Vietnam. One of those episodes focuses on the tet offensive. Documents and photographs from the National Archives and its president ial libraries described the attacks and their consequences but particular blow to American Public opinion of the war was the vietcong infiltration of the u. S. Embassy in saigon represented in the exhibit by a map of the defense of the embassy. And a memo describing the breach. If you have not already gone to the exhibit, i encourage you to come back and spend time there remembering vietnam, explores the war not only through documents but through interviews with american and vietnamese veterans and civilians and firsthand experience of the wars events. Now i ask all Vietnam Veterans or any United States veteran who served on active duty at any time during the period november 1, 1955, to may 15, 1975 to stand and be recognized. [applause] veterans, as you exit the mcgowan theater, volunteers will present each of you with the Vietnam Veterans lapel pin. On the back is embossed a grateful nation thanks and honors you. The commemoration is a National Initiative and the pin is the nations lasting momento of thanks. To get our discussion started, i will turn the lectern over to charles, the executive director of the u. S. Army center of military history, department of the army. A retired colonel, he was commissioned to the Aviation Branch of the army in 1988. He has seen service in the pentagon and served overseas in korea, iraq, and afghanistan. He studied history at west point and served as the chief of doctrine at the u. S. Army Aviation Center of excellence. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Charles Lowry jr. [applause] charles good evening. I would like to begin by thanking the staff of the National Archives for partnering with the center of military history to host this great event. All historians see the National Archives as our personal nirvana. I would also commend their outstanding vietnam exhibit to you if you have not seen it. Tonight we celebrate the release of the 12th volume in the cmhs official history series, the United States army and vietnam. In staying the course, dr. Erik villard chronicled the u. S. Army operations across vietnam from october 1967 to september 1968, including of course, the tet offensive. On the morning of 28 january, 1968, the north Vietnamese Ministry of defense notified the Southern Front commands via an encrypted radio transmission the general offensive was to begin at midnight, between the first and second days of tet, the Lunar New Year and a national holiday. Attacks across the country began the next day and continued for three weeks or more, engulfing South Vietnam in savage fighting that left thousands dead on both sides and hundreds of thousands of vietnamese or rendered homeless and destitute. By any measure, the tet offensive was one of the most significant events of the 20th century and the publication of this book at the 50th anniversary of tet serves two purposes first, it adds to our continuing National Conversation about vietnam and it helps us to remember the service and sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of army soldiers. This is significant in that our chief historian writes half the u. S. Population now is too young to have a direct memory of the vietnam war. The spirited discussion and strident critique surrounding the recent ken burns documentary on vietnam tells us that these are not merely historiographical debates but this is a teachable moment for our nation. And second for me personally, this event demonstrates the u. S. Army is a learning organization, committed to interrogating its past and the pursuit of a more effective future. We will continue this process in march with a symposium at the pentagon, cohosted by cmh, the army judge advocate general and center for Army Professional ethics at west point. The vietnam war still has much to say about our current army. As we listen to mr. Farrow talk about the exhibit and the archifacts, i had a moment to think about another fringe benefit of my job to be in charge of the armys museums. Ill highlight a piece in our collection that has a direct relationship to tet. If you visit the military police corps museum at fort leavenworth, missouri. You will see a jeep in the collection and it is present in many of the iconic photos about the fighting around the u. S. Embassy in saigon. That jeep carried the Quick Reaction force that reacted to the attack on the embassy. That vehicle is sitting in our museum at fort leavenworth, a tangible reminder of army service during the tet offensive. It give me great pleasure to introduce our keynote speaker this evening. Chuck hagel served as the 24th secretary of defense from february 2013february 2015. Hes the only vietnam veteran and the first ever enlisted combat veteran to serve as our secretary of defense. Secretary hagel also served two terms in the senate representing the state of nebraska. Secretary hagel has also chaired the atlantic council, the u. S. Vietnam war commemoration advisory committee, and the Vietnam VeteransMemorial Fund corporate counsel. Beginning in late 1967, secretary hagel and his brother tom served together in vietnam in the second at 1047 and the part of the ninth infantry division. The photo on the cover of staying the course depicts his company in action in may, 1968. Secretary hagel. [applause] secretary hagel thank you. And thank you for your service to our country. Mr. Farrow, thank you for hosting this event and all that the National Archives do for our country. The National Archives is truly a National Treasure that affects and reaches into every home in our country, as well as telling the story to the world of who we are as a people. And as a nation. So, thank you for you and your colleagues do every day for our nation. Dr. Villard, congratulations on your book. It is 5000 pages. I know the scholars will appreciate it, but rummaging through it a little, and getting a sense of what you cover, its a pretty masterfully written and historic document that i know will make endless contributions to educational institutions across this country for years to come. So, i congratulate you on a terrific accomplishment. To our veterans here, who have already been recognized, thank you for your service to our country, and your families, what your families have contributed, often, i think the spouses of our military get left out and the families and the children get left out in recognition and they shouldnt. They make as many or maybe more sacrifices than the activeduty people who serve our country. So, to all of you, thank you. My assignment tonight, and i know its risky having a former senator up here, and not put some time limits on him, but i will adhere to strict guidelines that theyve asked me to make some comments about certainly the tet offensive, 1968, because i was there. So, i will share some of my thoughts, maybe initial thoughts at the time. And then, how over the years i have come to assess what happened. First, it is my opinion that the tet offensive was probably the most defining event of the