Okay. Good morning. Good late morning, everyone. This is im going venture to be bold and say this is going to be the most exciting panel of the day. Because were all about solving the problems that you guys have been hearing about this morning. Im very happy to have an International Panel. It shrunk by one individual because the professor is ill. So she couldnt join us. Ill try to channel her as best i can with my own personal twist. We have an International Panel that im excited about. Because they have thought long and hard about lou to counter disinformation especially in the context of dealing with russia. To my immediate right i have have ambassador rene nyberg. He is a distinguished former finnish ambassador to russia which is relevant here. And former chief executive of east consulting. He is also served as ambassador to germany for four years, actually, from 20042008. He also was head of finlands delegation to the ose which obviously also deals a lot with these types of issues. Misinformation, ethnic conflict, peace operations, et cetera. And then he was, of course, also finlands ambassador to austria. He has a long distinguished career. I wont list all of the other things hes done in all of the other accolades hes received. But he is well poised to help us think about how we in the United States and other countries can deal with the russian challenge. To had is right, professor ashley deeks. She has a long career now working in the legal area with regard to cybersecurity. She is from the university of vas law school at their center for National Security law. And thats her area of emphasis. She focused on International Law and National Security, intelligence and laws of war. She also served as an academic fellow at the Colombia Law School for two years. She served in the government so she has the academic and the government expertise in the department of state, in the office of Legal Adviser for a year 20072008 and, of course, shes also a cfr alum. She was an International Affairs fellow in 2017 so she did the state Department Work there. Shes extensively published and again in the area of International Legal security. What i would like to do is ask the panelists to give us a prescription. We heard about the threats that we face. We know very well from firsthand experience and from research what the threats are. Can you i would like to hear from each of you what your prescriptions are, what you think we should do what the United States should do as a matter of Foreign Policy and then i will try to add to the discussion by talking a little bit about how i think the russian government might respond to your prescriptions. I will start by staying my perspective on the russian Foreign Policy, eye lay it out just a little bit, from my perspective, the russian government is not likely to respond to a soft request for negotiation on the legal front. Theyre not likely to respond to anything except for a real strong, firm policy. And so i think that its important to note that from the russian perspective, if they think that what theyre doing is bringing them success, they will continue doing what theyre doing until essentially we force them, and i dont mean by force, but we essentially have to force them to recognize that the price is too high for their existing Information Operations against t the United States and our allies and they need to change course somehow. There are a number of ways we can do that, well hear about two of them from the panel here and then we welcome your input with regard to other ideas you might have. But i think i wanted to just lay that out as a foundation that from the perspective of dealing with russia, its really important to raise the price for them, whether its economic, political, or otherwise pot to raise the price i think is what were aiming to achieve. If i could, ambassador, start with you. Please give us your best advice. Im a little bit reluctant to come with advice concerning the United States american policy. But i can talk politics and i can talk russia. I can reflect on what is going on and ha theyre doing, how theyre doing that. But let me start with a political comment which is doesnt have anything do with cyber. And thats if you think about the United States a year ago there are were three people who were stunned by the outcome. The first one that was stunned was donald trump, he didnt expect to win. The second one that was stunned was Hillary Clinton who expected to win. And the third one was Vladimir Putin who was absolutely sure that the devil he knows would win. That is hillary. Yeah. So i think this is i mean, this was your basic and the cyber comes after that. And so its not the technical issue, theres a lot of politics there. Now, im reluctant to speak about the americans, what you should do. But if im looking at and listen together last the panel before us, i very much agree that it is a question of resilience. Its a question of education. Its a question of understanding what all of this is about. Now, i had dinner the other night with a New York Times correspondent and i surprised him by telling him that a couple of days back a quite a famous german price called mario duneoff price, shes a famous german journalist already dead ten years ago, her prize was award to the New York Times. Never ever heard that a German Foundation would usually award prizes to individual journalists awards it to a newspaper like New York Times. And this actually reflects the interest in countering everything which we everything which is false. That you have a you have serious newspapers, you have serious news sources, and it is a fact that the europeans do read more newspapers. The Public Education in this sense is more geared to be to be kind of more immune, not totally, more