Transcripts For CSPAN3 Iran Hostage Crisis - 40 Years Later 20240713

Iran hostage crisis. On november 4, 1979, 52 american diplomats and citizens were taken hostage by a crowd of iranian students who stormed the u. S. Embassy, the combination of worsening relations between this country and iran in the wake of the iranian revolution in february 1979. Even though the crisis ended with the release of the 20, 1981,n january after an incredible ordeal that lasted some 444 days, it has had a lasting influence on the relationship between the two countries. Images of iranian students breaching the u. S. Embassy, shouting antiamerican slogans, detaining Embassy Officials and burning the american flag, traumatized a nation and a presidency. They live on in popular consciousness here with such movies as the 2012 movie argo and they continue to weigh on the public discourse. Here today, we want to explore the Lasting Impact of the hostage crisis a bit further, and we have convened a panel of distinguished experts which will be moderated by my colleague. Im very pleased that our expert, that the distinguished guests have accepted our invitation. Todays event is being organized by the Centers History and Public Policy program. The Program Seeks to provide meaningful Historical Context two through Public Policy issues and debate as a Global Leader in uncovering and publicizing documentation through its awardwinning digital archive, easily accessible to all of ought digitalor chive. Org. Youll see the front page there. It works with a network to build next Generation Research capacity, foster dialogue on New Historical sources and perspectives, and to push for greater archival access and transparency. We have recently launched a new initiative on exploring and documenting the contemporary International History of the middle east through genuine local and regional sources and perspectives. Someday we hope to analyze and discuss episodes such as the one well be focusing on today based on iranian and other archives in the region. Let me also say that the middle east program has graciously agreed to cosponsor todays session. I want to thank our speakers and my colleague for moderating. Unfortunately, john, an eyewitness to the hostage ordeal, who agreed to be and here really wanted to be here, had to cancel at the last moment for a health emergency. We are, of course, sending our best wishes to john for a speedy recovery. Im grateful for my team for the recognition of this event. Two of our talented program interns, and especially my colleague on the history program, ken burns, who took the lead putting this together and who spearheads our middle east initiative. Well introduce our speakers, so let me briefly introduce her, not that she needs an introduction to this group. Shes the founding director of the middle east program, now Public Policy fellow at the wilson center. In iran she worked as a journalist, an academic and on womens issues. She directs a complex of several museums and Cultural Centers before joining the wilson center, she taught persian language at princeton. Shes the author of reconstructed lives, women and iranians islamic revolution, and my prison, my home, one womans story of iran based on her own ordeal in iran, on months of imprisonment in prison in 2007. Let me also add shes an amazing colleague and dear friend who we at the center have been fortunate to have around. She is a institution. Shes a sought after expert on iran and ive learned a lot from her as a scholar, public intellectual as Program Manager and institution builder, and as a moderator who combines grace with draconian discipline, and im looking at our panelists, so thank you for sharing this event. The floor is yours. Thank you very much. Its an honor to be here with such a distinguished panel. I think some of us in this room remember 1979. I must confess when i saw the pictures of these students climbing up the gate of the American Embassy in tehran so shortly after the revolution, i thought they have gone completely crazy. What a thing to do, you know, and i thought, ok, theyll go in and theyll go out, and that would be it. And i believe there was an interview he gave recently, he said that he thought that the students were there to just demonstrate, and so he volunteered to go out and talk to them, and so he walked out, they locked the door behind him, and the next thing he knows, he was blindfolded and he was taken by the students. His counterpart, you know, not his counterpart, but the student who designed the whole plan gave an interview just a couple of days ago, and he said that he thought this would be a 48hour affair, and it will end, and they would send a message to america, and that was that. But it wasnt. As christian said, it lasted 444 days and just one day people of tehran, iran, heard that the hostages were put in mi ni buses, sent to the airport, and left the country and freed. To make sense of all this, this happening, we have a very distinguished panel. He we will gett, a historical background of what happened that day and during that year. He is, as was mentioned, the Deputy Director of research, the National Security archive. He is currently the director of the u. S. Iran relation project, which studies controversially events through multinational and multiarchival corporation. He was a Public Policy scholar at the wilson center, and hes the author of irancontra, reagan scandal, and unchecked abuse of president ial power. Hes a senior fellow and director of the brookings intelligence project and the senior fellow at the center of middle east policy here served under the last four president s to shape u. S. Policies and middle east, and additionally he has advised nato and Foreign Government on similar issues. He has a number of books, so i picked and choose to mention one. And hes the author of kings and president S Saudi Arabia and the u. S. Since f. D. R. I was so intrigued by the title, i read the book and its fantastic. I recommend it. Finally susan maloney, the susan maloney, i always refer to her as, because shes the top expert on iran. I think not only in this town, but in the country, and i have watched her career from day one, so therefore, i think i can say whatever i want to say. And shes the Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow in the Brookings Center of middle east policy and Energy Security and climate initiative. She had served on the secretary of state policy planning staff, and directed the task force on u. S. Policy towards iran at the council of foreign relation. She is the author of Iran Political economies since the revolution and iran reconsidered the nuclear deal and the quest for a new moderation. When i saw the word moderation, i thought wishful thinking. Ok, lets start with you. I have some thanks and an apology. The thanks are to the organizers for including me. And my apology is to all of you for not being john. I had a reminder of the effect this might have in the elevator when a person whos here in the room and heard in the elevator me saying that john was out because of surgery, she said john isnt going to be here. So i hope you dont all feel that way, but obviously i cant fill his shoes, but i can provide some historical background on the really fascinating and important episode. Ill do this in three small lightning fast chunks. The historical background, the approximate causes, and also just run through some of the dates of that event that happened during this crisis. I also brought some artifacts, some declassified documents as christian requested, and im always happy to oblige. These may help illustrate some of what im going to talk about. And i will just say before we start that im sure we all feel the same way that aside from john, the person who we most miss here is bill miller who played a part in these events and was always the strong supporter of certainly our project at the National Security archive on iran. With that, let me start with the historical background. There are three main things that i want to mention. The first is you have to go back to 1953 to understand the motivation. That is not as straight forward a proposition as you might think. In the good old days, it used to be widely accepted that the c. I. A. And the british were largely responsible for the coup against muhammad, but there have been some challenges to that thesis of late, that basically posit the c. I. A. Had virtually nothing to do with the actual overthrow, that it was really iranians by themselves. I have some problems with that, but i think dont need to get into the specifics to recognize that what is important for our purposes is the awareness that iranians believed that the United