This 90 minute talk. I want to thank you all for ignoring the weather reports and coming out on this not as cold as it has been monday afternoon for the first session of the winterspring term of the history seminar. Todays seminar features melvyn leffler, wholl be speaking on his just published collection of essays, safeguarding Democratic Capitalism us Foreign Policy and National Security, 19202015. I am from the George WashingtonUniversity History department. I am the cochair of the seminar along with my colleague of the Wilson Center. Is onngstanding cochair a welldeserved sabbatical from publictorys center of policy and will be engaged in research and writing in germany for the next few months. As many of you as many of you know, this is a collaborative of the George Washington university and the Wilson Center. If you have not seen our lineup, please pick up a flyer outside of this room. It carries us through september although we go into late made toe in or you can go online the National History centers website for the full schedule. The programming for this season is diverse and exciting. Sumners like this do not just happened by themselves. Like this do not just happened by themselves. There is a lot of behind the scenes planning. We also rely on the Financial Support of a number of groups. One piece of business, if youve got one of these devices that is not already on vibrate or silent, i would ask that you do so now. Choked now, my cochair will introduce our speaker. Good afternoon. Im supposed to fill the shoes of christian. Those of you who have been here know that is impossible. I will step in. , who i am glad to welcome back is a professor at the university of virginia and works at the miller center. Who was compton . He said, a rich guy. Is the author of numerous books and one of his books is. Preponderance of power the reason i emphasize that is he won a trifecta on that. You know in this room, that is not usual. For, he received awards the soul of mankind. He has coedited numerous volumes on foreignpolicy. Office of thehe secretary of defense during the carter administration. He has been president of the society of american historians. He has been a professor at oxford university. You have the idea. I think his proudest accomplishment was that he was a Public Policy scholar at the Wilson Center for some time some years ago. That having looked at his biography online, i came prepared to congratulate him as someone who grew up in brooklyn. He is distinguished because he grew up in brooklyn. Born inme he was brooklyn but he grew up in queens. We are glad to welcome him, none the less. [applause] melvyn thank you so much. To theally appreciative washington history seminar and the National History center for inviting me. I know christian is not here but he helped set this up. I am indebted to eric who will provide some comments on this book. Thanks to all of you who came. I know you fit me in the between sessions fit me in between sessions. Thank you. Is a particular pleasure to be back at the Wilson Center and to have this opportunity to talk about safeguarding Democratic Capitalism here, of all places. The Wilson Center has been. Nstrumental to my career i first had a fellowship here in 1979 and 1980 when i came to begin work on preponderance of power. I came here in 1979 and i started doing the research as a fellow here at the center. About 20 years later, i was invited back and i did a lot of the work on the book that became for the soul of mankind. About four or five years ago, i was here as a visiting scholar to do research on the postcold war foreignpolicy, particularly the policies of George W Bush, some of the results which appear in the essays of this book, safeguarding Democratic Capitalism. This book is intending to do three things. Wanted to provide an ofmination of the evolution American Foreignpolicy from the end of world war i until the global war on terror. Someted to provide analysis of the evolution of American Foreignpolicy. At the same time, in the first notesr of the book and in to each of the chapters that precede the essays, i seek to interrogate the evolution of my own thinking about the making of American Foreignpolicy. Lastly, what i wanted to do in this book and what i hope to do today is take time to explain and the utility of what i call the National Security paradigm for explaining the history of American Foreignpolicy. In trying to fulfill these goals , i address several sets of questions that i consider understanding the evolution of American Foreignpolicy in the 20th century. , did the of questions United States return to a policy of isolationism after world war i . Rejectublican officials wilsons vision of a liberal, capitalist, International Order after they thwarted his vision, defeated the treaty of versailles and repudiated the league of nations . Were they isolationist . , as mostere not historians now would say, why did they refused to guarantee French Security . If they were not, why did they insist on more debt repayments . . Hy did they raise tariffs that is one set of questions. I go on to explore why american officials reconfigured americas role in the world after world war ii. Why did american officials assume responsibilities as the Global Economic hegemon after world war ii and not after world war i . Why did they incur strategic commitments around the world in order to contain and deter the soviet union . In short, why did they decide to wage a global cold war . The third set of questions. In one ofinvestigate the key chapters of the book why the United States won the cold war. Why did the United States win . To what extent was it related to strategy . To what extent was it related to diplomacy . To what extent was it a function of domestic policy . Lastly, in several essays, i try to investigate whether the end of the cold war reshaped American Foreignpolicy. In particular, i address the question of whether 9 11 transformed american policy as many observers thought at the time. Let me begin by briefly outlining what i say about these key matters. I show republican officials in the 1920s, like secretary of state and the secretary of commerce and the secretary of rejectasury, did not wilsons aspirations for a stable, liberal, capitalist International Order. In short, they were not isolationists. Wilsonsthey