Up and wondering who these people are. We would play directors jeopardy. I have not done this before. It may fall flat. Or i may spend the rest of the night doing that. Lets start with this. Longestserving director of Central Intelligence. And you can shout out the name. Allen dulles, correct. And there is right there. Conversely, im the shortest serving director. Pompeo was in for the better part of the year. So was george bush. Schlesinger, almost. He was in for about a year and a half. We have to go way back. The first one. He was a crony of harry truman. He made it very clear when he took the job that he only wanted to serve a few months. He was not experienced. Truman wanted a figurehead who could get the Intelligence Group up and running. I am the only convicted felon richard hounds. Regrettably. He was caught in a pretty nasty gotcha episode. He was testifying before the Senate Foreign relations during his hearings before he went out to iran and was asked by senator stewart and who knew the answer but for whatever was grandstanding at the time, did we ever try to covertly overthrow the government of chile . This is an open hearing. Richard helms should have said i cant answer in public. We will have to go in to closed session. For reasons he has never explained i helped him with his memoir and in writing, he says no. Three times to direct questions for this to direct questions. This is a flat out lie because we were doing quite a bit in chile in a twoyear suspended sentence and a small fine of a few thousand dollars which a group of friends paid on his behalf when they had a celebration at the Congressional Country Club after his sentencing. [laughter] david ok. I had my security clearance pulled. [indiscernible] and . One more. Where is he . I cant see him too well. Deutch, am i getting there . John deutch. He had laptop trouble. Round up losing his clearance because of some, the fact he had classified material on his laptop and his son was using the laptop to connect with internet sites that i wont discuss in any detail for this audience. Lets see. I am the only career analyst to become director. Robert gates. Brennan was an analyst for most of his life but had a hitch as chief of station, then he left the agency to become president obamas Homeland Security and terrorism advisor, and he came back to run the agency. Lets see. Here is an easy one. Im the only director to later become president. Bush, ok good. That was the 100 question. [laughter] i was Dwight Eisenhowers chief of staff during world war ii. Walter smith. I could also ask a tougher question, i resigned as director to take a better job, that was also smith. The better job interestingly was undersecretary of state which back in 1962 and 1963 was a much more prestigious position than the director of Central Intelligence. I later became chief of staff of the air force. Nope. Check out the military uniforms. [laughter] david we only have two air forcers up there. And i will also add i am the only dci who became the namesake for an important military post. Military installation. Vandenberg air force base. That is Hoyt Vandenburg who took the job as director, as a stepping stone to becoming chief of staff of the air force. It was a different world in the late 1940s which is why i say sometimes in history the director of Central Intelligence was not a very prestigious position. Here is one with four answers so you will at least get one right. I served in the o. S. S. We heard dulles, that is correct. Who else . Helms. Not bush. Did i hear colby . Yes. And bill casey. So we have four. This is an important point, four fomer directors who used to serve in one of cias predecessor organizations. They bring to their experiences as directors that on the ground, in the war intelligence experience and it was very influential for many of them. Lets see. I am the only former fbi director to be bill webster. I am the only judge to be webster. They are piling on. I was the classmate of the president who appointed me. Turner and president carter. Good. Lets say. See. I used to be white house chief of staff. [indiscernible] i used to be a congressman from california. Leon panetta. Good. I used to be one of the Senior Executives at the bechdel corporation. Thats a final jeopardy question. John mccone. He was a classmate of Stephen Bechtold at cal berkeley where they both were studying engineering. I was the only person to be director of cia and director of the nsa. Michael hayden. Ok. I used to be an officer in our directorate of operations before i changed careers and served in another capacity for a number of years and then became director. Well yes, you could say that because any of the oss grads. This is directorate of Operations Meeting cia position. He was a case officer for about 10 years. Gates was an analyst. Porter goss. He worked in the d. O. , had to leave for medical reasons and became a local politician in florida and then a congressional preservative, ran the House Oversight committee for a while, then became our director. I am the only person up here who is both director of Central Intelligence and director of cia. Goss again. He was running the agency when the dni position was set up, the intelligence, terrorism intelligence reform and prevention act passed in 2004, effective 2005. It abolished the position of dci and for the first time in history created statutory the director of Central Intelligence agency. We will talk about the effect that had in the prominence of the dci and the different authorities that they had. I think that is a pretty good warmup. You all did really well, super job. Let me go on and talk about the main