was yalta was the blueprint for allied victory. He reminded us that halting at that another scholar picked up in 1967. It was very much in the historiography at the time. I would add the important reason for eisenhower to halt at the elbe, was he was afraid the nazis were belting a fortress in the forest of austria and bavaria. So he sent armies down to the south. To make sure that fortress system would not come into being. In fact they had no time to prepare such a last stand. But thats what they were afraid of because nazi intelligence fed it to the oss that this would be happening in the alps. That was another reason to halt at the elbe, to get quickly to the alps. And then issue raised online, that person said yalta, is it so previous is it so different from previous conferences . Isnt this the game of diplomacy, whatever you call quick pro quote orton for dad tit for tat, is that is what is being done in realpolitik . That is it i would like to throughout therefore potential discussion issues but im sure , theres many more. You talk about the yalta myths, the selling out of Eastern Europe, selling poland down the river, any of these european eastern ethnic groups that lived in cleveland with me. You could answer this as well. Theres also that roosevelt was sick. He was not up to it. There is stalin looking in fine fettle. Churchill was depressed. Manroosevelt, clearly the was on deaths door, but i love that you set a graduate student to write a Research Paper on this, looking at word counts and the depth and size of roosevelt interventions. Story its not a matter but was the fact that roosevelt was sick at yalta important . People ofng the poland in particular, on one hand, its not a myth that the big three gathered together in decided the future of europe without much confirmation with consultation with the rest of the world. Thats the reality. That created a lot of resentment. But where the mythology starts, really, that the western allies were there in position to get a much better deal and did not do that for whatever reason fdr was sick or there were spies in the american delegation or roosevelt was trying to get to stalin to get the united nations, his Main International project and his legacy goal. And the people of poland are important go for them yalta was a turning point. That is where it was agreed that whatever government they had in london would be replaced, and they were losing territories in the east. The molotov ribbentrop planned line allies. And that was the loss of their city in todays ukraine. The molotov ribbentrop line was accepted by the western allies. And that was the loss of their city in todays ukraine. That was a major disappointment for the polish. Yalta was a word for betrayal in poland all the way until the 1970s and 1980s. Maybe one more issue that was raised throughout the conference and in dr. Plokiis paper was german reparations. Stalin demanded 20 billion of german reparations to be evenly divided between the soviet union and western powers. That is how evenly he wanted to divide it. Of course, he had a point. The soviet union was destroyed very badly. Roosevelt and churchill could see as they traveled to delta through crimea. In order to reconstruct the soviet union german reparations were needed. But there was a lesson to be learned from world war i that if you insist on reparations it might create bad politics. As it did in germany. That was one of the big issues the nazis very early picked up. But i think dr. Plokii, correct me if i am wrong, stalin got his 10 millions. Even though it was not granted yet at he got it through various yalta, eventually he got it through various means. First removal of industries from east germany, the same thing he didnt mentor area. When they realized that was not such a good deal they often did not know how to put these industries back together. In the soviet union. Are they became rusty and polished rail yards it is being said as well. Then they decided to take reparations out of current production in germany. And that is how the soviets got their 10 billion. They took reparations from austria, too. I found out a remarkable thing. The soviets took as much reparations out of their ports in austria as the u. S. Poured into their port in austria. [laughter] that would almost make you think the u. S. Paid the reparations [laughter] theres no such thing as a coincidence. [laughter] prof. Bischof i thought that was pretty remarkable. They took reparations away from german assets and eastern austria. That was all the way up until 1960. Austria delivered oil to the soviet union all the way up until 1960. But what the historian has reminded us, we need to keep in mind the fact that the americans got reparations from germany, even though they did not demand any at yalta. How did they get it . In a smart way. They sent teams into germany. To take production methods, to take patents out of german corporations. And apparently that saved Companies Like dupont, who took these production plans billions , of dollars of research plans, so it is assumed this smart way of intellectual reparations netted the United States 10 billion or so, too. In the