Serhii plokhii here, the director of the Ukrainian Research institute at harvard. As i mentioned this morning, he s been on our list for a long time and we finally found the time to bring him down here. His titles include the last the cossack the forgotten pastors of the eastern front, for peace. Ladies and gentlemen, dr. Serhii plokhii. [applause] plokhii thank you for the introduction. Thank you to the organizers for bringing me here. I also want to thank all of you , these coming from boston today, being as it is coming inside to listen to presentations like mine, i really appreciate that sacrifice. Thank you. The organizers really couldnt find a better time to have a conference like that, given that we are really having our symposium 75 years almost day today to the conference that took place in crimea back in february of 1945. And the conference that is still very much with us on many levels. 4 of this year, that was exactly the anniversary of the conference. Coverage,the media and of course of the conference was not forgotten. Thee were pieces online on anniversary of the conference coming from russia. There was an oped in the new york times. There was a major expose on the bbc. That ins interesting each of these contexts, in each country the titles were different and emphasis were different. So the conference is important for all of these countries, but for different reasons. In the oped that title was Something Like we still live in a world made by stalin, in germany it was a conference made in the postwar world, and in russia it was about what a wonderful time it was and may be the founders of the United Nations should get together and Start Talking again. Well, um, yalta is the conference that is remembered not just on anniversaries a light february 4 o light february 4 of 2020, it is the conference and that is there [laughter] orther it is february, april may, it does not matter because of its a symbolic importance. Its symbolic importance. Oneou think this is only particular situation where somebody wants to make fun out of any of this, as you can see on the screen, this is not exactly the case. Every president ends up to be in a photograph that will be addressed did adjusted. There would be chinese leaders or german leaders dependent on the situation. The question is really why. I do not think there is a more iconic image that exists of diplomacy. Diplomacy of world war ii, but in general. And in that sense yalta keeps coming back again and again. Was veryountry, yalta much part of major debates and discussions which were on history, but also on politics in the late 1940s, 50s, 60s and 70s. And through most of the cold war, yalta was there. The question that certainly one has good reason to ask, why yalta . We talked about, and in the thellent presentation by professor, there was a discussion of the conferences that led to yalta. There was also mention of pot stamp. Potsdam. Yalta is happening very much in the middle of the war, but it is still considered as a peace conference to the degree that there was any after world war ii. If you think about it from the m, why yalta . One reason is yalta is very important because those decisions were made. Some of them prepared by previous conferences, others finalized at potsdam. Another resume another reason was it was the last conference of president roosevelt. That was really his last major, accomplishment or failure, depending on how people look at that in the national arena. And in the 40s and 50s, as you know, issues of history can become very political and in the discussions and debates between republicans and democrats, that more thane was there any other conference at the time. There was little interest to go after truman. No one believed he would last for so long. Certainly, the democratic legacy was associated with president roosevelt. Is notse politics it for the politics of the moment, politics of the year. Not the only reason why yalta was so prominent. Another reason was when it comes to world war ii, the image emerged for some very good reasons that it was a good war in the sense to the degree that words can be good. In gay sense that the war that was fought in a sense that the war was fought for the right reasons. And also the war that actually brought at a certain level the results that were expected. You can compare the occupation of germany, then later the raq,pation of iran or i sorry, as attempts to model it on what happened in germany or japan. And it did not happen that way. So that also explains may be one of the reasons why it is world war ii, not the korean war, movesam and so forth that so prominently in the american historical imagination. Notthe good war ended with something that most people expected it to end. It ended in cold war. There were High Expectations with the United Nations, with the victory of germany there would be a different kind of International Order that would come into existence. And a very different kind of International Order did come to the fore, but that was actually divided into two warring camps. Mainne of them, the anniversary was the former world war ii ally, the soviet union. First under stalin, then under his successors. And there was a need to explain what actually happened. From that point of view, yalta happened to be an easy explanation. Either it was fdrs bad health, es, whopresence of hugh was later put in prison and the documents supported the argument that he was spying for the soviets. And there was also mr. White, that was mentioned earlier, who was working within the American Administration while working under stalin. That was easy to explain the start of the cold war, the form of the grand alliance, to a degree that the result of certain decisions, wrong decisions that were made at a very particular time and place. And that time was the yalta conference and the