vietnam war. I think, also, 1968 was probably the most defining year of that war. And, when you review, as dr. Villard does in his book, many publications, many shows, the ken burns documentary which i think is brilliantly done and very fair, we now understand a lot, what happened, what did not happen, why it happened. And so, it leads us at least to, it does for me, to the conclusion that this event, 1968, that year, really defined the course for the rest of the war and the end of the war. And, in many respects, how it ended, which was a pretty inglorious ending. And the sacrifices made by over 56,000 americans who lost their lives and the hundreds of thousands of individuals who were wounded, and those all who served, were, as we now know, never really given much recognition for an assignment they did not choose, but they served and they served honorably, and they served their country and did what their country asked them to do. And, i think, that is a part of this story, that needs to be told more often in that our Vietnam Veterans came back, they didnt view themselves as heroes. They viewed themselves like all of our veterans of all of our wars, they did the job their country asked them to do. It was not their decision, but it was their country. And they did it honorably. They did it in a way that sustained them as all wars are sustained by the camaraderie of the individual, looking out for each other, believing in each other. And, yes, believing in your mission and believing in your country. That is an untold story in many ways. Now there is more recognition, of course, today. The whole welcome home effort. But it is a story that i think threads throughout every dimension of what happened in vietnam and not just 1968. The morning of january 31, my unit was a mechanized infantry unit that was assigned to the Michelin Rubber plantation security because intelligence had shown the vietcong had a significant number of battalion sized fighters in that area and using the plantation as a refuge. And we were alerted at about 5 30 in the morning of january 31 to assemble and put our tracks on the road and head for long bin. Long bin at the time was the largest Ammunition Depot in the world. Under the command of general westmoreland, they had a major office there. Across the street from that facility was a place called widows village. It was set up by the vietnamese government, South Vietnamese government, for the widows of fallen South Vietnamese soldiers and their families. The v. C. Had gotten into that village the night before and slaughtered all of the people and used that village as a staging area for the next morning to attack long bin Ammunition Depot. And so, as my tracks were moving into that area at 6 30 in the morning, the explosions were things that we had never, ever heard before, seen before. It was like it must have been like somewhat of an atomic explosion. And we didnt know where we were going, really, or what truly the assignment was or what was happening. That really personified tet in many ways. Certainly for the first few weeks. Until we started to intelligently assess strategies and what was happening and why. But nobody knew. And this was happening across vietnam for three weeks. But, initially, the shock of all of this during a truce, and probably also the shock of completely underestimating the strength of the north vietnamese and the vietcong, and all that came together, which resulted in a terrible, terrible loss of life. Although part of the story that rarely gets told, too, is that our military actually did pretty well. In fact, very well considering. And it was seen as, and broadcast as, a great loss for america. And a great win for the v. C. In the north vietnamese. It was certainly, not militarily a win for the v. C. And the north vietnamese but it was certainly a win for them with attitudes with the people of South Vietnam. And in the end, as we all know, that is all that counts because in the end, wars are determined certainly the wars post world war ii, are determined not by military might, but its the support of the people. And the support of the recognition of what kind of life do we want . What kind of life do the people deserve . And the United States found itself on the wrong side of that. It wasnt just tet. It was not just the military side of that. But every documentary now out, ken burns, if you have seen the recent movie the post or any other movies, they all tell that same story. There is a lesson in that. A lesson for today in afghanistan, in iraq, in all of these regional and localized conflicts. That without the support of the people, you will not win regardless of the strength of your military. And you put your military in a very unfair position when you load it onto the military as it is the militarys responsibility to win over the people. And we tried that in vietnam with all the different actions and we did try that. But in the end, it is, it is the culture, the people, and their attitude toward the forces that are involved in the conflict. That morning, i was a young 21 year old private first class who had been in vietnam two months. So, i was not thinking grand geopolitical thoughts. I didnt think many grand geopolitical thoughts in my year in vietnam, but like all soldiers, and we have many here, you think of survival. And how you protect each other. And what it is that that threads that camaraderie together. In americas case, and now, after i have had some wonderful privileges in my life, experiences in different jobs, its as clear to me as any one thing that the decency of america is always the i speak of defining things the defining dynamic in who we are. And that showed as much as anything as i have reflected so many times over so many years on those days in vietnam with people that, my brother and i served with that we did not know. In those days you went to vietnam independently. You did not go in a unit. And that made it more difficult because you are thrown in with people from the time you got on that plane at oakland, Travis Air Force base, to go to vietnam, you did not know anybody. You didnt train with any of the people. And you were separated into different units. But you soon bonded because of the decency that, i think it is so part of who we are. We are imperfect, we make mistakes. I have never believed that were gods chosen few. Maybe we are. We will all find out someday. Im in no hurry. But there is Something Special about the american soldier. And i think, as i end my comments here, that is one message that i wanted to impart. And everyone here who has worn the uniform of the United States military, regardless of service understands that, and every Family Member understands that. When i had the great privilege of leading the pentagon, i saw that up close. There was not a decision i ever made as secretary of defense, or as a United States senator, that i did not think about my experience in vietnam. Some were big decisions, some were not big decisions. But i always tried to reflect on the experience that i had in vietnam. The people that i learned so much from in vietnam. People