I would like to say a couple words about the revolution and the history of intelligence. This is one subject that is vastly underrepresented in historical literature. Most of us went through school and learned about the revolution. Even at the college level, we do not delve into the importance of intelligence during the american revolution. This is quite problematic. If you look at the advantages of the british over the americans, the british at almost every advantage. They had a modern professional army that had been battle colonies didas the colon not. The americans had a small Continental Army that could not really be counted on. The british of the greatest navy in the world. The americans did not have a navy to speak of. We have privateers. Pirates, essentially, that we gave the ability to steal and pillage for their pay. Most americans did not actually support independence. Less than half of continental americans support independence. Thousands fought for the british. And many of the others just wanted to be left alone. That is not to mention the thousands of german soldiers and the thousands of native sided withhathat the british. The british have be worlds greatest economy. We had no central bank. We had a very hard time raising money. So, how did we win . Its not that we wanted it more than they did. It had a lot to do with the fact that we used intelligence better than they did. That George Washington, among others, was really good at utilizing the information that came in from a network of spies. And the intelligence apparatus that he had set up. B. A. Inler holds a historyand a m. A. In from the Maxwell School at syracuse university. After he got his masters, he served in the United States marine corps and then joined the cia. Today hes a cia operations officer. From 1969 to 2003 when he finally retired. He has written other things. Mr. Daigler authored astounding fathers of american intelligence and black dispatches. Those are available on these cia website. I advise you to go check those out. They are very fascinating. I invite you to check them out. He has also written numerous articles for publications with his true name and his p. K. Rose pseudonym detailing activities through the end of the civil war, including studies about intelligence and the association of former Intelligence Officers. He is here to talk about his newest book, spies, patriots, and traitors american intelligence in the revolutionary war. I would like to introduce him now, wherever he may be there he is. Please join me in welcoming ken. [applause] mr. Daigler thank you. Ok, i want to start by telling you when you write a book, the first thing youre supposed to do is make a business plan. I just wrote the book and hoped assumed somebody would want to read it. This is the cover of the book. It is a very distinctive cover. It was not my choice. It was my publishers choice. They were obviously very correct about it. But my point is, i was at the beach, and i said i will walk around the beach a little bit at rehobeth, maybe a little dewey, and i am going to look and see what teenagers are reading my book. Ive got to tell you, i found not one single male or female teenager reading my book, so thats not the target audience. The target audience is people interested in revolutionary war. As we get into the revolutionary war, you will find all three of the key elements in the intelligence profession, counterintelligence, covert action played a key role in the americans ability to win, and because i am dealing with something that is 250 years old, i have the latitude here of naming names, naming identities, naming sources of information, showing what the intelligencer like, andports look talking about resources and methods. Something i cannot do come in my ownusly, background. Through history, intelligence does not change. The fact that they left it in a leather pouch under a rock and the fact that today someone will leave an encrypted note on the website, it is subject to the individual orting and the individual who will use it. There is a real learning experience i believe in strictly being an Intelligence Officer. Now, before i get into the book, i have been told by a much more experienced authors is why did you write the book . I will tell you why i started writing the book. I had retired from the agency as and a little bit of time consulting with the department of defense. After a little bit of time you , have done everything you can. I decided i would retire and this time i would actually retire and take up a lot of my own personal interests and hobbies, what have you. That work for about two and a half weeks. It all came to a conclusion when one saturday, my wife, who is a optpotter, had gone to her studio to work. I went to make myself a ham sandwich. I found that kitchen was disorganized. I couldnt find the ingredients, i could not find the plates and glasses that i wanted. Time, so i went to work reorganizing the kitchen. [laughter] daigler yeah, that did not work out too well. I went to work writing a book. The genesis of the book comes from 20 years ago. In the 1990s, i was in the management position at the agency. The cold war is over with. We had defeated the soviet empire, but the issue is that now, like we always do we, because we won, we are going to downsize, because we dont have any enemies out there. Everything is peaceful. The order came down from Senior Management the budgets were going to be cut, and we were going to have to do more with less. That normally strikes fear in the heart of any government employee. The way we do that in the agency