place was yalta. Period of time after the conference, in the 1940s, 50s, 60s, the thinking and writing about the conference came through a number of stages. The debate started very early on with publishing of memoirs by some of the participants of the conference on the american side, like the secretary of state, burns, and his predecessor, the secretary of state who wrote a book roosevelt and the russians, the yalta conference. And thesn issues were what i described, to what degree the world we thought was the outcome of mistakes or unpreparedness lets say on the part of fdr, that was burns argument that happened at the yalta conference. And some parts of europe, in in polandr poland, itself and polish immigration, and in Eastern Europe yalta became a symbol of betrayal. N to the degree that munich has been taken, a western betrayal of allies into smaller countries. Went mostlyd 50s under the understanding of yalta as the bad conference and ended a good war. And as a result we get not perfect peace. The 1960s brought to the fore t all sorts ands of all kinds. The result of that reevaluation of yalta came in a boat published by book which is called yalta, and the authors take on the conference was there was no betrayal. That if you look in terms of real politics, what goals had the soviet union, what goals had the u. S. , the outcome was not bad at all. Of theitics was, yes,tion said this is probably true but this is truth researched in the british and american archives. They know that there was maneuvering, that they were positions and longterm strategies, and so on. The soviet documents and it soviet position looked like a black box because there was no access to those archives, so the author was trying to treat stolen stalin not only as good or as bad as the western politicians, but also to a degree that the argument is robbed of stalin was his victory by the western maneuvering. At the end of the cold war, of course we brought access to the soviet archives. Or allowed us to look at the conference not just from the perspective of the sources we have on the western side, but also from the soviet side. Many found out that stalin was quite dishonest in the position he was taking, the way how he was playing the game, the fact that the premises were bugged, that all this information was reported to him. Anotherwas in many ways correction to our understanding of how the game of diplomacy was played at yalta. That. Skip let me now go through a number i can probably cover everything discussed at yalta, after all it took them eight days to do that and i have roughly 40 minutes, but i will try to do my best. I will try to touch upon the major themes associated with the start of the conference, then major blocks of the issues, the questions discussed there. I promise you that whatever i i will not be able to cover everything, but i will be more than happy to answer questions after that. Eo let me start with th location of the conference. There were already questions about that. Ins is a photo of the palace yalta. Like a really nice place to be, right . To come there. One of the warmest places that than in the territory back then in the territory of the soviet union. There was one problem. This was taken during the summer months. Fdr, Winston Churchill and stalin it was an easier trip, but Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt traveled far away to come to crimea. Winston churchill said if they would spend 10 years looking for a worse place, they would not find one. And if you think that he was he was flying from the mediterranean and fdr was flying from virginia, maybe not, but they were coming from much farther places. The takeover by the workers and peasants of those the czarss th palaces. Nazisere destroyed by the and had to be rebuilt. It was a question if it was stolens choice and wanted to show crimea. Ns preference was odettes, odessa, where it was logistically easier to organize the conference and is still warm, but he had to convince fdr to come all the way to the soviet union. Harry hopkins was a very influential when it came to foreign policy. He knew that fdr read mark twain and mark twain traveled to the crimea, so that is where he met the russian czar. So crimea was on fdrs map somewhere, because of the crimean war, because of mark twain and fdr wanted to go to the places he had not seen before. Odessa did not sound right, but crimea fit the bill and eventually that is what happened. What the western leaders sought in crimea was not just the destruction done by the fighting and by the germans. A few months before the conference, 200,000 crimean tartars were forcefully resettled by stalin in the area, so adding to the depopulation and devastation. This is where the conference was taking place. There along the c line sea line. Why if itod question, was such a devastated place, if it was so cold and unpleasant, why then it was yalta . The main reason was that stalin refused to go anywhere else. After afraid of flying flying to tehran he had problems with his ears and decided not to do that. He was also quite paranoid in a sense he did not want to go anywhere he was not under the protection. Also atehran, this was place half occupied by the red was completely occupied by the red army, and yalta was not an exception from there. He also bugged the premises, which of course helped him with negotiations. But why did the leaders of the western world decide to go through all that trouble and travel so far as yalta . The professor mentioned fdr could not fly above a certain level. And those work conditions reallynditions that were ith unpressurized cabins, so was really difficult with his Health Condition at that time. So why did they do that . The reason was they actually needed something from stalin. They were there to negotiate with him not just the end of the war, but