deemed to u. S. Ess than vital security interests. This was because they did not see u. S. Security endangered after world war i. Germany was defeated and substantially disarmed. France was weekend. Britain was hobbled. Russia was ensconced in civil war. Threatenedemotely u. S. Vital interests in the 1920s and early 1930s. Officials did not want to incur commitments or assume responsibilities or make sacrifices that appeared to them disproportionate to the interests at stake. Ignorant not naive or as they were often portrayed during world war ii and during the early years of the cold war. Was a, for example, pragmatic progressive. , hoovertary of commerce employed hundreds of economists and statisticians in the bureau of foreign and domestic commerce. Like most progressives, i show in a key chapter in the book, hoover placed great faith in cooperationoluntary , and a political solutions. That is why he supported things like the agent general preparations, the establishment of a world war foreign debt commission, instruments that were supposed to take controversial issues out of politics. That was the idea. Hoover often failed to it here to adhere to his own principles. During the early years of the great depression, hoover failed to foresee the rise of totalitarian governments and their impact on the distribution of power in the International Arena. A setn in this book, and of essays, to show how and why American Foreignpolicy changed after world war ii. Agreedts and republicans that the United States should andme strategic commitments hegemonic responsibilities. Responsibilities that the nation had forsworn. They did so. So because they had come to believe that the distribution of power in europe bearing ond a direct the preservation of Democratic Capitalism at home. 41, roosevelt and his advisers had come to believe that axis domination of europe might lead to a garrison state at home, inside the United States. Ii, roosevelts successors harbored similar fears about communist and soviet domination of europe and asia. Truman believed this. His advisers believe that. So did eisenhower and his advisers. And power, i argue, shaped in u. S. Foreignpolicy after world war ii. Think,r, as most people of soviet premeditated military thatssion, but fear postwar economic conditions, financial disarray, social paralysisnd political would lead to communist victories in places like france, and allowly, greece soviet leaders to gain a preponderance of power in europe and asia. Germany and japan had achieved in the 1930s. Such preponderance, truman and his advisers believed, would trigger a sequence of reactions inside the United States that could endanger personal liberty and Free Enterprise at home. American officials knew they had the power. If they could mobilize Domestic Support to deal with these postwar economic lyrical conditions and thwart soviet and communist gains, National Security emerged when you fishels when officials realized core values at home were endangered by events abroad. Abroad endangered vital security interests at home. Policymakers had to exercise judgment. I show in my book that the best judgment american policymakers strategy was not about. Nd was not about diplomacy their insight was the realization that they had to make Democratic Capitalism work inside the United States and inside the political economy of their key allies and partners. They realized that a halfcentury of imperial competition, world wars, great depression, political paralysis, and genocide had discredited Democratic Capitalism. U. S. Officials and their partners in london, paris, and tokyo needed to make Democratic Capitalism and social democracy work for their own citizens. If they could make Democratic Capitalism work. If they could make social democracy work, these examples of successful polities could serve as models for newly emerging countries around the globe. American officials realized that they had to use state capacity. They had to use governmental capacity in ingenious ways to complement and supplement the market. In one of my most important how governmental policies in the United States, western europe, and japan stabilized the business cycle, nurtured Economic Growth, provided minimum social provision, stimulated research and innovation, empowered civil society, and enhanced living consumptiond made the benchmark of modern civilization. The state, the activities of the government, i argue complemented markets, structured markets, liberated markets, and most of all, the state helped allay the hardships caused by markets. Western statesmen won the cold avoided in they truck capitalist conflict, because they garnered the support of their own people and created a culture of consumption that engendered the envy of people around the globe. Soviet officials failed to do these things. Rapideved racket Economic Growth in the 1950s that they were stymied by the globalization of the World Economy in the 1970s and the plummeting of oil prices in the 1980s. Making Democratic Capitalism work at home and making social democracy abroad was a astounding achievement of western statesmen, accomplished mostly by enlarging and recalibrating again and again the role of government in domestic life. After the cold war, u. S. Foreignpolicy did not change a great deal. In a controversial essay in this volume, i argue that 9 11 did not transform u. S. Foreignpolicy as many observers argued at the time. Wanting a balance of power in favor of freedom, as George W Bush insisted was his policy goal, was not very different than wanting a preponderance of power at the beginning of the cold war. Seeking a Democratic Peace was not new. Nor were preventative and unilateral actions to achieve vital interests. These had gone on for a long time. In my essay, i show how fear, power, interest, and values interacted in complicated ways to shape the global war on terror. In addressing the evolution of u. S. Foreignpolicy, like most historians, im interested in continuities and disconsolate annuities. I see the major transformative moments occurring in 1940 and 41, when officials in the Roosevelt Administration and the president himself came to see that the configuration of power in europe and asia had a vital bearing on u. S. Interests and values at home. I came to many of these conclusions slowly, through