Transcripts For CSPAN3 Assistant Defense Secretary On China Policy 20240713

A Nonprofit Foundation in washington that deals and specializes in eurasia with terrorism and deal a lot with china. And we appreciate the people, this program or discussion today is going to be broadcast on cspan. Were very excited about getting the visibility throughout the United States and the critical importance of this speech is that randall schrivers speech today, comments are on the record. He appeared last year at the Jamestown Foundation China Defense and security conference. His comments were off the record at the time. So this year we keep progressing in how were advancing with secretary schriver and were trying to get more attention to this issue. But let me first of all say that a couple words about randy. He is has long been known in the China Community as a robust choice on china, leading strategic thinker on china. In 2008 he cofounded the project 2049 with mark stokes. Hes been very active in this region for quite a long time and has a wide and distinguished career starting off with the Consulting Firm Armitage International and hes gone onto different areas. Of course hes the ceo and president of project 2049, a Nonprofit Research organization dedicated to security trends, lines in asia. Hes also served as Deputy Assistant secretary of state for east asia and pacific affairs. He was responsible for china, taiwan and mongolia, hong kong, australia, new zealand and the pacific islands. Many of you have the bio for him. I think that one of the things that he has done in terms of being a robust thinker is and i think hes very proud of this and he has every right to be, is that in june 2019, he helped develop the long term in order to deal with chinas long term strategic competitor, he created a new position in the department of defense called the new deputy, assistant secretary of state for china. And that has been a very Important Development because its really kind of helped focus and synthesize the thinking in the pentagon on china and were delighted that randy has once again taken the time to come and talk to us. And so without further adieu, i turn the floor over to randy. Thank you. [ applause ] thank you, glen, really appreciate the opportunity to be back. I guess this is progression, being on the record, but i welcome the opportunity to have this discussion in public because i think its a very important and consequential time in the region and what were trying to do to compete effectively with china. So i appreciate being here on the record and being part of this discussion and congratulations on all the work that Jamestown Foundation continues to do including this conference. I was able to stream some of the discussion earlier and saw some old friends like russell and helping us to get our hands around these various challenges and particularly enjoyed the discussion enjoyed, or maybe i should say learned from the discussion on influence operations and how aggression china and johns comments on that. Im very pleased to be part of this discussion. I thought i would just talk a little bit about some recent developments, recent travels that i had and then embed that in our strategy that were implementing and then leave some time for discussion, questions and answers, and i will talk a little bit about internally how were organizing for this challenge as glen mentioned, the creation of this new position. I am just back from the region. I was last week in china, vietnam, and japan. And trust me, that is the right order to take that trip. A strategic competitor, an emerging partner and end with a close, rock solid ally. But i certainly learned that a lot of the trends that weve been tracking and observing are unfolding. I think the chinese did receive me at the normal protocol level and we did have a discussion about our defense relationship. They continued to say to us that they want the military relationship to be a stabilizing force in the overall relationship and of course that overall relationship is facing a number of stresses, trade issues and concerns about whats happening internally in china and whats happening in hong kong. But we continue to hear from them that they want the relationship to be a stabilizing factor. Were trying to better understand what they mean by that. But at a minimum, they seem to want to continue the highlevel engagement which we welcome. We want good channels of communication. We want the ability to talk about our intentions, our policies, hear from them about their own. But also try to advance our agenda that were working on with respect to risk reduction, trying to make sure the operating environment safer so we can avoid unintended incidents or accidents and still try to work on issues where our interests may align to include the challenges were facing with respect to north korea and the korean peninsula. So we had a chance to talk through those things and understand better where the chinese are on this. But i think what we also observed particularly as the trip continued into places like vietnam and japan that although theres some rebranding under way, that the ccp is trying to put a better face on the one belt, one road initiative. Theyre maybe not highlighting as much some of the activities in the East China Sea or the south china sea, but certainly what we see in the rest of the region is while the branding effort might be under way, the behavior and the activities are still quite robust and of concern to us. And vietnam, for example, the incursions into the vietnamese eez and putting pressure on not only the vietnamese but other International Private companies that would do legal exploration and extracting. In japan, they talk about an improving relationship and theyre focused on a possible xi jingping visit to japan next year. But in fact the same level of activity is occurring into and around