Guess, that were scheduled to go there, and i will be happy to listen to anyones comment on what they think this might be added on here for and what it either foresees or doesnt. Thank you. Okay. We have the three questions. The consequences of the Trump Presidency on Foreign Policy. Onechina policy, whether its being challenged. And whether ill start with the first good question. Everyones going to have a different view on this, but i think i think there are some very hard lessons ahead for the United States. This would be my view. The first would be that you look at a succession of regional bipartisan administrations, democratic and republican, and you look at the status of certain kinds of negotiations. And then you look at President Trump and you have found that in a lot of circumstances, countries have put more on the table than we would have anticipated. M particularly china. Other countries would also be in that case. The question is you treat countries reasonably, responsibly, miin some of their approaches. You act difficult a end unreasonably and at least in the short term, there can be potential positive outcomes on the trade front in particular. I think thats a bad lesson, but i think is a lesson that some would take. I think the other issue is i think the idea that you see, particularly among some of my democratic colleagues, is that if a democratic leader is elected, that there would be some outpouring of gratitude and relief. I dont think thats the case. I think whats much more likely is that we will be attacked and criticized that we had gone that direction in the first place and theyre going to feel more comfortable saying things that they may not be as comfortable now. They will count on the reasonableness of a new administration so they will be able to exert their displeasure more assertassertively. Thats going to be tough for a new administration that would want a, you know, oh, thank god, youre back. There may be a little of that but not nearly as much as we think. And i do believe that there are going to be elements of trumpism that will continue, and i take no i take no pleasure in that, and i think its going to be difficult but i think hes had a much more profound impact on americas role in the world than we realize now. And i think there will be deep fundamental rethinking of how you link up what the middle class wants in the world to what a new administration does. So im not sure i know whats going to go forward, but im certain that it will be much more difficult than o resurrect deeply predictable confident set of interactions between the two sides. And to the question about onechina policy, think the questions are much more fundamental about u. S. Relations with china about technology policy, about trade, as tom and others have suggested. I dont think that is the fundamental debate. In the past, that may have been an issue that occasionally is debated on the sidelines. I think fundamentally, right now, it is about the core issues between the United States and china and economic trade policy. Yeah, so i wanted to i wanted to Say Something about the people leaving the state department. You know, it it was one of the great honors of my career to serve briefly in the state department for a couple of years with career professionals that are there. Im looking at cathie stevesens. People like that. Yeah. It was an incredible experience. Its an underappreciated asset for the United States in the security realm. That these people who learn foreign languages, spend a lot of time abroad, get build relationships and really understand strategy and policy across administrations, and theyre there and theyre an anchor and ballast in our Foreign Policy. When people like that leave, its extremely damaging. You cant just replace them overnight because you can have a very smart person. Can get a smart person in there, a highly educated person in there. To build the experience that these people have is very, very difficult and time consuming. So i think of my colleague, my former deputy, susan thornton, who served 30 years in the state department and recently left. You cant just replace susan thornton. She speaks russian, chinese. She spends all this time around the world. She gets it. Right . So when she leaves, its a big damage. We spend a lot of time thinking about the military and not enough about the foreign service. Yeah. On the onechina policy, ill just say, you know, i dont want to go into a lecture. The u. S. Onechina policy is not the same thing as chinas onechina principle and its not the same thing in a very important way is that its very flexible. The u. S. Onechina policy. Different things can be emphasized and be consistent with the onechina policy. And i would expect as administrations change and as challenges arise, different parts of that to be emphasized. For example, arms sales to taiwan, they may go up because the military challenge, but thats consistent with onechina policy. Youre saying will the United States fundamentally break out of that the broad constraints of the onechina policy . And it is imaginable. I can tell you how that would happen. If it were to happen. I dont think thats going to happen. Because i think people would realize that it would not be in anyones interest and would not be in taiwans interest. Thats the most important thing. So i often say that everybody in the United States loves taiwan. Some americans want to love taiwan to death. Just one other thing, this point about i agree with tom, and the state department really is a fantastic institution, and there is real damage thats been done. But its not going to be enough to say its going to take us 20, 25 years to rebuild. We will not have that luxury. And so there needs to be some really insightful looks at how other institutions have rebuilt quickly under duress. I think some of that is going to require some midcareer hires taking some lessons from business, other institutions. The military as an example, we have in certain periods rebuilt. Its not just money. Its how you retain, how you go gua guard. Were going to have to look at policies and see what we can do to try to rebuild the state department as we go guaforward it will be really difficult. By nature, these are things that take 15, 20, 25 years. Any other comment . I feel like you have one more comment. I wanted to, again, thank victor for being who he is and providing this opportunity. I know the chair is bigger than the man, but, you know, hes been in the chair since it started. So, you know, just maybe a round of applause for him. [ applause ] so i think we are about to go and celebrate and have a reception. So, thank i want you to join me thanking the panel for this excellent discussion from the region. Thank you. [ applause ] thank you, dr. Terry. Before we go to the celebration, we have a few closing remarks. So were now transitioning to the party. So there is there is there is an open bar. There is lots of food. We really want you to stay for the next part of the program which is the evening reception and the presentation of an award to our president and ceo, john hamry. So, please, dont leave. Youre not allowed to leave. [ laughter ] and enjoy some of the food and then well be back. We have an excellent panel that will sort of close out the days discussions, featuring ambassador stevens, general brooks, and a number of other people, so, please, do not leave. Stay with us until the end. And is there anything else . Of course, thank you to president lee for the fourth, i hope successful, strategic forum. So please enjoy some drinks, some food, and then join us in about half an hour. Right . H [ applause ] this allday forum on u. S. Relations with south korea currently in a break. Were going to continue our live coverage at 5 30 eastern time with a panel looking at nuclear diplomacy. Until then, we take you back to the discussion from earlier today on President Trumps upcoming summit with south koreas president moon jaein. Thank you, everybody, for joining with this occasion and thanks to csis for inviting me and the panel to participate. I wanted to give a special, of course, congratulations to the korea chair and to victor for all the job that youve done over the past decade now. Probably seems like going quickly, but for us journalists, im a reporter at the Washington Post, victor and the korea chair have been a valuable, valuable resource both, obviously, in the past two years but even before that i was bugging victor and others in the program quite often, maybe many times you didnt necessarily want to be bugged, but for a terrific analysis and to help sort of walk me through whats happening. And so i wanted to take a timeout to thank the korea chair for that. And to congratulate you for such a successful ten years. I am a reporter with the Washington Post, and i cover the white house, and ive been doing that for about seven or eight years. First under the obama administration, now the past 2 1 2 with President Trump. It has been quite an experience shifting between the two, but one thing i focused on the entire time thats kind of a through line is asia policy because its so important, starting with president obamas pivot to asia. So its my great honor to be hosting this panel. I wanted to say that well be discussing i know theres three panels today so well be discussing the u. S. rok alliance and as a journalist, i like to be very topical, but let me introduce the panel then well have sort of a healthy discussion about where we are. Its an auspicious week, of course, because President Trump is headed to the region first to osaka for the g20 as you know, and then to seoul for an important summit with moon jaein and well sort of ask the panelists quite a bit about that. Ill be on the trip along with several of my colleagues and i leave tomorrow. So very much looking forward to that. Of course, we have victor cha, hardly needs