research and reassessments over many years. In this book, i try to show how my thinking evil over time and how my analysis changed. Timeinking evolved over and how my analysis changed. I write about embracing complexity. I was originally inspired by the wisconsin revisionists. I came to realize that markets were important but not determinative. I came to realize that one had to examine the goals of policymakers carefully and assess the priorities they assigned to these goals. Yes, policymakers and elites in the United States wanted to expand exports. They also wanted to do lots of other things, like cutting taxes. Domestic economic requirements often conflicted with foreign economic goals. The historian has to waive the importancetant to policymakers. Embracing complexity also meant theing to understand external routes of u. S. Foreignpolicy, as well as the domestic sources that the Wisconsin School had so rightly emphasized. What i came to see was that the threat perception was a key to policy making. Realize that an external danger is not an objective condition. External danger is a matter of isception and perception influenced by emotions, like experience,ory, by and by ideology. Asame to understand that important as were structures in the making of foreignpolicy, so is human agency and contingency. To understand the role of domestic interest groups. I needed to understand the institutional mechanisms of government and governance. I needed to understand the configuration of power in the International Arena. I also needed to understand political leaders and statesmen. I needed to understand their ideas, their fears, their aspirations, their memories. In trying to understand policymakers, i struggled and continue to struggle to empathize, combining empathy and criticalsm inquiry is hard. Myself helpedound by the new literatures on emotion, religion, identity, memory, cognition, and culture. And by conversations with emotions. Out as i embrace complexity, i came called a what i have National Security paradigm for interpreting American Foreignpolicy. In the Political Science literature, i found a nice, simple definition of National Security. According to some experts, the protecting core values from external danger. National security is the protection of core values from external danger. National security is more than the protection of territorial integrity, more than the protection of national sovereignty. National security means the protection of core values. What are core values . , i think corey values are encapsulated by the capitalismdemocratic. American core values are individual freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly. Core values include Representative Government and the rule of law. Core values include private property, Free Enterprise, and a marketplace economy. Different individuals and different groups and different policy makers a sign different degrees of importance to one or another of these core values. Core values is a capacious concept, always changing, always contentious. I think that is one of its virtues. It forces us to think deeply about what policymakers are trying to do and what americans. Are about to understand National Security policy, one must explore external dangers to these values. This requires an objective assessment of the distribution of power in the International Arena and of the behavior of allies as well as adversaries very adversaries. Assessmentuires an of the perception of threat by policymakers themselves. This perception, as i have emphasized, is often a product of ideology, emotion, memory, domestic politics, and personal experience. Show that National Security is a dynamic, evil being concept. Little evolving concept. It has little interest a meeting intrinsic meaning. It is fundamental because if you define it the way i do, it forces us as scholars to think deeply about the meaning of. Ital interests, core values the concept of National Security should impel careful analysis of both the internal and external sources of policy. It should force us to integrate and reconcile realist and revisionist constructionist interpretations of policymaking. In the United States, National Security has been about preserving Democratic Capitalism. Democratic capitalism is a catchall term encompassing what i regard as americas core values. The purpose of america, dwight toower said, is quote defend a way of life, rather than merely to defend property, homes. Defending the american way of life, defending Democratic Capitalism has been a process, filled with failures as well as with successes. That is what i try to portray in safeguarding Democratic Capitalism. Thank you. We are doing something a little bit new today in having a comment. For ther commentator next, i hope 10 minutes, if no more than that. It is a privilege to have this opportunity to comment on melvyn collection of essays and to comment on a number of issues he poses. Outset, i amat the not a diplomatic or foreignpolicy maker i training. By training. I am a historian who has moved somewhat into the area of cold war history, a transition made by my participation in the washington history seminar over the past five years. My engagement with his work came just under two decades ago when i first read and taught a wonderful essay that he wrote, entitled the cold war, what do we now know . That there remained much we did not know, that we should be wary of overemphasis. N contemporary fascism ideology alone does not dictate policy. It is not enough to examine the making of policy in any one nation and if the opening of new to render anyound narrative more complex. He concluded the cold war will defy any master narrative. This was a model essay. Its tone and powerful in its punch. I have taught it in a number of occasions. As i turned my own work modestly in the direction of foreignpolicy, i am reminded how much influence he has on my thinking. Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism brings together a number of his essays. The book is framed by a new autobiographical introduction that charts evolution from his late College Years onwards. The essay introduces readers to schools and debates and recreates the intellectual and Political Climate in which the essays were written. Is ai want to highlight different point. An academic character trait i find admirable and in short supply and that is a commitment to engaging sources and following them in directions not predicted by dominant frameworks. As he notes in one of his i knew i had, followed the evidence as best i could and i recognized it did not fit into prevailing categories. In my remaining time, i want to ask you to indulge in questions about a number of issues in the book. First, there is the central term in the title. Democratic capitalism. Quality a self evident to the term. The United States is a capitalist nation and its political system is democratic. He has defined the term in a aslic interview on pbs centering on the core values of the United States, both political values and economic values, which he elaborated means Representative Government, political liberty, individual freedom, freedom of assembly. The basic political values that we cherish. He coined the term capitalism to convey the tone of rituals we care about. Private property, Free Enterprise, a marketplace economy. In the discussion of american policy he said there is much hasroversy, with what it been about. He said it has been debated fiercely over the years. Eventually he said, i came to feel the best way to frame broadly what american policy is is about safeguarding american capitalism. To a scholarly outsider, it makes sense to a degree if this safeguarding is about the american homefront. It makes less sense to me how abroad. On is applied there is rhetoric about the free president s like to sing democracies praises and would like to see it abroad. One does not have to subscribe to a twitter feed or walter mcdougalls critique of religion offeel the skepticism Democratic Capitalism as an actual key goal or a result of American Foreignpolicy. 9 11,eorge w. Bush post the overall goal of american policy in september of his configure ato balance of power favoring freedom. Onthe books opening essay American Foreignpolicy we are mustded that the u. S. Defend civil liberties. These principles are right and true for all people. Told bob would work, i think we have a duty to free people. We have a duty. This rhetoric is significant all the more so because it infuses the thinking man around the pentagon. It should be taken seriously. No question that the rhetoric was heavy, some of his officials fought against democracy. At least in some places at some time. Record one track they argue, was hardly impressive and points out Numerous Companies that were exempt from the administration. Over theackwards second half of the 20th century, it is clear the free world was characterized by anticommunism not by freedom. What many people in central or latin america may conclude from the 1950s onward. Look at theect the colonization may be perplexed by the notion of promotion of Democratic Capitalism or freedom in playing in Foreign Policy at all. Would also suspect that with regard to the hope runt, civil rights historians, may question the applicability of democratic that has kept people of color disenfranchised. Many would argue well beyond. It is not to say rhetoric is not important or the policymakers lookingthink they were at freedom. Many did. Frederick can also be misleading. Policymakers and those on the receiving end of the american mission. I imagine i am hardly the first person to raise these concerns, thiscome the response to rhetoric and the applicability of the notion of Democratic Capitalism. My second question has to do with the historians influence on policy and policy makers. , number of the essays have beyond their scholarly contributions, a scholarly punch. In an article, he revisits the atd war years and looks soviet violations of the old agreement as overly simplistic. The result was a selfserving image of not a graph of concern. The reagan administrations have a rationale for extricating the United States from the restraints they had accepted in arms control accords to allow us to move ahead. The rhetoric of american innocence and soviet duplicity early cold war scholarship. A rhetorical overkill in the 1940s and the 1980s, a compromise and accommodation for difficulty. In another essay, he revisited an, itr triumph it is was not just a freedom and the sovietid in union. He argues passionately and capitalism wasat the triumph of the welfare state and or social democracy. To conclude that would be engage in bed history. Communist bloc was crushed not just by the supremacy of the the market system but by reformed forms of capitalism, social democracy, and social market economies where government play critically important roles in providing safety nets, ensuring social provisions, spurring research and innovation, and dispensing hard times. Thatis not a conclusion both houses of our congress would arrive at. The lesson reiterates this is generally important. Lecture aorial day number of years ago, history could indeed serve policymakers. History can eliminate an answer s. Out thinking of policy issue is to bringays history to bear on Public Policy. Anclosing question is invitation to address this point in a little more detail. To whatxperience, extent have historians actually serve policymakers . To what extent has history illuminated real of thinking about policy issues past and present . In regards to the westward, i cannot resist asking several blunt questions, questions i expect he has been asked before . Does this book safeguard capitalism or promote freedom pursuing core values, and the notion of reforming policy, to what extent do these applied to all in january of 2018 . A great deal has changed over longast year, many defining aspects of american domestic and foreignpolicy have been offended by our current and ratified or applauded by the majority in both houses, through the old rules and paradigms, are we in Uncharted Waters . Findings in this book and toewhere give us insight this current moment . There is much of this book i do not have time to touch upon. You will have to read it for yourself and benefit from its richness. With that, mel. [applause] mel well, i am extremely grateful for that summation and critique, and probing of queries. A messageody wrote me a couple of weeks ago and said he would be the commentator, i was both surprised and delighted. Surprise mostly great surprise because naturally when a historian of American Foreign relations comes to talk about