points of tonights presentation. When the cia was set up, a couple of different models came to mind for the leaders. You had allen dulles, who at the time had his oss experience. He thought based in part on that and his dealings with the British Service during world war ii, that the cia should pretty much always be run by a careerist, somebody who grew up in the agency and was whetted to, devoted to that particular line of work. Wedded to, devoted to, that particular line of work. We have only had a few directors who were careerists, people who started at the agency and worked up to be director. Bill colby, richard helms, gina haspel and bob gates, but not directly because he did do some tours at the nsc during the reagan administration. If you are talking directed straight from desk to the seventh floor, we have only had those three. That was one model. What has come about is the one Dwight Eisenhower specifies here, which is, and he is using the word peculiar in a variety of meanings, not just strange and not just oddball but peculiar in the sense of requiring special capabilities. What i think he was getting here is that, and we will see this as our talk goes on, but you have to be able to pick a certain type of person to run the agency at a particular time to fulfill you, the president s, Foreign Policy agenda. That became the pattern. These individuals were neither elitists from a small cadre of careerists like the british model but drawn from all walks of life. It became an important element of their strength and utility that they had this variety of backgrounds. Taking a quick statistical snapshot of them, we see that they are, region of birth, for what it matters, is a couple parts of the country. We now have our First Southern born director, gina haspel, previously nobody from that part of the world. Who is the only overseas born one . Any idea . John deutsche, born in belgium. As far as education goes, this is a pretty smart lot. A lot of advanced degrees, four doctorates, people like schlesinger and gates. Only one outllier, he only went to high school. Ironically this was one of our most influential directors ever. You go back and look at his record we are still living with many of his accomplishments. This is walter smith. The reason he is so influential is he established the directorate structure of the agency where we had analysts, operations officers, support officers in separate directorates and then a decade or so later the science and Technology Directorate is created and that was the structure from 1963 on until the modernization that occurred under director brennan when directorates still exists, the action in the agency occurs in a group of 12 Mission Centers that fuse together major components of the different directorates as a way of encouraging collaboration, getting rid of stovepipes, that sort of thing. This is where the diversity really comes into play. If you look at those variety of backgrounds and of course some people did more than one thing in their careers, we have 25 directors either dci or dcias, so this is a variety of backgrounds. This is a strength for them because they were able to bring, based on what the president s wanted at times, a specific kind of expertise and background to bear on foreignpolicy agenda. All three branches of government are represented as our three of the five military services. As are three of the five military services. Perhaps one of the keys that distinguishes many of these directors, in fact almost all of them, 24 out of 25, from other cabinet appointees, many of whom when you think about it dont have much experience in the Cabinet Department area of responsibility they are running farmers, they werent farmers or involved in energy, didnt have anything to do with military directly, on and on it goes. With the exception probably of William Raborn who served for one year 196566, and johnson picked him because he had no other alternatives and was looking for someone he was remotely familiar with, but his main point was he was trying to give richard helms, who he did want, a year of highlevel grooming. Director of operations helms is promoted to deputy director, and he is in the more prominent position getting more washington experience and his ability, then rayborn checks out almost by design and helms is elevated to the director in 1966. What i mean by direct experience is that an individual was either a practitioner of intelligence, analysts, case officer, or they ran an Intelligence Organization like they were the head of air force intelligence, in the case of vandenberg, or they were a senior officer in a military Intelligence Service like general hayden, air force attache for a while. You are either a protection are or run Intelligence Organization. Indirect experience means a person who was a consumer or user of intelligence in a Foreign Policy or National Security position, not practitioner but someone who had all the clearances needed, use intelligence to inform decisionmaking and 10 of them had that background. Admiral raborn was the only individual who had no background at all in intelligence. Some would argue leon panetta didnt because other than engaging with it when he was in congress and chief of staff at the white house, no direct or even indirect contact in any depth. That is an arguable proposition. It is a definite job for the middle agers. Who do you think was the youngest dci ever . Bush . David no. James schlesinger. He was 41. Who do you think is the oldest . Casey. Casey was in his 70s when he was appointed. The tendency of the spread is toward that mid50s age range. It is not a job with a lot of security though. We