an introduction, here to my left. Victor founded the korea chair in 2009. As we mentioned has served after having served as director of Asian Affairs in the National Security council in the Bush Administration from 2004 to 2007. That role, of course, victor was very involved with the sixparty talks and other negotiations with north korea that have predated where we are today. Author of five books including the impossible state north korea, past and future. And i believe victor, youll see him quite a bit on nbc and msnbc as an analyst. Of course, right next to victor, ambassador joseph yun. Thank you for joining. He probably needs also very little introduction. Joe is currently a Senior Adviser at the asia program at the u. S. Institute of peace. Before that, he served 33 years as a diplomat. And for two years, you well know was from 2016 to 2018 was the u. S. Special envoy to north korea and he was a key player, of course, in reestablishing communications with pyongyang through the new york channel and of course traveling to north korea to ultimately secure the release of otto warmbier, so thank you, joe, for all your service. I think joe also a regular contributor at cnn if im not mistaken. Kbh competitor well have a little faceoff here. I think next to ambassador yun we have dr. June kim whos a professor at hondong Universitys Department of international studies. Conducted Extensive Research or the u. S. rok alliance as well as the interkorea relationship on the peninsula. Previously served as the director of security and diplomacy center. An independent think tank. And he spent time prior to that as a visiting fullbright scholar at george mason university, not far from where i grew up in northern virginia. So thank you, dr. Kim. We have next, of course, another diplomat, joy yamamoto who last fall took over as the director of the korea desk at the state department. A job she assumed after serving as the minister counselor for Economic Affairs at the u. S. Embassy in seoul. Joy is obviously very much involved in all the things that well be talking about today. Very happy to have joy with us. Before that, she had previously also served as a diplomat in indonesia and china and other locations around the world, and also, close to my heart, was a former newspaper reporter. So she knows all my tricks and, joy, youre on the record today because this is a big crowd and being broadcast. Finally, we have dr. Sonheon lee. Also serves as the president of the Korean Nuclear policy society. Dr. Lee served as the director general for policy planning. The minister of Foreign Affairs from 2011 to 2013. Hes authored numerous papers and analyses including a summary of the u. S. Dprk summit in hanoi. So, thank you, to our panelists. Were just going to jump right into a dialogue rather than have opening presentations which i think sometimes slows things down. As a journalist, i mentioned were interested right now in whats happening and no better time to have this panel than the president s trip and i sort of want to get right at it. I think theres a lot of interest now after what seemed to be a dark period in our diplomacy, in our dialogue, after the collapse of the hanoi summit which i was at, about whats going to happen, how to get the talks back on track. Now weve seen what tends to be the path with this president , this administration, which is sort of a direct leadertoleader engagement. Exchange of the socalled love letters that President Trump might call them. Most, you know, first kim jongun apparently sent a letter to the president , and then you saw arou around his birthday. Then. You saw a reciprocal letter just being reported over the weekend which kim jongun received apparently from President Trump. The white house has confirmed that letter was sent. And that that letter contained, according to the state news agency, excellent content, and that the chairman is considering it. That raises a lot of intriguing possibility. I know its been a lot of discussion about what to make of this summit between moon and President Trump coming up, but maybe i can just start with victor and well go down the line a little bit about what we think about a third summit, do we see now that these exchange have sort of renewed that idea and that President Trump we dont know a lot about what was in the letter but do we see a third summit and what does that mean, what would it take for us to get to that place . Sure. Well, thanks for the question. The other thing you should all know before we get started, david didnt properly introduce himself because what he is most known for in the korea policy Expert Community is hes the only journalist that we know that has asked a question of kim jongun at a press conference and gotten an answer. I joke now that i joke now on my tombstone it will say, he shouted a question at the most ruthless dictator and lived for a while to tell about it. I did write a story about that moment. I was in the press pool in hanoi. I had been in singapore f. For the first summit, i was not in the pool, a small group of 13 reporters allowed into the photo ops. Everybody cannot get in. That pool, both television, radio, and print, me, writes a summary and sends it out of what happens, of course. I was very disappointed not to be in the pool for the singapore summit. Had to sort of remain in the hotel and hope for some briefings. I actually went to kim jonguns hotel when he first arrived. I waited about four hours with ordinary folks on the streets right off the shopping corridor in the hot sun to just get a glimpse of the moteor rid acade running bodyguards and wrote a scene piece, why we stand on the street with our kids with my ipad, get a glimpse of this ruthless dictator. I was very thrilled the wo Washington Post was the Pool Reporter for hanoi. When we went in, as a group we said we need to shout something to kim. President trump engages so quick, after the photo op, reporters immediately shouted to President Trump and he answered and i sort of positioned myself closer to kim and was just sort of keeping an eye on him, try to make some eye contact, then when i heard trump stop talking i finally shouted, chairman kim, do you feel good about a deal . He kind of looked at me. I did one of these feel good. As i wrote in the subsequent piece, now you get taken to task if you write something about being, you know, too chummy with a dictator, why are you normalizing this guy . But my point, this was a universal sign of feel good, you feel good. I didnt know it would happen but i was sort of time slows down and youre in the moment. I saw if you look at the replay trumps interpreter leans over, they both have an interpreter and trumps interpreter leans over and i guess interprets my question or indicates its for him. Then he responds. So i was thrilled. In the moment, at the end of the piece, i didnt realize no one had ever done that or gotten a response. But we were quickly ushered out as they didnt want to keep letting us have a chance. Then rushed back to send a pool report out. Thats when i, you know, then saw on twitter and so on that this had made some big news. You know, what he said was i feel hopeful, but, you know, we feel hopeful but were not there yet, so at a time were assuming there would be some sort of interim deal, thats all signs that sort of led to that, but, you know, in reality, he wasnt there yet. They may be hopeful. I think my colleague, anna, used the quote at the end of her book on kim jongun, the hopeful feeling, well see. That was the experience. But id love to see if my colleague, you know, on this trip or subsequent, may have another chance because it seems certainly that another summit doesnt seem like were close to that but we should be close to that, but because the president does things differently, were coming up on a quacampaign, id love to go down the line briefly about i feel like theres i want to echo what rich just said in the beginning, theres something in the air. I think theres something in the air. After the hanoi summit, there was basically no dialogue taking place. All the efforts at the working level to make contact were not not were just going into a black hole. And then all of a sudden, this birthday card letter comes from chairman kim to trump, which he then responded to. And then xi jinping goes to kenya. Every time you see that setup, thats an indication of a third meeting. Those pieces are pieces that we generally see before there is another highlevel meeting. In addition to that, based on my experience as a staffer setting up trips by the president , its quite unusual, i feel, this time for President Trump to be spending two nights in korea off of the g20 summit in osaka. Usually when we do these trips, and there are many in the audience who know this well, usually its an orn in japan and early in the morning there is a trip to korea. You do the troops, you do whatever, and then you move on. So this is a lot of time in korea. I think there is no doubt that the president will go to the dmz because hes never been there, and the last time he went, he couldnt go general brooks was there at the time and there was a lot of it was like really bad weather that day, really bad fog that day. So he couldnt make that trip. I think every u. S. President thats going to say say about korea has to visit the dmz to see the actual division and how armed it is. So im pretty certain hes going to do that, and then the question is, is he going to make a big statement at the dmz . Is he going to do it himself . Is he going to do it with president moon . Are there going to be other surprises . This president likes surprises, and so there is something i feel like theres something going on. Were not really sure what, but it looks like there is an effort, really, to reset after hanoi. And maybe not a third summit immediately, but at least a reset that will allow the working level to