Transcripts For CSPAN3 Evolution Of U.S. Foreign Policy 20240714

Next, ran export themes that shaped policy. The exporting of concepts like progress and civilization in the 20th century and the lack of diversity and thought among u. S. Policymakers during the cold war. This discussion was hosted by a conference was part of a organence hosted at the at oregon state university. , i first realized how brilliant he was when i was at the university of pennsylvania. A dissertation entitled which was awarded the 2016 allen evans prize. Be ook manuscript will a book will be based on it by the Harvard University press. He is a great scholar to lead us off. Help me in welcoming him. That is a very generous introduction and i feel like i have a lot to follow since you gave a great summary of what im doing. Thank you all for coming out here and thank you everyone for reading my paper. Im excited to be able to aesent this work in such diverse audience, people who are doing work different from the stuff i normally do. For me i kind of live and breathe in a time when the United States isnt a thing, and isnt a thing anyone imagined would ever be a thing. Being able to talk about a moment where the place that i think about all the time, the n set modern north america of societies we are jostling around, thinking about that as a transition every moment to what becomes the United States is really what im trying to do here. Ofticularly through the lens colonial and native relations. Hereaper i submitted entitled indian subject and british populism in america, it is sketching out a long history of evolution of native american subject hood, from the beginning of connell getting of colonization 2 oris not just objection domination. It is the early form of political membership, which is basically defined by the relationship between the subject and the sovereign, a direct vertical relationship. This is in contrast to what we think of in terms of modern citizenship, more or less a horizontal relationship among part people, who are all of the policy in the same kind of way. The subject made possible in the early modern world to have gated groups of subjects who are not necessarily like each other. The only thing that really mattered where their personal relations to the monarchs. That made it possible for things that madetle nobility it a more complicated set of Political Rights and responsibilities that defined the nature of subject hood. Varietyacity to enclose is what made subject hood a handy tool for colonizers to incorporate native americans into the expanding english empire in the 17th and 18th century. It why virginians in plymouth conducted trees that transformed the leaders of the palace out and Wampanoag Indian nations to battle king james the first. Was a Political Court political ploy, a cover for conquest. Embraceus people could objection. In part because membership in the British Empire offered all kinds of advantages, ranging from access to trade network to military allies and their own indigenous rivalries. Subjecthood could be marshaled as a source of power. Native americans could also exercise the cherished right of every subject, the ability to petition the king for address of grievances, sometimes with a surprising degree of success. In thearkable petitions historic record that were written by native leaders or written on their behalf by colonists revealed indigenous understanding of subjecthood that contained a duality, a tension. In which they both come on one hand, acknowledge themselves as members of the imperial politics, and at the same time claiming status as a sovereign nation, whose sovereignty had beforetended long europeans ever put boots to north america. And therefore to assume that British Imperial officials would not tolerate that indigenous understanding of subjecthood in a way that was compatible with their own tribal nationality. Imperial officials endorsed that view with relatively few reservations. In 1743 the british attorney general and board of trade concurred that the mohegan nation was politically equivalent to the colony of connecticut virtue of their subjection to the king. They were essentially equal subsidiary units of the larger empire. Himhat scenes seems like seems like an anomaly, it is not. For example, scotland and ireland were politically distinct in the 17th century, they each had parliaments and each of their people was politically distinct with separate sets of rights. In the colonies, the concord ,orth populations of dutch swedish, finnish, and german people, who are prior and habitants because of new sweden, they also possess special rights, such as the ability to worship in their own churches. That was a right other british subjects did not have. And they had a exemptions from duties that english subjects had. For example, all of those people in the form areas of new netherland and sweden were not required to arm their countrymen. Legal pluralism was possible because of the hierarchal relationship. Be ts did not need to part of my point is the case of indigenous subjecthood was not at all anomalous, we need to see this as normal in the early modern world before the United States comes around. It is one aspect of a patchwork of semi autonomous jurisdiction in a multicultural British Empire. The problem if this sounds overly rosy, it is. Im glossing over a tremendous amount of conflict and violence here, in part because thats what previous historians have focused on. Im trying to recover a story about the possibilities of indigenous inclusion in the empire before we reach a historical moment. That happens in the middle of the 18th century, with the conquest of new france during the seven years war, the British Empire gained control on paper of a vast swath of the continent, a continent full of native american nations who had never acknowledged themselves as subjects of the british king, and most of them had no interest in doing so and resist any imposition upon them. British officials try to extend the same ambiguous nation within empire model that they had honed over the previous entry, by treating those native groups as subjects. What they try to do is treat foreign indian nations as though ,hey were domestic tributaries considering them subjects to be governed, rather than sovereign nations that warranted diplomacy. In 1760 three this provoked a vigorous defense. To theological challenge model of sovereignty, the model that defied sovereignty that characterize the British Empire did not come from metropolitan policymakers. It came from marginal actors on the western frontier. The example that i think is most 1764,ant here happened in when a group of pennsylvania settlers massacred the last indians nearestoga lancaster, pennsylvania. In the pretext that they were an danger. They deployed a vernacular quasiconstitutional argument. The indians were the commonwealth inside the empire, and they argued inhabiting the commonwealth was a political absurdity. They and others like them argued that a British State with indian subjects threatened their rights as englishmen. I 1765 they were willing to engage in Armed Struggle against the Indian Military to protect those rights as they saw them. British insistence on maintaining divided sovereignty, which is to say a subject status within the empire, provoked a crisis in the west at the same time as the stamp act crisis. Colonists came to see the struggles as intertwined because of their common connection with his tyranny. They viewed it as an assault on their rights as englishmen as taxation without representation. In their mind, the struggle with indian nations in the struggle with the British Empire essentially became the same thing. I think the upshot is that as colonists began forging new bonds of citizenship, one of their axioms were the indians could not be a part of that civic brotherhood. In the end, what i want you to take away from all of this is Indian Subjecthood in the colonial era was subject to the constitutional and theoretical debates into major malaise. The first is even as americans reinvented a political theory of divided sovereignty, which is to say federalism, they erase the possibility of native sovereignty for indigenous rights. Old as americans kept the ambiguity of Indian Subjecthood, which Supreme Court Justice Marshall codified, the citizenship that was explicitly linked to whiteness. Just to conclude, i want to offer some thoughts in the spirit of speaking to the paper and the larger theme here. If there ise that if there is such a thing as u. S. Intermediary Foreign Policy it comes right here. And its defining feature was a commitment to center colonialism. I