Transcripts For CSPAN3 International Ideologies U.S. Foreign Policy 20240714

Weekend on cspan three. , historians discuss ideas that shape into national ideologies. Topics include 19th and 20th century and unilateralism and the impact of fear on u. S. Foreign policy. We are going to start our last panel for the day. Incredibly exciting. Im one to keep my remarks short. We have billion people who should be speaking. To borrow davids description of the panel. This is the panel on international ideologies. Ideas onng on these elite and grassroots levels that have shaped the United States. Unilateralism, internationalism. And the way it does Foreign Policy. The first people speaking today is an associate professor of history at Michigan State converting the world in the early american republic. Of is working on this study missionary diplomats. Tentatively titled Foreign Missions and Foreign Relations in 19th century america. Quick going to try to be since we have such a robust panel. At first i thought it was too silly for a conference on a serious topic. In the broadest scope over the second half of the 19th century. Thought i would start off by talking about how i came to look at this project. How it relates to my book project. One has to do with chronology and one has to do with sources. The peril of 19th century. To thes my story relate 20th century . We have so many 19th century views this weekend. My first book is in the early republic. Civilization and christianity are overlapping categories. When these missionaries and their supporters look out, they understood it in terms of hierarchy and season is him, focused on religion and culture and race. They expected major cultural and political change. Thats early 19th century. A different way missionaries are talking about the world and people. You can think about this in the fabulous books of melanie mcallister. Through both missionary there are major differences and really compelling similarities. One thing im trying to think about as i work on my new project is how to marry that shift from the mid19th century into the early 20th century. Some of the key points thinking about in this transition is thinking about the shifting ideas, the emphasis on the adoption of civilization, on cultural transformation. Easilys debt easily assumed superiority of the early 19th century also gets challenged in interesting writ interesting ways. Also the leadership of women. As we think about that, the 20th we look at the fundamentalist and modern split as the major explanation for why we have these different stories. Visionariesook at in general and we can have evangelicals nearly split in the 20th century, that is one of the big differences. That is happening earlier and much more slowly than that explanation let us to think about. They are both evident in the 19th century. With myis working along colleague with what my colleague calls christian how might we think about those changes in broader ways . Not just keeping it to that fundamentalist story, but Something Else . Multiple do with generations of missionary experience by the mid to century. And theirhildren children who have grown up in their entire lives. What difference does that make about civilization and politics. About changing transportation and print culture opportunities. Creates new avenues of conversation and competing imparted has to do with Major Political changes. Of cosmopolitanism. What interests me the most is having to do with expertise throughout the century. They work to evangelize the world but explain the world through the dissemination of what they call missionary intelligence. In my book project, im exploring the ways in which missionary intelligence work connects the Foreign Mission movement to american diplomacy in different points of the 19th century, how it allows certain american missionaries to be deployed by the department. How we might explain the ways in which the 19th century model is and not like the 20th century model. Jobhow we might do a better across this. Eyes asian this periodiz ation. As i was flipping through these questions, i was flipping through the harold. Ive found as i was building through, a new column introduced in the late 19th century, called four young people. The 17thom 1879 into century. Out for aon stands couple of reasons. Suddenly there are images, which do not exist before the introduction. All the illustrations are only in it is more visually engaging. It is also sectioned off. As you get to the journal i wanted to spend some time with that column thinking about Young Readers and how ideology was being packaged and what that might tell us about larger conversations about shifting chronology, how they are packaged in different ways. Some of the fun sources you get when you thing about children and the readers. With a discussion of an earlier example of children missionary literature. Entitled phlet letters on the condition of the heathen, which gives us a sense of the contents. He positions himself as an expert on india, the idea of missionary as experts start early. The topics are on that which he knows best, india and his people. He tells the children that he lives in india and he knows the people, so he can give them a view of what this pete this place and people are like. The letters emphasize their wretchedness and wickedness. He talks about the need of the gospel in india and he dwells deeply on scenes of violence. Come awayreaders to understanding how bad hinduism for childrenn and in particular, he wanted them to understand that as American Christians they had a duty to support the movement through sacrificial donations to missionary organizations. That is in keeping with a lot of the mid 19th century and early 19th century juvenile missionary literature. People holds onto some key points in that genre all introducing important changes, the emphasis of missionary of expert as expert continues. Readers were supposed to understand that by virtue of their long residencies in the places where they lived, their close conflict with ordinary people, their knowledge of the language that missionaries knew what they were talking about in ways that other american writers might not. The tone of the columns is quite new. Readers were understood to care about missions not because they have a religious duty to do so, but they could import learn important things. Theynts of missions learned where the best geography students. Andionaries had fabulous exciting adventures so you might read these columns not because your sunday School Teacher is making you, but because they have actual interest for you outside of that. Individual columns might focus on geographic information, there are some very elaborate maps. They might focus on a profile of a missionary. They might include ethnographic discussions of the residence. Often they were written by missionaries who were writing short letters to Young Readers trying to describe where they lived and why their work was important. The racism that we see in the earlier examples remains. Had a sort of relativism that reflected back on american norms in a new way. Where as with the previous generation, other than his own experience was strange and wicked, the new generation would still talk about the strangeness of foreigners, but would say and you know when i meet them i think i ams they think i am strange too. They would have that kind of reflection that the strangeness is in the eye of the beholder. Tot wouldve been news previous generations. One of the columns that i talk about that i find the most exciting is on the question of expertise is the one on rev land reverend deforest who writes the problems of idolatry in japan and then talks about how he is in fact collecting the idols that his new congregation members are giving up in order to send them to the United States for Museum Collections in the u. S. To teach americans about various ancient asian cultures, which speaks to this constant back and forth of saying idols are bad, you need to give them up in order to be civilized and because we are civilized we want to consume them and look at them in different ways. Thinking about the role of missionaries playing this intermediaries and experts is where this will connect to my larger book in looking at how adults are reacting to this. In the interest of not taking too much time so we can all talk, i want to hit the Big Questions about ideology that we might think through. This comes down to thinking about childrens literature as a source of these conversations. This will connect to what daniel will be talking about tomorrow. What does it mean to be looking at these alongside sources written for adults . How are they different and what might they suggest . There are two things i might. 