reengage. The problem is that as long as both sides dont put a lot of or dont empower the working level to make agreements, were going to fall into the same trap we fell in in hanoi, which is workinglevel meetings on everything but the most important issue. That is left to the two leaders and the two leaders cant make a deal. I feel like right now it looks like were headed down that road, and what the president did on iran in terms of pulling back at the very last minute with regard to retaliatory military strike for the downing of the drone only reinforces the view in north korea, that you got to talk to the leader. So that means the working level are not going to be able to make agreements that can then set up a successful summit. So thats what i worry about. Joe, what do you think would put us on a path to a summit that makes march sense than maybe a rushed meeting, certainly this trip, and what kind of time frame do you see as who sensible . I think fund mentamentally, is something between the relationship of donald trump and kim jongun. There is kind of a mixture of both admiration for each other, but the information said is quite aasymmetric. Kim jongun knows everything about donald trump. He knows how his government operates, he knows what key staffers, pompeo, bolton, are like. Donald trump doesnt know anything about what is going on in pyongyang. There is the mismatch. And so i think, in my experience, North Koreans study washington like anything. I remember back when i was in government, i think it was in november of 2016, i was talking with a north korean and i was trying to set up a meeting for my thenboss tennyson, to go to pyongyang. And they said, we really dont wa want tennyson. We think hes going to get fired. Of course, they were right. He did get fired about four months later. But the underlying the underlying rationale is, of course, we all know if historically its true that the north korean side had been wanting some summits. Now the difference is donald trump wants some. I have no doubt there will be a third summit probably sooner than later. I mean, you know, what will make it a success, of course, victor is right. There has to be work done at a working level so there are no surprises. But im relatively optimistic. If you look at what was on the table in hanoi, theres quite a bit on the table from the north korean side giving up offices, so the key issues like definitional denuclearization, how much denuclearization for how much sanctions were left out, but i do think you can reach a next level of a deal relatively quickly. So in that sense, its in both their interests to have a sum t summit, put this to a place where its sustainable at least for a while. Donald trumps main goal is, of course, to win the 2020 november election. So get through that. I mean, fortunately for kim jongun, he doesnt face an election, so i think youre looking at a shortterm, a mediumterm path that puts on a stable route. Dr. Kim, can you give us a sense of how the blue house, how the South Central government has been trying to work with both sides to help reengage them. We know there had been very little communication after hanoi in pyongyang. South korean government has no choice but to be positive. Thats true. And actually, as you said, after foreign matters, any change of animosity and something is going on. It looks like something is going on. And xis visit to north korea and kim jonguns appeared to be on the anniversary of singapore. But to me its not really any of theeds is not a game changer. Its look a buildup. They were coming out to meet south korean president just like happened last may. It was 24 hours since the second meeting. Actually, they couldnt meet until may 26. The but the thinking of the situation right now from north koreas perspective, theyre still angry. Certainly devastated to pretty much they recoup themselves, but its not ready to come up p. Our stress frlsly. U. S. Chajd the calculation or south korea has tried to persuade nerk to their spergs sv svly. It will be sooner. Even if they decide to come to the negotiating table, they need to rebuild the position to have better deal in a sense. They dont want a repeat of what we had . Exactly. Regarding these love letters, an blue fuchls it would be five unknown persons there from kim jongun to trump. I think this is in a way to special communication method. I dont think there is really a gamechanging. They tried to maintain this whole table to put together some kind of decision orde deal. I want to skip joy because, as you can see, shes in a somewhat compromising position. In the case of north korea, though, we usually have a better sense of it, but these letters are pretty formulaic, maybe have a lot of flowery language. We know President Trump released one letter last summer that he got from kim jongun. You know, what we think about what could be accomplished in these kinds of letters between leaders. President trump is so proud of them, he asks reporters to treechd in which i think the reporter teemtd. You can read it but you cant take a picture it have. At one point nimplt. Tleez many but clearly not violate kim jonguns confidence, i guess. But i wonder if you could tell us a little more about what you think is trying to be accomplished, other than praise to each other, unless thats it. Well, i will say that and this is a good sign that because both sides want to continue. Ive been watching inside those letters. At the same time, since the holiday summit were, at least we have some momentum to continue this dialogue. I think thats already a good sign. But perhaps if actual, physically is the map made in the coming days and months, then perhaps it may be visibility. Is it will be another disappointing round of just the c letter. R. What do i understand of sflerlt. There are some new talks about that. I want to come back to what we can infer about some of the changes of north koreas negotiating team, President Trump sort of contradicting john bolton at times on north korea. That tells us where this might be headed. But first, joy, im wondering since were on the precipace of this trup. I wonder if its considered untraditional, especially in the relationship between mr. Trump and mr. Un. Hes in the spotlight and has continued this diplomacy with President Trump to try to flatter him and work his relationship and try to stay as sort of midground and sort of have a different view of how they can proceed with this ndiaye plolg. There are other things they want to talk about and maybe more about why he is spending one night on the agenda. Is it still one night . Okay. So theres no question that the priority is the negotiated denuclearization in north korea . Theres no question that this is the most important issue thats facing both the rk and the United States. Theres no question this will be the subject of meetings between kim jongun and President Trump. What we should also remember is what they will do and what they will commit to is the enduring, strong, bilateral relationship by the alliance. That alliance is more than just the dprk issues, it is about showing the world that together these two countries, these two governments can do extraordinary things, whatever they want. And the greatest example is the fact that were working together to engage north korea, but beyond that, weve also shown that we can work on Economic Issues together, we negotiated changes to the korea u. S. Trade agreement that were difficult but we managed to coerce with amendments that were mutually compatible with both industries, and we also made a commitment to Work Together in the endo pacific region, both under president moons new policy and under president s specific strategy. Were finding that there are cynersin sin sinergies between those two efforts and the fact we have confidence in asia, southeast asia. Its based on wanting a free and open endo pacific region. Its based on that we want countries to preserve their sovereignty to develop in ways they want to and not because tear being coerced into doing so. I guess what im trying to emphasize is that is this relation is, yes, about the dprk, but please dont forget that this relationship is much more and can r in so many ways across the board. We cooperate on health, science and technology, energy, so i fully expect that this commitment to bilateral alliance to these kinds of aspects of our lives will be very much a part of the conversation. I dont think president moon plays golf. We saw you know, this is President Trump who puts a lot of faith in sort of that interpersonal relationship, it seems like, whether its with our allies or other leaders, even xi jinping. On a trip like this, its fairly quick. Its not a lot of time. I just wonder if theres any kind of Relationship Building even if they cant tell us what it is. Do they have efforts to do that with president moon . So the trip isnt fully set i know it feels like its just a few days away, but believe me, they havent fully settled on the schedule for this trip. There is no question it will be bilateral meetings. But there will be other activities, hopefully something related to business economics, something related to the alliance, so to speak. Again, there is nothing set but President Trumps intent is to be with him almost every minute of this trip. Since we talked about the limits of leadertoleader negotiating, and i think weve seen the limits over this time, there have been plenty of reports of what happened over the uncertain fate of kim jonguns negotiating team. Some may have been overblown, but some seemed to be authentic in that he may have wanted to start anew. Im wondering, even though we might not know exactly what those things are, or what the resulting thing is, that his problem maker is only one in new york. Thats kim jongun. Oyment, as some of our an session, i guess, and what would that be. I think there has been a change. I