Transcripts For CSPAN3 North Korea Policy Part 2 20171208

Caused by Nuclear Weapons. Most people have no real sense of what a nuclear bomb means, but tarumi tanaka does have a sense. He was 13 years old and living in nagasaki when the United States dropped the atomic bomb on his city. He lived about two miles from ground zero, and somehow survived, even though the bomb devastated his neighborhood. Thats just amazing. Two days later, he and his mother visited the epicenter searching to are their family members who live nearby. Heres how he described the scene. This clip is in japanese, so im going to translate this one as well. He says houses were gone, only the steel bars of concrete buildings stood bare and hollow. Steel bars of factories were entirely bent. Everything else was a burnt field. On the way to my aunts house we saw black. Ed bodied all over the place, they probably burned underneath houses that burned down. People who died from severe injuries and burns, they were left on the ground, without being collected. Those who were gravely injured and alive were left to writhe in pain, without rescue. Well today, mr. Tanaka is a Nuclear Engineer himself and hes an activist against Nuclear Weapons and as he told us, he feels things are going in the wrong direction. Listen. He says further its especially disconcerting that the current japanese government is actively feeding the military threat. St provoking more. I want the United States to stop provoking, but instead, work to create the conditions to make dialogue possible. Of people ina lot japan might feel differently. They have seen north Korean Missiles flying over their territory. There have been air raid drills. Glyn where else could they go . Todd let me get the question out. People in japan have seen north Korean Missile tests flying over their territory. They have had air raids, sirens going off. What do you make of what mr. Tanaka has to say . I have little sympathy for mr. Tanaka. Why have they got air raid sirens going off . Be was to get a rid of the constitution. The only way to do that is to frighten the japanese people. Him 6 percentput behind, and hes going to call a referendum, so japans interest is to make every phone ring. Every time there is a north Korean Missile within 1000 miles. If you want to launch a medium range missile, there is no other direction to go. Todd so you think the government of japan has a stake in alarmism here . Glyn absolutely. They are the ones that wrecked the sixparty talks. Theyre the ones that wrecked the Six Party Talks. I understand. I have a great deal of sympathy with the issues of the abductees. They refuse to agree. This is why the North Koreans walked away and why the North Koreans have refused to go backo to the sixparty talks, because they werent a venue that was going to get anywhere. Ar frank, is the experience in japan with american Nuclear Weapons as part of their culture now obviously, does that ni experience and the nightmare of it feed into the modern japanese approach to north korea and the potential threat that they tpresent . Well, i think the threat has always been there so north koreas had Nuclear Weapons for at least ten years since 2006, so the Nuclear Shadow has been there over south korea, its been there over japan. And now with the longrange tests, its growing appreciably in the United States. G i would add that, you know, itc one thing to have the capability, doesnt mean theyre going to use it. So i think north koreas not suicidal. They know if they were ever to attack the United States or its allies that we would respond with overwhelming force and that means the destruction of the country. I think really the concern is dn that sometimes we tend to nitpick north koreas test. Or well say, they didnt achieve this, they didnt demonstrate a reentry vehicle so what north korea may do is they want to prove beyond any doubt that r they have this capability so the concern is that they would demonstrate a missile test with a live warhead that does an atmosphere detonation over International Waters and that would be a game changer for us. I think another concern for us is that north korea may now t mistakenly believe that they have a Nuclear Weapon capability so they can keep the u. S. Aside and they can run amuck and coerce south korea and do a lot of provocations for their purposes. We started with japan and lets go to south korea now el because we have another contributor that i want to help drive our discussion here. This is yooun jay kim. From the university in seoul, who has a clip here. And im going to translate this one, as well. Oh, good. I dont have to translate this one. An you can translate into korean. I can give my korean a rest. H or japanese. Well, i guess the first thing i would like to know is whys the u. S. So afraid of north korea . North korea has a very tiny army even if it gets icbms which it is working its wail towards, america still has a qualitative and quantitative military edge both in conventional and Nuclear Capabilities and so the North Koreans know that if they do anything that if this escalates to an actual conflict with america, they will just definitively lose. Why is the u. S. Making such a big deal out of north korea . Weve had a lot of analysts and experts and journalists maybe even you on the takeaway on my show explaining that sout koreans tend to be much less excited about the north korea threat than americans are, is that true . B it is true to a certain degree. South koreans have be living t with this threat for decades now and they have to go about their daily lives. A they are living in a country that is extremely competitive. They have everyday concerns that theyre much more concerned about. I remember as a child when i was visiting south korea we used to have these regular civil air raid drills at 2 00 p. M. And you have to pull your car over to the