One speaker short for this panel. Dr. Raymond callahan due to circumstances beyond his control could not be with us today, so were sorry that we are missing him today, but, you know, his friends here in new orleans are certainly thinking about him. To lead this session, we have called on one of the most distinguished military historians that were very fortunate to have right up the road here at the university of new orleans, dr. Allan millett. His career has not only filled many bookshelves, but he has also fill the ranks of military history phds by overseeing the most doctoral candidates of anyone in the country. Its hard not to find one of his students around. To talk about one of the most important battles in june of 1944 and the war as a whole, its my pleasure to call on dr. Alan millett and Hiroyuki Shindo to discuss the battle. With that, allan, its all yours. [applause] prof. Millett im a pale substitute for ray callahan, i can assure you. When i wrote about the berma campaign in the book a war to be won which is on sale, right out here. I can assure you that i went to ray to critique it and did a superb job. The level of american participation in the Burma Campaign is more considerable than you might imagine, in a historical sense, we think about Clint Corcoran and his daredevil special forces air force, meryls marauders. But that is only a very small part of the picture. What characterizes the campaign in burma was in fact it was fact it was several wars, the United States interests was fundamentally and openly some kind of route of, from india to china to supply the Chinese Armed forces and the Expeditionary Air force that we put in china. That was the still well war aided and abetted by the chinese nationalist, some of whom would fight, some of whom were saving themselves for the campaign with the communists after the war ended. There is another war which is the wingatechindit war. Which again, catches peoples imagination because the robust and flawed assumption about how one operates or does not operate in a very hostile physical environment. Burma is not a great place to wage war. I have not been there, but i have been to thailand, there certainly are some similarities. If ray were here, he would talk about the cohema and Fall Campaign as the birth of the modern indian army which is what his book is really about. I certainly recommend it for you who are interested. There are longer works on some a semi official history by lewis allen, another somewhat shorter account by Major General julian popson sponsored by the imperial war museum, my function, however, is to, at least when the q a starts to handle the allied side, but the real important part of this presentation is Hiroyuki Shindos account of the japanese side of the campaign. However, i think its probably part of my role to make sure that he doesnt get too far from [laughter] prof. Millett an allied point of view. Whether youre curious or not, i dont know, but this is native to maple leaves, burqa, and the blade is made from sheffield steel, which had once been railroads in nepal. Is they havee done taken the Railroad Tracks and turned them into knives for tourists. On that high note, hiro, you have it. [applause] prof. Shindo good morning, everybody. I would like to thank the organizers of this conference for what is turning out to be a very, i think a very successful conference and a very rewarding experience and since we dont have a lot of time, i would like to get into my talk right away. I will be talking about the operation, but i will just say impal operation from the japanese perspective. And the operation lasted from march 8 to july 2, 1944. And it really stands out among the Japanese Armys operations because almost half of the 60,000 to 80,000 men committed died before the end of operation and most of these died because of disease and or starvation. And in the japanese literature, its been called the clearest example or maybe the worst example of a rash or a reckless or an imprudent operation because most of the problems that they ran into during the operation had been foreseen. There was a lot of objection to it before it even got underway and yet it was carried out anyway. So in my talk, i would like to talk about how this operation came to happen and then ill add a few details about the operation itself. The inpal operation began, took place in 1944. But to look at its genesis or its roots, you have to look back to 1942 when the pacific war began. The Japanese Army strategy in the burma area was defensive. In other words, they wanted the 15th army to capture burma in order to protect the rear of the 25th army which is driving down the Malay Peninsula toward singapore. So burma, the burma offensive started with the start of the war and by early may, they had occupied most of burma and completed their mission. And by occupying burma, what they also did was they cut the burma route of supplies from the allies that went from northern burma into southern china. And so after this route was cut, the allies began flying air supplies over the himalayas, the the famous hump route. And anyway, after the 15th army finished its occupation of burma, the japanese switched to the Strategic Defensive not only in burma, but also for the entire Southeast Asia area. And after they had done this, they were making this transition. While they were making this transition, the Southern Expeditionary Army command which was in charge of all of the army units in Southeast Asia came up with a proposal to