the Senkaku Islands and in the East China Sea, the same naval and Maritime Militia and coast guard activities into japanese territorial waters or what they regard as territorial waters. So i think the rebranding is under way but the activities are still and the behavior is still of concern to us. And its really of concern because its embedded in what we understand to be longterm chinese Strategic Ambitions and aspirations. And when we talk about competition and why we believe were on the leading edge of longterm strategic competition, its really based on those different visions and aspirations, right . We talk about a free and open indopacific and although that sounds like a slogan and can become a mantra as we keep saying it, its really important to open that its founded on enduring and widely shared, if not universal, principles. Respect for sovereignty, support for International Law and international norms. Support for peaceful resolution of disputes. Fair, open and reciprocal trade. Thats what we mean when we talk about a free and open indopacific and, again, we see the chinese and the ccp with a different vision. Sometimes we talk about the chinese being opaque and difficult to understand and enmag tick. And at project 2049, as glen mentioned, we had a very sophisticated methodology in trying to understand the ccp. And im going to share it with you. Its our intellectual property but were going to share it with you. We listened to what they said, read what they write and watch what they do. And if you do those things, youll start to see very clearly a different vision for the future, Security Architecture for the indopacific region and one that could be a threat to those underlying principles that i spoke of, the respect for sovereignty and International Law and international norms. When we talk about competition, its a competition of different visions, but its also our belief that we need to maintain an edge to include in the military domain in order to promote and sustain the concept of a free and open indopacific along with so many other countries that share that same vision and same aspirations. We sometimes hear from countries they dont want to choose between the United States and china. We say, were not asking you to choose between our countries, choose between washington and beijing, but if you can support protection of your own sovereignty, if you can support International Law and norms, then were confident youll be with us, because thats all we seek. We seek strong, independent, and prosperous partners like vietnam and japan, not an erosion of those things that countries value so much. So as i said, our competition with china is embedded in this regional strategy. We released in june 2019 at the shangrila dialogue, our indopacific strategy report and we talked about the strategy being based on the three ps. We have our own branding, right . You got to make it memorable. So we have the three ps, preparedness, partnerships, and allies and promoting a networked region. Work a little harder for the third p but its there. Preparedness, thats about increasing the lethality of the joint force. If you look at our budgets, particularly the last budget and i can tell you the one that will come after that in the next fiscal year, youll see a shift in resource allocation. Youll see more investment into the types of things, such as hyper sonics, cyber, space, the kinds of things we need to maintain that edge i spoke about with respect to china. To when we talk about increasing the lethality of the joint force, were very clear that chinas modernization is a pacing threat for us along with russia and other strategic competitors, but its really china thats the pacing element for us. The second p, partners and allies, we invest a lot of time in these relationships. For us, its absolutely critical. The United States is of course a pacific nation. I know that having been born in hawaii and raised in oregon and looked pacific my whole life. But for some people, you need a little reminding that we are a pacific nation, but were not a resident asiapacific nation. Even as far as guam stretches or the aleutian island chain in alaska or other u. S. Territories, american samoa. Were still not fully resident in asia, so were very reliant on partners and allies for their own capabilities that they can bring to bear with respect to this emerging china challenge. We want more capable partners to look after their own sovereignty, deal with the security challenges and contribute. But were also very dependent on partners and allies for basing, for presence, for access opportunities. And so as we develop these partners and allies, all these things are in our thinking. So we work with very mature allies like japan and we look at how our National Defense strategy and their National Defense Program Guidelines align and what it means to implement and operationalize those strategies and what it means to promote the free and open indopacific and we also look at emerging partners as i mentioned, countries like vietnam, but also beyond that. Indonesia, malaysia, further to the west in the indopacific, india and what it means not to be an ally because many of these countries guard their nonalliance status. But to be a partner in promoting these principles, giving us the opportunities for training and potential access opportunities down the road. If you look at what it means to maintain an edge against china and have confidence that you could prevail on contingencies, ultimately it does involve dispersal, diversification opportunities and so part of our relationships are certainly oriented toward creating those opportunities for us. The third p, promoting a networked region, is a recognition that the security challenges in the indopacific are inherently multilateral challenges or increasingly multilateral challenges maybe is a better way to put it. When