I think that maybe the only want to have identified this, but this was so unpopular that people to not notice that this is the dawn of a new technological warfare, we go into this basically with almost no precision capability, no space capability, by the time 1972 arrived we have position rapidly we have Mission Planning and space detail and weather and we have taken a huge step towards evolving into the air force of today, we get to see in this case loops and action, the orient decide an act and as we know from other courses from earlier discussions in this course, if you have that capability to go through that process quicker than youre adversary then you have an inherent advantage and warfare, what we are gonna see is that advantage playing out over and over again through this narrative. This one is really important for you guys because anywhere you go in your career youre likely to be in the more technologically advanced forest, you probably have more resources and your adversary, on you may see an adversary that could be weaker and in some ways they are it is also important to understand how or adversaries go about compensating for those advantages that we have, okay, it is going to be a consistent story through this narrative and to talk about the versatility of air power is not really novel here at the United States air force academy but it is interesting and in this case to look at the huge range of options and capabilities that air power provides throughout this so we will talk about the principal actors and we will do that because we tend to talk about these events as abstractions, you know as tngs created by policy committees, these are real people with really experience is making hard decisions, we will talk about the context of the battle and the outcome and the lessons are available to be learned, and once youve been around as long as i have there are things that are available to be learned in this conversation law, so here are the principal actors of the American Policy Committee in this period, the interesting thing is that we have studied world war ii from various perspectives in these class, these are the guys playing, it is the greatest generation growing, up Richard Nixon elected in 1968 on the basis of stabilizing the domestic situation of the nation and ensuring an honorable and to the war on. And world he served out as an attorney and putting prices on tires and he and his wife decided that that was no way to spend the war and so he signed up for the navy reserve and went out as a supply officer and became known as the best poker player. And where you will find of interest is that he law tends to think of Strategic Affairs in these poker terms. Talking about moose and games all the time, it is National Security advisor Henry Kissinger has an even more dramatic story, he was born in germany in 1920, his family is stay was from the third ryan he was drafted in the army 1943, went over to europe isnt a listed oh. Person in the Intel Community and who is such a valuable asset because he knew the community and he knew the language and the movement and what we now call Civil Affairs and became a law minister of germany. Law secretary of defense mao during world war iis enlisted man which took a kamikaze strike he was introduced that strike and its one of those erie coincidences that the vietnam war kicks out and it triggered americas immediate engagement in the war, here is president nixon with the chairman into a chief of staff mueller during the war was a pilot and he was flying most Famous Mission of a troll aircraft that but shut down by a japanese aircraft. So we got rescued by a passing ship that got torpedoed by a Japanese Submarine and it is that that plate you know you were having a really bad day, they survived that and law later central role in this administration which i will talk about in just a moment. Down here we have general abrams who was probably the most luminary law. He was in general patterns army going around germany and was considered not only the best commander and the best take commander in patterns army but the best there was, path in was not you would call up modest man but he thought abrams was the finest in the American Forces, at this point in the war he was a commander of u. S. Forces for the military assistance command in saigon and general john over here in that photograph, he is serving a roll on the joint staff, in that role he has worked for cruz relationship with nixon and kissinger, three events like the cambodia incursion that we will talk about in a moment. This is him giving a briefing on the progressive one of those events law, secretary of defense looks on and in world war ii he was a squad commander by the age of 26, he was a commander of the peak 47 union that took off and provided patrol law a combat patrol over the normandy legs, so that is something that would change a persons life to see something that majestic out there but a few months later his task to defend the autumn bridge that was coming out of the paratroopers in about half of the squadron got shut down law and the general had basically car combat fatigue, he had a nervous breakdown and he lost his ability to make decisions, even to get up out of a chair so they evacuated him to the United States and he came back to the air force a couple years later law and by being a wonderful staff officer heroes to the rank on, to four stars webb nixon promoted him on the outside of the admission but a remarkable set of stories kind of tracking the lives of these men cars we have gone through the warren indochina few times but just to refresh everyones memory. We have french into china and north you, South Vietnam with its really long and defensible borders, cambodia that has been neutral for much of the war, dragged into it and allow switches elusive interest in the war for the supply routes running down through southern allows which was a concern to try to block law. Nor is free and mom we see on the north that is where North Vietnams military equipment comes from, all of it, they manufacture