[ applause ] >> they produced 120 questions for me to interrogate this panel with. so this is actually a ten-hour session, not a one-hour session. i am thrilled to be here with this panel, some old friends and new friends are with me on stage. to my feed left is andrea thomson, the former undersecretary of state for arms control, national security adviser to the vice president, and potentially most importantly 25 years in service, time in combat zones, and certainly served her country nobly. andrea, welcome. i have the great pleasure of having anders ras moouzen with us, the former danish prime minister, chairman of the danish liberality party, and secretary general of nato. the ceo of marasmussen global. thrilled to see my old friend av rail hanes here. as many of you know she was the former deputy national security adviser, more importantly than that though, she was the deputy director of the cia, and she is currently at columbia university. also with us today is michelle for illinonoy. she was the co-founder and ceo at c-nas and right now is the co-founder and managing partner at west executive advisers who are helping a lot of small companies. thank you very much for that. i'm told i'm to make opening remarks. i will keep them very, very brief, because we've had a long day, and we've covered an awful lot of ground. i think we've talked about research. we've talked about applications. we've talked about talent. this notion of the global positioning or geo strategic positioning of the i.a. conversation is one that's founded on the notion of norms and values, and the way democratic free societies are going to embrace these norms and values. and i think that we're going to talk a little bit more about that as we go through it. that said, that the developments in a.i., the advantages that will be attained through a.i., can't be separated from the emerging strategic competition that we have and we've talked a lot about with china and russia. some of these challenges are just never going to go away abat least not in our lifetimes. but there's a browder geopolitical landscape and geo strategic land scape we need to talk about, and that is who are the friends and allies we need to cooperate with and what does that conversation need to look like in order to assure american positioning? our particular group within the commission was really looking at the united states' need to develop a holistic strategy to ensure long-term competitiveness in this emerging environment. i'm told i should reinforce the five initial judgments that were made by this particular group. the first one is the need to foster cooperation amongst the u.s. allies and partners, and doing so will be essential to retaining a long-term competitive advantage. the second is really this notion that the united states and our allies should seek to pro serve existing advantages in a.i. hardware. we haven't talked about that a lot today. we've talked a lot about software but that's got to run on something. thirdly, ai presents significant challenges for military interoperability. when we look at this if the united states and its allies do not coordinate early and often, the effectiveness of this combined coalition will definitely suffer. fourth, we should also be open to possible cooperation with russia and china on issues of mutual strategic interests, such as pro moeting ai safety which we will talk about more and managing ai's impact on strategic stability. i think that within a group like this, we often think about the military applications. but i think those in the private sector would agree that we're looking at ai for things like health, climate, and a number of other enduring problems that mankind faces. finally the united states should lead in establishing a positive agenda for cooperation with all nations on ai advances that promise to benefit humanity. so with those judgments being so read, i think i'd like to open it up to the panel to give their thoughts on what dr. kissinger was really teasing at, and this is that notion that ai is the philosophical challenge of our generation. and when it comes to negotiating traetries and engaging in agreements around ai, how do you do that with such a complex, nuanced technology? so andrea, let me tee it up for you. why don't you start? >> thanks krb chris, and thanks to the commission selfishly. and thanks to chris mcguire, shout out for my former team, part of the family and now with the commission. would like to echo chris's commence about the work of the staff and the commission. if you haven't read the report, read the report. a lot of amazing panels this afternoon. dr. kissinger, what do we need to do? the next thing? missing? we need to implement the things we've raised. read through the report. if we can make half of those come to fruition, we'll defeat china. we will be the first out of the block. but three things foundationally. this is what i've seen over the last two years at the state department traveling, meeting with partners and allies, talking about ai and cyber and other emerging technologies. it comes back to people and processes and partners. we've talked about software. the people, the panel earlier today about talent management, we've talked a bit about processes. this afternoon the last panel will talk about partners. we work together. we're facing common concerns. whether i'm in a nato partner or in an indo pack, whether i'm in africa, our partners and allies are raising these concerns. this is not unique to us. so let's implement what we're seeing. it's new. ai is new. but the challenges of ai are not new. the principles are not new. we saw it with cyber. we saw it with standing out cyber kon and the services. we learned. so the foundational elements are the same. we just need to integrate what we've already been talking about. >> enders? >> thank you. thank you very much. and also thank you to the commission, i think it's an essential