you think about protecting your 12 nautical miles of sovereign territory into your territorial waters, when you think about protecting your eez, its really about domain awareness, right, and maritime security. That doesnt start or stop at 200 nautical miles. In fact you need queueing, information, and you need to be able to contribute the same to others who have a similar interest in protecting their own areas. So maritime domain awareness and maritime security, we think about how countries can move along a particular spectrum, seeing, sensing, sharing and contributing. Seeing, as it sounds, is the most fundamental element of knowing whats approaching or in your territorial waters or eezs. Sensing is beyond seeing, knowing something about it. What is it, what kind of vessel or element are you dealing with . Sharing means youve got to be networked, right . So you have to be able to have the ability to pass data and communicate information and then contributing being in a position to actually respond with some capability, whether its a coast guard cutter or aircraft or whatever it may be. So moving countries along that spectrum we believe will get us to a point where the network pardon me, the region is sufficiently networked to deal with the emerging security challenges. As i said, they are increasingly multilateral in nature, whether thats actual incursions from naval vessels, whether thats drug trafficking, whether thats human trafficking. These are all challenges that benefit from a more networked region. So we work on that. We still maintain those ties with china, as i mentioned. We do believe that its important to keep the channels of communication open. Were glad to have a willing partner to continue the dialogue, but we want more from our chinese counterparts. We want a more advanced dialogue on intentions and visions for the future, regional Security Architecture and we want more in terms of contributing on the real World Problems where we think our interests do have alignment. And i mentioned the korean peninsula. Were at a particular juncture there where weve made an attempt to restart diplomacy with the meeting that steve beegen and his team had in sweden. Well see where that goes. But in the meantime weve been doing our part to try to maintain pressure on pyongyang through the enforcement of sanctions so that they will come to the table with a particular mind set where they want to be productive, where they want to Reach Solutions with us and we think that its critical that all countries who have the capability to contribute to that do so. And what were seeing from china right now, unfortunately, is some slippage in the enforcement of the sanctions particularly when it comes to shiptoship transfers in their territorial waters. And so we want them and need them to do better on that front. So as we compete and, by the way, we say competitor. We dont say adversary or enemy, thats an important distinction for americans because competition can be done in a way that is benign and doesnt lead to conflict and can bring out the better in both parties if its done in the right way. We want to compete at a minimum, safely, and not spiral the relationship in a downward direction that would be dangerous for all parties concerned. Thats our basic framework. Were well into the Implementation Phase of that. To do that more effectively as was mentioned, we have created a new ship for you, underneath myself, the assistant secretary, i have four Deputy Assistant secretaries of defense and the fourth that was created as glen said is for china. Its for the china challenge because it goes beyond just the bilateral interactions with the pla. Its an office that will be directors under it that will deal with different parts of the defense enterprise and seek alignment within our department for the china challenge. Its one thing to have a great strategy, its another thing to have policy statements, but its another to bring the enterprise of the department of defense into alignment for the challenge. Well have directors that deal with other regions. Well have somebody on the china desk that deals with africa, somebody who deals with middle east and europe and russia and actually will help our Department Work on those issues rather than having to integrate at a very senior level. Well have people who deal strategy and plans. Well have people who understand china and are involved in china policy informing that process in a better way. Well have people who deal with ec and tech. Everything from the 5g challenges, protection of the Innovation Base in the United States, understanding chinas own efforts at acquiring technology and modernizing themselves better. That will all be under our china ship to we think put us in a better position to compete well and effectively and do so in a safe way. With that i may pause and see if that is enough to disperse some discussions, questions, comments, whatever may be on your mind. Thank you, glen. Thank you very much, randy. As i mentioned earlier in our previous discussion beforehand, i wanted to ask you about what is the pentagon thinking about china in the arctic, if you could address that. Well, we put out an annual report at the pentagon called the pla military power report and every year we select a special topic or two to include as special annexes. At this point were more in the observation phase and trying to better understand phase. We see certainly a lot of interests on the part of the chinese, joining the Arctic Council as an observer. Their own stated policy of the arctic silk road. They put silk road behind just about everything now or belt or road. But theyve near arctic state. Theyve declared themselves a near arctic state. The heavy investment in ice breakers. Theres some ambition there and i think were trying to understand the full spectrum of whats driving that ambition. Maybe resource