the piece after peace after, before the soviets were in berlin, before they would give up control in eastern and Central Europe. That was another reason why Winston Churchill flew to moscow in 1944, to make an agreement because he saw how fast the red army was moving and he thought if i can get anything from stalin in terms of an agreement, this is the right time. So fdr puts his life on the line. He could very well and return from that trip. Plane, or toin the fly over the german positions in the mediterranean, and they were shooting at them. Tothat is very important keep in mind about the yalta conference. The place where it takes place also tells you something about the disposition of forces who needs whom and who has the trump cards. This is joseph stalin. Minister of foreign affairs. They are portrayed here, this is one of the photos from the soviet archives that became available after 1991. They are waiting for fdr and Winston Churchill before the famous photograph was taken that with. Ted the presentation that would be 20 minutes before, when they are waiting in the court of the palace. That is president roosevelt iner landing at the airfield the crimea. You see that he is tired, he is sick, you can see that he does not have much time. Photo, in my opinion, also stresses the point i tried to make a few minutes ago about who needed who and the sacrifice of the fdr mde, and what he prepared to undertake and what reasons he had to undertake them. He told his son where his will was whe he decided to go to yaltan when he decided to go to yalta. Now, lets be more specific. What did fdr want and need . Why did he go . . At the top of his agenda is the creation of what became known as the United Nations. The creation of a new world world order with liberal institutions. A world where there is no spheres of influence. And enrolled in which world that would fit very well the pragmatic interests of the u. S. In terms of business, but also would it look like ideologically from the perspective of the United States, as a country that comes into existence in revolution against an empire. That it is very important to understand for the mindset of 1945. It is important to understand in terms of the tension that would be there between the british and americans, because the americans would be very suspicious and that what churchill is trying to this, going through the soft underbelly of europe into the center of europe, this is about british imperialism, not common goals. This is not the best way to defeat nazi germany, the british are just trying to control Central Europe, secure the control of the mediterranean, so there is a lot of tension of that kind there. The United Nations is at the top of fdrs agenda and that is supported by people in the state department. And then there are other generals. Generals want fdr to go to yalta to negotiate their position in the pacific war. Because the estimates are if the war actually, if the battle starts on the main islands per se, the losses could be up to 750,000 american soldiers. So they need allies, they need the soviet union there. Is,dy knows what the bomb whether it would work or not, whether it would blow up half the United States, or it can be delivered somewhere. It is a big unknown and you need a lot of imagination to think that the atom that you cannot see, you can split it and create a major explosion. View, andat point of what becomes obvious by the summer of 1945, by the time of obvious at all in february of 1945. You could be laughed at if you would suggest Something Like that to the average person in 1945. That is the thing you can see, but it could blow up half the world. So these are the main points on fdrs agenda. Another soviet or photo from the soviet archives, here you can see Winston Churchill. He is not happy. He is not happy for a number of reasons. And my colleague, professor bishop, will probably be talking about his happiness and unhappiness. But one of the reasons why he is he realizes for the first time that britain becomes a third rate power. Literally third rate. So at the top would be the soviet union and the United States, and number three, still not bad, pretty good, especially by todays standards. But britain would be there. It was not obvious earlier when most of the soldiers on the western side, that were on the front lines, they were british. Now the americans after dday outnumber the british. The british are the junior partner already in this alliance that is working in the west, and when you bring in stalin that diminishes the british negotiating power. And he wants a lot. E gavets really to h away the balkans to a degree in 1944 to stalin, but he is not prepared to do the same with poland. So the future of germany, the role of france as a great power with which britain can actually ally in the future and help to keep the rest of Central Europe away from the soviet union is important for him. So there is a long list of things he wants to achieve, but his negotiating power is diminished compared to what has happened, or what happened before that. Map that helps twonderstand why those western leaders are at yalta. Us understand the first day of the discussions that was dedicated to the situation on the front. It is interesting. This is from time magazine, a nice way to present that the allies are working together, but as it can see only one ally is on the offensive. The reason is the conference is daking place after the an the u. S. And british are still recovering from a major surprise battle. They are not prepared to continue their advance. The soviet side is advancing. They start their major offensive on january 12, 1945. And by the time of the yalta conference, they are 40 miles away from berlin. They already have established on order. Meet,n fdr and stalin they have this tihing, who will be first the americans