Transcripts For CSPAN3 Irish Ambassador To The U.S. Daniel Mulhall Others On Brexit 20240713

We appreciate your spending your time with us. My name is dan hamilton, im a professor here at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Policy institute fellow. We have a post doctoral fellows. We are delighted today help publicize it in the first public release of the book. So shes here as a post doc fellow has this new book. Pretty timely. And shes been working on it with her colleagues in europe on those questions. We thought the context of the book would be good to talk about very timely issue now, which is whats going on with brexit. What does it mean, not only for the uk and the e. U. Member states, but also for broader Security Issues, which will start to affect, of course, the u. S. Interests quite intensely. So what well do is i will just briefly introduce the speakers. Youve had an invitation and so on, more about their backgrounds. But just to keep it brief, ive got cornelia to tell us briefly about the book. Then were going to go to two colleagues, the assistant professor here who does work on these issue and teaches courses on the issues, and john denny, a Research Professor with the u. S. Army war college who works on Security Issues and has specialized in this topic. And the fellow, who is two doors down working on europe will offer a further perspective. Were delighted to have the ambassador of ireland to the United States. He also was an investor in the uk. He can convey some of the reality from his time there. Welcome back, mr. Ambassador, were so delighted you can join us here. Without further ado, let me turn to cornelia who is going to tell us about the context and well go from there. Hello, everybody, and welcome to this book launch on brexit, European Security and Transatlantic Relations. Thank you very much professor for this very nice introduction. So as we mentioned, this is book were launching today. I would like to say a few thi s things i just wanted to check my time. The book is an academic project. Its a collective project with different contributors to various universities in europe. And in relation to the genesis of this book, the idea of the book has materialized at the university of hamburg during the ecpr conference. European conference for Political Research last summer. This is where we have started and we decided to put together this contribution to have a greater understanding of the subject matter. And before coming to telling you something some of the major findings, i would like to say a few to put this in a broader context, so like the role of the research and researchers in the 21st century in a broader context so you can better understand how we reach the conclusions of this book. Uncertainty, insecurity and crisis, as we know are some of the major hazards in the 21st Century International security order. And in this context, the role of Academic Research is to generate a body of knowledge, which can help us to understand, to explain or predict crisis and unsecurity. And of course its not easy to predict uncertainty or to know uncertainty. Because yeah, the question is how do we know if its uncertain. And a professor of mine during the talk this year has made actually a very interesting point referring to a picture which probably most of you or many of you have seen this year, that of a black hole. So to know something, which was previously unknown which was difficult to know and how did they do it . They put together several telescopes. And this is what we tried to do in this book as well. We tried to put together the pieces of the puzzle in order to estimate more complex variables. Which can help us better predict and understand. So the objective now coming, the objective of the book was to fill a crucial scientific gap and to contribute a better understanding and management of the challenges associated with the Brexit Process for European Security and transatlantic cooperation. And the big is based on understanding of peace and security going on resilience, anticipation, and integration of aspects of daily life which are important for predicting uncertainty. So now i think ill come to the findings which we can categorize in four major themes or sections. The first finding is related to the e. U. uk collaborative potential. So here we the findings suggest that there is a mixed track record of e. U. uk military cooperation. And reaching an agreement in the area of Security Defense has proved more difficult than expected. Because maybe because of diverging interests of the uk on one side and the e. U. So interestingly, security and defense was an area where we would have expected an easy agreement. However the development after the brexit vote, as i said have made reaching an agreement increasingly difficult. Another major category of findings relates to the future of europe. When we talk about the future of europe, we need to talk about the future of csdp, the Common Security and defense policy. And to har our findings suggest, or a highlight draw of policies entrepreneurs such as france and germany, in making advancements for csdp and but still challenges are expected to continue in the future because of the difference in the strategic preferences of this major policy entrepreneurs, but also e. U. 27. We can expect increased cooperation for lifting obstacles in the future for csdp. Another aspect also in this category and the future of europe is related to peace. And because when we talk about the future of europe, we need to think about this essential aspect. Peace is a major attribute of european integration. Its a pr the findings have highlighted how the Brexit Process can or brexit can undermine or undermines the Peace Process and good friday agreement. Because the good friday agreement was possible due to the e. U. Membership of both companies, the uk and ireland. And open ended nature of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. Im sure the ambassador will say more about this later on. Another important thing was related to which we found was relate to bilateralists. We could anticipate the uk would individual Member States will be strepngthened ona bilateral basis. We had a section in our book based on estonia. Individual Member States in a difficult strategic environment or in exposure such as estonia can have an increased yult for the uk particularly because corporation on a bilateral basis can constitute avenues of influence for the e. U. Policy or on the e. U. Policy. Then we have a third category of findings, which relates to new sources of power and legitimacy. Here we assessed whether and how new and emerging Security Technology things can be turned or can turn into a competitive advantage for the e. U. Another thing we looked at was the potential of collaborative defense, security and defense regimes and procurement. And European Defense fund. And also we looked at the future of the European Nuclear deterrents. And finally there was a fourth category related to prospects of strategy. Here we find a greater need for we find the need the findings suggest the need for a more holistic e. U. Agenda. Holistic in the sense that these two cooperative strategy should aim at fulfilling or this will increase interdependence at all government structures, and and, yeah, so i i would say in conclusion that that the findings of the book suggests a greater need for increased eu xe tipsies and for the uk it emphasizes the importance of bilateral and mini lateral or multilateral structures, particularly in the scenario of a no deal. To conclude, feature eu uk relations, we can probably expect to depend on the uks ability to normalize its relations with European Partners and also on its level of commitment or ability to show commitments to csdp, and it also depends on the preferences of the u27. So i think thats from my side, and were now going to move on with the beginning of our panel. Our first speaker is alice pannier who is assistant professor in ir and European Security here at Johns Hopkins university, school of advanced international studies, and she will talk about brexit or the uk bilateral relations with the European Partners, particularly with france. Thank you. Can you hear me . Yes. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you so much, cornelia, for the invitation and congratulations for putting together this event in such a short time. So, again, im going to talk about the uks bilateral defense and security relations with European Partners, in particular france, but by talking about france i hope to draw conclusions that apply to other eu Member States and so it could be of interest to other partners as well. So indeed as cornelia pointed, bilateral defense relations have taken a particular importance during the Brexit Process. There will be potentially even more important after brexit is effective, but they have always been extremely important and that indicated the ten past years working on bilateral defense and security relations in europe and in particular the uk French Defense relation, and hopefully well have a book coming out on the subject in about a year, so when it comes to the uk in france, even though conclusions can be applied to other cases, there is something quite special about the uk french bilateral relationship. They done joy a special relationship even though the term is connoted and terms to relate to the uk u. S. Bilateral. It can also apply to the uk french relationship. Its unique according to the French Embassy in london pause it refers to all domains of security, and it is special according to the uk director for general strategy in a tweet he posted in march 2019 because it applies to Nuclear Deterrents as well as through the uk and frances military expeditionary capacities that other european states do not necessarily have. The Bilateral Partnership in the past ten years has been rooted in a bilateral treaty whereby france and the uk have committed to enhance their bilateral cooperation across the spectrum of defense and security ranging from joint armament projects and including crossborder industrial integration, and thats an important part of their cooperation that im going to go back to, because its probably the one thats been the most affected by brexit. They have endeavored to integrate their missile industry in particular around the company and mbda coowned by french and British Industrial groups. France and uk have talked about the interoperability of their arm forced. They have jointly led operations in libya in 2011, this together participated in the u. S. Led cooperation in syria and have worked together under french leadership and under uk leadership in eastern aeurope ad they have built a force which is a nonpermanent military force involving all three services, that is going to reach full operational capacity next year in 2020. France and the uk have also been collaborating in the Nuclear Domain, Nuclear Deterrents domain which makes their partnership indeed quite special, sharing facilities for the maintenance of their Nuclear Stockpile as well as test simulation on their nuclear warheads. France and the uk are obviously both members of the un security council, an as such they engage on a lot of international Security Issues, and they have a common approach on current affairs, including on iran, russia, or syria. So thats for if you like the the background of what im going to say now is going to build. So based on this bilateral strong allencompassing partnership that has been working for us in the past decade. What happened in 2006. This microphone, i dont know if i should speak close or far. Should i speak like this . Okay. What i said for the past three minutes was not that the interesting anyway so its okay if you didnt hear anything. So what has happened since 2016 . So obviously when you have such a partnership that has no equal in europe and you have a bilateral treaty, what you come up with something after brexit is first disbelief on both sides as well as public declarations that support the maintenance of the partnership and try to create a political atmosphere of continued trust and support and mutual support, so in 2016 when Francois Hollande was still president he said france would work with a big friend country and the close relations in the defense field will be preserved. Theresa may similarly in july 2016 suggested that the intelligence and Security Cooperation between our countries is something that will always endure and that they will even strengthen the wider Strategic Defense Partnership between the two countries. So a lot of goodwill was showed at first. Then since 20172018, we have some sort of fatigue. We have macron taking a hard line on brexit to preserve the different pillars of the eu and and maintain unity of the eu, and we face the fact and the problem that defense indeed is not as important or is only secondary to economic and social issues, right, so you have defense coming. If you like it more to the back of the bilateral declarations and french posturing, same on the uk side. Then with the rejection of theresa mays deal, there is an increased fatigue and disbelief on the french side of what the uk is up to. And then you have an increased governmental instability in the ek and with the coming into power of boris johnson, the question is is it even worth working with johnson and how long is he going to stay in power anyway, and the talks and the constant postponing of brexit make any kind of focus on defense and security very, very difficult. So in the meantime you do have the collaboration that continues at the working level, political military cooperation, competition continues and is affected by military events. Deployments in the indian oceans of combined Aircraft Carrier groups continue. Collaboration in sahal and Eastern Europe and syria continue. However, on the industrial side, things have started to take a different turn. The big project of a future combat air system, uk french air system was abandoned, not only due to brexit. There were already many disagreements on the industrial side. Differing needs between the two countries but it was acknowledged in all the research and interviews that ive done a brexit presented a sort of window of opportunity to just abandon a project that they no longer had an incentive to maintain because of bad political context and difficulty economic context as well, and now there are many doubts about other projects including this very ambitious industrial integration in the missile sector that i was mentioning earlier that is now put into question by brexit. Meanwhile cooperation in the Nuclear Domain continues. So then that was if you like for the past three years, and now we can wonder whats going to happen after brexit, and this indeed begs the question that you raised, cornelia, about resilience and i have only two minutes and im very late. Im going to speed up. My point, and thats something that i write about in the book that i will hopefully be able to publish soon is that even for partners and neighbors that enjoy such special relationships and very deep partnerships, those partnerships they need a minuteth maintenance, they need effort, and when we think about whats going to happen next we can think about four lines inquiry. First is how are the two partners going to construct common interests, decide on things they want to do together, and this is going to be difficult, first, because of brexit representing two opposing political visions, first you have on the one hand you have france thinking of its future in the european context and almost only in a european context and on the other side you have the uk thinking of its future individually around this idea of Global Britain, so you have different political visions. You also have political tensions because of the brexit negotiations which creates diminished incentives for negotiating common positions, common interests and finding areas and ways in which to work together. Then in the longer term, if the uk does not participate in the eu, in the European Defense fund, the common policy meetings, there is a chance that there is not going to be able to converge on many issues that concern eu diplomacy, but maybe my colleagues will talk more about that. So thats also going to make it more difficult to reach common positions for procurement choices and military procurement, especially as eu moves forward to become an actor in that field. Then there is the broader question of how willing and able the uk is going to be as a military actor and the root of the partnership between the uk and france is that they both share the Expeditionary Defensive and Strategic Partnership and if the uk is indeed still struggling with brexit, has lower defense spending and just a general loss of leadership, is it still going to be a very attractive partnership for france . Theres also the risk that maybe if the uk has to negotiate trade deals with great powers including the us, including china and including russia, then maybe thats going to create some edge anaheim angelments for the European Partners. Second about coordinating governmenttogovernment military activities. The uk being outside of the eu will make it more difficult to okay on a conformative basis and regularity basis including and especially for the Defense Industry because the eu provides for simplification of crossborder arms exports and the exchange of parts necessary for building arms. So so thats making it difficult for Companies Like airbus and mbda, tallus, thatwork on crosthat work on crossborder projects, its not so much on tariffs, because they are not so much a consequence in the armaments sector, but if you have more paperwork, more Administrative Burden as well as border checks, it just also removes some of the incentives of working with the uk, and you may have some relocation of industry. Thirdly, and im reaching the end of my short blurb, for a bilateral relationship to continue, you need to be able to make deals including making bets so if you want to cooperate on something you may say give me this and ill give you that. You do tradeoffs, and its a constant bargaining, even among close allies, and so if you have uncertainty about the future, how are you going to make a deal . Youre not going to be able to bet on whether the uk tomorrow is going to be able to fulfill their commitment to certain deals that youve made, so youre going to be in the short term disincentived to make certain deals and that again applies to armaments projects. Are you going to put money on the table if you dont know that your partner is going to be able to fulfill their obligation. Finally, and