States was involved, and in fact, there is very clear evidence that i dont think anybody disputes that at least the u. S. Had the intention to overthrow. Theres absolutely no question of that, and i do have one item that has always been compelling to me. It is a cable from the u. S. Ambassador in baghdad on the 17th of august, the day after the shah fled iran after the first attempt at the coup failed. And the part that ive highlighted here says the sha fled to baghdad and has to meet with the ambassador, and the ambassador writes, i found shah warned from three sleepless nights, but with no, repeat no, bitterness towards americans who had urged and planned action. I suggested for his prestige in iran he never indicate that any foreigner had had a part in recent events. He agreed. So that to me is fairly compelling, but anyway, the point is iranians have believed for many, many years now that the u. S. Was centrally involved and that was a big part of the motivation. The second event is the 25year reign of the shah that followed his reinstatement by the u. S. And iranian forces. This was the period where all the damage was done. This was where the shah increasingly alienated the population, accrued greater and greater power to himself, became essentially a dictator, witnessed wide spread corruption and so on, all of which iranians came to resent more and more, and many of them believed, as we know, that the u. S. Was the hidden hand behind all of this, even though scholarship shows that the relationship between the shah and the u. S. Was much more complicated than that. The third event was the revolution itself and the prd that followed the 10 months or so after the departure of the shah in january of 1979 and the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeini who would eventually be the Leading Light of the Islamic Republic of iran. The point here is that that event was not something that could be readily predicted at the beginning of the revolution. It was uncertain how events would unfold. Iran was in a chaotic state. There was all kinds of strife, ethnic political and otherwise, the kurds, leftist, others were all pushing and shoving, and it was a very violent and unsettled time. And this, i think, played in as well very much to the thinking of the people behind the hostage seizure who wanted to do something to advance their cause. So what were the approximate causes . I would point to three. The first is one that is not readily remembered, and that was a resolution passed by congress in may of 1979 sponsored by jacob javits of new york, which called iran to account for all the executions that were being perpetrated and generally the terrible treatment they were goiven their citizens, including jews. Why is this important . Because khomeini thought it was important. He himself took great exception to this and railed against it publicly, not failing to mention that this was a Jewish Center who was leading the charge, again,as the United States was interfering in irans internal affairs, and he made a cause celebre out of this. Charlie nass, who was at the time the acting d. C. M. At the embassy in tehran said that the endically spelled of any of his hopes for improvement of the situation, and he shortly thereafter left and was replaced by bruce langen. Much better known as a cause of the takeover was the admission of the shah to the United States for medical treatment in october of 1979, and before that time, bruce was appreciate werent in a cable that he wrote to washington in response to a query in july, so a couple of months ahead of time, in response to a query, what did i think it would mean if the u. S. Admitted the shah. He gave some background, and he said subject to this reservation, i conclude that for the shah to take up residence in the u. S. In the immediate future by which i mean the next two or three months would continue as before fore seriously prejudicial our interests and to the security of americans in iran. This was exactly how things worked out, and he was not alone in saying that. Virtually every iran expert, certainly in the state department, warned of this. But along about october 20, the word came down from the white house that the president had approved, this was a note on october 20 to the president , but then theres handwriting on the bottom that said the president called late saturday evening with approval. That didnt immediately cause the takeover. It took a little while longer, and then the final event that seemed to break the camels back was the infamous meeting between him and. And this was an event that he acknowledged he urged. He suggested strongly that he meet with him because of the lack of highlevel contacts before that time, between americans and iranians. Others thought this would be a really good idea. I dont know that he believes that they would be the one to meet with him. I think he thought David Newsome might be the person more appropriate. Be that as it may, it was made headlines around the world, and that appeared to be what set off the students following the line. Those are the three causes i would draw attention to, and i think i got a few more minutes. Then i will go through, as was requested earlier, and give just a couple of the key dates that are good to keep in mind, so november 4 is the day that the students stormed the gates. Theyd been planning this for a couple of weeks. After apparently rejecting the idea of storming the soviet embassy, which none other than he was behind, so he lost out on that. One of the results was a great deal of highly classified material was captured, the Agency Officials and others tried to burn and shred materials. The materials they shredded, the iranians managed to , amazingly, reconstruct in many cases, and then sold them at a little book stall at the gate of the embassy. These materials are actually incredibly fascinating and important for understanding all kinds of aspects of policy. Day or two after this happens, they offer emissaries to go to iran to negotiate the hostage release. Its someone who is known to have associations with iranian dissidents and bill miller, who had been tapped to be eventually the ambassador, replacing bill sullivan, but that never came about. November 6, the government collapses while the clark Miller Mission is still heading to turkey. They end up staying in turkey because they cant get access to tehran, and its a great story of how they tried to push their agenda no matter what. The Carter Administration immediately moves into action. The special coordination committee, a subset of Council Starts to meet, and weve got a lot of records declassified at the Carter Library, virtually every meeting is recorded there, and its a fascinating account of the evolution of thinking. A couple of items that i have that relate to that that just gives insight into what the top levels of the administration were thinking include this december 1979 report from brzezinski to the president where he offers his opinion about socalled difficult choices than iran, and he says at one point we need to consider military actions, which contribute to his downfall, meaning the downfall, and thats the release of hostages of obtaining the other objective, his downfall, i have set up a very small, tightly held group to see whether we can make this happen, etc. , at the end of it, carter writes in his handwriting, he says we need to list everything that khomeini would not want to see occur and which would not incite condemnation of u. S. By other nations. Now this is a little extreme what he was proposing. And in fact, there is an even more remarkable document that was available in the Carter Library , have not seen anything like this. Its from brzezinski to carter, and its entitled black room report. And my theory is that this small group, the small tightly held group that he mentions is what this black room is. And he starts off saying we have been examining the situation in iran from the standpoint of influencing the course of political developments. Goes on to list some thoughts, and he says are we prepared to accept a commitment to destabilize the situation in iran and try to replace the leadership . Carter writes in the margin, not yet. It goes on to suggest some other things that are very similar, and carter again, as is wont to do, made some handwritten notes at the end. He says be extremely cautious about u. S. Action for now. But assess options within c. I. A. Let them give me analysis of all potential anti khomeini elements. So again, this is extreme. The s. E. C. Was considering all kinds of things from dealing with student visas, freezing assets, mounting a blockade, all kinds of things are being