continue the offensive into india, into northeast india. The purpose of this operation to operation would be to cut that airlift, to interdict the airlift that was going over the himalayas and do this while the japanese still had the initiative. This proposal offensive out of burma into india was opposed by the army general staff. And the reason they opposed it was basically the army after they had completed what they called the Southern Operations or the occupation of Southeast Asia, the army general staff wanted to shift to Strategic Defensive for the entire area, draw some of their forces down and refocus on the on going war in china and get back to their preparations for war against the soviet union, which was their traditional hypothetical enemy. So they were against any kind of continuation of the offensive into india. However, they couldnt completely rule it out either, and so although the general staff was reluctant about the idea, they did in august 1942 authorize Southern Expeditionary Army to continue studying the issues and continue making plans for an operation. However, they said they would need the express approval of the general staff to actually carry out the operation, which they tentatively scheduled for maybe late october 1942. And they gave it the name operation number 21. Now, this proposal, which of an offensive into india by Southern Expeditionary Army was opposed not only by the general staff but also by the combat advancement that would have to carry it out, the 15th army and the Division Commanders underneath it. The main reason they opposed it has to do with the geography of the area. And i dont know how familiar you are with a map of the area, the border between burma and india runs northsouth and also the major rivers and Mountain Ranges run essentially in a northsouth direction. As you can kind of picture, the japanese are in burma on the east and they have to cross over the river and this Mountain Range into india on the west. And the Mountain Range, its called the arakan Mountain Range. Spelled arakan. It consists of high mountains, steep sides reaching up to 10,000 feet and equally steep and deep canyons. Its a really its a really large physical geographical obstacle to any offensive into india. And so the 15th army and the Division Commanders are all opposed to this operation. First of all, they say we dont have enough forces to do this. The Southern Expeditionary Army was thinking of doing this with about maybe four divisions and the 15th army and the Division Commanders say that is not enough. And even more importantly, they say you cannot pass that kind of force over the arakan mountains. And the next, even if you did get them over the mountains, you cant supply them with a line of communications through the mountains because there is almost virtually no developed road network crossing the mountains. Now, at this time one of the Division Commanders who opposed this especially strongly was a guy by the name of, let me see, Major General renya mutaguchi. He was the commander of the 18th division at the time. He opposed an offensive into india for the reason i explained. Basically, you cant cross the Mountain Range and you cant supply them even if they did get across. Now, what happens to this operation 21, its postponed by the general staff after the japanese fail in their october offensive on guadalcanal to take henderson field. The situation in the South Pacific is much worse than they had imagined. So they postponed any offensive into india. However, they do say you may continue preparations and planning for it. Now, in march, 1943, the japanese reorganize the command reorganize their command structure in burma and sorry to keep going back and forth, but this is a very simple organizational chart of the new organization and what the japanese did in march 1943 was they inserted a Burma Area Army command between 15th army and Southern Expeditionary Army. I hope you can read it. The japanese did not have a core structure in their army, so their army command is actually about the same size of a corps in the u. S. Army and their area army is im getting that right, i have it written down. So they dont have a corps structure. The army is equivalent to an american court. And the Burma Area Army is not as grand as it sounds. They set up this new command structure. And at the same time another change they made was they promoted mutaguchi to commander of 15th army. Now, about the time mutaguchi was promoted to commander of 15th army, he did an absolute about face and he began to promote very strongly and forcefully and repeatedly the idea of an invasion into india. And mutaguchi was hoping to invade india and then go through nepal and maybe go all the way to the state of asam. I guess you cant see the laser pointer, im not going to try. Asam is kind of in the upper lefthand corner of this map just below the himalaya mountains. Which are the very lefthand, the upper lefthand corner of the map. Its fairly deep into india. Mutaguchi began promoting this idea of a major offensive all the way to assam. One of the Big Questions is why mutaguchi, a few months when he was Division Commander opposed this kind of idea, why he suddenly when he became army commander, why did he suddenly began calling, advocating for such a major offensive into india, not just in nepal but beyond to the state of assam . The first reason is that he, after he opposed operation 21, he came to regret his opposition. He saw that he had somehow let down his superior officers