Transcripts For CSPAN3 State Department Official On Nuclear Security 20240713

Stints in. For those of you that are attending this very event for the second time. Many apologies and it was not as you may have assumed our speakers agenda i cause that cancellation but an exploding manhole but we are paying our bills at the Stanton Center and back at business and very pleased to be welcoming doctor chris ford back to the stage. Chris for those of you in the no and the assistant secretary of state for enough security for International Security and nonproliferation. He talked about Nuclear Security yes laughs chris is going to give a few remarks and will be time for us to ask some clarifying questions but with that chris, welcome back to stance in. Big applause thanks, brian. Its great to be back here. I applaud your persistence after last time, and rescheduling this after the explosion. It sounds so dark. Its i could not that bad. Those of you who been around washington that long i have remember there was a series of exploding manholes in georgetown back in the 90s. And for keeping at it and thanks for all of you who were willing to come back notwithstanding all the rescheduling. Its been nearly ten years since the last Nuclear Security summit was held in washington, d. C. There were three more after that, and they brought many World Leaders together to declare their support for improving security practices. We all know that. While my own view, some of the object is declared at the outset of the process were more ambitious than fax would justify but the summit deeply about the role and drawing attention to the challenges of Nuclear Security. Participating countries were encouraged to come up with or to cite up to gift baskets as they were called up promised Nuclear Security improvements. The meetings did elicit some important pledges to address Nuclear Security challenges. But a decade after president obama made his promise in 2009, to secure to secure all vulnerable material around the world, a decade later all too much remain still to be done. Where the summits played a valuable role in they must not forget about Nuclear Security. It is a challenge, i would, argue to institutionalize, and regulars, Nuclear Security. To make, good Nuclear Security, and, in the, sense as i suggested, that it becomes ordinary. And habitual. Enter national, tool, states and, stakeholders. In the same, way that everything, is to any individual human. Where the summits played a valuable role in jump starting the tensions to these, in other words, we must do together the work of making sound nuclear into a habit rather than a pledgement in a world in which terrorists do seek to acquire materials, Nuclear Security is too important not to be scrutinized. And a summit akin to a new years resolution, if you will, that so many people make in order to lose weight and get in shape, that kind of thing. Promises that may catalyze one to go to the gym and eat right and work out every once in a while and then fade back to the status quo. In the Nuclear Arena we need something more akin to a longterm health program. We need a new normal that establishes healthy patterns that can and that will be sustained indefinitely. To be sure, the daytoday, routinized promise keeping ensuring nuclear best practices and institutionalizing these practices worldwide is not easy. It lacks the intuitive draw of clashy summit promise making and theres far to go before such practices are routine everywhere, but bringing that outcome about is or should be, i would argue is the core of our Nuclear Agenda. And one of the ways, the nfcg. Improving Nuclear Security worldwide and gather notes and encourage each other and coordinate their own Sovereign National efforts to promote effective steps forward ill admit even among the members, progress is lower than one might have hoped in Generating Energy that the challenges require, but theres a good deal going on and were proud of it. As can sometimes happen in such well intentioned International Groups there is sometimes too much assumption that simply being there demonstrates a commitment to the cause and too little meaningful action. And theyre making limited progress against the toxic interests or antagonism that still exists in in some quarters, that hinder security practices and can threaten the cooperative nuclear sharing, depends upon the reassurances that are provided by good security. But we have, as ive indicated, seen signs of progress. Thanks in part to, i believe, Contact Group interventions and consciousness raising from likeminded states, theyve gradually increased the regular budget for Nuclear Security. The agency continues to increase the profile and activities levels of its Nuclear Security work as suggested in the 2013 evolution of its office of Nuclear Security to a division of Nuclear Security. Theyve made a modest, but significant step forward in 2018 with adoption of a Nuclear Security resolution. That it continues to the positive nuclear activities. Thank the language of 2019, in it, signaling that Nuclear Technology sharing is getting more sustained attention than before. The iaea a looking at ways that compliment and reinforce the agencys ongoing work on Nuclear Safety and Technical Cooperation program as well. This new focus is making sure that tc efforts are not derailed in the way that they would lead to unauthorized access. The Contact Group released a statement of collective commitments related to Nuclear Security. This document, which is now available on the nscg website is not a concensus negotiated lowest common denominator that we usually see nor is it a summary of group deliberations. Instead its an informal food for thought statement designed to pull useful strands of thinking together in a constructive way to help move channel forward more effectively. Im proud of the role the United States has played in bringing them together and helping to lead the group in this respect and hope this will indeed prove useful with constructive thoughts how states can have more thoughts within the nscg and broadly. Focus in about the paper. Many of you may have seen it, it available on the website and our commitment to a great deal of a great