who were from all over the country, many uneducated many came from very tough backgrounds. But you learn something from everybody everyday. Now, ill end this way. An old First Sergeant in vietnam once said to me when we were talking about a number of things. He was from lake charles, louisiana, Sergeant Rose. He said, just always remember, chuck, that every human being in life, no matter where they are from, or their station in life, has a story to tell. And every human being has a book in him about their life. And he said that in regard to service in vietnam. In 1968, you recall so much was going on here in the United States. The assassinations of king and kennedy. The riots. Everything was turned upside down. Institutions were being questioned like never before. Ive never forgotten that wisdom that Sergeant Rose imparted with me and to me, because it was a very strong message about how we interact with other people. I know when you are in war, you are in war, but you cant ever forget that dimension, that advice that Sergeant Rose, that everyone deserves respect, and everybody wants respect in their lives. And i do, i do want to end this way. When i said 1968 was i think the defining year of vietnam, it also was the defining year in this country. It defined an entire future dynamic that was instilled in and affected every institution in our country. Every institution was changed by vietnam. And it was changed and 1968 defined it. It was changed because it was the first time in our history that the American People started really questioning their government, and really started questioning their leaders and now we understand. But that was the defining dynamic of 1968, that the tet offensive really began. It really started. And from that point on we know the rest of the story. How every institution was turned upside down and changed. And yes, its imperfect. It didnt all come out right, but i think after reviewing it for 50 years and looking at where we are today with all the problems, all of our issues, it changed the country for the better because what it did, it opened up a process. So many things and so many areas of social injustice that had been swept under the rug for so long. It opened all of that up, all of it. So, i leave you with that thought, at least coming from me. So many people who have served, like my brother and i did, came away with a lot of different thoughts and different opinions. But, because i was asked tonight to share some of mine, it does doesnt mean it right and does not mean that my observations are better. Or more knowledgeable than anyone elses. , not at all. It isr those because where i am today in my own mind and my own heart. Maybe, a little not just because of my expansion of vietnam, but also because experience in vietnam, but also the vietnam experience affected everyone at home. [applause] host before introduce our three panelists, if you have a question that comes to you , our twor presentation colleagues are stationed on the aisles, you can pass the questions over to them. We will read them out at the end of the presentations. Our first panelist is here and his phd in history from the university of washington. He currently serves its as a digital military historian. He is the founder and president of the vietnam war history organization. It touches tens of thousands of Vietnam Veterans and involves them in their past. He serves as an advisor to several groups. Associate professor of a masternd director of of arts program. A retired u. S. Army colonel. Phd in history. The chief of the American History division of the u. S. Military academy. G is a veteran of Operations Desert Storm and iraqi freedom. Served in the cia for 27 years as a language officer, operations of the sir, and staff officer. Including five years in saigon during the vietnam war. He is now an independent researcher and author specializing in the vietnam war. [applause] i would like to say thank you for being here, being a part of this. Ais is the culmination of dream of mine. I knew i wanted to be a vietnam war historian since forever. I got my wish. This is a special occasion. Thank you everyone. I want to say a few things about what i thought were some of the big takeaways. I have been working on my book a long time. I could not have done it without the National Archives. Most of the primary documents that i have i got up in college park. The other National Archives branch. About who taught me more the communist way of thinking and their sources than anyone. Sources in mind, i want to walk through about five of what i consider the big takeaways. Takeaway, some of you may have heard this argument that the border battle thesis, that in the autumn of 1967, north vietnamese and viet cong forces launched a series of major battles on the periphery of South Vietnam starting in northern nicor. Nd going down with the intention of drawing away American Forces from the cities. Prior to the tet offensive. So that the communist forces would be better positioned when tet happened. No. That is not true. I know this because of the source from the National Archives. The real story is more interesting. If you understand how the communists military system worked, and how it was very different from the americans in a lot of respects. What you come to understand is that their process is actually very slow. These campaigns and big battles that were taking place in september, october of 67 were regional camp lanes regional campaigns that were planned back in the summer. The communists had their local objective. When the americans were fighting , though north vietnamese poet. Aboutadmit up its mind whether was going to do the tet offensive or exactly how it was going to happen or when it would happen. These choices were still being made. If you think about it, it always bugged me. Why would you want to major operation in early november if you think that you are going to launch your big attack at the end of january. Three months . You know how the americans can move around. That is not a smart way of drawing forces away. What turned out to be the truth is that the a diversion operations were based on, as most of us know, this is mid january. Their intent was not to draw the American Forces away, but to move around as fast as they wanted to. The paratrooper battalions, marine battalions that were the only mobile Reaction Force that the south korean South Vietnamese had, those were the troops that were the best positioned to turn back and attack against the cities. That is who they were trying to draw in. Second point. It has been asserted that general westmoreland was wedded to this notion of victory through attrition. The way to succeed was to kill enough of the enemy that you cross this imaginary threshold and you could grind your way toward success. Would with due respect my friends who argued otherwise, i dont think so. Westmoreland deserves far more credit than he is gone. He was a very shrewd person who understood the value of pacification. Also, the neglected thing is how he understood that entered acting north vietnamese supply lines was the