interests, it may be new routes for commerce and it may very well be military in terms of whats a driver. And those arent mutually exclusive but were of particular interest in what the military dimensions might be and it could be taking a page out of the soviet model, how theyve used sort of remote areas for positioning certain assets, a bastion strategy. So were watching and learning about that. Were of course an Arctic Council member ourselves and very interested in what unfolds there and were open to a discussion with china about it. But what we mostly find is discussion with other Arctic States that are interested and somewhat concerned about chinas behavior. Thank you. Well, on that note, well open the floor to some questions. Please identify yourself. Im from the air force institute. You talked about senior level meeting with counterparts and the practical, lets not run into each other in the high seas or in the air. Can you talk about the middle, you could call it a 1. 5, Something Like the sean sean forum and workinglevel visits between the United States and the pla. And what if anything the department is doing to promote or curtail some of those activities . I think were doing a lot to curtail. Weve made some discussions because of chinese policies and behavior. We made the discussion, i think we talked about last year in this very forum to disinvite chinese because of their militarization of the south china sea. They go to the rose garden and say they wont militaryize and then do it. Were interested in a variety of levels of contact if it can promote our interest. We try to have an interestbased approach. Were not looking our metric is not volume, number of visits or how much engagement we have. Its are we promoting our interests, developing a better understanding of the pla, promoting an openness in transparency. And i thought the release of their white paper, we can critique it as to the quality, but the release of the white paper was a good move in terms to coming to be transparent. We welcome that. But other objectives in terms of promoting a safe operating environment and trying to develop better relationships with the next generation and future office, all these things get worked into a proposal for an annual military contact plan and we work through with the chinese whats acceptable. Anything that we think can push us toward achieving our objectives were open to. Were not saying this level or that level is out of bounds. But, again, we dont just want engagement for engagement sake. And i think there are past eras where that was a metric and frankly its been a metric in other relationships. Its something that gets transported into the china field. But its were trying to tighten things up and have things that advance our interests and are meaningful. The previous speaker mentioned that u. S. And taiwan may consider to sign a joint mou to combat disinformation. Will you be willing to do so and the second question, when you were in china, did you talk about the taiwan issue and how did the chinese respond . Thank you. You may not be surprised, i didnt have to bring up the taiwan issue when it was raised. It was not long after, for example, our decision to make available the f 16s, so it was on their minds. I simply reiterated that our policy remains the same related to the implementation of the taiwan relations act. Theyre not seeing new things, what theyre seeing is an implementation based on their own trajectory, own modernization, the threat theyre creating, and of course were going to continue to honor the law and provide systems that are needed for taiwans selfdefense. I dont want to comment on any future agreements we may have. I think this is an area where we share some concerns and would benefit from understanding best practices and we know this is an issue of concern related to the upcoming taiwan election. Well have our own election shortly following that. So i think we need to engage on this and, again, learn from one another best practices. But i dont want to comment on any possible future agreements. Capital alpha partners. For the new dazdee are you pulling people from other areas. A little bit of both. We we have a 750 billion budget. But we still are resource constrained. Were doing our best to build that team out and it will be a combination of all of that. The good news from our perspective is the secretary of defense, the deputy, the under secretary, are not only behind this initiative and the creation of this office, in fact it wouldnt have been possible had they not approved it. But the notion that this is needed to drive the alignment, to compete more effectively, theyre 100 behind. Were getting a lot of support we need to build that out in all the ways you talked about. Song of hope. We have been broadcasting news to china about the cyber security, National Security from china. We heard we all huawei, we also heard a browser will send customers. And theyve taken the information from the customer. We know in your view, how to avoid those security happened, thank you. Well, i think it requires a degree of vigilance and understanding the environment, understanding the relationship between these companies and the ccp and having a full accounting for where the vulnerabilities may be. From the United States, the awareness piece is there now. The effort to better understand, go through our networks, go through supply chains, things of that nature to understand where the vulnerabilities are, thats well under way and i think advanced. Writ ge where it gets more challenges is with partners and allies for a variety of reasons. One is the education piece and the awareness piece, thats come along and maybe not where it needs to be everywhere, but countries are either learning themselves or in some cases ahead of us. Australia has been well aware of these challenges for quite some time and made some bold