Professor, looking back 50 years to 1967 was it possible for the u. S. To win the war in vietnam . Simple answer, no. I would definitely say no. It wupt a war for the United States to win or lose. Take us to the end of 1967 and politically that president ial elections are happening in 1968. Whats on the horizon . Lbj was there a fair amount of difficulty. The democrats had lost not control over congress but lbj had lost 47 democratic seats in the house and two in the senate. The war was damaging lbjs pop la la la populari popularity. I think what you see is a kindovkind of breakup that lbj depended on to one of the biggest landslides in american president ial history. You could see it was a thing of the past and that the coalition was fracturing into any number of pieces. Here on American History tv all weekend long we are focusing on the war in vietnam. For the next hour and a half we are going to focus on the state of t of the war in 1967. Our guests are professor leann hang win. Also Mark Lawrence, fprofessor f history. We would also like you to join the conversation with your calls and comments. For those of you in eastern time zon zones. We look forward to your calls and comments on your kmeerns. 2027488902. We welcome your kmecomments and calls. We are on facebook at facebook. Com cspan history. You are from vietnam. You were born there vietnam. Tell us your post war experience. I was born november 1974. I was five months old when my family fled. In terms of memories i dont really have any direct memories of the war. My first memory of course where i grew up in springfield, pennsylvania. What happened in 1975 to my family is a story that is very common for vietnamese refugees that fled. It began with ben crosbys white christmas. It was a signal they were going to leave. We had escape routes planned. Our first one failed. We were supposed to meet my upg l on top of a roof of a high school. He wasnt able to land the helicopter. They were shooting. A second escape route was revealed to us to go down to the saigon river. There another uncle had access to a boat. We almost lost a brother on the bay. We found him with many other children out in the streets because it was clear chaos what my brothers and sisters were telling me. We secured space on a boat and were able to get on the u. S. 7th and stayed in the South Pacific and later in carlyle barracks. Lets go back to the origins of the u. S. Involvement in that war. Tell us how the u. S. First got involved. Well, strevietnam was that p few americans could have reck cog flinoised on a map before t. What really puts vietnam front and center is of course the cold war. It is the coming of the cold war in asia in the late 1940s that really causes concern among americans about the communism, the loss of vietnam to communist control. 1949 is the most important date when the chinese civil war comes to an end. They declare the peoples republic of china. From that point forward americans were anxious something similar would play out. These others would fall into communist hands. From 1949 it seems to be on ward. You seem them try to go prevent that into the communist block. How does president johnson encounter when he comes into office . Terms of the vietnam war . What is he facing . A mess. I think in many ways johnson had inherited a war that had begun by his predecessors. H he made choices to deepen american involvement into vietnam with when he assumed officer after kennedys assassinati assassination. It was under kennedy that the number of u. S. Advisers so vietnam violated the terms. When kennedy inherited office there were 600 advisers. By then about 23,000 advisers and thats what lbj inherited. I look forward to your calls and excellents. 20207488901. Vietnam vets, 2027488902 for eastern and central time sozone. I wanted to play this, get your reaction of what he is talk about there. Here it is. Ill tell you the more i stayed away last night, the more i think of it i dont know what it looks like we are getting into another korea. It worries the hell out of me. I believe the chinese communists coming into it. I dont think we can fight them 10,000 miles away from home and ever get. I dont think we can get out. It is an awful mess. We have got to think about i look at this sergeant and i thought about all of the kids and what am i ordering them out there for . What is it worth to me . What is it worth to this country . We have a treaty but everybody else has a treaty out there and they are not doing a thing about it. You start running the communists they may just clas yhase you rin your own kiftchen. Thats what the world will think if it comes apart on us. It sounds like a very personal phone call. It is an incredibly striking phone conversation. There was a time it seems to me when most historians described a certain amount to his decisions. The tracks had been laid for intervention. This argument happened top the man in the white house when nothing short of the introduction combat force would save the day. A conversation like this shows that lbj was deeply aware of the problems that the kbrieunited s would confront if it went down this path and thought hard about what the United States was getting ready to do. This conversation shows more than anything else to my miend that he potentially be difficult. And pretty soon it would propel things forward. Thats what i was thinking about. That was may 1964. The events of early august we see a very different johnson, one who especially the noni nonincident, the Second Attack that never occurred. It had made a decision to sort of the fabricate events so he could achieve he needed it to legitimize . Yes. It shows preplanning and ma 234 manipulation. We see different sides. What we see is very different. We are talking to leannhang win and mark. Well go to jane in North Carolina first. Good morning. This is jane. I want to ask what had our country spent in removing the land mines and were involved in that but how much has my country to repair the damage that we did to that country . Thats a great question. You know, the individual efforts of americans, many of whom served in vietnam and are back in the country working to remove these mines as well as Many Americans that were involved during the war there trying to clear the mines, address the victims of agent orange and these are issues that really, you know, sort of strengthen the ties between the United States and vietnam. What was interesting, i was just at the National Archives exhibit. It was a Video Montage that took place. The sheer scare of the bombing, it is devastating. It hurts to watch the video and to know there are these individual efforts by people who, you you know, might have been involved in the war effort but are trying to sort of amend, it is great. It is disheartening to have it be done at the government level but i would say one really has to applaud the viindividuals. And the things about the bombings, the land mine, we know this in hindsight. What was the mood of the American Public in 1967 . How much did we know about the war . I think 1967 is when lots more were foe kisicusing on the. The public approval certainly dropping quite dramatically across this as more americans focused on it, as the draft calls increased which have the event of drawing much more attention to the war than had been the case previously. It is no surprise you see the dramatic expansion to the point where the biggest demonstration took place about 50 years