Transcripts For CSPAN3 The Kerner Report 20180107

Divisive times in American History. A time that marks the emergence of a postcivil rights racial order that defines american psyd today. Formally known as the National Advisory committee on civil disorders, president johnson establish the committee in july following violent racial confrontations in newark and detroit which left 69 people africanamericans, and city blocks burned to the ground. That summer there were more than 150 riots around the United States. Ignited byriots were incidents of Police Brutality. Of growingtime racial and Political Polarization and the retreats from the progressive reform agenda ushered in by the Civil Rights Movement and Great Society legislation or the factors were the war in vietnam, the republican sweep in the 1960 Midterm Elections, a law and a liberalismm, and insulated from the realities of black life and dismissive of lack protests after 1965 from the evolution of Martin Luther kings leadership to black power. What senator harris described as americas greatest investor crisis since the civil war, Lyndon Johnson established a Bipartisan Commission on july 7, 1967 to answer three questions. What happened during the riots, why did they happen, and how to prevent them from happening again. Over the next seven months the commissioners and the staff they assembled pursued a probing examination of conditions that fueled the riots, including visits to 23 cities to interview residents and activists. An eyeopening confrontation with realities invisible to most politicians and policymakers. A context, and significance. I will introduce them in t the Kerner Commission produced a 704page report that sold 2 million copies. We have a group here today prepared to offer insight into the report, the historical context, and significance. I will introduce them in the order in which they will present. Julian zelizer, professor of history and Public Affairs at Princeton University and a news commentator on cnn. He is the author of numerous books on american political history. The author of numerous books on american political history. His recent book is a monumental study of lbjs legislative season which produced civil rights legislation, the war on poverty, and transformative initiatives. He published a new edition of the Kerner Commission report which includes an excellent introduction. Julian zelizer will consider the policy constraints and considering the political backlash that was underway by 1968. Is a professor at trinity college, dublin. His work focuses on the intellectual, political, and cultural significance of the United States. , the moynahan legacy provides a critique of the controversy of the 1965 report regarding africanamerican families, including the role of black feminists in shaping the debate. He will develop tensions within the Kerner Commission and growing divisions among liberals regarding policing, civil liberties, and how to address africanamerican inequality. Elizabeth hinton is the assistant professor of history in africanamerican studies at harvard university. Her research focuses on the persistence of poverty in the United States. On the war onhor poverty to the war on crime the making of mass incarceration in america which was published in 2016. Recommendations when it comes to policing and black urban communities. Had worked with the Public Health service and the National Institute of Mental Health before joining the staff of the Kerner Commission. Produced the team that harvest of american racism, a controversial report on policing the firingh led to of him and his associates and the suppression of the report. As an assistant to Police Reform or patrick first andshingtons only director of Public Safety. In his work in policing practices and criminal Justice Reform and academic training, his career has included in the publick and private sector and a faculty appointment at Carnegie Mellon university. This year, harvest of american racism will be published by the university of michigan prep. His comments will draw on his experience in the Kerner Commission and controversy surrounding harvest of american racism. Elizer. Begin with z thank you for coming and putting the panel together. It is a pleasure to speak on this topic. Until year ago we had a president that understood the need to address the problem of institutional racism that had been broadcast to the entire world through smartphones and criminalf a Racialized Justice system. We now have a president and Republican Congress who shifted the agenda towards the theme of law and order and away from policies that were under 2016. Sion in 2015 and this is not the first time we have seen this. When questions over race and policing were front and center in 1968, the federal government failed to take the steps necessary to make any concrete changes. The government understood how institutional racism was playing out in the cities, and how it exploded into violence in the summer of 1967. The electorate was confused by Richard Nixons calls for law , leaving and crackdown most of the problems of institutional racism untouched. Rather than deal with the way racism was inscribed in many institutions, the government focused its attention on building a massive and cultural several car state andal police state. In july of 1967 in the aftermath of the riots in detroit and newark, new jersey, and smaller startedeach of which off with incidents of police againsty africanamericans, president Lyndon Johnson establish the National Advisory commission on civil disorder, known popularly as the Kerner Commission for chairman auto koerner otto kerner. Politicallye at a fraught time for president johnson. The socalled concer conservatie coalition and congress was bleeding and insurgents following 1966 where republicans in the backlash against some of the Lyndon Johnsons policies. Disastrous vietnam war was consuming most of the president s attention and conservatives on capitol hill were starting to force Lyndon Johnson to make a decision between spending for guns or spending for butter. The black Power Movement turning tensions toward bolder stands that were needed on housing discrimination, policing, and unemployment. Desperate to do something, but not in a position to do much more than defend his existing accomplishments, president johnson created the commission we are discussing. The president staffed much of the commission with established moderate political figures who were committed to working within the existing system. He wanted them to demonstrate to the public the administration took the problem seriously, but also to avoid making any embarrassing recommendations that would cause political problems. Johnson was cognizant of the problemsand racial afflicting cities, but felt there was not much more he could do. By late 1967 given the politics of the moment. Which is why the first version of the report would be killed. Commission staffers, with the lead member on our panel, produced a radical draft of the report in november of 1967 called the harvest of american recounted the deepseated racial divisions that shaped urban america with damaging conclusions about johnsons programs. The report said only offered moderate assistance while leaving the white power structure in place. Rioting as anted understandable political response to the conditions of the city. A truly revolutionary spirit had begun to take hold, it said. An unwillingness to compromise, to risk death rather than have people continue in subordination. Report andinated the eliminated the social scientists who worked on it. The final kerner report was hardhitting, especially given where we have come today. Basic conclusion is our nation is moving towards 2 societies, one black, one white, and an equal. The softened much of language