decisions. But as others come along, the other issue is, we need to meet them where they are, right . Some countries are heavily invested in huawei, 4g and its part of their networks and infrastructure. And so understanding how they can advance and get to where they want to be in terms of their modernization goals and deal with the cost of, you know, if youre having to rip out an entire existing infrastructure versus just sort of adding on inkre mentally, thats a huge difference. Meeting countries where they are and working with them in terms of themselves having secure new york city networks. What we dont want for these conversation to become inhibitors on how we can share intelligence and information with partners. We may have to respond accordingly in terms of how we deal with those countries. I think its all those things. Its the education, awareness, understanding vulnerabilities, making economic decisions and adapting from there. Thank you very much. Mr. Schriver, i was wondering if you could speak a little bit about hong kong. What are the options that the u. S. Has if beijing adopts a more forceful approach and how do you see the hong kong human rights and democracy act. Thats been seen or characterized by some as playing into beijings black hand scenario, by others as a much needed support for the demonstrators and sort of everything in between. Not only that, but sometimes seeing if you do take some series action with the Hong Kong Policy act, thats a rather blunt interest that could hurt the hong kong people more. Thank you. You dont have to do a lot to be accused of being the black hand behind some of this stuff. That cant be our guiding principle of how we avoid that label. We seem to be stuck with it by virtue of who we are. We believe in free speech, human rights, and so that makes us i think suspicious to the ccp authorities. Look, i think we as an administration have said all along our hope is this is revolved in a way that avoids violence and chaos and that the authorities are able to deal with those who have legitimate grievances and are merely asking for respect for their rights that are guaranteed under the basic law, that are guaranteed under the 1984 joint declaration. President trump in fact you may have noticed did mention the 1984 uk china joint declaration and we view that as binding as does the International Community that cares about rule of law and those fundamental rights should be respected and guaranteed. So i think for those that have those aspirations and are speaking out merely for respect for those rights, were 100 behind and believe that the authorities should accommodate based on previous promises made both political promises but also enshrined in those documents. Certainly we have some concern about some of the tactics that the protestors have been using and may use and i think single instances where that becomes a real problem, we would point that out. But i think in general were concerned about the heavier hand that beijing has taken and the hong kong authorities have taken with what we regard as legitimate activities on the part of the people of hong kong. I dont know that weve taken a position on legislation, so ill not speak directly to that other than those fundamental principles we believe should be supported. Is there a limit to i wont use the word red line. Is there a limit to how much heavy handedness in hong kong and truly disturb the United States . Weve talked about this internally and i think we regard the let me say by historic standards, we regard the Hong Kong Police and the authorities there as a very professional force and i have historically acted in accordance with upholding law and theres a very good judicial system historically. What were concerned about is the heavier hand from beijing and how that can be distorted and turned into something more repressive. You know, it almost have to be case by case if there were to be an incident of some sort judging based t based on the merits of an individual case. But i think the general trend is concerning that were seeing loss atutonomy and an erosion o the things that were promised to the people of hong kong in the joint declaration and the basic law. Thank you. Lets go to this side of the room and then well come back over to you. We have about ten more minutes. Im from air force check mate. Earlier you talked about the concentration camps in the west, and so initiated you talking about that. When you talk about carrying out an interestbased policy in our nation which is a valuesbased nation. I think it was a defense and security issue. First of all, i think its indicative of how this regime will behave and what tolerance it has for you something about ccp. That could easily translate into external behavior as well. We have the potential radicalization of a population that historically isnt particular radical. We did designate a group in 2002, which basically doesnt exist anyone other than chinese propaganda and chinese accusations of everybody who wants freedom. Theyre potentially radicalizing a population that was pretty peaceful and could create terrorist problems and networking that spills outside china. We know there have been some who have been involved in groups outside the borders of china. Part of that is training and information to try to take back into china, but part of it is actual, you know, contributions to other fight. And so what we see is these activities can spill over into the broader terrorist problem and radicalization problem. Theres also the issue of this, again, why is this a defense or security issue . Whats being created there in terms of the tools of repression, the technology, is exportable. And theyre, in fact, exporting it to other like minded regimes who want to exercise similar control over their populations. Things that were concerned about all of a sudden then can become things were concerned