side of the road, take cover. Frankly, i think people dont even stop what theyre doing right now theyre so oblivious to some of these threats from north korea. That said, things are a little bit different right now. Ar i think the uncertainty and the lack of clarity in terms of wha President Trump might do has unnerved some South Koreans and also whats interesting is theres a growing call in south korea among some parts of the population for south korea to arm itself. I think its reflected in what the student was saying. Some people are calling to have Nuclear Weapons reintroduced to the Korean Peninsula since this is a really Interesting Development that i see happening in south korea. Frank, you have experience in the diplomatic world and were talking about the potential for military confrontations and how these societies view the threat culturally. Youve been around the negotiating table. How does the actual threat of violence, the actual threat of war if there is such a threat really inform how these discussions you were at the sixparty talks. Those were defunct. There may be talks in the future. How does that inform how talks proceed . Well, this is really the debate over whether we can have a policy of deterrence. I think the students question is a good one of i think i think frank mentioned this as well that of course north koreas not suicidal. I dont think any of us think that. I think north korea sees its icbms and Nuclear Weapons program as a way to prevent the United States from coming to south koreas aid and probably o protecting japan as well and so the question here that one that i think people have been ts struggling with is can you can you Deter North Korea . Can we a possible policy ai solution can it just be lets s just not give them all this a . Credit and intention for these provocations and lets just saya you know, do whatever you want inside but you cant attack thw United States or south korea, japan. I would say, of course we can Deter North Korea from those military strikes but the problem with that is a policy and that gets to the students question is, you cant really use that as a policy to Deter North Korea from proliferation. For example, north korea built a Nuclear Reactor in syria that was destroyed by israel in 2007. For a policy as similar to strategic patience, lets not worry about this. We can, of course, Deter North Korea. Lets focus on Something Else especially Something Else with china, then are we prepared to have a north korea Nuclear Weapons program and an icbm program that it will sell to anyone thats willing to pay for that and thats really the crux of the policy debate with north korea, which is you can have deterrence as an element of that policy, but what is the other part of that policy and thats thats where i think we get into the debate of sanctions versus diplomacy. I just want to make one last point is that a couple of times panelists up here have noted, you know, it seems like the u. S. And the japan are not interested in settling. Rere its interesting that that question really needs to be on the other side. Is north korea really interested in settling . I mean ambassador joe yooun for the u. S. Has been trying to get the North Koreans to respond and his latest response said theres no signal from north korea. If you want to have negotiations as they say, it takes two to tango, right . T if the North Koreans are not interested in negotiations, be where does that leave us . We cant just show up to beijing in the state house where the Six Party Talks were before and sit at the plenary table and say, okay, were ready for sixparty talks. It doesnt work that way. The North Koreans have shown no interest in denuclearization talks. I think they havent responded, that doesnt mean theyre not interested. I think they eventually do want to get to the negotiating table but theyre doing it on their own time line. They want to get their nuclear w Weapons Program to a point where they can sit at the table as peers. He thats what theyre thinking. I guess i would say thats the danger there. I think che was very clear in russia that she sees this or north korea sees this as an arms control negotiation. Con as a discussion amongst nuclear peers. Withthta north korea replacing ussr in those negotiations. And that is plainly unacceptable for the United States. I would argue it should be unacceptable for everyone one that we would suggest that we would accept north korea as a Nuclear Power as an end goal. Thats not naive suggesting they dont have Nuclear Weapons. Of course they do. Sh but i think we have to think you know, north korea experts have this, you know most of us have this flaw of, you know, thinking about it in silos. Rt if we accept north korea as a Nuclear Weapons power, a Iranian Regime will stand up and say, of course, lets renegotiate that nuclear deal and you know what i want, i want the north korea deal. Wh i want the deal where i can get a Nuclear Weapon. Ll so we have to be careful about the precedence that were willing to set here with regard to global nonproliferation. One moment. Ng in just a few minutes i want to tell our audience here at the institute for peace, were going to open it up to q a to all of o you. Thats coming in ten or 12 minutes. Im telling you now so you can get the juices flowing, start to think about your questions. You know all the different areas of expertise that these panelists are bringing to bear. D start to think about your questions because in the few minutes the mike is going out in the audience. So i leave you with that. Glen, go right ahead. Youre saying you have set a precedence with north korea. Youve set a precedence with israel, youve set a precedent with india. Youve set aa precedent with pakistan. I mean, thehe worlds most prolific proliferators were the pakistanis, hawking his gas centrifuges around the world. Where were the sanctions