Transcripts For CSPAN3 American Democracy Post-World War II Japan 20240714

Captioning performed by vitac as a service to the washington community. Details on how to donate and details on future programming are on the back of the flier that was available outside. Let me also thank a couple of individuals who behind the scenes kind of put this event together, jeff reeger, assistant director of the National History center. Over there. Pete all the way in the back on my team and our two interns, kyle nichols and su yan kim who you will be meeting during the q a, they will be running the mics for which we ask you to please wait and then once you are called on, please at the same time state your name and affiliation. Let me welcome Professor William roger lewis from texas who is joining us here today and remind all of you finally to turn off your mobile devices or silence them so you dont interrupt the intense discussion that we will be asking here this afternoon. With that i will turn it over to eric to introduce our featured speaker today. Thank you, christian. Welcome, everyone, on this fine afternoon. It is my distinct pleasure to introduce our speaker this afternoon, jennifer m. Miller. She is an assistant professor of history at dartmouth college. She received her ma and ph. D. From the university of wisconsin madison and her ba from wesleyan university. She is a scholar of u. S. East asian relations and is the author of lets not be laughed at anymore donald trump and japan from the 1980s do the present which appeared in the journal of american east asian relations in 2018 and fractured alliance antibased protests and postwar japanese relations in diplomatic history in 2014. This afternoon she will be presenting on her new book cold war democracy, the United States and japan, which has just been published by Harvard University press. So with that, jennifer miller. [ applause ] thank you so much. Im really thrilled to be here. Can everyone hear me okay . Yeah . Okay. I will get started. Let me move this over just a little bit. Historians and commentators have long debated the place of democracy in American Foreign policy. Are u. S. Actions across the globe motivated by democratic ideals, intentions or goals . Or are american claims about the importance of democracy simply an empty rhetorical facade, amassed to disguise the United States true motivations of access to markets and resources or imperial domination. Within this discussion or debate one of the most cited if not the most frequently cited case studies is the relationship between the United States and japan. In the aftermath of world war ii the United States occupied and radically transformed japan under the stated goal of democratization. The occupation authorities wrote a new constitution, they held elections, they reformed the japanese education system, they empowered labor unions, among a bevy of other reforms. So politicians and policymakers have cited japan as a prominent example of the United States democratic intentions an capabilities, of its commitment to spreading democracy. Perhaps most famously in the run up to the invasion of iraq president george w. Bush repeatedly pointed to japan as an example of the United States ability to transform and democratize foreign states and peoples. Yet others have pushed back forcefully on this claim. Scholars have highlighted the vitality of the japanese people rather than american policymakers in shaping postwar japanese democracy. Theyve pointed to the later years of the u. S. Occupation when u. S. Policy became obsessed with anticommunism due in part of the development of the cold war. In parallel with developments in the United States, the occupation began to prevent labor strikes, purge labor activists and alleged communists, it censored communist newspapers and crafted antisubversive laws, it cooperated with former members of the wartime japanese government and rebuilt Japanese Military power with the goal of creating a Firm Security alliance with the United States and japan. So this leaves us with the question how should we understand the place of democracy in this story . Now, in my talk today i want to take a slightly different approach to this debate. I want to argue that the United States or that american policymakers did care about democracy in postwar japan, even after the start of the cold war, but not necessarily in the way that many people think. Indeed i think that both sides of this discussion often miss a critical point, that the meaning of democracy has changed over time and that in this moment it was in the process of being redefined by the earthshattering events of the 1930s and the 1940s, namely global depression, world war ii and the rise of the cold war. In my book entitled cold war democracy the United States and japan which i dont of to hold up because its already been displayed, i argue that world war 2 and especially the early cold war sparked the emergence of a specific definition of democracy, the belief that democracy was a mental and psychological system. Politicians, scholars, policymakers, military leaders routinely claim that democracy was not just based on Political Rights, specific political practices or representative institutions. After all, pre war germany and japan had elections, they had parliaments and that did not prevent the rise of naziism or militarism. So after world war ii to take root and endure, many believed that democracy required what one politician called, quote, a state of mind. Or what they often called a democratic spirit. It required rationality, selfconfidence, public resolve. A real democracy these advocates claimed was one in which the people were spiritually, mentally and psychologically strong, even if this strength came at the expense of other rights and freedoms. Now, as i argue in my book, this conception of democracy was crucial to the u. S. Occupation of japan and the alliance that followed. It shaped american policy and it also shaped japanese reactions to that policy, especially protests. Now, in particular, and this is what im going to talk about today, it was a vital context to one of the most controversial american decisions during the occupation, the decision to end japans demilitarization and begin rebuilding Japanese Military capabilities. So my talk today is going to have two parts, first i want to explain the origins and some of the key features of this understanding of democracy, and second i want to show how this idea about democracy shaped japanese rearmerment in my view i hope this story allows us to have a more accurate and deeper understanding of the impact and consequences of democratic ideologies in shaping u. S. Engagement with the wider world, at least in the aftermath of world war ii. So let me begin with the first part, by talking about the occupation of japan and american thinking about democracy in the aftermath of the war. Now, when world war ii formally ended in september of 1945 and the United States embarked on the occupation of japan, american leaders had assigned themselves a lofty goal, to fundamentally transform and democratize japan. And they believed that if japan was democratic it would no longer seek to wage aggressive war. It would be more engaged with the International System, the domestic system would be based on power sharing and that states like that then wouldnt seek to tear the International System down through war. From the beginning, however, the occupation authorities believed that democratizing japan was not simply about building new structures or political practices, though these were, of course, vital. It was also about building new mentalities, a new consciousness. For example, as secretary of state james burns declared upon japans official surrender, quote, we come to the second phase of our war against japan. What might be called the spiritual disarmament of the people of that nation, to make them want peace instead of wanting war. At its heart the goal of the occupation was to change the wants and desires of the japanese people. Now, where did this belief come from . For Many Americans working in japan and here im talking about diplomats, im talking about scholars who are quite involved in the wartime planning process, the occupation authorities, most came from the military, for Many Americans working in japan this belief emerged in part from their understanding of japans militarism and the reasons that japan had pursued war in the first place. Now, during the war american policymakers who had been tasked with planning for the postwar occupation spent countless meetings discussing the nature of japans pre war political system and the reasons i cant pan had pursued war. Many of them argued that japanese militarism had drawn its unique power from the mental weaknesses of the people. Now, this was in part a very racialized way of thinking, they claim that there was something unique about the japanese psychology, that the japanese were overly emotional and irrational. The most famous example of this attributes japanese militarism to overly aggressive toilet training, thats the most infamous example. But they argued that japanese leaders had then preyed on this infantile japanese psychology, that they had deceived the japanese people with false promises of glory to control the japanese mind. Now, according to this line of thinking, it followed that only a rigorous education in democracy could destroy the roots of japanese aggression. So