immune to false fake news. And actually, there was an eu study about super stition. And the level of super stition is dmirch different countries. It turned out that my country, finland, turned out to be the lowest level of people who are superstitious. Okay. Thats it . Yeah. Okay. For beginnings. But i think thats wonderful and i think resistance and resilience is the most important thing and well get back to that a little bit in the q a. Thank you very much, ambassador. Ashley. Thanks very much. Im going to take a different tack as a lawyer im going to be sort of technical here and offer a number of buckets of tools, i think, that the United States and its allies have to take little bites at this problem. I think the last panel was relatively pessimistic about the success on this. Im not going to be much more wildly optimistic than they were, but i will just put on the table what i think the tools are that the u. S. Government and its allies, especially its nato allies have. So the first bucket would be are there legal tools that we can employ . And i think the answer there is, yes, there might be two different kinds of legal tools. One is International Law and the other is draomestic law. Let me say a little bit about International Law. There have been lots of discussions going on for the past five or six years at the u. N. And something called the group of Government Experts thats asking not just cyber questions related to elections or election interference, but broader cyber questions about how can we think about whats appropriate behavior as between countries in this cyber space . And they were making some good success, some Good Progress up until 2017. And by that i mean there was at least a general consensus that the basic principles of International Law embodied in things like the u. N. Charter were relevant to cyber space. Thats is if something happened in cyber space that produced the equivalent of an armed attack then the victim had the right of selfdefense, thats sort of the basic principle of International Law dealing with security. What happened in 2017 was this basic sort of consensus that well understood norms of International Law applied to cyber broke down. The cubans were sort of the most vocal cause of the breakdown, but i think its well understood that the russians and the chinese also diverted this consensus for entirely political reasons. So that there is not now even a kind of formal International Consensus that some of these basic norms apply. Okay. So what then is left for International Law to do . One thing might be to try to engage the russians very directly in a kind of bilateral discussion about certain kinds of behavior that takes place in cyber space. And i think our moderator evelyn has suggested that is going to be quite challenging. Maybe we could talk a little bit more about whether that could ever happen. But there is a model for that, and that model is between the u. S. And the Chinese Government related to economic espionage, most of which was occurring in cyber space. So it was a real problem, it was something we were skeptical that the chinese would agree to. And we get into a position where there was a bilateral mou with an adversary basically agreeing that a particular norm should attach to our behavior especially as it applied to cyber space. That might be one potential mod pelt theres another model which is can we as likeminded states, that is sitting down with our nato allies, for instance, try to articulate in some level of detail what norms we think are acceptable . There was some discussion in the last panel about values. What do we stand for . What are our values . We could come together as nato countries and identify what our values are as reflected in behavior in cyber space. So that would be another possibility. There is a domestic law angle too and weve already seen some of this happen. And what im talking about here is indictments of people overseas, including foreign officials for activities theyve engaged in in cyber space, including hacking. There have been indictments of people from the Peoples Liberation army, that might have been the thing that motivated the chinese to enter into an mou with us. There have been indictments of iranian officials, and there may well be nooimts indictments there have been news stories that at least six russian officials who were involved in the hacking are being investigated and potentially going to be indicted by the United States. Is it like that i these officials are going to show up at jfk airport so we can arrest hem and prosecute them . Not likely. On the other hand, it definitely cabins travel for people. It has proven very it complicates their lives, i think, in important ways. So i would say watch that space for whether the Justice Department decides to indict named russian officials, six probably more, for activities like this. A couple of other buckets, just to mention quickly. One is sanctions. We have seen sanctions imposed by the obama administration. Its Something Congress has been very interested in and has enacted laws related to sanctions imposed on individuals associated with the election interference. That is another way to make people feel pain in their pocket books through their Business Opportunities and so on. A fourth category, intelligence sharing. We and our nato allies, germany, italy, the brits, lots of these countries, mont enegro have experienced interference. So i think there are important ways in which we can share with our allies and they can share with us what are we seeing . What tools are being used . What are sort of the new iterations of tools weve seen before . And come together and think a little bit more coherently about how we can respond both in cyber and Information Operations. I