is increase liaisons, those intelligence fields around the world. The first step was we had to enlarge our facilities. For reasons that were esoteric, the job i was in, i had to create some new spaces. For the liaison folks. Architecture architects and others who could do the heavy lifting. As i talked to others who handled the actual liaison, the mission was while the , Liaison Services understood we had money, compared to them, to spend, we were very good technically, but had not been in business that long. Only since world war ii. And maybe we didnt quite understand how to handle it, but the more sophisticated aspects of human intelligence. But we had to address this problem. I did a Little Research and i ended up writing the pamphlet you had mentioned, the Founding Fathers of american intelligence, where we identified George Washington as a key figure in intelligence, a collection of foreign intelligence, ben franklin in terms of covert action, propaganda, and john jay, surprisingly enough, as the key figure in counterintelligence. I wrote the pamphlet. It was kind of was well received. We put up copies in the liaison rooms, and we named each room after one of these principal figures. It has become institutionalized and is available on the website and now is a popular download. To my surprise, it is actually quoted in some history books on the revolution. That is basically the way this came about. As i said before, the key point behind this book is to look at the revolution from an intelligence point of view. I am not a historian. I would not claim to be. Ofut i have about 40 years expertise in intelligence, so i have a little expertise or knowledge in that area. As we go through the revolutions , starting in 1765, new york 1783, intelligence and the impact it had, the mistakes made, and how it was done. When we first start well, rather than review the book for you, i think probably the best approach is to take a couple of key issues that Everybody Knows about from the basic history lessons in the revolution. I guess we have to start with the one principal that is come to mind with the revolution, and that was George Washington. George washington was the key chief of the Continental Army, the key consumer for all intelligence during the revolution. His small battle staff was his analytical arm, but in addition to that, but he also functioned very much because of economies of scale, he also functioned as one of the key intelligence managers, so he writes specific orders on tradecraft. Very unusual. You have the chief consumer, in effect a chief operations officer, and even though it is a small element, the tensions that exist today are the same tensions that existed there. The consumer wants the andrmation right away, operator wants it as quick as possible, but wants to protect the sources. You see what washington did. Washington ran an incredibly sophisticated operation when you consider who he was and the issues he had to deal with in terms of logistics and strategy. Politicseadership of at the time. Washington was an expert at what i would say is the most difficult aspects of intelligence deception planning. Deception planning allowed him on many occasions to completely fool british commanders as to the size of his army and what he planned to do with it. For deception operations, you need three key factors that are very hard to put together. Number one, you have to be able to control the information that is coming out from your side. So there is a steady stream of information of what you want done. That means no leaking and often falsifying internal reporting to junior officers, so they can not inadvertently say what is going on. You have to have sources, Double Agents primarily, or people who are friendly with that adversary , so you know that information is going to the adversarys command. Keythirdly, and this is a that most people forget, you have to have the sources within the enemy command to know that your message is not only getting there, but also coming in a way reverberate inan a way where the enemy believes they are making the decision providing the validation for , that information. Pretty sophisticated for a guy busy with a lot of other stuff. Obviously it is not something you learn. If you go back to his early diaries, as early as 1753, you find the first time he was sent to the country by the governor virginia to see with the french were doing. He immediately started to hone his skills, not only in debriefing but also in observation. One key point he makes in his journal in the fall of 1753 is fascinating. He was kept at a french fort until a commanding officer, come would come and see him. Obviously, they knew he was important. He was able to observe and have a good enough memory to write down what the fort looked like, the number of soldiers, the number of cannons, et cetera. He had no idea about the number of allies that they had. So what did he do in his spare time . He walked up and down the riverbank and counted all the canoes and extrapolated from there exactly what kind of force could be moved at any given time. You get the 1754, when he goes out and involves himself in fighting with the french, and is able to use deserters into not only in terms of very sophisticated debriefing but also in spreading disinformation and using them as propaganda value to encourage more desertions from the enemy. 