through practices Like National and local voting, the censorship and purging of mill tarrist ideas and people, the con furl of rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech and especially freedom of thought, the occupation would liberate the japanese mind, and its goal was to foster rational selfaware democratic subjects capable of internalizing and acting upon key rights and distinguishing between democratic and antidemocratic ideas and practices. Now, during the occupation these policies initially focused on combating japanese militarism which americans believe was responsible for the war. However, by the late 1940s american policymakers both in the United States working in places like the state department and in the occupation authorities in japan increasingly feared that displacing militarism was not enough to secure a healthy and rational democratic regime. They became more and more anxious that communism was becoming a global threat to the democratic mind. That like the wartime mill tarrist regime, communists would poison the public mind through propaganda and false promises. The american about japan and elsewhere was not simply due to the military might of the soviet union or geo strategic, american also stemmed from the belief that communism was a psychological threat to the rational and healthy mentalities that were allegedly necessary for democracy. And that communism could come to power if the people were weak and feebleminded. A bevy of speeches and government memos proclaimed that a commitment to communism was not simply a political or economic act, it wasnt simply a political choice, it was an act of psychological perversion. Perhaps most famous was the 1950 National Security Council Document known as nsc 68 which declared that communism necessitated, and this is a quote, an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. Communism, therefore, required a complete a shul of the individualism necessary to democracy. And this was a submission, an a shul, that would come out of mental weakness, mental vulnerability to this socalled perverted faith. Moreover this anxiety was so strong because many people feared that communism was perfectly positioned to destroy democracy from within. Communists many believed operated through the spreading of lies, misinformation, propaganda, fake news, as we call it today, to dominate and control the mind of the people, leading them to choose their own enslavement through psychological domination. Democratic societies were especially vulnerable to communist subversion, this line of thinking went, precisely because these dangerous ideas kwob expressed and disseminated through free speech, a free press or free elections. So this is an example after the start of the korean war when the Japanese Communist Party newspaper published a photograph sort of celebrating north korea, it was shut down by the occupation authorities and the japanese police. For democracy to survive, then, the presence of elections or constitutions was not enough. For democratic rights and practices to endure, democracy required a psychologically strong citizenry that was capable of being vigilant about protecting Democratic Values and distinguishing between healthy and harmful ideologies. Now, this conceptful zags of democracy they had to unexpected outcomes. In the United States and japan proponents of the world view often claimed that the only way to achieve this mental strength was through rigid and harsh often antidemocratic practices such as loyalty oaths, censorship, political purges, antisubversive laws. This dialectic process whereby an obsession with democratic qualities, an obsession with an illdefined democratic mind and spirit fueled an almost antidemocratic democracy. That process stands at the heart of what my book called cold war democracy. Now, such ideas were widespread among american elites and in the late 1940s and early 1950s they had also become prominent amongst the occupation authorities in japan. To give one example, in may of 1950 general Douglas Macarthur, there he is with his massive pipe, who was the head of the occupation authorities gave a speech to mark the threeyear anniversary of japans postwar constitution, this was a constitution that had been written by the occupation authorities as a cornerstone of japans da mock ra at this zags but first karter used the occasion to warn that japan faced a threat, one akin to the wartime regime. He drew a clear continuity between the war tar thyme of militarism and communism. When he declared that japan was again under siege by, quote, a small minority which through the pervasive use of liberty and privilege seeks to encompass freed freedoms destruction. Mccarr thur cautioned that the triumph of communism was imminent if the majority remained passive and complacent. Communists were waging an unrelenting attack on individual freedom, aggressively using misinformation and confusion to control the peoples psyche. Any thought, he warned, that japanese communism would lead to anything other than oppression was, quote, thoroughly disabused by the communist embarkation on the spread of false, malicious and inflammatory propaganda inteded to mislead and coerce the public mind, end quote. So this was the essence of cold war democracy, the belief that Democratic Politics was dependent on psychological strength, an idea that was often expressed in terms of saying that you needed confidence, morale, popular resolve, spirit is another word they used quite a bit, the democratic spirit. Equally important was the belief that democracy required constant vigilance against a nefarious enemy and might even require the limiting of Political Rights or Free Expression or dependence on undemocratic or even antidemocratic People Practices and institutions. Now, all of this may sound a bit abstract so now i want to move on to part 2 of this talk and give an example of how this conceptualization of democracy actually shaped u. S. Policy in japan. And the example i want to talk about was one of the most controversial moments of the u. S. Occupation, namely the United States decision to rearm japan. Now, in june of 1950 the korean war began when north korea invaded south korea. This was very shocking and very scary to many, including u. S. Policymakers who feared that northeast asia was under imminent threat of communist domination, that japan would be left alone in northeast asia. With u. S. Soldiers leaving occupied japan to fight in korea the u. S. Occupation authorities ordered the japanese government to create a defensive force called the National Police reserve to ensure japanese security. The npr would go through several different iterations but it was the foundation of japans current military. Throughout the war american policymakers had repeatedly and openly blamed japans military leaders and japanese militarism more broadly for causing world war ii in the pacific. Some of the most Important Documents that laid out the goals of the occupation declared that the mill tarrists had deceived and misled the japanese people. During the first two years of the occupation the occupation authorities completely demobilized and dismantled japans imperial military. They ordered the japanese government because the occupation the japanese government existed and the occupation authorities governed through the japanese government, they ordered the japanese government to undertake large scale purges to remove mill tarrists and military leaders from public life. National symbols were censored and banned. A tribunal tried military leaders, the new constitution drafted by the occupation authorities formally banned offensive military power. Article 9 declared that air, land and sea forces will never be maintained. Essentially the entire occupation was premised on the idea that building a democratic japan required the total i wish ul of military power. Many japanese declared japan would be a new model of peaceful democracy and pacifism. So for this reason the decision to create the npr seemed like a radical break. To many people at the time especially but not exclusively members of the japanese left this decision was a huge dee trail. It represented the United States dropping its earlier commitment to a democratic japan and these actors criticized the United States as minded by its fear of communism. That in their hysteria american policymakers sought to empower the mill tarrist forces that had led japan into a disastrous war. The npr was a major change of policy, unthinkable in 1945, but what i want to argue today is that this decision was not simply a departure from earlier thinking about democracy. Rather, it was a product of the way that Many American policy makers and the occupation authorities had understood democracy as the product of mental strength, vigilance, spirit as much as institutions practices and rights. Indeed the occupation authorities did not simply hope the npr would enhance japans defensive capabilities, though that of course was key to its creation, they also hoped that the npr could produce the responsible, mentally strong citizens and leaders necessary to building an idealogically and psychologically secure democracy. They declared that military training combined with sort of a broader Public Awareness of japans ability to defend itself would foster the confidence, the resilience, the morale necessary to resisting communism and its constant assault on the minds and souls of the