ago. In the fall . Exactly. It resulted in the famous march on the pentagon. I think it was paying more attention. It was fracturing like the larger american political scene. This is not to deny the fact that some people when they were looking a it the war thought more should be done, not less. We need to take a look okay. Lets hear from john in pennsylvania. Caller greetings. Im very happy to have the chance to be on the air. I was a medic. I served with the First Calvary Division but i was within a month in country. I was assigned and by provided medical services to the people. My thought and my question is did anybody really know of these programs that we had over there . I was a draftee. I was u. S. All the way. Im glad i had a chance to do something product iive and to hp people that were in need of medical treatment. To this day everything is as clear as a bell to me. If you could address that. And one more thing, sichnce you are both hishistorians. We used George Morses vietnam. Do you flow anything about that . Thank you for your kind atep attention to this. I do know that book. It is not one that personally i have used but i have a lot of respect for it and certainly consulted it. I would hold that out as one of the best texts thats out there by way of a survey on the war. I think its fair to say that americans were aware of the kinds of programs that the caller asked about. I think that the american view of the war as more americans became fixated on it was sort of difficult for the American Public to pick out what was most essential about the war. This was one of the things that was probably really jarring for People Living through this experience. Massive usesover fire power and america at its best all happening simultaneously. Lets hear from rocky point, new york. Caller good morning everybody. My question is what would happen if we decided to use a Nuclear Weapons in the war . Would it have ended the war or would we have to use too many of them because it was all over the place or would it start another world war . Would other countries protest and say this is not right and join forces with them . When you talk about the exhibit and the incredible amount that was dropped on vietnam. I can tie those two questions together. Basically that last scenario, world war, peoples republic of chi china and the soeviet union woud have definitely gotten involved. It was ruled out by all of the great powers involved directly or indirectly involved that it would not escalate to a nuclear war. In terms of leadership there are so many debates going on. They mir record t mirrored th debates. It was sort of raging. You can compare the months going from Something Like sort of the stri spring of 1967. You know, what would take place deeply fractured the vietnamese communist party. Who were making the decisions in North Vietnam . One of the most surprisiing things was the extent for which they were marginalized. This is when that happens. It happens to them on the part of two men who carried out a campaign and that included his right hand man who would rise to fame as being the main negotiator. In the early 1970s rp, right . Yes. Lets hear from ed. Caller was the government an ty anti buddhist and was it to build support from freedom of religion . Certainly many buddhist a activists upnderstood it to be antibuddhist. You had demonstrations goeagain the saigon government. There is no duty spectrum of opinion when it comes to buddhist leaders. It seems to me they had a per s per sis tant problem. It is beyond that part of the South Vietnamese population that was most strongly behind it. What was the u. S. Governments relationship with the South Vietnamese government . Well, i think it was complicated and a source of frustration alongside so many other sours of frustration for lbj. Di johnson recognized there had to be a part flnership for the war succeed. Naturally is government was a central component of any successful strategy. It had to be cultivated. Lbj like president s before him, was consistently frustrated with the unwillingness to do the kind of things that in the american view would have established vie have had more popularity for that government. Lets hear from orlando. You are on go ahead. Caller what have we learned from the vietnam war and not to get involved in these future conflicts . Thanks, robert. Lienhang nguyen, go ahead. I think one of the main takeaways from the vietnam war and American Experience with the vietnam war, what was happening in vietnam predated American Intervention. This was one of the situations where the United States came into a very complicated civil war that had been brewing for decad decades, if not centuries one can argue, various in fighting between the political groups in north and south and central vietnam. And the United States clearly did not know the situation. And this gets to sort of the other previous question about the sort of South Vietnamese government, its policy towards the buddhist majority, i think its a lot more complicated. And the Buddhist Movement itself is very heterogenous. So it was a very difficult position for both governments north and South Vietnam during the war, as well as various political actors in both countries. Now, one side was able, above the 17th parallel, the democrat of vietnam and North Vietnam to squash dissent. And the second question gets to the question about the relationships between saigon and hanoi and their big power patrons. I think what i find striking through the course of my research is you actually see some of the same lines from chinese source, soviet sources and american sources with how difficult if it was for these big power patrons to deal with their junior clients or allies in saigon or hanoi. And gets to the difficulty of state of International Relations and cold war and decolon saturatiization and these post colonial conflicts. Even though they wanted to direct the course of the war they were unable to. Take the question of what did we learn from it, and you look back in 1967 what were the decisions that lbj could have made then that could have changed course of u. S. Involvement in the war . How could it have turned out differently for the u. S. . Thats a fascinating question. What were his options . And i this i if we put ourselves back into lbjs shoes we can see how difficult it would have been for him to break out in another direction. Nevertheless, there were concrete ideas in the mix during that period and sometimes assumed there were no ideas, sort of sort of reaching lbjs desk and thats not true. Secretary of defense was increasingly souring on the war, and it seems to me what he had in mind was steps of negotiation of american negotiating position in a way that would have led to some kind of negotiated settlement short of maximum american objectives. Interesting point on this is that in september of 1967, the cia did a study of this question wharks we , what were the alternatives, and what would be the consequences of the United States of winding down the war . Would the catastrophe be what it would . Would the domino play out . And cia conclusion was probably not. Southeast say sh southeast, asia, louaos would fall, but the rest of the world would survive intact. We heard in the conversation, you mentioned mcnamar owe, these were both hold overs from the Kennedy Administration. Tell us about these men. These were typical kennedy appointees, i think, brilliant men, highly accomplished, mcnamara