2. Ways thatis, the childrens literature tells us about the ideology of adults and authors. Missionary childrens literature is explicitly didactic. It is supposed to be teaching anddren in the most simple distilled form possible. For christian parents and adults, who believe in the Mission Movement and are trying to give their children a religious education, these texts are supposed to be the foundation that will get interested and get the next generation to continue giving to the movements. If you do not hook them as kids, you will not have the continuity of the movement. Of the way that childrens literature becomes the way of trying to take complicated, conversations adults are having and put them in terms a child can understand, see a clarifying clarified version of the conversation adults are having. What is harder to get at, and much more interesting, is thinking about them as sources for childrens ideology and this long term, what is the effect of reading this as a child, how does that shape your worldview Going Forward . This is one of the things that speaks to that question of chronology, change over time and continuity. One of the things with that boat that i talked about, it is built i missionary childrens donations called the morningstar. By the time the article is written is written, it is the second one. The boat talks about how their parents when they were children had been contributing to build the first morningstar. And now you can contribute to this. In some of the letters that the boat rights, he talks about how hes getting old probably she. She is getting old and does not know how much longer she will last and there are talk about replacing her with a steam engine and whether she wants to be replaced by a steam engine or not. There is this multigenerational, you are building this one and maybe your children will be donating to future boats. There is an understanding of continuity across time. There is a letter where you have a missionary who talks about the book he read as a child that made him want to become a missionary and it had an illustration which was reprinted people. Oung he talks about the experience of reading the letter when he was a kid and seeing this illustration illustration and how it understood his vocation. And now you, child today, what are you going to do next . I do not know what the readers do next. This is what is tricky about that, thinking about the examples that we have of this on the Young Readers. Often times when we are looking at missionary texts, youre people at the effects of who read missionary text usually become missionaries. That was informative for me. As we have seen with marys study of the reception of the marrow more the memoir where you have 200 children being named after her afterthefact, 200 people do not go off to be missionaries necessarily, that enough parents name their children after her. Ofre is a larger readership these sources, adults and children. Is not thepeople only example. There are standalone magazines, books, and other columns. There is a large readership consuming this information. What we might think about is how does breezy reading these sorts of sources then shape your understanding of the world. We can all think about transformative books we read as children. To be thinking about texts that are so explicitly didactic and attempting to shape someones worldview and are positioning themselves as the expert vision is how you here understand japan, idiot india, africa, and how it relates to your life. What i would like to see you all help me think through is how to think about Young Readers, and how the experience of reading this will be shaping the next generation. Sources,about these juvenile literature, might help us think about longerterm changes and slow changes in these bigger questions about ideology, chronology, and how we get to an early eight 19thcentury story to a mid 20th century story. It is in that generational readership that we may think that we have new ways of narrating that. I will end that they are. [applause] moving quickly along, next we have a professor of history and director of american studies at indiana university, purdue university, in indianapolis. He directed the institute for american thought and serves as the head of the division of american culture. He is the author of five books. Thank you. [applause] right, so, let us try to put a timer on here. I have this project that i am im on that looks at not sure if i want to do it over the course of United States history as a whole, or use Something Like an example that i will talk about today, the challenge of the catholic peace pastoral as the fulcrum and talk about why it became an interesting moment to talk about just war. Im interested in how religion has been used to confirm or analyze, or provide substance to peoples understanding of america as identity. Andrew and chris have had a lot of influence on the way i think about this stuff and they have read stuff that i have written. Before this project, one book that attempted to do this was god and war that looked at religion after 1945 as that if america is alert known for killing, and it affects the world that is disproportionate than any other place, that all comes back to the United States itself. That was one of the ways that i try to think how civil religion affected is affected by americas tradition of war. In this case, what i am looking offshoot of the project, because after vietnam, if you are killing and dying for a war that goes badly it throws the United States into a theological crisis, similar to the civil war. It engendered a similar crisis. This vietnam, there was rejuvenation and renaissance in just war, which is ironic because they were not many wars in American History then were unjust than vietnam. Of course, what people were talking about was not so much the ethics of war that comes remoralize how to American Foreign policy or evaluate foreign in moral terms by using just war as a vehicle to talk about the moral nature of the nation. And so, what im i what i am trying to do is talk about how ideology can masquerade as religion. I am sure a lot of people go yes, there is a lot of similarities and crossover. That is where i think it gets confusing. When does religion fly into ideology or become a vehicle for ideologies of power and masculinity . In this chapter, i tried to talk about a group of leaders on religious rights that use this theory in a very particular way, and i think it has a cognizant and how the religious right used abortion to moralize domestic politics at the same time. Has not think that just war gotten a month as much detention attention about the debate about abortion. So why has it not been seen in these terms . You can tell me whether or not it should be. Littlesame time as religious right is starting to pick up on just war, you have this other set of american intellectuals writing in ethics that have become captured by just war theory. Calling grays is one of the colin grays is one of the figures. They are trying to justify American Foreign policy in moral terms and trying to demonstrate that it is a force for good. And they are desperate to find a theory that can allow them to do that. And just war becomes one of the ways they do this. Vietnam, begins after Foreign Policy is in shambles, american identity is linked to wars, theution of vietnam syndrome grows out of this idea. Those afflicted with this conflicts wondered whether the United States could ever win a war again, and in the right way. And, also be in the right. Among the roads to hopeful redemption was the idea that they could import just war to make the case that america would not only win wars, but when it the right way and be in the right. About, howng different sides did not debate the medieval term of just war. Of thew different sides political struggle, for the sole of American Foreign policy used alter therrogate to debate about the morality of Foreign Policy. Michael walter has a role to play in this. He becomes popular after vietnam. He writes a book called just and unjust wars in 1977. He says that the non vietnam is the book that this gets any sort of play. Says it is because america has this long tradition of intimate relationship with war. And people, for the most part throughout American History, war has been seen as a force for great change, it affirms something good about the nation. Rarely has it been seen as a way to critique what is wrong with some sort of essence of the United States. And so, walter writes that during vietnam, created a moral imperative to talk about the nation. It was the left that began to use just war, opening the door for the debate that would emerge after vietnam. And engendering a reaction that the way that the left was using just war. From the start of this renaissance of just war theory, the theory itself and the term itself was not used to evaluate the ethics or combat. One readsrs book, no the whole thing. He is clear about this. It finds its way into military handbooks but soldiers read it, not the people sending them off. That is key to understand, and why there think why think there is much more to do in connecting to what is happening in the world and what is happening with the religious right and religious left. In all of this, almost oft of the blow, comes the challenge of peace from the catholic bishops. This peace pastoral in 1983. The catholic ships had written hadt war before 1983 and it come out softly against vietnam and ways for to be of ejectors. Re has been some upset dissent over war. After vietnam you had genuine dissent among religious institutions and leaders over the course of the war and whether or not it showed something fundamental about american life. Bishops argued that Nuclear Deterrence was immoral. That was their main theme. By making this argument they wanted to call someone into questionss, not just the reagan not just the reagans administration but also the United States. They rejected the notion of that the u. S. Was not necessarily a force for good in the world. And those were fighting words. That engendered a strong reaction. The reaction came across the right wing including right wing catholics. You have to take one step back. The reaction to the peace pastoral goes two ways. Administration do anything to american policy, not really. 