many things, i should say, that are important and hopefully can contribute to a National Agenda in this respect. To begin with it reiterates our commitment to the principles that the circular of 899 sent around that founded nfcg. Making it clear that the principles are at the core of where the group is coming from and makes clear that good Nuclear Security is required in order to prevent Nuclear Proliferation and in order to ensure the maintenance of a Strong Foundation for sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of Nuclear Technology. Now, that latter statement, i would argue is particularly important because it highlights the way in which, rather than competing with each other, Nuclear Security and Nuclear Technology sharing actually go hand in hand. Specifically, Nuclear Security improvements are a crucial enabler for benefitting the pieces of Nuclear Technology worldwide because they help form the Foundation Upon which rests the global system of Technology Sharing that has provided untold benefits to all human kind in which we intend to help preserveand which we intend to help preserve for many years to come. The quote from the paper. It probably seems to you like it does to me basic common sense and it would be difficult to imagine the continuation or expansion of today as worldwide sharing of the benefits of nuclear know how. Without confidence that Nuclear Technology and materials would be reliable kept out of the hands of unauthorized persons such as terrorists. Nevertheless, there are still some people who dont see good Nuclear Security practices as an enabler, instead worrying that where they exist in some kind of tension with the global enterprise. Thankfully this is wrong and im proud that the commitment paper makes it clear that there is not a tension here, but rather, a strong complementary. But the paper doesnt just voice this important insight how security reinforces sharing, its a number of practical themes and emphasis and points it out, points of focus for us where they can be more. Stresses which will be an adequate nuclear and regulatory frame work. Pointing out also the countries can play an Important Role in assisting each other as appropriate, in developing and maintaining Capacity Building. It makes clear that states that strengthen, excuse me, should strengthen their own legal and Regulatory Framework by promoting addherence to and such as the convention on the physical convention of Nuclear Material and International Convention for the acts of Nuclear Terrorism. As well as universal implementation of resolution 1540 which seeks to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction for goods and know how and relative transfers between states are appropriately regulated. The importance of all states improving their own National Security practices, such as through protecting against insider and cyber threats. Strengthening the security of forces, ensuring the preparedness and coordinating with support centers and assuring best practices. And this expands the Nuclear Security efforts as well encouraging this work in its regard and stressing that the agency must undertake this agency must undertake this work with vig gar and promoting activities with the resources and political and Institutional Support and encouragement that they need in order to succeed. And the budget for Nuclear Security and corps activities and new donors with the Funding Sources within the funding base. The paper advocates for close coordination between the tc program and nuclear support plans. Noting again the Critical Role of security as an enabler, sharing the benefits of peaceful uses of technology. In our view, this paper is a valuable way forward to help guide all of our collective approaches here and useful. I encourage people to read it and spread awareness of the points that it raises. Were trying to use this as a stepping stone for our own engagement with other partners in this and like minded states in the Nuclear Security Contact Group can and will do likewise. In practical terms, the work that were doing at the state department, for example, in addition to working bilaterally with our partners, we have a great deal of engagement with the Capacity Building that was referenced in the paper itself. Our office of Nuclear Energy safety and security, for example, leads efforts to develop and implement policies and diplomatic strategies related to Nuclear Security such as cochairing u. S. Coordination bodies focused on Nuclear Security and this Group Supports our engagement with the Contact Group and serves as the departments lead on interagency physical protection, assessment teams charged with u. S. Obligated moves abroad and efforts of that sort. Our office of multilateral and Security Affairs implement in the offices, excuse me the efforts of the iaeas division as i mentioned before. To minimize risks associated with vulnerable material. Our weapons of mass destruction Terrorism Office against it, rather than for it, provides a focal point for our work against terrorists, providing nuclear or Radioactive Material outside of regulatory control, including those lost during the breakup of the soviet union. The wmpt office manages our role as the cochair of the 89 member Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism. Which is one of the bright spots of the u. S. Russian cooperation. And the cochair with the russians and we recently are going to have a new iteration of that cochairmanship that started up last year and thats a quite effective cooperation, i must say. So, we work with the Nuclear Forensics International Technical working group to identify best practices and Nuclear Forensics, and u. N. Office on drugs and crimes. These are how we engage on these issues and through our office of export control cooperation we do a great deal of Capacity Building assistance to help countries bring up best practices in ways that complement these goals, very effectively as well as in our office of cooperative reduction. Thats just a sampler of the ways that the departments engage in these questions. But let me finish up in terms of drawing out where we see the conceptual challenges as we look ahead at the future. If you were