president of ford motors, and other characters from the Kennedy Administration very much like that. And i think these biographies are important, because they were can do men, did not back down in face of a challenge. These were men who had a lot of confidence to use american power, very precise ways, to achieve american objectives. I think thats very important even going back to the conversation that we heard earlier between bundy and lbj, you hear lbj voicing all these concerns, but it seems to me at the end of the day, lbj, but especially his advisers believe they could solve those problems. Thats just the kind of people they were and kind of experiences they had during the Second World War and cold war down to 1967. Professor lien. This is the best and brightest. The United States was just no way could lose the war against the third rate, fifth rate, whatever johnson had, described vietnam at the time, that this would lead to americas downfall. It was u. S. American humorous. Lets hear from john, florida, go ahead with your comment. Caller good morning. Thanks for this opportunity. To a degree, well, background, i was drafted in 1967, september, lost a brother there in january of 69. I didnt go primarily because i got orders in 68 and he already had orders, two brothers cant be in the country at the same time. My question goes to some of the points you raised, missed opportunities. Why were not the voices Coalition Government listened to . Why were not the scholars, the people who new the mind and aspirations of the vietnamese, why were they not listened to . I cried many hot tears over this year, and recently viewing the ken burns episodes, those type of questions were brought forth, and the missed opportunities were shown in detail, as youve shown some of them this morning. I just wonder if you agree that the world war ii and cold war mentality of our leaders was what drug us down this path. Thank you, much. Thank you, john. Professor lien. Thats a good question. And its a difficult one. Why werent other roads taken. And i think professor lawrence just nailed it. There were other options and they werent taken, those roads werent taken. And they include all these peace attempts. You had operation mary gold in 1967. But peace talks is not what leaders in washington wanted to pursue. But at the same time, what i see from records from the other side, the North Vietnamese side, they also did not want to pursue negotiations in 1966, 67. So you had sort of more military tant leaders wanting to pursue a military solution, first and foremost, before they engaged in any substantive talks, despite influential policy makers, scholars, other voices saying, you know, that the United States and the drv, that the combatants needed to engage in talks. May i add one thing . Absolutely. Very quickly. It seems to me that if we are looking for roads not taken, opportunities missed, we would do best to go further back in time into the 1950s. Maybe the very early 1960s. But once significant americans are on the ground, dying, once politically maybe eisenhower, certainly kennedy, definitely johnson are engaged, it becomes very difficult of course for reasons of politics and prestige and reputation to pull back. But it may be that there were significant missed opportunities at an earlier point in 1954 or 1956 or various other points in the earlier history of the war. We are looking at the year 1967 in the vietnam war all weekend long on American History tv focusing on the vietnam war. We are joined by Mark Lawrence university at texas austin, and lienhang nguyen history professor. We are glad to have your phone calls. And for all of our vietnam vets, vietnam era vets and those of you may have been antiwar protesters during the war, that number, 2027488902. Lets go next to new york and hear from david. Excuse me, hearing from excuse me, i lost you. Going to electra in new york. Go ahead. New york city go ahead you are on the air. Caller hello. This is electra. I was an antiwar protester. Electra is a pseudonym. My father was protesting the war. I attended the famous pentagon demonstration with my 10th street block group in manhattan, new york. And we were tiear gassed as the soldiers came out of the pentagon with bayonets drawn. We were peaceful protesters. Why do we still celebrate war heroes . When are we ever going to have peace . The peace we are fighting war to get these, that never happens. We honor the veterans who went to fight. But what we did was support the protesters. The draft. The people who refused to honor the draft. Elect ka, thanks for t. Electra, thanks for the call. Thats a big question that goes beyond what a historian of the war can probably grapple with fairly. But ill say this about the history of the vietnam war in the longer flow of American History. It seems to me that one of the lessons that American Society, very broadly took away from vietnam we should be able to distinguish between the servicemen and women who were called onto perform a particular function, and on the other hand the policies and policy makers who sent them there. And in more recent times, in the United States, i think our society has learned to celebrate the sacrifice and service of the people without necessarily implicating them in the decisions that sent them to a place like vietnam or afghanistan or any number of other places. And it seems to me thats a healthy development. Though i do understand the spirit of the question. I think there is a point. Heather, did u. S. See antiwar protests of this scale, world war i, world war ii, the korean war . On this scale, no. But on a large scale, i dont have the figures at my fingertips here, but in connection with the First World War, in particular, it seems to me that there is striking evidence of large scale dissent in earlier periods of American History. Kind of experiences not lnormaly how we think of American Military. Certainly to think of vietnam as essential because of the degree and opposition it inspired. And that may be. That may be in the number one position in terms of those kinds of experiences. But if you look at the mexican war or the First World War or the korean war, you can also see striking levels of this. So the spanish american war, so there has been, and i do think that the Antiwar Movement in the United States, you know, the history of it is very interesting. And i think that in the end, the debate about did it matter and have an actual impact on the policies that were passed and made in washington d. C. , you know, depends on the scholar you ask. And many even who participated in the Antiwar Movement would say, no, we had no impact. They didnt listen to us. And on the other you would say, no, Antiwar Movement is the reason the United States ultimately did pull out. And i would agree with the latter. Heavily constrained policy makers in washington d. C. , and in a good way, the war could have been much more destructive, could have lasted much longer, but thanks to the opposition on the streets and campuses and particularly in congress, did limit the ability of policy makers in washington under lbj, under nixon administration. But at the end of the day, they did pursue the policies they wanted to do, mainly in secret. You talked about some of the political conflict in vietnam in 1967. Was there an Antiwar Movement in north korea and south vietna . Yeah, there were, ill talk to South Vietnam. They were different. There were some segments in