work. i'm definitely not an engineer. but when president putin stated that artificial intelligence is the future and whoever becomes the leader in this fear will become the ruler of the world, he got my attention. and demonstrate why so essential that america is the leader. but american national security is strongly linked to strong partnerships and alliances. so i would say what we need is leadership of the whole free world. and against that backdrop, i would like to make three points. firstly, what we need is what i would call a technological alliance of democracies. democracies must be in the lead to be sure that we set the right norms and standards, living up to the principles upon which we have built our free societies. and we must realize that artificial intelligence is an integrated part of our national security. so we need strong cooperation between government, industry, and academia. and i do not share the skeptics' view -- the skeptics who are reluctant to cooperate with the government. i think they miss the point. if we do not have the strong cooperation between the private sector and government, the chinese will be the winners. it is as easy as that. so if the employees in those big tech companies want to make sure that it's their ideals that will be the winners, they also need to cooperate with the government. i would call it a patriotic duty to cooperate in this field. and in this respect, by the way, chris, i would like to thank you very much for your work in inkutel. i think it's a prime example of getting a right. we need much more of that and need much more of that in europe. that leads me to my second point. namely, we need a stronger transatlantic cooperation. we should stop the fight between europe and america. there is too much at stake. what we need is cooperation to counter the challenge from the advancing awe tok rasies. that's what it is about. europe must do much more constructively, increase its own investments. the european union should increase funds in its own european defense fund that was established a couple of years ago. it's only around $600 million a year devoted to that fund. it's tiny compared to what the chinese invest in this area. gradually, nato allies are investing more in defense. in 2014 we decided that within the next decade, all nato allies will invest at least 2% of gdp in defense. at that time only three fulfilled that criteria. by the end of this year, eight countries will do it. and i think to his credit, president trump has really done a lot to raise awareness of the 2%. but there is another goal that is equally important, namely 20%. according to nato standards, nato allies should devote at least 20% of their defense investments to investments in equipment and research and development. i think that needs to be raised further. the u.s. currently spends an amount equivalent to around 27%, i think, of its defense budget in investing in equipment and research and development. why not raise that figure to 30% for all allies, including the u.s.? so i would encourage more presidential tweets on the 30%. [ laughter ] i think that would help. my third and final point -- >> we may have already had one by now. [ laughter ] >> -- is that we need to strength nato. in that respect, we also need an awareness in the united states to take leadership in sharing data and intelligence. sometimes, and i speak based on my experience at nato -- sometimes the united states is too reluctant to share data and share intelligence with other allies. but it creates a lack of confidence. it creates some mistrust. and we should avoid mistrust. we should strengthen our alliance. and we should make it natural to trade across the atlanta without suspicion. and to that end, you also need to be more open. primarily because if the united states do not share data and intelligence, and technological progress with its allies, then at the end of the day we will have growing interoperability problems. because if the u.s. is here, and the rest of it is here, then we will not cooperate, it will weaken the alliance. we should strengthen the alliance. you should do what you can through american leadership to get other allies to increase the investments in artificial intelligence. we also need bigger nato funds to invest in new technology, including artificial intelligence. today, nato as such, nato as such, only devotes around 600 million u.s. dollars a year for investment in equipment. the rest of it is national responsibility. and of course it will remain national responsibility. but i do believe that we would make a leap forward if we devote more resources for nato funding of artificial intelligence and other high-tech investments. and we should speed up decision-making processes in nato. when nato took responsibility for the operation in kosovo in the '90s, nato spent six months to take that decision. when we in 2011 took responsibility for the operation in libya, we spent six days. in the future i think we will have maximum six minutes. so ambassadors cannot discuss this at length in brussels. we have to speed up the decision-making processes. and my final remark will be, i also think the u.s. should take leadership in preparing international conventions, to regulate the use and production of artificial intelligence. because otherwise, we might risk that -- the awe tok rasies would misuse it in a way that we cannot accept. i know this will be a challenging task. but i think we should explore areas where we could cooperate. so in short, what we do need is a strong and determined american global leadership. >> want it weigh in on this? >> sure. thanks so much. and thank by the way for staying for the 3:45 panel. you set us off on this idea in a way of reacting to kissinger's comments on application. from my perspective, i think it's this interesting question of, right now we see autocratic governments, others, using artificial intelligence in ways that