people. This mental strength, they believed, would be the core of this nebulous democratic spirit that was so necessary to make sure democracy could endure. Now, this belief that military power, military capabilities could help foster the right psychology was evident even in the earliest months of the npr. Now, the nprs origins lay in a letter that general Douglas Macarthur sent to the japanese Prime Minister on july 8th, 1950 so only a few weeks after the start of the korean war. This letter ordered him to create a new internal Security Force in japan that would be called the National Police reserve. Macarthur declared this new force would not only defend japan from foreign threats but it would also, quote, safeguard the Public Welfare by, quote, preventing subversion by lawless minorities which was a clear reference to communist subversion. Equally important, though, macarthur and others claimed that the npr could also guard against democracys psychological vulnerabilities to communist ideas and forces. As the state department asserted in september of 1950 so only a few months after the this npr had been created the shock of the korean war had, quote, raised questions about the psychological attitudes of the japanese people. Unless the japanese people have some sense of continued security the state department warned it will be natural to expect a growth of a sense of futility of resistance to communism. So the npr was meant to provide this sense of security, to make the japanese people feel secure. Now, such ideas also shaped u. S. And japanese efforts to recruit both soldiers and officers for the npr. For example, npr recruitment posters and advertisements presented the npr as the opportunity to become a responsible citizen, to fulfill democratic duties, posters showed npr members with images that were designed to have sort of a democratic spray lens, such as a dove which was the npr inn sig knee a or standing in front of the diet building. U. S. Officers who participated in npr training and i apologize for this picture, its very hard to find pictures of u. S. Military trainers and the npr unless you go to the National Archives and i didnt have the opportunity to do so, so this is a picture actually from an article about the npr that was in the saturday evening post in 1952. So the u. S. Officers who participated in npr training emphasized that the npr would simultaneously secure japanese democracy while enhancing japans physical and psychological strength against communism. For example, a senior u. S. Military adviser declared in a september 1950 speech to npr recruits that the npr would ensure that the rights guaranteed to each and every japanese citizen under japans new constitution remain in violet and that the npr would renew the confidence in your nations security and ability to defend itself against internal sabotage, revolution and lawless depp ri dags. Both American Military trainers and the nprs japanese staff soon came to fear that the npr might not be able to fulfill this lofty role. In particular they worried constantly about what they called the quality of npr personnel. The nprs first commander lamented the nprs lack of military spirit. A former Imperial Army general who was still friends with Prime Minister yoshida described the early npr as an undisciplined mob. Oral histories from Early Service members in the npr recall that japanese gangsters had joined the npr, and americans and japanese believed that such inferior personnel which was the language they used was a problem not only because these personnel might not have tactical skills, the skills necessary to safeguard japan, socalled inferior personnel would leave the npr and japan more broadly open to communist infiltrati infiltration. One american adviser bemoaned that the low recruitment standards meant, quote, we will only get the jobless and probably uneducated type of no professional standards who are wide open to subversive influences. It was essential another adviser claimed that commanders and staffs from the lowest to the highest have the moral and patriotic stamina to resist communism and become a real force for law and order. Now, these fears led both american and japanese to seek new solutions, particularly by seeking to improve the nprs leadership, what would be known as officers. The npr had police titles so these would be like constables and things like that, but they were essentially officers. Good officers, they believed, could impose the discipline and stamina and morale necessary to building a Strong Military force that could resist communism, could make the japanese feel secure. Anybody above the rank of captain, anyone who had graduated from japans military academies were banned from participating in public life and this meant they couldnt join the npr which severely limited the pool of potential officers. Therefore, in 1951 the u. S. Occupation authorities raised the prospect of changing the purge terms, what they called dee purging, to free these experienced military personnel as a solution to these fears about the nprs tactical and psychological witnesses. The american supervisors of the npr now ironically began to claim that only former soldiers who had the discipline and commitment of the wartime jab niece military so supply the experience, leadership and psychological and spiritual strength necessary to the npr. The main American Military adviser was a main named franco wall ski and he recalled that purged officers, quote, possessed much they could give to the new force, military competence, strength of america, devotion to country. Its not just their military skills that he is seeking and admiring. More than any soldier the japanese Imperial Army soldier had military spirit, spirit, heart, guts, whatever one calls it is the essence of a fighting force. Now, this was a dramatic reversal. Only five years before these officers were described by americans as the psychological cause of japanese militarism and the main enemy of democracy and now they were seen as a potential source of the spirit and devotion and resolve, so necessary to not just resisting communism but also sustaining democracy. By 1951 these beliefs were even shared by general Matthew Ridgeway who had replaced Douglas Macarthur as head of the occupation authorities after he was hired by harry truman, and they led him to make a shift in occupation policy. Specifically, ridgeway intervened over the objections of some of the in the state department to change the terms of the purge so that Imperial Army veterans could join the npr as officers. Writing in june of 1951 ridgeway argued that men who had graduated from japans military academies after 1937 and 1937 is the date when japan invaded all of china, so its when the japanese war spread dramatically into all of china that these men should be allowed to join the npr. And ridgeways reasoning was especially interesting. He claimed that these experienced officers should be eligible because they had only provided, quote, the service which a man owns owes his country in a time of war. They were, he claimed, quote, motivated by normal patriotism. Now, such claims amounted to a major rewriting of japans recent history. Rather than blaming the military and militarism as the cause of world war ii, ridgeway recast the nature of wartime military service. It was not, he said, the product of total tear yachl mobilization, it was not the product of a state that dom nalted and manipulated the mind of the people, instead these mens actions had stemmed from civic responsibility, from patriotism and national devotion, from a healthy and normal psychology. I find his use of the world normal especially interesting here. The exact qualities that were desired in the npr. Ridgeway thus changed the purge terms, this opened access to a larger pool of manpower. And several groups of these depurged officers would enter the npr in 1951 and 1952. So with ridgeways decision we can see how this emphasis on the npr is the source not only of new capabilities, but also of sort of psychological and spiritual mobilization led to unexpected and surprising outcomes. It fostered a growing convergence between u. S. Military officials and former members of the Japanese Military and many of whom behind the scenes were sending all sorts of memos and reports to the u. S. Occupation authorities declaring that the npr was nothing compared to the Imperial Japanese army and that it needed some of the spirit of the Imperial Japanese army and ultimately these ideas would enable the formation of a new military force, one that continued to grow, one that still exists today. So to conclude, what do we learn from this story . First, it shows that democracy itself has a history. It does not mean the same thing in every time and place. The values that people ascribe to a successful democracy are a product of their context and they can change with that context. This means i think if we want to assess the impact of democratic visions or ideas on the conduct of policy, we shouldnt focus on simply celebrating those who we think promoted democracy or condemning those who did not. Instead we should pay close attention to the specific ideas, meanings, limitations, hopes, fears that people invested in democracy and think critically about these ideas. What are the policies they enabled . And what are the outcomes or policies that they prevented . Secondly, and more specific to the time period ive discussed, i hope that