think its important to remember the first Foreign Policy crisis was not in the atlantic but in the ohio valley. And as the foreign policies in question were not britain or france or spain, but the shawnee and the pottawatomie nations, part of the larger western indian confederacy, who collectively destroyed two u. S. Armies in the 1790s, and represented a viable alternative to american expansion into the northwest. The crisis was not provoked intentionally by any cadre of elite foreign officials, but by settlers like the paxton boys, who is willing to overthrow any Foreign Authority that threatened indian rights. Ofpropelling this engine colonialism was White Supremacy, creating opportunities for whites. And White Supremacy may have been the only solid bond linking poor settlers in the west to policymakers in the capital. Those officials chose to treat what were in fact foreign spaces as domestic ones. By the alchemy of ideology, transmuted invading settlers into endangered citizens, who are entitled to the protection of the federal government. People whoed native were defending their homelands into rebels against the legitimate authority of the United States. I think thats fiction as foreign as domestic woven into the dma when it was just an. Mperial zygote thank you. [applause] thanks so much, that was fantastic. Fiction of foreign as domestic. Be an assistant professor of history at wake forest university. I met him when he was in grad school when he was finishing a brilliant first book, legalist empire and International Law and Foreign Relations in the early 20th century, published by Oxford University press, received an honorable mention. He is currently focusing his work on questions of the history of economic stations economic sanctions. Hes a great speaker and historian. Please join me in welcoming him. I would like to begin by thanking chris, danny and david for putting this together and thank you in advance for your comments and questions at the end. A side project. Im looking at the ideology of civilization in u. S. Or in relations. If you look back throughout the language of american Foreign Policy you will see many references to civilization from the 18th century onward. As tempting to see this as fig leaf or power. As i was working on my first book, which looked at law and empire in the early 20th century, i came to see that the historical actors werent simply using civilization as a historical tool, but it was functioning as an ideology. It was a way how they made sense of the world. This ideology civilization. Earlyer and empire in the 20th century and attempting to build an expanded rule of International Law. These two projects were brought together under the ideology of civilization. These folks believed that civilization was sort of and exorbitantly expanding overtime. Empire byexpand this expanding civilization spatially. You can make a case that civilized nations would willingly accept the decisions of International Court because they were becoming more civilized and rational and aware of their International Rights and responsibility. It seems to me that the turn of the 20th century was a time in which the idea of civilization was a master concept or master ideology. Wrote in a book that this didnt really survive world war i. When europe, which is sort of the birthplace, the heart of civilization, is destroying itself using weapons that are themselves the product of civilization. There is this irony of modern technology being turned not to turn things up but to destroy them. I have a feeling this was not the whole story. It persists as western civilization during the well during the cold war. Have a clash of civilization in reference to present trumps President Trumps need to defend western civilization. I want to get a sense of how civilization persists and change over the period of American History. The problem is there are difficulties in doing this, because civilization is a huge capacious term. If you want to write a textbook called 5000 b. C. E. To the present, it covers everything. Where would you look for sources . They want to have some empirical basis for research. What i decided to do is look at the Public Statements of american president s. There is an excellent database available, the american presidency project run by you see santa barbara. They have digitized almost every Public Statement from american president s. There are 129,000 documents on there. I searched for civilization and its various permutations, civilized, civilizing, civilize or, and i came across 3000 documents. There are limitations to this approach. One is what american president s say in public is not necessarily what they say in private what they believe in private. This is only a small segment of the american population, the white male segment. And theres also the problem if you are looking for use of the term civilization, you may miss it is discussed but not the term itself. I want to start thinking about the public meaning of the term and exploring it over a longer time period. What did i find . When american president s talk about civilization, they are doing it almost exclusively in one of three ways. They are talking about civilizing native americans or who is or not following the norms of civilized warfare, or they are using it as a kind of vaguely neutral descriptor term. There is a reference to civilized nations and civilized world, in which they mean the United States. Europe and the United States. You get the rise and prevalence of civilization to justify imperial expansion and oversees territorial expansion. And famouslyinley calling for work in spain because for a war in the name of civilization. Theodore roosevelt more than any other president has civilization as a fundamental ideological concept in his Foreign Policy. Yourgues, for instance, if look at relations between the civilized nations, the laws going to be a useful way of maintaining peace between them, and he vacillates on whether germany or japan are civilized or not. These civilizations need to maintain their armies in order to please the uncivilized or savage people of the world. Noticed ah century, i shift in how civilization deployed, increasingly in defense of terms. Its not about civilizing the rest of the world, its about defending from various calamities. He then says in retrospect this is a war to preserve and dispatch to preserve and defend civilization. Depression and world war ii are also seen as fundamentally menacing. Fdr rhetoric is interesting because he tends to add adjectives before the term civilization. When he talks about the depression he says modern civilization, and modern methods are necessary, by which he means new ideas of the role of the state. He sometimesapan, has civilization as a whole, other times he says they are a threat to our civilization or American Civilization or our American Civilization or democratic civilization, no more national sense of this. Suggesthe is trying to the unity between american and global interests, such that if you want to defend your home, if you want to defend American Civilization, that means defending global civilization as a whole. Aat is one way of working on globalist ideology, which sets the groundwork for american policy during the cold war. It doesnt disappear, but it doesnt seem to decline in frequency, and it was interesting for me to see that the president never talked about the soviet union as presenting a threat to civilization. They certainly dont talk about fighting a soviet union war for civilization. Nuclear war in particular, thats what represents the threat to civilization. As lbj puts it in the lbj fashion, one impulsive reckless move could incinerate our civilization and wipe out the lives of 300 million men before you could say scattered. This is a threat here. The end of the cold war opens up new possibilities, the collapse of alternative model makes it possible to think of a universal civilization. Alternatively we have a clash between multiple civilizations. Bush casts the war on terror as a civilization fight, with terrorists as savage or barbarous enemies. This active describe in terrorism or kidnapping has a savage threat to civilization 1970s. T to the President Trump has recently about explicitly defending western civilization. What can this history tells about ideology and u. S. Foreign relations . I will make a couple of suggestions, but i am open to hearing more reactions. I think one way this is useful, it is helping us think about term. Gy over the long its how ideologies adapt their circumstances, but there is a thatnsual structure endures. I think this is true for civilizations, which from the