and commands by raising all of the negatives and not supporting what they wanted to do. And he vowed hence forth to be more positive and aggressive and try to realize the intentions and desires of his higher commands. And its kind of ironic because mutaguchi already had a reputation of being a very aggressive, strong, charismatic leader. Some would say he was arrogant and overly demanding. But he found that he needed to be more positive when it came to the planning and execution of operations. So that is one of the reasons that he suddenly came to favor invasion into india. And another reason is, mutaguchi had this he was overly selfconscious about his role in history. He had an exaggerated view of how he affected history and especially history of how japan came to find itself in this kind of war. And now mutaguchi in july, 1937, was commander of the first infantry regimen of the china garrison army, which is at the marco polo bridge. He was one of those that was among many that was responsible for this incident developing into something and going beyond a local resolution. And so mutaguchi came to feel that he was responsible for getting japan into the war and then he thought that he had, therefore that he had a moral responsibility to deliver a knockout blow against the british and bring an end to the war and get japan out of the war. Now, he didnt feel this because he regretted getting japan into the war. He just had this exaggerated view of his importance in all of these events. And in addition to these personal factors of why mutaguchi came to favor an offensive into india, there are also certainly military rationales. First of all was the win gate operation, the chindit operation from february to may 1943 which professor millett just mentioned. And as a result of that operation, mutaguchi, among others, drew a couple of conclusions. First of all, it convinced him that a sizable ground force could be passed over the arakan mountains and could also be supplied over the mountains and second of all, mutaguchi came to feel that he had a lot of difficulty dealing with the win gate force and he came to feel that rather than fight the enemy after they had attacked japan, would be more advantageous for the japanese in burma to launch a preemptive offensive against the enemies bases of operation and deny them the chance to conduct an offensive. So mutaguchi came to favor an invasion of india for these reasons and once again, everybody above and below him opposed this idea. And first of all, i would like to look at the Division Commanders. Every one of them and their staffs opposed mutaguchis proposal to invade india. The reasons are the same. Its the geographical reasons, its the arakan mountains that you cant cross and you cant maintain lines of communications over or through them. In addition, these commanders felt there wasnt enough motor transport on the japanese side and also by late, you know this debate goes on through 1943 and by late 1943, the Japanese Air Force has lost command of the air in the burma area. Thats another reason why the Division Commanders came to oppose or oppose mutaguchis concept. And against these, mutaguchi offers rebuttals or counterarguments. First of all, the Division Commanders say we dont have enough motor transport. In all fairness to mutaguchi and the 15th army, they did ask for reinforcement of transport companies and so on, but they didnt get all of those that they wanted. And so he said, ok, then we will use cattle and other animals to transport supplies over the mountains and then once we have gotten over the mountains, they can be eaten and that will solve our food problem as well. And another reason that the commanders opposed the proposal is, as i said, the japanese had no control of the air anymore. Mutaguchi said, well, control of the air wont be such a problem. It will only be a problem when we cross the chinwin river, its the major river they have to cross before they get into the mountains. Thats the only time when control of air is a problem. Once the japanese melt into the mountains, they wont be able to see us from the air. So loss of command of air wont be a problem. And as for not being able to pass enough supplies over the mountains, mutaguchi says, first of all, we will capture british supplies and use those and also he says well rely on speed. He expects nepal and cohima to be occupied in three weeks, 20 days, so he says the lack of supplies wont be a problem. Our men will be able to do this with what they can carry on their backs. And finally, the commanders opposed this operation because of their concerns with the monsoon season, which lasts from about may to october every year and is characterized by very heavy torrential rains which wash out bridges and roads and they say, once we get into the monsoon season, all our problems will be multiplied. To that mutaguchi says, well, if we capture nepal and cohima before that, we can be sheltered in there. It will rather be the british who will be impeded by these heavy rains when they try to counterattack and retake nepal and cohima. So mutaguchi kind of brushes all of these objections away. And underlying his position is just a general dismissal mutaguchi looks down on the fighting abilities of the british. He only has experience fighting the british at singapore, where he was commander of the 18th division when they assaulted Singapore Island in the final stages of that campaign. So mutaguchi has a very low opinion of british soldiers and he says, oh, theyre