do have again a bit of a scatterplot. We have dulles serving over eight years, one of them over six. But almost like figure skating scores, souers with five months, bush 11 months and so forth. Three years is about as long as they last. It is kind of moving in the downward direction lately, but for the most part, and you will see why president s change or dont change directors when they are elected or if reelected they choose to maintain a director instead of picking a new one instead of the cabinet shuffle. That is an interesting factor is the surprising durability of directors through transitions or election times. When you are talking about the director being placed in the washington political environment, a couple of things need to be kept in mind. One is that a lot of intelligence people dont know much about intelligence. They come to it as overseers or managers of the agency, being the chief executive, overseers in congress with a lot of misapprehensions about what intelligence is, what it can do, capable of, how long it takes to set up intelligence networks, develop covert action programs, why analysis is a doggedly difficult proposition. They have a simplistic idea of what intelligence is, go steal secrets and tell me what they mean. That is the sort of simple stick view of what intelligence is. It is misrepresented in the popular culture. We all read trashy spy novels and seen horrible spy movies, nonfiction sometimes isnt much better. Journalism can be hit or miss when it comes to covering intelligence. Journalists in the National Security area can be good or sometimes sensationalist headline chasers. When you put it into the washington environment you have a tough situation for a director. He is under the spotlight all the time. The cia is the most open secret organization in the world. It is held accountable by more vectors of accountability, organs than any other service in the world. When you add to that all of these misrepresentations and misconceptions, a director of Central Intelligence is in a difficult situation, not being able to explain to the public or the overseers or executive branch why they are wrong. Secrets have to be kept and cant always be brought out into the public to explain. Even in camera and closed environments our leaders, political masters often just dont understand what it is like to be an intelligence professional. Helms point goes back to something i mentioned earlier that contrary to the conspiracist literature and the cia as the puppet master of the world and all of this nonsense, the director when you think about it is a politically weak individual. One way to represent this is to go back to something a number of us learned in Political Science courses in college. Remember hearing about the Iron Triangle . Some textbooks had a diagram of it. What it means is in washington politics, a cabinet official, secretary, has a Cabinet Department, has a usually sympathetic Congressional Committee and some kind of lobby or trade association that is advocating for the business of that cabinet. They all kind of work in a mutually reinforcing fashion. That is the Iron Triangle. When you think about the cia, it doesnt have that. For one thing it is not a Cabinet Office. It is an executive Branch Office that reports to the National Security council and through that to the president. It doesnt have an executive department that is nearly as powerful in policy terms as a Cabinet Department. Secondly it does not have a lobby group. We have our retirees associations. The association of foreign Intelligence Officers. Other kinds of Public Events and published the and a letter to the editor now and then, it is not what you would call a strong activist organization, nothing like the ama, chamber of commerce, planned parenthood, you just name it in washington. They are powerful lobby groups and have targets in the executive branch. Our congressional overseers are often hostile to us. They are not sympathetic most of the time. Consequently we get into political trouble, when scandals ensue, when investigations are run and people want to make headlines by beating up on intelligence and Foreign Policy, cia is out on its own unless the president backs it. Sometimes we can enlist sympathetic members of congress. Richard helms was good at doing this. More often than not we have to hope that the inhabitant of the white house is supportive and will go to bat for us in these controversies. That has always been the case as you are undoubtedly aware. This is a little bit of work i have done at cia. You can read about it if you want more details in an article i wrote in studies in intelligence if you go to cia. Gov and google my name. It will pop up. When i was doing when i worked on my mccone book was put him in the context of other directors. Why john f. Kennedy picked him to not somebody else because he did have alternatives, and especially after the bay of pigs he had a number of options to exercise three why did he pick that individual . I expanded my analysis to look at a variety of important and i think objective facts or data points if you want. This is very important. What did the president want that director to do . When you think of our history going all the way back from souers through pompeo and you associate those directors with the president they serve, you will make the connection. Not every director is supposed to do the same thing with cia. The president doesnt want to use cia for those purposes. If it is not fighting the cold war are going after the communists, it might be something entirely different like staying out of trouble, getting out of the headlines, reforming