his book usually the commentators are historians of , itican Foreign Relations is pretty unusual not to have a historian of American Foreign relations. I thought it was great to articulate a great because as i write in the introduction to my book, i actually went to graduate school to study labor history. Undergraduate, at Cornell School of labor relations, my focus was on labor history and i wrote a big thesis at the time of about the impact of the bolshevik revolution on the American Labor movement. My advisor was a pretty wellknown historian at cornell. Senior in undergraduate school. He encouraged me to go to graduate school, i was extremely ambivalent, my parents want me to go to law school. Finally, i did when some Financial Support, i decided to university, for one reason and one reason alone. That is because i advisor at that there told me was a young historian who had just gone to ohio state, who was destined to be the best labor was davidand his name brody. He turned out to be one of the best labor historians in the country. And, i got to ohio state the first year i was on leave, the second year he was on he never returned. There was no one there to study labor history. As i described in my introduction to the book, i gravitated to study for an relations history primarily because i was so influenced i the war in vietnam. I am glad a labor historian is here to comment on my work. Asked a lot of questions, i will not answer them all because i think it is a good time for other people to comment. On hisbegin by focusing last query. Talking feel about about core values in the age of trump . Good talkingely about core values in the age of trump. Think everybody should talk about core values in the age of trump. Imperative i mean that seriously created we madeto reflect on what america truly great. Great in the eyes of most of the world in the early cold war years, in the 1940s and 50s. Policymakerss jettisoned every part of american firstism. What they did is create a world order at least in half of the world, that was far from perfect , as eric pointed out. Quiteheless, it achieved some monumental accomplishments at preventing war of great powers. Promoting the greatest prosperity the world has ever seen. Inmulating Economic Growth northeast asia and western europe. That was unprecedented. Eventuallydels that many countries, in what was the 1970s,rld, in the late 1980s, and 1990s, embark on themselves often with difficulty , often with the authoritarian leaders leading the way to private marketplaces and compromised democratic governance. Achievements there were. Questions as he should, to the United States support democracy promotion, human rights, and individual freedom everywhere . The answer is no. Thedid not. Every scholar knows that. Most americans know that. The United States promoted policies that were anduring both democracy capitalism. Sometimes democracy more than capitalism rented. Was that not the framework . Why did george w. Bush, in his and hisies contemporaries think the United States was promoting a socalled Democratic Peace. Alone, they were neoconservatives were neoconservatives were not alone. Think about the intellectual life of the academy was in the 1990s. With the Democratic Peace when the Democratic Peace was the buzzword of academics around the United States, and around the globe. Supposedly through systematic studies scholars found if you promote democracy and democratic do not wage war against other democratic nations. But was also happening in the 1990s, a fact that was somewhat obscured by the good generalizations eric made. In the 1980s and 1990s there movingny more countries from authoritarianism and some form of democracy. You can look at the statistics and freedom house. Around 2005,me 2006, 2007, when we have begun to reverse back to more nations that are inclined towards authoritarianism. There is a reason why policymakers embraced the Democratic Peace, they were influence, if you rightly asked, did scholarship have been impact on policy . I would say that is an extremely good example. Had anee scholars having influence on policy makers. Democratic peace was something that the clinton people picked up, and the push people picked up. Upy put it up picked it partly out of expediency, partly because it was the every day discourse of intelligent people. Or policy makers shape by the discourse . All you need to do is speak to some influential policymakers ore Paul Wolfowitz undersecretary of defense merrick aleman. These people, for good or bad, were deeply immersed in scholarly discourse. Readknow scholarship, they what we collectively have written. Say that west should policy, we all know scholars do not shape policy, can we have a marginal impact . Can we affect the overall intellectual environment, can we influence the National Conversation . I think we have an imperative duty to do so. Today, many scholars including working ine students the trump administration. Are they determining policy . No. Are they helping to constrain some of the worst aspects of the policy . I suspect that they are. I suspect that when they sit in our classes and engage in our graduate seminar discussions, what we do has a positive impact. About thetalks also a framework called Democratic Capitalism. He tends naturally to single out democratic from capitalism, focusing on democracy promotion, and ifstions legitimately policymakers were focused on democracy promotion. As i said in my opening remarks, as i say in my essay, both at the beginning and end. Core values are a combination of many ingredients. Of which have a political inflection, some of which have an economic inflection. Different policymakers and different times, are more concerned with the private marketplace or with private property, or with the nationalization of American Private investments abroad. They believe most of the time that when they are focused on creating a successful private marketplace economy, that in time, in time, it will promote more democratic governance. Whether that is true or not, it an be argued, it is presumption of policymakers that is indisputable. Let me stop there for now. Let me invite other questions and comments and come back to some of these points. We have to wait for the microphone to reach people. If you could identify yourself first. Itin your