considered. Obviously, just because its written doesnt mean that was going to happen, but it certainly is interesting that it was on the table. A couple of other quick dates. November 12 and november 14, carter ends oil imports from iran and freezes the assets. A couple of days later, the africanamerican and women hostages are released as a symbol of iranian concern for these minority groups. In january, january 27, a famous canadian caper happened, which was the subject of the argo film, and there are even documents about that that have been released by c. I. A. April 7 takes a few months, the u. S. Finally breaks off relations with iran, and just a little over two weeks later, mounts the doomed operation eagle claw, which ends in disaster, and the iranian desert, we have, among other things, declassified a topsecret report which examines the operation, and when we get into the question of ramifications of this, which my colleagues will do, this is one of them. This is one of the conclusions that we need to ramp up our special ops capabilities so that we can defend our interest better in the middle east, and obvious implications. July 27, the shah dies in egypt, which is important here because it effectively removes one of the key conditions that the iranians had for resolving this crisis, and then finally in january, january 19, the algiers accords are signed, which free the hostages who come home january 20, the day that Ronald Reagan is inaugurated, very much deliberate timing, and that ends the crisis, but we will hear, and as you all well know, this was only the start of an incredibly bitter and prolonged period of relations between the u. S. And iran. Thank you. Thank you. Great, thank you so much, and thank you, especially for this incredibly generous, both the opportunity, the incredibly generous introduction, which i will interpret as roof rather than actual description of my role here, my role in this field. It was one of the great thrills. The first time i came to washington was to go to a conference where i saw the greats of the field and how sitting in the audience, and my career ever since then has had the same sense of thrill to be with people who have not just incredible scholarship on this issue, but also the benefit of firsthand experience during what i think was an incredibly critical juncture in the history of iran, the history of the region, history of u. S. Policy to the region, increasingly evermore relevant today i think this particular episode. Im going try to quickly make four big points about the impact of the hostage crisis on iran, and on the relationship between iran and the world and the United States. The first, as many of you already are well aware is the role of this moment, the seizure of the embassy, and the 444day standoff that followed, in consolidating the authority of the clerical elements of the revolutionary coalition, in iran, among iranians at least among those , within the system, the hostage crisis is often described as a second revolution, and i think if anything its an understatement, and to fully appreciate this, especially because were here among historians, i think its important to recognize how the revolution transpired, the way it was perceived within iran, as well as from a distance here in washington. This was a completely unprecedented moment in the sense of the upheaval from the streets leading to the eviction of what appeared to be an impregnable, prowestern, highly securitized monarchy. This was something inconceivable. Weve lived through a variety of revolutions, including in the middle east, but, of course, also in Eastern Europe and latin america and elsewhere that have been primarily driven by people on the streets, but in 1979 and 1978, as these events were transpiring, it was inconceivable to almost everyone, including those who were part and parcel of the undertaking that led to this outcome, which is to say that it was primarily khomeini during the run up to the revolution, during the mobilization on the streets, which was highly coordinated and orchestrated. It was khomeini who was determined from the outset to make this a revolution rather than a project to try to rein in or impose reforms, and it was khomeini that drove that train, as it was once described, he was not the driver of the train, and there was so much political there was so much conflict and competition within the revolutionary coalition. There was such a wide variety of ideological perspective. There was no clear state for this effort other than the determination to evict the shah, and, of course, as we all know, there was really no consensus about what was intended to follow the monarchy. And so his return on february 1 after the shah left the country leads to this question of what will happen, and theres about a 10day period celebrated in iran today in which theres this uncertainty about whether the reform oriented Prime Minister the shah left as a caretaker government would survive, and whether he would indeed as everyone in washington anticipated, return to the seminary and primarily acquit himself as we have seen in some respects, since 2003, as someone who is highly influential, but not someone whos involved in the daytoday affairs with government. That from the start, i would argue, was never going to be the case, but it was not clear to anyone in washington, nor to anyone in iran. He authorized the establishment of a provisional government. He was not a cleric, but was the leader of the iran freedom movement, an organization that was highly influenced by religious preferences, but in a sense was also very much an heir to the prodemocracy republican orientation of the National Front and the most era pressed for more accountable government. Matthew was in charge. He established the reestablished the institutions of the state under his control, but throughout this period, between february and august, there is a competition for authority, and theres the establishment off or the preparation to try to coordinate the mobilization on the streets against the shah, and over time it becomes clear that those organs, in fact, are really running the affairs of government in iran. This competition came to a head with the seizure of the embassy because at that moment when it was the americans in the embassy turned to the provisional government, as they had done in february during a prior, much briefer siege on the u. S. Embassy, to look for help from the Security Forces to remove the students and end this standoff. What they found was the provisional government clearly wasnt in charge. This, in many ways, only formalized what had become true over this period, that it was the council that was absolutely making the decisions with the affairs of state, that the provisional government didnt and wasnt ever going to have full control. Over what was to be the future of the iranian government. And by giving by forcing the provisional government and ministers to resign from their posts, this moment, the seizure of the embassy enabled him to really take the reins of government in a much more formal way, spear head what was already underway. Its away from a truly Representative Government towards something that created, and as we seen for 40 years, the office of the Supreme Leader and a set of institutions that had no popular basis and had no accountability in terms of elections. In terms of this moment, the way it played out in iran, i think whats important is it amplified the sense of siege that was already felt by iranians. This was a time of tumult. There was upheaval throughout the country. The revolution wasnt a oneday affair. Thofse us sitting in washington often watched these things, and we assumed that once the former government leaves and once a new government is established, that the revolution is done. That was not the case for iranians. Iranians. There were fights going on, even on a neighborhood by neighborhood basis. Local leaders sought to assert their authority as elements of the revolutionary coalition, this Diverse Group that included religious extremists, those who saw to create a more democratic Representative Government in iran, and many others. Really jockeyed for power. So you have this sense of tumult and uncertainty. And then to have what was seen as the most powerful government in the world, the institution, its presence in tehran, overtaken not just by anyone, but by Young Students who themselves were infused with revolutionary fervor and excited and hoping to see a different outcome. If you make the memoirs of some of the students and some of the commentaries of the students, they are now, even more than me, middleaged and have had many opportunities to look back on this