yourself, whatever. Directors get picked by certain president s at certain times to do certain things. These can be readily identified. Then you look at the end of the career. Did they accomplish what the directors or the president s wanted them to . Interestingly how did they go about it . Were they effective managers . Did they have good people skills . Was the political antenna sensitive to shifts and changes . Did they try to find ways to work especially if they were brought in from the outside . And then patterns, can we discern that certain types of directors get picked at certain times based not only on what the president wants them to do but with the prior directors had done or failed to accomplish or gotten the agency in trouble with . You have, and i have colorcoded these for reasons of visual later when i do some graphics and animation, you have these five types. I will spell them out more in detail. You can see them up here. Two types of administrators, an intelligence operator, an insider supposed to reform the agency, an outsider to reform, and a restorer. We will define all of these. The administrators come in and two types. Lowenergy and medium energy. [laughter] david and what the president at the time picked them to do was not a whole lot. Because either he didnt want much done, or thought the agency did too much, it would cause trouble so he wants it to stay out of trouble. Steady as you go leadership. Oftentimes after scandals the president s want to back off from activist leadership and simply simply, say, keep the lights on, keep the engine running, but dont double park. Certainly dont speed. So on the lowenergy end of the spectrum, you have sidney souers, roscoe hillenkoetter. I am sure you all knew him. [laughter] and the ineffable William Raborn. These were definitely chair warmer directors. I mentioned why truman picked souers. He wanted a friend in politics to run this brandnew agency and keep it out of trouble. Hillenkoetter is brought in after vandenberg who was an activist director to sort of slow things down and synchronize the new cia. Hillenkoetter is the only i could have asked this during the jeopardy round. He was the only person to run both cia and its predecessor. He is selected in 1947 when the central Intelligence Group still exists and after the National Security act is passed, he stays on and becomes the first dci. He was not much of a manager, but at that point truman didnt want a lot of activist leadership at cia because most Foreign Policy back then is being run by the secretary of state. After 1947, the secretary of defense, which office was created under the National Security act. Raborn as i said is picked by johnson to simply fill the position until helms is ready. At other times president s have said they wanted more energetic type of leadership, not one that is going to take the agency on big foreignpolicy crusades but rather to manage it during times that are in transition. When you think of jim woolsey, who is bill clintons first director of Central Intelligence, clinton is a president who comes in and doesnt really know what he wants to do with cia because he is fundamentally a domestic policy president. He does not have a foreignpolicy agenda. He picks a known quantity to kind of come in and say, keep the agency running and i will phone when i am interested in having something done. Needless to say, woolsey didnt have much of a relationship with president clinton. He rarely saw him. As best i know they met only a couple times in formal meetings. You have heard the old story about the airplane crashing on the white house lawn and people joked that was jim woolsey trying to get an appointment to see the president. [laughter] he will be the first one to tell you he was pretty much written out of foreignpolicy. The Clinton White house National Security environment was run by the National Security advisor , secretary of state, secretary of defense were prominent figures. George tenet becomes clintons third director. John deutch falls in the center but he is a different type of director, as we will see. Tenant is interesting because he is the only director who falls into two categories. From 1997 to 2001, george tenet was not much of a presence at cia. He was popular and people loved to see him in the cafeteria am a the cafeteria backslapping and chewing his cigar and all of that but he really wasnt a person with clout at the agency. The agency was still kind of moving along in this post cold war period, finding its moorings, looking for new targets and avenues of interest. But the white house is providing very little guidance. Petraeus comes in, appointed by obama after panetta leaves to become secretary of defense. He is only there for a year and we will not get into the reasons why he left. In case youre wondering, yes, he will have an official portrait at cia. We are all inclusive when it comes to our directors. We even have a portrait of a convicted felon and portrait of a person who lost his security clearance. We are a forgiving agency when it comes to our portraiture. But petraeus didnt accomplish a lot at the agency. One could almost put him perhaps in the custodian category except he was such an energetic person you cant imagine him being just a custodian. Aside from a couple of minor tinkerings, he did not accomplish a lot as far as the agency went. It seems at the time that is what president obama wanted. Obama was largely a domestic policy president during his first term. Now, the intelligence operator is an individual who, as the title suggests, uses experience particularly in clandestine activity to move the agency aggressively