1755, he is an unofficial aide braddock, you will find he is learning about the Operational Security aspects of movements, putting out advanced chirps, and also the mistake he made not having intelligence for his attacking force. So 20 years before, in august of he takes over the army and is already starting to develop intelligence. For someone like him, it is working to his advantage. One of the things we need in a political organization, if youre going to start a revolution, with the stamp act, we started to have small groups in the coastal cities who decided they would organize politically against the stamp act and that type of taxation. In the course of 10 years, a Group Calling themselves the sons of liberty involved into a sophisticated United Front Organization as sophisticated as anything we have ever seen in the soviet union or the chinese. What is fascinating about this is in most American History texts, you look at the sons of revolution, and you see a caricature, riding around on a log, dancing around drunkenly around the liberty pole with a cap on top of it. Let me tell you, they were more sophisticated than that. Starting in the mid1760s, sam adams, who gets a lot less less credit than he deserves, started to organize various individuals calling themselves sons of liberty all along the coast, on the way from massachusetts down to charleston. By the time you get to the mid1770s, this is an organization that has put its people in all the key leadership. The provincial congresses, the committees of safety, and what have you, so you have a United Front Organization that started out with the very broad idea that they were going to oppose taxation. And by the mid1770s, you have got an organization that has decided they want political independence an organization , that cannot only put people in the street, often mobs, often more sophisticated groups that can send a message, you have a propaganda element where the majority of the printers are the members of the sons of liberty and they have established a courier route, so that within weeks, the same perspective on a political event or opposition approach to the administration of the brits can come from massachusetts down through the southern colonies with the same exactly the same message. In addition, you have a paramilitary force. By the time you get to 1773, the british recognized that where they dont have military, they have virtually no control. And these Paramilitary Forces that have been groomed and have been politically led primarily by sons of liberty are at this point making sure they take over thepowder, they take over arms, from the ministerial armaments in the colonies. By 1773, 1774, you have these forces forming up to stop British Forces from coming back to get these arms or reoccupy a fort. 1775, ofme you get to course you have concorde and lexington. ,hat is fascinating about this from an intelligence point of view, is that it becomes an Intelligence Organization. That is exactly what happened. First, the committees of safety, who were able to monitor what exactly what the british were doing. For example, thanks to the committee of safety in boston, the militia and the sons of liberty knew exactly what route the british were going to take to get to concorde, because two months earlier, they had monitored the officers that , sonel gage had signed out they had earlier set up to go down there, so they only had to find out the timing through an organization they set up, which is the founding of the american Intelligence Organization. A group called the mechanics. It was led operationally by paul revere, but also to other ways by twohip other members, one being dr. Benjamin church. This organization was offensive and had penetration into the generals command. So by the time they got to concorde, they not only knew what place was going to be attacked, when the movement started, but the exact route that was going to be taken down there and back. This puts an entirely different light on why the british took so many casualties and why these diverse militia groups were able to hone in as well as they were. On the march going back. It is because they have advanced knowledge of it. I always say if you want to connect something to modern affairs, lets look at what another former Intelligence Officer did, vladimir putin, in did recently in crimea. If you want to look and see how he was able to very effectively shut off the greater government of ukraine from crimea, all you have to do is just have to look at the sons of liberty did it. You will find many other examples of that in the book that you see still going on today. Now, the second thing i would like to talk about is the covert Action Campaign that we really dont give enough credit to. After the conflict actually started, the colonial forces actually found that they had very little in the way of logistics necessary to carry on a war. In the colonies, there was virtually no capability to create gunpowder. Very little capability to create very little capability to create cannons or heavy artillery. They found they needed that. How do you handle Something Like that if you are a revolution or organization . You create a covert Action Campaign, which is what was done with the assistance of france. Like all good covert Action Campaigns, this started on a dark and stormy night in december, in 1775, at Carpenters Hall philadelphia, when Benjamin Franklin, the head of the newly created Congress Committee called the committee of secret correspondence, met with an individual traveling as a flemish merchant, who in reality was a secret agent from the king of france. Im talking december, 1775, during the course of three nights, they discussed what help france would provide, and the americans promise two things. Number one, we will declare political independence