from the original draft, but the argument remained quite powerful, the focus on institutional racism. Meaning racism was not a product of that individuals who believed africanamericans were inferior to white americans, but racial hierarchies were indebted in the structure of society. Segregation and poverty, the report said, created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment unknown to most white americans. What white americans have never fully understood in the negro league and never forget is why society is implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, maintain it, and White Society condones it. The riots in detroit and newark were not caused, nor were they the consequences of, any. Rganized plan or conspiracy the Police Received the most scrutiny. In a section of the report it believed negros firmly Police Brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in negro neighborhoods. Had shown Police Enforcement had become a problem, not a solution, in race relations. More aggressive policing and the militarization of officers had he come the de facto response to urban decay. In several cities, the principal train theas been to equipped with more sophisticated weapons. Stressedt Law Enforcement officers were to thetart factor riots, but had come to symbolize white power and white racism. They argued they had to stop arming the police and recruit more africanamericans into the forces and impose stricter guidelines. They would to cry the commissioners from backing away from the tougher language. Language that would acknowledge the violence was often used in fashion against protesters and helpfully Police Brutality against africanamericans was constant, not sporadic. In 1968 the kerner report included tough language from an official government body. The commissioners warned of nothingconsequences if changed. Johnson tried to ignore it as long as possible and refused to formally meet with the commissioners. He didnt want to talk about the report for weeks. The public did not ignore it and the press broke the story. , a 700 plusuction page paperback with the bestseller list in 1968. The kerner report was the fastest selling book sense valley of the dolls. Marlon brando even read part of the book out loud on the joey bishop show. Environment had changed so dramatically since 1964. Any historians stressed of the limits of the report and johnson, it is to understand what the political environment had been when the report came out which constrained part of what he could do. The report made recommendations employment,nts in education, and housing that johnson knew would not move through congress. A respected pollster told were to be Congress Given such a program at this time, i presume it will not pass. Believing that white middleclass voters would determine the Midterm Election said i would follow a program of lot and order balanced with goodies for the ghetto. That is what happened. The government and public moved in a different direction. Johnson decides not to run for reelection. Vice president humphrey concentrated energy on trying to find some solution to vietnam. Despite his historic role in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 feared that the power of the right was going to be more important than the power of the left. He kept a distance from some of the grassroots activists who were urging the party to do more on the recommendation. It was former Vice President Richard Nixon and alabama wallen whoorge framed the way americans would talk about racial unrest and governor wallace did not hold back. The people know the way to stop a right is to hit someone on the. Ad anxietiesed to these with a way that would resonate with the mainstream. Blasting liberal Court Decisions on crime and denouncing radical Civil Rights Activists who accepted violence as a means of protest. He called for a means to restore law and order. We have been amply warned, he said, that we face war in the making of our own society. We have seen the gathering hate. We have threats to burn, bomb, and destroyed. A taste of what the organizers of insurrection are planning. We must take the warning star heart and prepare to meet with force if necessary. He fine tuned some of these arguments in the 1966 midterm when he campaigned around the country helping republicans gain elections. Now he had a better atmosphere to sell his message. D we all of the decent, lawabiding citizens of america to take the defensive against the criminal forces that threaten their security and rebuild respect for law across the country. His law and order arguments won the day. Books such as the new jim crow, booksizabeth and dans cover these became the foundation for a racially unequal Justice System that exists today. One that disproportionately punishes and africanamerican and revolves around a prison system, Police Forces, and sentences individuals with minor crimes to jail. The problem is politics have moved again in the wrong direction. A little bit like what happened. Fter 1968 Structural Racism has to be addressed and President Trump and the Republican Congress has criminald progress on Justice Reform. In charlottesville the president sent a clear message when he hesitated and resisted coming down hard against american nazis. President trump will likely play to some of the worst racial sentiment in the country, and use this moment to build an expansion of the criminal Justice System rather than change it. In the 1960s the United States so what could happen if institutional racism was allowed to persist. Of racial violence americans witnessed in the past few years has brought the nation to a comparable Inflection Point and has moved in the wrong direction. This makes grassroots activism and a pushback against more urgent than ever before. Thank you. [applause] the kerner report has often been recognized as a quintessential document of american liberalism. Reflecting the governments ability to understand the underlying poverty as it saw as the root cause of the urban uprising of 1967. No other document embodies the strengths and limitations of 1960s liberalism and endorsed racial integration, valued civil liberties, generating policies and enlightening the public, and that americas problems could be solved within the established political system. It would be a mistake to see the kerner report as reflecting in monolithic liberal response the issues of inequality and policing raised by the uprising. My comment will highlight the divisions among liberals that have too often been overlooked by historians. I will thereby contest some of the standard interpretations of liberalism that contrasts a coherent liberalism to existing conservatism, or assume that a liberal consensus pervaded american politics, or that c 1960s liberals paving the way for massive incarceration and over policing. None of these interpretations account for the heterogeneity of postwar liberalism which we can see in the making of the kerner report that embodied three strands of liberalism. First of all, Lyndon Johnsons liberalism. He commissioned the report, but famously disowned it. D by the republican victories, the vietnam war, and uprisings which seemed to reveal liberalisms faults. It seemed like liberalism was making a quick retreat after the seeming triumph of the Great Society. I wont say too much more, except that we cannot take the Johnson Administrations policies as the whole of liberalism at this time. Secondly, the liberalism of the Kerner Commission itself. This was a liberalism that was far bolder and more ambitious than johnsons liberalism and the liberalism of the Great Society a few years before. Commission envisioned massive spending to address the problems it saw behind the uprising. A Bipartisan Commission advocated programs of the kind that only someone