against pakistan . Where were the threats to pakist pakistan . Where were the negotiations . No, that was fine. North korea, oh, no. Theyre a big problem. So from the north korea perspective its the u. S. Thats its not being its changing the rules of game halfway through. Frank, youre the one around this table whos worked at the pentagon and you dont have a uniform on but youve worked over there. The other inevitable discussion is military action from the United States and its allies. I had admiral mike mullen on our show a couple months ago and i asked him if when he looks at the big map and looks at the military options inside the pentagon, as they relate to north korea, if any, of those options are good, he said none of them were good. Ar that was his short answer. There was a longer one but i think you have some thoughts on viable military options, if any, really exist . Is there anything the United States can do failing diplomacy here to really brush back the north Korean Nuclear and Missile Program . Mi im not going to object to what admiral mullen said. Thats my first point. Theres certainly military options. I wouldnt call them viable military options because they all entail significant loss of life. Am theres a recent Congressional Research service that came out that said even in a conventional conflict within the first few days you would have anywhere d from 30,000 to 300,000 deaths and then obviously those numbers go up exponentially when you have Nuclear Weapons involved. So that being said, theres other things you can do militarily that may not be escalatory enough that would put us in a conflict. Its hard to think a lot of what those are because i think if you have a kinetic action that strikes, even, say, one missile facility, you know that north korea will spawn. Based on history when theyre pressured they dont wilt, they certainly persevere, they almosn always fight back and retaliate. It sounds strange and it sounded strange to me the first time i read about this that theres a language of military, you call it kinetic action. I like that phrase. You have the option of a devastating strike that hits pyongyang or you can send two cruise missiles to one site and those two things say Different Things to the victim. Right . Just a pinprick strike says were not going to wipe you out were just sending a message. So interpret that as message sent. Does that type of language work with the North Koreans . The North Koreans have to ni interpret whats happening and theres a danger they misinterpret whats actually happening. Thats the first problem because theyre acutely aware from studying the iraq war and the ct rest that they literally have om minutes to make a decision. Lets hope they appreciate the distinction between two missiles landing somewhere and a fully fledged assault. Thats the first problem you actually face. And secondly, yeah, there are talks about pinprick strikes. Theres talk about if you want shooting down a missile in flight, you might get away with that because kim jongun can actually say that was a missile failure. You strike or disappearing a submarine or hitting a t. L. On the ground . Hes not going to survive very long with his own administration. This is not a man on his own. His military agree with what hes doing as well, so hes not going to survive if he doesnt fight back. How about bringing down a Computer Network with some very creative worms and viruss . I think ive seen that before. Hang on. The u. S. Is doing that and why do you think the missiles are failing. W the North Koreans woke up to that and rewired their whole rt Missile System or whatever and they started to work. They also read the newspapers about what the israelis and americans were doing in iran. So fine. Thats going on. I think that would work. Its not a very computer oriented society. Li its not quite like the states or europe. They can get by without computers probably better than anybody else can. Jeanne, lets get back to kinetics for a second, because the United States has thousands of troops in south korea huddled on a couple of bases as i understand it within range of north korean artillery. So we have to think two or three times about the ramifications of even a pinprick strike. United states has 28,000 troops in south korea and in the region, 80,000 troops and we have we have 200,000 americans in that part of the world. So this is there are huge risks to any kind of kinetic i dont even know what kinetic action means. There are huge risks to any action that could spark or trigger military conflict not just to the Korean People or japanese but to americans as well. When i hear the words military options, we do hear the president threatening invery vague terms that hes going to do something or handle it, but to me military options usually means were going the americans are going to remind north korea that they have some powerful tools in the region, powerful force in the region nuclear operated weaponry that they could unleash if they wanted to. So and also remember that they carry out joint military drills, exercises, twice a year with south korea. The North Koreans see this as provocative and consider it a rehearsal for an invasion. Tith i think this is something thats really dangerous right now because we have just to remind you that theres a Winter Olympics coming up in h south korea in february, so this is something certainly on the mind of the South Koreans. The americans and the South Koreans have a joint military exercise thats going to overlap with part of the olympics and the paralympics. So this is a huge concern, as well. Thats always the start of the s cycle of tension on the Korean Peninsula. So thats but thats also another sort of military option, is these joint military exercises. Im not sure i answered your question. No. You did after a fashion because i know the whole idea of k kinetics