nothing and so here through the port or through real networks, basically the biggest going up towards the northeast in the second line and Rolling Thunder the chinese had deployed about 300,000 road workers and anti aircraft crew man to support a North Vietnam during that period, during that period they anticipated the campaign law line and had more road work done but to isolate North Vietnam would have to start with closing the border in shutting down the transportation routes. Law they they came down from there was High Technology material that the North Vietnamese needed, that the aircraft in service tear missile batteries ed, the chinese to to provide a complementary type of support to the North Vietnamese uniforms, small arms infantry weapons, that kind of big. Any questions on the general lay out here . Law okay i think we all have that. Carine when so this is a fairly complicated story, so we certainly with him coming into office, at the moment that he takes the oath of office hes a war president and this is the most important thing of his mind every day of this administration, we talk about the state of the nation and the extreme trouble while that is out there in the state of the conflict, at that point it happened about a year earlier and had completely strange Domestic Support and became imperative for america to end the war, nixon was determined that he had to do that but it had to be done honorably not just by packing up and leaving, there is no real clear plan in his mind how to go about that but he is aware of the different elements of the strategy that could work. Those elements include, first of all you have to law builds of the South Vietnamese military so they can assume the rule that was taken by American Forces at that point, that was it slow process but that is what it had to be done, as the withdrawal of the american troops can begin and this began in fact in the first half of 1969, they knew at this point that there could be law no all out military victory, there would have to be a negotiated settlement so under johnson they opened up public negotiations and nixon and kissinger knew that would never be a pathway to success its basically a propaganda theater, so in august 1969 doctor kissinger went to paris and made within north of the enemies had started secret negotiations that would continue for the next couple of years. We have really critically this triangular diplomacy that we have talked about in this class before, we have a working gradually to build a relationship with the soviet union and to get away from the dangerous confrontations that we had earlier in the cold war and we also had worked very subtly and gradually over time to create the opportunity for opening with communist china. Those are both critical moves for the shape of the International System both respect to the vietnam war these are critical. When nixon is intent on doing its a phrase that he loved the use was to give the soviets and the chinese bigger fish to fry then their support for vietnam, if they cut their support, if they were to back off their support nixon can offer them technological advantages, he could sell them wheat, he could basically recognize them as equals in the family of nation which is something that rationale was always interested in, these are the tradeoffs that jeopardize North Vietnams war. Law so this was a critical part of next in this program, the problem with the set of strategies, is actually, to some of the elements are contradictory, you have a very slow law process of minimization. But then you have a withdraw of an troops, and in addition to being a good secretary of defense and he has seen the Johnson Administration get crippled by this war and he wanted us out as quickly as he could make that happen. So he was always pushing, using every tool in his disposal, budgetary tools, running his own policies to accelerate the withdrawal of u. S. Troops. There was an inherent conflict in, the quicker you withdraw the law the quickly lose your negotiation and talks with the vietnam. Hes the other thing is it takes time to build up an allied military and to execute all these processes and hes not sure that he has the time. So during that first year in office, 1969 you see the Nixon White House orchestrating three major studies on the war and law a third of them one thats almost unknown, you have law nixon trying to find some strategy by which they can execute coercive airstrikes in the North Vietnamese and away in a pace that does and bringing the Anti War Movement back onto the streets but is Strong Enough to coarse them into honest negotiations, so they have a working movement in the services out there to look at military options, they have a Planning Group in washington d. C. Law and basically law the civilian Planning Group gets mad at the military and they can find a pathway forward and that is one next and gives his silent majority speech on november 3rd and convince him to this law gradual program of withdrawal, during that program nixon direct a South Vietnamese u. S. Army forest in cambodia to disrupt the north economies Logistics Base camp that was over there and then a few months later an even larger offensive into los, these two are linked conceptually but theyre also linked practically, what happens is when we sent those troops into, the North Vietnamese hero that prides itself to protect its action is taken by surprise, there is a certain amount of Tactical Response but theyre taken by law surprised that nixon could stand his forces into cambodia and they convene a Planning Committee to find out if nixon is going to go into cambodia to district the logistics there what is his next logical move. The next move is to do it again but this time up and laos, closer to the source of supply but the bigger threat even into the North Vietnamese forces and cambodia had been, so had a main conducted this, the north enemies are back on it, i want you to remember this because theres a lot of strategic assessments that you will take part in your career law that will have little effect on