thats an important point as well, is how do you arbitrate among different bilateral relationships . States at different times retain Close Relationships with different states. Uk has relationships with the u. S. And france and other European Countries like germany which is in the that small. On the one hand the uk will be incentivized to arrange bilateral links with other European Partners but also with the u. S. And this may be detrimental to friends if the u. S. Is indeed lobbying the uk as it has been doing to buy american equipment, including in the missile sector where the uk has been trying so far to work with friends and there has been a forceful american lobbying to sell some american missiles, for example, that the uk would be otherwise developing jointly with france on a bilateral level. Interestingly this this u. S. Lobbying can also be felt towards other european states as they try to finalize alternatives to the uk as an entry point into the eu, so maybe also other colleagues will talk about that aspect. Meanwhile, france is obviously incentivized to try to look for other partners, including turning back to germany. If its a difficult partner in defense, it remains another favored ally. Im actually done because i think i skipped just a couple of points. Looking forward to, you know, questions and comments if there are any afterwards. Thank you so much, alice pannier, for your input. Our next speaker is john r. Deni, Research Professor of joint interagency, intergovernmental and Multinational Security studies at the u. S. Army college Army War College strategic studies institute. He will talk about brexit, nato and transatlantic corporations. Thank you. I think, cornelia, you used a bit of my time getting my title out, but thank you for that introduction, cornelia. My name is john deni and im a Research Professor at the Army War College in carlisle, pennsylvania and specifically i work at the relatively Small Research facility there, the strategic studies institute, a small part of the much larger war college. As such im a Government Employee. We have Academic Freedom and im a Government Employee so i have to acknowledge up front that the views i express now and during the q a are mine and mine alone and dont reflect those of the army, the department of defense or the u. S. Government. First, corniel yeah, back to you, thank you so much for the invitation, and congratulations to you and john doyle for an excellent book and the publication that have book. Im honor and delighted to be here to talk to you about the transatlantic aspect of brexit, or at least my take on it, and im going to talk about that in terms of three potential rather negative impacts. The first of those is going to be the demise of uk capability and capacity militarily. Second follows on from that, the receiving of uk strategic horizons. In other words, how far beyond the borders of the United Kingdom does london perceive uk interests, okay . Right now that goes pretty far. Im going to argue that i think well see a receding of that, a pretty significant one, and finally hand most dramatically and heres where im on the thinnest ice because im going to do something and thats predict. I think it could lead to the special relationship and demise of the uk as americas righthand partner and the number two power in nato, and i dont just mean that in terms of military issues. We americans, as many of you know, we like to operate with partners throughout the world in all of our international dealings, and the uk is arguably the closest partner we have in a variety of realms, especially in the military. I think that is at risk. So let me talk about each of those now in a little more detail. First in, terms of the demise of uk capability and capacity. I mean that specifically in terms of whats going happen to the uk defense budget. Most of the reputable, independent and Economic Analysis that came out in the run up to the brexit vote over three years ago were fairly consistent about the impact of brexit on the uk economy, and that was there would be a pretty significant negative impact, right, on gdp, on purchasing power and on Household Incomes across the board. That was one or two exceptions. Thats what most independent analyses found. Now they vary in terms of the depth of the bad news, right, but the hard brexit was the worst case scenario, and there most analyses averaged about a 7 drop in gdp. Now that doesnt sound like a lot, but that translates into about a 47 billion pound loss of revenue. That number sounds like a lot to me and it is. Back in 2012 and 2013 when the uk government was dealing with the aftereffects of austerity and the sovereign debt crisis, those two years saw drops in revenues of about 33 billion pounds each of those years, so 47 billionpound drop in revenue over the course of the next five years, most of these studies looked out five to seven years, thats a fairly significant impact. Now how did the uk government respond to the drop in revenue earlier this decade . It was pretty clear among the most severely cut budget categories was defense, and from 2010 until 2018 you k defense spending dropped by 18 in real terms. There was a 25 cut in manpower over that same time period. Now, theres been some recent good news about what the British Government is expected to fund in the coming year for defense spending, and and as many of you know weve seen kind of a reboufnd defense spending across europe in at least 2015. I question the durability of that rebound, especially in the case of the uk and especially if a hard brexit comes about. Defense cuts, my view, are very likely. The government will likely do that in order to fence off or protect social welfare spending it is a did in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. I dont think theres risk to things like highprofile procurement such as strategic submarines, but i i do think theres risk to other procurement promise that could be delayed or cancelled outright, and here im thinking of maybe the challenger tank replacement, helicopter upgrades and replacements and possibly some general purpose frigates. We should also expect to see cuts to manpower. Thats what we saw a couple of years ago. I would expect the british army and the Royal Marines to take pretty significant cuts to their force structure. Perhaps more significantly for defense would be questions about whether the United Kingdom remains united in the event of a hard breksinch. Many of you know that scotland is home to the only strategic Submarine Base for the royal navy. Its also home to some fairly important raf bases as well as a Training Facility at cape rath that the m. O. D. , uniand ministry of defense labels the only place in europe where you can do sea, air and land exercises all at the same time. So if scotland were to hold a referendum in the worst case of a hard brexit, trying to recreate, replicate or even lease these facilities in the short run would be extraordinarily expensive and difficult to pull off, i think. Now, even without brexit, lets say that we dont get a hard bre brexit. Instead, theres an agreement between the uk and london, we know that already austerity over the last decade dealt a serious blow to military capacity and capabilities. If you think back to what the uk was possible of doing militarily back in the first persian gulf war, 1991 time frame or at the outset of natos involvement in afghanistan or of the coalition of the willings involvement in iraq, early 2000s, okay, those time periods, the uk military could field divisionsized military units. Were talking about thousands, tens of thousands, up to 20,000 or so, the size of a division mechanized forces. That is simply not possible today, and that is because of austerity. Of course, the armys not the only service in the uk affected by that. Weve seen a a decline in platforms, royal Navy Platforms and the raf has been affect as well. In 2018 the house of commons itself concluded that the uk military was, quote, at the minimum threshold of operational effectiveness. Thats their words, not mine, unquote. That will ultimately, my view, heres the second impact, lead to a shrinking of uk strategic horizons. Now, there are a lot of things that go into how a country perceives of where its interests lie, right . But the ability and willingness to do something about them, thats tied to this, and i look at two historical examples to indicate to me why this is most likely. The first is the dutch. From the mid2000s until the middle of the current decade, the dutch went through a pretty significant military transformation. Their strategies, 15 years ago. Talked about having really worldwide interests all in the framework or context of multilateralism, of course, working with nato or eu context. Ten years later new strategy comes out 2018. It states very clearly the focus is now on europe and the kingdom. Not on operations far afield. In 1990 the dutch army had 104,000 the Dutch Military had 104,000 personnel down to 41,000 in 2011. They went from 1818 f16s in 1990 to 68 in 2011. From 913 tanks to zero. 15 frigates and dede stroiers to 6. This reduction in capability and capacity is what contributed in part to the this reframing of how the netherlands viewed its security. The second example i look to historically for this is ironically the uk