this story allows us to better grasp how people understood politics during the early cold war. It shows how central psychological and spiritbased ideas were to how american leaders understood democracy. And in turn this can help us to better understand how rigid and limited this thinking was. It was obsessed with subversion and infiltration, it was not particularly interested in what the japanese public wanted. We have to remember that all of this democratization is happening under military occupation. It led to an obsession with vague and immeasurable qualities, intangible qualities like mind and spirit over and sometimes even against the expansion of rights or participation or equality. Indeed this way of thinking led u. S. Policymakers to empower a hierarchical and to many japanese dangerous institution, the military, in order to protect democracy or at least that is what they claim they were doing. And if there is a lesson in this story to us today its exactly that, that the promise to promote democracy abroad even if its sincere often has strange and unintended consequences. Thank you very much. [ applause ] thanks so much. Should i sit down . Yeah, sure. Thank you for this very stimulating talk. Let me perhaps start the discussion by just asking some initial questions. One since youre, jennifer, here at the home of the cold war, the National History project with our focus on archives and new documentation, could you talk a little bit about what archives, what documents, what sources you consulted for your book. Could you talk a little bit about especially japanese sources, if you looked at those, and perhaps give us an update since you probably follow this more than most others here in the room, give us a little bit of an update on where we are in terms of access to japanese archival repositories. So thats one question. The other one is could you for our audience place your book a little bit more detail in just a graphical context. Who are some of the the works out there that you are contending with whose thesis you must be contesting with your book. I think it would be interesting for the seminar to sort of get a little bit more of this graphical context. Thank you. Thank you for those questions. I will start by talking a little bit about sources. The talk i gave is drawn from two chapters of the book, the first and Second Chapter. The first chapter is about wartime planning and the u. S. Occupation and the Second Chapter is about the creation of the npr specifically. So for these i used a great deal of american sources, of course. The wartime planning documents for the occupation, which i think are actually a very underutilized historical source, they are quite wonderful, these extensive discussions about all these different aspects of japan that were undertaken by various state department committees, and then i used a series of occupation documents, especially the papers of what was called government section. So the occupation was structured that there were these sections in the occupation that paralleled sort of various responsibilities of the japanese government. So there was a government section, an economic and scientific section, all of these different sections and i focused on the work of government section because it supervised things like elections. But what i was struck by as i was working on this was how similar and this is from the first chapter i was writing about the occupation and sort of tracing these couldnt nuts between wartime thinking about the threat of militarism and cold war thinking about the threat of communism was how similar their thinking was about the United States and japan. That was very striking to me. So i had quoted nsc 68 which is probably one of the most famous early cold war documents which goes into this extensive discussion of the psychological nature of communism and the psychological nature of the free world and that communism has a shortterm advantage because it doesnt require the difficulties of individualism but contrary its contrary to the human spirit. Two months later macarthur gives that speech i quoted. He would not have read ns 68 but he is talking in the exact same terms that this is a psychological threat that seeks to deceive and control the mind. So i also used some sort of domestic american sources in terms of like newspaper coverage or documentation from the state department and the National Security council not related to japan to get at that larger atmosphere. Now, for the next chapter, that first chapter mostly focused on tracing american thinking. The Second Chapter on the npr i used both american and japanese sources. One thing that was interesting about it on the american side was the papers of the npr are of american training of the npr, which is what i was interested in, are quite scattered in a bunch of different places, there are sort of five boxes here in the National Archives, five boxes there, five boxes over there. So i pieced all that together to draw together that story. On the japanese side unfortunately there is less postwar npr archival material available. I went and spoke to some researchers at the National Institute for defense studies but wasnt able to get much in the way of archival program. They kindly sent me way more oral list res than i could ever read but i managed to read some of them. That was a good resource that i also utilized to write that chapter. And then in terms of list or graphical context, what am i arguing against . I think im arguing against a couple of things. Now, there is kind of this one story of the u. S. japanese relationship and thats a story thats called the reverse course. For the first couple years the u. S. Genuinely cared about democracy and the occupation and then it sort of became hysterical over communism and stopped caring about democracy at all and only cared about anticommunism. Im not arguing against the idea that there was a change in policy in the occupation because there clearly was. There were things like labor strikes that would have been allowed in 1946 that were not allowed in 1948. There were things like the creation of the npr which i think is one of the biggest examples of this. But what i am arguing is the idea that we can trace a lot of couldnt nuts. What i am arguing for is the idea is that there is not couldnt nuts across the two halves of the occupation. To say the reverse course is no couldnt nuts is a bit of an overstatement. I was really struck by how much of the turn against communism in the later part of the occupation was facilitated by the regulations of the early occupation. They could purge communists because they used the same regulations used to purge mill tarrists in the first part of the occupation. They could apply censorship against communism newspaper because there had been so much censorship against mill tarrist ideas in the early part of the occupation. The other thing that i wanted to do is i think japan is often treated in isolation or in a bilateral context and im somewhat guilty of this, my book is a book of a bilateral relationship but i was struck by how many parallels there were between what was going on in japan and the United States at the same time. So, for example, in this chapter that i talked about i talk about the npr, but i also place it in the context of american efforts to impose a program of universal military training in the late 1940s and Harry Trumans claim that a universal am i will tear training will be a school of Republican Values and democracy in the United States. Similarly i write a little bit about writing antisubversive laws in the United States and or in japan, and the authors, the japanese policymakers and bureaucrats that were working with the occupation authorities to draft these antisubversive laws were looking at the antisubversive act like the mccarran act, also laws that were being written in places like australia. So another thing i wanted to do was think more fully about almost this kind of concept of the National Security state or anticommunism thats crossing boundaries in this time period. So to ask to go back to the context, i dont know if im contesting it so much as trying to deepen and complicate our understanding of this reverse course moment specifically in the u. S. japanese relationship and push back on the idea that democracy didnt matter in this relationship after the first two years of the occupation. Because what the book does is it traces this all the way up to the 1960s and it looks at issues like the transition from world war to cold war, looks at the creation of the npr, looks at the peace treaty the end of the occupation, it also looks at how japanese ideas about democracy shaped this. So i have two chapters about antibase protests and protests against the u. S. Japanese security treaty and finally it looks at ideas about democracy and Economic Growth especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s and trying to trace the strange career of democratic ideology in this alliance after the occupation. Thank you. I know eric will have a question or two in a minute and i was going to ask you just to lay out the rest of the book, which you just did, but let me just ask you for those of us especially the audience out there who may not be familiar with nsc 68, many of you are, i just looked at it, i was just reading it a couple days ago, but a lot of people dont, so talk a little bit about nsc 68 and then its over to eric. Okay. Nsc 68 is probably