like bernie. Anders today would contemplate they went beyond this to examine the causes of civil disorders and how to prevent them and offer a comprehensive statement on the social and Economic Conditions of lower class africanamericans. It called for significant social investment in employment, education, and housing to be funded by tax increases if needed. The kerner report endorsed civil for a leaders calls Marshall Plan for investment in African American ghettos. This was hardly an original approach, but was notable or who was endorsing it. A significant part of the political establishment. As the journalist to introduce theriginal report wrote, devastating validity that it was drawn by representatives of the moderate and responsible establishment. Not by black radicals, militant leftists. Cademic the rejected by johnson, the out a program that defined the liberal wing of the Democratic Party for several years. Running in the 1968 primary, kennedy called for the reports to be implemented insisting the crisis in our cities and ghettos have been met with too little, too late. Fred harris, one of the people on the commission, who later runs and has president ial ambitions as well and is running on his part in the Kerner Commission. Liberalism,rands of notably those that saw the issue as poverty and inequality, and those who saw it as white racism. I will focus on the difference between the final report and a third liberalism. This is the draft of the harvest of american racism written by the social Science Division. Im delighted that we have robert shellow, who headed that division. If i say anything wrong, he can correct me. It is a remarkable report. You should look for it. Not justinterest historically, but of Significant Interest to many issues that we are discussing today. This report, which led to the firing of the entire division of the social Science Division, had a key difference with the current report in the treatment of policing. Resized thereport violent overreaction in oppressing the uprisings and rejected the use of lethal force against rioters and looters. Not insignificant. The majority of white americans thought the killing of black rioters was fine in opinion polls. It sidestepped to a degree the issue of Police Violence that precipitated nearly all of the uprisings. Wereeport recognize there 2 riots. One of africanamericans against white property. The far more deadly and destructive coming from police that behaved in a lawless fashion. In the the tories incident in detroit, kerner found policechers rearranged the bodies of killed africanamericans killed by Police Forces to make it seem like the police were responding in selfdefense. Document pulled no punches in calling the police one of the most reactionary and racist institutions of White Society. It made it clear addressing the underlying causes would require federal effort to correct the lawless practices of in powerice forces and urban africanamericans. The report made radical recommendations. It was politically unpalatable to the Kerner Commission, but the authors are characterized as liberals. They are not radicals, really. No one known to oppose the vietnam war could work on the Kerner Commission. That was one of johnsons stipulations. That would exclude almost anyone on the new left at the time. When the kerner report came out, though social Science Division is critical to a degree, but supports much of what the final report says. The lead researcher gives the kerner report 2 cheers, not 3, but appreciates the accomplishment. Radicals, they are what i would characterize as left liberals. , there was no single liberal approach to the uprisings and the many issues they raised. Liberals differed in their understandings of uprisings and what they were willing to say publicly and what programs they would advance. History should pay as much attention to differences among liberals as they do between liberals and radicals, or liberals and conservatives. Thank you. [applause] thank you for organizing this panel. The introduction, for all of you for coming and exploring the issues of today and those of you watching. I would like to reflect on ways in which the conclusion reached by the Kerner Commission on pursued an alternative to the consensus that supported the federal war on crime that Lyndon Johnson began in the late 1960s. Johnsons staff the Kerner Commission with moderate liberal policy makers who sought integration as the desired path for future domestic policy. The Kerner Commission recommended the creation of 2 million jobs for low income americans, federal intervention to ensure school integration, yearround schooling for low income youth, the immediate construction of Housing Units in deprived communities, and a guaranteed minimum income. The precursor to the Bernie Sanders platform. Expanded policing was part of the prescription, but within and to the American Intervention in southeast asia. Calling for a massive 50 billion federal urban Police Program to be paid for by pulling out of vietnam. The Kerner Commission believed the federal government had three domestic policy options to manage the crisis of race relations. All of which resonate today. The federal government could but to foster separate equal access to institutions. It could enact structural reform such as busing or affirmative action. Or it could continue the current course while the nation hopes for the best. Goals of black nationalist organizations and the preference of sections of the american public, the first option was the enrichment choice. It was premised on the idea that African Americans could achieve equality of opportunities with whites while continuing in conditions of nearly separation nearly complete separation. Some might be satisfied with the quality of continue separation the commission and sought enrichment as only a means towards the goal or interim americansting poor from poverty and giving them the capacity to enter the mainstream of American Life until the integration option could be realized. Taking this path the federal government would simulate the outmigration of black americans from cities to servers, create to suburbs and create that her access to opportunities. The goal must the achieving freedom of every citizen to work to his abilities, not his color. On the part of Political Institutions that would make visible impacts on life for African Americans, the commission warned that the nation would be plagued by Violent Crimes and lasting and equality here the Kerner Commission believed what it called maintaining the existing Community Action, manpower development, and war on poverty would be the most detrimental for the future of american democracy. The federal government did nothing to address the forces that perpetuated exclusion. That an action could conceivably urban apartheid with semi martial law in major cities and enforce the segregation of negros in areas. Prediction inng the age of mass incarceration. Maintaining current programs would unleash conditions where ining portion of negros disadvantaged areas might look as they suffer the inherent inequalities within , the Kerner Commission feared a spiral of police force would emerge, compromising games of the Civil Rights Movement and Critical Reforms of the Great Society. Despite such warnings, the pursued nonenment of the broad domestic policy options. Not even the maintenance of existing policy. The attention to the role of white racism in perpetuating any quality and segregation may johnson uncomfortable. Even though the president staffed the commission with liberals, he viewed it as unreasonable and to radical. The controversial nature of the conclusions led policymakers to distance themselves. Although the Kerner Commission received more public attention than any other task force in the