itself, and thats what happened about 50 years ago when the uk went through this really wrenching decision to withdraw east of suez. One of the reasons why the uk made that decision was the increasing cost of paraperforming platforms east of the suez. Ultimately now i think these two were first factors that were impacts in a i mentioned will have profound impacts for nato as well. The profound relationship is rooted in history as we know. Many of think of that as being born in the crucible of world war ii, but it real extends back a little over a century ago to the late 1800s, early 1900s when there was an increasingly common outlook towards the world, between london and washington, and that relationship is based not Simple Police on material factors like whether we can operate militarily together. You all know its based upon common language, common history and common values, right, but to the extent that it is based on material factors and in part it is, those things are likely going to diminish over time, and by time i mean the next five to ten years. I think that is going to be the case because washington will increasingly see less utility in the relationship, in the closeness of it. Of course, the uk is going to remain a close ally and cooperation until other mechanisms will go on. America is always interested in having allies along for rarious International Pursuits and operations, but the closeness of that, the special relationship which has already spoken of mostly in british accents is going to i think generally fade with time, and with there ill end. Thanks for listening. Thank you, john. So our next speaker is Erik Brattberg who directs the program at the carnegie endowment. Great. Thank you so much, dan and thank you, cornelia, an congrats on the book and thanks for having me here. I was sdod talk about the uk future relations with the eu, nato and the United States and try to do that in ten minutes. What i would like to do is highlight a couple of points and maybe moving this conversation a little bit beyond defense to talk about broader impact for security and Foreign Policy. I think to me a starting point is just to recognize, frankly, that brexit marks the biggest shift in uk Foreign Policy since at least the end of the cold war, and its going to have major implications for the eu, for nato, for the United States. I think you can say that traditionally british Foreign Policy has really been based on three sort of overlaying pillars. The first one is being a part of europe. Second one maintaining a close special relationship with the United States and also the third one being sort of an active player on the global state, supporting multilateralism, because of brexit and because of trump and the rising power of competition in the International System. All of those three pillars are now in flux. So what does this mean in terms of the relationship between the uk and the eu postbrexit . I just got back from a trip to brussels last week where i was part strategic discussioning discussions about the future of European Security, and it is noteworthy how little brexit actually came up in those discussions. I think thats quite telling, but i do think, you know, talking to europeans, especially french strategic experts, there is a notion that brexit actually represents an opportunity for European Security and defense policies, the sort of traditional opposition to defense and Security Integration with brexit allows the eu to move forward. I think theres some truth to that, but i also think that theres some reasons to be concerned. I think we have to recognize that the uk has actually traditionally played a very strong role in europe yap Foreign Policy when it comes to back in the 1990s addressing issues in the western balkans and pushing for enlargement in central and Eastern Europe and leading on the eu in terms of trade policy, russia sanctions and so on, so i think that thats an important starting point that the uk has not just blocked security and defense cooperation in europe. Its actually played a very important role. I do think its important to also recognize that europe itself, leaving aside brexit, is undergoing really an important major transformation where brexit is only a part of this process in a world that the u. S. Is no longer as predictable and a stable leader as it used to be, where International System is becoming less rulesbased and more competitive. So the eu itself is undergoing this process of realigning it self, and thats why you see so much discussion coming out of europe these days on strategic autonomy or the need for more european sovereignty. We can come back to that. I think much in terms of the future uk eu relationship postbrexit depends on the outcome of brexit itself which we dont yet know at this point. So far Foreign Policy as others highlighted have not really been part of the brexit conversation in the Withdrawal Agreement which theresa may negotiated with the eu. This was really about the exiting from the eu part which addressed other issues such as immigration, the uks future, financial contributions to the eu and and the back stop issue. For policy was addressed in the sort of part of the Withdrawal Agreement that talked about the future relationship, but not a whole lot of attention has actually been paid to this yet, so i think much of it will obviously depend on whether we will see a soft brexit or hard brexit or a nodeal outcome at all, but it also depends on where the uk itself wants to go. You know, you could foresee, and others have highlighted already, can you perceive situations where the uk will seek to maintain a very close relationship with the European Union after brexit and you can see a situation where they might pivot to the United States and try to find eke distance between the two. That still remains to be seen. When it comes to how the uk will address and respond to broader developments and central artery jim developments in europe, i think its fair to say that you have seen, again, this progress in europe on defense cooperation in the past couple of years. Some of these trends precede brexit, but they also come as a result of brexit. The European Defense fund, the initiatives coming out of brussels on strengthening European Defense cooperation in many ways will treat the uk postbrexit as a thirdparty country, and that will have important implications, in the only in the uks role potentially in being part of these initiatives, but how the uk may perceive them and respond to them. Will the uk be supportive, or will it actually try to sort of dilute some of these European Defense efforts and maybe even hedge against them . I think its too early to tell. What i do think you will see is also, you know, uk increasingly responding to deepening European Defense integration and sort of the deepening of the francogerman access in europe, maybe trying to offset that by investing in new relations to other countries around the continent, but it is fair to say that british influence in europe i think has already diminished, and it will need to be rebuilt, so the question is how the uk can go about doing that. I think here actually the uk can learn a little bit from the United States which is an outside power in europe that has long worked in europe to be to be influential. There will be a need for london to increase its diplomatic presence in london, in key capitals across the continent, investing in the relationship with berlin and paris and also a new type of relationships, the league of the netherlands and the nordic countries but also central and Eastern Europe. These are sort of Natural Partners in europe that the uk will have to increase its engagement with. I think ultimately the goal here should be for the uk to be a key partner, a special partner to the European Union, but that will require some changes. We will have to fire new arrangements, both with the Foreign Affairs council and the pse. There will be a need for new structures and institutions and arrangements to koorcoordinate security and defense policy but at the uk eu level, and then will be a need to have new relationships between the uk and individual Member States. Weve already seen this i think. In some ways even brexit hasnt happened, weve seen it already as a result of the brexit referendum, an increase in sort of e3 cooperation, germany, france and the United Kingdom on issues such as iran or the South China Sea or hong kong or whatever. I think this is very likely to continue, and even intensify as a result of presentationit, and we could also see i think other formats emerging such as the format where you would quake in the bright. You could also see the g7 perhaps which also includes italy becoming more significant as a venue for having security and Foreign Policy discussions that brings in the uk. Of course, president macron has floated this idea of a European Security council, sort of a deliberative body to discuss Foreign Policy issues, sort of like an eu security council, and its unclear what it means. Once we get a better sense of where brexit is heading, well very much where the discussions are going to go. The state of play right now is, of course, still quite uncertain because we dont know where brexit will actually end up. If anything, it seems that not only the europeans are a little bit hesitant to