long run, both sides got what they wanted. I would like to throw in one thing, gunter, about this issue of myths. Myths are easy to sell when there a kernel of truth to them. I dont really believe in the big lie. That you just invent a crazy thing and sand enough times. Let me talk about poland. And say it enough times. Lets talk about poland. We have all worked with graduate students at certain points in our career. I love them dearly. They bring a certain wisdom to the table. Yearsin a class for 30 and some smart students as is that kind of crazy that the war was fought over poland and there was no real independent poland after the war. That ironic nature of what happened to the polish state after the war, the feeling bid that it had from one form of come to any to another the from one form of tyranny to another. The germans got liberated, they got to live the benefits of a democratic way of life in western germany. Brace poles, whose stand against nazi aggression started the war. We know why it happened and i think everyone knows why it happened. What kind of Foreign Policy is that . When poland up under the yoke, wines up under the yoke, you statistics casually and poland is shocking. Casualty statistics. Not only the first to fall but one of the biggest sufferers in terms of the war as well. Its still there for me. Prof. Bischof Winston Churchill, was very aware of the fact that great written went to Great Britain went to war over poland Great Britain went to war over poland. And that yalta he kept insisting he was going to bat for poland and the polish government and the declaration of liberated europe. And guaranteeing freely elected governments in Eastern Europe. It did not work out that way because he was very mindful of the fact that we went to war for poland. Prof. Citino and churchill is the mastermind behind the growth of the yalta myth. At least that is what i heard from you. He also sat across from michael collins, the great Irish Revolutionary prof. Citino the big fellow. Who, when he signed the irish treaty, said, i have signed my own death warrant. And that turned out to be true. He was killed to the following year during the irish civil war. That think when we look at we have to say that ultimately and hission on his part fellow irish negotiators to sign that treaty was in evitable. They do not really have any choice. The british would not have accepted the notion of an irish republic at that time. And the british war machine was primed and ready to assault ireland even more viciously than it had. Way of a longwinded saying, is that the conference we are talking about or is the yalta conference simply a symbol of or a ratification of these inevitable forces, or could it, conceivably have gone another way on the coast of crimea . Prof. Bischof i would like to return actually to this to link this question and line of argument to the question good to post earlier, whether yalta is another place where a lot of horsetrading is taking place. Orth there is something particular about yalta . I would say its not much different from the conferences that happened before that in International History with one exception. And that exception was quite idealistic, this liberal view of president roosevelt, who, of course, was following in the footsteps of president wilson, this idea of a liberal order and an international organization. When fdr comes back and addresses the joint session of the congress and senate and says we are in a completely different world where there is no more secret agreements done. He announces diplomatic relations. A new era in diplomatic relations. The question is to what degree he believes in that. Then things start popping up. There is a secret agreement on the participation in the war soviet participation in the war with japan. And there are problems in Eastern Europe. With poland. And that is where the reality of the old sphere of influence was and the vision of the neoliberal world comes, and the clash, and from that point of view, the expectations from yalta become much, much higher. Partially because of the participants fdr in particular , put them on that level. And one more comment on the internal politics of Eastern Europe. Whether it was sold down or not is that churchill comes back from yalta to a revolt in his own conservative party. There are tax on the government in the parliament. For a lot of people in britain, britain went to war for poland. It was a major issue. Said, what as you britain was getting as a of that or the world what it getting as a result. With fdr, the polish, it seems to me he was talking about three or 4 million polish voters in the United States. Im not sure. Thats what he was talking about. He was saying im not against this changing of the polish orders but i cannot commit to that publicly before president ial elections. The poles, before that they were the staunchest supporters of the Democratic Party ever in the world. My guess is they do not stay so dedicated after that. The secrecy of the agreement was an important point. Historians have paid attention that it trickled out, what happened in yalta. In the spring, and i think the secret agreement