understand that nato has created a center of excellence related to counterpropaganda. So thats another kind of positive place where we can put our Heads Together and figure out how to manage this. And then the fifth bucket is countermeasures. So, what ive described as all sort of fine and good and well recognized and at least public, are there things that we can and should be doing less publicly . So to take a nonrussia example, north korea engaged in a hack against sony. Reports suggest that the various Media Companies in north korea were force the offline for some period of time. I have no internal knowledge about what happened, but you might speculate that the United States made it difficult for those Media Companies to get online for some period of time. So theres this other bucket of activities, a toolkit that the u. S. Government could and probably is thinking about use ing. Well thank you very much to both of you. I think theres a lot in there for us to process. I think i want to start with the United States and United States resilience if the does relate to the legal realm because in some in some sense we need to be legally resilient as well as being resilient as a culture to false information and to cyber operations. And ready to also take action, but ill get to that in a second. But in terms of building resilience, one could argue well, its easy in the swede issue context because its a small country, you all more or less can find some Common Ground on you fiend the finnish case . Sorry, what did i say. Swedish. Almost the same. That was a terrible mistake, im so sorry. On the finnish case. And, but when were talking about the United States today, we have a very divided political arena. We have unfortunately i would argue although i havent seen any data on this, but i have seen reporting indicating that our civic our Civic Literacy, if you will, is lower than it certainly than it should be and perhaps lower than it has been in vent pas recent past. So youre dealing with a landscape thats not similar enough to finlands landscape. You can comment a little bit about what lessons you might draw from your countrys experience that could be relevant here and what are the steps we need to take . Even if some of them are more long term like obviously improving Civic Literacy that would take action along the educational front which would take some time if youre starting with primary education. Well, i like very much the comment from the second panel where they made a couple of important principal points. The first is we dont the answer already in during soviet period was that we do not have a propaganda ministry. We dont use the same playbook back. We dont act this way. Its also important, this is very much in our case, but also this should not be antirussia. It is a larger problem. And we should also analyze remember it was thomas reed who said this is of course as a presocial media even hacking, i mean, breaking codes, et cetera, on stealing reading other peoples mail, this is not a if you phenomenon, its done on different scale and methods today. But im russian and im reading a book now, transatlantic flights is good for books, im reading styling waiting for hitler. I have 700 pages to go. And he has a wonderful example which actually actually is worth quoting. And that is the famine which ravaged ukraine in the early 1930s, in 1932 the Russian Media was not allowed to use the word famine. But they did published a thing about famine saying that there was famine in poland, starvation in poland and its not a crisis, its catastrophe. In check sul vacya, the villages are dying. In china, hunger, hunger despite a good harvest and United States red lines. So theres nothing new about this. But the question is here, propaganda had a very low credibility. Its effects in the west were actually very, very at the end that in no way affected them at all. But propaganda failed also to convince its own population later in the late period of the soviet union. The situation with the russian propaganda is different. Theyre much more smarter, and this is this is of course this is of course the challenge. Im not an expert on cyber on the technical part. But theres an interesting thing is theyre hybrid operations where Information Operations come in. We had a case in which was quite exceptional or sensational in the fall of 2015. One of the sudden the russians let let third Country Nationals without documents cross over to norway, 5,000 people crossed over. After that, a thousand crossed over to finland. They just the only the only reference you can make about it is they just could not resist playing with the scare of the migration crisis in europe. I think your foreign minister at the time called. Same term we had our military officials calling it the representzation of refugees. Correct. But a result accompanied by a media media campaign. It died down one of the maybe the only really effective argument we had with russia was asking them, is this the view you have about your border, that you allow criminal organizations operate on the russian board center and this border is the best border. Were facing all kinds of very different things. This is the reason why the finnish government put up something which was mentioned mentioned in the earlier panel, European Center of excellence for countering hybrid threats. The government is also working with Harvard University on this. So it is educating your people, informing the people, and also also kind of trying to analyze what is going on. And but not playing playing the playbook back. That is an interesting example which we dont have time to get into into too much detail. But i think its interesting to note at the same time this was occurring these refugees were basically being told to