are helpful to them. to essentially achieve their own agenda. and in some contexts, that's weaponization of information or bolstering their surveillance or doing a variety of things concerning to us. we know artificial intelligence can be used actually in other ways, to bolster our own agenda and we're not keeping up in the competition enough to do that and push back in this context. but overall, i'd say that the purpose of our strategy would be one that really should be focused on the prosperity of our own systems, right, on our security, and on promoting our values, and pushing back where we need to in that context. and if that's what we're trying to achieve in terms of the overall implication, and that's certainly, and i think the intermim report does an excellent job of identifying the steps that are needed to push in on these issues, then i think the question that i think maybe is really worth digging into is, how do you achieve those things most effectively with the strategy internationally for this panel? right? how do we actually promote the kind of international landscape that helps us to do that? and i think that's about certainly cooperation and coordination. but i think it's more than that. i think it's about shaping the development and deployment of artificial intelligence more generally. and i believe that, as the secretary general noted, there are a whole series of ways we can do that through the context of working with allies and partners in europe. and there's no question that we're stronger when we're working with our allies and partners, certainly to push back against russia and china, variety of others. but really to begin to shape that environment. but i this it comes in a whole series of difference of different areas, and i think the commission can do a lot of good by mapping those out in some respects. i think there's the question of building up norms and standards, which are things that are talked about in the interim report a bit. there are a whole different series of way to do that. i would not recommend going out and trying to negotiate a treaty at this moment. i don't think that's the most effective way at this point. but i do think having discussions internationally with astates and developing ideas for, what are the things that are acceptable? what are not? what's in the gray area? how should we be thinking about that? i think the question of developing standards and thinking about them through the lens of safety, trust, trying to develop those types of things, but really doing it at a body that the united states trusts, in other words an international body where we think they can have a productive conversation about this, thinking about whether you want a third party mechanism to be evaluating, people are keeping up to the standards, thinking about how it is you provide some accountability for not dealing with those standards, all of those are things you might want to do. you want to set up obviously international structures in terms of organizations and belly buttons in nation states dealing with these areas. you don't have to remake the wheel, set up new institutions. but you do have to identify who is doing the collaborating? should it be done on a bilateral basis? multilateral? whar the guidelines you think are useful? is that a whole area you want to work into? how do you want to work about the defense pieces, interoperability pieces? this is not going to be in one place, it's going to be in a whole series of places. i think those are the things that can be thought of in the context of the work you're doing, but trying to pro mote in all of these areas that are so ingrated i think the work that needs to be done. >> michelle? >> i think you've been hearing all day, we've been hearing all day, riffing off secretary kissinger's remarks, about the strategic implications of the ai competition and how it comes out he can nochlgly, politically and militarily in terms of relative balance of power. and i guess what i would focus my three points on is the importance of marrying whatever we're doing in the sort of ai -- development of ai applications in a much larger frame of american leadership, and leveraging our allies as truly strategic and unique source of advantage. i think one of the mistakes we've made so far in the competition with china is framing it as a bilateral competition as opposed to a competition between authoritarian state that's trying to spread that model and the coalition of like-minded democracies, which include the riche richest countries of the world. and that we together as democracies across, you know, north america, europe and asia, if we really go at this together, we could be much more competitive with vis-a-vis china. let me give three particular ideas. number one, i think the first rule for all of us is to the best way to shore up our own -- our competitiveness is to invest in the drivers of that competitiveness at home. research and development, science and technology, access to higher education, 21st century infrastructure, smart immigration policy that atracks the best talent from around the world and then does everything possible to actually keep it. this is a moon shot moment for all of the democracies. we're not acting like it. we're still sort of asleep. i think the national security apparatus is awake, and they're thinking of it in these terms, but our societies are not -- have not been led, have not been inspired, to the kinds of public/private collaboration that we're going to need to be successful. number two, it should be us, united states and its democratic allies, that lead the development of norms in this domain. i think the dips principles on ai that were offered to the department is a great place to start. there's a lot of good work being done out in industry as companies trying to figure out what norms guide their work. i think we're in a great position to lead an international dialogue, not