or soviet . There is no question the soviets will be there first. Whoever has more divisions on successes tod more show has the louder voice in the negotiations. That brings us back to something that we keep forgetting, whether we want to or not my yalta is not a peace conference, this is a wartime conference. What is happening on the front lines at that moment gives a lot of power or takes a lot of power from the negotiator. This is an illustration to what we had already started to discuss in terms of who contributed what to the defeat of nazi germany, a separate question from the defeat of japan, right . When we talk about contribution of Different Countries to the victory in world war ii, we must remember that there are two major theaters. And we quite often only talk about europe. That is the number of people who ii. In world war as you can see, the soviet union is at the very top. Did you expect china to be there as well . We do not hear very much about china. Look where poland is. Deaths help us. The United States and United Kingdom are here. This helps us to understand situations that they do not really contribute much to the question about the overall impact or overall contribution, because again china is there, poland and indonesia, but we are not arguing that indonesia made a bigger contribution to this or that. But that is a good way to start and think about of the world war ii in a different way from how in terms oft here the impact it had on everyday one, on regular families, the destruction of life worldwide. Regarding the situation on the fronts in february of 1945, there is approximately between 12,000,00013,000,000 men and women in the red army on the eastern front. Around 4here million4. 5 million american and british soldiers. Anywhere between two or three times more soviets. That is more or less what is reflected in the number of the divisions. But given more important than the number of divisions is the dynamics of what is happening at yalta. The soviets are about to take berlin. They are in control of poland. They are fighting in budapest. And the western allies are stuck in france. That is the context for of conference. Were discussed at the conference, apart from the military coordination, coordination of the military, the activity on eastern and the futurents, was of germany. The question was earlier whether there would be small german ies. Was about saying, when i thisled and there was all german states so he has no real problem with dividing germany into a number of states. And Winston Churchill was also excited about that idea. Thein was a late arrival to idea of the partitioning of germany, but in yalta he was actually the one pushing for that. And fdr and churchill, who before 1945 were champions of that idea, actually took a position where they were not behind the idea of partitioning germany, and the main reason for that was the advice they got from the state department and foreign office. The advice was, if you would actually trying to introduce Something Like that, you would have actually to keep troops on the ground and there should be a real occupation because there would be german resistance. Unless there were movements from below that could be supported, that those regions or lands would go independently, imposing that from above would mean andally occupation insurgency and then counterinsurgency. Of course, the british were not prepared to do that for financial reasons. The United States government happend that what would after world war ii was exactly what happened after world war i, the United States would go into isolationist mode. Saying therer is is no way i can keep american troops in europe for more than two years, the congress would not allow me to do that. Partitioningf the pretty much dies in yalta, despite the fact the documents that are assigned still suggest that situation can happen. But the big issue being discussed is about the zones of occupation. Churchills where tries to get the zone of occupation for france, because he needs to build up france as a great power. He also tries to bring france into the Security Council of the United Nations, because he needs allies. He needs allies in europe, he does not think britain would be able to on its own to keep germany down. Stalin does not believe the soviet union on its own would actually be able to do that as well. It is very interesting. When we think about the future, our vision is based on what before, based on experience. These are the people 20 years earlier, think about the year 2000 that is where from their perspective world war i ended, and that is where they are now. It is very recent in their mind. They not only think the United States will not stay in europe, but they also know that germany, no matter how much it is destroyed, it will be back in 20 years. Or maybe earlier. That is there thinking. R thinking andhei it they know it will be a powerful force. So in the end, stalin agrees to the british french occupation. But you can give it from your own occupation, from american. And that is eventually what happens. And now the big issue with the germany and reparations. Stalin wants 20 billion. Fdr arebritish and really very worried about that, especially the british. Because the british look at germany eventually as their sphere of influence and they think with reparations like that, with the restoration of germany suggested at yalta, that idea is not it is half dead. Fdr liked it personally because of the publicity he was forced to abandon it. With all of that, germans wo uld restored. But the british do not have millions to supply for of people, so the british are again against reparations. The u. S. Is against reparations u. S. Public is against reparations. After world war i, the germans took loans from the u. S. And never returned to them. It was a mess. Fdrs position