mean, kim huk cho and kim yung cho were the ones leading up to hanoi. No one in their life probably said no to kim jongun. Then these four guys on the train had to watch them for the entire 617 hours. Kim huk co, i knew him because he was on the sixparty delegati delegation. He, as sort of the key interlock, it will certainly lent him much more grud ground. In london he gave the best speech about why north korea needs Nuclear Weapons. He was almost persuasive. And he has them and jo knows rms approximately frls and she was involved heavily in the sixparty talks. If anyone knows the technical details, of course cannot nag. They ever not brought those sorts of people back to the table. So i think overall, the change is probably for the betteheof p. So i think overall, the change is probably for the bettepeople. So i think overall, the change is probably for the bettef peop. So i think overall, the change is probably for the bettesorts table. So i think overall, the change is probably for the better. What was the second part of your question . Just everything had to go through pyongyang. Everything was coming through kim jongun. Is that going to continue . I think that will probably still continue, but at least it can sound a little bit more flowy in terms of a negotiation. I think it will be much easier to have side conversations because both of them are fluent in english. I think it will give our sides negotiation a better feel. My guess is it was very stilted with kim hong cho and kim huk cho because theyre not really theyre not diplomats. Theyre not Foreign Ministry people. They have not spent a lot of time outside the country. Given what we know about ultimate positions of both sides in hanoi that led to sort of the sta stalemate and the. The placards were laid out and all of a sudden this thing was 30 minutes away and it was on the rocks, and we didnt know how quickly it would be over but we got the news. What dr. Lee was saying, that kim felt, you know, still upset and angry about where that ended and doesnt want a repeat of this, which is what dr. Kim was saying as well, what step should the u. S. Take to feel confident this thing can move forward. I thought we could get into some sort of dialogue. I think at this point, really, the north korean existence is for if. This has to be the u. S. Offering sanction tptz. Plus for the u. S. And some kind of sanctions relief. Plus for north korea means something on denuclearization. To your earlier question about if you think you know, interagency fights in washington are bad. If you lose, you could end up somewhere like csis, and thats not very pleasant. I do believe, and i agree with victor, that the whole team was discredited, and now its moving back with essentially a foreigner handling nfa. Thats good news and bad news because they know the history. They know what the u. S. Will and will not do. So the negotiations, i believe, are going to be more civil but tougher. They will be a lot tougher because they know exactly how far they can go without really angering the leader. To me its very interesting that there is in north korea a fairly open debate in media. Places like redemption moon and kcna on whether kim jongun or north korea should be negotiating this at all or rely on more traditional build our own defense . And so to me, if it indicates that there isnt the complete control that you would expect from the leader, so that has some legs. It is critically important for them, for kim jongun right now that he save face. Whether the u. S. Can do anything to save that face, i dont know what its going to take at this point. And thats why they need to have working group meetings, to probe each other so they get at least a minimum package that satisfies both sides. Dr. Kim and dr. Lee, im wondering if you could address a little bit of i think we saw from president moon, head of hanoi, he was hopeful that the u. S. Was moving towards some interrung step , reports of smaller sanctions. If theyll allow the south to kind of engage the north on projects and tourism. I wob would start moving in that direction. Is that still a viable plan . How might moon try to make that case. In the government, the feeling that president moon has is there was do i understand of twist. It could happen, maybe. Because actually one are on the plane calling president moon eight times. Please, talk to the chairman king and find out what he thinks. So he has some kind of regret or things like this. I think eyes speaking pramwork is if he mace two of th meets with two of them, thats a pretty narj narrow margin and probably better if we have third because ta because. If you go to the big deal, that means north korea is losing. So i think we need to add up a little bit more or sanction and relive plus some kind of risen security issues. But, anyway, i think, of moving on. Imt you i want to you Pay Attention to this. After the meeting in hanoi, three arguments, especially in washington among hardliners, are getting louder. Number one is sanctions are working. It is time to push more not to stop. The second one is finally we finally found out that the genuineness of nuclearism of president kim means he has no intention to denuclearize. Third, limitation of approach. We have to go back to working level negotiation. Actually, north korea is well aware of this. They are building in these three areas. They said, especially in april speech, kim jongun said, we are ready to tighten our belt and survive. Regarding, too, genuineness after he tried to appeal his genuineness toward russia and china and international. I think number 3 is the most important part. Thats why he tried to reconfirm the topdown approach is still usable, because he believes people who support this workinglevel negotiation is actually dont want this topdown approach to be successful. Same thing happened to President Trump and president moon. When they met in washington, they reconfirmed this topdown approach, of course. It has to be somehow negotiated in a working level negotiation but has to be left by this top. This they may frame it this way, but i dont see why they cant do both. A small deal is only in the context of the big deal, right . The big deal being everything, all the weapons, all the sanctions. If they can get an agreement on the big deal at least in principle a product expansion. I think there is a deal that could be made. But the working level is important because somebody has got to set up the leaders so that they can say in advance, that looks good to me, right, so that when they meet were not just saying this because were all workinglevel stiffs, its practically the only way its not just any field in business in anyplace, umt pm i think an interesting way to pate double deechlt with the idea that any kind of move to some sdmimpld, even if there is some big deal on the table and agreed upon in the outer frame, unless it was specific it would be hard to have confidence that they reached that. Looking back on the time of the hanoi summit, the south korean government was quite festive, were too optimistic about the outcome. Actually, it turned out that they both wanted the agreement. He was preparing something for march 1st. March 1st is a big day in korea. According to the report, a deep acknowledgment contained a plea to engage both politically and economically. But in a sense that in hanoi there was an obstacle. Nevertheless, after the hanoi summit, as i understand, the korean government is still optimistic, still engages a plan, and perhaps they could engage in the plan in court, for example. And also many korean ventures. It depends on whether they engage in denuclearization. And i would say give me two things that i think are important. One is the hanoi summit very clearly indicated that whats the bottom line that both sides demand. The point of efficacy was one thing, but lifting sanctions was what they considered their survival. Also some kind of review was inever tabl. A topdown approach may be a good way to open up the ndiaye lolg. At the same time, each level was quite the important one that we had to think about. So if there is a summit, then perhaps working toward that preparation. You know that those many people can review the system. The only people who can review the system is kim jongun. Even throw there was never a confrontation between the gis and also how to offer some kind of give and take. So in order for us to be so successful, i have to say that kind of lefvel of preparation i something to think about. A little broader for the g20, not to weigh in on all the things the president is going to do there, but he has a quick trip to the g20 as well. I think two nights. It original was going to be one. But i think the president is going to arrive and hit the ground running. I think hes going to go here. Having covered the obama administration, i know there was significant work down try to have the United States sort of broeng deal. I know at the time relationships were really struggling. I think at the g20, the president is going to have a i trilateral, if im not mistaken, between china and india as sort of a broader framework of policy. Has there been any thought toward doing some kind of trilateral with tokyo and seoul . Not necessarily in this trip but in general. Can you talk at all about how important it is to helpment. A lot of friction between south korea and japan generally, but you see them together and getting the alliances right and having the negotiating table, and frankly, that relationship between gentleman and that is good. At this particular momment, it not good in those two countries. We would love to be involved and bring them together, but we recognize the risk of doing anything, frank many there is no question that any chance we get, we encourage both sides to work out these historical issue issues, that theyre now disputing. If anyone has a suggestion on