with the expectation that russia and china will necessarily sign on to that consensus. but to the extent you can build that international consensus and create buy-in, then you have the pushing back on behaviors that violate those norms and imposing consequences. and third, i think it's important even now to be reaching out to china and russia to have a dialogue about this. i wouldn't construe is narrowly on ai. we need a new dialogue about strategic stability. that used to be the realm of the nuclear priesthood. the world in the potential for early cyber attacks that have strategic import or the world in which ai can inadvertently escalate very quickly, the speed up the escalation ladder, we need to be having conversations with countries like china and russia about strategic stability in an era where there's potential conflict in space, in cyber, and using tools enabled by ai. so those are three specific ideas of where i would start if it was up to me. >> so andrea, you owned the nuclear priestesshood. how is this a different conversation? it is a dual-use technology. it is a more nuanced technology. how do you engage that dialogue internationally? what are the different -- that you would engage? and how would that conversation go? >> absolutely. and i agree with the points were made and if i could give some recency on dialogue discussions we have had. to answer the question, it does happen to happen bilaterally and multilaterally. and we're having those discussions. if robert is still here, giving a shout-out to the state department family again, every time we travel, every time i have engagements with my counterpart at the undersecretary level, we talk about cyber norm ask a responsible behavior and we talk about ai. partners of the united states are looking to that. they want to know what we're doing. what our private sector is doing, what our strategy is. and we learn from each other. so we've had those discussions. we've also had those discussions multilaterally. we've had discussions with counterparts with nato. we've had those discussions in the indo pakt. we've had those discussions up at the u.n. those discussions are happening. i would say kind of on the periphery. they're happening because do lead -- did lead until 12 days ago, whatever it is, arms control and international security to include the nuclear nonproliferation. most of my counterparts are those people. most of our partners, the people leading the emerging technology piece, many are wipgtd that same sector. we're having those discussions. i agree, you have to have increased information sharing, as the secretary general mexes. we did that. we did that. it may come out as a partisan take, with the im frngs. the intelligence community did incredible work to share it. when we went to nato we could show this is where the -- when it was fired, where it was fired. that's an example of what we need to do with ai. we need to share information. we need to get best practices. we need to share with our partners. and yes, we need to have dialogue with our competitors. the most recent example in july, don't quote me on the date, when we went to geneva and met with my russian counterpart on the strategic stability talks. we can have these discussions. the door is open. it has not been as open with china yet. the president has been clear that he wants to multilaterallize and have those discussions. we need to have the talks with russia and china as well. they're going to be part of the solution if we are going to accomplish this together. >> anders, you brought up sharing data. i'm going to change the context a little bit. data is really an underpinning of ai. and gdpr and the privacy conversations that have been going on in europe are going to impact europe's ability to lead in ai in many ways. they're just -- chinese are checking way more data today than anybody else. how is europe thinking about china from a strategic competitor's perspective around ai? and where are they going to draw the line between the rights of privacy and the needs of the defense community and military communities? >> hmm, well, for a long time i would say europe has not been aware of the risks, the strategic risks, europe has been a bit naive maybe. but recently europe has realized that it is necessary to focus more on what has been called the strategically important sectors. this is why the european commission has introduced a so-called screening mechanism to investigate whether a potential chinese investment or any other foreign investment might be done with the intention to make strategic decisions in europe. let me mention concrete example. the chinese invested in a greek port. they are considerations, investing in a portuguese energy plant. they have created a so-called 16-plus-1 format in which they gather the eastern europe european countries. so what the chinese are doing is to focus on european countries in economic need. and they exploit that. they offer their money. and we have seen how the european union has been faced with increasing problems in criticizing violation of human rights in china. because all decisions in that sphere must be taken by unanimity. and they're always at least one country dependent on china that is opposed to such criticism. so europe is i would say more awake now, but there is still a lot to do. for instance, on 5-g and huawei, some european countries have refused to cooperate with huawei. others are more reluctant to prohibit cooperation with huawei. i would prefer a common european approach to that. i share the concerns, concerning cooperation with huawei. so it's a mixed picture. >> so i'how do we -- you've got the military infusion in china. i think it was general shanahan referred to maybe being a potentially canary in a coal mine and being of concern. how do we have a conversation both within the united states and outside in this concept of norms and values and what that would mean to the