episode. They do express that malcolm suggested, there was a deep paranoia and concern that there was a plot from the United States to find a way to reinstate the shah. They were watching very closely, of course, the context. You have this sense of and rather than seeing this as a reassuring gesture, which is what was intended from those here in washington trying to find some way to preserve a relationship, they did not want that relationship preserved. And so they were determined to find a way to create a full and permanent breach between iran and the United States to ensure the revolution could not be disrupted, to ensure that its intent could not be subverted by the machinations of american imperialists. So this was very much what they had in mind. There is an interesting historical debate going on now. There is a wonderful book from an author from texas a m. There are a couple of other books forthcoming, and there are khomeinications that had some advanced warning of this episode. The standard interpretation is that he was unaware, but he made the most of the moment. We know khomeini over the course of the rest of his time as leader of the Islamic Republic was highly opportunistic. But there is at least some suggestion that he had advanced warning and was able to take advantage of this in the way that he did to press for not just the removal of the vestiges of secular authority, but also to use this in a way to cement the ideological fervor of the population, because in his remarks when he actually announced that in fact this was approved by the leadership, he described this very much, his decision, on the basis of the overwhelming popularity among the iranian masses. What this did was to deter dissent from the decision. He described this as something he has embraced and the masses embraced. If you are a political leader or someone from another perspective, if you seek to press back on this, you are then speaking back on those who form the leadership and the population. It became very difficult to oppose the decision from the outset from within, and it enabled khomeini to marginalize not just those in power, not just the provisional government, but also other contenders for ideological authority, most notably someone descended from the ideology of the Islamic Republic. Dissented from the ideology of the Islamic Republic. The hostage crisis also transformed irans place in the world. It created this breach between the United States and iran. It also created the sense and conviction that iran was prepared to take extreme measures to embrace unconventional Foreign Policy in order to advance its interests in the world. Of course, it also coincided with the development of institutions within iran that were intended to foment subversion and export the revolution. For khomeini and many of those within iran, this reinforced, the episode itself, reinforced the sense that the United States is on its last leg. It is a waning empire. The phrase america cannot do a damn thing was a phrase painted on the walls in front of the embassy. I believe they were recently cleaned and repainted in preparation for not just the annual commemoration, which will take place over the next few days in tehran, but also for a new movie the iranians are producing just to one up argo. This really did demonstrate that iran was not going to be a compliant proxy. For the americans of course, what this did was to reinforce that we are a more limited power than we have often perceived. This, of course, the time this was all transpiring under the carter presidency, the sense of futility and frustration that here are americans whose lives are in danger and there is not a damn thing we can do about it. This is such a fascinating, just a couple of final points just a couple of final points this is such a fascinating, important episode to study if you want to understand both the trajectory of american policy, its impact on iran. The very first thing that happened when this special coordinating committee was established the day after the initial seizure of the embassy was a decision that we need to use both pressure and persuasion, or as it would later be described, carrot and stick to influence iran. But ultimately in part because of the concerns that malcolm noted about carters fears of moving too fast or too far, the use of economic sanctions was first employed against iran in early november 1979. And it was deployed in probably one of the most effective periods until the Nuclear Crisis we ever saw, because the seizure of irans assets in u. S. Banks, not just here but abroad, really did create constraints for the government and helped to then and an end crisis. It also had a massive and formative impact on irans economy, because what it meant was the economy turned inward. Iran sought not to engage economically abroad, but to rely on its own capabilities. That is something we hear even to this day in the themes of resistance economy and the idea that sanctions can in fact be a blessing. The negotiations, if you want to think about how the Nuclear Crisis or the situation we are in today with iran might lead itself to better conclusions, it is very useful to study the negotiations that took place over the course of the 444 days. The multiplicity of interlocutors, both from the United States and a variety of fascinating international characters, the essential role of the algerians in the final stage as a mediator, but also the perpetuation of the crisis beyond its useful life. The Iranian Parliament set conditions for the end of the crisis in september of 1980. By then, the shah was dead and there was a clear understanding with the invasion from iraq that iran needed this crisis to be over. Still, it took another four months before the hostages were released and irans assets were also released on the same day. Let me just close with a thought or two about the understanding of this episode today. I am old enough to remember it. I was not old enough to have lived through it in a personal way, but it really personalized this crisis for americans in a way that has had Lasting Impact. Every american understood this was a seige. It was on the daily television. It birthed the idea of a nightly news talk show, which eventually became nightline. But it personalized this in a very direct way for the carter presidency, which in many respects, this was a crucial episode in understanding how carters presidency went into failure. But also in terms of the end of the monarchy in iran. There was a quote i have preserved from the leader of panama, which is one of the shahes that the eventually, when he went into his flying dutchman mode was forced to travel in his final dying days. The leader of panama commented that, imagine that, 2500 years of the persian empire reduced to 10 people and two dogs. It is easy to find this humorous today, but i think the kind of humiliation this episode represented, for all those who had invested themselves not in the kind of glory of the shah, but the hope that the monarchy could bring about a better life for iranians, for all those who invested themselves in the hope that the revolution would bring about a better life for iranians, this episode has very direct and personal consequences for all those involved. And i think in that respect, it is important to reflect back on and also to consider how we move forward with iran today. Thanks. Thank you very much. Just speak up, ok thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me. I am delighted to be here with my two colleagues and friends. Let me begin where suzanne ended, with a personal note. In october of 1978, i was a quite young analyst at the Central Intelligence agency, and i was reassigned on very short notice from the syrian desk to the iran desk. The analysts who had previously been on the desk were taken out to the helicopter pad and were executed. No, that didnt happen. [laughter] we are not that black deep state. I was on the account through the end of the hostage crisis. So i have very strong feelings about it. This was a critical turning point in u. S. Views, especially towards iran, but even more broadly towards islam in general and the middle east in general as well. Iran became the boogeyman of american Foreign Policy. And i would argue, it remains the boogeyman of american Foreign Policy 40 years on. It became a dominant issue in politics. Few Foreign Policy issues resonate to the electoral calendars. Iran is one of the few issues that has resonated more than once, and certainly resonated very powerfully in the 1980 election. The demonization of iran came easy. First of all, the iranians did a lot of things that were wrong, like keeping american diplomats hostage for 444 