on what the u. S. Had to give the soviet union to get involved in the war and the far east. You talked about it, rob. That came out in february, 1946. One year after yalta. It was that secrecy, of course, which gave them, the republicans, the means to create the myth that yalta sold the Eastern Europeans down the river. This became bigger in the 1940s. This is how yalta was being discussed through the 1950s. I think it was very early, like 1955 that the Foreign Relations volume was published, which was a principal source on the american side of what actually came to pass. It was very early on. Usually it takes 30 or 40 years before any approved volume is published on any given event. Dr. Bishop i dont think you are on, jeremy . We have a question to the right from dr. Dupont . One to all of you and then one that is very specific. The general question is, everyone has used language like, the u. S. Gave or churchill gave and so forth. ,specifically about Eastern Europe can you name one thing , that was given away that stalin had not already earned means . Military second, to mr. Bishop im not sure whether you are defending churchill or setting up a theory about why he fought this, but it seems to me there is an inherent contradiction between your later interpretation of his being appalled at what is happening in Eastern Europe and the fact that he wrote on the napkin this famous napkin that was, as i understand it, was initiated by him. Either you are arguing there was an up if any after yalta. But he contributed mightily by his acquiescence in moscow. [indiscernible] [laughter] tough crowd. Dr. Bishop you make a very good point. I mention it only because i did not want to present churchill as being unrealistically above the sorted compromises involved in diplomacy and with yalta. All i can say is he was not complete control to stalin, even on that paper. There was that symbolic 10 in the west and romania. I dont he wished for or foresaw what was going to happen later. I just think it was an example of his commitment to empire and his vision for what the world should look like in the future. Becoming dominant. Because he was alone there with stalin at the time. And the irony is things changed. In greece, so quickly. He forged an agreement with stalin, which ironically enough, stalin kept. For his own reasons. And britain intervenes they cannot maintain the commitment and they step back. And the american step in. It was not churchills finest moment. And he himself said that and he uncomfortable about that. But keep in mind churchill lived to be 90. He had a sevendecade political career. Some of his views shifted over time. Although i think he is a lot more consistent than a lot of people give him credit for. Even though he was horrified by the yalta settlement he was alert to any sign that there might be an opportunity for a breakthrough in relations with the soviets and i quoted some of the things he said in the aftermath of the death of stalin and how he saw that as an opportunity to bring about a peaceful settlement. To the cold war. Is it possible to hold both of those positions to hand you an agreement . And later to rail on it against communism . Because churchill was an imperialist and understood how to divide the world into spheres of influence and he was a bedrock anticommunist. I realize we are complex beings. Sometimes one of our obsessions comes to the four. Then later it is replaced by another one of our obsessions. I can posit a churchill who signs what the Group Suggests and then rose about communism. If you are a conservative anticommunist and churchill is your hero you can be uncomfortable to read that he he vastly preferred Adlai Stevenson in the president ial election of and he was 1952, disappointed in eisenhowers victory. He thought the soviet union was the same whore in a different dress and he could not abide john foster dulles, the american secretary of state, who he said with the only bull he knew carried his own china shop with him. [laughter] of this and makes you wonder. But having been so adamant and can sincere and consistent through his career regarding hatred of communism, he was genuinely horrified by the idea that the world might consume itself. A nuclear war. He wanted to do everything he could to avert that. He was capable of change. He maintains the big principles throughout. He was able to adapt to changing circumstances. Prof. Bischof i would not advise anyone to take at face value what you read in churchills memoirs. [laughter] that famous story about napkins. There was one week of negotiations. Yes, maybe there was a moment with napkin, but it was the top of the iceberg with negotiations. Churchill was closer to stalin than roosevelt in terms of understanding the world to be organized in spheres of influence. What he didnt like, he did not like where poland was going as the result of that. In that sense he was consistent. He wanted more, as the war was coming to an end. Who goes to yalta he goes to yalta understanding he has a weak hand. And, yes, chamberlain was wrong hitlers, and i do not think i am wrong to trust stalin. This is after yalta. He is in a situation where