was, we can talk about whatever a bit we cannot put a dollar number to the reparations, because i will cklash when i come back to the United States. Eventually, stali gets his wayn stalin gets his way and a 10 million in reparations is contributed to the soviet union. If you look at germany as a battleground between the Different Countries, it looks like stalin gets reparations, churchill gets a zone of fdr,ation for france, and you remember his main objectives . The United Nations and war in the pacific, this is not something high on the american agenda. Is poland. Yalta is an interesting conference. A wartime conference perceived as and this is also the conference where they spend more time on poland than the time combined on germany and japan. So that is how oriented they are to the decision. That is how poland is important for them, and pickler for churchill, but also for fdr. And there are two thirds of questions with poland. The first one is the borders. Prewar poland, was really the country, the only case in history, that was lifted up and then moved westward. Country. Vement of the you had to negotiate eastern borders, which were meant stalin insisted on the borders that he got with hitler, with western ukraine and belarus going to the soviet union. And then there was a question of the western border of poland, ng andns turni kicking out the german population from eastern germany and establishing polish states. These are big and complex issues. The eastern border, the border with the soviet union, is negotiated at yalta. The western border would be but theat potsdam, soviet union would get its way. Another big issue was the government and democratic elections. Way. Gain, stalin got his poland was a major defeat for churchill and a major victory for stalin. Again i do not think even he would predict how important the document would be, but he proposed to sign a declaration for a liberated europe, which during the entire cold war was the one document where it was clear the soviets didnt do what they promised to do at yalta. But that was a declaration, nothing specific. It became a major factor in the cold war. At that time it was something that they spent maybe 15 minutes going through that and assigning it, but it would become an important issue. So a loss to churchill, a win for stalin on poland. The pacific. Again, one of the key reasons sked his life to go to yalta, to get a commitment from stalin to participate in the pacific war. He knew already from his ambassador in moscow that what stalin wanted in return, he wanted japanese territories. The sea ports. In fact, to create a sphere of influence there, because stalin wanted control over the railroads that led to the ports. That is this map. Happened in terms of the creation of the soviet sphere of china. Ce in i mentioned that they spend more on poland than on any other subject at yalta, but in the far east they spent 30 minutes. Under marginsng of the conference. They spent so little because so much time went into preparation for the meeting and they already knew each others positions, fdr knew what stalin wanted. He felt uncomfortable to pay for the soviet participation in the war with the territories not just of japan, a potentially defeated enemy, but allies, which nationalist china was at that time. So he postponed the meeting with stalin as the conference was moving ahead, but he was getting one memo after another from the chief of staff, saying that the soviet commanders refused to discuss anything related to the pacific war until the political issues are resolved. Eventually, they are resolved there. Wasmore big issue that discussed. Yalta was the composition of the Security Council. So the goahead for the creation of the United Nations was also given at yalta. States, fdr eventually got stalin to commit to be part of the United Nations cept thetd ac procedures for the Security Council. In exchange for that, stalin insisted that the soviet union have more than one vote. Theh was a problem for United States, because when the United Nations was created that en british asked for their dominions have votes. And there was strong opposition to any country having more than one vote. Fdr eventually agrees and he gets Something Back from stalin, where stalin said he would not mind that the u. S. Also have more than one vote. There is a discussion that there hawaii thatska and would join the United Nations and have that. But once that information was leaked to the american public, there was a major scandal. People were prepared actually to forgive stalin for breaking the one nation, one vote, but not prepared to forgive or accept that from their own president. We are not supposed to behave like that. So as you know, alaska never became a member of the United Nations. And i am pretty sure that i am running out of time, so i will try to wrap up my presentation. Again, i miserably failed to cover all aspects of the conference, but i tried to deal with the most important ones. Aftere big question is this review, whether the History History of the 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s was right or wrong, whether yalta was a failure and diplomacy, whether the betrayal did start the cold war. Or maybe it was a success for the United States and western allies. Well, the answer to all of these questions are may be more nuanced than the question itself. One thing that is very obvious, yalta, immediately after the agreement was signed, was seen as a Great Success for all three powers. The reason was they actually got what they wanted, what was at the top of their agenda, all of them. Andgot the United Nations the soviet union in the pacific, and it turned out that it was not necessary, truman then was trying to stop that. Point, from the perspective of 1945 it was a big success. Stalin knew that he would get away with