1984, reagan is softening his rhetoric. ,here are people who testify but it does not change his Foreign Policy. What it does do is that it creates a new humanism on the right for militarism, aim militarism because now it is clear that the bishops have shown that if they can turn against u. S. Foreign policy who else out there in the vastness of the religious landscape might also be headed in that direction . That freaked people out at the leadership level, especially the evangelical protestants. It is that this moment around the early 1980s that people like George Michael George Weigle who became a bigger figure than he should be, Richard John Neuhaus who ran centers over the course of his life, they become key figures in bringing together protestants and catholics on the right to reclaim the moral authority over american lives. Euhaus will do it domestically. He says he wants a Christian Mark to emerge, someone who can create a theology that is competitive with communism and leftwing ideologies that seem to be attracting young people. Weigle wanted to be an american augustine, hold forth on what it means to be a moral nation and have them do bad things for the right reasons. That combination they hoped would be a winning one. They failed. Haus did not become the isistian marx and weigles not the american augustine, but they become a glue. That reaches out to the National Association of event gadget goals evangelicals were having problem with their members that come to the conferences that represent the millions of evangelicals across the United States. They are worried that these folks are becoming pacifistic or antiamerican like the catholic bishops have shown some catholics are becoming. Helps to write what is called the guidelines for peace, freedom, and security, published in 1986. These guidelines set out how all evangelicals should understand the american role in the world, how america should fight wars, how they should justify wars and what militarism is for evangelicals. It is something that immediately gets a harsh reaction from the moderate left among catholics. And, from protestants. It is clear that they have made this moral high ground. Proposes something, and alternative and a true back the marx beats others, we would be telling a different story, but they do not. Soon afters fairly this is that you begin to have just war, and the language seep into policymaking at the highest levels. One example that we know is George H W Bushs gulf war in this pronouncement that it is a just war to defend the build up and then the invasion of kuwait and iraq. Neuhauseigle and defending the pronouncements and his actions through just war language. It is at this stage in the ,ame it is clear that just war what walter imagined would be, which is a healthy debate about the ethics of the America Fighting wars or how americans see the rest of the world and how the world should trust the United States as it edges into military conflicts, just war is no longer being used for that. It is being used to silence debate over the ethics of militarism, and become a cudgel to beat back the left on this moral terrain. One of the things that seals the deal, at least for me. By george w. Bushs time in uhaus haveigle and ne labeled everyone who are asstioning this theory functional pacifists, and that is the worst thing you can be. Then there is no more security left, euler leaving the united you are leaving the United States defenseless. I leave the question, what is better, being a functional pacifists or functionary for the state. Clearly they chose the latter. Thank you. [applause] danielle up next we have penny, the professor of history and the william r can professor of american studies at the university of virginia. She is the author of a number of jazz investorsng play the cold war, race against him higher against empire, which won a prize. Please give her a round of applause. [applause] penny thank you to chris, dani, and david for inviting me. This is a Wonderful Group of people. After these panels i am having project and sensory envy. I am saying why did i not study the 18th century. What am i doing, why did i leave the 1940s like, oh gosh. Really overstimulated by all of these great papers and it is leading to a crisis. Paper comes out of the first three chapters of a book i am finishing about contested legacies and claims about the cold war. Conference,t with a i am not going to talk a lot about the paper i will talk about the key confrontations that i talk about or the contestations as George H W Bush in 1990. H mandela some of their differences up to the iraq war et cetera. I want to start by just talking a little bit about the way that i approach ideas of ideology and discovering that we are big fans of the same authors and it follows that the vein of which that he was speaking about this morning. I will do that relatively quickly and come back to trying to address how i have seen and how i am seeing this moment as a shifting moment of Global Politics in need to put together a new hegemony, and what is overtly the ideological process contained within that. And, in a rough sense, and my favorite formulation of ideology towards a new reflection and revolutions of our times, which is a 1990 book. That book is more of a reflection of possibilities of radical politics. One thing that i think he does which is really effective is to talk about the ideological and throught forms which a society tries to institute itself as tries to close off meanings. Institute itself as the normalized and cut off ways of understanding how it is humanly constructed did and how the center of politics is. I think the reason, and i have my own sort of love of michael hunts work, and putting the world always putting the u. S. In the world, not just the u. S. Up there and the world. When i teach u. S. And the world, i use his global textbook, and the reader that goes with it because this dunes are reading ho chi minh and mao. Even though they are reading other even if they are looking at other parts of the world. Other people have commented that he draws on a more anthropological motion of ideology with ideology, which i do not think it is closed and fixed. Helways think about his might say do not talk about the 20th century, but he had the powerful intervention when he writes about the abuse of history and construction of ideology around the war in iraq. In that spirit, he would be appreciating this. If you start with a simple totality and that notion it does not inherently emphasize the contest in contradiction that we need to do an ideological critique. There is the classical notion, and people run away from talking about this, but it comes up in politics as a class as a consciousness. Someone misrecognizes the interest of the class they are in. Inverted notion of consciousness, because we cannot do away with misrecognition. We do not want to say a subject is miss recognizing themselves miss recognizing themselves against the true lessons, but that they do take whether it is themselves or their project to be something that is essential and natural and normal. Sense that inverted we need in our critique. Just love the work because it is about history and the radical contingency of finding the moment of a new social formation that forecloses others in various ways. Moment,y drawn to this theink of that is both breaking up of the eastern bloc and the collapse of the soviet union. It is a moment of many continuities and many new things, many ruptures. This is all going on. Simply,king, to put it at the way that the project in the stories and ideologies of bush, and people around him, rumsfeld, toeney naturalize and normalize violence that was in fact the result of cold war policies. Normalizeturalize and , radicaled markets capitalism as the only natural and normal mode of the world. Anything else was just a horrible distortion. So, that is to jump into some of and i do think i started to be drawn to wanting to center an observation as early as 19 three that if the west does not get up in the east it will give rise to its own nationalisms which it had managed well in the cold war. Trump,ard not to jump to but i do want to say two things in terms of discussion here that as i i do think that draw out the paper that the u. S. Recognizetently National Forums over on federated forums. The big example that goes out brokendow today is russia away from the soviet union followed by the ukraine. Nationalism,sian and this is and then yugoslavia, and i will come back to that. Andink that a part of this part of what i am thinking about idea of thisnk the doctrine that stated and was controversial at the time, that no hegemonic forums should be allowed to reemerge in Eastern Europe and the soviet bloc. That is critically important. Having aof the u. S. Unipolar power. If you look at the micro actions in various places, it is taken seriously. That also means that, as you see in bushs confrontation with is bad news ton. The United States by 1980. Ourre just not going to pay dues. You have all of these weakened organizations and people do not turn around on that in very significant ways. So, the other thing i want to say in the broader sense is that in this moment of flux, i find it useful to talk about hegemonic projects in terms of projects. Enemy this hedge is the moment when a former alliance is an arrangement, by which the u. S. Tried to assert its power in the world and it is completely changing rapidly. The first set, and it is they come to the United States. Errorss this comedy of in misunderstandings. A very them including anticommunist labor leader in poland, they say how can you help us you need to help gorbachev. They are very committed to a mixed market, and very antiauthoritarian. The vision that they see is more of a meld of the best of western european reforms reforming socialism with a human face, and not losing social safety nets, not losing what they see as socialist values that were grossly distorted by authoritarian governments. Deep desire to demilitarized. Really imagining a a demilitarized world. The warsaw pact is irrelevant, and this freaks bush out. He cannot even take this seriously. But i would argue that he does an enormous work. He is on the phone with leaders all over the world every day. Anonymous amount of work to bring people onto his side even bore for the a walk even before the iraq war. Thing case of hobble, one that gets him over to his side in terms of the iraq war by talking to him about human rights. And, the courage. Somebody else might talk about something entirely different. I think it speaks to how much of a profound desire for a demilitarized world, and that is the vision of the reformers in the eastern bloc, it is also mandelas vision, how much that was on the table in the work that went into getting rid of that. Five minutes, ok, great. Somewhat go in Chronological Order because the was big moment around this the war in iraq. I wanted to talk about talk about bush and mandela. A little bit for those who have not read the paper, mandela comes to the stage, bush had been involved in putting him on the list of major terrorists and did not get off the list until 2008. Despise bush despises him and everything about his project. Mandela comes in they have a confrontation about nonviolence. And mandela takes the high course yousays of would agree with me if you would just understand. We have no Political Rights and our country, so we have to maintain armed resistance. Once we have Political Rights we would never use violence, we have no other choice. This comes down to a question of to justthe connection and unjust war wars, is it simply the state or the u. S. In this . They have a confrontation over nationalization and the economy. Bush finds it ridiculous, you have to give up all of these