from Great Britain. Number two, he promised we will , defeat the british army. Nevertheless, that is what he promised. What was the result . The creation of a company that was phenomenal. It was led by an individual who was named pierre beaumarchais. He wrote the barber of seville and the marriage of figaro. He actually was a secret agent operating for the king of france. Under him, he created a company that by 1778 at 100 sailing ships that delivered hundreds of tons of gunpowder, weapons, cannons, other military supplies to allow the Continental Army to exist. Without these military supplies, it was doubtful washington could have been able to fight as long as he had. At the bunker hill, for example, before the ship started rolling in, they had two shots per person. By the time you get to december of 1776, a very crucial time, they are down to about three shots per person, but a much smaller army, probably 3000 people. A very important asset here. Three people connected with the interests of enough were of course Benjamin Franklin, who at that point became the diplomatic head of the paris commission, u. S. His first diplomatic session of interest. And, of course, beaumarchais, operating behind the scenes under an Alias Company and then thirdly a german named Robert Morrison in philadelphia was in the revolution. It was his job to get to the colonies to reduce the agriculture products that could be sent back to europe to repay the various loans. Now, there is a very famous cartoon, political cartoon. I think it was from the chicago tribune, but i am not sure. It mightve been in the newspaper, had to do with world war i when blackjack pershing made the famous line loss yet, we are here, meaning we are returning the favor of what you helped us are in the revolution. And its a beautiful drawing. Then it turns all around because we know what happens, he decides to move across the delaware and attack trenton and attack princeton, two major victories that turns the morale of the army around, because of the colonies to resupply him with troops, to actually sign on, and you see supplies coming. Yes, but did you bring the money. Were talking millions of dollars. We get concerned when people do not pay us back. I want to tell you about probably what i think is the key point in the war, where intelligence played such an important role. Theres a couple of points here, and if i have time, i will try to go through another one. It was december of 1776. Washington had just been struck out of new york. He was set to cross new jersey. It is snowing. He is down to maybe an army of 5000 people, maybe 3000. They have no ammunition. These guys are literally marching barefoot through snow, the enlistment is about to go up in january. This is the low point. Washington is actually thinking point,piont at this if i cannot do something, i will go west of the allegheny and conduct there. God knows what would have happened. But then it turned around. We all know he decides to move across the delaware and trenton and thats quickly princeton. Subsequently princeton. It allows troops to sign on, and it allows them to keep supplies coming, allows troops to have a safe winter. Why did that all happen . Because of intelligence. It happened because he knew the order of battle, who was sitting in princeton. Was colonel knew it hesshions regiment that had fought from long island through manhattan and new jersey. He knew they were a Battle Tested group, but also knew that they had been in constant combat for five months. He knew that the new jersey militia had basically had him surrounded a trenton and hinder ed their efforts at logistics, prohibited them from getting firewood and he also knew, in my belief, a lot about the colonel primarily from an individual named john honeyman. There is some debate whether his story is true. I happen to believe it is. He was a spy for washington and was able to tell washington that raul was a strong character who had no respect for the american soldier whatsoever, to the point that he refused to build fortifications around trenton. His famous quote is if the americans are foolish enough to attack, we will repel them with our bayonets. He also drank a little bit, which might have been one of the reasons washington chose that particular time to attack that he did, not that the troops were drunk because they werent, although sometimes youll hear that they were. Washington was able to have a great victory at a crucial time because he truly understood the enemy and understood the weakness of the enemy. Same thing is true of princeton as well, thanks to some crucial debriefing and his knowledge of the troops at princeton and the fact that a spy only referred to in official correspondent as a young gentleman was able to tell him the defensive positions around princeton and the one unguarded area that the british had not put up a defense in. Ok, so washington was unable to take princeton, another victory, another bit of morale, a few more troops, more enlistments at a very crucial time in our history. Then he ends it all up with an excellent deception plan that causes the british to believe that his army is about four times bigger than it is. This is a classic deception plan. Among other things, writing up false estimates of troop strength, leaving them in places where merchants are traveling through and just happen to see them on a persons desk when that person is called out of the room or taking the same troops and as the british prisoners are being exchanged, have them take a route past a concentration where troops of different flags are marched