the north that the party wanted to pursue in terms of unification. They didnt want to go to war, mainly pro soffit Party Officials that wanted to reunify through political means. And this they believed that waging war in the south, going to war in the south, supporting the southern insurgency would be a kwquagmire of rapid proportio that would drain from the north. They were on the losing side. And in 1967 this all came to the floor when they were arrested. They were arrested in about like a few waves of arrests that began in july of 1967 all the way into the tet offensive. And it was tied to the strategy to the tet offensive. That was one element. Another element was side lining ho chi minh. And to quiet this dissent. People calling for negotiations to end American Intervention by talking directly with washington d. C. , but the leaders in hanoi did not want to pursue that option. You are welcome to tweet us, at mad man across water, about asking about an issue that resounds today. And his question is how many people were fathered by gis, u. S. , after they were treated 45 years after their u. S. Departure, what do we know of that population in vietnam now . Its a tragic story. After 1975, you know, the wounds of war did not heal. I mean, vietnam went through another war after that. Unify vietnam under communist rule. And in terms of they were called amor ray shun children, in vietnamese they were reminders of that conflict, and they were called dust children, lower than the soil you walked upon. So their plight is very tragic one. And they were allowed to immigrate over to the United States, but this also caused, brought havoc on many families in vietnam because it was also a clans for some vietnamese to leave vietnam during this period of this was the economic part in 1980s. So these children, these dust children then became valuable. Because if you could link yourself to them, possibly you could come to the United States. So it was very, very difficult for these children. More of your calls and comments for our guests at looking at the vietnam war in 1967, particularly want to hear from vietnam vets and protesters as weve heard from that era. 202747 h 2027478902. We wanted to show you a short portion of cbs report of some of the experiences of marines at that time. Heres a look. Got about 25 or 30 incoming heavy artillery rounds. And that area seems to be really covered. So ill go ahead and get these people out and inform you what ive done. Over. Go ahead. Go ahead and fire make sure your own troops are out of the way. And let the tigers do their business. Ho chi minh has become a focal point for heavy fighting along the dmz, a lightning rod across the border and closer vietnam war has come to being conventional. The marines are holding a half dozen outposts and base camps just south of the dmz from the laos border and along route 9 and of the south, and to the north of what is called leather neck square. They provide the marines with observation posts overlooking the narrow valleys and plains that they use to move the troops south. Also staging bases for operations. They are connected by a six mile strip of bulldozed land cleared to give them a better view and becoming a more elaborate barrier from the south chinese sea 40 miles to the border. Work has stopped on the strip. Vegetation is growing back and does not appear to do the job without many more marines to protect the engineers. Above the ben high river, North Vietnamese introduced heavy military, pounding them with 152 millimeter shells as often as 1,000 a day. A marine who was there the in the month of september had a 50 50 chance of being hit. There were 600 casualties among the 1,200 men that were on it. The marines took a terrible pounding. But they held their ground gal antly. How do you feel about this kind of war . Its what we are trained for. And we will prevail. We will win. Do you ever imagine that war was like that . That is a negative. It was a big joke until i came over here. Very serious business, isnt it . Real serious. A lot of lives been crushed over here. I thought it was a joke before i come over, but now i realize its no joke. We cant reach the big guns and they keep dropping in. There is nothing you can do. Being like a big bulls eye on top of the hill and you are just sitting there waiting. You cant be sait. You can be lucky, thats it. Professor Mark Lawrence, that report from 1967 hearing from obviously a couple of marines on the ground. How did experience of american troops influence policy, or was it beginning to influence policy back home . Well, the line that stnd out to stands out is close to the beginning this is as close to conventional fighting as we have seen. And i think this is important in connection with 1967. The war was starting to take place on a larger scale. And some of the conventional wisdom that we may hold in our heads about vietnam war as a guerilla war, this was starting to change, and the war was being conducted on a larger and larger scale, simely more americans in the country between 4 and 5 hundred,000 in fact depending on the month in 1967. You see big operations near the dmz, also the famous operation cedar falls unprecedently large operation near saigon. So i think to connect this back tour question how policy makers were looking at this from the advantage point of washington, i think they saw that more and more resources were being pumped into vietnam. The war was really being taken to the enemy, at least in the american perception, in an unprecedently intense way, yet stalemate was the best that c could be achieved. They were at the dmz, so demilitarized zone. What can you tell us about that . Well, what professor lawrence was just talking about, in terms of the more conventional battles taking place in 1967, this was part of North Vietnamese strategy at the time, that they were ready to move to big unit battle after having this defensive posture following American Intervention in 1965 through 1966, this caused so many debates in hanoi, because on one side some of the leaders did not want to revert to a defensive posture, that in doing so, moral of the troops would below, that they had to wage big unit wars is that was the only way to win. So you can see this born in 1967. And they were a part of this. These were the big battles. But this was also, they were hoping that u. S. Policy makers would look not at that, but further south, not further south, but then south, and a little to the west, and that was ka son. And what they wanted and were hoping for was that william west more land and lbj would think that would become from 1967 and 1968 and North Vietnamese po put all their resources to take it. So you would have the scenario what happened in the french indio china war, and in fact they circulated what was called the diversion plan. It was a deception plan. And it was called, in the vietnamese, it was 694 tg 1, and the deception plan was distributed throughout the south. And it was so that the americans would find it and it talked about how many resources they were going to pour into taking ka son. And then it would go through three waves from 1967 all the way to 1969, and that talks would be planned around it so that when North Vietnamese troops would seize ka son, the talks would open, and this is what happened in dmz in 1954 with the geneva accord to talk about it after it began. The siege with the big guns. Where are the North Vietnamese getting the guns . So, its