long-term way of life that we've become so accustomed to in the free world? how does that conversation go on? and who leads it? >> i mean, i think, you know, at least from my perspective, and andrea i think said it as well, people do look to the united states for leadership on these issues. and i think if, you know, it is to our advantage to have this conversation. and it's to our advantage to lead this conversation. and so, you know, i think the first step of it in the norms and values space is first of all to recognize that that's got to be a part of every aspect, frankly, of what we're looking at in terms of artificial intelligence, right? because it comes across every area in which artificial intelligence is going to be used for the purpose of whether it's military or economic purposes or other, you know, aspects of it. so i think that's something that's got to be built in. i also think that, you know, it's not only a part of the sort of, you know, arms control in a sense, you know, conversation that you're having. but it's also built into things like technical standards that are applied across ai and a whole series of ranges. right? so one way in which you have this conversation it seems to me is when you're talking about what are the standards that you want to apply to ai sis toechlz in their development and deployment? you also want to think about, well, if they're using algorithms that may be legitimizing and reason forcing biases, how doe we address that in the context of development and deployment of artificial intelligence? or if we are dealing with systems that have privacy information, how do we think about, you know, encryption or other ways to manage those issues in the context of what might be a broader system that also involves ai? there's a whole series in ways in which it's got to be a part of the discussion. i think you can't do it in isolation around ai. i think your norms and values are a whole series of different areas that you're injecting into the technology piece. but i think it does -- was there a prior panel and i think sue gordon was talking about this a little bit. i think it is -- proves us to rogue that we have to very actively address this in a way that promotes a conversation on it that goes across the technical, the civilian, the military, all of these different sectors that talk about these things in different ways. rand it's not just about making policy makers smarter about technology. it's also about helping technologists get smarter about technology. rand it's an issue that if we don't start injecting into the conversation early, we're going to lose track of it. >> michelle, drawing on your experience in d.o.d. policy, how do you think about export control within the context of ai? how should we be looking at export control as one of the tools in the toolbox for ai? or should we at all? >> i think it's a really hard question that this is where -- the department could benefit from people doing some serious analytic work looking at all tern tivz. i'm not a technologist, but i have a hard time trying to understand how we would control algorithms. for me the long pole in the tent is the data, and making sure particularly when it comes to the military or security sphere, the data and the platforms that are going to be enabled by ai or to become autonomous or semi-a-thon mouse. to me at first blush those seem to be the primary levers. we already do the second. we already do the second. but that first one, figuring out how to actually do that, is important. i think it also ties to the broader question of how we approach a chinese or competitor's money, people,e et cetera, in our innovation ecosystem. and right now my is, there is definitely calls for some concerns but some benefits that we reap from certain international collaborations. right now my concern is we are taking a sledge hammer to this. we need a scalpel. right now if you put a sign in front of dod buyer of a company they want to invest in or buy from, it is usually that's the immediate freak out for forget it, no way. where as and i will give you the distinction of passive investment where it is just you know another investor getting roi and there is no access to non public ip or controlling interests or nothing. it is just blood in the bloodstream of silicon valley. we should not give a hoot about that. that's us using their money to our advantage. it is different if it is a controlling interest. if they can access to ip. those are the kinds of extinctions that is we need to be making similarly. yes, we need to worry about talent coming into dod funded labs and that kind of thing. does that mean we need to treat every chinese student as a spy? >> no. we need to have a sophisticated process for doing due diligence and preventing money and so forth. a much more clear-eyed perspective from academia. there is a real concern effort to get inside our ecosystem. without the benefit or talent, we don't win this race. strange as an immigrant nation has always been attracting the best talent in the world and keeping it. that's you know so many founder stories in silicon valley. so many stories of this space race. how we won that and so forth. i think we have a very nuance clear-eyed approach to this. i don't think we are there yet. >> with that i am mindful that i only have 9.5 hours to go with this panel. i would like to open it up to questions from the audience. i got a slew of them. one at the very back and one in the middle. first one with the mic wins. gentleman in the back. >> for all panelists, you all served in national security positions. and so if you were to go back into service as a senior national security position, what would you do differently to get bigger seated making decision table if anything? >> that's the one example just talking about evolution, i have not seen it through. i heard of it before it came into tuition. we have a security advisory abor