about more broadly in the region. Theres a pretty the potential for the development of pretty toxic mix when you have return of foreign fighters from the middle east. When you have the rohingya problem spilling over largely in bangladesh now, but theyre having trouble containing that. Great as their efforts have been. A disaffected population there who has no place to return to because the burmese have done nothing to make the rahkine state a welcoming environment for their return. Now the larger population. Were concerned about this activities in western china. Well continue to speak out about it. Could you talk a little bit about the department of defenses concern about skur cybersecurity . Last year there was a ban, so is the department of defense concerned about companies and organizations that might have influence by the prc government . Yeah, again, were concerned given the nature of the relationship that these Chinese Companies have with the crossexamination cp and the influence that the ccp may have on their Decision Making and how they may be involved in state sponsored goals such as theft of technology, intelligence, et cetera. So our first concern is the vulnerabilities that can be created by these Companies Using these technologies, et cetera. The concerns in the cyber realm go beyond that. We see the chinese are investing in china, not just for the purpose of intellectual property theft, technology, and helping their own technological Innovation Base. But integrating it into military plans and contingency plans. So understanding better how the chinese may use cyber in their own future war fight is a growing interest and concern of ours. If you look at our Cyber Strategy report the department of defense put out, it addresses both sides of those equations. The vulnerability side. If you really want to understanunderstand the strategy, increasing the value of our force, look at how well make investments for the future. Where were doing research and development and were trying to acquire capabilities as quickly as we can. Cyber is at the top of the list. Once we require the greater capability, the other thing our Cyber Strategy points out is we do need to think about classic det deterrents and how we can use capabilities to give the chinese pause in terms of their own use of cyber. Mr. Secretary, thank you sfrerch yo very much for your presentation. You mentioned the importance of u. S. Working with their allies and partners in the endo pacific. I was wondering if you can speak to how you see japan and taiwan possibly working closer together and in realizing the endo pacific. And a weekend event that was held on this very topic of exploring different avenues of cooperation. I was wonderinger if this is a subject matter the d. O. D. And you are thinking about. I think as individual partners we have ongoing work to try to promote those respective bilateral relationships and how they can contribute to the free and open endo pacific. Japan has the guidelines, we have our National Defense strategy. Were doing a lot of work to go beyond recognizing Strategic Alignment and thinking about operationalizing that. Talking about roles and mission and how we can further and advance that. It really does support mr. Abes own vision for being more proactive in the region and be a proactive participate, constructive participant. You know, theres some data over where that term comes from, free and open pacific. But we think weve got a very strong reliability interested partner in japan in promoting those principles. Taiwan is facing a very real immediate threat from china. It comes in a variety of ways, forms, excuse me, the diplomatic pressure, the use of economic coercion. The military pressure through more robust exercising and training that is clearly designed to imtimidate taiwan. Taiwans primary role is really protecting itself and insuring that a Democratic People can preserve their status, preserve their ability to decide the future for themselves. And then beyond that think about ways to contribute to those principles in the region. Taiwan is constrained because of his diplomatic status but taiwan still finds a voice in promoting those things where it can. In terms of the trilateral, i would say there are things that happen quietly. We do try to lencverage whats happening in the think tank world. A lot of good ideas are being implemented there. The stuff thats happening behind the scenes, i wouldnt want to go into great detail, but were finding it fruitful as well. Im from voice of america korean service. A few months ago the Washington Post reported that huawei allegedly helped north Korea Building its own network. Do you see that as a security issue as well . I dont want to comment on any particular intelligent report. I think more broadly speaking, the chinese can claim a lot of responsibility for north korea. What would pass for modernization, certainly on the military side but also in the commercial sector, private sector, infrastructure. Those relationships are there and the chinese have become the most important partner for north korea. We want them to do better. At a minimum sanctions enforcement but i think there are other ways china could help pressure pyongyang. Were just not seeing it right now. First of all, id like to thank very much the secretary shriver for taking time out of his day and coming to spend about an hour with us. Were thinking everyone at c span for watching us. Were going to break for a few minutes. Lets give secretary shriver a big round of applause and thank him. [ applause ] well take a short break while the next panel comes up. Were live this morning on capitol hill where u. S. Special representative for iran, brian hook, will update members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on u. S. Policy toward iran. This is live coverage on cspan 3. We do expect this to begin shortly