doing whatever he wanted in poland, but there was also a formal agreement to support democratic processes, so there was hope for churchill and fdr. Given was not only occupation of germany, but a seat at the Security Council, so there were modest reasons for churchill to be happy as well. And stalin basically got to keep europe, in eastern whatever the red army would take over would be his to decide. So there was this euphoria to a degree. With one exception. When it comes to the americans who were not participants in the conference per se, but there on the margins. Se were the era men airmen and also the ground specialists of the u. S. Air re stationed in 1944 and 1945 at the three american airbases in todays ukraine, in the region of poltava. They are the main heroes of my book, forgotten pastors of the eastern front, which is written on the basis of open cage he be archives, because americans were under surveillance there. Therenew after they were for close to one year, they were aware of the fact that what had been said by the soviets was not exactly what would happen. Majornew about the differences that existed between the allies, especially when it comes to questions of political culture, democracy and authoritarian regime. Farmer fromhem, a illinois, left memoirs about that. He wrote something that i wholeheartedly accepted in my book. Witnessed backe va was really the start of the cold war. That was very interesting, an interesting assessment from somebody not sitting at the negotiation table, who was a sergeant in the u. S. At that time. And those underlying tensions, not just geopolitical, but also in terms of politics, understanding how the world hold, brought the unraveling of the grand alliance and the start and beginning of the cold war. Yalta was an important part of that story, but i do not think it can be fully credited or fully blamed for what happened. It was an important step toward the defeat of germany and then japan. Thank you very much for your attention. [applause] thank you. We will get to a question in the back in a minute. But the first one will come from online. You referenced the kgb archives, and gunther talked about it in closeness,enness and how did you achieve access to those archives . Kgbplokhii well, the archives are not as closed as they used to be on the territory of russia today, and that is where the major documents and sources are. The archives are probably the most open archives that exist in ukraine today, after the revolution of dignity. So there is an openness of archives. And because those airbases that i am talking about, that was the only case where the americans and soviets were fighting sidebyside. The grand alliance was a strange alliance. The british and americans were together, but the soviet union was fighting on a different front, so those airbases over the only exception to that rule. And because it was in ukraine, those materials of military counterintelligence, surveillance of the population, they are based in kiev and they are accessible. There are volumes and volumes of documents. And i was in touch with families and sons of some of those people who are there, exchanging information and also trying to theirther memoirs of correspondence or photographs, and i included those in the book as well. Toward the back in the center. Hi. Two questions. First of all, the 10 million that stalin requested, what did he actually get . Thenderstanding is regionalization of germany was going to be further east, there was a proposal for a line running that way, can you expand on that . Dr. Plokhii i will start with the american proposal. Really al line was it was really supposed to go western and into central germany. When the three commissions discussed that, though soviets and british were surprised on given at that time it was the very early days, dd just happened, militarily it was impossible to discuss that. Hadthe american negotiators no explanation for why they were arguing that. And eventually they went back to dontd he said, just read it seriously, this is something i wrote on the napkins when i was flying from casablanca or Something Like that. So eventually those things were renegotiated and the british insisted that they would get thate get to the map part ofld get this germany, which was much easier to supply by the sea. The american proposal was that they would be there. But again, the british insisted. Occupation,zone of a good part of it went to france. It was in an area not easy to have supplies. But the u. S. Started really with basically asking for probably the line was supposed to go like that, and all of that was claimed by fdr. But not without a consultation or serious thought. But i think that was a good negotiation strategy. Course, whatof thisd the soviets to give part of germany to poland was the soviet sphere of occupation. It was not just here, but also all this part. Part ofets got good germany. And again, what was decided there, there was denmark asian the medication lines. And therted from 1944 expectation was that if the soviet troops, or american or british troops would cross that line, they would withdraw. That is what was happening. They would withdraw. Now the question on the reparations. They were asking for 20 billion and they got permission to take 10 billion. They couldnt take all of that because with the start of the of ther, and the fact creation of western germany, the western sphere of occupation and eastern germany here, the soviets lost access to the equipment and other things that were in the western part of germany. They ended up occupying mostly agricultural areas. And when the Marshall Plan weked in, molotov said cannot keep taking more and more from our sphere of occupation because we need to keep them competitive with the u. S. Pouring money in. So it became a political impossibility to keep