the course of events, the north than me is when they decided theyre going to protect with the americans will be up to next law they build a road network in the area they expect this campaign to happen, they build a command structure so that they will be ready to go and get organized and respond, the deployed anti aircraft law works, all of this before we had even begun to consider going in there, this is one of the weapons, if we are predictable we will be predicted and they will be ready, remember that law. So what happens then is that the United States ends up supporting this sophie enemies forest going along this jungle road and to a town law, the North Vietnamese basically set an operational level trap, an ambush, what they want was like lincoln out of gettysburg, he didnt want to just push them out, he wanted to destroy them and that is exactly how the North Vietnamese felt, they didnt want to just push this out the enemies out of life they want to destroy them. They didnt succeed because of, basically a large part was the air power to keep them back off the south the enemies but it was a major defeat for the South Vietnamese, including the north korean emmys had a gradually recovered from their losses and law it had a couple of very important events law. I think this is what puts us on the backstreet and the war, this is what been shapes this, a couple of things happened been, first president nixon and kissinger lose faith and doctor abrams and the u. S. Military because of the sluggish reaction to this operation and allows mean, probably more important based on that the bureau gathered and trying to projector an action for the next campaign and they decided that the south eateries with all this law support cannot do better with going into this incursion and what are they gonna do one the americans are on it, it seems unthinkable that they could offer a significant resistance to the North Vietnamese operation been, based on that basically they decided to risk been an offensive the following year, 1972, their strategic estimate includes the fact that a withdrawal would be complete by them and we will have very little combat capability, we know like all of our adversaries always do and on well that we have the president ial election coming up, they predict that nixon will be constrained by the domestic policies, they expect their policies in moscow and beijing to restrain nixon as well law which is also a mistake scene but they actually put a paragraph we have their strategic plan, they put it on paragraph that says you may know these calculations but the one thing we cannot calculate with certainty is the reaction of president nixon, he is unpredictable and he is likely to use powerful weapons against our offensive scene. Been vulnerable thing now we has military people have an appreciation for is of the north you know hes entered into this period with Infantry Army and president warfare background, what they plan to do in this offensive history transform their army and to basically a smaller scale replica of the soviet style tank or jewelry infantry force, they are going to do that in the course of a few months in the training at the end of the supply train that reaches all the way back to hanoi and moscow, they have to get this agreement and they have to assimilate it and they have to deploy, they have to do all of that in the midst of an ongoing war, its a remarkable accomplishment. And left that was some weaknesses that will show up and the defense. Why and you cant train people that quickly to do this scene, a combined attack does not happen overnight been, the other is is that theyre planning cycles they borrow from the soviets as well, its a very deliberate planning cycle in part because their communications are so bad they can make adjustments on the battlefield, so over and over again and this offense i will follow soon we see them stagnation and that gives the defensive chance to really solidify, i want to point out here that the president of South Vietnam is a general who survived a man prosper throughout the chaos, emerged as a leader of the nation and over here we have on the communist side of this equation, we have the successor of ho chi minh and we have the a bid supporter of the north korean amuse war effort. So i goes all and, this is all they got, they roll the dice with a three a front offensive, the plan is to start with this conventional warfare in the sand tanks, heavy all to larry, and forced against the Demilitarized Zone and then a second fragile north of saigon threatening the Nations Capital law and there is a slower rising offensive in the central islands and they and been driving the South Vietnamese back law, sitting siege to the provisional capital scene and it looks like this whole plan is going to succeed and what they plan to happen and suspect is to first to achieve the conventional success and then when they south bend amaze move out of position they can reclaim territory in the populated areas. Now and they may cause delta and reestablish their hold, when that happens they expect the government will be so weak but they will encourage Political Action on the streets an overthrow the government and join a coalition that they expect to follow. So that is their own version of the bigger game. Law everybody with me so far . Okay. So how do we think nixon will react based on what we know about him. So this technical phase is he went nuts, is not having an, easterly not having him and he uses this as a direct threat to his domestic position and his chances of being elected again, to his relations all around the world with the europeans, soviets, the chinese, he orders and all of response and that is important because he has lost his confidence, hes lost his confidence in general abrams and he has no feeling that they will interject into this operation and, the energy and the power and the creativity that he wants to see, so he calls them into his office and says this ones anello, you guys in the military have been complaining about these restrictions for years, now its kind