my favorite government document to teach so im happy to talk about it. It was a statement drafted by the National Security council in late 1949, early 1950 under the leadership of paul knitsy and it was drafted because two things had happened, the soviet union had successfully tested an atomic bomb and the chinese communists had been successful in their revolution and established the peoples republic of china. In the eyes of american policymakers these are both very bad things, they are not good things at all. So they draft nsc 68 which is laying out american National Security strategy. When its mentioned in like a history textbook its mostly mentioned for the fact that knitsy recommends this overarching military buildup and essential communist incursion must not be allowed to happen anywhere. So its usually discussed in that it articulated this very Global Version of American Military containment. But nsc 68 is like 60 pages long and i often say to my students knitsy didnt need 60 pages just to say that. And so nsc 68 also has these detailed discussions of how they see the National Security council and knitsy and the other authors see the logic of the communist world working and the logic of the sort of american led world order working. It calls the cold war a contrast between the free world and the slave world and talks about how in the communist world people seek refuge in communism because of bafflement and anxiety and insecurity and that communism has the shortterm advantage because it can just tell the people what to do. It doesnt have to build consensus. But they also argue that ultimately mankinds natural desire, mankinds psychological inclination is to seek freedom and ultimately man can only find that in the free world so they believe that the free world can win out in the long term because it fulfills mans natural desire for freedom. And for knitsy there is a relationship between this psychological psychologically divided world, these two different lo jiks, the slave world and the free world, and this recommendation for a military buildup because when he recommends this he says things like a complete buildup of the political, economic and military strength and thereby of the confidence of the free world will be crucial to winning this long and drawn out battle. So on the one level nsc 68 is a recommendation for a massive military buildup but on a larger level its this long discussion of the inner psychological workings of the cold war world. Thank you. So let me introduce another question that kind of builds on some of what you said, but takes it in a different direction. Its kind of a twopart related question. So the first has to do with your language about the threat. So you talk about the american panic over communism, hysteria and anxiety over communism, and those words panic, anxiety and hysteria suggest that the thing americans were concerned about was more a figment of their imagination than Something Real. And so i would like you to perhaps just say a few words about that, how real a threat was it in your mind, you know, or in theirs. And the second and connected part, there is one anecdote or one example that you briefly touch upon and shortly after the end of the occupation on may 1st, 1952 the bloody may die riot that racks tokyo and other parts of the country and you write that the end of the occupation was a moment of mixed emotions, a missed opportunity to build a truly independent and fully democratic japan. One of the people present that day who was to give a speech and then was not allowed to give a speech was norman thomas, the longtime head of the american socialist party, a critic in many ways of American Foreign policy and in his postmortem this boils down to the communist control of the crowd, the communist control of trade unions. In his real threat. And as a veteran socialist he did not like communists very much. The back drop or the counterparts to the americans limited visions of democracy that you lay out is the japanese left or japanese citizenry who dont like bases so much, who dont like the treaty, who dont like this or that. At one point you talk about the governments efforts to quell the lefts antiauthoritarian vision of Democratic Politics. Norman thomas didnt see this. Granted, theres a wide spectrum on this thing called the left but the communist part of the left i think one would be hard pressed to argue, you know, did not embrace or did certainly didnt embrace a democratic or a fully democratic japan nor put forward an antiauthoritarian vision there. So are communists included in this spectrum that youre talking about and if so, how do you apply these terms of antiauthoritarianism to i think what most of would agree is a pretty authoritarian movement. Thats an excellent question, thank you. Okay. So the first thing you asked about is the language of the threat. And as this sort of a figment of american policymakers imaginations or is it Something Real . I think that there were very few if no moments where occupy japan was directly threatened by communist takeover of the communist revolution. Not in the least because there were thousands upon thousands of military troops stationed throughout the country. I also think that many people within the occupation authorities and within the japanese government had a frame of mind that they believe the threat was real. This was particularly true in 1948 and 1949 and early 1950. This was there were especially i talk about the long, hot summer of 1949 in the book when theres all these seemingly sinister things that are happening in tokyo. Where theres these train accidents and someone is found dead, the president of the National Railways is found dead by the tracks and people think that, you know theres something sinister in the air and people think that something is going to happen. The Japanese Communist Movement its true was targeting institutions like the npr seeking to infiltrate it. It was acting very aggressively against the occupation against u. S. Military bases. But i personally find it hard to believe given the military situation in japan at this moment that it would have been success. But that said, both americans and japanese were very concerned about it. To the point where when the npr is created, japans Prime Minister had been asking for antipolicing operations for many years. He had been sending the letters to macarthur saying like you know you guys you localized, you decentralized the police but that doesnt cut it anymore against communism so they believed it was a threat. I think if i have to maintain my historical distance but i have to take those beliefs seriously. Now, in terms of the bloody may day riot and the Japanese Communist Party the japanese commune i party, the im not an expert on this, but they go through a lot of phases between about 1945 and 1955. And the japanese left goes through a lot of phases so right after the war, the Japanese Communist Party under says theyre going to participate in the diet and participate in politics. A couple years later they talk about how theyre not getting done what they want done through politics so theyll start doing more demonstrations and extra legal things and thats kind of in the dietic with the labor striking down and theres the purges of the occupation and this is done in the media. Its also done in the labor unions the same thing is happening in the United States. And especially with the start of the korean war the Japanese Communist Party starts to go underground. A lot of people leave japan and go to china and progressively throughout the 1950s, the communist party is increasingly marginalized on the leftist groups. So the antibase coalitions that are built, earlier have the japanese communist as a member. Theres a pretty active japanese left that is also acting outside the okay. Great. Well open it up for your comments and questions if you can please wait for the microphone. State your name and affiliation. Start up here. Thank you very much, benjamin tore, a retired diplomat. Clearly the postwar occupation and development of japan in in the years since has been a remarkable success. That said, i was struck by the extreme selfserving nature of the rhetoric and language used to justify particular policies at different times. Sometimes 180 degrees different from each other, but just justified with the appropriate rhetoric. Secondly, and the success of the occupation was of course due to enlightened u. S. Leadership and the military and Diplomatic Service and so on. But it also of course had a lot to do with the japanese motivations and their understanding that they had lost the war and that they had to act in a way to preserve as much of their culture and institutions including the emperor and to do this they had to play ball. Id like you to comment on a couple of the photos that you showed. The first is the voting photo. We cant tell whether the people were actually the person was actually voting or registering to vote. But if he was voting its kind of unusual to have two soldiers kind of taking you know . It seems to be an open ballot, et cetera. I had to look long and hard to find that photo i should say. Okay. If second one is the article by worden. William worden in the saturday evening post where he talks about the men are combat hardened in war against us. And he also said can the tough little japs bring new hope to that lost continent . So could you provide some of the background for that kind