key to success. There are different ways to reduce combat effectiveness. Telling a person is one way. If you cut off the supplies he does not have the bullets, the weapons, the medicine. That you can also reduce combat strength. This explains what westmoreland was doing and 67. Doing in 67. He was building up the ho chi minh trail. He was not just hanging the marines out to try. That was going to be the jumping off point through southern laos. That is why those battles took place. The north vietnamese knew that that was a threat. He deserves more credit. Tet itself. You could argue that it is a turning point. On the whole, i would argue for continuity. U. S. Military possibly policy does not change. Military policy has ordered been established before tet heard president johnson has artie confided in westmoreland that he was not going to run again. Johnson was a sick man at that point. He had already served for one and a half terms you cant run for reelection and also try to solve a war. He had already set the troop limit. From 65eady had a plan that there would be two years of buildup, two years of maximum effort, and then drawdown. U. S. Onditions upon which policy proceeded from that point, proceeded under the cloud of the tet offensive. Pictures and images of burning cities and so forth. It turned Public Opinion there was some effect. The u. S. Policy did not change. View,re thing, in my general abrams, had he taken charge in april 67, very little would have changed. Were verytmoreland sympathetic. The fact is if you look at the war, 90 of the American Military effort is already committed. There is things you have to do. Defend your bases, communications, support pacification, interdiction operations. There is not a lot of room to maneuver. In whent happens abrams takes over is the war had changed. The war is beginning to change. You dont see a major change in the war until the middle of 69. The final point. Goes from 30sive january 2 five march. Three phases, not to. Not two tet 69, the after exhaustion of the communist forces, and after vietnam position began to take hold, that is when both sides change policy. The year after tet, abrams still wanted to cross the border. Still wanted to fight the big battles. Still doing all the things westmoreland had done. Those are some of the takeaways. I cant say enough about how great the National Archives is. If you can get into the sources, it is amazing. Thank you again so much for having me here. I pass it over to my friend. Thank you. Think it is, i important to remember that the sources that we study, when studying the what the vietnamese were thinking about, to kind of documentation that we get to learn the vietnamese strategy and tactics and what throughout the. Of tet, are written and produced by citizens of a dictatorial, one Party Communist state. You have to look at that material with a bit of a john decide. A john this eye. As reagan said, trust but verify. Thehave to compare it to information that comes from the american side and see what how it sex up. Found how it stacks up. What i have found since i retired, at the vietnamese sources, there is a great deal of propaganda. Alsoer, the vietnamese have a great love of history. , acrosseat desire to the board, to tell their children and grandchildren what they did and why they did it. There is a lot of individuals that pushed this. There is a party on one side and a lot of individuals, generals, colonels, even lowerlevel people that want to pass on their experiences and explain why they did what they did and why their families made the sacrifices that they had to make. Surprisingly, in a lot of the publication, if you get through the propaganda and put that aside, you will find some very frank and very honest discussions of what happened, why it happened, the problems that they had, this mistakes they made the mistakes they , on our sided talk we focus so much on the history of the vietnam war and what happened with the americans, we have forgotten that however our armyp we felt, was, our commanders were, we were paired, we did not notice was going to happen, there was no planning, etc. , if you look at it from the vietnamese side they were doing they were saying the exactly same things. Again and again. When the military commander , hee, this is discussed discussed it in a big form the vietnamese had forum that the discuss the vietnamese had to discuss the tet offensive. He said maybe somebody up there knows what they are doing. Secondaryt the theater. Go iny we are supposed to and take the city, everybody else is going to be doing it, i guess we can give it a shot too. Doing it for very long, they were very skeptical. These things come across in vietnamese publications, their military history journals. They write, there is several big histories of the civil war that were produced for the general public. There are smaller histories of. Ivisions of regiments provinces. Military reasons. Military regions. All of which have a great deal of detail on individual battles. You have to push past the propaganda. Do, you will find a lot , thatngs that make sense tracked with what the americans saw happening, i think that helps to explain why, in many respects, the americans did not believe such a thing could happen. Because the vietnamese did not have that capability, and the vietnamese felt the exact same way. They felt exactly the same way. Some really telling memoirs that have been written. At least, portions of the memoirs of very telling. Generals, various military commanders across the board. Which was the attack into saigon. A general who commanded 24th. Egiment let me read something that he said. Various orders about what he was supposed to do. On the 27th of january, three days before the attack, he received orders to attack the capital from the east. A couple days later he was told that he would attack it from the north. Then they told him just before the attack, ok we want you to send half of your officers and ncos back to the rear so we can form a new regiment. Hes got an attack coming, immediately. This is what he writes. After i receive this message, i discussed it with my regimental political commissar. He said the regiment has been order to launch an attack into the city. The precise target is unclear. We do not have a clear picture of the enemy situation. We are attacking to pursue orders from higher authority, now they have ordered us to pull out half of our comrades. How is the regiment supposed be able to a couple should mission . Well, it didnt. He was relieved of command, reduce in rank. It took him a couple of years to. Et back into his career path he ended up as a general. Clearly, he was very bitter about how he was treated and how his unit was treated. He lost a lot of people. By thes another memoir subregion three commander. Poignant. Pecially not only did he lose a lot of men, he lost his son. A southerner who did not go to the north, came up through wanted to his son follow his father from the age of 14. To protect his son, he brought to into his security detail protect his headquarters. On the outskirts of