impact they lacked the of its predecessor, the Crime Commission. In 1965, the Crime Commission brought together experts from the civil rights and corporate world that shared moderate implications and were committed to preserving the current order. Johnson carried out the most extensive investigation on crime ever. Research program that would the for congress. Among the Crime Commissions recommendations that shape interaction with Law Enforcement, the phone number became the basis for 911. Compared to the Crime Commission, the Kerner Commission had a subtle influence. Current policy that was ongoing with recommendations coming to fruition when the Kerner Commission championed strategies developed by the Crime Commission with respect to the issue of urban policing strategies. Commission identified five problem areas in urban Police Departments. The Kerner Commission encouraged local Law Enforcement to develop screening procedures. Operating on the assumption that there is more crime in the ghetto than other areas, the Kerner Commission hoped screening measures and special sensitivity programs would kurt practices,minatory promoting positive Community Relations and preventing violent outbreaks. Second, the Kerner Commission agreed to deploy manpower to ghetto areas would reduce crime. Unlike the predecessor, the Crime Commission resolved urban Police Forces needed to focus on apprehending suspects involved in serious crime rather than minor infractions like loitering, which seemed to foster distrust. Third, the Kerner Commission proposed institutional reforms, including the development of internal and external Police Review boards. That departments needed to policy guidelines to regulate contact between citizens and police and high crime urban areas to help officers determine when to break up a social street gathering and make arrests for victimless crimes. The Kerner Commission suggested that field interrogation quotas established by Police Administrators discouraged officers to differentiate that isbehavior suspicious and behavior that is suspicious to an officer simply because it is unfamiliar. Wouldng policy guidelines involve reducing or moving entirely specific arrest quotas during each duty. The fifth recommendation was the only policy adopted ivy on the of by the omnibus act 1968. The effort to develop Community Support of Law Enforcement. Commission members urged policymakers, in addition to increased the number of africanamerican Police Officers, to rethink the purpose of urban police by emphasizing the Community Service role due to the fact that the police occupied a frontline position dealing with ghetto problems, the Kerner Commission thought it was important to give police the opportunity to provide services. Bringing Police Officers into the war on poverty programs seemed to satisfy the need to Crime Commission identified. Improving police Community Relations. In line with larger domestic policy, the Carter Commission of the Kerner Commission endorsed lawenforcement and urbans situations. In one of the most important recommendations the Kerner Commission argued if Police Officers were to perform social Service Functions and partner as part of the national fight on poverty, incentives would need to shift accordingly. Since the late 19th century, it has been the purpose of American Police to enforce the law, make arrests, and build criminal cases. Suddenly, Police Officers were called upon to deliver turkeys on thanksgiving, played with children in afterschool programs, and help low income couples and marital disputes. These had the potential to promote Public Safety and innovative ways. In practice, officers have little incentive to dedicate themselves to social welfare. Law enforcement authorities measure the performance of rank and file cops by the ability to catch criminals and based the criteria for awards, promotions, bonuses, and selection assignment on demonstrated activity. Arrest this takes equal cognizant of the work of officers who improve the relations with alienated members of the community and minimize the potential for disorder. Federal policymakers didnt heed this recommendation. Proceeding to increase patrol and surveillance of black urban americans on the streets, schools, social welfare services, without refashioning the definition and reward for Effective Police work and vulnerable neighborhoods. Officers who were expected to build longterm relationships rarely receive the reckoned received the recognition as their partners who participated in highspeed shootouts. Kerner commission took fo granted that Community Pathology caused crime. It identified black urban neighborhoods as the primary targets for the federal governments intervention. Described a situation where Police Responsibilities in , as other have grown institutions of control have so little authority. Failing Public Schools and the decline of religious and Community Volunteer organizations, it is the police that deal with this institutional vacuum. Like other officials, the Kerner Commission did not imagine the state of affairs to be altered role. Duce the police they called to participate in social programs, particularly those serving black youth, it was one that policymakers found worth pursuing. Defending the return to surveillance, the Kerner Commission affirmed the focus andintention on attention on africanamerican youth based on data projections indicating the black population was the fastestgrowing group in. He and United States use and population trends, the Kerner Commission predicted africanamerican populations would reach 21 million people. This was discounted in the early 70s. The Johnson Administration crew concerned about the conclusion that the population of young black americans would grow much faster than the Negro Population as a whole or the white population of the same age group. 15 and 24 wereen identified as being responsible for most urban crime and urban disorder. They maintained the problem is white racism compounded by poverty. The suggestions reinforce the unit ofof the historic intervention. In the final analysis, the Kerner Commission supported the war on crime that targeted low income africanamericans. The Crime Commissions blueprint for national Law Enforcement set the course for the escalation of the war on crime. We celebrate the Kerner Commission and its lofty goals. We criticize the Kerner Commission as a celebration of it. Africanamericans lived in the shadow of the Crime Commission to one can imagine what the United States with look like if the Kerner Commission had the same Lasting Legacy as the more punitive forerunner. Thank you. [applause] the one question that i had in 1967 was why me . Know, there were 167 throughout the summer of the United States in 1967. One predominant theory that was concurred by the head of the federal bureau of investigation, was there was a conspiracy afoot. Probably even a foreign conspiracy. Is sort of the mindset that beginninginto at the of september of 1967. Why me . I am not and never have been a prominent social scientist. There were a number of them that were approached. People ofn, considerable stature. None of them could find the time or inclination to take on this task. I think a number of them felt it was going to be a whitewash, so to speak, and they didnt want to be associated with it. Background first of all, i was a commissioned officer in the Public Health service. That meant i was available and cheap. The budget was a very serious and important matter to the commission director. I had done work with police. Called the riot that didnt happen, and it was a description of work a colleague with thend myself did Prince Georges County Police Department to prevent a ride from occurring by training the Police Officers. Basically, the elements of collective