beginning is complicated and full of tensions and dualities. You have the noun civility, meaning manners, sort of restrained behavior. Then you have the verb to civilize, which at the time had a technical meaning, from a legal matter to a civic jurisdiction. From the beginning there is this tension from civilization between the individual and collective descriptors. One can be a civilized person in terms of behavior and refer to civilized societies as civilized societies in terms of political organizations. And the termension civilization comes between universal versus plural. Single talk about a civilization that has particular universal values and you can rank societies between less more civilized. Then you talk about the simultaneous existence of multiple civilizations that rise and fall according to their own set their own schedules. How does this fit for the United States . Of it as civilization being different in terms of freedom or liberty, which are quintessentially american ideologies. Civilization is not an especially american ideology. It has continuing associations with europe. What is the persistence of this in american Foreign Policy rhetoric tell us . Ishink one thing it tells us that highlights the persistence of tension between universalism, and we may see a we may say exceptionalism. What is american Foreign Policy supposed to be about . Is it about transforming the outside to make it look like the United States or to conform with some notion of civilized values . Or is it about protecting a kind of pure or exceptional list inside from a corrupting outside . You can see these ideas play throughout American History. They are reconciled by making the case as fdr and wilson and others have done, making the case that in order to protect the inside you have to reshape the outside, and thats how you reconcile these two things together. That leaves a lot to be discussed. Basic questions about the relationship between altruism or humanitarianism and self interest, debates about what to do with these supposedly uncivilized people on the outskirts of american jurisdiction, are they to be brought in and uplifted as the language of the late 19th century would have it . Or to be excluded or exterminated . S grant uses this literal language of the choice between civilization and extermination when he is talking about native americans in the west in the 1870s and 1880s. In terms of think about the function of ideology, i wouldnt go so far as to say the existence produces these tensions. I think by looking at how civilization is used over time, it can help us draw attention to the persistence of this tension between universalism and protection of the dynamic in the discourse of Foreign Relations. Fantastic. Next we have an associate professor and director of studies at the university of iowa. I first got to know her because of her amazing book know your enemy, the american debate on naziism, 1933 through 1945, which won a number of awards. You may hear a theme throughout this conference there are a lot of winners throughout the winners of that award here. Countriesdebate their night in that paper she analyzes the transformation of grassroots american nationalism and patriotism, during and after world war ii. Please help me in welcoming her. You. Ank well, a big thank you to chris and david and to danny, and also good spirit behind the scenes for bringing us together here. So many biographical and into four actual and intellectual stands come together. Never before have i been in one room, in the presence of so many authors whose books and articles have been so foundational and inspiring for me and my students. And also to help me out with my halfbaked ideas. My question is once again where are the people in our stories . How is our understanding of u. S. And or ideology in Foreign Policy change, especially with and after world war ii when we take the voices at the Grassroots Level into account and consider them as legitimate participants in the traditional great debate. Ofn though as most studies Public Opinion and foreign public,how, they, the the people usually have had , which isno impact fatal in our field, which is obsessed with power. I argue that broadening our understanding of Foreign Policy debates include voices at the Grassroots Level bring some unsettling questions about the of our american democracy and its compatibility with military globalism into clearer focus. It reveals the wider and deeper conversations. Especially if we no longer segregate africanamerican voices into a distinct mostriography, we have the critiques of foreign policies available, as well as some puncturing of the pretense and hypocrisy in the ideas and claims that underlie it. A study in Foreign Policy ideas from the bottom up brings into of americanl range sentiments and arguments on the voices ofith the elite dissenters and critics, duly noted and amplified in the public sphere. A more complex and multidimensional opinion landscape that defies our conventional binaries of isolationism, internationalism, elite masses, and even conservative and liberal. And i have found in my research that these dichotomous labels flowed somewhat uneasily atop a much wider and deeper more entangled public party public body of opinion. About the changing expressions of american patriotism, nationalism, changing ideas to democracy and hope for the u. S. In the world. The history of u. S. Foreign policy as written by many of you here in the room highlights and paper,luded to in the highlights the inherent tension in the ideas underlying it. In ordinary citizens i have found regularly noted and commented on these contradictions between especially between exceptionalism and universalism, between nationalism and globalism, between claiming democracy and supporting dictatorship, fighting for other peoples human rights democracy and freedom, and denying them at home. Im particularly interested in and have become from the sources crisis at the end of the vietnam war. Im particularly interested in the period of the 1940s, which sees a more profound transformation than our. Elis asian then our periodization. Its the end of world war ii and roughly the end of the Roosevelt Administration and the beginning of the truman years and the cold war. Another problem is our will call of what i the normative power of events, and i mean the justification and rationalizations of the beginning of american cold war, as that is what rules, we have to accept that. We know there are many intellectual challenges and within thegainst it Foreign Policy establishment, from politicians in congress and among intellectuals, black and white. Public opinion polls, in other words quantitative data, and then qualitative data, like my own archival research, primarily with oral history, but with letters written to the president and other elected officials, also a recent study postwar, all of the shows after world war ii americans overwhelmingly wanted to come home. They wanted to continue their newfound nationalism through diplomatic means and delivering to the World Council the united nations, and they wanted to reach a peace dividend. There was a widespread and outspoken concern of the blurring between blurring of the line between war and peace. It was duly noted at the time. And people were upset about that. There was little readiness to , there was little popular acceptance for putting u. S. On a permanent war footing. I was struck by how clearly citizens in my case registered the shift from the antifascist war and aligned space multilateralism of the four global crusade and leadership. As andrew writes, and i find confirmed, emotions, especially fear play an Important Role here. While i cannot entirely defend corrected fdr from the observations that he was among the fear mongers, and my from ae illustration is press conference in 1948 where he warns ioans that they are going to be attacked by germans. The fourth term president with his inauguration speech, the is fearng to fear itself, but also the trajectory providedtion, and reassurance and guidance that was widely accepted. Many letters have been published. Many letterwriters projected that that spirit, a more that too is one, his successor. Letters wrote to president truman and other elected officials show they often drew different lessons from world war ii than their political leadership, and then the lessons that dominate our Foreign Policy. In the context of the debate over military training, most citizens rejected military preparedness as unamerican, as undemocratic. That is what the japanese do, that is what the germans did. As unchristian. Like Foreign Policy experts who