taking money and resources out of east germany. But they got a lot. P forwas also a major tra them because it slowed down their own modernization of equipment. Lesshe u. S. Was interested in the reparations. But once the documents were signed, the u. S. Was supportive of reparations as well. Fdr said he did not need property, he did not need assets. The only thing he was interested german know how and patents. And in the long run, the u. S. Benefited the most from that compared to the british and soviets, which is ironic. The 10, they got part of billion, but not all of it, the soviet union. The next question is to your right, halfway back. Thank you. In terms of the history you are speaking of, to what extent is yalta as a failure an echo of who lost china debate in the 1950s in the u. S. . Dr. Plokhii very much so. The major publications, again i mentioned that already in the late 1940s, they were fighting that battle. The loss of china. The department of state official, charles as one, who was at yalta of the advisors to fdr, he was going through the hearings in congress to be ambassador to the soviet union. It is online all the discussion. It was about the loss of china. We cannot explain it just by the loss of china, this very negative attitude toward the yalta conference, but that was an important part. It is just after 1949, when you see one publication after another. So it became not a battle between the former diplomat, but a much more public affair. Quick will get to the question, did the western leaders know that they were being bugged . Dr. Plokhii they did not know, but they suspected. Said, i dosome point not remember anymore whether it was in the context of yalta, but that he did not mind, let them listen. We have nothing to hide kind of approach. Aray to the left. Thank you for the nice talk. At the yalta conference, the western allies decided to ians ande the yugoslav give them as much as they could. How did that come about and it did it have ramifications for the postwar events in the balkans . Dr. Plokhii thank you. Itself,ia was discussed but it got little attention on the highest level. This the meetings between the principals. In key decision took place moscow in 1944. Was is when the agreement that yugoslavia was 5050. By the time of yalta, churchill already knows he is being outgunned or cheated or whatever, that the soviets actually want to have full control over yugoslavia. And in that context, the negotiations in poland would also be affected by what happened in yugoslavia. Am pretty sure that there were no major decisions but on thet level, lower level there could be some technical issues decided. 5050 of yugoslavia was decided in moscow. One final question to your right. Thank you so much. Two questions. To what extent did roosevelts physical frailties affect his ability to negotiate effectively . And how much of this information was given to truman, also knowing the frailties of his difficult situation . Dr. Plokhii thank you. Was very much forced on fdr as his Vice President in 1944. So there were maybe two meetings that were there before fdr died, of substance, between the two leaders. Died, the first moscowhe ambassador in did, it was a key figure in negotiations on the pacific, the first thing he did was get on a plane and flew to washington to advise truman on yalta agreements. Or the time in time when molotov was traveling to at thest convention United Nations in san francisco. He also came to washington. They convinced truman that the soviets were violating the documents signed at yalta. So the meeting between molotov and truman was dramatic, when molotov said, nobody can talk to me like that. And truman said stick to your agreements and we will no longer talk to you. That was really the beginning. Up until 1947, truman was really unprepared. He was going from one extreme to another. He was very harsh with molotov in april of 1945, then when he dam, his closest adviser was the former ambassador to moscow, last name davis, the first name escapes me. He was in moscow during the trials and believed what he saw the. There. He was the main advisor for treatment. An. For treatment. Trum in 1945, 1946, he was really working at that position. So that is on truman. That was the question . Oh, health yes, thank you. Th is a great questionis this is a great question. I have taught for a number of years on the yalta conference at harvard, and one student wrote a very good paper asking exactly that question. And in the way how he approached that was he looked at the minutes of yalta discussions and discussions later, how often fdr madehow often comments and how good they were that they corresponded to his own vision. And the conclusion he came to, and i agree with that conclusion, was that clearly at yalta fdr was in a bad state in terms of health. His contributions to the discussions and participation was fewer, but he actually never the positiond from that he wanted to take. More often than not, that position was different than that of the state department. But it does not mean that he did not know what he was doing or able to understand, he had some strong opinions. Point, edward was just appointed secretary of state did not allow to participate in his discussion with stalin on the far east, he said he did not need him there. Thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] announcer this is American History tv, featuring interviews, archival films and visits to college classrooms, museums and historic places. Explain our nations past, every weekend on cspan3. It comes out to be a campaign in which we have one candidate who is standing up for the workingclass and middleclass, we are going to win that election. For those who have been knocked down, counted out, left behind, this is your campaign. 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