called kan ku. This is also for the North Vietnamese a very important sight, because their rockets to reach this base, this marin military base of the other side. Are these chinese or russian rockets or who is supplying them . Yes, these are soviet rockets. So if the North Vietnamese could seize this area, then they could infiltrate this region. So this was very pivotal as well. So lets go to david. Welcome to american tv. Caller thank you. I wanted to ask about hr mcmaster currently adviser, 21 years ago wrote a book called dereliction of duty. Very powerful book when i read it, i was impressed here is a guy who is a serious scholar and stabilizing influence. I was wondering what the two historians think about that . And particularly in terms of right now we are looking at a situation in korea that looks like militarily its spinning out of control. And the military folks seem to be in a very similar situation to where the joint chiefs were during the period that mcmasters was covering 63 to 67 but not being listened to. A group in the washington filtering their opinions and doing the agenda. So i would love to hear your guest historians on this. By the way im in my 70s so i was 20 when i enlisted. Turned out i was 4 f but went on to be an anticommunist, antiwar program. In other words, i saw the soviet fleet and knew we needed to win this war. I agree mcmaster book is a fantastic book, kind of a classic now in the study of the vietnam war. In this book he argues, i think, quite pervasively that the joint chiefs of staff were guilty of a der an election of duty for exaggerating the potential for military solution tos to a prob that was much more complicated, so therefore they failed civilian policy makers and bore for a lot of mistakes. And i agree with the sentiment of the call, that having mcmaster in this position would presumably is reassuring to those of us who would like to certain amount of constraint and caution in the american policy in the present day. Whether hes actually having that effect and to what extent his ideas may spring from the vietnam war effect current policy, im not an expert that i can share that though i hope thats the case. You mention more land, one of the public face of the war, tell us about him, what was his story. Well, like many. Senior commanders in vietnam, sort of cut their teeth, gained prominence and rank in the Second World War, and korea. And a complaint that is often lodged by scholars against west more land and others like him is they thought of vietnam in terms of their experiences in Second World War, as big engagements. Critiques that is often made is what they missed was vietnam war at least in early stages was fundamentally guerilla conflict, but these guys blinded by their own experiences werent able to see that until it was later in the war. I think in recent times the best scholarship on west more land and general ship has chipped a way a little bit at that caricature and encouraged us to see him and others in the u. S. Command nuanced way. Although reasonable people can disagree. But for my money im still drawn to that critique of west more land as a fundamental problem with the way americans went about the war. So i think there is a lot in that point. The most prominent the viet cong. Lienhang nguyen, how were they, and how were they different from the North Vietnamese army . So what americans had called the viet cong was a derogatory term given to the South Vietnamese communist movement, the People Liberation armed forces or political front which was the National Liberation front. Their relationship with party center in North Vietnam and hanoi was a complicated one. But according to my research is what i found is when les swan decided to support the war and to embark on bigger war in 1963, we witnessed basically the side lining of the vietnamese communist, southern communist movement and leadership in their own war effort. So that by 1967, 6, 69 especially surrounding the tet offensive, one of the arguments against that how it failed toll achieve the objectives was that, well, is it something that Northern Leaders wanted to do to ensure they would control this war effort. And i dont see that. There is a ton of reasons why the tet offensive didnt unfold in the way that Party Leaders had planned. But the ones who did have to take bear most of the brunt was the nfl and plaf and the viet cong for sure. Well go next to cliff in maryland. Caller good afternoon c spr pan. Im a disabled vet. The similarity between vietnam, where we the narrative was we were fighting communist and the war in the middle east we were fighting terrorism, but the most striking similarity is both wars, vietnam and the war in the middle east, were both preceded by false events. The gulf of tan can in vietnam and 9 11 in the middle east. Thank you. We talked briefly. Thank you, cliff, we appreciate that. We talked briefly about the gulf of tan can. Professor lawrence, tell us what that incident was all about. Well, the gulf of tun can incidents that happened in august of 1964. The episode began with an american destroyer coming under attack, we know for a fact it did come under attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats. This was seen by lbj and his advisers as a provocative act. We now know that the american ships that were operating off the North Vietnamese coast were conducting operations against the coast. Any case, this was seen as provocative act. Where the story gets even more complicated is there a period to it be a Second Attack, we now are pretty confident, i think very certain, in fact, that that attack did not occur. There seemed to have been a jumpy sonar operator on the u. S. Destroyer thought it was coming under attack. But the Johnson Administration used this as confirmation, right, first attack was no accident, it was no one off event, that americans were now coming under attack by the North Vietnamese. So this was used as a method for getting approval by congress, for essentially a blank check. Lbj from that point forward had the legal cover, the political cover to do what he saw fit. Caller terms it a false flag event. Has history and research born that out . Yes, i think that was precisely the case. That johnson had received word that it was sort of sonar, technology, even he said they could be firing at whatles out there. But he purposely misconstrued it for the first year. I want to address the first attack, just as controversial in hanoi. After it took place there was an investigation by ho chi minh who gave the order to the captain, the man on the spot, to fire on the u. S. Vessels. And even though everyone who was a part of the committee, they knew the equivalent of william west moore land, general, im blanking on his name, the general was not in hanoi on august 2, 1964. One man who gave it was secretary, and when ho chi minh brought that captain who ordered the attack on april 2nd said who gave you the green light and go ahead. He just said someone very high up. And less swan was standing there. And ho chi minh had to launch this attack is soviets wanted an investigation. And younger general, Lieutenant General said no matter what we do, the imperials will strike. So we must strike first. So it was basically reaffirming his secretary position. And there was a quick ramp up of u. S. Troops after this incident . Well, no not really. This is very interesting episode. This happened in august 1964 during lbj president ial campaign. I wont say only reason for his caution, but make tear reason. He did not want to stir the vietnam pot during the election campaign. In fact to the extent he wanted to discuss it, he wanted to be the reasonable leader who be counted onto act in reasonable ways. In contrast to the hawk, barry gold water. So he could act decisively, and indeed there were bombing attacks, but then the issue settled back down and vietnam did not dog throughout the remainder of the campaign. The Big Decisions to wage war in a bigger way in vietnam would come after lbj election, so december 1964, january, 1965 are the crucial months if you want to focus on the decisions that led to the initiation of sustained Bombing Campaign against north vianey nam then introduction of ground troops. Mark Lawrence University of texas and lyienhang nguyen are joining us. Looking at the vietnam war kaurl for the eastern and central time zones. 