behavior theory and applying them on the street. Credential,ind of if you will. I had just come back from europe. I had been over there for a year on assignment. When i arrived i had read about sensedts, but i hadnt what the mood of the country was and how alarmed they were. I was mostly recovering from culture shock. By the waste in abundance in the United States. I was trying to get used to that. The i was approached, it is described in this publication coming up by the university of hasigan, that publication the harvest of american racism, the political meaning of the 1967. Ce of the summer of re along withe comments from the 4 surviving authors of it. The 5th is deceased. In that document, we talk about how we reacted to the assignment. Thing was put together, recruited, and how we did the work. That is detailed. All i can tell you is that there , we wereirst of all confronted with many disturbances. We approached the problem in a linnean fashion, to classify them as best we could and sample from them. We were able to do that in 23 based that were selected on the characteristics of disturbances throughout the disturbances that occurred. Characteristics such as large lasting arbances considerable number of days that adjacenta cluster of communities that also went into disturbance. These were the large city dual cities like minneapolis st. Paul that had a characteristic that others didnt have. Then there were isolates as well. The intensity o and familiarities of the spatial characteristics. Set out. E they were for the most part, not social scientists. One commentator said the commission hired 100 social scientists and fire them later. That didnt happen. Lawyers. E mostly young many people coming back from peace corps volunteers that had returned to the United States and were working under contract with companies that provided the staff. They were sent out to these cities to do intensive interviewing and collect all of the data they could. I can tell you we were inundated by the tsunami of information being brought in from all of the cities, filling an entire room with documents, recordings, and what have you. Team, the five of us plus three students that were helping out, plus three consultants and collective , they came iny wee or twice to monitor what were doing and give their opinion if we were going in the right direction. What we did with the material is suppose,ted it to, i careful analysis. The difference in our approach rather lawyers was sharp. Tended to start with their conclusion and search for the evidence to back it. It is a good way to do it, too, if you are trying to make a case. We started with the data and search for relationships or patterns within it and let the chips fall where they may. At least we hoped we were doing that. Thatd produce a document discovered, within the document, we pointed out there were certain elements of certain disturbances that were not for seen. Inse were political elements the sense they were disturbances that alternated violence with negotiation. This particular finding did not find its way prominently in the final kerner report. 5 chapters of the harvest are devoted to an examination of who participated in the riots and something of motivation. We were looking for why. We took one of the president s charges quite seriously, what caused them . Not what happened. That was one of the things. Haskerner report in spades told us what happened. Tons of data, graphs, and information. Sense from the broad statements. Even about racism, that is an amorphous explanation. It is not what we were seeing in our analysis. Queste seeing the the powerrticipate in relationships and communities. A quest to do so to maintain a certain amount of respect. Many of the lead participants of the riots in many cities were not destitute. They were educated. They were northern, many of them. Was ey were doing maybe i shouldnt go too far with this one with what they if they were aware of the fact that the disturbances may have been an expression of exasperation, of desperation, what have you. That they could be utilized, possibly. That they could be converted into something rational that maybe could improve matters in their communities as well. That is what we wrote about. Had to turn out a report. We thought we would spend five to six months doing this. The decision was made to go to one report and we ended up with 12 weeks to do office. We didnt to do all this. We did it know this until the 11th andahalf week. The result was there was a demand for what we had in hand. Top directorship of the commission, not the commissioners, but the staff wanted to see what we were going to deliver. They put enormous pressure on us to do that. We had been spending 12 weeks, 18 hour days, seven days a week, described by one of my colleagues in an interview at one point that you could come in at any time and see people running around in their underwear with their toothbrush, sleeping on couches, and what have you. We were living there. If i can convey the intensity of the commitment of the young people that were working on this , that would do it. Pretty strapped. We were essentially caught off guard, cut short. We had a document that had gone through a couple of revisions. 110150 pages he wanted to tie into the analytical part of the report. That was not completed. It was only partially done. And yet, we had to deliver right away, and we delivered. It is my responsibility that i very goodve a very, look at the last chapter. The last chapter was written by lew goldberg. He soared with it. Goose, ifooked our you will. Years, i really hadnt given to much thought to the current commission, or what we had done, or what had happened, until most recently when i was interviewed by steve gillen for his new book coming out called separate and unequal, which i think is most is a most remarkable and thorough examination of what Commission Politics and how they operated. Anyway, when he interviewed me, then i began to wonder, began to think about it, and began to harvest ofmaybe the american racism should be made public. There were very few people who know about it. Scholars took the trouble of going down to austin and digging through the Johnson Library and through my papers. There they would find it very, 272 pages ofopy of the word destroy written across the front of it. And those who did see parts of it, or had heard about it, did write about what was in it, but for the most part, they focused on the last chapter. In the last chapter was the one that caused the problem. And why did it cause a problem . I did not understand that until a couple of years ago. Within the commission, there were two factions. On the one hand, there was john lindsay and fred harris. On the liberal side. On the other side was on thornton, and industrial ceo, and congressman mccullough. They were the republicans and very much into law and order. And the problem that the executive director and victor somethingying to find that these two factions could agree thethat is when they saw harvest, when ginsburg and paul mary saw the harvest. They had heartburn, bad heartburn. And so they moved ahead. They had to move ahead. And i could see why. I could see why the harvest, particularly that last chapter, and had, hadident, language that was rather heated overheated. , it could have been toned down and maybe made acceptable, but i rather doubt it because the notion of political elements within the disturbances of the south was something that was very difficult, would be very difficult to get those two factions to agree to. Anyway, ok. A couple of things about i could stop at this point and maybe answer questions as to what else might have been true, but if why dont i just do that . [applause] thank you. Before we open it up to the floor, i would like to see if