recognize in the early postwar early who recognize the postwar period as simultaneously critical and pernicious moment in building a preponderance of power, similarly letterwriters also understood the undetermined quality and their countrys unique quality to shape the future, but wanted to see it put to different hues. Its a big theme in these letters. They raise questions about the cost of military globalism and they fought for domestic priorities. It obscures a significant shift from aligned space, time bound war effort in which the u. S. Casualty was low based on burden sharing and recognition a recognition of the limits of u. S. Power and u. S. Political will. The shift from that to a strategically more ambitious global containment doctrine under the successor rooted in National Triumph but also fear, rooted in fear of a new enemy. Elsewhere, i go into greater detail about what i have come to call the strange career of american anticommunism. I just wanted to mention these elements, which are relevant in this context. Americans were not afraid of communism. There are polls for that. It turns out americans didnt know what communism was. They werent worried about it and they didnt see the union, their recent ally, as a threat to their security. Those threats were effectively manufactured by separate efforts. And the longer standing Defamation Campaign on the part of conservatives. Findg the vietnam war we ,hat strange rationalization especially in the speech of soldiers and letters, lets fight communism over there so we dont have to fight them in kansas. ,arlier during the korean war often conservatives suspicious of the policies of fdrs successors, they see much more of a continuity between the democratic president s who start wars. Why fightingng if communism was so important to their government, why did they not fight it at home, pacifically in the state department, rather than sending our boys halfway around the globe. Also a very prevalent theme. Protest against creeping militarization is expressed elsewhere in a religious vernacular. Both the more conservative and more progressive variety. Which brings me to the most striking finding to date, which is the clarity in which citizens articulated insights, for which realist Foreign Policy experts were subsequently celebrated, especially in the context of the early vietnam war. A conception of human endeavors, the need for humility, the recognition of acceptance of other peoples nationalism and pride, warnings of overextension and militarization. All of these things are from the very beginning and several decades in the letters of regular citizens. In contrast to the artists and scientists, many ordinary americans clearly actually articulate their belief that their country could not and should not attempt to shape the course and outcome of u. S. History of human history. Not even under the guise of creating a security environment. Realiston i think such popular appraisal warned against power, advocating humility and cooperation were manifold, sometimes there are grounded in veterans with firsttime , often seemin war to share a religious conception with the alleges with theology adjusts like dr. King ologists like dr. King. And worry about the contradiction between the war aims and strategies. Americans across the political spectrum and in each generation show themselves invested in the American Dream at home and prioritized its realization over any ambition to export it. Conclude, my research on Foreign Policy at the Grassroots Level, oddly, has only confirmed the importance of their cultural formation and conditioning. If we find regular americans increasingly trapped in the iron cage of National Security rationale, so are the Foreign Policy thinkers and makers, trapped in the ideological framework they themselves have created, perpetuated and reinforced. I like his argument and his phrasing. Ae way he uses logic means compulsion, something he cant break free from, like an addiction. There is the more resigned version of the midlevel u. S. Military officers. Now that we are here, lets not question the whole project, because we are already in iraq. We are an empire now, we create our reality, we dont have to engage with this. As david and others have shown, even though Foreign Policy thinkerskers delete show their son a problem with the course correction seems as helpless as the sorcerers rentice one last thought, it was more fairytale, alice in wonderland and the emperor has no close that suggest themselves to me as i look at the grassroots views. It was the sorcerers ,pprentice, which is the poem who goes on to write a twopart play about an intellectual who makes an impact makes a pact with the devil. Thank you. That final thought is an interesting one. Particular in thing about our role as producing knowledge that elites could leverage as ways of thicket about the u. S. s proper role in the world. Sobering thoughts, i guess. A faithful and very generous scholar, former president of professor mark philip bradley, distinguished professor of history at the college and university of chicago, where he serves as the faculty director for human rights and debbie dean. He is the author of quite a few articlesning books and. Projectng with us a new , which tends to be some thing fantastic. Professor mark bradley. Thanks. A really important moment for us to be thinking ourhe world of ideas year three and this administration or year two . Decades. Feels like together inwing us a gorgeous place i have gotten to know the passive north west in the last four years. My son has been in college out here. It is one of the most beautiful places i think in the United States. What a nice place to be. Talk that mucho about my paper. If you havent read it, no worries. I have three issues i wanted to put on the table and sort of lightly use the paper to advance those. Those three are thinking a little bit, borrowing from davids wonderful formulation, world making and the global. Second thinking about questions, continuity and rupture, and third and finally, if i have time, thinking about method and reach, so going to the issue of what humanities may look like coming out of a project like this. To start with world making and the global, this will date myself a little bit, i started graduate school in 1987 when michaels book on u. S. Ideology and Foreign Policy came out. I think i and a lot of people there were moving through with me kind of wish they word michael hunt. How it he write so beautifully about the things that mattered to him . I think its important for us to realize this, we are using that book as a jumping off point, that i was a radical book in the moment. Arguments,ng three one that americans thought of themselves in an exceptional way. That maybe wasnt new, historians were happy to talk about american exceptionalism. A criticaling it in posture rather than a celebratory posture. He also insisted race mattered for thicket about questions in american Foreign Policy we take that for granted by 2019. Take that fornnot granted. The ways in which traditional historiography have been configured around american Foreign Relations, every other field of American History had gone to race by 1987, but our field was a little slow to get into the mix. Then the idea of fear, fear of revolution. We are only starting to talk about the history of affect and the way that might have configured american Foreign Relations. And thinkingo about, policymakers are people too and these fundamental ways of being in the world affect how policy may be made. I would say there was another figure that was important. Putting on the table an issue that american Foreign Relations had largely ignored and now fortunately no longer does, that Emily Rosenberg and putting gender on the table. Category of analysis and an option to study. I think thats having words front and center. Want toone thing we think about over the course of today and tomorrow is there were a lot of envelopes being pushed here by what michael was doing and emily was doing. What are those envelopes we want to be pushing in thinking about this project now, and both of those ways . That, to one dimension of i want to remind people that there was a companion book to michaels u. S. Ideology book. 1991, the genesis of communist Foreign Policy in china. Notael was trained at el just in American History but in east asia and chinese history. Had that large internationalist cosmopolitan sensibility to the kind of work he was doing. The United States was not always at the center of the work that michael was interested in. I think that is a useful thing to keep in our heads. A distance for the United