theres very little for him to go on except stalins word, which probably addresses, to a degree, your question about what to cure fdr have to give stalin. There was something stalin wanted from them in Eastern Europe. In the pacific, its very clear. He wanted territories and he was prepared to send his army into battle. In Eastern Europe he needed legitimacy and International Recognition for his territorial acquisitions. Him is what they could give in this halt or play some sort of games and that is what the negotiation about polish government were about. That is why he tried to say i did not interfere with what you did in paris and france with de gaulle. He was saying that but he really did not insist. There was still the veneer of diplomacy in negotiations because he needed legitimacy. Let me add to what michael said, there might have been guilt on churchills part as well. You brought the story to 1943. It could be fleshed out more. Stalin dies in 1953. Churchill comes out and says this would be a Good Opportunity to meet the new leadership at the highest level, be in another kind of summit meeting and i think he was trying to resolve the cold war then and there if he could. Part of the problem was eisenhower was president since january and he gave a speech in saying he was not excited about april 1953, a summit because the soviets would need to make major armistice is working on that. , and maybe atreaty german peace treaty. Ofhad very specific kind things he said that soviet needs to make confession before we sit down with them in a summit meeting. Nothing happened for the next two weeks, and then the summit that happened was actually at bermuda. That was late in 1953. It was the french, british, american summit. Thats when i in eisenhower made that remark about the woman in the street. That is the same talking about the soviet union. Third sort of tension between church hill eisenhower carried into when eisenhower was president. Some historians think a great opportunity was missed, may to bring the cold war to the end. This was also the time when the Nuclear Arms Race really expanded with the hbombs being detonated. Churchill was horrified about those weapons. It was all and in effort to keep the Nuclear Arms Race in check. Were not really prepare get to leave either because they needed to figure out who would be stalins successor. Democraticabout governance is that we have an election every year. If we dont like the guy in the white house we can vote him out. Soviets did not have clear procedures. It took the soviets almost two years to find a new leader. Eventually crew chef emerged by the spring of 1965 and thats when things started to move again. Gentlemen, the next question did you have a point to add . Give . Had what we had to we dealt with that. Ok. Is,ne thing that puzzles me what are all of these percentages . The people in the resources. I have always wondered exactly what churchill was thinking about when he was doing these percentages of influence. I can see myself making a note like that. Maybe all of us can. Maybe youre working on ideas in your head. Or 10 days is a week of this discussion of this very point of fluid have influence. The wisdom of the typical american undergraduate. Some would say, what does 10 of greece actually mean . Theoretically it could have been just an effort to at least symbolically say, we will not withdraw entirely. Stalin a freeve hand even if there was not a of talk behind it. That 10 role of what would happen to romania later really do not mean anything. That thek understanding of the spheres of influence against stalin and churchill were but then it was different. Churchill said, for that was also the way. Our observers can be there, our businesses can be there, and so on and so forth. For stalin, that was unacceptable. , who knew what stalin was thinking and how he was doing that, later said the only way for us to coexist is for the west to decide that this is yours and this is ours. They were very insecure. Economically, after marshall was there it, they knew they cannot compete with the United States. Their way was the iron curtain. Thats where the complexity of churchills position is. Is not against influence, but he is against iron curtain. This is not how he understands the world. Jim, to your right has a question, then i will get to the other side of the room. This is kind of an essay question. You shared statistics about the casualties. What was the west perception of those numbers . Did they just think it was stalin pontificating . Believe that the soviets could continue the sacrifices of military and thatmically, and did make a difference . Start of american and u. S. Involvement in 1941 it was clear who was bearing the burden of fighting the germans. Roosevelt knew it, people knew it. The exact statistics were not known. They are still being argued about today. There was a radical revision of those statistics in the 1990s with the fall of communism. We are not quite sure what it was during world war ii. But the notion that stalin and the soviets had to be kept in the field because they were bearing the biggest burden fighting the germans, it was a bedrock