put the security and defense issues on the agenda, i think in many ways the uk itself, because of its negotiating tactics, it may be trying to use security and defense as some leverage right now to get the europeans to get to a deal. Ultimately, in my view, it is really essential that that the uk and the reu find this future arrangement because its its pivotal for not only the uk but its also pivotal for europe. I think in a world thats increasing multipolar, with the Transatlantic Relationship is in flux, where were rising countries for china and also for europes clout in the world, uk, europe, second biggest military power, major diplomatic force and major diplomatic act tor maintain that close relationship to the europeans. I have some other points, too, about the nato and the u. S. , but maybe well just shelf them for now. Ive already talked for eight minutes so we can come back to discuss a little bit mortgage impact for nato and then the specific impact for the United States. Thank you so much, Erik Brattberg, for your input. Now i would like to invite the ambassador of the republic of ireland to the United States to talk to tell us some yeah, to tell us something on the effects of brexit on the Northern Ireland Peace Process and the good friday agreement. Before doing think wanted to say briefly that before coming to washington Daniel Mulhall was ambassador to the germany and uk and also the book a new day dawning, a portrait of ireland and the coauthor of Northern Ireland, a centenary assessment. Thank you so much, ambassador mulhall, for sharing your assessment with us. Thank you very much, corneliaadria corneliaadriana baciu. I want to talk about this book, its a book that was credited by academics, Cornelia Baciu and john doyle. Both at a time of the books production, academics at dublin city university, and indeed i would like to commend the chapter on Northern Ireland and the brexit issue because it not not only does it cover that issue very, very well indeed, but its also a very good introduction, i think a short by very concise introduction to the nature of the issues that arise in Northern Ireland, the different traditions that have been in conflict for some time in Northern Ireland, and that conflict has to be any resurgence that much conflict needs to be avoid the at all costs. Just to say that ireland is a country. This book has a focus on defense and security. Ill be focusing on Northern Ireland and on the political challenges and the economic challenges facing Northern Ireland on brexit. From the point of view of defense Northern Ireland is not in nato. We have a policy of military neutrality. We have also been heavily involved in United Nations peacekeeping. We have an unbroken record now of 60 years involvement in u. N. Peacekeeping and very significant percentage of our armed forces are deployed on u. N. Missions in various parts of the world and also in recent years our naval vessels have been involved in the operation sophia in the mediterranean combined with other European Countries rescuing migrants. Our three latest naval vessels, they they take turns in being deployed in the mediterranean, and the three vessels are called after three irish writers. The wbh and the sam bekkers and the joyce. Only country in the world that names our vessels after the great irish writers. Why should americans be concerned about brexit . Well, for me there are two very good strong reasons. The first that the European Union is part of the fabric of Transatlantic Relations, and im talking about now not just security and defense relationship but the broader shared value system, the shared interests that combined that bind europeans and americans and have done so for the last 70 years, since the second world war, very successfully indeed, and anything that damages the European Union is a negative for the United States, and those here who might take pleasure in the decline or in the brexit as a hit to the European Union are really i think also taking pleasure in what would be a hit to the Transatlantic Relationship and also ultimately to the United States because the European Union has been part of the Transatlantic Relationship which has provided over an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity in western Europe Europe for the last 70 years. The second reason is economic in that the relationship the economic relationship between the eu and United States is by far the most important economic relationship in the world in terms of the volume of trade and investment that flows back and forth across the atlantic which is second to none. Now, of course, there are opener relationships in the world that are developing and emerging, but none of them for the foreseeable future will match the transatlantic economic relationship. Now, you get different views from different economists on the likely impact of brexit economically, but i the impact, the predicted impact ranges from moderately bad to mod to very bad to catastrophic, and i and i know of almost no serious economist who believe that brexit will produce an economic dividend either for the uk or for the European Union, so in that context, if the eu economy is damaged because of brexit, if the uk economy is damaged because of brexit then the overall effect will be felt in the United States because the economic relationship between europe and the United States will suffer accordingly. These are two very good reasons why why americans should be concerned and worried about the impact of brexit in political, strategic and economic terms. Now, from an irish point of view, we are deeply committed to eu membership, and we will remain part of the European Union come what may. Whatever happens to brexit in fact support for the European Union in ireland has risen significantly in ireland. It the has done also in other parts of europe, but its risen significantly in ireland since the brexit issue became such a preoccupation in britain and in ireland because of the impact on ireland, and the support for European Union membership in ireland now is in excess of 90 . I think the last poll i saw put it at 92 and practically nothing in the world in any democratic country enjoys a 92 support, so basically there is a there is a unanimity in ireland and all Political Parties share the view that irelands interests are best served by members of the European Union and the reason for that is quite straightforward. When we join the eu in 1973, we were by far the least developed economy in europe. We were well behind the other Member States and over the last 45 years weve caught up and now on a gdp per capita basis ireland is one of the top two or three countries in the European Union so its transformed our country economically but also socially in that weve become much more open, much more attuned really to european morays, and the best example of that i suppose is the demographic transformation of ireland over the last 20 years. The ireland i grew up in was practically homogenously irish. Maybe had 2 , 3 of the population at that the time who were born outside of ireland. They were mainly retired people who come back to ireland or would come to ireland in retirement. Today we have about 17 of our population were born outside of ireland which means we are among the we have among the largest percentages, highest percentages in europe of people in our country born outside of ireland, and if you go to any of the big corporations, the big u. S. Corporations in dublin, google, facebook, amazon and so forth, you will find that their workforces are multinational. Google told me recently that they have 66 language languages spoken by native speakers in their offices in dublin, so the other thing about brexit, the other thing about breks yipt is that its a tragedy for britishirish relations because when we join the European Union in 1973, we joined for because we saw it as an opportunity to advance our economic interests and to advance the interests of our country as a whole. We probably didnt anticipate that it would have a benign effect on britishirish relations but it has because for 45 years british and irish diplomats and officials from different ministries have been sitting around the same tables in brussels discussing eu issues. And guess what. The irish and the british found themselves very often on the same side, something they positively hadnt imagined that would happen, but it did happen. I can remember also back in the 1980 and 90s attending European Councils when our respective Prime Ministers would get together in the European Union buildings, at European Councils and would have private discussions to try to resolve some of the issues that were hindering progress at that time in Northern Ireland. So this benign effect allowed us in 1998 to find ourselves, to develop a shared analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland, and that led on to an agreement, the good friday agreement of 1998 that was agreed with considerable support from the United States, most notably the contribution of president clinton but also many members of congress and on both sides of the ail and, of course, the chairmanship of senator george mitchell. So ireland, therefore, was not happy to find brexit coming on to the agenda in britain, and i was there at the time. Initially it looked as if there might never