where the u. S. Government could be useful and helpful, i think were really open because these are important relationships, and if theres something we could do to help japan and korea resolve them, we would. I also remember the president did, in 2018, especially in the young mplg tmplt rchgs how much the dofr ya issue will be, part of discussions with no, maam he willen foijd fmly how will he try to get that message across osa. So i wont make predictions but i think you could assume it would be natural considering xi jinpings visit to pyongyang that there would be great curiosity about what messages were there and any ideas that xi jinping has on engagement with north korea. This is a priority for the United States, north koreas denuclearization, so i wouldnt be surprised if thats on the agenda for almost all his bilateral meetings. Victor, i did a piece about a month or two ago about whether trumps escalating trade fight with beijing could bleed over into his efforts to keep china on board with. At the time vrmt it will and it didnt see evidence that the two issues were necessarily affecting one another. Im wondering now what you read into xis visit to pyongyang. Was he sending trump any signals . Did you have any sense of whether that connects to the trade issue and puts more pressure on trump to resolve that at all . I dont think so. I think that i certainly dont think that xi went to pyongyang to try to help broker a deal for the United States. I just dont see him doing that for the United States. For me, what it means more broadly for south koreas longterm visit on the country visavis the United States. Today they have twice as many miles than the south has, or the north its only a matter of time before they start financing one belt. So china is slowly growing its influence in north korea. So when xi goes to pyongyang and says, look, i know you want refompl. Let me tell about you the la latest. Thats something that will, i think, is where that trip is going aside from the u. S. china trade friction. So, you know, i think it is one of the Big Questions about engagement with north korea. We were talking about this at dinner last night, particularly from the south korean agreement, but if you want to make an agreement, if we dont engage, china is going to take over the northern part of the peninsula, and unification, if it ever happens, is going to be much more complicated. Thats from the south korea u. S. Perspective. That is a less persuasive argument rather than saying lets buy the horse for the fourth time. Let me jump to our panelists from korea. Are we okay to have questions from the audience . Sure. Well do that in one second. I think were going to 1 45. For our two panelists in korea, i was thinking maybe we should do a story at some point of which countries are looking and hoping for a donald trump reelection in 2020, and one of the ones that came to mind and that people sort of signalled to me was south korea because the president has done this engagement with the north. And im wondering if you can give a sense politically how the moon government, how invested they are in campaign 2020. Are they hoping, do you think, for a donald trump reelection . And i say that at the blue house and then the broader south korean public. We know a lot more about Vice President bidens Foreign Policy, but is there a contingency plan . Well, if trump is reelected or if he fails, that is to be expected. There is an opinion in korea thats quite unique. Some say that trump, even though he is not the best president , hes doing a good job of handling china. At the same time because of his policy leadership style and also because of policymaking processes. It may be good if he was reelected. If he fails, what happens . He will take a more complicated approach. Theyre a force to put inside whether or not trump will be reelected or not. Of course, he is a personal president. Kim, i dont know if you had any thoughts. As a president , actually, i dont deal with him in any sense except this peace process. Having said that, and if he does some irreversible denuclearization partially, then it doesnt matter whether hes elected or not. But if he cannot do anything, then, you know, democratic government will reverse everything, so well be more in trouble. This is where i said that we are now in the postreversal because we just heard one of the most prominent progressives in south korea saying that donald trump would be good for the north korea problem. But my question, then, is, is donald trump good for the alliance . Unfortunately, i would say hes not good for the alliance, right . And so we are now in a completely new area of conversation that dont fit in the guidelines of where people fall on certain issues. John, i dont know if you feel that way. You want him to be reelected . This is a very tough question, because for american voters, even if you want to look at Foreign Policy, you have to look at totality. Iran, venezuela, trade, immigration, mexico, and so all those things. And you have to weigh them. To me there is no question that conventional wisdom now holds. In that sense were looking to really shake up the political spectrum. What my friend, professor kim, said, it doesnt make sense if youre korean. Thats the only thing that matters. But for americans, theres going to be many other issues that are there. Its complicated. A complicated question. I have one more wild card for joe, but maybe we can open it up to questions. I dont want to lose much time. Does somebody have the mic . What are the biggest risks to the alliance . We know the alliance is strong, but what is the risk . Is it potential daylight on north korea . Is it trumps America First orientation of protecting his policy . What should we be worried about . Since joe cannot answer that question, perhaps a comment on where we are. Im sorry i cant answer your broader question, but on burden sharing, the administration is reviewing its policy on burden sharing worldwide. I think the president has made it very clear that he wants our allies and partners to pay a fair share, a greater share of the cost of protecting themselves. And so it comes under that. Once this review is over, we will begin again negotiating the special agreement with korea and well be asking for more of koreas contribution to the stationing of forces. One of our guests from seoul . An alliance in crisis is like a frequent menu for conservatives to criticize president moon, but as you have said, hes a strong ruler. If there is an exclusive choice between the alliance and north korea, he probably would pick the alliance. The biggest risk is trump again. Trump is people, in a way we go back to 2017. Trump has taken advantage of our situation to sell weapons and things like that. For me, for our future, i think its a good chance. South koreans almost think this is a good way to secularize this myth. If its making alliance trouble, but on the other hand, if trump secularized this alliance, its better for us fundamentally. Just below the surface, we have many uncertainties. If this question is swayed, whats the role of the u. K. . Look whats happening these days. Chinese communication in hanoi is big for confidence as well. In hanois case, perhaps impact may be a significant footprint and korean economy. Also, think about the political sense. This may be a different kind of challenge for north korea in the coming days. What i would like to see in terms of an answer to steves question, sure, north korea is the number one issue, but really a focus on all the other things that the United States and korea are doing. So he when i think back to when we were doing this in the administration, of course, we had a progressive government. We had to talk a lot about north korea, but at the same time South Koreans were sending troops to iraq, they had a pft in afghanistan, we had a green growth alliance, we did visa waiver, we had the work study program, we had a variety of things. Also i would dreblirect you to speech that mark lippert gave when he was talking about all the areas of cooperation. Everything from Development Assistance to work in outer space together. This is the proactive form of the agenda that i would like to see Work Together in the alliance. Its about burden sharing and difficult issues, but there is a very positive proactive agenda to the alliance. It was either our morning speaker, rich nye or rich armitage and joseph nye that said, alliances are like tending a garden. If you dont tend to it, weeds will grow. We have to continue to tend to the alliance, and im sure joy and her team are doing a lot of these things, i would just like to see it more in the public narrative of the alliance. Especially since the president is going to see moon. If i could just add thank you, dr. Todd. I thi in fact, under the reduced quality of south korea and under strategy, we all have projects we are working on, including a water project, womens Economic Parliament in laos, cybersecurity. Again, i think we havent been doing and something we would like to work on together. I lowould love to see presidt trump Say Something about parliament. Ambassador, you had referenced on the trump question the venezuela, iran, north korea and so forth. I think, really, all of those should be sub dtssumed under whe repeeats over and over again tht he wants to establish relationships with russia and china. These are two very personal operations in which he has a chance to get out from under the antichina, antirussia hysteria from the british, from the congress, from the press, from his own cabinet. And i would like you to comment on that, the question of that personal diplomacy when were going to see from xi and putin this week. My own assessment is that in any of these areas, he has yet to hit a home run. Maybe the exception of mexico, where i think he got some result. Then mexicans were coming around to it. The