to ask me what i think the main challenges are as we try to move from the era of promise making to this era of what i think of as institutionalized promise keeping, normalizing best practices, i might point to what some might pithely say two camps. Some may fall short for adequate security. For one reason or another they cant get the standards. They might not be aware of the need for good Nuclear Security in some particular context or might not be aware of what best practices actually entail. The second cant relates to possible failures of education or capacity such as where despite good intentions, a government may not know how to strengthen Nuclear Security in its country in order to come up to appropriately high standards or perhaps lacks the resources or capabilities necessary to do so, thats the second cant. The third cant relates to governmental brand width and such as where a government may not be able to address Nuclear Security properly because relevant leaders or personnel are preoccupied with some other pressing channing or threat in their context. As a practical matter its not easy to solve the challenges provided by the three cants. But much of it anyway that we engage in in the bureau as well as the department of energy and the Nuclear Regulatory commission, not to mention in the iaea as well, and most handles these particular problems and theyve got a pretty good track record working with countries to improve things, where it comes to the cants. And what i describe as the wont. Some countries choose to deemphasize Nuclear Security or perhaps even hostile to it. The first potential wont relates to the perceived costs of economic interest such as where parties convince themselves proper security measures will unduly increase expense. And the capabilities that they wish to acquire. The attitude may tempt them to cut corners, sometimes potentially quite dangerously. Similarly, a supplier may see security as a needless cost that could be cut to the sales or market share. All such thinking i would argue is shortsighted such as with Nuclear Safety, if you are truly worried about cost, the worst possible outcome would be to face a Dangerous Nuclear incident resulting from ones own negligence. All the same it can be a problem. Thats the first wont. The second wont is more of pathology of outlook, if you will. Believe it or not, as i indicated before. Some countries may still resist Nuclear Security measures because they feel that a focus on security is perhaps some kind of a western imperialist imposition or some such. At best, i think such a contention is simply silly. At worst, such positions might in fact smack of a sort of shameful cultural essentialism or racism as if to apply that common sense can be monopolized by a particular culture and people of the global south are incapable of them. We should resist any such nonsense and rebut it. And some have some what of i have alluded to, the spendings that there may be some tension between the Nuclear Facility and the widespread sharing of benefits. And the belief that promoting security is somehow intrinsically comes at the cost of inhibiting cooperation. At this point you wont be surprised that i disagree with this approach. Both safety and security to emphasize yet once again, the mantra that they are enablers or facilitators of cooperation. That would be difficult to imagine cooperation occurring or continuing, without it being clear that safety and security could be well handled. And this manifestation of the second wont, i think its important that we all, again, pay reference to the commitment that i paid for before. It articulates quite well, there is no tension between security and cooperation and that it rests in large part upon the foundation that its provided good security. So, in parallel with concrete Capacity Building assistance, and to help with the cants, this dramatic outreach to the wonts is an important part what we ought to be aware of to raise the positive value of Nuclear Security and encourage all governments to develop the political will to follow through in the promise keeping business of Nuclear Security. Thats the Nuclear Security business as we engage with it in department of state and i hope our colleagues in the Nuclear Security, see it. And hopefully it gives you a taste of what we do in this area and you perhaps as experts and thought leaders in this rainy will be able to help contribute to this effort as we move Forward Together in the months and years ahead. So thanks for listening and i look forward to taking questions that i have every confidence will range across a much broader range of issues. Thank you. applause well done. Youre a seasoned veteran at this. Chris, as you look in the audience, you see, i am sure, and it has a broad many familiar faces. Expertise. They have opinions and i do. Theyll want to share them with you. I have no doubt. Well get to that, but first, maybe a couple of questions to warm you up. You started by talking about the kind of relative utility of the Nuclear Security summit process and then ended with some of the challenges that you see and that the administration and we all, in fact, have in terms of encouraging governments around the world to take Nuclear Security not just seriously, but inseriously in an enduring way. So i want to press you a little bit on your views of the relative success of the nss process, which i think is rightly rightly debatable. If terms of did it have a longterm set of circumstances that has fundamentally improved Nuclear Security around the world . What i think is indisputable about the nss, i think youll agree, is that it raised the level of political attention around the issue that certainly drove budgets in fundamentally different ways than had been the case . It matters almost as much as what we are saying as who is saying it. When its an Office Director saying it, its one thing when its president s and prime ministers saying it, its another. I guess the question i have drawing from your remarks is now that we have kind of left the nss in our review mirror and we have adopted an America First approach across our Foreign Policy, does it make your job more difficult rather than easier . Well, your