ahead to advance the president s foreignpolicy agenda. These are people who are experienced with intelligence he either current or former Intelligence Officer. During their 10 years tenures, the agency does a vast amount of espionage, technical intelligence, counter intelligence, all in the aggressive support of the president s activist foreignpolicy agenda. Because these directors are closely tied to the president s foreignpolicy agenda, they often have close ties to the president himself, not that they are best friends forever but they have entree. The president does listen. Sometimes they are elevated to cabinet rank like bill casey. They get drawn into policymaking. For some directors and observers of the cia, this is not a good thing, because this can lead to the politicization of intelligence. I would say in the real world , intelligence is always deeply steeped in politics. Fromis entirely different politicization. Which is the corruption of the analytic product to support foreignpolicy agendas. Cia, i will tell you what to write so you can say i agree when i am advocating a certain foreignpolicy. That is not what i am talking about. What i am talking about is the fact certain president s want intelligence at the table to do more than inform. If you work for the president , and he says, what do you think i should do . You are not going to say that is not my job, pack your briefcase up, and head back to langley. It will be the last time you are in the oval office. Instead, you secretary of state, you wind up becoming a de facto policy advisor sitting with the secretary of state, National Security advisor, whoever else, working on those decisions. A combination of long tenure, involvement with policy, often leads to mistakes, scandals, and screw ups. Some of these are not the agencys fault. Some of them are. Policy can be good or bad, and the intelligence used to support it can only be as bad as that policy is. Covert action is a classic example. If you have a fumbling, inept , nonstrategic foreignpolicy and you ask covert action in at the last minute to bail it out, it is going to fail. But in washington, who do you think takes the blame . The finger always winds up pointing at langley, not the white house or state department. That is usually why the long serving directors go down in flames in a manner of speaking because they get in trouble in part because they are put in trouble, in part because the agency has overreached or overstretched. It is a variety of reasons for those disasters that have huge political implications for the agencys standing. You think of allen dulles picked by eisenhower. Eisenhower is on a containment crusade and in some cases you tosome cases, even trying roll back, to push communism back from whence it came or to whence it came. Naturally an intelligence professional like dulles was a perfect fit. That is also why he stayed around as long as he did. Now, Lyndon Johnson picks richard helms, i believe, because he wanted a skilled operator and an individual with a good political sense to run the agency as the vietnam war was heating up. A good fit there. Ronald reagan has pledged to win the cold war. He goes back and fix his and picks his Campaign Manager bill casey to lead the agency on a worldwide crusade to finally crush communism for good. Again, a perfect match. It is hard to think of another president other than someone like eisenhower perhaps taking picking somebody like casey. Hen george tenet after 9 11, he becomes the head of a massive Counterterrorism Organization that president bush has mobilized to lead the fight against al qaeda and the taliban. Tenet almost overnight transforms from a technocrat to a highpowered intelligence operator with major influence in policy. You can see the connection between the president s agenda and the transformation he made of george tenet. So all of the president s who picked these individuals really had no qualms at all about using the agency aggressively. A very opportunistic kind of appointment that perfectly dovetails with the president s agendas. At other times, and in particular after the agency has gotten into trouble, president s decided, well, we have to pull way back and cool things off and probably clean up the mess, reorganize, hire different people, change the way business is done, reconnect with congress, a whole new agenda for the agency with the president at that time. In these cases the president can choose to go inside or go outside. In a few cases, the president s have deemed the timing right to take the agency into a reform mode but to do it kind of low key, quietly, dont ruffle feathers, keep the waters still. The best way to do this is to pick an Agency Insider to lead those changes. These individuals have experience with the agency, no know bureaucracy and the cultures, the personalities, and are there to get the agency out of trouble and stabilize its in this time of uncertainty. They go about making personnel changes, organizational changes , and mission changes in a quite deliberate low key fashion. Here we have three examples. Richard nixon picking bill colby after a very brief tenure by James Schlesinger that was quite tumultuous for the agency and somewhat counterproductive. Nixon says during this time when you have the watergate scandal, you have dissent growing in the United States or very widespread against the vietnam war, you have a lot of distrust of government, and a trusted insider like colby is appointed. Robert gates becomes george bushs director of cia in 1991 after the webster period, which was kind of lackluster, not much going on and webster had fallen out of favor with the white