is weird to you and it is to me a little too. Let me go to one more video clip. This one is from shanghai from an Office Worker in shanghai, china who asked not to be re identify. Im not sure if im translating this one or if its translated idt i guess well find out. Entified. Im not sure if im translating this one or its translated but i guess well find out. If you ask whatever consult south korea or solicit help from south korea or china and if they dont help or they dont want to be engaged what will the u. S. Proceed . She wants to know if the u. S. Would engage help with south korea or with china. Its actually a good question. Former ambassador chris hill was on our show just the other day, former ambassador leader of the sixparty talks, where you were, anthony, he said that one of the motivations he saw on the part of the north right now is to drive a wedge between the United States and south korea, that these increasingly sophisticated missile tests are designed to divide the United States away from its allied relationship with the south. What do you think about that . Absolutely. One of the Major Concerns in seoul right now is something they call korea passing. Its the concern or fear that theyre being bypassed and that the u. S. And north korea are in the middle of some sort of move toward bilateral discussions that wont involve south korea. South korea wants to be part of the discussion. They are really the ones whos lives are at stake here so theyre desperately trying to make sure they are at that table and at part of those discussions. Weve got an ideological difference between the current president of south korea and the president of the United States. The president of south korea comes from his parents were born in north korea so they were refugees from north korea. He has a much more holistic i think sense of the Korean Peninsula, he sees hes concerned about the future of the north Korean People as well. So he doesnt want the obliteration of either south korea or north korea. Its a little bit at odds i think of course right now hes very angry about the provocations especially with the olympics coming up so he is trying to be tough but he does eventually want engagement so theres a little bit of a difference in policy and approach between the u. S. And south korea but he also wants to be at those discussions, does not want north korea to create a situation where the North Koreans are only talking to the United States or the United States is only talking to north korea and not including seoul. Anthony, do you see the United States vulnerable to a play, if you like, from pyongyang to divide us away from our allies, from the South Koreans . Well, you know, i guess thats the part that surprises me the most. I would say that kim jongun was very good at doing that and very strategic. His father, very strategic in getting incentives for giving up his programs. And, of course, we all know that he didnt give up his programs. Thats pretty obvious. I was surprised with the election of south korean president moon jaein that kim jongun didnt make an overture towards south korea to divide south korea from the United States. It doesnt seem like that has happened yet. Certainly could be something that he winds up doing. I think that unfortunately jeans right, of course shes right, moon jaein would prefer to have a different north korea policy than he is currently. His north korea policy in his view unfortunately is aligned with the tougher policy that the United States wants now, whether its deploying thad or making statements about stronger sanctions. I think he would much prefer opening talks about about the north south industrial complex. And we can talk about how that violates sanctions but thats for another day. Hed much prefer a trip to pyongyang and a conversation and talking about the olympics and having, you know, ceremonies associated with that, but he cant do any of that. Thats what he ran on and he cannot do that. Thats what surprises me that kim jongun has not taken that opportunity having that administration in south korea to really drive a wedge between the United States and south korea. Hasnt done it yet put maybe he will. Frank, is kim aware that the United States does not have an ambassador in seoul right now because he might have an opening here if he wants to sew this kind of dissension that he has an opportunity to sow. We dont have an ambassador to south korea. I do think that point is maybe exaggerated because we have definitely a strong cohort of career officials at the state department that do their jobs very well but it reflects concern amongst people in south korea and in the region about the lack of attention given the diplomacy. I dont think youre short of people giving sensible advice. Youve got general vincent brooks whos an exceptionally good man. I wouldnt worry about whether childs is going to arrive in seoul any day soon. Thats not the problem. Whats interesting, of course, is clearly kim jongun is not trying to divide if you want south korea from the United States because hes not made the kind of offers youd expect him to make. Clearly thats not one of his aims. What would you expect him to do if that were one of his aims . What would be his best play now if he were trying to drive that wedge which a lot of people expect . I dont think hes terribly interested at the moment. He was probably interested back in july when he thought that there could be a difference but then moon jaein made the decision that he couldnt afford to be further than lips and teeth away from trump. Because the danger was that south korea was going to be left out of the decisionmaking loop and that was going to be bad news for south korea. I fully agree that the South Koreans dont trust President Trump so in the shortterm theyre going to cleave to him as closely as possible in the medium term theyre seriously talking