presentation, almost brings one to want to bring the distinction of structure and superstructure. Success ofre of the the western countries in the cold war was based on the the socialcreating market economies. Ated the bringing up loud bringing about low in unemployment, social welfare systems, so on. This glory. Which western economy could say begins around 1946 and last until the mid1970s is finished. Be rapidly receding. In all countries we seem to have a diminishment of the situation. Not just in the United States. The United States is an extreme example. Even in western europe, we retreat with the social democracy, you rightly present militarymuch more alliances and military powers, as the basis of the western competing ideologically with the soviet union. What happens now . When the whole structural basis of this is now very much in question. Thisthe recent defense of just a few days ago, this is the sort of thing that framed since the beginning of the 1970s. Very quickly, my view of the Clinton Administration is a little bit different, i see destroyer being the of failure. We had this incredible business you name theving, selfdetermination, as the croatians expel 400,000 people, i no a single word about that. There is not one index mention of ukraine. This apparent inconsistency which bothers borders on in poverty. Is the basis of the Clinton Administration and the aspects of American Foreignpolicy which has indeed been magnified with the passage of time. Mel the first point about the structure of social democracy which were put in place in the late 1940s and 1950s and shaped in the western world and , that success of social democracy and Democratic Capitalism. Wereay these things , i have in the 1970s an essay called victory. Arguably the most important essay and the book. I said that in part because most people have never read it because it was reviewed in an obscure publication. I tackle the, issue that you have just spoken to. What i show in part, is the that neoliberalism began to flourish in the late 1970s and 1980s. Even when deregulation and privatization became mantras of allUnited States and really the before reagan regimes. Closely at the statistical data, i have it in that essay, what is pretty noteworthy is throughout the 1980s, in all of western europe and the united and england, despite reagan and thatcher you will see social welfare payments as a percentage of National Government expenditures, actually did not decline even often tooktization place. In some countries, the amount of money spent on social welfare anticipated direct compensation for the dislocation that officials understood would occur when privatization began to take place. Essay,st you read that with how they try to eliminate this. Your larger point is exactly right. Since the late 1980s, the clinton during administration, during the george w. Bush administration, increasingly as a result of ,onservative neoconservative new democratic rhetoric. Government was seen to be the problem. Extrapolated the wrong markets thinking that had tramped. We should therefore china. We should therefore championed the markets. That essay was written specifically to rebut those arguments. Awareely to make people that a strong argument can be made that what won the cold war was the synergy between Government Initiative enterprise and private markets. One has to understand that synergy which was often recalibrated. It was always there. Of theppened as a result end of the cold war and the rhetoric that accompanied the end of the cold war in the 1990s and to this day has been our understanding of the role of government. What is important is for those of us who believe my interpretation is complete, understanding the role of government is key to understanding domestic success that also foreignpolicy success , understanding the role of government in nurturing growing inequality and the nurturing of prosperity and the entire western world was a key factor in winning the cold war. We need to disseminate that point, that is what our obligation is as scholars. For your second point about the hypocrisy of bill clinton and balkans,f force in the i have an essay in the book called temptation of our dreams of freedom. The end oflly about 9 11. Between the fall of the berlin 11 2001. September hypocrisy, which is a legitimate way of characterizing it did or are other ways of characterizing it and what went on their print the Clinton Administration was inspired to act out of public americans were disregarding Human Rights Concerns in the balkans. More importantly, what i write is that there is a time of 10 both in the 1990s when clinton w bush and bill are struggling with the forcement of when to clinton ue or not to use force. Unparalleled power, i think it is unbelievably instructive to read two speeches that george h. W. Bush gave after in 1992. Feated he gave two speeches, one of was that texas and them. He talks a great length about the dilemmas of using great power. When the United States should use military force. What are the conditions, what are the motivations that justify it. What often appears as hypocrisy, following my instinct to empathize with policymakers, is to regard some of it as ambiguity. Impulses,licting clinton was not eager to use military force. He was not eager to use it. The response to domestic pressures and to the only Public Opinion that thought he was disregarding issues of human rights. That have his actions the type of implication that you quickly allude to. Those are some of the dilemmas that are in the agony of policymaking. Question here with the red sweater. I am here at the Wilson Center as a scholar. In respect to how we talk about our own National Development as a country, in the absence of what you call core values. About whatever values. Been theack has , this democratic handack and on the other the pushback is the contribution constitution. In a sense it is much better to go back to the democracy. Values ande core which ones are antisemitic. Antique that radical antithetical this reflects a proclivity for the rule of law . This has those constitutional values. They constitute part of the about him of core values. Keep in my core values are often in conflict with one another. Reconcile the core values and determine the priority of corvette accuse. Is it an ongoing predicament