States can see the United States and what they are doing differently. It can suggest there are processes in the world that are not all about us, and we have to engage with those processes in one form or another. Nonetheless a historian like michael had this kind of dual vision back in with could see that, in a way in which i think sometimes we are slowly in american prism or perspective. Therei am doing now is one sentence that says there is not much about American History in this paper. I am working on that for the book. I do think its worth saying of thes this imaginary Global Health that cannot be collapsed into Foreign Policy. There is something to be said to keeping it separate for a bit, to understand it before putting the americans back in and figuring out where the state or individual americans are in that story. Think i work on the south side of chicago. Southside of chicago may have more in common with the sensibility im trying to talk about, about the global south. Americanof as starkly bubble processes. We have a way of thinking ideologies and ideas someplace else that can bring us back into American History and different sorts of ways. Continuity and rupture, as i read a lot of papers for the conference, they are great and i learned a lot from them. Thats what michael was trying to do. Exceptionalism was a continuity you could trace. In the papers we are seeing over the course of the next couple of days, civilization, unilateralism, running right through the american story. Anynt mean to say there is problem with that necessarily. Then how do you think about rupture . Are there moments in which the continuity is less important than what is and what is coming up is to be thinking about. That seems to have to be in the mix. And i think that is harder to see. That kind of ideology wants to push back forward and think more about continuities over time. Thats what i try to do in the paper as well. The late 20th century, lets say, is a real breakpoint. Not because that not because the cold war is over, but there are structural and federal changes going on in the world that make it an important breakpoint. The structural arguments you have read and heard from other people, the ways in which the international, International Economy gives technological changes going on that help us understand the present day social media, and fundamentally people are moving in different ways in the late 20th century than they were earlier in this century. Claiming there is a revolution of affect in the 20th century may be a more controversial set. F claims the eyes known as the central mechanism in which people are thinking about themselves. And the notion about motivated truth as a way of making true claims in the world seems to be a shift from the way people were thinking about the world in a previous period of time. In the global south, the argument im try to make is it is not just the third world with a new name, but that in fact the sense of chances are why the global south becomes the political project it is becoming today. That the keywords that mark the global south are fundamentally different than those in the third world, and one of the things i try to do is track he went speeches by the world leaders, every september they come to new york to give speeches. We track that rhetoric over time, what kind of changes do we see . Inre are effectual changes the way in which International Organizations are talking about that part of the world, the rise of indicator culture, the notion that develop meant no longer has economic markers but there are all of these more individualized affective subjective markers rather than necessarily just income in one form or another. A worlddnt have had Happiness Index in the air of the third world. What does that mean for this part of the world . Said, and people can push back as much as they like. But really is a big rupture in the 20th century . Or not weng whether are in a moment of rupture. That brings me back to trump. Notion,ublic utilities thats the thing people are talking about. If we had done this conference for five years ago, we wouldve there frame around obama is a danger of hanging too much ,round the present moment assuming that is some kind of rupture that necessarily needs to be or can be explained in ideological terms. You dont know if you are a blip situation or in it for the long haul. Of kinds oflot things that can happen to him. On the other hand he can be around for a long time. Know at this particular point. Im not sure whether a person like him, whether thinking in classic or Foreign Policy terms is exactly the ideational lens we want to be looking at. It is the 1970s and a particular version of the 1970s that seems to drive much of what he does so the moment of industrialization, the culture wars of the 70s and 80s coming back in the form of these portion debates, that home moment, which seems domestically driven, may be the ideational way to think about this. Thinking about questions of method and reach. There also, how method might be able to give us a bigger reach bigger public in terms of the kinds of conclusions and arguments that collective we to make out of the project. So again, thanks so much for and just looking forward to the way the discussion goes the rest of our time. [applause] all right, so just as a brief for q a, please wait for the boom mike. There. T up keep questions short and make them in the form of a question please rather than a statement or a comment and ill call on it. S and go for thank you. It got me thinking as im supposed to be thinking about michael hunt and my read of that book was theres a community of people, americans, and they have thats particular to them, that sort of emanates from them. Consensus about it, and its fairly invariant. And what i heard was no theres a stable community. An ideology is imported as well emanating from. Like to hear the directly toack organizing our thoughts because i think theres a lot to say. To wants to tackle that start . Summarized au su 40yearold dialogue that i had with my mentor. As importantwas for me as mark just explained it. Liberating. Really and there was something i appreciated that he really was a him ad that made little bit less suitable for me to supervise my dissertation germany, about nazi but that was that dimension of you of thisany of room, infamously including the the culture knowing Something Else in the u. S. I think thats really informed and made it, you know, eye opening and liberating. I write in my paper, i the book stems in a er historiography and cannot of its focus, avoid the enlarging of that thinkiography which i anders says its really less culture,as than about that has something to do with the definition that michael uses ideology. And another way of describing culture i think with the nationalism terms that many of us use, and i think once theput nationalism at veryr of your study, its tricky to escape the pull of solipsism, that the subject matter itself and the practice has. Tionalism so Frederick Cooper warns us of that. Dont conflate the nationalism, thenalism with category of practice with the category of analysis. That we all understand intellectually and then comes the moment where its that pullto withstand because you are talking about a new Foreign Policy now and not the germant to empire. So that was the one aspect that made me a little bit hesitant, and then in 2014 he in which hearticle become that the areussion at the seams that captured under ideology and Foreign Policy has become so aspectsand so many including things i hadnt read about at the time, religion and so on that we need a new umbrella idea and that should be nationalism and thats when my thought no,up and i lets not go in that direction and moret will more lead to essentializing, what i write about in my paper. To resistdifficult that pull. So we have to find a different to highlight and bring out the diversity, and then to explain why it even because there is that problem. Doesnt seem to be relevant because it doesnt have ofimpact in the formulation Foreign Policy, but i think we need to finetune our perceptions. So that is how i would never pedestal,ntor off a but thats where i had to push back. Comments . Ill just say i read his book school and i reskimmed it before this doesrence and i think he actually the way he frames his book is that there are these ideologies which persist over time, but he does way, theirt the changes. On he talked about National Greatness and how it intersects with race and that has a lot to with territorial expansion, after 18481848 and or before 1898 and after. Back to marks great point about rupturing define an, we