question as to whether the degree to which the summit process created longterm changes and circumstances, and the answer, i think, is very clearly not yet, but thats not surprising. The whole purpose of this as i understand these things, what to catalyze commitments that will help changethe effect of it is not to have good joint statements at the end of a meeting. Its to have better Nuclear Security practices on the ground and that process was moved forward and commitments made that represent important milestones for trying to achieve that new and better facts on the ground and its up to all of us, as i indicated in the remarks, to go from that promise making phase to all of those best practices, just what we unthinkingly and routinely do every day. Thats a work in progress. Its not done yet, but the summits contributed in important ways to doing that and now its up to us to build forward all of the practices into the everyday neural habits and muscle reflexes of how every stake holder approaches their job in the Nuclear Security business in related fields that impinge upon Nuclear Security. I record what were doing now as aits natural follow on from that process. And one would have to move in that direction irrespective of administration and its something that the Obama Administration as i understand it was already starting to do in the last year or so that it was in office and i hope that, between the catalytic effect of the summit process itself and the more daytoday slog trying to make them feel normal every day, well have something to show for these two facets of what i think is an important collective effort. Does it make it more difficult for you . In this contest, it scratches everyones itch and its american interests and Foreign Policy interest to not have terrorists and rogue regimes outside of regulatory control. I think that meets everyones security interest. So theres no tension between any of those values. I think they work nicely together and be complimentary and reinforce together. And i want to go to burden sharing, its spreading the love, spreading the list around the globe. Next year, of course, the United States will chair the g7 process, including the little partnerships. So you didnt mention the Global Partnership in your remarks. Youve mentioned, able, not focused on them, not saying you excluded them deliberately. The fact that you didnt raise it, the fact that it wasnt top of your mind does that represent a diminishment in the relative importance of the administrations view of the Global Partnership . Tell me what your thinking is. Not at all. It remains very important, weve worked very hard on this. One of the things im personally proud of what weve done the last couple of years is to try to bring the Global Partnership to the programming side of the Capacity Building work and engagement in areas like Nuclear Security, together more closely with the policy engagements that we have, and things such as the Directors Group within the g7 process so that the policy and programming sides are able to have more contact, more engagement to make sure the programming is more cleanly and crisply represent the policy objectives that were talking about. And i think the synergy in the last two chairs of the process to do is paying off and were going to certainly keep that emphasis under our chairmanship in 2020. One of the things theyve been active in doing as well under the fresh presidency, theres been a lot of outreach efforts in support of universalization in the prevention of Nuclear Materials and thats an effective process and one of our important goals and were delighted to be joined with that. And youll see that with the u. S. Presidency and g7 in 2020. I think these are all, once again, very complimentary, i meant no disrespect to the gobel partnership, but its a major piece of what were doing and an effective tool. Im proud of the capacity that we do. In my bureau alone, 250 million is used for a variety of capacity engagements, a critical piece of what it is. Theyre analogous challenges to the cants and the wonts, i mentioned before across a host of engagement, whether its getting partners to improve their capacity to meet the requirements of the resolution 1540, for example, all the way to i am moving export control and border security, and model legislation how to do these things more effectively. A whole world of practice sharing and cooperative that we engage in all the time that works nicely and in hand with things youre describing. So you mentioned the amendment. Let me press you on that a little as well. We have the review concerns, obviously, in 2021. Can you tell me how the administration is planning on leveraging that in support of its kind of wider Nuclear Security agenda . Sure, i think, again, these are complementary. And i hope that the commitment paper that they have will be useful for is helping the group that they represent to guide them to make the mouse out of the upcoming review coverages. The same thing can be said of the upcoming the material thats coming up in, i believe, february. You know, we are all in the position of needing to coordinate our diplomatic activity as much a gotten out as possible, pushing for a universalization as a major piece of this, for example, but as we get ready in the review conference to assess as one needs to, you know, the adequacy and success and progress of the convention, you know, having this kind of a focal point for where it is that Nuclear Security needs to be going and trying to use the convention to achieve its goals most effectively having a focus of effort. Is a major piece of what were doing. So i want to come back to your wonts and cants, is interestingly framed. It sounds like a slogan. I apologize for that. I read too much chinese writings. And you mentioned in your remarks, chris, i want to know how you when youre out and about beyond themy canadian accent comes through and interpret it for you, we can get an interpreter for you if you like, when youre around the globe, particularly in the global south, how do you effectively communicate the mission that you have on Nuclear Security on nonproliferation to governments whose girls may not be being educated, who