not going to be much of a problem anyway, so you dont have to worry about these other problems. And mutaguchi repeatedly tells his men, his commanders, that you only have to surround the british and fire in the air and the british will come out and surrender. And overall, thats another characteristic of mutaguchi, he had this extreme overemphasis on the value or importance of absolute faith in victory. You see this throughout the Japanese Army and also the navy. Its kind of extreme in mutaguchis case and he believes that you may have all of these other material and religious problems, but having an absolute faith in victory will allow you to overcome them all. And another thing, factor underlying that kind of multiplied all of these problems is mutaguchi had very poor or even bad relationships with all of his commanders. He had three divisions under his command, the 31st, the 15th, and the 33rd divisions. And he disliked or distrusted all of their commanders. They in turn didnt like him or did not think much of him. So they clearly had problems i talked about how all of his divisional commanders were against his proposal but also the commands above him. Army, and southern the general staff were against his proposal to invade india. At best, they were reluctant. The underlying reason is a change in strategic situation in 1943. Especially in the latter half of 1943. July, theto early americans and australians restart the offensive in the inth pacific and advancing new guinea. They face a serious situation. In september 1943, italy and europe surrender. Southern Expeditionary Forces in general staff are concerned about the British Naval units in the mediterranean. They thought they could be transferred into the indian ocean where they may carry out an amphibious operation. There is all of this opposition from above and below to his proposal. Becomes whyquestion was he able to carry it out . One reason is the japanese desire on the political level to realize indias independence. One of the ways the japanese wanted to end the war was to force britain to capitulate. One way to do that was what they called detach india from the british empire. They thought some sort of pressure against india could have that kind of effect. Toy had a concrete plan bring about indias independence. They hoped by invading india they could foment the Independence Movement and encourage it and india would detach itself from the british. That, maybe this operation even though it was risky could have a political effect of bringing about independence, his superior ok. Ers his superior commanders were not on the same page concerning the purpose of the operation. What it should be or where the main weight should be. Complex andf detailed so i cannot get into all of the details but what happens is there is a difference between the higher command and my taguchi general mutaguchi. Should it enhance burmas defense by pushing japanese . Rontline out and occupying or should it be to go on and deliver a knockout blow against the british . General mutaguchi and his commanders never resolved that. His higher command never clearly tell him in written orders that he should only do this operation to enhance the defense of burma. To the very end he keeps thinking he is doing this operation because he wants to go on and deliver a knockout blow. That if they do the operation, where they should put the main weight of the attack. Command they see the operation is risky but it may have a political effect on india and they see that it could, if it works, it could strengthen and enhance japans defensive position in burma. Commandly the higher and southern expedition r come to the field that this has a lot inrisk but may be ok improving the defensive position. Case as i said the higher commands are worried about an amphibious invasion in the south. Burma area army proposes if you have to do the nepal operation, how about putting the main weight on the left side . Mutaguchi should 33rd it isnd hard to see and basically attack with two divisions and keep the 31st in reserve. That way they could respond to an amphibious invasion in the south if it happened. Map, youp of them have cohiba and that is the only d road leading to an paul nepal. Some importance to cohiba. Hold itd they should for that purpose. They before battalions would be enough. What mutaguchi does, he has his the psalm nasam. What he does is decide to commit the entire 31st division against kohima in the north. If the opportunity presents itself he was the 31st and the intoof the 15th to go on asam. He proposes a right hook operation with the weight of the offensive is on the right side. Taguchi mutaguchi and the higher command never resolve this. Excuses heason uses after that. Higher command never ordered him not to carry out the operation and they never ordered him in written orders about how he should carry it out. One other reason that complicates this is his relation with his immediate superior. Commander of the Burma Area Army. Superiorhas immediate time of the marco polo incident. Said that if the superior had any reservations or objectives about what he was doing he would have said so. He never said so. The reason he does not is because of his command philosophy. Once you make objective clear to your subordinate, you should leave it up to him how he is going to carry it out. Says theytaff army have all of these reservations about the proposal he says i understand, but mutaguchi is so confident we should just let him do as he wants. Mutaguchi