the panelists have any remarks they want to make in reference to each others comments. It is interesting the discussion is a lot, not just about the report, but about american liberalism, and it taps into this debate we have had since we have started writing about the decades, about what liberalism was about, and i think there is variations. Were there different kinds of liberalism . Was liberalism as expressed in the Johnson Administration either more moderate than it was often presented, or i think elizabeths case, actually proa very tough law and order approach we associate with the right . And probably i come down more on the type of political environment that i see, johnson facing the possibilities of liberalism on capitol hill. It is kind of interesting just to hear this debate, which we have now had over several generations. Bill pointed out, as we discussed the kerner report, what it did in my its recommendations did not really have an effect. I have a brief response to that though. I am wondering about what mr. Shellow said in terms about coming into this environment where there was a notion that there was a conspiracy. And johnsons response was laid out brilliantly. Johnsonsspond response with lots, his response to what the riots represented, not questioning, but thought it was a conspiracy, and was looking for a conspiracy. I think that is what it was, the handling of these variations of individuals moving in this political moment, liberalism is catchall that sort of mrs. These distinctions misses the distinctions. Add to that, the Johnson Administration and the Cabinet Meeting right after the new york and detroit uprisings, johnson was sort of convinced that this was the work of outside agitators and that Stokely Carmichael that this could not possibly to that, the Johnson Administration and the Cabinet Meeting right after thef reflection of frustration and hopelessness, and kind of an impact of social economic inequalities. I think in part, if it was really about the massive amount of work that needed to be done, the recommendations of the kerner group, the resources that will be required to fix it, that would mean that johnson would have to come to terms with the fundamental shortcomings of the war on poverty. So if it is outside agitators can coming in, it is not necessarily it is not a political tactic rather than the natural, violent response to living under a set of violet violent conditions that are increasingly being policed and surveilled. If i can jump in, johnson was, he had different positions on this. Even with watts. He would talk in the same conversation about both conspiracy and carmichael. He would talk about the misfit theory, which you guys debunked which was often used to explain riots, but he would also talk about unemployment. He would talk about the kind of brutal conditions children were living under. And so, i dont know, i think he was more complex in seeing what was going on in the riots than we often attribute. I think there is a conversation with the labor leader, able, right after watts. He does it all in one conversation. But he did have in many instances that i saw an awareness, especially how Economic Conditions kind of bred some of the frustrations. He says at one point, if i were, if i experienced the conditions the rioters are experiencing i would riot, too. ,he said that publicly. He gets in trouble for it, but i mean, yeah, you know the johnson , administration is really vacillating between different positions. On the one hand, seems to have an understanding that is similar to the kerner report, but on the other hand moves on the sort of law and order wing. Even individuals and administrations, we should not necessarily expect them to be ideological consistent. So, we would like to open it up for questions. Come to the please microphone, cnn is taping the session, and speak into the microphone. [indiscernible] university of manchester, and i am studying African American in washington dc from 1960 to the end of the 20th century. We know that the development of Community Action was part of the Johnson Administrations strategies in the war on crime. How and why did Community Action fail . That is a big one. [laughter] ofyou know, the kind conventional argument is obviously the ways in which Community Action ran directly into the interests and power of local democratic machines, and so you will have the stories of mayors such as mayor daley, although he was one among many, who were uncomfortable with losing control over federal money. Influence to activists who were often on the far left. They were radical, had different strands of liberalism. And i think that is an argument that still holds a lot of water. I mean, i do think i think it plays out in the conversation, and often, the direction some of the Community Action groups were going, i do think were either places that johnsons and the administrations vision would not either tolerate or back to the point, that 1967 and 1968, johnson thought it was politically impossible. He was desperate to protect what already had passed from that program to medicare and medicaid. The congress was coming after what he did domestically. The southern democrats. And it is crucial to understand this, or you miss where johnsons mind was by this time. One last little thing, there was a rat in our conversation, one of the kind of concrete measures he is thinking about, in the summer of 1967, pushing that he is thinking of pushing the rat extermination bill through congress. Is a problem, and is killed instantly by the right. I cant remember the term they use, but they blamed it for the rioting is, this legislation. That is the mindset. It clashed with what some vocal analysts wanted and thought was necessary to end poverty. If i could just add that if , we understand the politics of the backlash of local democratic establishments, we could understand why the recommendations from the report would not fly politically because basically they are saying the federal government needs to step in and tell local Police Forces to revise their practices in very significant ways. And that was going to have backlash. They were going to be telling basically liberal mayors were where the riots were occurring to direct Police Forces. That was going to be difficult, even for the liberals on the kerner report, saying it is easier to say given their interests. Lets put a lot of money into these areas. The liberal democratic mayors had to get the money, but they dont want the federal government stepping in and looking at the races are in their Police Forces. I would not write off the impact of the Committee Action programs. I think they had a positive effect in the sense that it brought people to the point where they became involved in the community. And where there emerged ultimately political Leaders Within those communities. Now i speak from personal experience. After the Kerner Commission, i went to work for pat murphy here in the district, as assistant Public Safety director, and we came up with the idea of a police precinct, and that was funded. We got it funded by the office of economic opportunity, much to the dismay of our local poverty program. And the police i was placed in charge of it for two years, and that prompted the response of a number of local militants, you might say, one of whom was cutting his political teeth on me. He used the old salt and whiskey approach, that if you want to destroy something, go after it as hard as you possibly can. And he got a lot of coverage, and as a result, he became quite prominent in the district. And his name was mary and marion barry. Exactly. Mayor for life. That was positive. And i think that from what i , hear, that happened in a number of cities as well. The people ultimately, ok, maybe they wrote off the whole