2027488901. For mountain and pacific and former protesters vietnam vets. Lets go to harry in chesterfield, virginia. Thanks for waiting, harry. Go ahead. Caller good morning. As way of background i spent 20 years as infantry officer in the United States army. Deployed my first tour to vietnam in november, 50 years ago, next week. And i was wondering fif your guests had any indication, president eisenhower warned us about the industrial complex. Is there any evidence where the Johnson Administration may have been influenced by them . Harry, before we let you go, you are talking about 50 years ago this week, next week. Caller next week. What were your expectations and what did you find when you hit the ground there . How was it different from your expectations . Caller well expectations were high going over to help the South Vietnamese, to help them fight the communist threat they were facing. That was kind of beat into our head all the time in our training. I trained for two years from december 65 until november of 67. Two years of training. And that was talked about all the time. And of course it was a part of the fact that the South Vietnamese were under this heavy influence of being controlled by the communist government out of north vite etnam. So thats how i felt when i went there. I was glad to go there and help them. Things changed in my second tour, things were different. Second tour was from 68 to 69. Thats when you began to really realize that in order for us to help them, they have to help themselves more. And there seemed to be problems with that, with the South Vietnamese government being totally involved in that effort. So you kind of had the feeling later on that we really instead of helping them, we were really being hindered by the political decisions that were being made, both in South Vietnam and washington d. C. Thanks for your story. Remind us of your original question. Eisenhower. The eisenhower warning about the industrial complex. Thanks for that and sharing your story. Mark lawrence. Fascinating. Thanks for sharing that. The industrial complex, my answer is yes and no. No, because its always difficult to tease out the influence of Something Like the industrial complex, by alts nature its every where and no where. Its difficult to find direct causation, i suppose, between lt influences of arms manufacturers or this or that brap shall of the military on Big Decisions of National Security. So in that sense, im cautious about that. And yet it seems to me sort of an in brainer because its every where it must have had some impact. And heres one point i would be confident in offering that may give a little bit of specificity to my answer. It seems to me that eisenhower and very arguably john f. Kennedy were aware of these dangers, and within limits tried to resist the pressures that they felt might well push American National security in the wrong direction, lead it to make too hawkish and too aggressive decisions int internationally. And i think one of the important decisions between eisenhower on kennedy on the one side and lbj on the other, is lbj didnt have the same instinct. He wasnt as cautious as those other two were about pressure coming on him from the military, from hawks in congress. He tend today go along with them. Maybe in order to serve other political objectives that lay well outside the National Security sphere, but i think he was less sophisticated about that then his predecessors had been. If i could just add. If you think about the American Military preference in vietnam and what mcnamara was able to set up logistical brilliant success of that, it does blow your mind in terms of there were it was the first sort of this was a war in which you had stadium sized factories producing fresh bread for american soldiers. That was shown to the South Vietnamese population that did not have access to these luxuries to the americana bun dance brought to the pacific to in country. The soldiers we needed to show americans had to see that the boys were being treated really well in vietnam that they could have ice cream in 80 degree weather in South Vietnam. This is amazing. It goes to the callers comments to the South Vietnamese army. One of the under studied vietnam war is the republic of coop ngr. If we get past dividing the leaders, they really lost the war, and it was not the fault of the rank and file, you know, the average soldier, and that many fought, many fought valiantly, but their voices arent seen and heard and written about in the scholarship, because they were on the losing side. But i think this was a very, very tough war that had, you know, before the americans even arrived the vietnamese were at war. Heres tom in cole valley, illinois. Welcome. Caller yes. My name is tom. Im calling because my concern is both of the professors are talking more on a liberal vein. And i served from 62 to 65, i was out of california. Never served in vietnam. I served in the philippines. And i dont hear anything about the foot soldier, marines, who fought and did because they were told to go, drafted, or enlisted like i did. Im going monday to listen to captain billal break who had three silver stars and he has the same concern, we have forgotten about the soldiers and the sailors and the military both. I dont hear any talk about that. All i hear talk about is lbj, and eisenhower, what about the people who volunteered who couldnt come home and told to take their uniforms off without walking down the street and being spit upon. I think you need to talk about the foot souldldier and had to talk. All im hearing is esoteric from professors. I have a hard time listening to this but thanks for the opportunity to share my point. Thanks for your call, tom. So the impact of the war on soldiers coming home, the impact of the protest and what that means to the soldiers coming home from this war. Well, i think the caller raises a very important point. Im not sure that an interest in high level policy making and Decision Making on the american side necessarily implies a political side of the war. There are historians though are interested in those questions just as people across the political spectrum interested in the experiences of ordinary people who fought the war. And that is clearly a very, very important crucial element of the history of the war without question. And i would never want to be caught saying anything other than that. I think that the experiences of ordinary soldiers who fought the war and did so much of the heavy lifting have been and continue to be captured in various