not about u. S. Nuclear weapons but developing their own Nuclear Deterrent because they dont trust the United States and maybe rightly. You actually trade washington for seoul. On that basis theyre doing to be looking after their own interests. The one thing we might see out of this is if south korea goes nuclear, japan will follow within 15 minutes and were going to get a whole new environment there but i think thats the situation, the North Koreans realize that the results that they have to talk to the United States. Nobody else really matters in the end. So thats the solution. Theres a bit of peripheral work with the south with the people paying the bills because donald trump was not going to ask congress to pay any bills for north korea and even if he did he wouldnt get it so its going to be the South Koreans doing the heavy lifting with maybe some assistance from china, European Union, possibly depends how long it takes japan. Just one or two minutes left before we go to our final break and then on to questions from our distinguished audience here. We talked a lot about sticks and sanctions and a lot about ratcheting down. Lets give a moment of lip service to carrots. Shall we . Anthony youre the sanctions man. Talk about carrots for a moment. It may only take you a minute. What positive motivation do we have to offer the north right now and should we . Sure. Im probably the rare person that talks about sanctions that thinks we should be talking to north korea directly. I distinguish between talks and negotiations. I think that its valuable to talk to north korea directly. Im going to avoid listing out carrots because i would say my criticism of our negotiation strategy is that we would negotiate for both sides. In other words, we determine what we want from north korea denuclearization and how we get to that point and then we determine, you know, what were going to tell north korea, were willing to give them in order to achieve that goal. Its north korea that should tell us what they need from us in a negotiated settlement. We shouldnt be coming to the table with a list of here are the number of sanctions we can release, heres the amount of heavy fuel oil we can give you, these are just past incentives weve given them and i would just say my final point would be that is the one area that were not talking a lot about. What would be the negotiations strategy in a renewed Six Party Talks . Remember, 2005, Six Party Talks says no nuclear program, no Nuclear Weapons for north korea. Thats certainly not what the iran deal negotiated. Right . So wed have to discuss that and then we have to think about how do we flip it on its head and get north korea to commit to denuclearization up front. The flaw in the negotiations and in the 2000s and the 1990s was that we accepted this long drawn out negotiation that in the end did not lead us to denuclearization. Anthony, i think there might be a book in your future on the fine art of making deals. You think theres a market for that. I think that one might be written, but art of the deal . Has it. Jean, carrot . So i just want to followup on something you mentioned which was i agree if were going to figure out what it is they want, we have to understand who they are and what they want and how to reach that and unfortunately at this point in time we have were at a point where we have almost no access and theres almost no interaction part of that is what we call the new york channel has been silent to a certain degree. Thats the north Korean Mission to the u. N. Also we have a travel ban in place on americans right now starting in september. It will be good for at at least a year. It prohibits most americans from traveling to north korea. Theres still little opportunity for us to get to know who we are. Thats certainly a concern of mine. If we dont know who they are how do we even know how to punch them or reach out to them. But in terms of a carrot, one of the interesting things when donald trump was campaigning was that he said i would sit down with kim jongun and have a hamburger with him and i have to say it was intriguing. There are reasons why you dont do that because it really legitimizes the person youre sitting down with and thats certainly a concern. But i can tell you that thats exactly what kim jongun wants. It was an intriguing proposal put out there and im very interested to know if that could ever happen. A little bit of burger diplomacy which means legitimacy, frank, is that a good carrot . That is a good carrot. So we know exactly what north korea wants because theyve stated it repeatedly and i believe at this point the price has probably gone up. So we know that they want to keep their Nuclear Weapons. They want relief from sanctions. They want an end to u. S. Hostile policy which means end to military exercises, removal from u. S. Forces from the Korean Peninsula. Economic concessions. We know what they want. Its just a matter of what are we willing to concede that allows them to get to the table or eventually get the goals that we want. A peace treaty which is part of all its a bushel of carrots. I asked for one carrot. You gave me a bushel of carrots. Glen, one carrot. Peace treaty. Thats a big carrot. Thats a bug bunny sized carrot. Yeah. A peace treaty as simple as that. Come to the table. Yeah. Youre not going to get one vote in congress for a peace treaty with north korea. This is part of the problem. Some of the things they want are impossible to deliver so lets be realistic. You have to see it the other way around. Some things the u. S. Wants and we want the European Union would really like the North Koreans to give up their Nuclear Weapons. You cant get. Because you cant deliver some of the things they want. Lets be realistic about meeting in the middle some where. It seems to me the u. S. Interest is really about stopping them definitively, having