board. approached the secretary last year and said i want to carve at least a quarter or a third of that board for the tech industry. i want advisory services to come in on whether ai or etc. i will never have all the extras that i need within the right state department. we will within our boundary. most of the experts will come from the outside. so that's moving along. that's one example if i can do it over again, i would have started much sooner. and to get the folks on board, i hope that's one of the areas that continues beyond my legacy to get the iceps to that address and i hope the folks want to contribute and maybe not leave their company and say i will come accordingly and i will address. you will get a phone call from the state department and said we have a diplomatic challenge with the ai. we are setting up international body and how can we do it? . >> michelle? >> keep the advisory bodies that have not been formed, i mean it is a treasure and some of the best price talent in the nation working for free to help the department, i mean keep that. don't try to disestablish it. second, i think we need to build tech advisors into the system. senior technologists get a seat in the dod table. boot camps for staff. i mean i would certainly try to bring in technology broadly but for the non-tech staffs that have to deal with some of these issues, getting them smart on being at least fluent if what they are dealing with. i think about what i have learned in just the two years i have been doing the work, working with small cutting edge technology, companies that want to play with national security space. how much i did not know and still have to learn technology because it is a whole other world out there. we need to be looking for opportunities to provide people on the policy side with those kinds of exposure and experiences, granted they're never going to be become technologis technologists. >> what would you do differently? >> well. you know as you know we did a number of things and a number of changes the last few years, many of them are continuing and getting better other tim overti. but also it is and we had somebody who did this and having a senior leader in your senior leadership team that is constantly injecting into the conversations. we also had during my time sprint team that were capable of going across agencies and departments to work across issues. it is the most effective thing but it is not easy to do. a lot of the challenges that i found we kept on running into in the context of developing different structural ways to improve the opportunity for senior leaders but also frankly every aspect of your agencies and department to be able to leverage technology and actually having the opportunity to bring people in easily and quickly to address the issues that needed to be addressed. i am on a commission national public service and we are looking at the issue. i think some of them i suspect they're going to over lap with where you are on this issue, too. it is a really challenging space. >> it may not be a fair question, if you were to be secretary general again, are there things you would do differently? >> yes. i establish a new division called the emergent security, dealing with security and so on and so far so good. today i would focus much more on artificial intelligence. i would create an office for artificial intelligence. i would provide it with a substantial budget. i would encourage nato allies to actually building a nato framework, a commission line, create a national commission. i think nato should do the same to take nato allies on board and this very important cautious and that shows as a force changes with data. finally, i will take steps to improve the decision making process with a particular view on speeding up the process. one of the suggestions could be give the military leaders sector authority to take decisions. afterwards of course they have to be accountable to nato. in the future, you will have to make immediate decisions and we should provide authority to our military leaders to take those decisions. >> this is why it is good for the commissioner to be on a listening tour the last nine months as we get these ideas that maybe nato has recommendations perhaps. i think i got a question in the back and there is one over here. >> thank you. >> i think we have touched briefly on gdpr, we had conversations with europe and creating a third way around ai beyond the u.s. and china. the first question is if you have that third way, could it be a way to attract ai parishioner to work on nato security issues. my second question is does it need to be a third way? why are we competing with our companies and say eu regulations? why not work together to create a better ai framework? thank you. >> anderson. i think that's all yours. >> i think so. i fully agree and i think europe is wasting a lot of resources and attention by attacking big american tech companies for the european market. europe should do much more itself in a positive construction way because the risk is if europe is focusing on attacking big american tech companies without having any advantage itself and europe does not then we are weakening the whole democratic alliance, tech alliance. i think that's the overall strategic mistake. so i fully agree we should cooperate instead of confront each other. on the data issue, my advise to american tech companies would be to be at the forefront when it comes to the data protection. you should realize that for historic reasons that protecting a person's data is a center issue in europe. in germany for obvious reasons or eastern europe for obvious reasons. people are very much concerned about government control and supervision and so i think we should realize how important data privacy is in the european context. so my advice would be on the one hand to be at the forefront when it comes to protection of personal data, at the same time at the