in circular to indicate that he has more than he has or lighting up certain buildings to indicate occupancy that isnt there, all of which saves him in a crucial war period from december of 1776 to the spring of 1777. Finally, let me Say Something about yorktown. I think we are all aware of how important that was. What we seldom dwell on is that yorktown was made possible because of the strong deception plan that washington used for some nine months against british commander general clinton in new york, making him believe that as the French Forces and American Forces were meeting above new york that their intent was to attack new york city, which kept clinton from reinforcing cornwallis in the tidewater area. The book goes into detail. Some were his most valuable intelligence sources because they were individuals who the british had recruited for three and four years and actually used as couriers to carry their command instructions up to canada and down to the south. He he used some of his best collection capabilities for the deception operation, and it was extremely effective. But we never hear much about that. Hat we hear about is how cornwallis was defeated. It was due primarily to the deception plan that kept clinton believing that new york was the target until all of the american and most of the French Forces had actually moved south of the city. At that point, it was too late because the french had effectively blocked off tidewater. Now, i have to also say a couple words about the two people that we always relate with spying in the revolutionary war. If you read any book on it, whether its a biography or an actual book on the war, if you look under spies, youre probably going to find two names. You are going to find nathan hale and Benedict Arnold. But the truth of the matter is most of what we know about nathan hale is frankly a myth created primarily in the early 19th century. From an intelligence point of view, the one thing to know about nathan hale is if you want to run a good intelligence operation, from selecting an agent to having an objective to how you train to how you do communication, you do everything opposite than what was done with nathan hale. He was a very brave man, deserves a lot of respect for being willing to die for his country, but he was an incredibly poor choice for his job. I will give you one prime example. This was a man who did not believe in telling a lie. Let me tell you, you dont want an intelligence agent behind enemy lines who is not willing to tell a lie because it doesnt work out very well. And also with all his faults and how badly the operation was structured and i frappingly blame washington frankly blame washington for this in the book because he had the ultimate responsibility, it turned out that the reason he was caught was not inherptly because of mistakes that inherently because of mistakes that were made, it was because the british had a better counterIntelligence Officer working against him, named robert roberts, some of you may remember. Second was Benedict Arnold. Benedict arnold is an interesting figure because there are still people today who say he was a hero at a certain given point. We have to give him some latitude. He was really harassed by the Continental Congress. The politics of this were really bad. He paid out of his own pocket, wasnt reimbursed. Some of this is true, although like happened to many people people, they did not become traitors. But when you analyze this strictly from an intelligence point of view as i did in the book, you find that as opposed to this being a huge blow to the american cause, in reality it was probably one of the two biggest blunders that British Intelligence made because they andled him so badly. His volunteering effort was almost put aside for other things. He was not vetted before, all because the officer handling it, young major andre, was a staff officer much more attuned to handling the social responsibilities of being an aide to a commanding general than the intelligence aspects of it. Had Benedict Arnold been properly handled, kept in place, the damage he could have done to the revolution at that point may not have changed the course of a war but would definitely have changed the course of negotiations that led to peace. So i honestly believe that if you look at the revolution from a political point of view or a leadership point of view or an economic point of view ive actually read books that have looked at it from a marxist point of view, that adding the intelligence overlay allows the individual to take a much better look at why things happened the way they did. Another aspect that frankly i think has been to a large degree ignored, except perhaps in four r five books since the 1940s, [applause] all right. Thats better. Thank you, ken. Now we will have the opportunity to ask questions. After the question and answer period, he will be in the back signing books if you are interested. We have a significant ply of books, theyre selling well. But first open it up for any questions. Yes, maam. Wait for the microphone, please. Well, my question is actually not directly related to the book itself, but i am just curious, as most people are, i am sure, touring the museum. We know most c. I. A. Agents are spies who are clandestine, but then every now and then you hear people say, i retired from the c. I. A. So are they supposed to know that they worked with the c. I. A. Or not everybody is a spy in the c. I. A. . So i dont know what the difference is. Are we supposed to know or not . When you are on agentive duty, your connection with the agency