saigon second and third wave of the tet offensive. They were not allowed to to pull back. They were told to hold their position and stay there. His son was killed in an artillery attack on the headquarters. This is what you write. Even today, every time i recall these events, my mind is still filled with confusion. From a military standpoint, it would have been impossible to reach the decision to attack and seize control of saigon with the forces that were actually. Mployed why did the political offensive never materialize . What were the conditions among the masses and students that let our people to reach the conclusion that millions of people were boiling over with revolutionary zeal and were prepared to sacrifice everything when we entered saigon, we found this assessment was incorrect. For me, that was the most anxious. In my entire career as a combat commander. Was instead the result of the Impossible Task of trying to resolve the contradictions between the requirements of the mission and the forces and methods that were to be used to a compass the mission. The commanders hands were tied. Said once i said to my political officer let pull our forces back to the rear to regroup them so that then we can recapture the liberated area. The political officer replied if we do that not only will we lose subregion three, you and i will lose our heads. The 304th division was one of the divisions assigned to caisson. They sat on the outskirts, they were there the longest. They were there from january through may, almost to june. They took around his casualties. Right from the start, there is a memoir by a general who, at that time, was a Battalion Commander in the 60s of six regiment of the 304th division. The 66th regiment of the 304th division. They were marching into position, they were hit by two b52 bombs. Andook out one battalion part of the regiment headquarters. As men went in to try to pick up the pieces and get the wounded, another strike took out even more of them. They talk about problems in they had units refuse their orders. Units fell back. Without authority. Holding hat was which had been the old camp, outside the one that was overrun. Without permission pulled back and did not tell anybody. The americans moved in, took that position, and vietnamese artillery did not even know that it had happened. They could not even shall shell the americans because they thought their own troops were there. After the siege was over, the 30 304th pulled back and did a review and issued accommodations and disciplinary actions. Written in the 304th division history. About the problem that arose during the campaign that received serious attention from the division involved a number of incidents that revealed the combat revolve resolve of our troops was neither high nor uniform. The lack of a consistently high spirit of resolve and combat discipline throughout the division was also demonstrated in a number of incidents of desertion and selfinflicted wounds. The division Disciplinary Proceedings against a total of 329 individuals. 85 cadres from platoon level upward. Disciplinary measures included expulsion from the party, reprimands, warnings, removal from command positions, and the motion. Demotion. And is in one oft their campaign studies, after the war the vietnamese did just what the u. S. Army did. Reviews,tactical battle studies, reviews of campaigns to learn lessons from them. To assess how they had performed, what their weaknesses were, what their strengths were, everything else. In the tet 68 saigon campaign study, it says the following. In Lessons Learned about strategic guidance, the region the reason we set goals that were too high was because of our assessment being incorrect. The assessment did not truly reflect the actual situation. The central committees assessment underestimated the capabilities of the puppet army and puppet government. That is the South Vietnamese army and government. The assessment underestimated the response of American Military forces. The assessment overestimated the capabilities of our political forces. Conclusion that was reached by the Party Central committee itself in an assessment that it made five after the tet offensive in 1973. One of the reasons for their problems, they said, was because becausedinates they werent getting the truth told up through the chain of we have taught in our history of the war, we talk about the problem of body counts and inflation of the body count and reporting things that maybe ,ere grossly or overoptimistic the vietnamese had exactly the same problem. They wrote in one of their realitiesarned, the of the spring 68 offensive reports from lower levels to higher levels to dot accurately, or even closely, reflect the realities of they did not report mistakes and shortcomings. To make the authorities policy decisions that were not in line with the situation and to set goals that were too high. I will end with this one. I think it applies on our side as well as on theirs. Higherlevel authorities must be willing to listen to the opinions of subordinates, they must encourage the subordinates to encouraged to express their own independent thought. Especially those ideas that differ from, or are opposed to their own views. A leader must be willing to look truth in the eye, to hear subordinates out completely, and to encourage subordinates to tell them the truth. A leader must not be afraid to hear bad things. He must not only want to hear good things. He must not be overbearing and domineering toward the ideas and opinions of his subordinates. [applause] host thank you for coming tonight. I want to thank the National Archives for hosting this event. The university is about 10 or 15 minutes away from the National Archives. The National Archives is, quite simply, a National Treasure pun intended. Upstairs in the rotunda, we were thinking about how nicolas cage got in there to steal the declaration of independence. We will work on that later. Here withreat to be secretary hagel, and i want to congratulate erik on this monumental accomplishment. I know for scholars like many of destiny of the vietnam war, the center is an invaluable resource. I also want publicly thank you for being a resource and eriks work, there are quite literally hundreds and hundreds of andlars that mention merle rely on merle for his insights of the vietnamese perspective, which is an incredibly important part of the story that is one that too often americans tend to forget. This was as much if not more so a vietnamese conflict as it was an american one. The tet offensive is often painted as a military victory turned political defeat. Often times, that story line is depicted as one in which it is the americans fault. It is a triumph forsaken. There are certain elements of that story that i think are important, but i would like to talk about what happens tonight when we assume. Since we are on cspan, i will leave it at that. But i want to talk a little bit tonight about how the tet offensive is a tutorial in flawed assumptions, especially when it comes to developing strategy. In one part i believe, a large part, i