of a put of russia moment. So we send carriers, scene now theyre headed west enough they go to the war you have the midway have been way through a cycle and made law send them across the pacific, massive deployments of b52s across the pacific. This i think although not often noted its the first time in our history as a nation or any nation that weve had the capability with that kind of strategic mobility to get forces deployed and ready to go on on arrival, personnel choices, him he had no face of general abrams scene and he says basically what you say will, general abrams has had a wonderful career but hes tired and hes old and he cant do this mean, they put diplomatic pressure on russia and china and they send five b52 law into the panhandle of North Carolina as a warning saying to the North Vietnamese if you dont back off there is no lengths to which i will not go to stop this offensive. And when those john work kissinger is now off in moscow and nixon is determined that kissinger be there in a position of strength so he sendss into the North Vietnamese heartland and its a devastating attack its the only ones where there are civilian casualties, so the North Vietnamese its even more serious because been the jamming and the escorts and the spoofing was so powerful that they dont even know until the next day that there had been b52 use in the strikeforce. So they knew they had a problem, a real big problem on, nixon directs, personally directs a campaign against north panama north panama vietnam, so this is for not by history but mean its one of the most effective of the operations because this is catching your three enemies by surprise, most importantly we need to remember that and all this activity what is happening is on the ground, they fought South Vietnam with their power and they stagnate the salt scene but been on may the 4th mean to break down the south china means command stricter the north really means rebel to advance and take the provincial capital, the only one that they had captured at that point in the war, its a huge symbolic and diplomatic value to them law, no real practical value and meanwhile it seems that they could follow at any time and this is a crisis in theater but also its something thats going to damage this a all he said we can afford to not have a summit analysis war so he convinced horrid advisories in this is one of the meetings it is reported on the nixon tapes which was such a godsend, you could listen to nixon and kissinger and jon connolly talk through their options and finally law they decide that we need to escalate that this before, we need to mine up for, them it is no good if you dont shut down that road rail network, so you also have to open a sustained air campaign to isolate north korea from on the sponsors, mean this is a quote from next and where i got the title from my destination in fact, seen were playing a rushing game, and we are not going to have South Vietnam collapse, that is on the 3rd of april on been. Some nixon escalates, he directs operation linebacker pocket money keeps the for its close and he actually orchestrates and makes a speech to the American People announcing all these things at the very moment that there are dropping this into the water, vietnam is not famous law for its elegant operations this was inelegant operation and shut that however for the rest of the war so the objective youre strategically what youre trying to, first of all to pour receive economies into serious negotiations and secondly to isolate them from their sponsors, to do that at the operational level you have to close the means of transport, you have to shut down the roads in the real, technically you have a real challenge in trying to do that because the same factors that made Rolling Thunders difficult are also going to be there, the defenses and the wide open geography and the weather patterns of china, what nixon wants is everything that Rolling Thunder had not been, he wanted a rapid cataclysmic assault, just a nonstop attack on North Vietnam that would shock them in addition to bringing all this damage down to them, and what car was on a somewhat better air war, order the advantages of linebacker overruling thunders, says pretty well no law so this is where bombs become widely used and if youre going to try to drop bridges and put lows into roads that is a good way to do, it you can save hundreds but what you cant do with that is to shut down all of the roads and all of the bridges because the North Vietnamese are prepared for the air campaign they had a mobilized population ready to repair roads in a moments notice. Law Rolling Thunder was famous again and you guys wouldve heard of, this Elaine Johnson advisers had been picking targets, nixon again hated law a lot of things being Richard Nixon but one of the things he really hated was to do anything law that would get him compare to johnson, so targeting was seen delegated to commanders with fewer restrictions, about the most important thing is you have was johnson was a really reluctant for president , a man his heart was in his domestic program, next and i think loved being a war president and elise to the extent of being able to pump energy entry visa operation and there is this president ial sense of urgency there really is more important on the technical and tactical changes. Nixon says i will watch this every morning and every night ensured off he does on he gets up every morning and every now and he goes off to moscow and a late may he leaves a long letter giving him direction on what he wants done while hes away and basically mean its not to back off on the bombing its to intensify a during that period because he wanted to be strong in that meeting with gorbachev been, serena gorbachev ration of the. Okay so you have all these advantages in the air campaign mean that its kind of ironic in the sense, you know this advances of weaponry but it brings its own complication into ways. One is with the laser guided operations are more sensitive and conventional attacks to whether, you have seeker hands that it