of rhetoric and so on . Thank you for your question. Okay, so the selfserving nature of the language and the rhetoric used to justify policies, i think a crucial background here is that the occupation authorities im speaking of them as a joint unit. Though of course there were hundreds of people involved in this which had very different ideas, you know, some of them were new dealers. Some of them admired general franco. You have a huge range of people who are involved in the Occupation Authority and im conflating them a bit. I think one thing about the selfserving nature of the language and the rhetoric is that the United States believed i think this ties back to my discussion of nsc 68 that in the occupation what they were doing was they were allowing the japanese to realize their universal and natural human desire for freedom. If that makes sense. That what they were bringing to japan was universal. And that these decisions that the United States was making would liberate the japanese sort of mentally and psychologically. And i think even they interestingly continued to believe this, even as the occupation took this very firm turn against communism or maybe they believed it so strongly at the beginning at the occupation they continued to use that same rhetoric. If that makes sense. Now, im a historian who thinks that rhetoric really matters that ideas and understanding the policy really matters and the way they choose to talk about what theyre doing and present what theyre doing both to the public and the private audience really matters. But whats interesting is even in these later years of the occupation, there is some synergy between the public and private discussion of these policies. So its not like publicly theyre being like we need to do this to defend democracy and we care about democracy and privately theyre like we dont care about democracy, democracy doesnt matter. They actually are still thinking about it. But they really generally believe that democracy is under threat by communism. Now, as we talked about we can dispute if that was actually true but they believe it. But i think this comes back to this conception of American Power they have in 1945 that its a truly lib rating force at the end of world war ii. In terms of thinking about some of the photos i have used youre right to point out that the first photo is somewhat odd. But i think it also captures the foundational contradiction of the occupation which is that theyre claiming to liberate people through military occupation. And i will admit i had to look quite a bit to find a photo of japanese elections that had american soldiers in it. But i didnt have to look that hard. I mean, this is from getty. So i had to do a little bit of searching, but i didnt have to look that hard. If you in terms of the article, this is not the only article like this. Theres also one in life magazine in 1951. Celebrating the creation of the npr. Now, we can question, you know, the npr themselves didnt call themselves soldiers. They didnt have military titles, and it was not a force that was allowed to be overseas. At the time they talked about it as an internal Security Force although american policymakers always talked about it as the core of the military. Thats not what it ever wanted to be, an offensive military. So some of this is seeing the npr through japanese through american eyes but i think that the language in it is very striking. It says, can these tough little japs bring new hope to the lost continent which is interesting the idea that sort of democratic military power will be what can save asia. And that i think was also actually a fairly widespread idea. So another thing i talk about in the book in this chapter that we can think about the npr in the context of is this is when the United States is really turning to military assistance in the late 1940s so its sending all sorts of military aid to france, italy, germany, places like that and they talk about it in the exact same terms as in the npr. To the point there are hearings before congress, we should give them heavy equipment, but lets give them small arms because when people hold small arms they feel the spirit and the will of resistance. And like with these new military aid that were giving them, people have hope and theyre on the upswing. Granted this is theyre performing for congress they want more money but the language extends beyond japan. All right. Several questions. If you dont mind, if at some point you could comment a little bit on the you know, racialized gender discourse thats sort of staring at you from yeah, especially with the word of japs. Yes. And how that impacts the democracy. But lets go to finton, yeah, right there. Jennifer, thank you so much for a fantastic presentation. Introduce yourself. Finton hewy, wilson center. To what extent were you able to find the officers and recruited into the npr, to what extent did they engage with or internalize or deal with this notion of defending democracy . And this notion of them being a continuation of occupation ideals or not did they see themselves as rejection of early occupation ideals . I think thats a great question. Thank you, finton. To the extent that i was able to see this, it varied a little bit. So you asked to what extent did they see themselves as defending democracy . So at least some of the higher ranking officers of the npr who are writing things like studies about the per gyps that are coming into the npr they talk about it as if theyre engaging this idea. That they believe this is what what the npr can do and certainly i think there was a fair amount of belief that japan did need new military forces for internal security. And things like that. On the other hand, when you read some of these early oral histories, a lot of them comment on how sort of condescending and dismissive the American Military advisers were. Thats not surprising because i read the other documents that were that were the reports, reporting on the various npr camps and they were very condescending and dismissive so its not surprising thats how the japanese felt. So im sure to some members this was a sort of farcical exercise that theyre internalizing the occupation era commitment to democracy but theyre being treated by these American Military trainers as if they know nothing, as if theyre sort of children, they dont know how to do anything. So i think i know this is an unsatisfying answer, but at least from the documentation i saw it varied quite a bit. Some of it too. Some of the documentation that i had was things like npr members writing for an american audience. And so my guess would be in those kind of situations, im thinking specifically of the one document thats about a study thats written of how theyre going to incorporate d purge officers into the npr and what are the standards to do that. Very much are saying that the npr is a democratic is a product of the democratic japan and that needs to be sustained but theres an element of a fact theyre writing that for an american audience. Thank you. All the way in the back. Hi. Christopher gray. I would like to followup what Christian Ostermann was urging on you earler, professor miller. And i have a father who was drafted during korea and two of his younger brothers served in the occupation and the other fought in korea in the early 40s. Would you comment in relation theres three great books. John dowers two books, the and then dale you can get only for 10 from the bookstore we the japanese people that shows how the low level bureaucrats wrote the japanese constitution. I think youre right on the continuity section. On the racism which i think dower overemphasized in the book and how does this relate to your work . Have you modified what dower and helling hellingers have written . First about the racialized and gender discourse of this, there is certainly a heavily racialized discourse here, based on how american policymakers understood sort of the failures of prewar japan. They sort of toggled back and forth between this more universal explanation about the weak japanese institutions and the japanese not have been the consciousness of democracy and the very racialized understandings of that i mentioned in the talk of the japanese having a uniquely infantile psychology. Certain explanations of Japanese Culture. Some of this one of the explanations some of them talked about it was rooted in the japanese family which demands total submission to the father. This is part of why one of the things they focused on was like giving the women the right to vote. So that was always there. At the same time, they were understanding some aspects of the occupation as i have pointed out in a larger discourse of how people talked about democracy in this moment. So i think there is something about the way they understood japan in this very racialized way and especially the japanese psychology in this very racialized way that gave these ideas even more salience in japan. That seemed to give them even more explanatory power. Of on the other hand, its sort of interesting and i struggle with this writing the book because they do believe these very racist ideas about the japanese, but they believe that some sort of change is possible. In japan. All right . And part of this is their faith in American Power, part of this is their faith in the ability of democracy. But they do believe that some kind of change is possible. They think it will take a long time. There