house over intelligence during the first gulf war. Bush thought especially now the cold war seems to be ending that we needed new leadership but one of a lowkey trusted insider variety to start steering the agency into the postcold war environment. He makes an interesting shift from picking somebody with operational experience to someone with analytic experience. And that is bob gates. Then you have president obama in 2013 n brennan excuse me . Sorry. In 2013 to run the agency while he is trying to navigate some difficult foreignpolicy issues and bringing to the agency the knowledge from the white house sector because as i mentioned , brennan was the Homeland Security and counterterrorism advisor to the white house. So brennan comes in, and after managing the place relatively lowkey, sets off on the Modernization Initiative which breaks up the directorates. They still exist, but they are largely administrative now, and shifts all of the action to what are eventually 12 Mission Centers that integrate cias analytic, operational science, technology, and support functions into either functional or geographic areas. At other times, president s have said, i dont really want an insider because i dont quite think they will accomplish all i want. I need a lot of change out at cia. So i want someone who is not a careerist, somebody who is not an insider, who brings to bear these outsiders types of experiences to run the agency. This is the most diverse kind of group, and it also is the one that has the biggest agenda or the ones who were there to shake up the agency, to make major changes in personnel and mission focus. More change occurs under these , and needless to say, change is not always popular with people. They can be some of the most successful and unsuccessful directors, some of the most popular and some of the most unpopular directors. And here they are. Very quickly, Hoyt Vandenburg, who is head of the central Intelligence Group in 1946, 1947 , really brings cig into the Foreign Policymaking map. Previously, under souers, not much of a player, but he elevates it substantially with considerable collection capabilities. Smith established the directorate organization and turned the agency into a highpowered supporter of the military during the korean war. Mccone, i could go on all night, but was charged with keeping the agency out of trouble after the bay of pigs. Once he is inside, he creates the directorate of science and technology to move the agency very smartly into a cutting edge revolution of technical intelligence. Schlesinger comes in in 1973 with the agenda to finally run the agency in the way next and nixon wanted it. Nixon did not like cia. He chose schlesinger to implement Intelligence Community schlesinger had advocated at the office of budget. Schlesinger came in and fired about 1000 people, cut the budget, got rid of offices, created new offices, moved organizations around, and he was gone, thankfully, from a lot of peoples perspectives at langley, in only five months. Stansfield turner, who is carters director, comes in and tries to run the agency like a battleship. One of the big mistakes outsiders have made is to come in and bring a group of friends from the previous life, put them in senior staff positions and tell them to go tell the careerists what to do. The careerists will bridle and balk and try to undercut the leadership with rumors. It really got bad under turner, who never seemed to wake up to the fact that he was a large degree part of the problem. Any agency should take its orders from its boss, but the bosses also have to make sure they give the right orders and give them in the right way. For turner, this was the wrong way to do things. He became one of the most unpopular leaders. He fired about 800 people are encouraged them to leave, or did not fill their jobs, and really became head of the agency during a very awkward time. John deutch, picked by clinton to run the agency along more ch himselfines, deut wanted to be secretary of defense but took the dci position as consolation, then tries to run it as an adjunct to the defense department. He brings in a couple people he knew from previous jobs, quentin was the executive director, became his henchmen woman who oman, who really alienated a lot of Senior Leadership. Deutsch himself was largely out of touch and aloof with the agencys concerns because he was not interested in being there. The way they lost important capabilities like imagery analysis. We dont do that anymore because deutch farmed it out to the pentagon. Goss was another one who brought in people from the hill to help run the agency and got immediate pushback. Some of the Senior Leaders resigned in protest because of the way he was running things. He didnt have a direct action particularly. George bush appointed him because he was head of the House Oversight committee and thought it would be a good move, but it was politically disastrous inside the agency and goss left after a year and a half. Michael hayden was very popular because he knew exactly what not to do. He got out of the car the first day on the job alone and walked up to the seventh floor and said how can i get your help to do what i am assigned to do . Which was to help the industry the agency navigate the increasingly controversial counterterrorism scandals it was falling into with the black sites and rdi program and tough relations with congress. He had been a very adept head of the National Security agency, very good intelligence professional. I think of him not so much as a military Intelligence Officer , but as an intelligence professional in the military. That really was the perspective