could redrawn off by a bad weather and the other is, that general vote decided to shape this entire campaign on precision weapons. He had a lot of laser guided bombs but what he didnt have was guidance pods, he only had six of them and no more were granted nominated to protect those for the whole duration of this operation so he built the strategy for this air operations them or built around the package of a laser designator law and a few problems with tankers and it became a really complicated law, complex mode of operation which led then ours to fragility on the field of battle. These guys and have a chance to talk in the fog beforehand and say this is a plan, they are in indochina so they had to feed it go through orders and what they can piece together air for. So they had tactical integration and then once you find something that works you dont want to change a, rate, its like almost everything in life but if you do that in a military environment become predictable and the north economies rainfall to take advantage of that law. The weather remains a problem, with the car measures were mobilized, they had nothing more important than keeping the roads open, but meanwhile down south there is a cascade the air power is stagnate the eastern offensive and see the enemies capture and the bureau and a striking example on an interplay of war and diplomacy they gather and decided that we have got everything we need to, its time now to turn to diplomacy, so they enter into serious negotiations for the first time, kissinger and his north economies counterpart conduct talks and july, august, september both of them wanting to settle this thing before the election age for their own reasons been and their converging now towards the lowest negotiating session for october and there is a conversation captured talking about their view of the war and its really fascinating law, so nixon is basically making sure that he and kissinger have the same vision of the type of settlement that they need, what they need is to be out of the war and so scene, and so they expect to fully withdraw from the war, they expect to leave the North Vietnamese in place means, they basically take account of what they need to do given thats the outcome that they see, what they need to do is everything conceivable to support South Carolina up to the play and where we withdraw, maxwell military support for small logistic support, all of that, we cannot be seen it to be Holding Anything back scene but in the end we need to withdraw and nixon gives his reasons and what are the most interesting part the bigger game analogy and this time the victory again has to do with russia and the chinese and the europeans and even he wants to settle all of these are in play, so been, snowy and without a conversation, and a kissinger goes off reaches an agreement with the north korean enemies, actually has a ratified by nixon, goes up to saigon and has a rejected by the president to because he leaves the north economies in place and South Vietnam and it gives him a role in the political system and there is the most bitter three months and a president could have in the midst of this electoral trial, we have seen nixon and been toy and accent and kissinger unwilling to give any fundamental change to the settlement, to the south economies and finally they have the most been stepbystep means approach towards negotiated agreement but there are two basically symbolic differences between the United States and the north korean amaze, so kissinger been goes back to their capital, it and break up negotiations there is just a way to consult with the capitals and once again there is a meeting on the nixon tapes and you can hear this whole discussion that ends up been triggering linebacker to the christmas bombing on summer the 14th, linebacker again with the course of measure but less fanciful but i think much more important and the threats cut off of military and diplomatic economic support for the south being amaze which is a mortal threat to the, makes him feel like he is forced to turn again post sites in the endgame of this process, so now we move into the final climactic part of the, war this is going on as high as they can the linebacker with preparation scene and it extended for four days. For a days to put together an operation of this complexity and his highly defended area, so the north economies, now this is another one previous remember, remember those comments i made about high from where they have not been aware that it b52s were in the air force. No frenemies new that they sense b52s north once in they would do it again, they need to be ready, so they turned the entire country into a Research Answer to traffic road how to penetrate the missiles being fired, all of that and they deployed their missile radar case you get a visual loss of 52 formation, and you have to understand the information been and how to work the radar and they spent months doing that, they been put out campaign plans to defend the heartland, they did a version and july and in october, again finally in november. So the objective for the campaign as nixon and the National Security council said was to force the north been amazing into accepting any change into the proposed settlement that would enable nixon to declare victory and the war, literally there was a law tasking that says exclusively we are not choose strictly military considerations and drying up the plan, where the max psychological shock, operational means going downtown, taking b52s downtown on. Scene and taking each and these capabilities so the sequence we can and there something you guys will be familiar with basically they delegate the tasking authority and nebraska, no deals for the battlefield and what they have as a strict tradition, and an immense to orders and lack of flexibility, so there is a concept that involves basically three large law waves though for any b52s wave going in at the same scene altitude and airspeed in everything and this is absolute been, absolutely unacceptable by any concept of operations so we lose 