believe that strategy is an aspirational art. We aspire to a College Things accomplish things when we plan. Strategy is also a balancing act between means and ends. On one side, you can calculate means, but the ends are, in a sense, aspirational. You desire to accomplish those objectives. You hope that the means will be applied in a way to accomplish your ultimate political objective. I think what you see in tet, on all sides, is a historical case study of flawed assumptions. From the beginning of this storyline, which i think really starts in the spring, if not earlier, of 1967, is a fundamental assumption on all sides that the vietnam conflict is stalemated. And there are repercussions that come out of those assumptions. On the american side, there is a nearly yearlong salesmanship campaign that is orchestrated by the Lyndon Johnson white house that helps ensure the United States homefront is aware of the fact the military command in vietnam and the South Vietnamese allies are making progress. The war is not stalemated. Assumption among senior military commanders, not only washington, d. C. , but in saigon that because the war is still stalemated, they are going to lose public support at home. And that is going to have a longterm if not shortterm and longterm deleterious effect of accomplishing those political objectives that are laid out as part of that strategy. And there are also repercussions on the vietnamese side. Ecause of the assumption that the war is stalemated in 1967, ultimately, the hanoi politburo comes to the conclusion that the stalemate of the war has to be broken. Ultimately this will be achieved by a general offensive and a general uprising. And this general offensive is assumed to accomplish what is long called a decisive victory, and this decisive victory would not only occur simultaneously, to aopefully also lead general uprising among the South Vietnamese population. They have alluded to this, right . That there was this assumption bubbling below the surface that there was a revolutionary spirit of the South Vietnamese population. That is soon as it takes place it would crack the surface and allow the revolutionary spirit to bubble up. This general uprising will not just occur in the rural countryside, but also in the urbans 80s. Urban cities. It will prove to the vietnamese, the americans, the world, that this the enemies conflict is vietnamese conflict is about independence and the saigon regime is a legitimate and the true independence is best served by coming together in unifying under one government. There is also an assumption on thatorth vietnamese side the saigon political regime is wracked by instability and corruption, and there are certain elements of the truth to that. But those assumptions do not play out as well, as we can see by how the tet offensive unfolds. But there are certain elements of political stability that start to play out starting with the 1966 elections in South Vietnam. Yes, the saigon regime is still dealing with corruption. Yes, there are still tenuous relationships between the local population and that sidelined government that need to be worked on. Saigon government that still needs to be worked on, and that is part of, as erik mentioned earlier, a comprehensive American Campaign that is trying to meld combat operations with pacification, and the aim of pacification is yet another assumption of american strategy. The americans coming from the outside in and helping the South Vietnamese build bonds, political bonds, and build loyalties between themselves and the government. It is part of this holistic strategy that westmoreland does not get quite enough credit for planning. There are clearly issues in terms of implementation of this holistic strategy, oftentimes because of other assumptions in issues then and the, i would argue, counterinsurgency and nationbuilding as they are related to military operations. There are difficulties of this holistic strategy of military operations working at cross purposes, if not sometimes undermining nationbuilding efforts. Military operations will oftentimes destabilize the countrys. They will cost social dislocation. Increase refugee populations. That will all further destabilize the social and political fabric and pair the to work against this larger clinical objective of nationbuilding. There are also assumptions from an operational standpoint. As we move from 1960 seven into 1967 into 1968, when westmorelands staff, especially the intelligence staff, makes certain assumptions about what the enemy is capable of achieving in late 1967 and 1968. In part, there is a focus on caisson because there are also historical assumptions that are being made. That many in the Johnson White house and many in the saigon military command, especially american officers in west morelands command, see a historical comparison between the French Garrison in the French Indochina war, which ultimately that garrison would be overrun and lead to the geneva accord. There is a concern there are parallels between the marine garrison at caison being overrun and this would lead a swift turnaround of the strategic calculations being made in late 1967. And there are also assumptions being made in terms of not only what the enemy is capable of, but what the enemy consists of. In 1967s large debate that leads into 1968, and into 1969 about what the enemy actually consists of. The debate known as the order of the ciaccurs between and elements of the white house, and the department of defense get all involved in this larger debate of simply counting your enemy. How do you develop a Strategic Plan . How to view make solid do you make solid assumptions about your strategic you cannot even come to a consensus about how many enemies you are confronting . Clearly a difficult proposition as you are trying to craft not only a sensible strategy, but one that is also achievable. And these debates will continue throughout 1967, and i would argue, into the tet era. That will have repercussions, not only in the development of west morelands strategy from side, butan also will have repercussions of how the salesmanship campaign lays out in 1968, because the American Public themselves are also making assumptions based on the Propaganda Campaign that is being led by the white house. When general westmoreland comes home in 1967 and says were making progress and the Johnson White house says were making progress, there are certain expectations and assumptions being made based on those progress reports. And those expectations get burst when the offensive begins in january 1968 and early february of 1968. So i think it is important for us to think about it not only is military victory turned political defeat, but also a tutorial for us to think about how we make certain assumptions when we come to war. Whether it is the revolutionary spirit of the South Vietnamese, whether it is the political instability of the South Vietnamese. Whether it is what we can accomplish when we employee military force. Now, many of those assumptions i would argue lead to into 1969 as well, many of those assumptions that