plans. In the book and the paper i talk about a longer story about what happens with the anc constitution which bravely favors banks and helps uphold the oligarchy of companies. They are under enormous pressure from the british, the u. S. , the imf, so that is another story. ,he other big confrontation is and this plays out on television along with a lot of places, is people challenging mandela over andalliances with cuba gaddafi. Again, this is the end of the age of free world. The apartheid helped byas been other people. Refuses toolutely give up and criticize these alliances or talk about that this was the politics, these were my allies, this is the condition we were in and this was the side you were on. Interesting moment notuse these things do always surface in such a visible way. I guess quickly let me just say a little bit more hobbles point is about yugoslavia. This is toward not towards nationalizing naturalizing or normalizing the idea of a free market, but of the civilizationist ideology that people thought in. Will say mored i about the clash of civilizations because that resonates a little bit more. It is case of yugoslavia, the most successful socialist country. It was a buffer between the sofa union the soviet union. This is one sense of ideological, because if reagan weaponized the imf to go after countries like yugoslavia and flatten anything that was not free market, this is interesting because it does not make sense in terms of u. S. Security. This has been a good ally and stabilized things. It only makes sense from the idea of radical antigovernment and privatization. That is kind of one element in it. Then, in yugoslavia, as wars start to break out in bosnia which hobble is so concerned that the west is not intervening , many people. People have written this a lot. Clinton did not intervene because he had read Robert Kaplan who had written faltering ghosts balkan ghost and these problems are timeless and clinton thought that these people are always killing each other. I wanted to say a few things about civilizations, ideology and the different registers. I showed go back and say that in the war in iraq i should go back and say that in the war in in september. They have gone into saudi arabia and they have not gone into iraq, bush gives a speech and he talks about defending the law the rule of law versus the rule of the jungle. He tells a fabricated story about a young woman who is seen who has seen iraqi shoulders throwing babies on the floor. He tells the story over and over, and he tells the story and really pulls into this language of jungle law, and civilization. My own sense is i do not think that bush had any steak and allows it in islamophobia, i think he was scrambling, he was and he ise polls, pulling everything he can. This resonates deeply and immediately. Robert kaplan comes along and he has read at every policy level and this stuff is scary. It does make these timeless hatreds in the whole balkan region and it is worse when he gets to africa. Clancyalso got very tom novel, bestseller movies, immediately his first book japanes a revengeful attacking the United States. In 1991 people said japan was the biggest problem. By 1996 he has novels where iran and iraq has formed an islamic public and are after people. This is before 9 11 and before george h. W. Bush. That is throwing out a lot quickly. To see thatwe have this kind of fear of the outside, islamophobia, deep xenophobia that takes hold later was starting to be reduced immediatelya after the cold war. It is along with Anthony Lakes idea with a rogue state. Once people are commie list communist, now they are out law states that have decided to be outside the family of nations, slowlywing an enemy that Gains Traction and could get picked up both after 9 11 and by donald trump. I said the name. [applause] danielle this is our longest panel, so we will take a moment to shake out a little bit, breathe, and let the nutrients from all the information sink in. We are going to hear from andrew preston, a professor of American History and a fellow at cambridge university. He is the author and editor of seven books including sort of spirit, shield of faith, and american Foreign Relations. Please give him a round of applause. [applause] andrew thank you for that introduction, thank you david and dani for the invitation to speak at this wonderful conference. I would especially like to thank chris for hosting the conference. Nobody puts on a show like chris. I have been to a conference that chris had organized before, and you and if you wanted to go into conference organizing would be at the top of the profession because there are not any conferences like this. I mean this intellectually as well as professionally, personally, and in every sense. Thank you to your effort and the team who have supported chris in organizing the conference. One of the problems of going second to last on the day of a lot of papers is that we are running out of time so i am going to have to be short. We were given 12 minutes on a panel of five people to present and i will try to keep to around that. Also because the papers have gone before have been stimulating and enriching that i lots of scribbles on my own notes and i will have to read scribbles as i have been changing my own ideas and reformulating them not just according to the papers that i read and have been presented a that i also in the q hope the editors have been taking down. I want to take is my starting point in my paper the same one that i have in the essay version that you all read, and that is to point to the reach of desk the recent crisis between north korea and the United States that has been fluctuating over the last year. It has been interesting and impossible to predict. I had a reference letter for a student who wrote on nixons opening to china, and i had a couple of lines in the reference letter for nonspecialists on how earth shattering nixons trip to china was at the time. I said in his reference letter which i was sending out as late as 2017 that think about it today, it would be like donald trump and kim jongun meeting at a summit and it would be all smiles and photographs. It would be a sunshine moment which will never happen. And then i had to change that reference letter right away. It is impossible to predict. Trumpkim summits have followed on from decades of tensions since the korean war. You could argue that u. S. North korean tensions was never as serious as they were until early 2017 when it seemed as if the United States and north korea were on the brink of war, more on the brink than it had been ever before. And, of course that more meant that moment has abated. In 2017, it was a possibility. The odds were more in favor of a u. S. North korean war they are not. For the purposes of this conference what i find most fascinating and most puzzling is why it happened at all. The immediate trigger was north Korean Development of Missile Technology that could hit west coast of the United States. This was the existential spread that america could not tolerate. I put those words in inverted, and in inverted commas marksem in quotation because they were used by politicians to refer to north korea. This is what i found puzzling at the time and i am thankful for chris, david, and dani for the opportunity to figure this out greaterit into a context. I found the thoughts puzzling. We have live with this threat for a long time, not just from nuclear missiles, but short range missiles that can obliterate south korea, also from artillery that could eoul in the same manner a Nuclear Weapon could, in the United States tolerated this for a long time just as south korea had to. When north korea could erratically hit the United States, only then did it become an intolerable risk. Once missiles were in the range of alaska, california, and oregon, i think, became an existential threat. It jumped up from tension to imminent war scare. Assessment, this extreme assessment and diagnosis of what kind of risk would be acceptable that i find strange, that the United States could not accept a small scale what south korea and other countries have lived with for decades, or what north korea has lived with for decades and having american ms. Coat missiles targeting north korea. The strangest part of the puzzle was that we have the most powerful country in the world, probably the most powerful country relative to the power of other countries that the world has seen in millennia, not just centuries. It is acting in such a fearful way, much more fearful than countries in the region who are in the region and the people who live in those countries. The most powerful nation was acting as the most fearful nation. My paper is an attempt to work out the role of fear as a driving force of u. S. Foreign policy. Aspect of an ideology . I have a section of this which i will flesh out a bit more. It depends on how you defined ideology and we all have different definitions and mike said one of the problems is that it has such a protean character and it is impossible to define. Onould say, on the basis what the common understanding is and how michael hunt understands it, and how a lot of us understand it, fear is not an ideology. No matter how capacious lee we define it capaciously we define it, fear does not belong to the realm of ideologies, instead it belongs to a word that has not been used yet today, it belongs to the realm of culture and history of the emotions, and to affect more than two an all more than to an ideology. Said, i developed this in my paper as to whether what michael hunt was or whether he was an analyst of culture instead of ideology. Idea that draw on his he lays out in his book and how ideology is seen as a cultural system in a way that to me, in my in expert way strikes me as culture rather than ideology. If i were michaels editor, i would suggest retitling the book. To classify that as ideology, then fear probably belongs in that concept of ideology and belongs in our ideologies. My problem with fear as an ideology is not is it because is because it is not an idea, it is a source of ideas. It is a condition that affects the application of ideas in the formulation of ideas. It has much more and comment in common with affect than ideas. The ideaing a book on of National Security in