area that were all intimately familiar with north korea is that tensions are down, but the underlying reason for tensions, which is Nuclear Weapons in north korea, have not been addressed. Rather, they have been stockpiling more and more. So you can see i mean, if you want to, you know, blow the final whistle now, in north korea its been a failure. But the final whistle has not been blown yet. I think i saw a hand back there. Hi. Recent recently the kim jongun expressed a big frustration from his north korea counterparts. I think david mentioned briefly because their counterparts dont have any permission to make a decision so he really couldnt move forward on the negotiation. We dont really see that natural structure on change anytime soon. So my question is, we all know that the importance of having our workinglevel negotiation talks, so what can be the practical outcome of negotiations if they dont have any power to make a decision . Thank you. I think thats a common question from people who worry about the limitation of the approach. I want to raise up, you know, the arguments that raised my two panelists. One is by victor. He talked about we shouldnt have this we shouldnt have relations between the small and the big. Another one is actually working and negotiating you talk about, because right now even if realistic alley, yes, we need to kind of bend a little bit to accommodate internal awareness, its a big deal. Its important at least for now. And it is for them is actually bringing time clock to precinct a pore era. Singapore is plenty important. So you are calling the relations trust. So before somehow u. S. Make them sure about the change, the change of position, so they think its solutions and talking about this, they are not going to come to the table some the biggest, you know, purpose of our, you know, alliance to bring him to the come to the table. Right now its talking a lot, is now going to help. At this moment. Im sure, im totally realistic and important. And directly to your question actually much better person and people and they know that they are now experienced i think they will come in different position if they can be sure about the trust. Well let me make one point. We must think about in the summit and there should be come up with a little bit progress declaration about their nuclear capabilities. Trump lifting sanctions or so. One more question right here. So, when i was on active duty i worked as a secretary united nations, military arms communication. One of my jobs was to communicate with my north korean counterpart. We were looking for creative ways to engage, to deescalate a situation. We know right now the engagement is at the top between the two. So if that sort of bogs down, can you see other ways to try to move things forward, any creative ways, any thoughts you might have about that . So, you know. The 9th track coming on singapore as you know well the pow mia remains returns that is a way to directly engage in kpa. So that may be certainly and President Trump likes that. And so that may be something. But i think, you know, at this point its not about creativity, but new tracks. It is as we get closer to a third summit i think everybody agrees there is going to an third summit. What this comes down to internal battles in both governments. Right. Within the north korean government it is going to be about what do we do i dont think pyongyang. Thats what its going to be about. They know the United States want the uranium program. On the u. S. Side it is going to be a knock down, interagency, weve been there, it is ugly. About how much sanctions suspension singhs lifting versus sanctions suspension, how many sanctions should we suspend and what is the snap back . In the end that is what its going to come down to to facilitate successful third meeting. The one thing good about a third meet something that both leaders know that it cant fail. Both leaders really are going to direct their we have to get an agreement. You know, we want an agreement this time. To me that is the best way to connect leadership with the working level. Right. It strikes me, if you have a third summit i cant imagine it not going into i think they are going to get some kind of deal. You see john bolton on the rope with iran. This panel from the all day forum on u. S. Relations with south korea took place earlier today. Now we take you back live to the forum with the panel looking at nuclear diplomacy. Youre watching live coverage on cspan3. Thanks, everybody. Not yet. There we go. Well, thanks. Again victor, congratulations on a really remarkable 10 years. And its a great honor to be back here again with such a distinguished panel. I think people that really this panel needs no real introduction, i will go down the linement we have ambassador Kathleen Stevens who was ambassador at the time of the founding. And moreover became the most famous ambassador in terms of public skip loans, her bike is still in the embassy somewhere will. General vincent brooks, the last usfk commander before abe abrams before abe was close in the pentagon before he wrecked the place. Im kidding. But in all seriousness. Long distinguished career in the u. S. Military punctuated by the head of all army forces in the pacific, United States forces command, several tours in iraq and in the middle east. Its a long and joint staff as well. Max brut one of were lucky to be graced with one of the preeminent historian analyst of the exercise of American Foreign policy and were lucky to have him here today. Its a prolific list of articles and books that you have written, many of which are critically acclaimed at the highest levels. Well done, max and thanks for being here. Victor, we saw all the am could laids. I will get under way. Lets go 0 to the first slide. I wanted to bring up one slide if we can do that. Okay, so on the theme of 10 years, this is where a couple of things from 10 years ago, they put it back into 2009. First we have president obama sworn in as president of the United States. And then photo next to him reciprocal visits by president bak, president of president of corey and president obama right in the middle of it. Second gates ordered swapout of military commanders in afghanistan and the president ordered 17,000 more troops in afghanistan. The wars in iraq and afghanistan were central to Foreign Policy making here in washington. The reason i have ridgeway and macarthur, one article said that swapout of a military commander in afghanistan was the first time that had been done since the korean war in a combat theater. Ill be ready to be stand corrected. Remember, too, president clinton next line down, president clinton visit to Pyongyang Free to american journalists. We had the second north Korean Nuclear test as well. We had family reunions that year. On pop culture American Idol was the number one show in the United States. Extra points if you can figure out the winner there. Number one was i dont watch korean dramas, im told it was popular. Final line, beast which later became highlight was the k pop family founded that year and exists doing well, thriving, despite members of the military service. Nuclear test ended up in the last row. Two state funerals in south korea that year. And last but not least the new york tirings and new york yankees won the baseball two teams that have won the world series and k series the most. That was 2009 in a nutshell. 00 so let me set it up with this. Ambassador stevens you were in the middle of this this flurry of activity. We had this we had obviously a state visit or not state visit but a group assessingity by president obama seoul headline. Obama takes stern role with north korea and iran. On the north, mr. Obama said he was sending his north north korea envoy to pyongyang for talks to get the nations back to the bargaining table but warned that even getting the north back to the table would not be enough. On the alliance, south korea quickly proved true to the prediction it is would be more accommodating to mr. Obama with whom mr. Lee had been working with closely to halt north koreas north korea program. On trade the only point of potential contention on the visit washington was still not moving to rat few a pretrade agreement. Mr. Obama wanted to get it done, acknowledged, there is obviously a concern in the United States of the incredible trade imbalances that have grown in the past few years. A little bit of past is pro logged. Lets look back, that was 200ed this is then. Had you responsibility over the broad swath of every facet of the relationship. Youre now deeply in the middle of this, where are we on these key issues . Where have we come in the last 10 years, where are we today. Mark, thank you very much. Where did we come, we are going down memory lane, i am going back further. I want to say congratulations, and Corey Foundation for this extraordinary collaboration over the last 10 years. Praise to victor, well deserved. I noticed in the photographs what has happened over 10 years, you have a few women here and working in korea. Its going to deepen our expertise and dialogue and i congratulation you on that, too, thank you everyone involved inputting this together. Yeah, i thought you were going to another slide. I have a second slide, save that for brooks. Bring up the second slide. I remember i recognized that one on the left that is 10 years ago. Thats right. You were in the panel in 10 years, do it for general brooks, he was on the podium on the big red one, but that is everybody 10 years ago. Leading the charge i would notice that. General brooks there. Giving i think it was at a birthday ceremony believe it or not, that was on the internet. Max you were giving a talk. And victor mark, i had a lot more hair back then. I wasnt going to say. That finally victor. I have more hair now. The photo of you announcing the formation of the korean chair. All