is not made public in most cases, but also its misconstrued. A spy is someone who has access to information of value. The c. I. A. Officer seldom has that. Normally a c. I. A. Officers job is to recruit and effectively manage and collect reporting from what you would call a spy, someone who actually has the access. So when a c. I. A. Person refers to himself or herself as a spy, you have to wonder what theyre thinking they did. I dont know. I am sorry. That would be a whole course in itself. I just wonder, when we went to world war ii and we helped the french against the nazi germany, do you think ha that we felt indebted to the french on some level because of their help to us over the revolutionary war . Kenneth i think we probably repaid that debt after world war i with the horrible bloodshed and the amount of money we poured into it. I think at the point of world war ii, it was simply the need for a strong ally presence to overcome a vastly superior german army at the time. Thank you, ken, very much. You had made only brief mention and this is a brief talk robert towns jepped and i long wondered why there is a statue of nathan hale who failed and not one of Robert Townsend who was a great success. You also mentioned andre, who was a fascinating man, i believe. I have written about him. D his tomb at westminster yes, westminster. The king had a brilliant and you call it . T do yeah, epitaph, which includes the phrase he showed too much zeal, which of course is what killed him and what destroyed their chance to have arnold as a longterm asset. Kenneth clp exactly. I agree with you. I often wonder why we had nathan hale there. There is a statue outside of the auditorium at c. I. A. Headquarters at nathan hale. Its a very heroic pose as an individual. The truth is we have no idea what nathan hale looked like except another part of the entire myth. But he was he deserves credit because he was more than willing to die for his country while others werent. The culpers have a he are newed interest now because of the amc series and a book that is a historical fiction book called the secret six that is able to play out characterizations a little bit better because they are able to use a fictional pproach to it. The issue of spying on allied powers has currently surfaced. I am wondering, during the revolution, were there espionage friends, against our allies . By the british the british did an excellent job penetrating the french government and penetrating extremely well our diplomatic no, we were too busy basically hanging on. There was, however, one proven well, in paris the french government obviously watched the three commissioners, the american commissioners very carefully. But in the army itself, one of the foreign contractors an interesting point they started a tradition that today people seem to think just started during one of the gulf wars, which was the hiring of contractors to serve in the u. S. Army. The Continental Congress hired a lot of Foreign Military officers in specialized fields like engineering because the expertise didnt exist in america. One of those officers, dekalb, was a french spy who while he died gallantly, but he reported back privately his view of how the war was going to the french government, something a military attache would do today who was attached to a foreign government. In my previous experience, the National Interests of various countries are always different. So consequently it is always good for policymakers to know hat somebody elses agenda is. My understanding is that spying was not a very gentlemanly thing to do in the 18th century, and whats interesting about nathan hale is he was a gentleman. I believe that his friends tried to talk him out of taking this mission because it wasnt a very gentlemanly thing to be a spy, and i wondered if you might talk about that a little bit and if George Washington had any feelings about that. He did. Thats a very good point. The first individual selected by colonel knowlton and the rangers, which the army claims to be the First Military intelligence group, which is the reason their insignia has 1775 on it, that was the group that washington asked to select someone to go behind the enemy lines in new york. The first individual that he wanted to do this job refused for exactly the reason you said. He said no, i am a gentleman. You are right, many of hales friends did try to talk him out of accepting it because it was ot considered gentlemanly. It goes back to what burton was saying about the culper ring. While the war was going on, washington was fairly generous with his money and even more generous with his advice on how this very complex espionage ring in new york was supposed to be run. But right after the war was over with i note in my book the absolute truth that after the war the interest in the intelligence agent is really considered in a much less friendly light than they are during the war. He writes very tellingly, now i am not sure that all the money i spent on the ring was worthwhile. Truth of the matter it was but for exactly that reason, because washington also was a gentleman and i am not suggesting that townsend wasnt or anything like that, but you are right. That concept of its beneath me think frankly i today its still true. This is directed toward the french. In the world wars, do you think if we would have cried out for the french to help us, do you think the wars would have gone quicker, more swiftly . The french government was in a position where they were not adequately prepared to declare war on the british until after the battle of saratoga, where