American History, and the chapter that i have written draws a lot on that research. When i was first invited to participate, i thought of which ideology i would choose oren and present, and the obvious one was National Security. I thought it would be more fun to write about the inverse of National Security, and secured insecurity. To look at something less cohesive and identifiable than Something Like National Security. To look at the inverse of security, insecurity. Notw caveats, and i am going to go into detail in the interest of time in terms of the detail of the arguments, just to sketch them in broad form. A few caveats. I do not sketch a caricature that americans are paranoid. Or that they are unusually fearful. Second, although i will come back to that in a controversial way. Second, i do not to imply that the threats that americans are afraid of are not real. In other words i do not portray the North Koreans as peaceful and misunderstood in the United States. My purpose toot criticize certain u. S. Policy is although it might be obvious how i feel about those particular policies. Im not here to criticize clinton, bush, obama, or trump further handling of the korean crisis. About i like to think that there is this pervasive fear that is a nonideological among americans. Fourth, there is a lot of political theory on fear, and i do not have time and the expertise to go into it. This political theory is interesting and informative. Concern here in my remaining five minutes or however much i have. I argue that fear is unusually prevalent in u. S. Foreign policy and has been an unusually powerful to terminator. This is because american or dutch americans have a low tolerance for risk and a high asium to exert control high capacity to think they can assert control. Powers in all assets of in their because even though i am not a specialist in except maybees, canada which does not matter for all sorts of countries for all sorts of reasons and not in this context, but when we look at major or minor powers the u. S. Is unusual in having such an extremely the patients notion of selfdefense and National Security. Whether that makes the United States exceptional or not, i will leave that hanging. I would argue that the predominance of fear is a new development. It is not as old as the republic, not a completely new phenomenon that some political commentators have been saying recently. David brooks wrote a column in the New York Times that talked about this new sense of fear in American Foreign policy that is something that has only emerged in the last few years. I do not suggest that domestic fears, especially about race are not old, they are very old as we have seen in some of the papers. I do not to suggest that there have been no foreign threats to the United States going back to the republic. There have been threats to the United States, or threats that americans have identified as threats in the 19th century and early 20th century. The constancy of fear that leads a very extreme sense of threat perception is not and does not go back to the founding of the republic or the civil war, or to the 19th century, or even to the first world war. Instead, and this brings me to my mark bradley moment, i would argue that the prevalence of fear, as a prevailing concision condition began in the era of the depression and crystallized in the early cold war. When a long period of free secured he for the United States ended with the japanese attack on pearl harbor in 1941. But i would slightly predate this notion of Free Security to slightly before 1941. In this period we had franklin americans,owing that the only thing they had to fear was fear itself and promised a freedom from fear. He was also stoking fears, especially about foreign powers. Michaelas from paper, doing so in ways that were not altogether realistic. Of americanoduct globalism and superpower status. Here is another paradox, the paradox in that the more powerful the United States became, the more fearful it became. That is really the core argument of my paper. This was because the more power the United States had, the more it had to lose. Particularly when we consider that American Defense requirements were global, drawing upon an economic preponderance of power area power. Anywherecould be found if the frontiers of National Security could be found anywhere, threats could be found anywhere. Thely this was also because United States became incredibly powerful in this era and seemingly had the note teri technology and economic wherewithal to take it on. In a lot of ways, especially compared to every other country,very other major belligerence the United States did have a withwar, and emerged unparalleled supremacy. Its capabilities were enormous. Its capabilities to exchange at change itsl to external environment was important. Was in normas. Was enormous. To the limitless expansion of National Security. Why tolerate any risk if you had the means to eliminate it, which of course the americans thought they had but realized they didnt in places like north korea and vietnam and later on in afghanistan and iraq. There was no need to be discriminating about ends if the means were apparently inexhaustible. About to say a quick word methodology and focus and finish with a few closing remarks. Conference at this take the detail of case study approach, which i have found endlessly fascinating. Toook a different approach take in ideology, in my case fear. If the editors were to tell me we were actually to move more the case study emphasis, they were there would be an aspect on some of the episodes i examined briefly, in which i could examine in more detail. To me they are all postworld war ii and exemplify this prevailing condition of american fear. It could be the entry into world war ii and Franklin Roosevelts launch into the National Security revolution. Would be the case study i use in the cuban missile crisis, which is very similar to the crisis from the korean peninsula, when the perception of the change in deuces tremendous american fears, but things had to change a whole lot themselves in the actual situation on the ground, but they shouldnt change conceptually very much. Vietnam. Xamine i just have a placeholder for the paragraph on that. I think they all have more value in looking at them synthetically in the period since world war ii. I would like to end on this note. Somewhatf fear is different from other recent commentators and analysts and it is different from some of the discussions we were having earlier today. I view the fear americans expressed not as an elite creation or manipulation of popular fears for ulterior mold all tear your motives. But something that was sincerely held. A rethinktle bit of due to michaelas paper and her comments this morning, but i think it can be both. I think it can generate and manipulate fears, but also hold those fears sincerely. I think there was definitely the case in iraq. I have been amazed by through the record and the , i have been amazed at how often the declassified record matches the public rhetoric of the time, and there isnt all that much discrepancy, especially when it comes to portraying the stakes. Not so much for fdr himself. He was more minute relating and creating fears that didnt exist and unleashed a monster he couldnt control. But he used the fear elites used to legitimize and mobilize certain policies. By taking the concept of fear seriously, it would help explain why worstcase scenarios often, in fact usually become the for American Foreign policy making. It would help explain some of in places likens vietnam and iraq. To finish the day we have krista firm mcknight nichols, who has a whole page. In 2016 he was awarded an Andrew Carnegie fellowship. A distinguished lecturer. He has an amazing ted talk. His book. D peril is please welcome him. [applause] i didnt have to travel far from this conference. Taking my instruction to all the great people who came here. Then im going to talk about my methodology and core assumptions. I will talk about the current moment and attempt to say we totally misunderstand it and it goes much further back, and then we can talk about continuity versus rupture. The primordial American Foreign policy ideology is unilateralism. Outset,ey are at the there with the declaration of independence. Treaty, with the model this treaty largely written by john adams, which is great to teach, and reinforced how significant this arc is of unilateralism and Foreign Policy in the late 19th centuries. It is they are throughout the early 19th century. About ove to hear hear from our 19thcentury century specialists about why the u. S. Goes from conflict after conflict after conflict. It is that from oriole value that primordial value that is my initial prod vocation provocation. In terms of methodology, one of the things i have been attracted to in almost two decades of studying u. S. Foreign relations is a fascination with moments of paradox, strange bedfellows, and. Hings that dont make sense was very fashionable to be doing transnational work. That has been a fantastic part of our field. What always struck me and perplexed me about this move was then relegated to the background and equal and operative maneuver. For every Border Crossing there is a border making operation. It is not very profound, yet it is there. Nationstates,t interacting with other nationstates. People who dont have recourse when thereonstate wasnt International Law if their wellearned christian believers. They were tenting to circumscribe their borders. Really important move about decentering the american narrative. Localism, regionalism, isolate nizam shall ace in isolationism. How nationstates might eventually disappear, something that of you need to be told by me. Someaffected and inflected of our work, missing some of these other paradoxes. Internationalism that is often in the background is typical of the americans view. It misses all of the opponents of internationalism, the grassroots level, policymakers, et cetera. Glue thatism is the sticks those together. And in fact very often, people who want to project American Power but on the u. S. s terms. Thinking about the methodology for me and how to study ideas over a long swath of time, i have often reflected back on evolutionary theory and punctuated