days was a clear violation of International Rules but the crisis, and the atmosphere and the politics surrounding it, and the incessant reporting on television every night, what was going on, only reinforced all of that. It also had an important impact on the office of the american presidency. The office was diminished in many ways by this affair, and i will argue at the end that two american president s saw their legacies very badly damaged by the hostage crisis and the little hostage crisis that followed it for the next decade. Malcolm was right to start us with looking at the revolution. It was the stage setter. It was unprecedented. There was nothing like it. Of 1978g it in the fall , things were happening that no one had predicted were going to happen. Within the United States, though, i think there was more ambivalence about the revolution than we think in retrospect. The shah was not a particularly popular character in the United States. Any americans who actually followed the 1973 oil embargo knew it was the shah, not the saudis, who pushed for quadrupling oil prices. His image was very strong and positive among Foreign Policy elites, less so among others. But the number one american reaction to the revolution in 1978 was a sense of mystery. Who are these people . What is an ayatollah . What does an ayatollah do . What are all these things meaning . What is shiism . What is this policy, the religious holiday of people going around flagellating themselves . All of these things for most americans, i would say 99 of americans, were eyeopening. They had never seen anything like this. This all increased the sense of drama and attention that was being focused on iran. The hostage taking created a wave of unambiguously. On ambiguity unambi guity. It was no longer a mysterious force, it was an evil force. It is important to remember that the hostage crisis took place at a time when not only were the american hostages taken, but we had several other serious significant events. The seizure of mecca in saudi arabia, the attack in islamabad. All added to the sense that this epical event, a very important event. Much of that frustration focused on the president , james carter. It is deeply ironic, because we now know from hamilton jordans memoirs and others that jimmy carter from the beginning expected that the embassy would be taken over if the shah was brought to the United States. And he was pressed by his advisors and by outsiders like Henry Kissinger and the rockefellers to let the shah come in. He kept asking his advisors, ok, when they take the embassy, what am i going to do . What options will i have . The options they came back to him was, you dont have any good options. The iranians were right. The slogan on the wall, there isnt anything you can do about it, was very much correct. It was the impotence of the United States of america, because the bar for success that carter staged and every american expected would be staged, was that the hostages would be brought home, all of them alive and well, that we would not lose any hostages in the process. If that is the bar you set, you need to persuade the iranians to hand them over. As suzanne has pointed out, we went into a carrots and sticks phase. The problem was the carrots we had were not very good, and the sticks took a while to be operational. Diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, things like that will work, but it might take 444 days. It might have taken longer. We were really prisoners to the political process that suzanne described going on in iran, and we had very little impact on that process. In fact, we only had some inside, i would say, into what was going on. We did not understand that process any more than many iranians understood what that process was going on. Carter, in short, found himself in a position where the American People were clamoring for action, and there was very little action he could take. It is also important to remember in retrospect that the cold war hung over all of us, and that every conversation about american options in iran always came back to a russian angle. So for example, if you wanted to talk about destabilizing the regime, the immediate question would come up of who can benefit from that . And here, the paranoid fear of the communist party in iran was always on the table. In the 1980s, americans may not have understood what an ayatollah was, but they certainly understood what a communist was, and they certainly understood that the russians would be supporting any communist party. There were also, in the summer of 1980, very disturbing intelligence reports about the soviets practicing an invasion of iran. And of course, that came in the wake of the soviet invasion of afghanistan in december 1979. So no one in the Intelligence Community was going to dismiss the possibility that the soviets were seriously considering an invasion of iran. At the cia, our job is not to recommend proposals, but our job is, as malcolms documents laid out, to analyze the pros and cons of all options. The cons were obvious on all of them, and frankly, overwhelming. As a consequence, jimmy carter became perceived to be irrelevant, incapable. When he did carry out the Hostage Rescue Mission, of course, that only underscored it. The Hostage Rescue Mission never had one chance in 1000 of succeeding. In many ways, it was better that it failed to desert one, than catastrophically failed in downtown tehran. But it showed the desperation of the United States government, that it was willing to embark on such a high risk, low probability of success mission in order to get the hostages out. One of the other consequences of the hostage crisis was the iraniraq war, the longest and bloodiest conventional war in the world since the korean war. Saddam hussein rightly concluded in the summer of 1980 that the United States would not stop an iraqi invasion and the United Nations would not even condemn it, and he was right. Here was a clear breach of international agreements, a Country Crossing the border and invading and seizing territory from another and the United Nations Security Council did not meet to discuss it for several weeks afterward. This leads in the long run to the u. S. Tilting toward iraq and the u. S. Iran undeclared naval u. S. Iran undeclared naval war in 1988. For iranians, all this indicated that the United States was indeed the enemy, and it became just as easy to demonize americans in iran as it was to demonize iran in the United States. So despite his of session with iran, i think obsession with iran, i think it should be noted that jimmy carter did continue to pursue quite vigorous foreign policies in other areas. The one i would highlight for a minute was the response to the soviet invasion in afghanistan. The public response of the Carter Doctrine was the first statement by an american president that the persian gulf was a vital National Security interest to the United States and the United States would use force in order to protect it. It also led to the creation of what we now call syncom. Carterthe scenes, jimmy very, very quickly in the matter of a week or so put together the alliance of the United States, saudi arabia, and pakistan that would go on to support them. Other countries were rapidly brought into the loop. China as a source of arms. Egypt, the United Kingdom as a source of advisors with boots on the ground inside afghanistan, something no american did during the war. But all of this was behindthescenes. All of it was covert, and jimmy carter got very little credit for it. He couldnt even write about it in his memoirs because it was still a classified project. The Reagan Administration did inherit this policy and for the first year did first term did virtually nothing to it. It is only in the second term of the Reagan Administration. The policy was then ranked up. Let me conclude by turning to reagan. Reagan very much knew he owed his electoral victory in november 1980 to the unpopularity of jimmy carter, and he had exploited that. They had deliberately put out the image that they had a plan, that they were going to do something drastic. Once the reagan team was elected, we immediately at the cia got access to them. We were about to get his campaign advisor, bill casey, as our new director. I can tell you, having seen all the documents they prepared leading up to inauguration day, they didnt have a plan either. There was nothing in the works that was going to dramatically change the situation. So i think that Ronald Reagan thanked his lucky stars that on the day he came in, jimmy carter got to fly to frankfurt and welcome the hostages home. But he then suffered from his own slow burning, much smaller, much