of roosevelts Foreign Policy and shouted you from winning the war. I certainly agree with what rob just said. Fivetime stalin appeared on the cover of time magazine. Those redition of army victories. That reality was clear. In terms of the numbers, the soviets did not have been themselves. Cameirst time khrushchev up with the numbers are it stalin never gave the number. Million and it was as he emerged as the successor to stalin. Todays estimate is 27 million. Stalin was not talking about those numbers because that was putting himself in a bad light. He said that, any other people but russians would kick us out. What happens during the war . He was not not eager to do the numbers. I must remind you that the National WorldWar Ii Museum has a much watched will be, beyond all boundaries. The number is still 20 million. Government, to your left, please. Thate of you brought up there was 15 minutes or so spin on a document which was signed a 15 minutes or so spent on document signed. A blasted into something in the future. With this be a good time to discuss what that was . How did that have an impact on the soviet union . The declaration on liberated europe . Yeah. There was like 10 minutes of talk about this. The Major Concerns on the american side that stalin would not sign that. Togetherration was put , there was a long preparation for Something Like that. That there would be a body that and that the them policies could be implemented. Eventually it was decided that stalin would not go for that. Asit became a declaration opposed to an agreement per se. Which put a slower than other agreements, specifically. Greements that were reached stalin said, that is fine. Was really horrified by that. Said, you should not do that. That will give them an instrument. Stalin, according to molotovs memoirs, not memoirs, but something of interviews in the 1960s and 1970s, he said that stalin responded to him, dont worry, we will figure it out. What really matters is the position of the forces on the ground. Let them have the declaration. Minutes and americans were surprised. When the world went into the cold war mode, that was the only document where someone could argue that stalin violated the promises given. Everything else, the language was so careful that there were no specific violations per se. And when hermann was returning from crimea to moscow, one of the military commanders, i dont remember who it was, but he said , it looks like the documents , they can besigns stretched from here to washington. And they said, it looks like we have to start negotiations from scratch all over again. Declaration, that was also the way for roosevelt to come back according to his polish electorate and say that they bought something. Stalin promised on a democratic principles. Wasid not help, but that more of a political document for domestic consumption back in the United States. Add think we should also that the polish issue at yalta had two sides to it. One was the borders. Moving the entire country westward. This is something mark would remind us of. The other issue was the future of polish government. The fact is that stalin created conditions on the ground by setting up the polish government. Came to eastern poland where he set up the , and fdr and were concerned with what would present the future mode of the government in Eastern Europe. Countries were being liberated. They kept insisting that they wanted the polish government in exile to be represented in the polish government. In that context, the declaration of liberated europe came out. Mainly as a means to face roosevelt back home at the polish voters. Battled for poland with the declaration. But it was a very weak declaration and it never really did the trick of enabling free elections to be held in Eastern Europe. It sort of would guarantee the democratic future for those countries. Lets wait for the microphone, sir. Nobody will be able to hear you. I will bring it back. It a seed that was used by organizations like solidarity and so forth . Or in my thinking of another documents . You know, probably it was the act of 1975. Rights cut part of the agreements that were reached there. That jumpstarted and helped to start the dissident moment. Human rights and so on and so forth. Mindful of our time limit, i will ask the subsequent questions to be directed at one individual panelist. So we can try to get to all the hands that are up. I know there are about three of them still. I just wanted to point out the government that ran with their hands about the democracy of europe, especially the governments after. Somewhere in puerto rico, whoever you want. Poland was dismembered why germany. Essentially destroyed as an entity and reconstructed. Poland wasay that recovered. It was under control of stalin. But in the end unity was lost. Germany specifically removed part of the country. Littled say there was a happy ending to this world war ii episode, if we want, for the polish nation. The question is whether the government had the of russia mopping communists, had there been control from russia . Was communism a whole point or the lack of democracy . Churchill being very bothered by