poverty ,rogram, and it was all dead things, the atmosphere. But now they understand that now they have to go after the political power and go through the legitimate means. And i think that is what we are beginning to see return, if you will. Hello. My name is teresa. I am an assistant professor at a college. I have two short questions. The first is how much did this , Commission Cost . And did that affect the kind of imposition of the time constraints that were unbeknownst to you . And secondly, you mentioned that methodologically, the lawyers started with conclusions and searched for evidence to validate them. Can you speak more about what those conclusions were, and if they were kind of racial, or kind of classbased assumptions adhered in those conclusions . Thank you. It is directed toward me, i guess. The what i what i discovered , again after 50 years is that the head of the top staff of the commission, had a pretty good idea of what they were going to say. And what they wanted from us was kind of a scientific legitimacy, if you will. One thing that i mentioned in that book that we are talking about, i was recruited by means of a steak dinner over at the standard hotel, which was very nice. And at the end of it, as they are interviewing me during this dinner, afterwards, paul mary came up to me and said, you know we would like you to take this , job running the social science program. And i said, what do you mean . I dont have any background in survey research or i am not a historian. You guys would have done a much better job than me. He said, that doesnt make any difference. You got that phd, he said. And i shouldve known better. Shouldve known better. But the kinds of things that they had in mind, the kinds of things that they thought were pretty much the major emphasis es that were in the final report. You know, the poverty, the lack of jobs, to some extent, the they probably put it more in terms of the isolated or maybe personal insensitivity of Police Officers to the people that they are sworn to serve. Broaden that brought category of the institutional racism. These were all they knew about this, and they saw it as the reason or the basis. Their task was a herculean one. It was not only, how could they bring these concepts out through the commission process and have them survive, and get them through the commission itself . It had to make it had to make a unanimous decision on how they spoke. Incidentally, with regard to the , to the suppression of the harvest document, after it was suppressed, many of the team leaders and team members were from those investigating teams were very upset and were threatening to go to the press. And members of my staff were too. But i did not believe that this was a great catastrophe. Maybe that is because i was a bureaucrat, and i have seen this so many times. It what i, what i asked them , implored them not to do anything until we saw that the commission was going to say. As far as i know, there was only one, one week, if you will, and that was right close to the time of the report was released. By know, it was drowned out [indiscernible] budget from what i understand and Steve Guillen in the back said it was not very generous, and i mean, that was part of his strategic decision to limit from the start what you guys could do and not give you full resources. I want to mention that in douglas, aind, paul senator, big civil rights advocate, lost to charles percy. And one of the themes in that campaign was law and order. Nixon even comes into the state and runs on that and loses. In a lot of ethnic white areas in chicago, which kind of stunned the administration in chicago because these were Traditional Democratic areas. So when the budget is set up and the commission is set up those , are some of the considerations on his mind. Please. Hi, thanks, my name is chris, and i doctoral candidate. Am ai studied history of Magnet School reform. But i was interested to know, you know elisabeth invited us to , consider, you know, what if koerner style or that critique was listened to . It provokes the contingency question and what you have since suggested that this story is a political one about the rise of conservatism or about both in or machine nixon municipal democrats. I wonder first if the panel would adjust that story at all . If it is a political answer to why a critique like that could not move into the 1970s with any sort of real legs . But then secondly, what we should make of the kind of administrative or judicial liberalism in the like things like continued pushes for metropolitan School Desegregation or Community Control initiatives. Whether these categories of whatform relationship we should think them to have with these types of flavors of liberalism from the 1960s moment . One of the things that i argue, and i think that this is why really the only domestic policy that consistently, over the past years, liberals, conservatives and democrats and republicans have agreed on, are these crime control policies. It is rooted about what the outer commission pointed which is the heart of the problem which is institutional racism and consistent racism and a real resistance on the part of lawmakers to support policies that would disrupt and transform racial hierarchies, class hierarchies that have defined this country historically. Really in the 1960s, we get a , massive we get a new thoroughly implemented social program. We get a massive investment, and we get a job creation program, but that is more Police Officers. That is not for low income citizens. This really reflects policymakers priorities in the and the kinds of policies they are willing to support. As julian mentioned, there is an awareness and a commitment to tackling the problems of unemployment and housing and the often inhumane Living Conditions on the part of johnson the Johnson Administration and other liberal policymakers. But at the end of the day, there is this well, the problem of poverty is a kind of longterm commitment that will take this method of infusion of resources. In the short term we have to manage these problems with police, and eventually by the end of the 1970s, there is a massive disinvestment from social welfare programs. And in its place, get Police Officers increasingly becoming the arbiters or managers of the kind of material consequences of socioeconomic inequality and neglect of some of the most marginalized and isolated communities in the u. S. And i think racism is very much rooted and shapes those policies and those kinds of outcomes. The kind of longterm response to problems of unemployment and failing Public Schools with police incarceration surveillance and ultimately incarceration. If i could just add a couple of things. I mean one, yes, it is a story, but i say lets not make it too overdetermined. Robert kennedy doesnt get assassinated, lets say the watergate scandal breaks a year earlier. The liberal democrats were in power, which could have easily happened. They represented a significant force at the time. What the events are, we dont know, but it is a live program really for several years in american politics. However, and this is one of the problems with the kerner report is that it is proposing many programs, but it is tied to the riots. So you know you get the king , riots of but after that, they 1968, die down. So that seems to take away the urgency of the report. Other people say we dont need this massive investment because people arent rioting anymore. And on the other side, it opens up the conservatives to make the point, well, you are just calling for this as, like you , are being ransomed by the rioters in effect to spend this money, which in fact, the commission would not have been if it had not been for the rioters in the first place. I think that is part of the longterm