equilibrium. Somejacques jonas eggs genesis factors common. Actors, groups, the changing of international relations, economics, technology flows, communications. Factors common and things change. That doesnt mean you cant make an argument for continuity. You just have to recognize when those moments are and track them over time. Ideas,re subterranean unilateralism is a great one. It. Idnt always see west rim in a unilateralist. Make the case that every single one was. Did we see that in all of them . You can see some of these ideas operating in any given time. The challenge is, is your ideology thats the fun about arguing about these things. Another piece that i want to front, power is a precursor to unilateral articulation in american policy. What is perplexing about it, and what is interesting, as sometimes it is an aspirational project or projection, not real. Allearly u. S. Is not is about weakness, not strength. But the latter the unilateral impulse is there from the start. And then another element i would love for us to think about, and i think it is very fascinating in any area you want to study, is the role of executive power and unilateralism. Without a strong executive who doesnt expect congress to declare war. Anywhere at any time to deploy you might even say places in the same sorts of ways. To flag forwanted us, to talk about the role of expressionless him and hubris and arrogance. If unilateralism is baked in from the start, descent from the u. S. Canon that it should do anything it wants, in fact all of its duties are based not on binding agreements, but rather reciprocal kinds of onesided deals, trying to powers, coopt to get what it wants. If that is true, does not reside bedrock oftional hubris in the world to mark i wonder if our 70 that a train and 18thcentury foot if our 17th and 18th century folks would want to think about a new world mill you of ideas was operating and organized the constellation of ideas into a gravitational pull. Mission, how far back does that go . I will get us to the present and jump us through another hoop and get to our conversation. I love this piece, if john bolton had his way he would remake the Un Security Council with one permanent member, the United States. I dont think anyone in this room would doubt that quote it it comes from the Financial Times editorial board, headline learning things trump extends assault on multilateralism. Et cetera. And you can find hundreds of articles and essays from 2017 2018 making this case, focusing on the abrupt change of Foreign Policy and a shift towards unilateralism. Although it often diverges on the origins of this, i invite you to think about this with me obama recent past the administration unilateralism, or to the George W Bush years, the war on terror. You could go back to the first bush administration, the cold war speeding up and ending, and getting the gulf war, the moment of multilateralism. Could you imagine this at any other moment . And then, what . Unilateralism . Thats the term at that moment . When it started, where it is residing is one question in this critique. But that the abrupt turn has isped u. S. Foreign policy what these articles suggest and deride. The reality of an interconnected multilateral world. Penetratinge insights, i dont think they are entirely wrong. I think there are a couple of mistakes we should point back to. I would argue it is the most formative tool and ideological toolkit in Foreign Policy. It may be a tactic, may be a behavior. Just to underscore that, i quoted a few of the main tinkers who made the same case. If you go to your washington and jefferson and madison, you can find them arguing for national autonomy, calling for things like sovereignty, not to be ,ntangled in other nations arguing that happiness and interdependence, disconnect from all european interests and european politics, what the u. S. Mission should be. First treaty. The unilateralism, its a form of ideology. Else is going on there . Why keep unpacking this . Recency, get this are ofavel of the long ideologies in Foreign Policy. Thes long, intellectual and traditions. Traditions shouldnt mislead us that these kind of ideas have guided u. S. Policy for a long time. I think we are right to point out, as we have in a few parts of this conference, that they are also cultural. What are the ways in which unilateralism operates culturally. That is the one sidedness of americas role in the world. From filibusters running around latin america in the 19th century, attending to remake the world in their own image, which has an american component and another kind of hubristic project as part of it. I want to point out a couple of historical moments. You think about a few of these moments in the 18th and 19th century that helps prove the point. Thinking about no entangling alliances. Is one say unilateralism of the primary ways of understanding isolationism. Whats important is that unilateralism unlike isolationism doesnt compare to the 1920s. It is the antithesis of multilateralism. Another thing surprising to me is i would have thought political scientists would have been all over this. It is something you can throw on and access. It would be fascinating and fantastic. It is not until the 90s that you begin these conversations of unilateralism. It comes in the wake of the end of the cold war. The unipolar area, unilateralism, it seems to go handinhand. Time, this kind of multilateral aspirational unit aspirational utopianism, that moment at the end of the cold war. I want to center us on one historical moment. The u. S. Did choose to go to war. An important moment in Foreign Policy, and i like our injunction to think back to more recent phenomenon. It was far from abandoning neutrality. Not neutrality was another core concept. I cannot overstate how important i think neutrality was to american policymakers and citizens in terms of great power politics, up through world war i. The u. S. Did unilaterally go to war. Even though france was at war with britain, the Madison Administration did not pronounce itself associated in that conflict. Its wilson who adopts the term that the u. S. Is an associate power. It is still not an ally. The u. S. Has no formal allies in world war i, just like in 1812 the u. S. Has no formal allies, so it has defect too, and coke combat and sin that. And not having alliances fighting under or with foreign powers is really important. There is no alliance with napoleon. Jefferson reiterates this. He says the less we have to do with the entities of europe, the better. Lets close this off, despite the unilateral move to war, and we can discuss how unsuccessful the war of 1812 was. Finally George Canning commitment to the american minister in london, the wisdom of joint american affirmation and the independence of african rica allete american latin american republics. The response of John Quincy Adams . That innocuous offer of going along with the british and having ways of fellow travelers in the democratic project of the hemisphere. It nicely moves us up to the present and those projections of unilateralism, and show all the coverage of the current moment actually reinforces just how longstanding and deeprooted they are. I will leave it at that. I want to thank our panelists for a truly exceptional panel. Thinking about mission very quickly, i think we can look at the question of morality and morality specifically and democratic principles on the one hand as being in relation to fear and unilateralism on the other. I would like to open the question of funding, thinking of whose funding the journals, who is funding weigle and newhouse. So ideologies operate at systems. The study of ideology cannot just look at the content it produces, it must look at the negative space. What it obscures, what it makes possible the same. Up. Ll open it i was struck by this fear stuff. It seems to be in conversation with the paper we heard from danny before. The question i kept having is this a sort of particular cultural emanation that comes from the United States . Or is this just a predictable reaction to the loss of privilege . Thes wondering if geopolitical fear that the u. S. Is struck by is just a scaled up version of white fragility. Powere threatens your with a slave insurrection, and then you react in an extreme way. I suppose im curious if you guys see the relationship between your slightly different vocabularies, and if you regard this as particular to the United States or just a particular social logical response to the loss of preponderance of power. This is more specifically to andrew. What always struck me about fear and one of the reasons it became so powerful is it really emerges at the end at the begin of the moment of intensive state building, where the United States crazy National Security state in a way it never did before. Are essentially reacting and managing the world. I think these institutions are inherently reactionary in the sense they are reacting to a particular perception of the United States role in the world. So i was wondering if you might reflect on what you think the institutionalize asian of the politics of fear in these highly , whattrated institutions that says about our current politics where we are still operating on these institutions, these are still the major institutions to Foreign Policy, and over the years power has gotten more centralized. I was wondering if you think that affects with the United States does today, that these are institutions of fear meant to manage these global anxieties. Two good questions. I will try to keep it brief. What daniel one is asking you are asking a lot, but is the United States unique in this . I am not a specialist in other countries. Im not even a specialist there. I would save it is that the United States is unique in this sense. Need it is i unusual. American allies are pointing this out. They say we have live with this fear for quite a long time. This was particularly prevalent during the cuban missile crisis when americans were saying, why are you freaking out . Have been living with this existential threat for a long time. Now these missiles moved to cuba. Now the threat is not necessarily any greater, but you are bringing the world to the brink of world war iii and annihilation over the sense of fear that