the ability to hit the mainland usa. Forget about the Nuclear Weapons. Thats gone. That ships sailed. That ship sailed in 2010 i think which was the last time they mentioned the possibility of getting rid of their Nuclear Weapons. Another book in your future, glenn, impossible carrots. I already have a title for you. Well take another short break for just about a minute or two and that will give all of you time to get your questions ready. You have an opportunity to question these experts yourself. Stay with us. [ applause ] thanks very much. Well have a microphone circulating. If well have a microphone circulating. If you have a question just raise your hand. Well have the mike come down to you and todd will call on you. And wrap it up then. Also, make sure to when you ask a question, just identify yourself. And then if you have a particular panelist you it addressed to, make sure you identify who you want to address the question to, okay . Also after, were going to do a couple quick radio things, quick retakes. It will take two minutes of your time. Also, immediately after, were going to do a couple quick radio things. A couple quick retakes. So it will take two minutes of your time. Just little radio stuff. So just hold off right when we do a couple of quick things. To make the radio show sound good. So just beware of that. This is a radio show. Its going to be all cut together on your local mpr station. Like we always say on the show that i work on, this show relies on you and this part of the show definitely relies on you. Do not be shy. Youre here because you care so this is your chance to get in and i definitely want to hear from you. So please get in there and well start in just one second. Okay. Welcome back, everyone, to our program. Brinksmanship u. S. North korea relationship. Here at the United States institute of peace in washington, d. C. Were pleased to welcome back our panel. U. S. Ip, fraum aum, jean lee and glyn ford on the end. One last little round of applause, if you would. [ applause ] now its time for you to have your say in your questions. Ive asked plenty and im looking forward to a break. All i have to do is point to the audience and hands are already up so theres going to be a mike coming around the room. Identify yourself and who youd like your question to go for. Lets start with the woman with her hand up right up there. Hello, my name is bailey odonnell, im a freshman at American University studying International Affairs with an area in national security. Human rights and conflict resolution. Id like to address mr. Aum and ruggiero. I called him frank before and his name anthony. Is making a deal with north Korea Possible or do you think youre arguing with a child who wants a cookie but you cant give them the cookie but they really want the cookie . And if military intervention is preventible or necessary . I think a deal is possible but its at the moment its looking very unlikely because i feel what the u. S. Wants and what north korea wants is so fundamentally irreconcilable. I think the u. S. Is saying north korea is saying that we absolutely want to deep our Nuclear Weapons and the u. S. Is saying north korea absolutely cannot keep its Nuclear Weapons. So if you take this all or nothing maximalist approach then there really isnt space for diplomacy. I think there needs to be a little give or there needs to be focus or a shift away from that singular focus on denuclearization and a look at more practical, achievable, intermediate steps that give us the political space to later on tackle some of the harder issues. I would ill start there. I would just remind people that weve tried the middle ground. Right . Weve tried it a couple of times. When we tried it in the 1990s, north korea built a covert uranian program which was another path to Nuclear Weapon. And then we tried it again in the sixparty talks, and north korea was building a Nuclear Reactor in syria and even after that was destroyed by israel, the United States continued its negotiations removing north korea from the state sponsor of terrorism list, blowing up the cooling tower and none of that worked. I think we have to be very clear eyed suggesting that theres this middle ground here. That sounds like the possess is pessimist, but im actually the optimist. I do believe there is a negotiated settlement where north korea denuclearizes and how do you achieve that is the type of sanctions that i was describing earlier. I know that everybody is a pessimist when it comes to sanctions but there will come a time when chinese banks are punished for what they did for north korea and then you will have chinese banks on the front lines identifying north korean money that is sitting in china that is used for the elites, for the military and for the Weapons Programs. And what kim jongun is going to have to decide is which of those are most important. Now he gets to rank those one a, b and c. What happens when he has to rank those one, two and three and thats going to be the issue for him. His revenue is going to dry up, his relationship his economic relationship with china is going to dry up, and that is the leverage that the United States can use to bring a negotiated settlement. We dont have that leverage now and i think we shouldnt get caught up in the provocations that distract us. Its a deliberate attempt by north korea to distract the United States from denuclearization. Anthony, how hard are you working to raise this strategy up to the Trump Administration and to convince them that iran style sanctions are the way to go . I think they already know that. I think that we certainly have conversations with them. I think theres some great work being done by organizations here in the u. S. And d. C. In particular, c480s, for one, has written two groundbreaking reports on chinese networks. If c 4080 s can find it some of the largest banks