projects across the country to collect oral histories and collect testimony and experiences. This program is it a small indication i think of exactly that very broad based effort and i applaud that kind of thing. Hugely, i would only add one thing, i mentioned a little early, i think American Society has done a good job, and should be commended for its ability since vietnam to separate the politics from the war from the very honorable experiences of so many people who were called onto do their duty and sacrificed. How is the war viewed now in vietnam in terms of those who fought in it, the victims of it, whats it like in 2017, 50 years later . Its a very young population. So you have more than half born after 1975. So you know one of the things that i constantly hear about is that, you know, vietnamese have forgiven the United States and the americans and that they have moved on from the war. And i think that to a certain extent is true, especially if you look at demographics because more than half born after 1975. But at the same time it has major repercussions on the evolution of vietnam after 1975 to present day. And that is a lot to ask of any population to be able to move on from that war. But at the same time, you know, i think that vietnam has sort of differentiated between u. S. Government policies and the military war, and the individual, the average americans who served. And i think that its one of these really amazing, its great to witness, when an american, when a veteran returns to vietnam and visits the sites of battle and how he or she is able to connect with some of their possible enemies at the time and out pouring of love. So in that way you see the reconciliation and that is amazing. But at the same time so much happened to vietnam after 1975, that has roots in that war in ways that vietnam was marginalized sort of the international community, how it entered into this sort of very dark Economic Times that its something that vietnam still wonders today but is finally moving out of that, which is why are we not at the level or the stage that south korea or thailand is. And you will hear that because we fought against the United States during the war. And we want to remind our previous callers this is 48 hours of coverage this weekend on American History tv of the vietnam war and a lot of that includes the experiences of veterans of that war. And this program itself focusing on, in particular, in 1967, we do want to remind you wife set a side line for veterans, 8902. And in remaining time well try to get to a few more vets as well. Lets hear next from john in tucson. Go ahead, john. Caller hello, how are you . Fine, thanks. Caller i enlisted in the army in 1965. Thereafter, i went to Officer School until fort benning, georgia. And subsequently ended up or assigned to vietnam. When i got to vietnam i was assigned to the first air cavalry division, one of the finer units, not being prejudice that i am, we started in h han kai, later i was in a group and got transferred near providence near there. And that was the whole i was even there for the tet offensive. Im calling because i recently watched the ken burns special. And i was taken, a lot of good coverage that ken burns did. In that there were two events that caught my attention. One of them was the clip that you showed there earlier about lbj in 1964, the recording where he commented that, he was just bothered by the whole situation and he was concerned it was going to be another korea. And i think to myself if he only had enough you know what, gum shun, to have stopped the whole thing right there, and he missed it. The other thing in the ken burns special that i was very struck by that i dont think anybody even knew or realized during the whole event was the determination of the North Vietnamese people in the army. If i remember correctly, ken burns suggested that as many as 2 Million People from North Vietnamese were casualties, and they kept coming and coming down the ho chi mountraen trail, and dont think we realized their determination, we could never win that war. Tlaunhank you, john for yourl and your service. Mark lawrence. Well, there is a lot in that callers comments. As far as the, ill address the point that was made about the conversation between lbj and bundy that we heard earlier, and the callers comment if only these opportunities had been seized, if only lbj had the guts to seize this opportunity that was there. This is a fascinating question, reasonable people can certainly disagree. Did lbj have actual alternatives in 1964 and 1965 . Yes, we can all from the standpoint of 2017 imagine what he might have what he should have done, right. He should have neutralized vietnam, ie, come up with some sort of scheme to reach a kind of fig leaf political settlement that would have kept vietnam out of the realm for a long time. This was the thing people were advocating in 1964 and 1965. Maybe. We now know lbj was exposed to the ideas and understood them and knew where they were coming from and knew who was in favor of them. But i think in order to put ourselves back in lbj shoes, we have to understand the extraordinary weight pressures he was under. What was pushing him forward, the domino idea, the political pressures that had operated, all of these were 20 years in the making, and all pushed in the same direction toward escalation, toward doing more in vietnam. And the pattern that american president s had followed, starting arguably with fdr, but truman, to do enough to prevent vietnam to prevent them from falling into t falling into the communist camp. Lbj was in the white house. But we can see how those pressures, that pattern, the precedents blinded, not blinded him, but discouraged him from pursuing the options. And perhaps some of that is visualized this next clip of video. Here is lbj at a News Conference in 1967 speaking about the war with white house reporters. We have a lot to do yet. A great many mistakes have been made. We take two steps forward, and we slip back one. Its not all perfect by any means. There are good many days when we get a c minus instead of an a plus. But overall we are making progress. We are satisfied with that progress. Our allies are pleased with that progress. And every country that i know in that area that is familiar with whats happening thinks its absolutely essential that uncle sam keep her word and stay there until we can find an honorable peace. And if they have any doubts about it, mr. Ho chi minh who reads our papers and listens to our radio and watches our television, if he has any doubts i want to dissolution him this morning. Because we keep our commitments. Our people are going to spurt the men that are there. And the men there are going to bring us an honorable peace. Mr. Reynolds. Mr. President , hanoi may be interpreting the polls that you will be repoliced next year. How should this effect the cam page in this country . Well, i dont know how it will effect the campaign. Whatever interpretation ha moy might make that uncle sam, whoever may be president , is going to pull out, and it will be easier for them to make an inside deal with another president than will be the president theyll make a serious misjudgment. President johnson. We are hearing peace progress. Our previous caller said the North Vietnamese had determination. We are not hearing from p. R. President johnson in 1967. Thats a great clip to show right after the callers very interesting comments. And i