that western and enlightened statesmen have been dealing with for centuries . Just in american history, in french history, i mean the ongoing struggle right between the pursuit of the quality and the affinity for liberty. People are always struggling. They are they always will struggle to find the right balance between them to tacticse how to embrace that can reconcile these laudable goals. They are often in conflict with one another. Right here. Wonderful talk. You have talked about Democratic Capitalism is we were all clear what it meant. For some of us, we think about the International Corporation as the key contribution to World Economic development. Corporations are not democratic. Primarily, exclusively to their shareholders whose influence often they have no variance. And with American Foreignpolicy, in other cases corporations while before trump made foreignpolicy. Giveecision of texaco to general franco unlimited credit for buying gasoline was perhaps the key factor in spain winning the civil war. Dominance of the International Corporation, especially american International Corporation, is there as much conflict with cooperation between the Democratic Capitalism and our core values . Wasone word you never use prayer. Other nations when a trade deficit strengthens those nations. Art dear president thinks about trade and balance as a capital crime. Run tradeing them to surpluses. Part of myarge career studying the relationship between private corporations and foreignpolicy, there are several other people in this room who have spent their entire career studying this complex problem. Findl say this, i did to it as anes, i do find amalgam of economic principles. Includesore values individual freedoms, freedoms of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion. I also said core values includes basic capitalistic values. These are americas core values. Respect and protection of private property. Support for marketplace economies. Indispensable american support for Free Enterprise has always been a core value. However, core values and other values are often in conflict. The United States often, very often, has worked to protect private property abroad. Just as you were saying. In other times United States has expropriations, nationalizations, not because the states release of ordered for a variety of circumstances in pursuit of forr goals or in respect basic international principles. The United States has acquiesced americansue of foreignpolicy to private property, the issues of nationalization. The power of private corporations has always been an important element of foreignpolicy. Salience of that relationship has depended on circumstances. In the blue shirt, then we will go to the other side of the table. Thank you. I had the honor of working on the research to read soviet memoirs. I want to go back to this question of core values, pushing a little bit further, ways. Please. Of youryour estimation ideology . Sovietming from it as a point of view. What made an ideology more palatable to bring in a broad . If that is too broad, let me make it a little more precise, on page three you have a beautiful phrase about the self deceiving ideology of innocence that is inherent in america thinking about the United States. Is that a core value . If it is, what influence does that have on Foreign Policy. Thank you. Not say what was that beautiful phrase . I dont consider that a core value. The jistk that of that is we provide rationalizations for what we do. As you know in my essays and buy books, i show the degree to which realpolitik economic demands and broadly speaking ideological imperatives shape policymakers. A different times different variables are more salient than thathers for circumstances any historian would want to explore. I think one other, one of the contributions i made that you help me on is mankind. In terms of assessing soviet Foreign Policy and American Foreignpolicy, it was to show how ideology actually shapes perceptions. The degree to which those thenons than a fact effect real politics. Sides, i frequently show in , thesay in this book american perception of National Security, i show how history, memory, and ideology shape perceptions of what policymakers regard as realpolitik. Protecty must do to tangible economic interests. ,he audiological perceptions were beingfelt they encircled by capitalist nations. This was a fundamental axiom that they believed. You know what . Historical experience suggested they had reason to believe it. That theirers felt ideologically suggested to them that capitalism and fascist hours would extinguish communist nations if they have the opportunity to do so. That was inaccurate assessment. The result of that was dramatically shaped. Ideology, history, and memory shaped realpolitik. So it did in washington as well. What i have shown in my essays on the american perception of the National Security and what i showed in my book for the soul of mankind is to the degree and about theican memory interwar years, american assumptions about the inherent ideological expansion and ruthlessness of totality and totalitarianism. With memories shaping the most tangible of American Foreign policies. Upple like George Kenneth in alltally realpolitik of its various forms. They revitalized it in west german power. Policiese realpolitik based on a sense of ideological assumptions and historical memory on both sides. I think one of the interesting things as a historian is to see the nexus between ideology and realpolitik. That is what i tried to do in some of my writings. We had a hand in the middle. Start right here and then we can move up. I am a graduate student of history at georgetown. With youro followup ofments today on a question theory. Having read the material to discuss this and going off of the lecture, whether or not you have considered the idea of nations. In your analysis and the assumption that may have between ideology and realpolitik. With the construction of perceived threats in the formulation of the lessee perhaps, this can easily explained the role of choosing perceived threats to create certain policies based on core values, whether or not it may be useful for the task of historians to take up the challenge of what it means to pay core values to pick spacevism inside of the of persuasion per se. Policykes