could intermediate category that is continuity and change so it doesnt have to rupture necessarily, but its useful to think about there may be these ideologies, but they are culturally expressing themselves in different ways so the task is about maybe the agency of ideology. Know if thats theoretically justifiable way of thinking about things, but to extent to which you have these inherited ideas which are andrited both from American Foreign sources, and which those sources are constantly changing, intersection with the outside world is the shifting of the meaning of these trends over time and how are in particular cases . Thinkbe thats the way to about rather than static or categories. Appreciate that question because thats something ive been wrestling with a lot in terms of trying to to write about some of the events and the people that im concerned with because the primary actors that in in the 17th and 18th century are not people that historians usually of as having ideologies. Theres native people and white dont generally have a lot of documentary records. I would kill for the kind of letters that can inform 20th century havetigations, but i dont that at all. So what ive been doing so far and you know, those of you who this, i paper noticed use fudge phrases like vernacular constitutionalism as something, means which is just a way of saying theres clearly what i think we ideologicalbe as an component when you have, you frontierely literate settlers who are describing political theories of commonwealth, but where theyre from and mixing those ideas and who theyre always clear. Not just the directionality of what aboutdoing when we talk ideology. Its important not to just think of ideas driving action or behavior, but action creating ideas, the ideological world. Just the one go ahead. I guess i just want to push bit on this notion about the kind of radicalism of wasargument that michael making and i dont mean to say that michael is the only person race mattered, but there was a certain gravitas saying that race mattered for attorney more than relations. Become two absolutely fundamental categories by which people have thought about theican Foreign Policy and writing of american Foreign Policy since that moment of the 1980s. Late in emphasize how the day it got into the field, been fundamentally transformative. Now to me would be what is an offer that might have ways ofy transformative thinking about what it is we do . There,t to put one out because theres nobody here that really is doing that kind of work. I think about queer theory and not so much necessarily that we would be talking about the lives lgbtq people, but i mean, the theory that has emerged by the havein which people thought about those projects. Queer theory is fundamentally concerned about rethinking the in which power works and bet those insights might helpful for us in thinking about the ways in which American Power in one form or think part of what was going on was a willingness of senior people to say these things that we havent really thought were at the center ought to be at the center, and i think have an obligation in this moment to be thinking where are those things . Maybe it is queer theory. Maybe its not. Theyre certainly candidates for what those things might be and that we need to be drawn in with people who are doing that kind of work who may or may not see the kind of do differently. Ofits the radicalism again what was happening there that i think you want to recapture in a this. T like to your hand in back over there. While the boom mike goes over i say i really appreciate mark bradley flagging this for us that we should be ambitious in the theoretical approach that were taking here whatrying to figure out envelopes we want to push and the history of ideas is perfectly situated to bringing race, littery studies, affect, history of emotions in ways that seem obs us in historical records, but the field has not caught up with otherther fields, what disciplines are doing and maybe we are very well positioned because were talking about apply ideas and new theories so please. Hi, thank you, guys for a great panel. I really enjoyed it and i want said i up on what mark would want to pick up on is the affect question but to ask it in aspecific way to mark but in general way to other people on the panel, too, which is one is, do we thinkw carefully together about the intersection and the distinction affect and ideology . I think its important to not just collapse them into the same yet to see those intersections and i would like think folks in this panel or talk aloud about what you see as the usefulness or not of affect in relationship to the category of ideology. You two, i want to ask specific questions about your paper. Time period. In your last book you talked a lot about this transformation to more ioriented testimony culture thats really happening 60s and 1970s, but this project really seems post89 and if you were fucault you could say the era and that would be okay, but i want to ask you about that 70s areon about the the time period which are the thed world and then late postcold war era, that time period and its importance. That i want to ask you about the use of our as source. Im very excited about it, i think its great, but i wonder our as a source doesnt bias people. Hard for me to think there isnt a time period when you could find artists and say inple are really interested i and testimony and the self because artists tend to be that. Sted where i wonder if you could talk about art as a source for you and what that means. Let me do those things more because we can talk more about that and just get other people in about the sort of affect thing. I guess i just think now, you write a book, and then later, you think gosh, i , right . Et that quite i was so 70s, and now, i just late 20th century better as a moment to think about a set of transformations seem to me that its 70s into the early thing gets whole unpacked in one form or another and thats a more comfortable chronological space for me to be thinking with this. That i guessue artists think in those kinds of interiorized ways, although not always. You think about the big era of, you know, matthews period and of history paintings and general wolf and all of that theres ant interior dimension, but theres also a different set of think one canso i talk about thats not a fixed a fixed way like of thinking about the world frof the centuries in one form or another. I think what it helps to do in that when its arented back artists just free floating. In institutions that explodt 20th century. Suddenly, the third world is a and of the world art market a it is, hes also creating kind of esthetics of what the contemporary is. An interactive process going on between individuals and thattutions and structures again can help to see a set of not to do affect but to do a kind oflliams like structured feeling of what that early 20th century period looks like. Let me stop that because i can go on and on and on and have other people address other parts of the question. On art as a historical methodology or a broader question t you wanted people about affect and ideology. I see more hands so we can grab some more hands and come back around to that. Penny. Wait for the boom mike, please. Behind you. Now, its there. You want the mike. Mike. T think i need a okay. I apologize. Arst of all, this is wonderful panel and thank you all so much for these brilliant, thoughtful papers. And i want to second sort of do we need for what to push forward and really how do we think about power deeply and differently . Im going to talk about this a little bit more when i talk this afternoon, but i think in a ways people have thought through ideology and history. I think we have maybe a lot of the trick is to do it really well as historians. I just want to present a couple use one example. I could use examples from any of from something i thought matthews paper did strikingly well in the sense that im always trying to think about what were doing as a critique of ideology. So most broadly thinking about of ideological as consisting those discursive forms through which a society or group of project is trying to itself on the basis of closing meanings. That theiring to say formation is natural, normal, and all the ways in which they that, which may be intentional. So a nonrecognition of the real deep play of differences that help us understand the way power is constituted. And one of the things to me thats so important in critique and i thought like matthews paper just crystallized this brilliantly is that by studying power relations and sort of unpacking these