less dramatic, but nonetheless very real hostage crisis after the invasion of lebanon, and irans arm of hezbollah began taking hostages. I can tell you that in the mid1980s, i was working on the syria, lebanon desk again. Every day, we got requests from reagan and casey. What does this mean for the hostages . What does that mean for the hostages . In many cases, the answer was absolutely nothing, but it was an indication of their obsession with the hostages. But that obsession led them in the end to turn to the policy of arms for hostages. A really brilliant idea given to them by the israelis. It turned out to be a disastrous end, and as malcolm has written in his really excellent book, almost led to the impeachment of Ronald Reagan. In retrospect, the American People have whitewashed the arms for hostages thing. It has been forgotten and we kind of put reagan into a very special place in american memory. But if not for that, his legacy and many ways would have been as tarnished as jimmy carter by iran and hostages. Looking ahead, there is no likelihood i can see on the horizon of the stain of the hostage crisis and the impact of the hostage crisis being removed from u. S. Iranian relations. In my judgment, they are heading in a perilous way, they are more likely to be brought home to americans and reminded of the hostages, rather than placed in a different kind of perspective. Thank you. Thank you, bruce. Let me put the question to the trio. The generation in iran, lets say those who were 20 when the hostage crisis started, are now 60. Ok . So they have gone through the war, they have gone through all of these american sanctions, hardships, and so on, and you dont hear from them even the history of the hostage crisis. You have a generation that was not even born when the hostage crisis started. And now in their 40s. The ones who were born afterward. So for them, this is not an issue. What would it take for the United States to not forget or forgive this, or not make this an issue and to have a rapprochement between the two countries . Suzanne . I think that it is a very difficult question to answer. [laughter] you ask the toughest questions. I tend not to believe that u. S. Policy today is directly motivated by this sense of resentment, or even by the demonization of iran that has come fairly consistently over the course of the past 40 years, sometimes with legitimate provocation and sometimes because iran is a convenient punching bag the American People are familiar with. I dont see the question of the hostage crisis itself looming quite so large in the imaginations of current american policy makers, except in so far as it is related to what is seen as a fairly consistent thread of iranian policy, this readiness to take any means necessary, this capacity to target individuals, as you personally have experienced, to try to pursue the aims of the state, or simply because there is an unwillingness or an inability to get control of some of the elements of the system that have , that have thuggish authority, and to actually impose order on that system itself. And so i think the importance of the hostage crisis today for american policymakers, that sense that iran does not consider itself to be bound by diplomatic protocol or International Law that it will abuse individuals, target american servicemen in iraq, simply to pursue aims of disruption rather than constructive advancement of its own national interest. And i think until and unless you see iran begin to shed some of those types of policies and take responsibility for them one of the things that struck me and continues to strike me is that iran will celebrate and commemorate the anniversary of the Embassy Seizure as it does every year. Flags are burned, politicians photos will be stepped upon. But for iranians, this is dusty old history. It is sort of a bad thing that happened, but it was a bad thing after a lot of bad american things, so why do you even care about it . Why is it even significant . I dont think there is a full appreciation from younger iranians that it was a breach in the community of nations, the way that we conduct our diplomacy, the inviolability of diplomatic personnel when they are representing their countries. I think there have been these moments, these opportunities for personal meetings. John limburg himself has participated with some of those from iran who were involved with the Embassy Seizure and i think there has been stock taking. But even the regret expressed by the former president , it was always tinged with this sense of justification, that it was an injustice, but a culmination of american injustices. And i think there will be some need for accountability, or at least for an appreciation of the consequences, and that is one of the things one other quote and then i will stop. But richard warfield, who was one of the hostages, reports himself as having said to the spokesperson for the hostages that as he was about to be released, you were the first social revolution in history that did not have to compromise. From the very first minute, you had resources, money. When you took over, you had all the money to make iran anything you wanted to make. Anything was possible and you threw it all away as a result of this episode. And i think that recognition, i have not seen that from iranians, at least not expressed publicly. I think your question illustrates one of the great paradoxes of american policy about iran. Successive american administrations have identified iran as our regional foe and called for isolation, called for economic sanctions, to a greater or lesser extent. At the same time, every american president , with the possible exception of george w. Bush is also secretly longed to be the man who reopened the relationship with iran, that that is the surest path to a Nobel Peace Prize that you can ever imagine. It was certainly true of reagan. The whole ridiculousness of the cake and everything was to reopen that relationship, in addition to getting the hostages out. It was certainly george h. W. Bush with the rhetoric, which was undermined with the second smaller hostage crisis, but nonetheless very real. It was certainly bill clintons policy. We ran around the General Assembly in the end of 1999 or 2000, desperately hoping to have them bump into each other. It was even seriously considered dumping coffee on him to get the opportunity. [laughter] thank god we did not do that idea. W, ironically, was probably in the best case to make that scenario, and he seemingly thought about it briefly before his axis of evil speech. I think it is safe to say that obama saw this as his path to the Nobel Peace Prize. Of course, he got the Nobel Peace Prize almost before he was inaugurated. He didnt need it, but he still pursued it. I think that jcpoa would be regarded by president obama as not just an iran nuclear deal, but as the steppingstone to a much broader rapprochement, even though the administration said no, no, just judge it on its merits. And our current president , despite his rhetoric about getting tough on iran, also to me shows a fascination of the photo op and hopeful that will gain him stature. I think the iranians have drawn the line at a photo op. They might be willing to do a lot of other things, but the photo op is the last thing they are likely to do. It is a paradox. What it says to me is that american political leaders would be open to finding a way out, but it is a perilous trip. There are a lot of problems. There are a lot of impediments. And one of them is what suzanne referred to, which is some measure of accountability. And it is not just a kind of halfhearted, maybe it was not the smartest thing in the world to do apology, but a more serious thing than that. It is hard for me to see any iranian government being able to do. So bruce is stealing my lines, but he puts them much better, so it is fine. I totally agree with his comment that the hostage crisis made it easy for the United States to stop worrying about who iran was and how to deal with it. It was like an instant solution. They are crazy, barbaric, irrational. What can we do about that . And i think that has gotten in the way. If we could get out of that narrative, that would help a lot. But i also was going to make a comment that every leader is finding some reason to reach out to iran. Maybe not for full rapprochement or Something Like that, but leaders on both sides since the revolution, it seems reason, an had a expressed reason to try to reach out to the other side. Weve got the american side, the iranian side. Even khomeini agreed to the arms for hostages deals. They worked hard to try to resolve the little hostage crisis which continued into