3 50 50 choose, first night will come down and we lose more, so what we have here is a picture of the b52 crews and the first briefing that we are announced that were going to hanoi and i think the stating the briefing expected one of those world war ii movies where they say were going to put land they said were going to hanoi and everyone has this release look that is known to be an dangerous place and this is some of the b52 destroyed altitude so they have the initial phase scene and the stereotypical predictable tactics and the next few days been they basically reduce the size of the forest and they go hit targets and are outside the heartland, basically trying to reduce casualties and they have a day off thats an entertaining Christmas Holiday to watch both sides take advantage, theyre both blaming the other, the north and amaze have done a beautiful job on landing this campaign but they have missiles betts up and ready for a launch and there is a huge processing and the essay to use a huge system so this will mean literature on these north economies missile leaders to get missiles, they had plenty in their inventory and what they didnt have access plans to be ready to fire so they spent a Christmas Holiday building up their stops again on and getting ready for the attack a new would come out and the americans on the other hand recast their operation and instead of widely separated ways and stereotypical attacks they come up with a beautiful attack planned for the first day after christmas and hitting basically the north korean amys heartland simultaneously and getting away with law so fundamental change in the campaign and after that both North Vietnam and the United States knew the negotiations were about you pick up again so they are three more days into the campaign and the immediate outcome of the negotiations do pick up again on january 8th and they come up with a negotiated settlement. Law but eventually he comes along as well, yes so here we have kissinger at the moment of success he would say signing the october agreement, going out to the street and greeting the press. And so in the couple minutes that we have left, how do we summarize all this . Do you guys have any thoughts . I think one of the big things is how much change we saw over the course of the war and there is kind of one question i had, there is the iconic picture of johnson, kansas had faced, didnt exist ever have one of those moments in his presidency during the war . I dont think, ive never seen any evidence of nixon having that kind of alien no way out, what he had was a constant state of era to biloxi and the conversation as grant mentioned was basically is talking about an interval in an october six he said when we leave we are not coming back and they gave south being a mom a 25 chance of survival. He and kissinger would have conversation about it and part of it was sharing thoughts, exploring options, and part of it was letting off steam. So we had so much in our anger basically at the rest of the government and the military, you kind of name it and about this integral part of the way he conducted business, but there was never that kind of despair, there was frustration a lot any rotation a lot. So do you think they knew that the u. S. Was plannin withdraw, do you think there was a reason that they went this way . I think that is interesting in a couple of ways, first of all there is a huge massive information out on or three enemies planning an operation and Strategic Thinking but who made what arguments and who was on what side remains untouchable, that was never, released but there is an account actually that went out to paris, he visited the French Communist Party there and he talked about the internal deliberation and said why are you doing this . He said well i was a tough decision and basically it was the majority vote that voted for it, which may or may not have been true. But basically what drove them to triggering this offensive wall america was still in theater was they needed to have a negotiated settlement to secure american withdraw, that is what they needed interest of all and to do that you needed to raise the urgency to the american negotiated solution. If there hadnt been a negotiated solution by the end of 72 then we wouldve kept the residual force their antonio there was one that couldve extended indefinitely as a matter of fact, they need to bring the american president s in south being a mom to a close and what they did is raise the offensive. Do you think they expected the heavyhanded response or did they think that the u. S. Would back out and try to accelerate the negotiations . They were shocked at the response, absolutely shocked and with the vigor and style of it and the unrelenting nature of it, they really miss estimated what nixon was capable of doing and it played out through the remainder of this whole time period. So one of the big thing is the tell the logical aspect that he brought, to this set a precedent for future campaigns . Yeah sure did, in fact this period more broadly actually changes the whole culture and leadership of the air force, when you go into that period it was all the world war ii bomb or guys, its just a tj air command and by the time you have four at a conventional theater for seven years you have this whole different view of warfare and the utility of the air force a new house to leave the air force, so soon you have the fighter generals to quote the title of a book on the subject and complete change in the culture and again we see this pattern that was set, playing out 19 years later in the desert storm and this sort of overwhelming assault that we actually did succeed in conducting in desert storm. So guys we are out of time and content simultaneously, which is always a success. Thank you for your attention. I look forward to seeing you thursday. The paper has been moved back until next thursday. On thursday, lets come in and talk informally about our research program, what we have learned that how we have adapted to what we found in our resources. Thanks, everybody