good to the boarder a border and cros into these scanned n scandinavi. They were opt tune nistic. Thats important to know the again, they will be opportunistic, however, in this case it didnt work. In part it didnt work, many of you probably dont know about it. In essence that was also a failure for them because had there been a greater human cry in your country and then of course regionally and internationally, the russians may well have succeeded in attaining their objectives which had nothing to do with the refugees per se, it had more do with having us fight one another, European Countries fighting one another, fighting russia, fighting across the atlantic. And passing the message that we can harm you. Right. Right. Its kind of flagging that this is watch out, we can hafrm you. Right. But theres one point thats very important. This is the borders. Theres no country that can control a border without a partner. Think about russia and chinese border. I wont speak about the mexican border. Thank you. Just think about theres no way you can control a border without a partner. And violating this and playing with this is not something which is forgotten. They didnt achieve their aim. On the contrary, on the contrary, it left a very bad taste. Yeah. Yeah. So ashley, if you could comment on the first question and then also obviously the legal resilience from a legal perspective. And also earlier in the green room you mentioned sort of future threats we might face, like tampering with information. If you could, i hope im not asking you to go too far forward looking at what we might face in the future and how we can respond from a legal perspective. Sure. So on the resilience point, i mean, i guess one way to think about a resort to nato and sort of the likeminded democracies therein is a form of resilience. Its a form of employing existing tools and we understand each other very well, we know what our capacities are, we have all sorts of fora that currently exists. And were all experiencing similar though not identical challenges. So that might be seen as one form of resilience. You might also even cast the use of the existing tools such as the ability to impose sanctions or the ability to indict for hacking as a sort of form of look, this might seem new, but we know how to deal with some of these challenges and so were going to use what we have right now. Maybe until unless and until we can figure out a better way do it. We did talk a little bit, i was it was in part stimulated by a question from the last panel, which is were thinking about the most recent past threat challenge, the abuse of twitter and so on. But whats next . What else should we be worried about . And one thing that ive been thinking about some in my own scholarship is the misuse of things like fake videos, fake audio. Machine learning is making this increasingly realistic, easier do. And i think its easy to imagine how a country like russia that wanted to stimulate a military action by the United States against another country could use fake video do it. So, for example, it creates a fake video of kim jongun saying, okay, time to move the missiles to the launchpad and feeds that into a feed that our chairman of the joint chiefs receives and the chairman says, oh my god, here it goes. And you sort of send a country down to war against a country that has not actualably to atta actually about to attack you because have you used these increasingly sophisticated tools such as fake video do it. Its been surprisingly successful, the source checking things. Think about the Organization Called billing cat. People who are not providing information, theyre checking facts and how theyve been pinpointing for example, the downing of the malaysian aircraft over ukraine. Thats one of the most damaging examples of what has happened in ukraine which is a war of attrition as we know. So theyve been doing things where this kind of videos can be very quickly quickly identified as fakes and using geo positioning and all of that. Very sophisticated tools. And this is an ngo, its not government. I know theres a couple of finnish nationals who are working there, but its really something. Its one of those things where you realize that the that the society can act on its own. In a Civil Society, is not doesnt take it. Yeah. I was actually going to exactly make that point. I mean, i think there is a role here for a Civil Society for active and interested citizens who are doing what the bailing cat folks are doing which is essentially contributing to the investigations into the shootdown of the malaysian airliner over ukraine in 2014. And interestingly thats another case where the law is being used International Law is being used because the investigation has implicated russian actors and they will Intelligence Officers who will probably be facing some sort of retaliation legally at least if you believe the dutch government which had the largest number of citizens who lost their lives in that attack. If i could, were about to run out of time. But i do think its important to think about defense retaliation. You mentioned, you know, actions that we could take to retaliate. Clearly resilience is an important part of the equation. The only thing that i worry about is when were talking about a country like russia, unlike china which still has demonstrated that they believe in the international order, they are not acting counter to it, theyre not frying to rematryine rules of the existing order or challenge the existing frameworks. In the case of russia theres a real danger we cant turn them back from their disruptive activity and bring them into line with legal norms until, again, the cost gets sufficiently high. So until we threaten them which brings with it some kind of danger for