are facing famine, who are facing an Infectious Disease outbreak, whose infrastructure may be in tatters, who are in a postconflict environment, so many other priorities that quite frightfully, quite rightfully if i were this their shoes, it wouldnt be high on the agenda. How do you communicate that and how does the administration conceive a strategy to engage those prospective partners in the Nuclear Agenda . It wouldnt come up unless it comes up in the context of their own agenda. Nuclear, cooperation is a critical piece of many countrys agendas, a way in which, as we all know, the sort of quaint phrase from the eisenhower era, the benefits of the peaceful atom. Cliche as it may be, theres a truth there. Everybody knows a dangerous side of Nuclear Technology, but its not as often widely recognized. Its far beyond the generation of electrical power and clean and carbon zero sort of way, but it goes to the ways in which Nuclear Technologies and their applications can help, of course, in the agriculture industry, science, medicine, basic research of all sorts. Theres a whole world of benefit out there that i think many leaders even from which the countries to which youre referring are focused on. They want those, whether its desalination, or sterilize infects that cause debilitating disease, cancer treatment, whatever it may be, these are all what the countries around the world want to take advantage of and our message on security is to simply point out the basic fact that our agenda on Nuclear Security is not separate from their agenda of cooperation. Which is ours as well. Were a massive supporter of the Technical Cooperation program. For example, we provide enormous amounts of assistance as well through the department of energy, for example. Making clear that the agenda on cooperation on these kinds of prosperity and health furthering projects is not a separate question of Nuclear Security and without being clear that Nuclear Security issues will be adequately handled in any given context because it varies, but without that linkage being clear, its possible there would be less sharing, the odds of a sharing system surviving in the world where it is not clear that materials and technology would not be misused, are pretty low, and so what we try to do is point out that these agendas are not different and they compliment each other and that paying attention to Nuclear Security is a way to help ensure that the kind of sharing that these countries and their people so very much want and that we wish to provide will be possible and remain possible. So i think these, against, are complementary things and its a big piece of our diplomacy in this regard. I want to bring the audience in and well get some microphones out here. Until we turn to them. Im not going to until i ask my question. Kim jongun has given us until the end of the year to kick start discussions on a deal between the United States and the dprk. Can you tell me what more we can to to get them back to the table and move this discussion along . I will defer those questions to steve beacon who is in those matters. And making it nor the denuclearization were hoping for and simultaneously a Pressure Campaign to incentivize coming to the table. While working with steve and his team to make sure that we in the u. S. Government as a whole and with interagency partners as appropriate are prepared for a yes answer, too, we need to be in a position to effectively implement negotiated threat elimination in north korea if that comes out of negotiations which hope that it will. And you know, and that the Pressure Campaign were implementing can be turned off and were looking forward to the day when we can do that because weve achieved the goals that the president set for us in his repeated meetings with chairman kim. So were trying to be as prepared as we can for that outcome and we wish our negotiators well and will provide all the detailed Technical Support that they need to do this, but i would defer to them on exactly where were going with this because its very much a work in progress as we speak. Very good. So let me turn to the audience here, maam. Well get one to you, if you would kindly just state your name, your affiliation and make sure that your 15 second intervention ends with with a question mark, ill be grateful. It will definitely end with a question mark. Im samantha from nti, i want to turn back to the review conference and get a little more specific than the previous question. This is obviously a unique instrument, the only International Legal treaty that requires physical protection, its almost universal, not quite, were working on that, but it also has a mechanism if countries will take advantage of it, can be a tool for sustainable dialog, sustainable attention and for sustaining the regime itself. I wanted to get your views on what you believe the role of the rev con can be, the future rev cons and the timing of future rev cons and whether countries should in fact agree to those in 2021 . Sure, i know theres a lot of debate about details of how this should be built out. We are, as ive indicated, strongly supportive of the convention and its universalization. The rev con is coming up, i think can and will be a very useful opportunity for everyone to sit down and assess where things have come, where they should be going, how adequate the convention is to the goal that we all espouse in this respect so were very much looking forward to that and making sure its as successful as it can. As for future rev cons, we should play by ear rather than committing in advance to any particular given institutionalized cycle of things, we should sort of see where we are and well know a lot more once this review conference occurs and i think that that Additional Information about how and where everyone has been going on these issues will be an important data point in figuring out where to go in future rev cons. But well attempting to make those decisions when we know more at that time. So specific timing, we should make that call when were wiser and better informed and we all will be to this conference that were looking forward to. Well come and get you in a minute here. Liz kim from voice of america