others just have to live with. There is this meeting theres this meant during the meetings that i would like quote. Asks he kennedy knows that the u. S. Has missiles in turkey, but he speculates, what with the soviets do if we put missiles close to them and they have to point out, we have and we do and they are living with this. My sense is that the United States is unique in this extreme sense of threat perception. What i find interesting in a different context is that notions of american decline become very prevalent, very pronounced, the whole make America Great again evos, ethos, it wasnt called that, but it was present in the cold war when america reaches this superpower status that it begins to worry about decline. What we have is a belief in decline, which could be an ideology. You see it in a domestic sense, in a foreign sense time and time again, whether it is alan bloom or whoever. There is also a series of optimistic writing. , this is partee about book i am writing the genealogy of National Security. The flipside is social security, National Security as part of the new deal, that is part of fdrs the structures of the federal government will provide security and a broad range of things. That the last of the alphabet agencies, after the new deal. The last of the alphabet is all in this package of state building and liberalisms connection with american citizens and how the state is going to protect them, which is why you have a nice alignment of politics that is very antiNational Security state, like robert taft, herbert hoover. Everything aligns. I can answer questions later. Would you like to go . One observation that leads into my question, i noticed in all the panels so far, this is the one where the papers are dripping with moralism. The subjects, not the writers papers. The subjects are dripping with moralistic argument. I was checking them against the earlier papers. It is striking, the extent to which that is the case. Maybe that is about the particular subject here, but it leads to this question, which is, to what extent are the ideologies we are talking about, from just war to National Security ideology, are they actually phenomenon for an argument about world predominance . Each of your papers, the world can make that argument. The u. S. Wants to be unilateral, to claim that it is morally dominant. Our position is being threatened. Areything neoconservatives arguing for, that we lost our moral sense of superiority and we need to get it back after carter and in emilys paper, it says it on every line. Would you accept that proposition and is it something that should run through this question, about the moral judgment that underpins politics . To make this a profound response to the discourse which is still dominant in the field of Foreign Policy. Thoughts on that . I think that at a basic level, if youre going to talk about the way the United States operates in the world and goes out and kills people and asks people to die for it, it will make a moral argument for those actions. That has to feedback into a national conversation. Over time, that can change. Anything can change, punctuating equilibrium. We had an argument, then it changes in civil war. Andrew has a nice chapter in his book on this. One of the things that unites what i am looking at with andrew respond it is a way to as an erosionee of american moral authority. You cant stand on what existed during the cold war. Vietnam has dismissed the old relist or cold war moral argument, so Something Else has to come through. Just return and take it on a casebycase basis. There could be kissingers return in Foreign Policy. It goes back to culture. Arguments have to fit back into the landscape that americans exist in. They exist in and through something. It could be religious institutions, but it is often in places where they are. This is what makes it so popular. This is what newhouse sees as their project. I agree. I think there is something to that. That is an interesting question. I am thinking out loud, because i think it is a case of someone like George H W Bush, i do think he has a profound sense that it is exceptional us, moralistic, the United States is the only possible country to lead the world as a unipolar power. This is what gets interesting in terms of going to culture and generation and assumption rather than ideological critique or the ideological project, because he believes in his class, in the cia, in himself. He has no intention of not doing that. Thisnly check i have on ok, he is dead, it is one of the people i would love to eventually talk to. Who goes aftern iraq. It is unilateral. Is ef with mandela people may forget, but the u. N. Has a resolution. They wanted a settled negotiation that would include palestine. People did not want to go to war. Bush would not have that. He went into diplomacy and it is military u. S. Lead. Very unilateral. He knows well that they were allies with iraq a couple of years before in the war against iran. He knows everything that went on with that. He knows everything not just through the Vice President , but he has been in the highest level of power, close to the cia. I really do puzzle over that. Mandela going, and i think one of the things i am trying to do is, some people just look at russia. I think the soviet union is really important, i am also looking at the global south. He remains very suspicious of mandela. Mbutu to his house. He later says, mandela was the highlight of my presidency, forgetting that he couldnt stand him at the moment. The otherer on hand, will a great way to relate rewrite your life. Mandela looks good compared to all the thugs he is hanging out with. In theoaked righteousness of the cold war order and whatever his exact history with the cia, the bay of pigs was run from his own oil company. This is really deep history. He is not going to question himself. He has to do such mental gymnastics. In so manyting complicated registers. I want to know what people think about that. Is incredibly powerful in terms of pulling together the world that comes afterward, with momentous decisions that i dont think is recognized enough. Never mind his death. It is always, we miss him, we miss him, but if you look closely, he laid the traditions of what came later. I have a question for emily regarding this tack on question. When i think about that era and the urge in the early 20th century language to evangelize the world in this generation, to a fear, and aspiration. There is a moral clench and narrative in this moment that through new technologies and capacities, you can achieve this goal. It is perhaps the most grand strategic way of being oriented that you can save every soul on the planet. How does that filter down to kids. That generation, say 1910, are the ones who have grown up reading more stuff. Is it a declension narrative of the 19th century that is leading to a new essential ascension narrative and ideology of the world. Fabulous question. I cant believe we get to talk about grand strategy both times. The 19th century is built on a declension narrative. The idea is you go out and you can convert the world and it is so important because everything is about to fall apart at home. Into foreign states, to turn the domestic space into the righteous Christian Country that sends people out. Should i get closer or farther . Ok. Are we good . Closer is better . Ok. Nice and close. Evangelism ofthe the world in this generation. How does this connect to kids . Part of where the declension is happening is at home. There is this sense that American Christians are not taking this seriously and they need to. You are putting in these very grand terms, and for kids, i think they get it. In between the lines in all of this stuff, where for the mid19th century, what those is, you need to appreciate what you are given by being born where you were born and being christian, because if you were or in india, your mother would have thrown you to the crocodiles is literally one of the things that he says in that document. Think about being a small child reading that, and what is that supposed to train you to think about your country, your faith, the rest of the world. All of these lessons, to the late 19th century, youve got kids growing up with that. Isnt a 19th century bad start, there is still this sense of, by virtue of being where you are, you are better off than these kids all over the rest of the world, so you should be responding in this kind of in asnd word that can get you might not be. You might be interested in self sacrificial giving, it is being trained up in all this stuff. Going to thet is kids in addition to the adults. The sense that your parents are not giving enough so you need to know now, so you will give enough and missionaries are always giving more money than they have. Converting the world is an expensive and big project. Point, iriefly on that agree with emily. I dont see much of a declension narrative in the Foreign Mission movement. When people would ask john and others about the evangelization evangelization of the world in one generation, they would say we havent converted enough people. They would say, it is not about converts, it is about getting the world out. ,here are links to these papers especially bens paper, but they all flow from that on this idea civilization, the ideology runs their all of that. It could be George H W Bush, but it is the sense that america is the first among equals. There is a kind of egal is arianism and some kind of universal that everyone can. Scribe to it is not christianity, but it is america. It is americanism. Briefly, in response to the interesting question of moralism, i think that is true, but for me, it is more elemental, about protecting something. It could be about protecting something that is moralistic lee iny, but the language i see the language of fear could be independent in the sense that what we are protecting is so great, is the liberalism of fear. Perhaps, you get some moralistic language there, but to me, that is the difference between Woodrow Wilson and franklin roosevelt, in that when Woodrow Wilson takes the United States into world war i, it is about promoting certain ideas. It could be civilization or others. It is an optimistic vision, where fdrs vision is much darker. Need to protect