argues for this operation through 1943 and there are reservations. In the end, everyone gives in. The operation could be of benefit and so they decide to do the operation. In january 1944 the operation is ordered and started in march. The impahl operation is carried out. It is carried out according to the plan you see on the screen. We do not have a whole lot of time left so i will run through how the operation went. It starts march 8 with the 33rd division in the south jumping off. They have the farthest way to go. On the 15th of march the two divisions in the north start their advance. The operation, despite the problems that were raised, initially goes well. By april 6, the 31st division occupies kohima. Road5th division cuts the between cohiba and impahl. The 33rd division in the south gets bogged down but by may they which istening a place an important road junction. Entireout midmay the operation is stalemated. The japanese in order to advance to the mountain left heavy equipment behind including artillery. Shortage of that began to make a difference. The supply difficulties that have been foreseen start to happen from late april into may. Shortages of ammunition, medical supplies, and especially food. The japanese who carried out the attack have actually reduced rations from the beginning but from a, this begins to become acute. They go down to one third rations. Then down to 1 6 rations. Questionanswer i will tell you more details about the tragic, human side of this operation. Stalematedation gets in the face of this mutaguchi demands an even greater effort on the part of his divisions. They cannot move any further. They do not have the strength. Here is what gets interesting. With taguchi relieves mutaguchi release all three commanders for lack of aggression and commitment. The 15th Division Commander is also relieved. Sato of theneral 31st division unilaterally withdraws his division. Said they have reneged on the promise to keep them supplied. We are going to redeploy. Guchi said he will courtmartial sato and he welcomes that. They tried to get it changed to declaring that sato was insane. He said, no, i want a courtmartial. He is declared insane anyway. He tries to appeal that but by then he has already been put on reserve. Nothing comes of it in the entire matter fades away. June theay into failure of the operation becomes clear. Nobody can end this. Nobody says so clearly. Nobody came out clearly against the operation to mutaguchi before it began and now nobody can say it can end. Onre is an infamous meeting june 6 between both sides wanting to bring up the subject of terminating the operation. But neither would meet ends. With taguchi said he wanted wanted the other party to bring it up. The operation goes on for another month before the general staff finally call it off. On june 2, the Southern Expeditionary Army calls off. June 5, the Southern Army is stopped. All of the Japanese Forces are in retreat and since there is no mode of transport most of them have to walk on their own. Of incredible human suffering. They are wounded or ill and starving. Many of them die on the way back. There was a saying that he who cannot walk out on his own shall die. The operation was terminated in early july and the survivors trickle out. Dataasualties the exact is kind of hazy are incomplete. According to one estimate 80 died from disease or starvation. Area in january 1944 the Japanese Army had 300,000 men. By the end, 185,000 are dead. Up to 80 died from disease or starvation rather than combat. Only 118,000 get back to japan alive. Talk. D like to end my sorry for going on a bit longer than i had hoped. Thank you for listening. [applause] thank you to both panelists. Callahans unfortunate withdrawal i appreciate you carrying an extra load. We have time for a few questions before the lunch break and we will start in the front row to your left. Wonder if either of you could comment on the american involvement with their special air group . The first use of helicopters which was done in that theater. Strange seeing all the other theaters we were in. Considerable american involvement but not by combat troops. You have the marauders which was a combat team and they were functioning in north burma. The larger objective of opening the land route to india. A large number of engineering troops, support troops, a major theater begin to force us outside the combat units. Had a veryr force sizable presence. Thesupporting deployment of troops in india and running the operation over the hump. Support fromair the 14th army with considerable force. Degree ism to some missionral saw his increased the chinese contribution to the war first in burma and later in china itself. The difficulty is the british had a different objective which was only to retake burma but use that as a steppingstone for the reconquest of malaya and the dutch east indies. That was quite an ambitious program. Clearly there were differences in strategic objective and air assets were part of the argument. Slim made a decision that was pretty smart was that he decided he would not fight for american airpower to support him. Stillwell would get it. The rfay coopt all of assets in the theater which he could directly control. There is no question ariel rial resupply was important. It was difficult to get supplies to anyone except by air. Superiority was accomplished by the raf not the air command. They were mostly Running Missions up north in support of American Forces in north burma. Forid suggest the potential