service, following up on the north korea question. Six months ago you said that a long time solution is what the United States is pursuing with north korea. Is the United States still aiming that solution with north korea . And could you tell us in detail what longterm solution would mean in detail . Well, our objective is finally and fully verify denuclearization, that President Trump and chairman kim have talked about and to which chairman kim has promised to move. Our policy hasnt changed in that respect. As to the details of what it actually looks like, i certainly wouldnt want to get out in front of specific negotiations before they begin in detail, but, you know, such as i indicated before we stand ready to, you know, implement that vision and that agreement and hope that we hear agreement from inside as soon as possible. You mentioned the Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism and our collaboration with russia and its one of the few areas of open collaboration between the two countries. I wonder if you could give us more color what that looks likes and what your collaboration with beijing looks like. On Nuclear Security . Nuclear security. Its principally bilateral in engagement. And i think they call it their security of excellence, which is a little outside of beijing. Taken there a couple of years ago, having had a tour of the sfiment. Facility. Theyre beginning to play a role in training, folks in that area of the world of Nuclear Related skills and techniques, part of a Capacity Building efforts that hopefully will have good results. Weve engaged closely with them in those endeavors. I believe they trying to remember, i think theyve been indeed part of our discussions as part of the Contact Group as well that help produce what i was referring to earlier. So weve actually had pretty good engagement with the chinese on this and certainly hoping for, you know, to see more come out of this. The russian engagement continues to be pretty good through. And i was happy to be at the argentina meeting last year and thankfully it was agreed we should continue to cochair with the russians and it was strange and unusual for this day and age. I read a congratulatory greeting to the group and counterpart from Vladimir Putin. And it was actually a pleasure to see those signs of cooperation as the Group Continues to work and were looking forward to continuing our role and cochairing with our russian counters. Very good. Hi, chris, joe kimbell. I know youre from cincinnati and im from oxford and we have things to share. Oxford, ohio. Oxford, ohio, the real oxford. Ive got to be careful with that one. Last week it was reported that russia formally proposed the fiveyear extension of new starts and as you know, your fellow officials in the administration have said at various points that theyre interested in a new deal with russia, possibly one that also includes china. But putting aside the question of whether such an agreement is desirable or necessary, my question is whether you believe theres even time for such a negotiation of a new agreement before new start is due to expire in 13 months . Yes or no. And if there is time, who is leading the negotiation . Whats the plan, when is the next round of talks . Because 13 months is not very much time. And if there has been time, dont agree that extending the treaty would be time for the president with his agenda . Darryl kimbell with his 14part question. I would say laughs on the issue of the new start extension, as my colleagues have made very clear, this is something that is certainly under consideration, we havent made a decision one way or the other. We are approaching that question in part through the prism of how and whether and to what degree the question of new start extension can contribute to what we think is the more important objective, that is to find a frame work for arms control that is capable and will help nip in the bud the emerging threeway arms race in the Nuclear Arena that i fear that russian and chinese posture and Regional Strategies and threats to our allies is threatening to create. Finding a way to get our arms around that problem and trilateral answer to the arms challenge, is our cardinal objective and were looking at issues, such as, not exclusively, but include new start extension from the perspective of how we can most contribute to finding that longterm answer. And i do stress that we need a longterm answer. A longer term answer to these challenges because you know, even if it were extended, new start only goes for additional five years. Already the russians are buildings things outside the new start context, we see them, you know, this remarkable new best area of strategic Delivery Systems that Vladimir Putin was bragging about in his Video Production in march of last year, you know, this is including a new super heavy icbm, the infamous flying chernobyl and theres an air launched Ballistic Missile of all things, and in this area, most of that will presumably not be covered under a new start under any scenario and already building things that are not reached through the new start frame work. The chinese of course are on the trajectory to at least double the size of their Nuclear Arsenal within the next ten years, this is aof course, thats leaving aside the issue of Russian Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and those have been around washington for a while and youll remember when the new start treaty was ratified with the senate. It was made clear that it was essential that nonstrategic weapons in russian hands be parts of any future arms control agreement. These are all challenges that are sort of coming together at the same time and its really imperative that we find some way of addressing the russian and the chinese challenges in an arms control frame work and theres no way to do that at present. Ours is to engage with them to bring that to fruition is the cardinal effort didnt answer my question, if you could answer my question, is there time to negotiate a new agreement with russia before february 2021 . I think theres plenty of time to engage with them and move that objective of a trilateral frame work to get forward and looking forward to doing that. And were going to get a microphone. And thank you, chris. 