in the world in china can find it. I would also say capitol hill is watching. Some of the sanctions that were passed last year and this year an executive order 138 and 10 that was issued by this administration in september are carbon in some cases carbon copies from the sanctions program in iran. The issue here is the United States administration willing to go and implement those sanctions and in this case means going after china and are other countries willing to move past from north korea. Were seeing some positive. Over 20 countries have reduced commercial or diplomatic relationships. We need to see more but that is only been in this really over the last year. Interesting. Thats the place to watch over the next year or two i think. Lets go i dont want to give you too far to walk. Can we go down to the front to this gentleman here . Hello. Fascinating discussion. Im michael marshal. From the global peace foundation. Id like to hear from ms. Lee and mr. Ford who spent extensive time in north korea on their take on changes within north Korean Society particularly as it effects the elites . The people in pyongyang, how important are they and whats going to happen if their standard of living is steadily climbing starts to decline and also the nexus between marketization and elite corruption . Thank you. Jean, go first. The elites in pyongyang or the population of pyongyang is extremely important to the regime or to the leadership. Some people describe north korea as having a poor economy. I like to think of it a little bit like a monarchy in a sense. You have to keep a certain number of people happy in order to win their loyalty, so thats extremely important. And remember that until until fairly recently so many of the elites of pyongyang were working or traveling overseas, the flights that i used to take were packed with North Koreans who were doing business overseas, studying or had other reasons to go overseas. Were seeing some of that stop now because of some of these sanctions but that meant that they were exposed to what life was like outside their country so they were developing a taste for some of these creature comforts. Iphones. I used to think just like me, North Koreans would have to until 2013, they would have to lock their iphones up or their samsung phones up in lockers at the airport. Now they can take them in once they register them but often saw them with these devices they became very comfortable with. In some sense what weve seen since kim jongun took power say lot of effort to make sure to keep that population happy. So ive been traveling there for almost ten years and i can tell you that its changed this is a country where change comes at a glacial pace and thats because he knows he needs to keep those people happy. He needs to give them those comforts. Whether or not sanctions effect their access to this kind of these kinds of comforts i do think that were starting to see some of those fishers. Weve had quite a number of high profile defections from that elite class in the last year so perhaps theyre starting to see that theres a strain on even that population in pyongyang. Glyn . The people of pyongyang are extremely important and its been very clear since iran 2008 that theres pyongyang was always privileged but theres been an enormous further privileging of pyongyang. Youve now got restaurant shops. Youve got a dolphin area, water parks, outdoor ice skating rinks in summer, horse riding stables and you cant have a ski slope in pyongyang but youve got one. Youve got packaged holidays. Enormous privileging. You have borders around pyongyang. Anybody can leave but coming back in you need permission, so this is a closed city and its very important for kim jongun to actually deliver to those people which is the point im making. He believes he has to do two things which is, he needs Nuclear Weapons to stop regime change, syria, libya and iraq and he needs to grow the economy. Now theres a degree of incompatibility there and thats the trick hes actually got to pull off. Now, maybe the sanctions will work. I suspect that at a certain point china is going to get fed up. The notion you can push china around as some third world country i suspect doesnt work any more. President xi will say enough is enough and you start interfering with chinas banks in a big way and enough will be enough. [ inaudible question ]. I dont know but im pretty convinced that there is a level of corruption in north korea. Its probably not entirely dysfunctional if you look at levels of corruption around the world, nigeria barely functions because of corruption. There are other places where their functional. I dont think its interfering with the functioning of the system. Its like japan. In a way. You have the same kind of networks. Most of the industrys most of import exports are connected to a ministry, to a military unit, to a section of the party. There theyre the protected ones. And you have people going out, creating the marketplace. Some make a lot of money. Most end up in the hands of loan sharks and lose their homes and their possessions. But thats capitalism. What they want at the moment is they want two countries one system thats what North Koreans want. They want a separate north and south. 