the democracy in india or egypt or other places. Forritain has always stood the rights of small nations except ireland. Its a world of politics. There are moments when you can afford your idealism, and other moments when realism is the order of the day. That would be my comment. Anything since there was a churchill slant to that . Speculate, what would churchills views be if russia was a noncommunist state . Wolf church hill stalin were more comfortable with the whole spheres of influence way of world and say roosevelt was. It is possible that if you to communism out of the way and churchill would have been more comfortable with the russian influence in poland. The keep in mind, he was one of warning against appeasement, arguing for rearmament in britain, and ultimately became first learned of the admiral and rejoin the ernment only after you after the invasion of poland. I think it was something that was important to him from the beginning. Gentlemen, to your left in the front row, please. You talked about looking at yalta in different lenses, correct . My question is really based on looking at it through the lens of bottom to top instead of top to bottom. Domestic,actions from political ideas from each of the respective countries, how did they react to the yalta conference, if they had any reactions at all . That is a very good question. I think we already heard this information about what happened at yalta. It was over the course of several years. Which i recall call the standard narrative on the yalta, still comes back matter how many times you try to slay it. That would be formed in a domestic political context in the United States over the course of several years. I cannot really say if there was major public reaction or dominant public reaction to yalta. Really are back from the policy, because there still are secret agreements being made at yalta. The crystallization of this antiyalta narrative will be the course of several years. The germans are getting bombed from the skies in the cities are being overrun. Gentlemen, back to your left, please. This question as to mr. Bishop. What youike to know think Winston Churchill would say or do. We talked a lot today about winning of the cold war and the rise of democracy and Eastern European countries. What he would say in response to andn in crimea and ukraine the rise of nationalism and a loss of democracy in poland, hungary and other Eastern European countries. Would we have another iron curtain speech . A friend of mine, a lincoln scholar was on the radio in boston back in the 1970s for a call in program. Someone called in and asked, what would lincoln have said about blessing, which was the busing, which was the big issue of the time. My historian friend responded by saying, what is a bus . [laughter] it is always dangerous to try to divine the sorts of things. I do think that church would have viewed russia and putin with the same jaundiced and wary of thet he always did soviet union. I think you would be dismayed that this resort, destination where he spent this glorious week on the riviera of hades was this fellow leaders going to be seated back to ukraine and seized again by year 2013 42014. I would like to think that he would be vigilant and on guard and making very inspirational speeches. While at the same time pursuing the interests of the United Kingdom and a very effective way. Panelist all the way in the back center, please. I am wondering, in terms of the perception of the united , immediatelyta after entering into the war, where the soviet unions has ,een presented as a stout ally then the soviet union has seen wars fought on their torah terry territory twice in 30 years, giving them a set of buffer states is understandable and legitimate, therefore he was not perceived as a sellout the average american at that point . Ob have heard lots about how the information trickled out slowly. We talked a lot about how the information trickled out slowly. That was a stark reminder. Particularly amongst republicans it was beginning to change as it was become known what kind of agreement had been made secretly. Theink the tradition of policy, even the you expect in , that was aic party stark reminder and i think that is why the percentage agreement comes in. That was traditional, oldfashioned european diplomacy, the percentage of agreement the way americans and roosevelt did not want to see it. But the American Public did not know a lot about what happened at yalta. That only came out in little spurts all the way down to 1946 and even 1955. It took a long time to really find out what was agreed to at yalta. But the agreement on poland, particularly then, led to the myth. The historian wrote a book about yalta. It took a hold in the republican there you have it, the democrats and roosevelt of to their old things, they are not defending democracy as they should, they are selling nations like poland on the river. The perception slowly set in, but in a partisan way. I think that is important of the yalta myth. The way they am allies did, this became a partisan myth. Not all americans would share that. Paul has a question in the front row. When you talk about