different discursive forms we can get at i saysort of and original. At sort of the new institution when is thereso research, when is there change . The origin of a new social formation and a moment i think youre getting at a moment when theres a real contingency in motionnd whats and where is the contingent . This institution of of a settler, colonial social formation is possible only the repression of other options that were open at that moment, could have gone in other ways and so youre giving us a byent of radical contingency reinserting those actions where real historical real wererical options discarded. Its really wonderful to that reallyin fundamental social formation and then, of course, thats not going to be thats going to rearticulated in and itany other moments will be challenged and thats why i always think we should say contingency and whats in motion . Historians and maybe michael hunt is drawing a couple of people and mark a of other people observed girtsian anthropological notion of ideology. In certainplace kinds of studies, but i think a more moving motion which i think fits with dannys excellent paper this morning of the way what is the way and what are the ways ideologicaldo critique that really is really centered on power and how these and whent structured they can get challenged so thats all i wanted to say, but example ofliant ideological critique from all of you and wonderful papers. You. Maybe you could speak to the rupture moment you pointed out, developing thats and is essential to that comment and observation. Sure. Actually i think she explained did. S better than i so thank you for your comment. I really appreciate that. The firsttainly not person to think of this moment as a period of pupture in any way. And for me, the stakes are trying to understand exactly rupturing and what is remaining continuous. The things thats a little too easy for us to do is to continuities in the wrong registers. Example, iw, for mean, michael hunts work is wonderful, but i think one of the ways he talked about racism relates to native americans is fairly static. In itss to naturalize own kind of way some of the things that actually were kind of radically contingent at moments. And so that to me suggests that we really, really need to pay ofention to exactly the kind formations in motion, the various forces that are going to be, some of them ideological, some of them material, some of them effective. Are not necessarily in any way mutually exclusive. Are just different ways of approaching the same questions and looking at where theres moments of tension to understand what, rupturing . A hand over here. The aisle. Thank you very much for a truly wonderful panel. Im going to start with two twok questions and then questions. So i want to push back a little bit about thinking of power differently. I think maybe the field itself has gotten too far away from thinking of power in traditional senses, particularly guns and moment ofly during a United States military primacy where the United States kills people around the world constantly. And i think as a field we havent examined the military as should have. Quick little comment. Itsi also think that interesting that the conference itself is titled ideologies and and noteign policy ideas. It might be worth reflecting on sense think about in the of intellectual history from 30,000 feet, which is what michael hunt does and particularly hunts influential student in my field, which has these are the five things and go from there. So i think its important to think about the relationship of what one might term ideological high upfrom this very level how ideas function in history in actual historical times. Reflecting onrth that a little bit, and then for mckalea, two questions. Be very interested in hearing your reflections on the lack of influence or what seems public onack of the u. S. Foreign policy, whether this has been true since the or 1898 or to today where you see moments of rupture antiiraq war protests little effect and i wonder if you could talk about that a little bit. And a very brief specific point. Its really interesting to me, ordinary americans are very project that the United States winds up pursuing war. E cold i wonder what you think about this idea that so Many American elites, the people who actually policies are so informed by european imaginary, these people are literally in europe, fdr, etc. Antly in europe and then to starting with the munich analogy, thats all european powers. Senses quite odd in some that it becomes a foundational american metaphor. Could thinkyou about this disconnect between the elite and how that informed. He course of the cold war. Theres a lot there okay. I dont really have much to of influence lack acause im a little bit in defensive mode. I feel that some of you may know the acknowledgment of the shadow of war he said this project was never funded because no fellowship thought it was worthwhile. I feel a little bit the same way. No one cares about the people is actually what i get in evaluations, they dont matter. Them is more wonderfulis social history of the immoral imagination or i right about the grammar of the moral imagination. Since so many ideas, not ideologies, but ideas that are referenced in u. S. Foreign thecy, especially in are suffusedon with moral claims. I think it would be important to look at what actually americans say about these things because they see the tensions, contradictions, they comment on that all the time, just to picture. T into the that you aspect addressed. What can i say . My projectstart andally after world war ii and after roosevelt, i would. Brings i know semester after semester what i teach in u. S. Foreign policy history, and i basically pull rationalization for every single war that the u. S. Has ever fought, but i back off, with world war ii. And that has something to do the eurocentrism of the american people. My people and the europeans. The theres one one halfcontinent that benefits from the american project of the and that is western europe. Do with whatlot to you describe. Saw an opening, but maybe that actually goes back to melanies question. To say one more thing ology. De ect its towards andrews paper so im sure we can come back to it in that regard. Theres something really strange Security National ideology that has long and deep American History and little rivulets that come after 45 that are centered on security because and fear andcurity how that works. And we have you know, there a palpable sense of fear. We have books abound on that topic, but it is not what i find letters. So you know, think of two demographics that are important here, which is africanamericans often as soldiers, but also as citizens. Have the dont experience of security to begin with that i think americans have exactly, especially nonsoldiers and nonafricanamericans, meaning majority, howite they can be brainwashed into fearful of external attack. I mean, i think that is actually quite a feat that the cold war politicians, pulled off. S you know, many have written about that. Fundamentally different experience of world war ii in europeans, how they experienced war and how it, thes experienced minuscule number of americans even soldiers let alone combat soldiers in world war ii ho the facts of russia others. Fear and insecurity indirect in really complicated and counterintuitive way that we should look at more. I wanted to reflect on the question for a moment, too. In oureen drawn together work going against this sort of narrative of the triumph of internationalism and a break against world war ii as a watershed and what shes done in the grassroots i found higher up its on the right, and its the conservative right, robert taft but a host of other people. Hoover is the dean of this group and is getting lots of letters and there are policy sayingtions and theyre wait, a lot of americans object to what is happening after the war. Wanted to come home, they dont want universal selective service, they dont want nato, u. N. , theywant the dont want the korean war. And thats the hope of the right 52, that eisenhower wouldnt run, that taft would win and taft would pull back what becomes the cold war internationalism that we know for the era and thats a great way to check our assumptions at the door and the sort of normative power of events, that this sweeping series of events and read back into it, and donty historians kind of recognize those grassroots people, its a reciprocal relationship. Theyre talking to leaders who are trying to have serious policy positions, you can think back, the extension comes from the right. Counterfactual. Why didnt it . Eisenhower said that election. Would notd won, it have. Anyway i see a question over here. Really quick. Just wanted to encourage the panelists to put the world at center of the story for a minute and if you did that, how might the papers look different . Particular for civilization as a society originates outside of the United States, in europe and latin america. So is that all relevant to the how president s deploy and politicize those ideas . About howthinking youre dealing with audiences for the word, the terms, the ideas. How much does the audience play into transforming ideas into ideologies . Thise were talking about before. Wellnt theorize very sometimes. Is there a theory that you can grasp to explain how audience matters in changing the flurry ideas that circulate through all the stuff that youre working on, how they transform becomeeologies that policy . Are we going to correct or ideas for the public . Who wants to lead us off . Sure. Ill take jays question. 