be a referendum, and then the referendum was caused. Our hope was that the referendum would result in a remain majority. I pointed out, i was very active at the time in not campaigning in any way for for remain but pointing out that the challenges that ireland would face and we faced in Northern Ireland if britain were to decide to leave the European Union. Sadly the british electorate, that issue of Northern Ireland didnt really ever capture significant attention. It was an issue that really didnt didnt future on the first page of peoples concerns, join the debate about brexit. So we hope that britain would decide to remain in the European Union, but we accepted the result that the people of britain decided by 32 to 48 to leave the European Union, and from then on our aim was to to minimize the downsize of brexit for ireland and to maximize any upsides, and the upsides would include increased u. S. Investment in europe. We reckon that about 70 or so companies have moved to ireland because of brexit, and we expect that trend continue, so there will be had a benefit but the risk is, of course, that the economic downside of brexit will be greater than any upside that might arise in terms of increased u. S. Investment, increased Foreign Investment in ireland because we will now be the only englishspeaking country in the European Union after the unit kingdom leaves, and and so the the challenge for ireland with brekts brexit is twofold. Theres an economic challenge and a political challenge. The economic challenge is that while britain is no longer our number one trading partner, actually our number one trading partner is actually the United States and britain only accounts for about 12 of irish exports. United states for about 25 because of the huge number of the u. S. Multinational Companies Operating in ireland, but the problem is in some sectors of our economy, notably the food industry, agriculture, the filling, the percentage of exports going to britain is probably more like 40 or sometimes even more than, that so, for example, and this is one of the things which last week the because of the airbus dispute, terris were imposed by the United States on a range of european products, including from ireland, than will be a double hit for Dairy Farmers because brexit could upset exports of Dairy Products and the tariffs on the United States were deeply unwelcome in that context, and i pointed that out to the american administration, so thats the economic problem, and our governments yesterday announced our budget for 2020, and they provided for 1. 2 billion euros, is1. 5 billion t cope with the effects of brexit which will be quite severe if its a hard brexit or Nodeal Brexit and whats drawn the most concern is to do it with Northern Ireland. I mentioned how big a rheault United States played in bringing about peace in Northern Ireland, the good friday agreement. That 20 years ago now. Probably that agreement has saved thousands of lives because in the 20 years before 1998, probably 2,500 people lost their lives and many, many more were injured and maimed in incidents, violent incidents in Northern Ireland. In the last 25 careers weve had a few sad tragic events like the killing of a Young Journalist in april of this year at a demonstration in derry where shots were fired at the police and this Young Journalist was sadly killed, but by and large the peace has has been maintained. But, of course, politically theres great fragility because the government of Northern Ireland, which is part of the good friday agreement, which has to have unionists and nationalists involved in it hasnt functioned since 2017, so for two and a half years there hasnt been a government in Northern Ireland, and that means that the institutions of the good friday agreement cannot operate in the way they are meant to operate under the terms of that agreement. So a vacuum has been creed, and when you have a vacuum, of course, it does encourage other actors to insert themselves into that vacuum, and we have seen greater evidence in recent years and months of renewed activity by small but nonetheless quite dangerous paramilitary organizations. So we are very concerned that on top of that fragility and instability in Northern Ireland, the the brexit issue enters into the mix and churns things up further, and thats why we have been determined from the very ding that whatever happens with brexit we need to ensure that we protect the good friday agreement and the open border on Northern Ireland. Let me talk about the border for a minute. For the last 20 odd years there hasnt been a border on ireland. In pasttimes when the amount of trade between north and south was very limited. Today its very substantial indeed and then there was a security border during the conflict between 19770 and the early 1990s. Since that time, the border has been oh. Now the border in ireland is not a straight line. Its it goes for 300 miles, and there are 200 separate border crossings on the island of ireland, so it goes through homes. It goes through farm yards, it goes through villages, it goes through open fields. It has no geographical basis. And the problem is that if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, with no arrangement for future relations which would be the impact of a Nodeal Brexit, it would mean that there would be two customs and two regulatory zones on the island. Ireland, and that would mean that somehow the Irish Government would have to find ways of protecting the integrity of the european Single Markets to which were deeply committed because we benefit hugely from the Single Markets. So the aim over the last two years of negotiation has been to find a way in which britain can leave in an orderly manner but with guarantees that there can never be a border on the island of ireland. That was as back stop agreement negotiated last year between the eu and uk but rejected by the Westminster Parliament the back stop is essentially an insurance policy that whatever happens, if all else fails, there will be no border, hard border on the island of ireland because britain as a whole, the uk as a whole would remain the customs unit. This is controversial in british politics, and its proven to be difficult to get agreement. Now, the present situation, and for us the best solution would be for the uk to leave the eu with a deal, with an agreement that would include the backstop that was included in the Withdrawal Agreement agreed last year or some agreed alternative that would achieve the same outcome as the back stop. In other words, guarantee an open border, protect the good friday agreement and respect the integrity of the european Single Market. The British Government has recently made some appropriate sols. These proposals have been found wanting and the negotiations continue, and our government has said and the european governments have said they all want to see britain leave in an orderly fashion. Nobody wants to see a Crashout Brexit because this kind of thing has never happened before. No country in my view, in my experience, in my knowledge has ever left a Free Trade Agreement of the kind that exists within the European Union without any provision to govern trade between that country and the other members of that free trade area, but that is what a hard brexit that is what a Nodeal Brexit would entail. For example, the United States has sought to replace the nafta agreement with usmca, but until the usmca comes into effect there will be an agreement to govern trade between the nafta countries called nafta. It will be turbulent. It will create enormous difficulty for u. S. Exporters if suddenly you went from having nafta to having nothing but risk is that britain will go from having eu membership to having nothing. Now our Prime Minister will meet the british Prime Minister tomorrow in england. Hes going across to the north of england to meet him, and we are committed to trying to find a solution, but sadly theres a lot of toxic politics that surrounds the brexit issue at the moment, and while a Nodeal Brexit ought to be a zero percent possibility, sad lit percent and risk of a Nodeal Brexit is far greater than that which is why were so preoccupied with this issue and why we earnestly hope that an agreement can somehow be found tone able the uk to leave the European Union, but in an orderly fashion which minimizes damage to the irish economy, to Northern Ireland, to the Peace Process and to the European Union. Thank you very much. [ applause ] thank you, ambassador. Thank you, mr. Ambassador. Okay. Now we can hear. Okay. Thank you, mr. Ambassador. So let me were going to come now into some of the discussion. Let me though just circle back actually to our topic which we said was about European Security and Transatlantic Relations and just as another american voice briefly complements what john had said. He focused really on the uk and the bilateral issue so just to provoke everyone and to put out a couple of last points here, you know, my my brief point would be the shortterm impact is going to be strengthen nato because the uk will want to show its not leaving nato, that its leaving the eu, that its still part of the group, and most everyone else will want to reinforce that view, but over the medium term, as john said, its likely to weaken nato. Its also likely to