this because we are under threat. Wilson never couches the world situation like that, and to me, that is the big inference. Melanie. Thank you. This panel. For i want to ask every Single Person a question, but i just to quickly. I want to come back to you, emily, and ask about the framing of your paper in terms of childrens ideology, which makes a lot of sense, but i want to ask about childrens feelings. I am interested in general in the notion of an emotionally energizing ethnographic encounter. There is something about the ethnographic encounter as it is put forth to these children that plays into the notion that is so energizing to get to know people, to learn about the foreign stuff, and that might actually shape their experience as people who then grow up later and engage the world. I wonder if it might be part of the way we can think about change over time. Ideology is one thing. It creates an aspect that is different and that, itself, might change ideology. I just wanted you to think a little bit more about affect and how that might play and my other question, i really enjoyed your paper so much. I wonder, i heard in the paper version, two versions of how you are thinking about just war. One is that it is a strategy by the emergent christian right, and the other is it is a currency available to everybody, sort of like the elite version of what would jesus do. It turns out jesus does a lot of different things. Who knew. I wondered if you could talk about that. And somethingat, to think about a lot more as i go forward with this. I forget if this ended up in the paper or not, but there is this early 20th century piece where in educators rating to sunday School Teachers about how the bible is not an engaging text for children, so you should not be using that in your sunday school, you should be using missionary biography. I think that speaks to it, it is something about the individual encountering another individual with a story that would allow for a child to identify with someone else and put themselves a a position to connect in visceral sort of way. That there is something to think about there. What is the effect of making those kinds of personal connection through text and having that be such a deliberate move that you have emerging in this literature from earlier the any 20th century, when the bible is apparently too boring. That those encounters thereted here is so is a lot going on. Hand, the tone is often there are two sorts of narratives. One is, meet this person who is supposed to be inspiring to you. It is a protoversion of the enchantment stuff that you talk about later, where, here is a convert who has overcome tremendous awes that you have never had to face and this should be a model for your piety, that if this person can become faithful in that way, so can you. There is that track, which i think, i would imagine has a certain effect on the reader. Then there is another sort of text you see, which is, look at this person who you need to pity. That language both of these tracks we see today in this kind of literature. Often, the pitying stuff is where we see i talked about this in the paper, some of pieces where children are compared to animals and there is a lot of tremendously racist language being used as creating the child reader as youre in the position not of identifying with that child or emulating the piety of that child, but being the benefactor there. I think those are the two tracks we see coming. Through they background music is a little much. Trying to create two different types of christian person. Emotive kinde very of means in both cases, and whether it is identification or pity. [distant cheering] they are cheering for you now. You kind of eliminated the landscape for guys like newhouse. They saw on one side critics of American Foreign policy as antiamerican. Potentially, unified through sort of broadbased criticism of how the United States operates militarily. Then, they also saw on the others, that there were policymakers, the religious right getting worried about creeping antiamericanism, particularly through its use of criticizing vietnam. Academic ethicists who were there to provide cover for american militarism, and special military. Vietnam, whent of they take surveys of what the most honorable profession is, military goes way down after vietnam and steadily goes up into the 1980s, where bite 9 11, it is 10 or 15 points higher than the next profession. It begins to grow in the 1980s and those guys in the military need a way to rationalize what they are being used being asked to do all over the world. War as ad use just form of argument that is available to anybody. It could also be used to generate the unified argument, the unified concept of rheem moralizing or reconstructing the torican moral Foreign Policy combat what they saw was happening on the left, which was a critique without anything after it. Criticize American Foreign policy, the vietnam war, what was the reconstruction project linked to that . There was nothing really that they offered in the same way that the right was going to offer something to evangelicals by the millions, to the professional military, to policymakers. [inaudible] right, butame time, it is the people who supported war who are silencing those who wanted to critique it. If you look at the numbers, you have big protests come out for the persian gulf war. 10 years later, the protests against the iraq war in 2003 are minimal compared to what happened a decade before that, and the number of books and articles as they come out justifying, rationalizing American Military strategy overwhelms those books coming out critiquing American Military policy. Dont i need to do more about how these folks connect. Is there a club they belong to and talk about how it is going to look . It is clear that the trend is heading that way. Newhouse sees it early on. This is a way to generate connectivity among groups who are disparate, but the challenge piece illuminates that they are disparate. They are there to unify, but they have to find the right language. Andne less thing to add, then unfortunately, we have to close up. I am not one to ever have to think about continuity through all time, but think about unilateralism. You say i cant fit obama into that, i cant fit jimmy carter into that. What do they all fit . Maybe jeremiah. Without we were targeting people, we are better than that. Maybe every president has a story about what is going wrong. Everything is going to hell and we have to bring it back. We have become people looking for the city on the hill that is always falling apart. I love the question on your part. Hell, everything going to sounds like a good way to end the first day. Haps tomorrow we find the city on the hill. Thank you everyone for coming, thank you Oregon State University for putting this on. Have a lovely evening. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] now, you are watching American History tv. Every again beginning saturday at 8 00 p. M. Eastern, we bring your 48 hours of unique programming exploring our nations past. American history tv is only on cspan3. Announcer 2 this july is the 50th anniversary of the apollo 11 mission to the moon. Sunday on real america, a nasa prelaunch interview with the three astronauts, neil armstrong, buzz aldrin and michael collins. Here is a preview. This is astronaut neil armstrong, command pilot for the apollo 11 moon landing mission. What is the purpose of the mission . Apollo 11 is mans first attempt to demonstrate the ability to go to the moon, to land there, and to return to earth. How do you view your role as command module pilot . Apollo was designed to be a threeman job, and the third, which i perform, is, i think, as important, no more so, no less so, than the other positions. I think i would be a fool if i said i am the best of the three. On the other hand, i can say with complete candor and honesty that i am happy to have this seat which i have and to be doing the job that i intend to do. Eagle docked. Roger. How does it look . Would you describe what will be happening just before the lunar module touches down on the moon . We will continue burning the engine until an altitude of about five feet, which the probes will ignite the a light on our panel. We see it glistening, we cut the engine, and forward, drifting to the right. 30 seconds. Contact light. Engines stop. Recopy, eagle. Tranquilly base here. The eagle has landed. Above exploring the moons surface, esther not aldrin had this to say following the preparations, we will go through the planned twoman excursion on the surface, with neil exiting the spacecraft first. Thats one small step for man , one giant leap for mankind. You can watch the entire interview with the three apollo 11 astronauts on railamerica, sunday at 4 00 eastern on American History tv. Announcer 1 sunday night on q and a, former Police Deputy inspector talks about his book, once a cop. I was young, grew up on welfare, was in a family of six with five girls and myself. My father left us after the third grade. We have a picture of me in the fifth grade sitting indian style in the front, holding my feet, because i have holes in the bottom of one of my shoes with cardboard in them so my socks wouldnt get wet. I had a rough upbringing. I got involved in the street. I met some friends and they were selling drugs, so it was like the thing to do. Sunday night at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspans q and a. Next on history bookshelf, historian hwb and talks about his biography of ehrenberg, the politician and Vice President who is most remembered for killing Alexander Hamilton in a dual in 1804. He is presenting a collection of letters between burr and his daughter that recount his political rise and downfall. This was recorded at the gallery of art in washington in 2012. Thank you for having me back. I am delighted to speak here. I always like to speak in washington, where audiences are well informed and engaged. Having just finished teaching a semester for the year at the alwaysity of texas, i am delighted to speak to an audience of people who dont have to be here. There will be no tests. I say this sincerely. Im very flattered you took the time in your evening to come listen to me. I think that my students by and la