very significant. You showed me the slide, i was prompted by it because it did make me look tall that is november 2009 just as president obama was leaving after his first visit to korea ever. And it had gone well and it was a setup in the New York Times, it was the last stop on the trip taking him to china, singapore for apec, had a rough ride in the press in the rust. He got to korea it was an audible sigh of relief, now i can talk to people. Now, you know, its not so much of a game of gotcha, were working together on something. But it was the end of the trip after a kind of a tough time in china, it was a good visit. Just as he is going 0 out to did he part in november, its very very cold and what i remember about this, he was practically jogging to the plane. Next time you come i want you to give a speech to students, he said i need to get back and see my daughters play. I had been away for 10 days, it was quite a long trip. It did go quite well. Of course it made me reflect and you asked me to be personal about this, made me reflect i was just coming to the end of my first year as ambassador, i mean, i had unlikely journey, im not going to tell but that. It it certainly made me think as i listened to our new president talking about the relationship. I first went to corey in 1975 as a peace corps volunteer, wasnt volume involved in high policy. I was aware of things going on and learned about some of it later. What were the issues on the rok agenda in 1975 . When of our 0 ambassador z, he was saying to the South Koreans give up your Nuclear Program or well end the alliance. A huge huge issue with a lot of pressure coming on. That south korea fear of abandonment after the nixon doctrine withdrawal from viet nam. And security concerns, it was 1976 that the u. S. Military officer were killed very viscously with an ax. What i really remember from that time in the 70s, sitting in a little tiny restaurant having my lunch, there was a black and White Television in the corner, and the news came over that jimmy carter had been elected president. Everyone else in this little restaurant, and this is again its a time there wasnt a lot of freedom of press or debate, turned to me and said we understand that president carter is now he has been elected is going to withdraw all troop from south korea because of our human rights the dont you know that means, you know, that north korea has much more worse human rights. I will take that message back. I say that, i left korea then, i went back in the 198 east as a diplomat. Continued economic growth. But koreans, political officer i was political. Koreans, many of them young people, very angry at the United States. Thinking that we had not helped to promote authorization in the aftermath of the assassination slamming us for a lot of things that had gone on. This energy on consortium evens, we want to have democracy. So thrilling and inspiring, challenging time which really shaped me as a diplomat. I left in 1989. Now south florida 20 years later, you think everything i did in corey, infused this is extraordinary to see where the republic of korea has come. But where the u. S. Rok relationship has come where we are. The one thing president obama said in 2009 on his visit not reported by the New York Times reradar i repeated again and again. Is president obama said, the u. S. Rok relationship is stronger than its ever been. On and i, you know, youre supposed to be the biggest cheerleader for the ambassador. I never dared to say that, i was sensitive over selling the relationship. But he said it. And so the other i guess rule of being an boz ambassador later i quote your president. I asked the korean audience, do you agree and why . But then of course being practicing to be a professor i told them the answer. Here is why i think its stronger than ever. At the top of the list was koreas democracyization. Meant the United States and corey had shifting administrations from across the political spectrum and managed to Work Together on a lot of issues. Including trade. So that fast forward me to where we were in 2009. People kind of forget of the corey u. S. Free trade agreement back in the news, it was signed under president george w bush, and now ratified. Victor remember this is as well. Finally it was ratified a year i left as ambassador. I didnt get to enjoy the ratification. Under different administrations in both countries it took a long time but it got done. From 2009 to the present, i saw at that time all areas in which we worked to role areas, you worked in this, grew. Not only because of koreas greater economic health, because of it own Global Presence but because of shared values, about development, about human rights. We and i think the Public Opinion overall just turned much more positive. I always thought about that the Achilles Hill in south korea of the relationship was broad Public Opinion. We always had the elite. We had the English Speaking elite. But there was always an am bill lens and a divided country where we had ten its of thousands of troops. Again a free press demonstrations, changes of government and dialogue help weekend all that. So i think what weve seen over the last 10 years is that our relationship has become our alliance, institutionalized based on shared values. But i do see coming up where we are now i think we already talked about this earlier today, really looming new challenges. Now some of i think we are well prepared for, especially with victor here, another thing that we learned in this period, a little bit before 2009. 2005 nfc and i was at the state department. And we started this Six Party Talk under the second term of the Bush Administration, that was about alliance management. President bush and president were far apart. How to approach north korea. We were able to Work Together in party talks. I hope we learned Going Forward and i hope we keep in mind now that north korea is challenging enough, we need to find a way to Work Together. Its harder to do. And i think we did that to some extent in the 6th party talks. But now i think the challenge s im sorry to be so long, you gave me the floor first. One Nuclear Issue is clearly much harder. When we agreed to the statement 2005 north korea had not yet tested it was only the second test in 2009. Now we are at a different place. And another thing about 2009, im not implied why it wasnt there, in 2008 kim jong un had a stroke. That is an important point, historical fact, we tend to intellectualize our own roles and policies, other places have agency and influence, too. North korea was going through a change for several year. So with that we are at a more difficult place with Nuclear Issue. I do think that President Trump has broken the taboo. I can say but he did that. And i do think that it means whatever administration follows the aperture has widened in the diplomatic approaches, but remain challenging. And second thing i worry about is what the earlier paneled talked about, strategic plucks, uncertainty, the whole sense that the role of the United States and east asia, the u. S. Led world order is in a state of some challenge. Not least from from within our own country and that will have an impact on the alliance. Thanks, cathy, really a great opening really sweep of the landscape soup to nuts and insight into the history there. I just wanted to turn to general brooks now. General brooks, you like kathy served korea in your own career, second id in the 8th army rite and came back later. Feel free to pick up on any of the thread that kathy addressed, one thing i wanted to ask you, take one step back, kathy talked about the pen in suit states la, domestic politics in south korea. The job you had before usfk, you were in charge of army forces in eastern i cant. I wanted to read to you the new york tiles article, south korea government officials and diplomatic analysts said president obama represented add chance to raise profile with the owe bomb administration by stressing reliability as a partner in asia. Maybe taking a step back, could you address where the developments in asia have been over the past decade, how south korea fits into that and then the dynamics on the peninsula as a result of all those mack nations that you witnessed and dealt with firsthand as commander and all forces arm and usfk commander as well. Its great to be with you again. A great teammate we served together in seoul, couldnt have done it without you. Congratulations victor on 10 years and to john henry, early happy birthday because were calling it the anniversary of the start of the korean war, it was tonight in washington. 