increase the importance for the United States of noneu europe. Think about the three points of policy uncertainty for the United States and europe, the uk, turkey and ukraine. None of them are in the eu, and all of them are right now embroiling our own politics, and thats going to continue. The second is that this is going to put further pressure on the debate about the defense expenditures because once the uk leaves the eu, 80 of nato defense expend tours, the defense. Europe, is going to be provided by noneu countries, noncontinental countries. Noncontinental European Countries and that will only further inflame the current debates that were having right now. If you think about what weve done in nato recently is to provide a forward presence in the baltics and in poland. Three of the four battalions that lead those three of the four countries leading those battalions are noncontinental states. Canada, the u. S. And the uk, and theres just going to be greater debate about where is Continental Europe in its own defense as we go forward as the uk steps back from this. Im thinking from an american perspective. I think its also going to further challenge the ability to forge cohesive, european, foreign defense policies on common challenges which will mean for the americans, for the United States it will further challenge europes ability to be the kind of partner americans will look to to face common challenges beyond europe, not just in europe, and it means that europeans are going to be further focused inward on more process, on more governmental arrangements on how to deal with all of this which means less time and space in the policy realm for issues that are important to the United States. Its a message that one thought was one of the most stable democracies in the world sudden suddenly reveals itself to be terribly polarized and fragile. Im not sure whether thats a message that will be contained to the uk. So my conclusion is were facing a more fluid and lesssettled europe. We are facing one that is lesco heesive, more openended, less capable to what the George Bush Administration called desegregation, playing europeans off against each other because it is so easy to do and a europe thats less miracle, but more german. And that this disruption will not end with whatever the solution is to the uk, eu issue. It will continue beyond that because there are so many followon issues that will flow from whatever whether theres Nodeal Brexit and we havent begun to formulate that much less have answers to it. So i hope i provoked someone here with a discussion. We have another microphone that works either to the ambassador since hes here or other comments you would like to make. If you could identify yourself briefly so others know where youre coming from. Who would like to go . Okay. Jeff . Jeff stacy. When i was at the state department i did eunato issues and then worked with dan and eric a few years ago now, but id like to ask the panelists about a couple of things that didnt quite fully come up, but i wanted to particularly thank the ambassador for emphasizing the tragedy of this which, for an american who used to help Prime Minister and helped him write his memoirs and did the three chapters on negotiating the entrance to europe way back in the late 60s and early 70s. Question number one is why, when intelligence officials seem to believe that the russian role in the brexit role was more decisive than it was here have the brit his such a hard time, even harder than we have dealing with this issue and were they to do so how would they be impacting the Brexit Debate and second, why are we assuming that brexit is necessarily a done deal when theres enormous difficulty happening in london as we speak, multiple things are coming to an end. Boris johnson hasnt won a single vote across Party Majority and dealt theresa may three failing historic votes on the brexit bill and then finally, if it does happen, dan, could you say a little more, perhaps about is there potential for the uk and nato to develop a particular command or leadership of commands or a special will it almost be forced to maintain to the best of its ability some specific kind of capability that others dont have that it could be a leader on . Okay. Since we have limited time what id like to do with the variance of our panelists is lets collect some questions so we can get everyone more involved. Right down here in front. Hi. Im Brittany Gibson and im a journalist. Im sorry. Speak as close as you can to the mike. Is this better . My question is for the whole panel, but i think the ambassador might be best suited to answer. In terms of the irish backstop and the border it could create or the border it would not create on the island of ireland those against the backstop suggested there would be a board created with the United Kingdom. A bit of a twopart question. Just what are the concerns, if any, of that other border that could be created not on the island, of course, but within the uk, and also the difference between these two borders it seems is the pressure of violence that could come from them, specifically from the ira is what im thinking of, which is only associated with the border in ireland, if im correct . On the island of ireland. So what is the Irish Government doing to prepare to combat that kind of domestic terrorism . Okay. Over here. Thank you. Andrew hyde, formerly of the state department. I wanted to ask you, youve given us the presentations have given us institutional things to think about. I wonder if i talk about specific Foreign Policy challenges and the eu and how that will be affected by brexit and libya confronting the russians and other elements in the middle east and just take your pick. I just think in all of those areas brexit will have a real impact and i would be interested if you can share thoughts on one or two of those issues. Thank you. Thank you. Here, please. Speak right into the microphone please. Im a student in school. I wanted to ask about the constitutional crisis emerged, while other european country, therefore raised fuller, broader domestic conflict throughout the european continents. Will the crisis spread . So any other . Otherwi otherwise well close. Mr. Ambassador, well go to you. I dont think everyone should feel compelled to every single question and well end up answering by the time were done. Look, i suppose mainly the question about the irish backstop and its implications and also the question about, you know, is brexit a done deal and thats a matter really far from the uk. We want to see the best, possible outcome for breksity and for us, if the uk were to decide to remain in the eu, but thats a matter for them, we would be very happy, im sure and all of the European Countries would rejoice if that were to happen and thats not really in our hands. As to the issue of possible russian involvement. I dont believe thats ever really been properly explored and i mean, and im not sure if at this stage that would make as much scope in that because were now getting to the end game, and i think we dont know where the endgame will end up, but i dont think that going back and rewriting the 16 referendum is likely to commend itself to too many people at this point. Its a serious question about the backstop. I mean, there is no first of all, whatever happens with brexit, Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom. Thats absolutely clear, and nobody wants to pose a question about Northern Irelands status within the uk. That is covered by the good friday agreement which provides for the possibility or the option of having a referendum at some time in the future when certain conditions are met with irish unity, but until then we fully accept its part of our its firmly part of the good friday agreement that Northern Ireland remains part of the uk until the people of Northern Ireland decide otherwise in a referendum. Were not pressing for a referendum at this stage. We think it would be and it would complicate an already complicated and fraught situation, but the future, we have to see when that issue will become a prospect or reality, but that is a matter for a decision beyond the horizon of brexit. I mean, as far as nobody will be justified in resorting to violence regardless of what happens with brexit. So the Irish Government is completely clear on that, and i mean, the organizations that might threaten some kind of violence are very small splinter groups of the irish republican movement, and they have little or no support anywhere in ireland, but that doesnt stop them from being dangerous. The risk is that if you have any kind of border infrastructure on the end of ireland that elements like that will take the opportunity of attacking and of targeting those facilities and that could then create an escalation that could be problematic in a place like Northern Ireland where passions still run quite high on these issues and theres no sense of where we want to see a border on the irish sea. What is required is some way of ensuring that the open border on the end of ireland doesnt undermine the Single Market because we are committed to respecting the integrity and to preserving the integrity of the Single Market. Okay. So were closing here with time. So what i would suggest to our panelists, one issue, one minute. All right. Ill respond to