eric lays out are shown to be false. Flawed assumptions. The problem is now after the war, as we begin to write our history of the american concerns of vietnam, we have to start swearing those circles of the assumptions as we start to write our history. And i would argue that many of the myths we continue to embrace in vietnam come from those assumptions, and our inability to reconcile squaring the circles as we come to figure out what this event meant for us all. Is of them, i would suggest, an assumption that the American Media was to blame. There is a strand of that that is important for us to consider, but i would argue that is not the whole story, and i would suggest to you all that we should be careful of one word assumptions and explanations when trying to come to a inision about what happened the overall larger American Experience of the anon. Thee could include incredibly complex and complicated war, that the reason for the results of that war are because of the American Media, say it is tooould supposed to governor and for why the outcome, the inglorious outcome, as secretary hagel mentioned perhaps it is to simplest against to productive of an answer too simplistic and too reductive of an answer. A search forthan simplicity, reduction, and one word answers to understand a complex as oracle case study. A general comes in and completely turns the war around. Again, i would argue that we need to be careful with that. Not only in the context of 1968, but also fitting our own experiences more recently. About assuming how much one general, when american general, can turn a war around on a dime. That includes so many other things local issues, political, military, economic, develop mental aspect. A complex war that is both local and regional, that is about identity, that has often times many things to do not at all with the american foreignpolicy in the cold war era. Howe should ask ourselves we might think about this portion of the story. How much impact a major modern general has on the course and conduct of the war. We also need to be careful of certain assumptions of how we think about history at large. Assuming that history is a search for blame. Oftentimes, in the aftermath of the tet in the aftermath of vietnam, Many Americans in particular wanted to use the vietnam and the history of vietnam is a search for blame. As a historian, that might not be the best value of history. History is an opportunity for us to place blame. Rather, it is an opportunity for us to gain perspective. I think one of the best things we can take about the can burns and lynn novak documentary is for the opportunity to empathize with folks we disagree with. The impact of that documentary is to see this complex conflict through the eyes of so many people who disagreed. ,ntiwar activists, journalists writers from the National Liberation front. Propaganda officers. South vietnamese officers and civilians, American Military commanders, Young Marines families who lost their sons. Women who served as nurses and in the red cross, and many of these voices often times during the war were in conflict with themselves or each other, is toe value of history empathize with those voices, not to seek blame. I think that is an important thing for us to consider as we look back on vietnam. The last thing i would like to suggest is, as we look back at this episode 50 years on, as we try to gain perspective from this larger offensive, is that perhaps we should not assume too much of what a war can offer. Ande participants in 1967 1968 assume that military action would give them something. ,ould offer them a path oftentimes a decisive path to achieving political objectives. And so we should challenge those assumptions today. We should challenge our own assumptions about the efficacy of military power leading in the most direct way, as a shortcut if you will, to achieving our political objective. Aps one of the perspectives we can game is that , iftimes, military action we do not over assume, might, in fact, not be the best tool in all situations for us to achieve the political objectives we desire. Thank you. [applause] all right. Well, i think we have about 15 minutes for some questions and answers. I think i will begin. An interesting question, i will begin. We will proceed with these as we asked them to the panel as a whole, and what you gentlemen react. Our first question is what are the parallels between vietnam and the current conflicts in afghanistan and iraq . Oh. [laughter] i think we should all look right. [laughter] be i thinkr would these eminent historians gave the answer. Commentsy your last that the use of the military has and connectedrawn to a larger diplomatic, strategic objective. The use ofonnect your military from that, you are going to fail. Youre going to fail. And i think the afghana rock afghaniraq situation is somewhat parallel to vietnam. It always is going to go back to factthere were two, the that it is the people of that country, that region that will determine outcomes. To enter other reason a dropper elect the United States of america, the people of america are not going to allow their country to continue in a neverending war. With casualties and billions of dollars being spent. Support or the enough support, and enough ability of the countries we were findg to help to at least some someones of responsibility to take over from the United States. , think of afghanistan in iraq i was in the senate when those wars started. I would ask the secretary, the deputy secretary, the generals they all gave the same answer. We will be out of there in a year. We will be out of there in two years. Iraq would not cost the American People one dollar because of the iraqi oil. So where you start to see a disconnect between your leaders and what they are telling representatives of the people in congress, not on like what we know about vietnam, i do not think it is an intentional, malicious kind of thing. It is a parallel. And i think you could draw other parallels as well. Each isseparate, different, different parts of the world, to start with. Different cultures, different histories, different dynamics absolutely. But there are parallels. If i could turn that 90 degrees to make a pitch for the value of history and our military history, all that good stuff, i will tell you one thing from my point of view. Cmho see mh in 2000 in 2000, when a rock and afghanistan iraq and afghanistan started. What struck me was the fact that we have not retained the lessons of vietnam. Humvees suddenly had getting one of iieds in heavy urbanized areas, and people going well, wait a minute. Have we been through this sort of thing . The anon gun trucks. Manuals of ieds. This information is available, but hadnt been put in the right hands. Writing ax months special paper on detaining operations, based on the history of the vietnam war, geneva rights, how we handle prisoners because of that. Story,it is not a new but we do not seem to be very successful at retaining those lessons. Plea that we probably ought to, because on the ground, if nothing else, i think it will save some american