integrating short landing, short takeoff aircraft including helicopters into operations. Helicopters were used for reconnaissance and casualty evacuation. There are people who know what happened in vietnam find airpower. For use of andexperiments in burma vietnam. The next question is to your right in the front near connie. I understand the weather was bad and the mountains were high and the food was short but there were also British Commonwealth troops who had learned how to fight the japanese. Having been kicked out of burma earlier, general slim and his troops, i think, may have played a role in mutaguchi. What did he think about the postrmance of the enemy cohiba . The role of the british army i did not mention. The reformed British Indian army had been reformed in 1943. Definitely played a role and in fact, they did not expect that level of opposition. That was their first problem. The british were much stronger than they expected. Thent know much about , butsh army post kohima the 15th army was destroyed and so that opened the way and made it much easier for the british to advance into central burma from late 1944 onwards. I dont know if that answers your question. Timetaff officer at the said that mutaguchi repeatedly held map exercises but the one contingency did not take into account was that the british would resist. Taguchi had a low view of british existence and i think that increased the problem. Gentlemen in the center here please. Question was who provided the material for the British Forces . Was this all british . Some american . The britishnumbers, japanese, howthe did the numbers and equipment play out . The question is where were the supplies coming from for the british and what are the comparable numbers of british versus japanese . Let me take the first one. Upon4th army depended heavy equipment that was largely brought in from the middle east. The timing is such that the african campaigns are winding down. Most material and troops that had been deployed there could be redeployed. We think of them going to italy but the indian unit were in indiaafrica, came back to and participated in the Burma Campaign. It is a mix. British troops fought with conventional british weapons, 25 stuff that they had used for generations. Issue is howeal rapidly the british commanders and the division of core commanders were professional officers either out of the indian army or the british army. I think they had some real doubts about the fighting affect of the indian army. The real accomplishment is to figure out how to mix in the wet italians and indian battalion white battalions and indian per n battalions. The indian army bore a larger burden than the fighting as the campaigns went on. Army is largely indian. Supplied themselves. They had bases in india, sources of supply in india. They fought the war with what they had. Ps, see american trucks, jee and they are ubiquitous throughout the theater. Some aircraft were transferred to the raf. There are all kinds of transfers of capability. Litigate would not take lindgate would not take indian troops as he insisted they were not dependent. Equivalentwere the of the division and a half, maybe two divisions, sucked up a lot of the british battalions. Slimdid not make general very happy. Picture. Ixed the numbers sometimes are misleading because you have lots of people but find out that not a lot of them were trigger pullers and you had tremendous logistical problems to find a huge commitment of forces trying to keep the spare point supplied. Alliess is that the eventually enjoyed a slight numerical majority but not much of one. We have time for one last question from the back. Hopefully an equally quick answer before lunch. I will try to make it short. The Indian Campaign seem to bear cocodaty to the campaign in terms of terrain and supply. I am curious whether the Japanese Army made adjustments subsequent to that that may have been applied to this particular campaign in india. I dont think they made any particular adjustments. No, the short answer is no. [laughter] if i could add a brief last,t connected to the one problem the japanese had, they had less than the british in every category. They were losing control of the sea communication to thailand and burma because of submarines. Have intle they do china and the homeland cannot be andsported out to thai burma and that adds to the deficiency. Underappreciated parts of the pacific war which is the role of american submarine forces in stopping the deployment and redeployment and supply of Japanese Military forces. Cutting off oil and all of these things which were clearly important. You take a look at any campaign or japanese position and commanders are always complaining about the fact they troops,t the material, equipment they need because these transports are going down in 1944. An submarines thank you to this great panel. [applause] [indiscernible] announcer you are watching American History tv, covering history cspan style. Event coverage, eyewitness accounts, archive sums, lectures and classrooms, visits to museums and historic places. All weekend, every weekend on cspan3. Announcer attorney Rufus Edmisten was the chief counsel on the watergate committee. He recalls the day he served president Richard Nixon with a subpoena. When i subpoenaed the president 46 years ago on july 23 it was the first time in the history that a committee of congress had ever issued a subpoena to a president. It was electrifying because washington was filled with anticipation