he brought to the job. That might sound academic if you academic, but if you knew the way hearing the agency, you can see my distinction there. And the last group, the restorer, as the name suggests, these individuals are none of the above. They are not there to just sit there. They are not there to win the cold war and they are not there to clean up the mess. Except in the respect they are there to reconnect with with the wider world. Get the agency back on track with congress, with the public, with our political leadership. Usually when these people take office the agency is down in the dumps so they raise morale, good at public relations, portraying themselves having a particular type of image, rectitude, political experience, moderation , all of that. Not charged with reorganizing or reforming. Four here. George bush, bill webster, leon panetta, and mike pompeo. I will talk about pompeo because he is different in the way he was a restorer. The first three are here to stabilize the ship in times of controversy. When you think about bush becoming head of the agency right after the start of the scandals of the 1970s and the congressional investigations winding down, he is there to make the agency seem like it is not the ogre it was portrayed to be in the media and in some sectors of congress. Initially, as a politician, Agency Professionals did not like this appointment because we didnt want the agency turned into another Cabinet Office with a political hack or big donors running it. Bush was able to allay those concerns quickly because he was a nice guy. Everybody could get along with him. He was very honest about his agenda. By the end of his 11 months he had accomplished exactly what president ford wanted him to do. Webster gets appointed right after the irancontra scandal. You can see why having a former judge and senior Law Enforcement official after all of those illegalities was an ideal appointment timing. He brings in the image of rectitude. Of that,ster and all really kind of the mr. Clean of the agency. Panetta comes in under president obama as the agency is still under fire for the rdi program, congress is after us, we have had a variety of hot, High Temperature issues with them. Panetta comes in as a longtime congressional he knew everybody who was firing guns at us and was able to get them to steer their barrels in the other direction. He had experience from being i a veryff, so good and timely appointment for restoring the agency to a better luster. And then lastly mike pompeo. Here is where he is unique. He is trying to not restore the agencys reputation with the public, but with the white house. He is going the other direction. When he resigned and i could finally talk about him in this analysis, i was thinking, where would he fit . I was looking at things he did at the agency and for foreign and such. Some people said, well, he was kind of an operator because he was policy oriented and all of that. He certainly did not do a lot of reforming and reorganizing. Then i got to thinking, what about restoring in a different context . Thats where the restoration occurred. Pompeo was able to maintain that bridge between cia and the president. I dont think another director would have been able. Haspel has been able to continue that, but im not going to talk about her in any detail. Pompeo fits their the best. Cycles of leadership, as we look at these different leaders, and i have colorcoded them and given a little acronyms here, i emphasize once we put order into this scatterplot, there are interesting patterns. As i mentioned earlier, they always leave in controversy. They are always replaced by a inormer or a restorer, or one case, an administrator, custodian. Definitely not an insider, after an operator, by definition an insider, you do not want another insider necessarily to clean it up. So often, right after the intelligence operators, you have the outsiders to sweep the place clean. You will also notice that we have never had two operators in a row. Drift, you after have a more activist kind of leader being appointed. After the custodians, you have the energetic director coming in, even an outsider reformer or intelligence operator. You look at the agency in the context in which it exists, think about what they want to do, and pick a director to carry out that. Now, interestingly, the most senior level personnel change occurs with restorers. That is because i think they look at the agency is a little bit tainted, and they do not want a lot of holdovers. They need new leadership to give the impression everything is fresh and clean and sanitized for your protection. In other words, the Good Housekeeping seal of approval hereby getting rid of people in the senior ranks. The two manager reformers also clean house a lot but not as much as the restorers. I think some of that is there recognition that especially on the outsiders part, but also the insiders, they can only do so much getting rid of people before they destabilize and create internal backlash. They do a little bit less very smartly. Then, of course, the doinistrators do not personal changes because they are not supposed to. The intelligence operators also do little change. I analogize this to the head of a military who is about to go to war. The last thing you do when you are about to go to war is change your Senior Leadership. That just creates all sorts of instability and uncertainty in the ranks, new relationships have to be built, trust has to be established. You cannot do that as you are about to go to war. Intelligence operators keep the Senior Leadership in place as they march the agency off on its global campaign