politics of it. The report was so tied to those specific events that dont really persist in the same massive way past 1968. At the most basic level, i mean, the report for all its limits the language is worth reading again. It is really remarkable. When i edited it again, reading through it come and again, understanding limitations was quite stunning given where we are today, to see this from a modern government body is tom wicker said, but it was about the power structure. I mean, they used that term, and they are talking about at some level if you take it seriously, their account of why the why the riots are happening extraction of power from people , who held it police, mayors that is the natural logic. A long call for policymakers. So i think at some level, that barrierother kind of but challenge not barrier but challenge. That is beyond the politics of congress and the right. That is right at the core of the problem they had highlighted pretty effectively. Please come up to the microphone. Yeah. I am marybeth, a student at yale. This has been fascinating. It is one of those moments in history that has sort of lost opportunities that so often come up in our history of racial relations. What i wanted to talk about a little bit is some of the ideas you have suggested that came out of the report, such as guaranteed minimum wage and such, had not, or not new this time. They had been part of the cios push forward program. There were new dealers that tried to do this kind of thing with labor connection, and again, the militarized Police Response to the rioters, the meeting of violence with excessive violence from them comes up a bit as well when you look at the history of labor in terms of the militarized Police Response to strikers over the course of the century. So, my question is, did the commission make some of these connections in terms of what had been proposed in prior years with regards to employment and income . And if it did not make those connections or did make those connections, what would have been different in the report . Pointas just going to out, if you read the report and the way that it concludes a , social scientist who said to the commission basically, we have these riots and we have this commission. Everybody knows what needs to be done, and then nothing happened. Like alice in wonderland. Exactly. In that sense, they were aware. Yeah they were. What made it for me, what made that these ideas are not new, but they are being put together in a formal Commission Report sponsored by the president , and rest purported and then reported on life by the washington post, which breaks the original story with the headline white racism. And that is what the impact was, rather than is brandnew, original analysis. It was the way it was where it was being presented and by who. You had one more. Just, yeah, at the microphone. You will be our final two questions. Thanks. Greg. My name is i am a phd candidate at stony brook university. I was was wondering, did either of the draft of the report spent spend much time looking at Police Violence in latino or immigrant communities . I am just curious if there were differences on the draft on the subject. The report often puts in conversation contrast the comparisons. The moynihan report of course moynahan wrote beyond the melting pot, which is a very problematic book that took of violence and communities. I was wondering about that. Thank you very much. When you refer to the two drafts of the report, are you referring to the harvest as being the first draft . Yeah. Did i it was not. It never was intended to be. And actually, a historian by the name of Abraham Miller got that wrong. It was not. He he said that johnson had seen it, and you know, had fired all the social scientists. Johnson had not seen it, and none of the commissioners, although one of the commissioners may have known what was in it because he let the top secretary, and she was my secretary, said she i would imagine somebody new. But this was not the first draft in the kerner report by any means. Not at all. Itwas a report of the social sciences group, and we hoped it would become the kerner thert the kernel of kerner report. And it was nixed, and it was nixed not because of the harvest itself. People were led off, investigating teams led off, but simply because johnson decided he was not going to fund it anymore. There was not enough money. They had run out of money. And there was not anything and he was being he was being , lobbied by his own bureau of the budget guy. He had it with him. So it had nothing to do with the harvest. I had not realized that. Thank you. Ok. Hello. I am a student from wednesday university in detroit, and i have been studying the riots. What i have found and seen firsthand is that there is this intense debate as to whether or not to call what happened in 1967 a riot or a rebellion. People on both sides have really good points and make a lot of strong arguments. So my question was, when you are writing the Kerner Commission, which by and large, calls civills it a disturbance, was it a conscious decision to labeled it a neutral term . What are the panels general thoughts on the debate . Yeah, and our examination of what we were seeing, and we were looking at all of this data coming back, we could not identify the animal called riot. We really could not. It was what we were seeing is we were seeing many different kinds of events, collective behavior, from a sociologists point of view, that had different elements and they were not all the same. What we did was we tried to tease out the differences. It became complicated. It became very difficult to use a single term. It reminds me of a statue in the dallas, used to be the dallasfort Worth Airport of a texas ranger who stands about 14, 15 feet high, and there is an inscription on it that says one riot, one ranger. And that is the popular notion that any kind of collective action that involves violence, if it somehow or another, the meaning or the direction isnt understood, it is considered to be a riot. But i think we should probably retire the word. But i think the term right thing it is the correct word because one thing. I think the term is the right thing because it implies a level of organization and was not there. People want to call it a rebellion, but it suggested it was a conspiracy of a certain kind. These are spontaneous events not being directed. On the other hand, i dont know, it is particular to modern American History that riot has this weird connotation. If you talk about riots, meaning, they are not political. If you have this conversation with european historians, they will look at you very funny because they would say what do you mean . Just because i say it is a riot i am saying it has oppression, so there is something very weird about our particular discussion where right has that where where riot has that connotation. I would be hesitant to criticize people using the term riot. The argument is that some level of organization, and some kind of clear intention is necessary to make it a political act, but the report showed it is a response to very Political Institutions. And in that way, i think, it made a convincing case that the reason you had violence and so many city in so many cities, it is a common and familiar response to the same institutional problems. That is what made it political, even if they were not coordinated, or well thought through, in the end, that is why there was a political character to what was going on. All right. Well, i want to thank our panel and we look for to the publication which will be a great contribution to the discussion and understanding of the Kerner Commission report. Thank you very much, and thank you all. [applause] very good, thank you. Next, we continue our coverage of this weekends