the 1990s, and through his ambassador to berlin, tried to create the environment for improved relations with the west in general. Even khomeini agreed to some of these steps, even though he regularly spouts the opposite idea. And of course, the letters to the american president s. So on both sides, there have been a string of attempts to reach out. That suggests to me that what is required for an improvement to take place is the discovery of mutual need, satisfying mutual needs. They dont even need to be the same needs. Iranians and americans have different ideas of what they could get out of irancontra. The jcpoa is an example of perceived needs being met by this interaction. So that can occur if the environment is in place where the stakes for failure are not so high. They are always higher in iran than they are in the United States. But if that conducive environment can come about, i think there are possibilities. We are opening the floor to your questions. Yes, the gentleman in the back. Can you hear . I have a question for mr. Burns. You mentioned the film argo. Do you consider that film accurate . The countries involved are accurate. [laughter] the dates are accurate. A lot of license. The political implications or representations in the film. There is a lot they took a lot of leeway on. There is no question. It is fiction. What would you say is the message of argo . Oh boy. Was it that the u. S. Was involved yes, there is that controversy. I dont want to get too deep into the critique of a hollywood production, but i know there has been some dispute over who was involved there, and the same kind of thing that comes up in 1953 with every one of these issues. Who takes credit and who to who takes blame . There are documents that show that contrary to the claims of some canadians, that the cia had nothing to do with it that in fact they did have a fair amount to do with it, this notion of creating this fake Production Company and using that as an excuse to go into iran is something that shows up in the declassified documents. Im sorry. We will go on and get back to you again. Next question . Yes, please . Id be curious as to thinking of the m. E. K. And going back to the hostage crisis and the students that participated in that crisis, and how the crisis was used to consolidate power, and the islamist marxists essentially partnering with the religious types to bring down the shah. Has there been much study of the m. E. K. Today . You know, we have our current john bolton and other people who supported the m. E. K. , or taken money from them. Can you connect the m. E. K. With having lost out in the competition for control after the government . Did the m. E. K. Help bring down the government and then lose out to the religious types . Suzanne . Sure. I think it is fair to look at the start of the hostage crisis as the end of the moment in which the nationalists within the revolutionary coalition have a conceivable path forward. It is not a prospect within the coalition. By forcing them out, the primary cleavage within the revolutionary coalition became between the islamists and particularly the khomeini version of the islamist government, and the m. E. K. And the other marxists who were part of the coalition. There were a variety of groups involved. So i think it is important not to isolate particular organizations per se. Of course, the full reckoning between the islamists and the others does not come until the end of the government. Having taken over the presidency and being forced into exile. The violence that then followed, this is an element of the Iranian Revolutionary story that we often tend to gloss over, both because of its historical distance and the distance here in washington, the degree of violence that continued within the leadership, including the terrorist attacks against the parliament, the assassination of the president. And this is not ancient history to the current leadership of the Islamic Republic. Khomeini lost the use of one hand in the attacks. Another had been targeted, shot at. The degree to which the competition for power during the first several years of the Islamic Republic was really a fullfledged civil war within the political establishment and in various parts of the country where full control was not reestablished immediately. The role today, since it moved into exile in 1981, aligned itself for the first 20 years with Saddam Hussein and fought on behalf of Saddam Hussein during the iraniraq war. Whatever it might have been in the 1970s in the early days after the revolution and what it is today are, to some extent, very different. And that is not to suggest that either in the 1970s or today is a positive force. But it has become increasingly cultlike. It clearly benefits from outside support from governments which i cannot and formatively speculate upon. It has no real resonance among ordinary iranians today. And so it is a strange cultlike front for the interests of foreign powers, and it is a travesty that american politicians from both sides of the political aisle have used it as a cash cow for their own personal advancement. Thank you. Yes . Can you wait for the mic . Excuse me. Larry altman what could carter have done to avoid admitting the shah to the u. S. When he did . And if he had not admitted him, what do you think might have happened . I am sure there are hospitals in places that could have treated him just as well as in the United States, so it was not a question of medical care. It was much more a question of somehow reestablishing americas honor, which i find a very dubious proposition. Those politicians who pressured jimmy carter into taking the shah did their country a great disservice, and one they should have understood at the time was a great disservice. But carter could have done one other thing and probably should have done, which is once he made the decision that he was going to let the shah in to evacuate down the embassy completely. If he, as we now know from both his statements and the memoirs of his staff, believed they were at risk, it was a major mistake to leave them there. There would not have been any real substantial damage to americaniranian relations at that point, since our access to the iranian government in tehran was quite limited. Special emissaries could have gone if we needed to. What was the second part of your question . If carter had not admitted the shah, what events do you think might have good question. I think americaniranian relations were headed toward a black hole sooner or later. Khomeini, as suzanne has pointed out, was determined to take charge of the train and bring about the kind of regime he wanted, and that was almost certainly going to lead to problems with us. But it is conceivable it could have gone in other ways. Remember, back in 1979, even for many years afterward, one of the leading proponents of rapprochement between the United States and iran was the government of israel, which seems to have faith in retrospect that staggers belief. You would not have had that problem, the third party in this relationship wanting to throw the train off course. I do have to go back to the argo question for just one minute. There is one part of the movie that is totally false, and that is the last scene. There was no chase. That was the beauty of the whole operation. Im sure it was heart pounding, terrorizing to walk into that airport and get the tickets and get on the airplane. I cannot imagine a more scary environment than that. The truth is they sailed through the airport. It was easy as could be because they had done such a good job of covering their traces and the fact that they were bringing these people out, and because the canadians had been so forthcoming in providing all the paperwork. It is one of the most important dates in u. S. Canadian relations. I agree. I did not want to leave the impression that i thought the canadians did not do anything. They certainly were heroic in that. In answer to this question about the shah, just two points. One was that in retrospect, the number of officials believed that timing was really key in the question of admitting him, and that if he had come straightaway in january, it might have made all the difference because the issue had not bubbled up the way it would in subsequent months. Instead, he chose to go to egypt, he chose to go to morocco, etc. Another point that was raised in later years looking back was that there was a debate among state Department Officials about what to do with the embassy, as bruce was talking about. Should they cut back on personnel there . And another dog reference was attributed to bill sullivan, the ambassador, who said we should cut it down to three