8 days from now you have a birthday so happy birthday to you. As we think back to that time 2009, really so much was going on in the world, the picture you showed, i was in command of the First Infantry Division of the u. S. Army at the time. Something that certainly greatly enjoyed and appreciated having the privilege of doing it. Carrying with me the experience of being a Battalion Commander that came close to the Demilitarized Zone 10 years or so earlier, 1998 where i came out of command. A little over 10 years, not quite 11 at in a point in time. And that shaped me considerably in terms of understanding the importance of the missions over seas, candidly how little was known about korea and what was still going on in korea at that point in time. 56 years after a temporary armistice agreement was signed. I think about the diplomacy of Korean Forces to iraq. I took my own division back into combat in iraq in 2009 and 2010. And we were at the end of the surge which i had been present for and the two years before that, but division was there at the time. Row public of korea had forces into a hostile environment with the United States as part of a larger Coalition Just as they had done before in viet nam and of course our time serving side by side in korea on the peninsula. They had proven themselves in my view as a reliable partner in interNational Security and being committed to things where likeminded nations needed to come together and put themselves to some degree at risk. Just come back a few months before this, returning in december of 2008. I think of that time there was a general walking with kathey stevenson and the president , transforming the military aspects of the u. S. korean alliance, change of operational forces, putting south korea in the lead. A maturation of that process and perhaps a reduction of the type of role and activities of the u. S. Forces there. And a plan was laid out for doing it. So, the opcom transition plan, the creation of a success korea command and changing the structure, creating a new base that pulled the u. S. Forces further to the south. All of that has happened has gone into fruition. Which is i believe the important point about how things looked in 2009. It looked like things were maybe going to get better for period of time and risk to be taken in terms of how security structure was a raid on the korean peninsula. In the meantime we saw changing dynamics around the region 0, certainly the perch that i was on responsible for all army forces, essentially the west coast of india and and arctic to the arctic circle. So about 52 of the world and most of the worlds population inside of that actively engaging with them and trying to explain to them in a military support to Public Diplomacy role what the United States was thinking as it used terms like rebalance or both, what does it mean . What does it look like . What is the reality of that . And how important it would be for other countries in the region to be contributors to security while also working with an emerging china. The chinas rise was evident at that point in time. Their economy was picking up pace significantly and that was causing question bus what would china be. The u. S. At that time certainly hoped that it would be a china that was living within the rules, contributing to peace and prosperity throughout the endo pacific region. But in other measures china was creating a different arrangement, a new great power relationship is what they were beginning to seek and beginning to talk about as early as then. Certainly from then up to the present, weve seen this course navigating in very different ways which leads us now to position of labeling china as a security concern in the most recent endo pacific strategy. A threat to and a free and open pacific is what has emerged. And i think perhaps dangerously and maybe even causing the u. S. To focus on china in a certain role. Not saying there is more to the relationship than just the competition. We have this now happening in the background which causes other countries in the region from one hand question what the u. S. Commitment is going to be, is the u. S. Too involved in the middle east now. Will the u. S. Ever bring an end to that . And if it cannot how do we hedge our own security concerns, our own economic concerns, realizing that this china is growing. Thats what i think opens the door then to the comment about south korea being a reliable partner in security in asia. The reality has been since then especially with the period of time that i was there in korea as the Senior Commander of 2016 to 2018, it wasnt time for south korea to turn attention away from korea. South koreas a tension had to stay focused on the korean peninsula. They went through impeachment as Democratic Institution survived incredible internal pressures and emerged from that while under great pressure from north korea. Later under pressure from chain a under pressure from japan. A very complex circumstance emerged for korea in a period of time that people thought things were going to get better and it didnt. Until early 2018. Certainly the 2017 window looked like it was going to get a lot worse before it got any better. Might be at the brink of war and tipping over the edge. Having been a part that we can talk about it in more detail later. But very interesting to see that shifting occur where what we were seeking was north koreas colliculus being changed t it took risk in doing so. That blings us up to the recent years a lot has changed during that period of time. The alliance thankfully has endured all of that. And it has had considerable pressure applied to it internally and externally within the alliance and beyond the alliance and remains very strong. I support the comment of it being an iron clad relationship, i really do. It doesnt mean it doesnt get rust or barn accusation he wills, it doesnt need painting over again but it is still in act as a solid entity and its remarkable when you think about that and its unique. In fact i would stop with that and give the time to my colleagues on the panel before we get into deeper discussion. Thanks, general. I want to come back to you with followups but i am going to turn to mr. Boot here. And maybe if you could pick up on general brooks thread. Your specialty is you look back at your long list of extraordinary publications. 2009 you are writing a lot about the middle east, a lot about afghanistan, iraq, at least according to your council on Foreign Relations website you are. Later on you do write with asia. You talk about the article Donald Trumps pivot through asia. Why the iran deal is bad. Thank north korea. So, talk to the audience here a little bit about u. S. Foreign policy in the in the middle east at that time and what was going on in korea and how the u. S. Came to bridge those two really competing power center that compete for time, attention and resources in washington and a little bit about the Decision Making as you see it to mark the good, the bad and the ugly. First part i join everybody else in saying happy birthday to the career program, to john, to victor, the entire team. I look at arrival think tank i have to tell you there are no rivals for what they do in the field for korea studies, so its an honor to be here with you. And that is a very broad question, mark. Let me try to address that in terms of lessons learned. Let me address it this way in terms of kind of what i personally have learned over the course of whatever it is the last 20 years, tumultuous years in u. S. Foreign policy. Which really we kind of went through that kind of after the end of the cold war, there was a sense i think that i certainly shared of american United States was stand jag loan on top of the world as a sole super poor. Events of 9 11 and 200001, back to the world, we responded in part doing things that we had to do and then we did things that we probably shouldnt have done. I pointed that i think what i now see as a somebody who supported the iraq war leak a lot of people, a lot of people across this country showed some really teaching that its not enough to have good attentions or grand use goals. You have to Pay Attention to what your allies say, if theyre saying you are doing something wrong you probably shouldnt tell them to take a hike, you might try to listen to them. These are always that i failed and a lot of people failed. First time general, you were Deputy Division commander in baghdad in 2007, some of the fallout from wrong headed decisions. I think that catastrophic fallout of war in iraq, was reinforced by another major event that dough can you remembered in 2009 and 2009 was actually the most significant event at the time which was the Global Financial meltdown, the great recession. All those things shook the faith of the American People in their government and their ruling elite. Its undermined the international Foreign Policy and American Leadership in the world but i think, you know, to some extent, because he had opposed the war in iraq and Hillary Clinton had supported it. President obama a and i have my disagreements with him. I say it was kind of a he maded mistakes along that i think the pullout from iraq in 200 is 1 was a big mistake. But a mistake made with but on the whole i think president obama was somebody who we did believe in america as a force for good in the world including on issues like global warming, but not previously shown leadership, what youre saying is really the populous and the shockwaves that had that has swept through washington i think partially its a delayed result of the iraq war, partially a delayed result of the financial collapse of 008 2009 of course the result of that, how a president who fund fundamentally does not believe in the great traditional American Foreign policy going back to 1945, does not believe in American International leadership, who does not believe in allies, who does not believe in free trade. This is the greatest challenge to American Foreign policy and american standing in the world, certainly in my lifetime, im turning 50 this year. Really some of the greatest challenge since the greatest generation created out of the ruins of world war ii now we have to have an argument of the kind we did not have in 2009, we did not have any point about what should america be doing . I think the real challenge right now is for those of us who believe in American Global leadership, i believe america can be and should be a force for good. But, you know for those of us who believe in that role. President trump and the Foreign Policy that he is instituting is forcing us to argue and think about those First Principles and the way we have not done before, i hope, my fervent hope is that after this near death experience with American Foreign policy perhaps under a more sober future president we will rediscover the importance of the basic ten tenets, stand up for america since 1945 around the world. And certainly stand up for the value of alliances which of course the u. S. Bed rom alliances with the u. S. Alliance, nato relationship. U. S. And canada, u. S. And australia, so many alliances out there and a lot of repair work that need to be