90 of your speech theres important continuity on security. Curious to hear the administrations approach to making much of the conference on Nuclear Security, as youve said its time for Nuclear Security to be muscle memory every three or four years by the iaea and a chance to have ministers in place to have them Say Something consequential, and the vast majority of those pledges in summit area have been achieved for future commitments and have progress made. What steps is the u. S. Government making to get other countries to show up at the ministerial level with the Progress Report and new pledges in the icons meeting . Were working hard to encourage high level representation, this is the major part of the engagements that weve had with the Nuclear Security Contact Group, for example. Theres a Multiplier Effect in multilateral approaches youll be familiar with. Were using our work to help catalyze that. To bring as many to the conference and at as high a level as possible for the same purposes that youre describing. So, you know, this is a work in progress. This is coming up, actually, i think in february, if i recall correctly. So were getting down to the wire and making sure that we push these buttons as effectively as we can, but thats something that were actively working on with our partners among other things, through the nuclear Contact Group. The most recent meeting i think was a couple of weeks ago. Very good. Here, and then well go up to the far side as well. Thank you. Michael, stimson center, welcome to stimpson, chris. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We remember these words of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Are they worth repeating . Do they have utility at the present moment with this nonproliferation treaty review conference coming up . Potentially. This is one of the many topics that people are chewing on as we get ready to make them as productive as we can. Setting the appropriate atmosphere for it is certainly an objective for all sorts of states. Thats true amongst us in the p5. I think, you know, my own personal inclination is it that while slogans like that are often useful, concrete results and pragmatic efforts to address the Security Problems that make Movement Towards Nuclear Disarmament more challenging would be a better signal to send which is one of the reasons why were so pleased to have countries coming together through, for example, not exclusively, creating an Environment Nuclear initiative that weve been proud to be working on for the last few months. The second round of that engagement happened, i think, just a couple of weeks ago, in the u. K. The working groups in that group, under that Initiative Beginning to build out lines of eninquiry, and answering some of the questions that need to be addressed in finding ways to ameliorate conditions in that environment. Its that challenge of conditions is the crux of the problem here and if you refer to Ronald Reagan words, i would refer you to the remarks, i think he made in may of 1989, in moscow, probably polytechnique, its not we have arms because we dont trust each otherhow it is we affect or improve the environment in a way that make them more feasible rather than less feasible. We didnt get to the dramatic arms reduction in the post cold war period by any means other than having the underlying relationship with the soviet union at the time wane. We shouldnt put the cart before the horse and try to pretend that we can address the challenges presented by the nuclear tools, unless were able to somehow address the underlying challenges presented by just a fraught strategic relationship. So its been addressing those kinds of security concerns and thats why i go back to the trilateral issue in security environment. In a sense, one in which the challenges of traditional bilateral approaches to arms control mechanisms are no longer to the challenges in the world and thats not counting the incipient race and in south asia and many problems we need to figure out and address and the way i would get that, and focus on ways to try to solve or at least ameliorate the challenges of that security environment and from that, real concrete results, i think that history shows, can and will follow, but id be more inclined to focus upon trying to get the countries together on trying to address the problems than to simply find, you know, the ways to describe them. And christmas is the single biggest obstacles to an nbt review . Im not sure there is a single biggest, there are multiple scenarios thatweve had some blow up before some parties trying to use the mechanisms to brow beat countries to the table and to use mechanisms to try to achieve outcomes in the middle east, with respect to the middle eastern idea of middle eastern zone free of mass destruction, and to force country that are not willing to engage among themselves. Thats derailed. Thats certainly one scenario. Our hope is that we can, well, our diplomacy on the front is focused upon trying to especially at this 50th anniversary of the mpt, to try to draw peoples attention to the ways in which the treaty has in fact served the interest of all parties. Aspects of this is controversial. A goal to look back on a half century of its being in place is a great opportunity to remind ourselves of what has brought in terms of security benefits to all countries and i dont mean just security benefits, well, its the frame work of the mpt is a Reciprocal Exchange so that every single state party, including perhaps especially the nonweapons states gain in a security sense from the treaty because i know as a nonweapon state that youre not going to go weaponizing, and thats a mutual Nuclear Security its not just in terms of that security benefit, the treaty provided just the kind of foundation that i was referring to in the Nuclear Security context, through its safeguards approach. The idea of Nuclear Safeguards and nonproliferation has been essential to facilitating the world of cooperative benefit sharing. When it comes to all of the benefits of Nuclear Technology to which i was referring before. Without that frame work and the