certain effective and what makes certain policy ineffective. In the cases that you have shown, white ideology resonates intopeople and turns policy. What perceived threats do not takeow dubious historians this theory and apply it dynamically in the study of Foreign Affairs and how it relates to social patterns. Perhaps, not just a question of the economy. It is kind of complex. I think you hit a letter of the ideas right on the head. I was just wondering if you specifically look at that. And the effect it has. when you are thinking about that very few are talking about a security dilemma . It is based on a Copenhagen School in the 1990s. It is not an economic theory. Mel i dont know if we are talking a cross purposes. Answer to what i think you are in alluding to is, i do securityceptions of , which are influenced by many different factors can lead to escalate tory cycles. Dangerous, one of the things i have tried to show , inumerous writings was part, the arms race which designed towas provide deterrence was also thegned to provide capabilities to support risktaking initiatives. This was the dilemma of Nuclear Policy during much of the cold war. Its relationship to the security dilemma is direct. Actions that take do produce and did produce and security in the adversary. That is a key part of international politics, all of us who are sellers need to study and focus on. Last question goes to this gentleman here. Historianlabor admirer of yours. Intriguedn, i am looking back at your intellectual development and how you framed this. Upn you talked about summing the larger themes of the book, you emphasized the winning of the cold war was an astounding achievement. You also said it was a very complicated one filled with success and failure. Most notably you stayed away from the word tragedy. I wanted to ask you about that. It seems like a success formula applies veryalues well to the early cold war years, particularly in the late 1940s. I wonder how you defended defend it in the longer run. One back to the tragedy, what about taking into account the notions of the militaryindustrial complex, the lack of attention to nationalism , we have a bipolar framework of. Olicymaking the impact that you suggest with president clinton was not eager to use military force. Jfk or lbj, or any other president , and yet they used it over and over again. Why is that. Terms of the core values themselves, you emphasized the came downore values to private defense or private property. Surely since the new deal and certainly a cross the social democratic world, that sort of private property has long been came down to private defense or private property. Tampered by the notion of public interest. Thee is tension between that has determined the outcome. Mel under less point on your last point definitely. Was ant, this contradictory point, steve said private property always dictates it. My point is sometimes it does and sometimes it doesnt. One of the successes of american socialdid support democracy initiatives throughout europe during much of the cold war. That, the idea of core values is to realize re are many core values numerous times they are often in conflict with one another. The basic framework of trying to pursue these core values framees an interpretive for understanding the evolution of American Foreignpolicy. By no means do i think American Foreignpolicy has always been successful. I am perfectly well aware, i have dwelled on many of the failures of American Foreignpolicy. The idea ofbrace tragedy. I totally embrace the idea of tragedy. Remember, when williams talked about tragedy he often said ns find themselves engulfed in tragedy as a result of their pursuit of their values. The tragedy of american diplomacy is exactly that. It is a tragedy. American policymakers think that they are doing something good. They wind up doing things that culminate in disaster. Certainly the best example of that would be the vietnam war. , cuba and ther vietnam war, is what shaped that framework when he wrote the tragedy of american diplomacy. The First Edition was before the vietnam war, it was definitely preoccupied with issues in cuba, nationalization, the third world, etc. The intent ofsaid american policymakers is often are often results tragic, they were devastating. Oft is in fact the tragedy american diplomacy. I have pursued in many of my writings it is not because american policymakers were in different to this amalgam of values often in conflict with one another. Precisely because they pursue these failures with great intensity and with self deception. You and i are not in disagreement about these things. I suspect we could go on for much of the night, we are not allowed to be big and continue the conversation right next door where we have a reception. Say, next week as Martin Luther king jr. Day, there will be no seminar on the 15th. On january 22, you can join us loving interracial intimacy and america. Thank you to our participants. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] tweet us at cspan history. A tweet asking about an issue that still resounds today. His question is about how many people were fathered by u. S. Gis in vietnam, how were they treated 45 years after the u. S. Departure . You can be featured during our next live program. Join the conversation on facebook at facebook. Com cspanhistory or on twitter at cspan history. For nearly 20 years, indepth on book tv has featured the bestknown nonfiction writers for live conversations. As a special project, were featuring bestselling fiction writers. Withus live sunday at noon the author of the 2016 bestselling novel the underground railroad which was awarded the pullet surprise and the National Book award. 1s other novels include zone and the intuitionist. Indepthal series fiction addition, sunday live from noon to 3 00 eastern on cspan2. This year hosts the bison tell neil of Illinois Statehood the bicentennial of Illinois Statehood. Next, the journalists tell story about political leaders they have covered over the years and they discuss the National Role the state key figures have played in their lifetimes. This is about one hour and 10 minutes. 11 greetings to everyone. And greetings to everyone. We are glad to have such a wonderful turnout for this special program we have sponsored by the Illinois State society. B