men and a dog. And a mad dog, at that. Thats it. So there was a debate about what to do. This this last question to you in a different way. The hostage crisis and hostage taking happened on the fourth of november. If on the fifth or sixth of november, carter would have sent a private message to Ayatollah Khomeini that either you let our people out or we are going to bomb tehran, what was the reaction of the iranians . Put your thoughts in that framework of november 1979. Not tehran as it is today. What do you think . Suzanne . [laughter] then we go down the line. You know, again, you ask the toughest questions. I dont know. I think if there had been a decisive response from the United States before the crisis took on a life of its own and before it became clear to khomeini and others that it had a real political utility for them in terms of consolidating their authority, we can speculate that iran when faced with overwhelming force might have sought to preserve its games and preserve its gains and avoid massive destruction. I do think, the question gets to the dilemma that bruce and malcolm described in this debate within the administration, which was in many ways a legacy of the debate that had been going on since the revolution began to get underway in iran, which is what should we do about this . Brzezinski always favored a tougher approach, looking to find ways to try to subvert the revolution, and then looking for ways to try to push back forcefully. Vance and others within the administration concerned about the use of American Power and the implications for americas interests in the country before the revolution, concerned about the life and the fate of the hostages. One of the important aspects of this whole period is the lack of consensus at the very top of american bureaucracy about how to handle the problem of iran. And here we are 40 years later. I think we still have a lack of consensus. Bruce . I am going to give a point in favor of your argument, then agree with suzanne. The point in favor is in the summer of 1980, i think in august, there is a lot of talk in iran, including at the very senior levels, about putting hostages on trial. Jimmy carter at the time sent a message to the iranians, not in public but clandestinely, saying that if any hostages were put on trial, the u. S. Would use military force. And as you know, the hostages were never put on trial. Of course, there was also an intervening event, the iraqi invasion of iran, which was suddenly a lot more important priority of tehran rather than the question of show trials. That said, i think suzanne has it completely right. There was no consensus in the Carter Administration in those first 48 hours, or even the first two weeks about what to do. There were very strong differences of opinion. The first 48 hours, i think it is also worth remembering, there was a widespread assumption that the hostages would be released. We are going through a theater. They are going to be held for a little while. There will be a lot of stone throwing, and they will be released because that is what any responsible government would do. Why would any government want to first of all violate the Geneva Convention and put us down the track of potentially a very dangerous situation that could lead to war . The last thing i would say, and it would be interesting to check, i seriously doubt we had the capability in theater in 1979 to respond with a significant military attack on iran. It would have taken a considerable amount of time. Remember, in those days, we did not have bases. One ship in bahrain was our forward deployed, and it was not even much of a combat ship. I totally agree. This is what prompted the buildup in military capabilities and Rapid Deployment forces. There also was an even more powerful force at work that would have prevented anything like this bubbling to the surface, which is the u. S. Bureaucracy. When you talk to people who were involved in setting up the clark Miller Mission, they will remind you that carter did send a message with them, a handwritten note to the ayatollah, asking him basically to resolve the but according to a couple of these folks, it had been so watered down by the time it went through the process and their whole outlook, as one person said, sort of tongueincheek, their own mission was to defend themselves or create circumstances where there would be a minimum amount of embarrassment when a letter of that sort would leak to the new york times. It was assumed that these things would leak. So there was no real chance i know you are being realistic about this, but are not being realistic about this, but i dont think there was any real reality there, no real chance anything like that would ever reach a decision point. Thank you very much. Lets give them a hand. [applause] thank you for coming. Thank you. [inaudible] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2019] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] watch American History tv all weekend on cspan3 and features this weekend. Catherine cobe and kathleen stafford, held captive during the iranian hostage crisis, talk about their experience 40 years later. He said, why did you not ever say you were in solitary . You keep saying, i was alone. My mind did not work of those connections, that this is solitary imprisonment. My mind works, my god, i have been given an incredible gift of time. No appointments, no meetings what can i do with it . And from the Richard Nixon president ial library, Hillary Rodham clinton and william weld on their experiences as past judiciary lawyers house judiciary lawyers during the impeachment of Richard Nixon. Leave you to examine abuses of power by the president. The as circumspect and careful as john doerr was. Restrain yourself from grandstanding and holding news conferences and clinging to your base. This goes way beyond whose side is on, iran or your side. Explore our nation pose the past all weekend nations past, all weekend, every weekend on cspan three. Each week, american artifacts takes due to museums and Historic Places to learn about American History. Heres a brief look at one of our recent trips. He said, we ordain our ships arrival in the land of virginia, shall be perpetually and annually cap holy as a day of thanksgiving to almighty god. How did we find out about this . The president of the college of william and mary came across some papers at the new york public library. They chronicled a journey across the atlantic and once they landed. The doctor was excited to find this, as he lived on the james river and close to the berkeley plantation. He wrote an article in 1931 about his find, and i think this is the first time people really realized that the first thanksgiving had happened in virginia and not as not in massachusetts, as many had believed. He wrote the article and told his neighbor, mac james and at the time, who owned berkeley, and in the Jameson Family invited the woodley family to the plantation to celebrate the historic event that had happened on their land. The woodley family started meeting in 1958 and three years the public. It to today, as we celebrate the thanksgiving, we celebrate the thanksgiving, we celebrated with the virginia thanksgiving festival that has been held for the last 57 years. It actually recreates the first thanksgiving when the landing occurred at berkeley. Also, a lot of other colonial games and things take place, but the main purpose is, we have been reenacting that thanksgiving ever since 1958. Leftcaptain woodley england, they had given him instructions to do 10 things. The first thing was when he landed, to say thanks for this safe journey and to do that perpetually and annually. That is why captain woodley said his men a meal and gave them thanks. Did that, and it was the First Official , and otherg thanksgivings in the new world were spontaneous. Berkeley was the official one, because it was ordered by englandthat makes a n the thanksgiving in berkeley and how thats difference differs another thanksgiving at the time. Plus, it was two years early. Announcer travel with us to historic sites, museums, and archives each sunday at six clock p. M. And 10 a car p. M. Eastern on our weekly series american artifacts. Ons is American History tv cspan3 all weekend. Announcer Caroline Fraser discusses the life and novels of Laura Ingalls wilder. She explains the differences between actual events in the authors life, the little house on the prairie book, and the television adaptation. The Jefferson County Missouri Library hosted this event. Good evening, everybody. We are thrilled to see you here tonight. This is the third and tonight. This is the third and final program in this series