postwar politics in america, you cannot miss that committee and how it came into being probably because of this slow leakage about information that the altar. Yalta. At the time it was persecuting nazis were trying to find nazi spies in the United States. Only after world war ii were you activity, it was redirected towards chasing communist out of the american government. The committee was sort of subverted after the war towards the new purpose of the anticommunist activity that wants to be investigated. Truman himself started to investigated investigate such anticommunist activity in the federal government in 1947. People were fired from the federal government, but then ane a fellow who needed issue in 1950 to be reelected. He went to the president of georgetown university. He said, what would be a good issue today that would rile the American Public . The president of georgetown said this is a big topic. And he said, that is boring, nobody is interested in that. And then joe walsh said, anticommunism in government. From a catholic perspective it is a big issue. A few weeks later he had the virginia andt talked about 57 in the state department. Took aere mccarthyism strange fate, if you will. I know the stuff pretty well because i wrote my masters thesis under professor ambrose on the relationship of eisenhower and mccarthy. Eisenhower said, you have to give him enough rope to hang himself. We had a chairman from saint martinsville, louisiana. There is a communist under every bed. Ladies and gentlemen, lets give a round of applause for our panel. [applause] up, i haveyone gets a couple of Closing Remarks and then i will cede the podium to rob. Thank you in the audience for a great day. For your questions both online and also you who are physically with us. Maybe you are seeing for the first time our brandnew higgins hotel. I hope this is not the last time we see you this year. We have wonderful programming throughout the year. Keep in mind and look on our website for the memory wars september conference. World war ii at 75. We have talked a lot about the legacy of world war ii or yalta today. This conference in september will be discussing how the war is remembered throughout the world and how it is very relevant to current political and diplomatic affairs. It is looking at it through public memorials, through museums, monuments. That is going to be one in september. And then the week after the of the surrender ceremony on september 2. As our International Conference in world war ii in november the weekend before thanksgiving. That is our International Conference on world war ii in november that we can before thanksgiving. Let me ask for the final time for one of our speakers to come to the stage and make Closing Remarks as our senior historian. Thank you. [applause] i promise to keep this short. I am all that is left between you and the door and i realize that. I was listening to all the talks today, i thought we had a rich discussion on yalta. Two issues that crystallized in my mind, i say, what does yalta mean, why is it important . This view of Foreign Policy that you either have realpolitik or more realistic positions. Someone asked, is in this typical that we are read write boundaries and that is how it has always been. The Woodrow Wilson said, that is not how it should be. That has been a strain in the u. S. Foreignpolicy since then. In the roosevelt administration. We can Work Together for a common purpose and common good. A wonderful book called the wilsonian moment. It is about the post world war i period and then maybe you could draw some conclusion about world war ii. I think the real meaning of yalta is how important it is to end your wars. To think about how you end wars. They are surprisingly easy to get into. But wrapping them up successfully and any kind of conclusive fashion is often a very difficult thing. Clausewitz tells us that war is the continuation of politics by other means. You have to consider this from the beginning of the war. Why are we fighting, how can we get out of it . A British Military analysts, and one of my Favorite Book said, we why do we fight wars for a better piece. You did not like so much about the situation that you decided to go to war and spend billions of dollars of treasure and lose hundreds of thousands of lives in america and millions of mccain case of the soviet union. On that note, lets leave our discussion of the yalta conference and think about what a better peace might have meant in 1945. And as i always do in these affairs, i will end with the words of Douglas Macarthur on the back of the uss missouri. These proceedings are closed. Tv,his is American History featuring events, interviews, archival films. Txploring our nations pas every weekend on cspan three. Dermot turing talks about his book x, y, and z. British ands how polar spies were able to decipher the german enigma code in wwii. Good evening, everyone. Welcome to the International Spy museum. Progxcited to introduce a turing. Authoer dermot ofs the authoer of a number other books including alan turing and the bomb breakthrough. He is the nephew of the famous crypto analyst alan turing. Orermot worked