the American Forces proved that they were Strong Enough to defeat an army in the field. It was really touch and go. I mean we came so close in december of 1776 to totally dissipating as an army that it is remarkable. The fascinating aspect of sarteeg is historians saratoga is that historians predict 80 of the gunpowder that comprised the Campaign Came from hortalez and company. That allowed Benjamin Franklin to use propaganda and other aspects and at that point the french crown turned over its armament by selling off its old armament for shipment to the u. S. To the point that it was able to take on Great Britain along with spain. If i could jump in, you talked about the fact that since its so long ago, you have the luxury of talking about sources and methods and you can use real names. On the other hand, being so long ago, documenting it is problematic talking about intelligence and how close to the vest that washington kept a lot of these spy rings. A lot of what i have heard about intelligence from this comes even after the war when washington is billing the Continental Congress for the amount of money out of pocket. How difficult was it to come up with the actual evidence for writing this book, something new . The time in between made it very difficult to come up with. The primary documents are often difficult not just because theyre so old but if you have ever tried to read the spelling from someone who wrote in the 18th century, god help you, you need glasses. Washington was very good about protecting sources and methods. However occasionally he would flip. In the case of the ring, lot of subsequent documents were found in the papers of certain individuals involved, some of his staff people. But also in the pension records, because by the 1830s, you found extensive records explaining what they did during the war and justifications that involved officers affirmations of their actions. There is one individual, just because it speaks to your point, named david mclane, a delaware guy who was one of washingtons very good Intelligence Officers on several occasions, not only around philadelphia but he also did personal reconnaissance that allowed wayne to do a bayonet charge. He was at some other places. But his documents are fascinating because this was a very disorganized guy. He only had a thought would take whatever piece of paper he had on him and would write down what he thought. You would have a bill for a horse one time and on the back youd have something written such as arnold is involved with the british, which he did write. But youd have no idea when he wrote that, whether he wrote it before or after the fact, because he had written it on the back of a piece of paper. In the case of general green, i have done original research. I wept through his 26 volumes of correspondence and went back and looked at their correspondence. Thats why it took 20 years, i think. Right. Were the british the military spies that were british, was there any reason other than greed that they were spying for americans . Got to be very careful about who is a spy for the british because everybody was british until july but seriously, its not fair to call someone who was loyal to the crown a spy. Very few examples of high level spies within the american structure. Benjamin church is the best example. He was a nasty spy. He did it strictly for money. He was one of the leaders of the mechanics, first Intelligence Organization. What i didnt mention was that general gates actually had the first Intelligence Organization penetrated because he did have church reporting on it. But it put him in a fascinating situation because if he bothered to arrest all of the leaders of the mechanics, then the committee of safety and sons of liberty would have set up another group and he wouldnt know who they were. O its kind of a problem you constantly have, the devil you know ver is suss the devil you dont know versus the devil you dont know if you monitor what theyre doing. After we were supplied by this French Company for two years, did we find a way of making our own guns or did that Company Still keep supplying us . After 1778, and the formal alliance with france, french warships could escort bringing military supplies in. Before then, it had to be done covertly, through harbor entrances or through crib cran islands. Once the weight of the French Military could come to play, it was an entirely different deal. But we never got to the point where we would reduce gunpowder or arms in a sizable number. That goes through the war of 1812 for that matter. Please join me, again, the International Spy museum in thanking ken daigler to talk about his book today. He will be in the back signing it if you want to ask any further questions or you want to purchase his book and have him sign it for you. He is available for that. Thank you again. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2019] very interesting. Hard surface but very cohesive material of the same sort. Try to get a rock in here. Now you are watching American History tv. Every weekend beginning saturday at 8 00 a. M. Eastern, we bring you 48 hours of unique programming exploring our nations past. American history tv is only on cspan3. I believe theyre setting it p now. Houston radio check. Loud and clear. Roger. Roger. Next on the presidency, Louis Galambos talk about the evolution of ikes leadership style from a west point cadet to president of the United States. The Kansas City Public Library hosted this program. Good evening. I am the executive director of the eisenhower foundation, and its wonderful to see s