are documents kind of from the end of the occupation where theyre saying like the occupation is ending the japanese arent there net. Were going to need to stay around longer. Were going to need to keep a heavy american presence, and they do believe the japanese have changed. This is of course very gendered. The npr is a male institution. And as i mentioned a lot of these ideas are also being expressed about the possibility of universal military training in the United States which is also a male institution. Theres an idea that the responsible citizenship that is a male area. Thats what men are going to do. So the whole thing is just its premised on almost the total issue of women or their belief that women do not have a strong role to play in this in the public sphere. In terms of thinking of dower and hellinger, for dower i dont see myself as countering dower so much. Embracing defeat is a really wonderful textured book that examines so many different aspects of japanese reactions to the occupation and his argument is that it was possible because of the way the japanese embraced defeat. But one thing i found in a lot of this reading and hellinger is the exception and i used that book when i wrote about the japanese constitution, theres not that much unpacking in what was meant when they talked about democracy. I was actually kind of surprised in that sense. There was this talk, yeah, you need to have voting, you need to have elections and parliaments. That was what i was going to write and then i was struck about how often they referred to confidence, morale, maybe theres something more at work here. I dont see myself countering his work at all, just adding aspects that he fully spell out and he would probably disagree with me on because he was asking different questions than i was. Now the hellinger book is different. I find that helpful and especially the various drafts of the constitution. It has the appendixes that have different drafts of the constitution. I was very struck by some of the language in some of the drafts, so for example, one of the drafts talks about how democracy is like i cant remember the exact language. Its like this age old practice conferred and can only be sustained through the constant vigilance of the people. That this idea of vigilance was so important they wanted to write it into the constitution. I found that a fascinating reveal of some of the thinking about the occupation. Thank you. Marvin . Way in the back. Thank you. Marvin ott, wilson center. A quick sort of broader note. Three sino sized cultures in taiwan, republic of korea and japan with no tradition historically of democracy have nevertheless transitioned in to functioning, you know, stable rooted parliamentary competitive democratic systems and it just strikes me as something of a cultural determinist. Something really important going on here. And then on the culture theme just this is a minor question, but your repeated references to spirit and sort of related notions of sort of psychic strength im wondering whether that in fact echoed something fundamental in Japanese Culture . That there was appropriate. That that notion, you know, sort of sort of the notion of psychic mental resilience and strength was actually very fundamental to the cultural ground that the Occupation Authority was working in. Thank you for your question. About this, ill start with the second one. Did this echo something fundamental in Japanese Culture . Im i would be hesitant to say that. But what is interesting how much it echoed elements of japanese governing ideology in the 1930s, which in 1925 japan had passed this law called the Peace Preservation law which was about cracking down on communism. And one of the things that sort of japanese governing ideology and japanese leaders thought about a lot was kind of or talked about a lot was the threat of kind of dangerous thought. And the question of thought and dangerous thought in the way it could sort of disturb the national essence. A scholar named max ward has written a wonderful book about this. It was sort of a big inspiration for this. So whether it echoed something fundamental in Japanese Culture im really not trained to answer. But did it echo something crucial in in the recent history of japanese governance . It did. And i think that is in part why this language of spirit and the danger of sort of dangerous thought did become kind of a point of convergence amongst american policymakers and japanese prewar and war time leaders in the late 1940s and early 19 a 1950s. So it echoed something much more recent in japanese history if that made sense. Can i have a show of hands who else is interested in answering a question. Ill try to keep the answers shorter. Hi, Greg Brzezinski from the George Washington university. Im interested in how the american conception of democracy limits the scope of certain things and one of the things as someone who works on other parts of asia that im interested in what that was not discussed is of course japans horrific record of war time atrocities. Of course, you know, thousands of women forced in to sexual slavery, thousands of thousands of, you know, koreans forced to work in japanese factories. And im just wondering what does this american conception of democracy mean for japans ability to discuss these atrocities . And do you see this conception of democracy as being complicit in any way in japans ongoing difficulty in coming to terms with this aspect of its past . Thank you. I think thats a really interesting question. So youre exactly right to peg this idea that it limits the scope of the discussion, because what increasingly happens is that they start to say things like that people that are calling for a more critical reflection on japanese actions during the war or people calling for more egalitarian equal distribution at home they dont understand the scope of the challenge to democracy and the very fact of talking about that opens up the National Dialogue to potentially dangerous actors and ideas so you have to shut that down. I think also key here is the fact that much of this i dont write extensively about this at the book but a scholar named choi has written a wonderful dissertation about u. S. , korea and japan in the occupation. One of the biggest domestic fears of communist infiltration in japan during the occupation is by people from korea. Many of whom who are forced laborers brought to japan during the war and the Prime Minister and the u. S. Occupation authorities are talking about these korean residents of japan as the traitorous fifth column that will destroy from within. Thats a key back drop especially in 1948 and 49 there are these protests of human riots over the questions of teachings and schools and the korean population. They are concerned about. This this is why korea does one of the reasons korea does not sign the peace treaty that ends the occupation because they were worried that then koreans would be able to make claims under the treaty on japan. So theres also the fact that these ideas are being developed against that back drop, where one of the most physical m manifestations of the threat that further mitt gaits against the idea that japan would need to apologize for any of its war time behavior which the u. S. Is not ever at least not in discussions i have brought do they see that. Also the fact that you know they do increasingly start to see the Imperial Japanese army as something to be admired in certain ways by the early 1950s. That also works very, very strongly against that idea. Okay. Thank you. Gentleman up front here. Microphone is coming. My name is kuhnowe, im a longtime resident of washington, d. C. Professor miller has talked millers talk brings so many memories it is hard to go into one question. But one point i want to say, compared to other countries western countries included, in the 30s wasnt japans democracy a real thing in mose days . They had the parliament, they had voting universal voting for men, at least. And one reason why the japanese were so lets say accepting of the u. S. Occupation and their treatment of japan in during the occupation was that they were genuinely graceful that this grateful that this horrendous military dictatorship was destroyed without which they could not from within because theyre all persecuted otherwise. Did you get that sense . Okay, so thank you for your question. On japanese democracy in the 30s i think we could certainly say that prewar japan had some democratic practices and institutions just like the United States had some democratic practices and institutions. We want to remember that american democracy before world war ii is extremely limited by things like jim crow segregation and practices like that. Japan had national elections. It also had things like structures where the military wasnt subject to democratically elected leaders. In terms of accepting it because japanese people were grateful for the end of military dictatorship i think that and dower is the best to read on this. Because hes traced this out extensively. This is embracing defeat, his book. I think that some people certainly did. That is part of why on some level the turn of the occupation in starting in sort of 1947, 48, 49 against communism felt like such a betrayal to some people. You know, one person said one of the big turning points is theres a big strike planned in early 1947. At the last minute, macarthur cancels it and says it cant happen. One