forefront when it comes to protection of free speech and this strategy, i think could make it easier for american tech company -- >> professill like to hear of t cooperation that i am hearing that we don't have to look internally in the united states but actually a global cooperation at the world level. there is something i am writing, this is a good time to run it by you guys also, to keep america le leading, google and ai leader and facebook and other upcoming and from china and so forth, we need to have a global ai consultant based on ocd principles of corporate guns in a nutshell, transparency, if we take the position to lead the consultants and also funded not only from a u.s. and nato allies, we have to understand two-part solution. this is one whoever gets to the places but leading and so others follow our example. that's one part. small eastern country implemented a lot of ai and so many digital health and european citizens. when you look at it there comes to model with ai and the next is definitely change with ai and if the u.s. wants to keep its lead, we have to advance it. that's what i want to run it by you guys is what your thoughts are, the u.s. creating an ai consult globalism and leading it so not only at the large level or japanese or chinese or german based quarters but something that's cooperated to a level that we need to share and we keep our advantage. >> you want to take this one from a standard perspective? >> sure. it is hard to react without understanding what this consortium would do. and i don't think that it is a binary choice between either we are all in or cooperating with everybody or speaking or something in between. but, you know i do think oecd can play a role in some aspect of ai. i don't think it is the right place for everything across the board. and, you know which is depending on what the particular issues are then getting the right people on that. >> i think we got time for one more question. if there is not -- >> your question earlier and your answer, expert control on my favorite topic when it comes to ai. from the peer competitor or adversary positive of period 2025 to 2035 would be very important for their own reasons. the chinese and russians over that time period as a critical infl influction point. everyone is aware of china's longer term strategy to achieve scientific, technical financial and also dominance in a number of high-technology areas includes in the next 2025 to 2035 time frame. we have to look at the challenge from their eyes. when are they going to feel the most embolden? six years from now to 16 years from now? expert control is not going to do it in that time frame if it could do it anyway. one thing we have mentioned a couple times but have not focused on is american demographics. 10 year olds kids will be out of college in ten years. what are we doing to make sure a high percentage of those kids going into science, technology and math and ai. we worry of where students are training in the united states suggesting somehow we can't let them lead the u.s. and some are very vanilla and so induce people to stay or senior dod officials, people in the government now let's not train chinese students in ai, let's train them in history and archeology or english literature but not ai or computer science. >> liberal arts. >> sorry, it is a last comment. we need to address this demographic issue in a serious way. other countries do. so what are we going to do? >> let's stick with the tipping point question. go ahead. >> the time frame issue is very important. we in our own planning, one is the next five to ten years where the risk of miscalculation by china or russia in terms of under estimating our results and believing they may be able to act before we realize the capabilities we have that could be a challenge for deterrent. we need to think of what are the things we can do now to show in the near midterm including added urgency to the ai application that could be filled quickly and using mostly current capabilities and new ways and concepts. there is a longer term frame thinking of the big bets we are making for the 20 to 25 years time. on the human capitol piece is the same thing. what are the things we should be doing now so that kids in middle school or a secondary school and ends up having the same talent we need for the future but i also think again pulling it back to the near term interim period, thinking not just about higher education but up scaling. we have a work force. i know we are starting to do this. can we test people for altitude and start upscaling the work force that we have. can we take the soda straw of talent of places between silicon valley and dod and turn it into a super highway? what are all of the different incentive program efforts that we can make to do that in the near term everyone n if we make investment. we have to challenge ourselves to think in two different time dimensions because the near term you know quicker fixes are very different than the long-term investment and in some time and some cases they may compete with resources and band width. >> unfortunately our time is up. it has been an honor for me to be on stage with this is steest panel. thank you very much. please join me in a round of applause. [ applause ] my honor to introduce my friend and colleague, jason will come up to close out the afternoon and the day. stay with us. the senate impeachment trial of president trump continues today with opening arguments, house managers and the president's defense team will have 24 hours over three days to present their cases. watch live coverage of the senate impeachment trial on c-span 2, on demand at c-span.org/impeachment or listen on our c-span radio app. 15 judges of the court of appeals heard oral arguments in two lawsuits filed by the district of columbia and maryland claims president trump violated the emoulument clause.
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