the question whether nato and the uk might develop some sort of special arrangement, and i think i gathered your question, would try to maintain its role and its importance within the alliance . I dont think thats likely to happen. I dont think the alliance would pursue Something Like that. The uk, of course, would hang on to as desperately as it can, all of the fore structure and infrastructure, et cetera that it has within its borders for nato. So i wouldnt expect that to change, but as we discussed and i think as dan mentioned, the outlook for the uks role in nato as sort of this second fiddle is bleak, and i dont think theres much, frankly, the alliance can do about that. Thank you. I would concur, and i may disagree with you, dan, on nato, on the american view on how nato is forced by the uk for leaving the eu. I subscribe to what he said about the diminished abilities andity in owe has other things with whats happening in syria today. Its catastrophic and we also have an american president who is causing problems for the alliance and i dont think the alliance is in good shape and i dont think the exit from the eu will make it stronger in any way. On the one point they wanted to maybe tackle is from the from you, sir that the eus Foreign Policy priorities and how that may change with brexit and i dont see much of a change there, to be honest. One reason being that the eus main tools are either tools to which the uk did not contribute much or it could still contribute the third country partner in the future whether it is Civil Military operations can totally include some third parties, Development Aid can be if not done together, at least coordinated in a way. Hopefully, that both parties can agree similarly with economic sanctions and there will be a continued coordination, i guess, on russia sanctions. There is a risk, obviously, of a longer term drift, but in the next, say, five years, i dont see the eu Foreign Policy changing radically as a result of brexit or the ability being so diminished as a result of brexit, and i will stop here. Oh, there is also increased eu nato corporation for which everyone should rejoice instead of constantly saying its one against the other. I completely agree with alice on the impact of Foreign Policy at least in the short term. I think its more of a dilemma for the eu itself than it is for the eu. The uk is in a difficult position visavis the United States has been previously discussed especially on an issue like china for instance, where you have one of the notions of brexit that wants to pursue Global Britain with other countries around the world such as china and now the Trump Administration pushing britain and nonEuropean Countries to take a tougher approach towards china. That is posing a dilemma for london. Its posing a dilemma for europe, as well and europe as a collective block is better able to handle that and thats what illustrates the sort of irony of brexit here and it makings tes less sovereign under a mediumsized poverty and very quickly on the question that will there be contagion and brexit and very clearly for any foreseeable future the answer is no. If anything, the tumultuous brexit negotiations and the uk has simply led to the notion of exiting the eu and becoming unthinkable and thats why youre seeing countries and the population and the opinion polls in countries becoming more favorable towards the eu and even the far right movements with lepen and others leaving the eurozone and that i think is something thats far more easier to handle than would there be more brexits. Thank you, and i would try to be very short, and i think it was there was a question related to the yeah . I think there was a question related to russian influence. So from my perspective with my background in Political Science and as a Political Science researcher, i think this is very interesting because it emphasizes the importance, the increasing importance or the increasing unpredictability of developments, and as we know, brexit and the other event was that the election of donald trump in the u. S. Have been two examples of events which were failed to be prevented by opinion polls, and i think this raises a question and it also makes it interesting for research in the future to find new ways to try to estimate citizens attitudes and peoples opinions which are important for political outcomes, and the second point i would like to make is in relation to a future relations, and so according to the Alliance Theory, the Alliance Theory predicts when there are two actors that have common metrics or similar metrics of security threats and the similar and theyre exposed to a similar constellation of threats and plus the weak commitment of a common ally, the Alliance Theory predicts a Strategic Alignment between these two actors. Now if we were to apply this to our case. In this case we have the uk and europe exposed to a similar constellation of threats, we have seen the u. S. Recently withdrawing from several agreements. So we could expect both the uk and europe for a Strategic Alignment even after brexit, but we need to emphasize that at the time of this talking our discussions are counter factually because we do not yet know that there is a uk withdrawal from the eu with an agreement and whether there will be a postponement of brexit and whether there will be no deal. So, yeah, everything should be yeah, as a counter factual analysis. Thank you. Thank you. So this one point, from the u. S. Point of view, if you think of the eu Member States there are only two countries that have had this broader, strategic horizon and thats the uk and france, and i think to answer andrews question, and i think, jeff, without the uk voice within the eu, france will find it very lonely and that strategic horzness on will narrow. France is left to fight that, but i think it will fight it hard and from a u. S. Point of view thats want going to be good. So on that happy note cornellio, thank you so much for bringing us all together. I wish you success with your book. Everyone go buy it, please. We hope its good reading for you. Mr. Ambassador, thank you again for joining us and our panelists, please join me in thanking them. [ applause ] we have a reception next door if any of you would like to continue the conversation with our panelists or each other, come and join us. Thank you again for coming. Appreciate it. Thank you. This columbus day weekend on American History tv, saturday at 10 00 pchl m. Eastern on real america, the film the whole world is watching about the 1971 antivietnam war demonstrations in washington which resulted in the largest mass arrest in u. S. History. A thousand swarmed on to washington circle. Over a thousand more hit georgetown. Sunday, at 2 00 p. M. Eastern artist harvey pratt shares his vision for the upcoming native americans memorial on the national mall. In the middle is a 12foot stainless steel circle and at the base of that is a fire. So you can use that fire to light your sweet grass and sage you can use and touch the water and use the fire, and we call that the drum. And monday, columbus day, at noon. Supreme Court Justices youth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor discuss the judicial impact of the first woman on the u. S. Supreme court, sandra day oconnor. Sandra, if you read between the lines, what shes saying is if you want to improve the status of women in the nursing profession the best way to do it is to get men to want to do the job because the pay inevitably will go up. [ laughter ] explore our nations past on American History tv every weekend on cspan3. A new cspanipsos poll shows over half of americans are confident that the 2020 residential election will be open and fair. Theres a significant partisan gap of the question 72 of the democrats are confident in the system and 58 of americans think that foreign governments are among the threats to the system while only 41 of republicans share in that concern, more than threequartz of democrats and over half of independents believe that foreign governments may interfere with u. S. Elections. 31 of people believe the federal government has done enough to protect elections from foreign interference. 54 of republicans report having a fair deal or a fair amount of confidence in federal efforts and only 16 of democrats and just over a quarter of independents agree. You can find all of the results including whether americans believe president ial candidates should be required to release their tax returns and whether citizens should be required to show a government id to vote at cspan. Org. Next, a discussion on the efficacy of various Health Care Proposals including medicare for all and the Affordable Care act. Panelists at the American Enterprise institute include healthcare policy experts and journalists. This is 1 15. Thank you, everyone, for coming. Im tim carney. Im a visiting fellow here at the american enter Price Institute as being the commentary editor at the washington examiner. We are here talking about health care and we want to ask a specific question about health care and its a question of the Free Enterprise side and the free market consentive or libertarian side dont always ask in latin or who benefits . I think sometimes people on the right or right of enter are uncomfortable with that question because they say