100 and 1agree thing ive been thinking about. Civilization one of its functions as ideology the toic function of ideology is essentially find ways of naturalizing the existence of particular hierarchies, of making selfinterest seem universal. Are key words or ideologies that do that. As one thatization does it . Im not sure i have an answer, global context is an important one so where foreigns american policy using this term civilization so much at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century because theyre getting it from this broader european atlantic global context the latin american leaders are using this at the same time and are part of that pattern and theyre making their own claims in terms of civilization. Usere trying to civilization in an antiimperial sense to say okay in law, onlynal quote unquote civilized states rights. L sovereign were okay about that, but were civilized and were civilized christian and an argentine lists out various European International statesmen and lawyers who have put latin america within the sphere of civilization and you can sense the question of affect and emotion, you can read his insecurity into this book. Hes like were part of the club. In japan you guys identified a similar sort of pattern. Where the instance expression of particular american ideologies is by globald developments. Two . Her thoughts on those putting the world at the center and thinking about the ideas in motion as they become perhaps ideologies . I can ask that just a little bit in saying that i mean, this is well before the United States context, but the entire logic behind transforming native americans into subjects in the place for european empires has a lot to do with the way at eachires are looking other. You know, Early English colonizers want to try to asorporate native americans vassals because thats what spain has done already, a. , and looks better on the International Audience to have consent rather than conrequest. Thats just a more firm rationale. Its not as though they all have nativesion of harmonious subjects because of the goodness of their hearts, its a geopolitical calculation and thats about the relationship between north america and the rest of the world. Add because this question of affect and emotion think it mayup, i be worth thinking about when we look at the practice or these about thehinking specific context in which they arise, especially when those moments are code by the participants as moments of crisis. In the cases that i look at in instances what you get are white settlers in situations of extreme vulnerability or what like is extreme vulnerability where at any moment they could be killed or mayor families could be killed. Thats repeated over and over again. Them, the ways that the that, theome out of kinds of petitions they send to their leaders have a kitchen sink feeling to it. They are reaching for any justification to mobilize power behalf to receive the protection that they feel entitled to and also desperate for. So i think in a way, theyre any possible for justification to make it seem like they have a good case for and, in fact, thats actually what native people are doing to in their petitions. Theyre also reaching for justification within the realm culturesh political thats legible that they can mobilize on their own behalf and ofa way i think theres kind process of accretion, whereby of kitchen sinks, likever sticks, ends up that becomes a good basis for timenes strategy the next around. Mckalea and mark . The world at the center and the ideas in motion. [inaudible] it seems like the right thing me. O to but the question about kind of how you tell these stories in ways that are more complicated the kind of theoretical poverty of the field in doing that. Your question,o michael is at 30,000 feet and about scaling in a way and where matthew has scaled it a point where actually you can see these things sort of in movement and the kinds of conversations that are going on, the kinds of new sources of and when you do it at that level, i dont mean to say question takes care of itself. You begin to set up the thattures by which i think sort of happens in the analytics that form and so you know, powerng about the question in the same kind of way. I certainly take your point more traditional ways about thinking about power thatt isnt to suggest those arent important, but in scalar terms there are ways to be thinking about that question often in our field we get pushed into these camps. So wheres the global . Be moreeeds to domestic. Wheres traditional power . Needs to be queer theory 24 7. Balkanize in certain kinds of ways and its actually these moments of formation that balkanization just doesnt make sense anymore. Youre trying to figure out whatever tools can help you understand that particular rhetorically when were writing these sorts of field i thinkhe we get into these kind of dontr situations that really help if youre sitting there trying to go through the evidence to figure out what to way, right . N a thats about it for us on time. Reflect on just a couple of themes that im hearing before i mess up the mike that maybe we havent fully elaborated so one thing that was coming at over the course of the q a is transmission and reception, ideas flowing across borders or within borders, have they become or been received as ideologies rhetorics, what is subjecthood, how can you leverage that against the state . Grassroots, this sort of filtering up and down leveling of this, the different registers in several ways that we havent fully explicated. Think the International Dynamics and dimensions are really important here, the geopublication. Condenseing to complicated papers and loss of things, but one of the things we werent emphasizing as much as some of the questions were bringing up and mark was suggesting is keep the in view. Onal and i think moving back to questions of power, all of our papers revolve around power in some form, negotiations of power, and thats useful to keep in view. Power and affect would be something that would be interesting to think about, how power leveraged in the history of emotions and gender . Fits into that so the emotions in of politics and also the deeply misogynist ways they have thought of people and groups. Well see that coming out in the papers later on. Individual progress. This is something that mark up, how do we get to a 21st century neoliberal idea when and where did that happen and how is that instantiated in foreign construed . Roadly we should take a little break back herebe coming trying to start pretty rapidly about 1 00 p. M. So thanks very much. [applause] youre watching American History tv. All weekend, every weekend, on cspan 3. In 1945, four black privates the u. S. Women army protestnt on strike to discrimination. Next on American History tv, thera bolzenius talks about womens decision, their Court Marshal and the public and press reactions. The author of glory in their spirit how four black women took on the army during ii. War we recorded the interview at the history luncheon hosted by the association for the study of africanamerican and history. Bolzenius, what was the Womens Army Corps . Army corps or the wac, ill be using that acronym in 1942. Lished the military, the army was fighting a two front war and needed more troops so they enlisted women for the first order tots history in make sure they were able to fill the jobs that the men were leaving so they could go to the front. And there have been many books on the mistreatment of africanamerican soldiers during world war ii, but you wrote about four enlisted female soldiers. They . Re first of all, im very glad that you mentioned that because