regime, you would not see the kind of powerful, effective sharing of all of these benefits infrom Power Generation to agriculture and whatever else it may be. All of that rests on the regime, the nonproliferation regime has provided. Reminding people of that is important. The issue of disarmament. You cannot imagine that moving forward. And were not a nonproliferation in place. So in all of these ways the treaty has been incredibly important to providing structures that are important for daytoday piece of our policy agenda and we need this opportunity to remind all states party of that so they can recommit themselves that they continue to be available to all of us arounded world, the global south, the east, the west, whatever it may be, to keep these benefits available for another 50 years so that when they have 100th anniversary of the conference, they can sit around and say what a relief it was that all of the people in 2019 and 2020 didnt keep it up and folks at the treaty has been profoundly initially. I think we had one last question that we could squeeze in with your permission. Fine. Chris, you just addressed my question which was end. Perhaps you could provide a little more detail about how its going . I understand there are three working groups. How is that going . Whats the relationship between send and ipndv and are you trying to achieve some results from send that could play into next years nbt reference . Okay. The creating the environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiatives that you were saying, had the second round of meetings in the u. K. As i indicated before. And this was a series of meetings of the working groups, which designed to explore a group. What the mrenplenary meeting did, the participants in the plenary felt it was important to pursue in order to try to find ways to find creative help find creative answers to some of the questions that kept disarmament from moving forward more effectively in this challenging current security environment. One of those, what institutions need to be developed and built or augmented or whatever it may be, in order to help provide a frame work for the international communitys efforts to move towards and to sustain the achievement of Nuclear Disarmament. Thats the institutional piece. Another working group is looking at challenges of incentives created by the security environment, incentives that could for various reasons good or ill create reasons for countries to wish to acquire Nuclear Weapons or not wish to. And processors to retain or not to retain such weapons and trying to think through the questions, the challenges of how to set the security environments that shape the possession related incentives and what we can do to nudge those incentives more in the direction that is conducive to disarmament movement. The third group, risk reduction, there will of course be some period of time long or short between the present day and the day at which all of this hopefully comes to fruition in a world thats safely and sustainable freeway of Nuclear Weapons. During that time well have to continue to manage the nuclear challenges that exist in the world in ways that are safe as manageable as possible. Arms control, crisis stability, transparency and that sort of thing. So the third group is looking at what we can do to manage the multiple deterrent standoffs and dynamics in the world as effectively as we can. The recent meeting in the u. K. Was to set terms of reference for the way that each were pursued over the coming months and perhaps years. We do hope that it would be possible for the participants or the working groups, for example, to brief the rev con in where they see their particular working groups going. I want to stress that the cnd is separate fromseparate prt mpt process, we hope its complementary, but we need this discussion of the issues to be done independently of purely mpt processes, clearly the issue in south asia and elsewhere, the challenge of Nuclear Weapons solely cannot be addressed in npt and we dont want to get snagged on the political rocks there. And we hope to demonstrate through cnd that there is actually being serious work being done to try to address the many challenging questions, but we envision this to be complementary to and in parallel with the npt process even though we hopefully theyll usefully inform and enrich each other. Thats where we are at the moment. To where were going, im trying to be avoiding to be prescriptive about that. We didnt sort of dictate an agenda for where this should be going. These lines of inquiry rose out of discussions from countries with a diverse range of perspectives. The north, the south, industrialized, nonindustrialized world and we have treaty for prohibition and the p5 there, and people from both sides of all the Major Political and economic and ideological fault lines in south asia, europe, the middle east and elsewhere, bringing that group of people together and having the discussions, where that emerged from, and you know, this wasnt, you know, directed by anyone, and so, i cant in all honesty describe where its going because each will work as they feel they need to work and theyll work to develop answers and perhaps deliverables and points of emphasis as they feel their particular line of inquiry requires. I dont know where thats going to go and in some ways, thats a strength to process not a weakness. I know its frustrating not to be able to predict end states and outcomes. This is what its going to be if we address some of the security challenges, you dont know the answers in advance. If we knew the answers, this wouldnt be hard, it would be simple precisely because we need to develop the answers and because the traditional disarm the discourse has been in my view poor and an answer to some of the underlying security challenges. Its for that reason that we allow the participants to engage in really candid, thoughtful and hopefully live discussions with are to go with these groups and i wish them luck and look forward to where theyre going myself. Chris, your willingness to come back at this stage and sometimes other stages, listening to divergent opinions is commendable. Thank you for having me. applause