if we cannot member what has, before, the geopolitical aspect. When i went to him afghanistan in 2010 and saw a 22yearold First Lieutenant wave to his troops, who drove off in their strikers like a mob , the kids going to school, that is what it is about. Great, thank you. And i will do a synthesis of a number of questions that i have in front of me, and they relate to intelligence. So one of these is really wellwritten, and kind of sums it up. Tet offensive has also been described as an and intelligence failure. Do you agree with this analysis . It play inid establishing the offensive . And what plans were known but not planned for, or missed completely, and why . In terms of intelligence, it i think clearly, it was an intelligence failure because there was a nationwide surprise. On the other hand, there had both saigons by station, the Analytical Office there, and the nsa to put out a warning that Something Big was coming. It was going to be very big. And that was not accepted because a, it was politically people felt, and b, it was impossible. In other words, these people, the vietnamese, would not be crazy enough to do Something Like that. We did not understand the vietnamese. We put the vietnamese in our shoes. They were in their shoes. That weave to make sure try to understand the situation and see the situation from the enemys perspective, and not our own. And that is where we failed. I will tell you another thing that really struck me, this is getting back to some points we made earlier, the operational secrecy on the side of the communists was pretty extraordinary. There are disciplined bunch of folks, as was normal course of action. Of the compartmentalization information was so severe that when i heard of this i had a laugh imagine this. One of the subregion commanders basically, you might think of him as a two star, threestar general attacking saigon. Gets the word that his forces were supposed to attack the city in 24 hours. He gets this out of the blue and is thinking no, we will attack in march or april, when we get our act together. No, it is tomorrow. Running off to find his subordinate commanders. He finds one of his Battalion Commanders roaring drunk on tet wine, completely useless. Officerother executive with his family, does not know where the troops are. Part of the reason this was an intelligence failure to some extent, a major extent, is the fact that the communist were actually so good at keeping it a secret that our own people did not know, which led to a lot of problems when the actual attack happened. The story is either getting their late or they ran off or crossed the wrong river, it is like keystone cops out there. They sacrifice their execution for their operational standard, and that was one of the tradeoffs. And that is a theme that goes across the vietnamese accounts in case after case. They get the word they were supposed to launch an attack without any time to even make it through their assembly point. Memoir by a general who ended up as chief of general staff in hanoi at the time of tet. He was a Company Commander in the ninth division, and he was with the regiment that was posed to attack a Training Center outside of saigon, a South Vietnamese Training Center. They were going to overrun it, and take down saigon. They get the word at the last minute, they get to a river, there are only enough votes for one company to cross the river. His company is the First Company across. They get to their point, they make the attack they have one company and a Training Center that has 20,000 soldiers. They hit the headquarters, they are there for a while, and they have to pull out. They lose people all over the place. Nobody else makes it. They were their own worst enemy in that, and that just goes to show, across the board, there is a reason that you have we have to balance operational secrecy with operational rationality. Big in many respects, was a unbalance in that equation. All right. This has reached the end of our question and answer time. I want to thank secretary hagel for a greatlists evening. [applause] and i would like to thank you all again for coming tonight. Area, we willnt be signing copies of the book, which are available for sale, and also have a display of our remaining vietnam history publications, and i encourage you to stick around and ask more questions as we wrap up the night. Thank you. [laughter] good job, nicely done. Next saturday, American History tv takes you live to the museum of the bible in washington dc for a symposium on the bible and its influence on the founding of america. Historians explore references to in 18thcentury political discourse entering the american revolution, and examined Benjamin Franklins much debated faith. Our coverage begins 9 00 a. M. Eastern, next saturday, february 10. , formerht on afterwards speechwriter for president george w. Bush and atlantic columnist david frome trumpocracybook,. This is a book about the study of power. That is what the suffix means. This is the study of donald trump power. How does he get at . How does he maintain it . How does he get away with it . This is the system of enabling between the white house, trump and congress, trump and the media that enable him and create an audience, with a system that involves the republican donor elite, the traditional elements to the Republican Party. And above all, between him and his core group of voters in the Republican Party that enabled him to win the republican nomination and went on to win the presidency. Wrecks watch afterwards, tonight p. M. On cspan book tv. Railamerica, island of hope, island of tears. A 1980 nine documentary commissioned by the National Parks service that explains how and why millions of immigrants traveled to america, passing by the statue of liberty and ellis island to seek a better life. Here is a preview. Each week, American History tv real america brings you archival films that provide context for todays Public Affairs issues. Clinging to their possessions , they entered the great building and climbed the stairs. Jesus, mary, joseph, and jeremiah. They would come right into the big hall, and there they would sit and stay there. And they did not know where they were. They hadnew land, but not and all you could get was two years and the crying of the children. Tears andand crying of the children. The process will last less than a day, but for now they waited. Those from europe in the near east, those that had arrived from the caribbean. Those who were the first in her family to come to america, and those who would be met. Those who came to make money and return, and those who were determined never to return. Watch the entire film on real 4 00 p. M. Unday eastern here on American History tv, only on cspan3. The vietnam wars tet offensive started 50 years ago on january 30, 1968. Viet cong and north Vietnamese Forces attacked more than 100 80s, towns, and outpost across a broad swath of South Vietnam. Next, the museum in washington dc hosted a discussion on the tet offensive and the battle afterward, where some of the most intense and the battle where some of the