person criticizes him and says the United States was deceiving us. They only cared about democracy on the tip of their tongues. I found this interesting this quote interesting because it shows the shared ground that deception is antidemocratic. It just depends different people people disagree on whos doing the deceiving. So i do think there were certainly people that felt the early occupation to be very libbertory in certain ways. They had, you know, the right to express, to vote, to join Political Parties they hadnt under the war time regime. Were quickly running out of time, so the gentleman over here and ross. Let me also throw in one more question. In terms you commented on some of the american historians working on this subject. What issues is the sort of the graphical discussion in japan centered on . What do japanese scholars write about this when they write about this crucial period, with this crucial relationship . Well, thank you for your talk. Im a japan fellow here at bam home im a professor at the university. I want to talk sort of ask you about the acceptance on the japanese side and the strategic decision on the part of japanese leaders but since you touched on it a bit ill change the subject then. You mentioned about, you know, the u. S. Occupation policy sort of shaping the minds the aspect to it. And sort of the threat perception and i can sort of understand because professors and intellectuals used to be really respected in japanese societies. If you look at the intellectual hegemony after the war, most of the professors and intellectuals were left wing and they were really acceptable to sort of you know socialism and communism. I can totally understand the threat perception. I was wondering how you treated the role of the intellectuals in that period in the Japanese Culture. Thank you. Why dont we take ross question and then ill give you a chance to answer all three questions as were coming to the end here. Ross . Thank you. Thank you very much for the talk. As you introduce yourself, please. Ross johnson. Wilson center. Thanks. At least in the first part of your talk i thought if you changed some names and nouns, it you could have been talking about the first stages of the occupation of germany. And so i wonder how much sort of comparative perspective might have been involved in your work. And i suppose, you know, to the extent we have similarities that might point to i mean, the impetus is really how the american the americans want went about their business in general with a totally defeated country as opposed to the specifics of japan or germany. Okay, im going to work backward so ill start with the most recent question about germany and then the question about intellectuals and then if we have time we can get to the historiography. I think there are similarities to the occupation of germany. Its playing out in a slightly different context which is this context of a divided germany whereas japan is not divided. I think there are a lot of intellectual similarities and in particular in the occupation of germany by tend of the occupation theyre circulating this kind of theory of democratic threat or democratic survival called militant democracy. Which is developed by this german intellectual who had fled the why mar regime and they have the right to preemptively mobilize against the enemies. Basically that you dont need to give communists free speech. Because they will seek to use it to destroy democracy. Thus, democracies have the right to do that. Thats not antidemocratic. Thats being a militant democracy and the German Supreme Court would ultimately use that idea to outlaw the communist party in germany which never happened in the United States or in japan. But did in west germany. And so i think you can see some real similarities there in terms of how theyre conceiving of the threat in this time period. Im sure theres also similarities in the earlier years of the occupation, the way they conceived of it being about elections and constitution writing and the various things they tried to do. But that is also one of the similarities that strikes me. In terms of the question about professors and intellectuals, yes, they talked so one way i talk about them is in this question of threat. Because american policymakers talked about japanese intellectuals all the time. And really feared them. They saw they thought that they generally believed that they were way too susceptible to communist ideas, that they controlled the public discussion way too much in japan. They had a lot of influence on the public discussion. And they made a lot of efforts to throughout in various ways throughout the 1950s to try to displace that discussion. They enlisted private actors like the Rockefeller Foundation and american professors were involved in this. That is the main way i deal with them. I go a little bit into intellectual leadership, specifically in the antibase movement where there was there were some intellectuals that took a prominent role and i also talk a little bit about some of the early statements about peace and leading roles that intellectuals took in the Peace Movement which led american policymakers to reclaim kind of the ground of peace for american policy. Because so many japanese intellectuals claimed that american policy would not bring peace in democracy but imperil those things. Especially in military bases. So the critiques of the japanese intellectuals and the fears of japanese intellectuals because they published in the big journals and all of those is something i talk about quite a bit. And then the last question about the japanese history graphical discussion. Theres a lot of new work in particular in japan thats coming out on rearmament and the npr thats been a point of interest lately. Theres a lot of new work on in english coming out on it thats heavily inspired by the japanese work or working a lot with japanese sources. Theres also been whats interesting is theres a much more robust historiography on this in japan than in the United States. In the United States i think the first theres very few actual books about japanese armament. The recent one is by Thomas French called National Police reserve that came out in a couple of years ago and in japan theres a long and robust history graphical debate and what led them to bring in former Imperial Army officers. Theres a much more robust debate coming on. So christian had the fortune of inviting questions. I have the misfortune of shutting down the discussion that i think could go on for quite some time. But let me invite you back one week from today when daniel will talk about the new book how to hide the empire the history of the greater United States. Al i want to thank you, our participants in todays seminar and thank you to jennifer miller. This is a special edition of American History tv. A sample of the compelling history programs that air every weekend on American History tv. Like lectures in history. American artifacts. Real america. The civil war. Oral histories. The presidency. And special event coverage about our nations history. Enjoy American History tv. Now and every weekend on cspan 3. Weeknights this month, we are featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend. Tonight a look at the 50th anniversary of the kai he ga river fire of 1969. Historian david straddling talked about the fire, the myths associated with it and the campaign to find solutions. Hes the coauthor of where the river burned, karl stokes and the struggle to save cleveland. American history tv airs tonight at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan 3. Saturday at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on lectures in history, female activists in the 1960s civil rights movement. While women were instrumental in helping to organize and put the march together, the event was purely dominated by men. Sunday at 4 30 p. M. Eastern, the global significance of the declaration of independence during and after the american revolution. Multiple translations of our declaration made their way to colombia, venezuela and ecuador over the course of the 50year period after 1776. The half century known to scholars as the age of revolutions. At 6 00 p. M. , eyewitness accounts from inside the white house during the apollo 11 lunar landing. We really staked ourselves into the cabinet room throughout the day you can see the windows were dark. So again were into nighttime. The module landed at 4 15 in the afternoon and then the astronauts did not walk until later. Explore our nations past on American History tv. Every weekend on cspan3. Sunday night on q a go away we were taken out of the hall and confronted this mob of angry people. Middle bury College Political science professor allison stainer talks about being attacked in 2017 after an appearance by author Charles Murray on campus. At the end of your discussion with Charles Murray you left that room and went where and what happened . The fact of the matter is, i dont really remember much of it. I couldnt even tell you what door we went out. But we were taken out of the hall and confronted this mob of angry people. Some of whom were in masks. They were shoving and jostling. Sunday night at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspans q a. American history tvs look at u. S. Foreign policy shifts now to southeast asia. After world war ii, western powers hoped to foster anticommunist governments in the region. In his book