think that, you know, lbj, seeing him there in that press conference, just visiting the National Archives, where remembering vietnam the health care, i al exhibit, i also saw s that just saw her son in spring of 1967 and johnsons response to her, yes is why the United States has to stay committed in vietnam, and that hes sorry for his loss and scribbled all over this letter, he took so much time and effort into crafting this response to this mother, and its amazing, its amazing putting that in contrast to the conversation he had with macula mara in 1964 and then this press conference. I think what that shows in addition to professor lawrence what he set forth as principles that guided American Foreign policy makers at that time, credibility was high up there. Johnson did not want to be the one to lose this war. He didnt want to go down in history as losing vietnam as the way that truman lost china. And so this also weighed heavily on johnsons mind at this point. And in terms of if we look at North Vietnam now, taking another part of what the caller had mentioned, if you look at in filtration routes and numbers in 1967, they are amazing in terms of anywhere from i think the figure is 200,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in filtrating the south during that year. So this was a huge push on the part of the hanoi government and the party to win the war out right in 1968. And in that way they did not want to give negotiations a chance because they believed if they could topple the government in South Vietnam, this would be the way to win, and this would be the sort of they wouldnt have to engage in talks with americans because they could say we transfer our allies. And that didnt happen in 1968. So this is something we also have to take into account when we think about, you know, if the americans, the only option to them in certain ways was to cut their losses and run. But to think that they could come to any sort of compromise, political settlement with the North Vietnamese in 1967. What also didnt happen in 1968 lbj didnt run for president. How much was that part of it . Thats an interesting question. It seems to be the wisdom used to be it was all about the war. And now we have a fair amount of evidence that lbj had concerns about his health and he had shared with his family that he was seriously thinking about not running. So for many of the people who knew lbj best, it was about the war, but it was also about other things. So we need to have more complicated view of that decision than use today be the case. Lets hear from leonard in brooklyn. You are on the air. Caller yes, thank you. I have two questions. One question is if they are aware of any dog fights over vietnam between the soviet a vie ate ors and american . Official admission that there were russian aviators in korea. And they made a documentary about it which i watched with the soviet efforts. Nothing like that was done in contemporary russia regarding vietnam. It is known that the russian crews managed some antiaircraft missile batteries in vietnam, but nothing is known about the soviet aviators posing as vietnamese. And my second question is were there any american flyers shot down that were sent to the soviet union. Anyone have any idea about russias role in the military conflicts in vietnam . I dont believe that there is hard evidence of pilots carrying out dog fights over North Vietnam. I believe theres speculation along those lines, but im not aware of any hard evidence on that. But what the caller says about soviet technicians manning antiaircraft batteries, that is well established. This speaks to the role played by both in different points in supporting North Vietnam. I believe it was a total of about 300,0160,000 soldiers wer present in vietnam doing the sort of behind the scenes actions that freed up personnel. The chinese there were combat engineering troops. They were building the bridges once they were bombed, paving roads, so on and so forth. There were soviet advisors, much less than 320,000 but still sizable. And they were there to help the Vietnamese Air force. Moscow and beijing were squabbling and fighting. The soviets would say to the vietnamese especially as the chinese cultural revolution was raging, look at what chinas doing to your war effort. We cant get aid to you because the cultural revolution is going on and they care more about things going on in china than your war effort. Both sides basically wanted they were fighting the vietnam war to show they were the leader of the international proletarian movement to show that maos doctrine would defeat the United States. They both had a high stake in the vietnam war. Lets hear from oxnard california. This is richard. Welcome. Hi. Good morning. I found this kind of really interesting because this whole area are areas that i served and i was in vietnam in 1968 to early 1970. One quick thing that really bothers me. I was in the recon unit in the marine corps and we did a lot of missions up into the dmz, mainly concentrated on the routes. We used to put in sensors and things so we could track movement. But it seemed like a lot of things that we found in these areas, that the information that we got back in our debriefings were just ignored. This was written also in a book that my company commander, colonel alex lee put out. I often wondered about that, why that information was never looked at or considered. Thanks, richard, for also moving us a bit into 1968. Professor nguyen, youre working on a that. Tell us how things wrap up militarily in the war that year. So this ties back to one of the earlier questions about lbj and what he was doing in november of 1967 and that his resolute that the United States needed to stay and see an honorable end to the vietnam war. This squares with what he told William Westmoreland to hold s casson. Once they seized it, then the talks would open and the north vietn vietnamese would be in a stronger position. He told all of his military commanders, johnson did, to not lose casson even as the tet offensive was unfolding, those were the main targets of what became known as the 1968 tet offensive. Bring us stateside 1968. Whats it look like in terms of how the war is perceived . Actually i might start my answer to your question back in 1967 with that clip. The Johnson Administration deliberately sets out to change Public Perceptions of the war. Theres a big Public Relations campaign to reverse some of the growing criticism of the war. Lbj brings general westmoreland back from vietnam. He gives a series of speeches. Theyre all on the same page, expressing confidence, trying to bolster american dedication to the war. At the end of january 1968 comes the tet offensive, this massive communist attack focused on the cities of South Vietnam. In america, they had just been told that everything was going well, that the end was starting to come into view. And then suddenly the communists display this remarkable ability to use force in the south. We know that behind the scenes lbj and many of his advisors had deep doubts and lots of concern. That was not what they were putting out publicly. Why does American Opinion continue to sour in 1968 . Mark lawrence, history professor at the university of texas and austin and professor nguyen from columbia university. Thank you for joining us on this discussion on the vietnam war in 1967, part of our week long look at the vietnam war. 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