25 years to grow their economy. And then theyll be in a position to unify. Lets see some more hands, if we can. Maam, there in the black sweater. My name is maria. Im with Korean Center for peace building. Thank you for this discussion. My question is about talks. And what is the right way to go about encouraging those talks, who are the right players to, lets say, mediate those talks . It seems the situation is too polarized between the u. S. And north korea for there to be really direct talks without some sort of facilitation. So my question is, first of all, when you talk about the elites, are there people within that group that can be harnessed to be to come up with some sort of platform for talks . Are there intelligentsia that can be drawn, or only people from the party, Political Parties that can be engaged . If you could talk about the potential for talks and how that might come about, that would be great. Jean, would you like to take that one . Its not dennis rodman, i know that. Does one of you want to take on the background . Youre talking about direct talks . Or even say track two talks . Well, ill make a quick point. Im sure glyn has something to say. So i want to reenforce a point that anthony made. Ill provide some background. Early 2015, north korea actually originated their proposal for a dual freeze, which china has taken up the mantle on, and later in the fall of 2015, they also proposed peace party talks. They have been proposing talks, certainly, in recent years. I think anthony is right that recently, at least since september, so they have been silent. So if we dont have that partner on the other end, its hard to see how. Things may change, things are fluid, but i think you need to have a willing partner. I suspect youre going to get a willing partner. I mean, as i say, i think the announcement, the best news of the third icbm was the announcement by kim jongun that hes now finished his program. The logic of that, its in the near future, they will now be willing to talk. He didnt have to say that. I suspect if the u. S. Doesnt get down to talking or if the talks fail, hell carry on with the program. I mean, you look at the history of the United States development of Nuclear Weapons, you have a series of attacks. Io develop a particular weapon and a bit later, you start another series of tests and develop something different. There are places for him to go, but at the moment, theres a pause on it. Whos next . Lets go to this gentleman down in the third row, please. Also with the black sweater. Thats our theme. Aaron from the university of melbourne. So two questions. One is ive heard plans to close the sanctions office in the department of state, and i wonder if iranian sanctions are the way forward, to implement that regime. And the second is that the 2013 Crisis Group Report on north korea suggested a positive way forward is really to avoid state tracks and to focus on sporting exchanges. Private sectors or rather venture travel, to open up new links. I wonder if anyones got some good examples of where they have been able to continue despite the travel ban situation. Anthony, go ahead. I wasnt able to hear the first question on sanctions. Would you mind, if you restated your question just a little louder. And use a radio trick. Get right up close to the mike. Yeah, my apologies. Thats the one. I heard theres plans to close the sanctions office within the state department. And so i wonder if thats going to reduce the capacity of the u. S. To implement the iranian style regime. I would say that the decision to close the sanctions office in the state department, i think that a lot of those responsibilities are going to be moved to other elements of the state department. And im sure there will be others, whether its in the policy Planning Branch or in the east asia office, that will be able to get other countries to implement north korea sanctions. I think what we saw also in the iran sanctions was that the Treasury Department actually played a larger diplomatic role where you have the undersecretary for the Treasury Department going overseas, meeting with banks and companies and countries directly and describing the sanctions. So im not, you know, i wouldnt focus as much on bureaucracies. I would focus more on are the right sanctions in place . Is the Trump Administration actually implementing those sanctions . And are they pushing countries to be consistent in their interactions with north korea . Music to Rex Tillersons ears who tells us there is no hollowing out going on at the state department. Wont comment on that, but i think that traditionally, secretaries of state have different priorities. And it was only a couple years ago that the sanctions office did not exist. And we were fine with sanctions. Good enough. He had a second. Oh, im sorry, yes, you did. Did you want that question for glyn ford. Did you catch it, his question . Restate it one more time. Were going to do the loud mike. Im stealing mike time here. So the same question was about the 2013 international Crisis Group Report, which called for positive moves forward in terms of sporting exchanges. Private sector initiatives, so Adventure Travel programs. And not just from the u. S. But from around the world. I wonder if the panel has some positive examples of where thats continued despite the travel ban situation. I think sports, you mentioned sports. Sports diplomacy has some potential. One of the only way North Koreans can get overseas right now. We have an opportunity with the upcoming olympics. We dont know if the North Koreans are going to send a delegation. They have a pair of skaters who qualified. But sports is always one area. The North Koreans know this, as well, and they try to take advantage of that. So there is some potential there. But a lot of other avenues where peopletopeople engagement have been cut off. No areas for soft power of vacation planning to the grand canyon or suburbs of pyongyang . No. The more you engage the North Koreans the better if you want to change the regime. I mean, have engagement. Disengagement is entirely the wrong approach. I mean, i pick lithuania, im sure there will be a lithuanian here. If lithuania cuts off diplomatic relations, it doesnt mean a damn because they dont have diplomatic relations. In a meaningful sense of the term. The United Kingdom has an embassy in pyongyang. I think it would be crazy for us to close the embassy from pyongyang and throw out North Koreans from britain. We want a dialogue. How the hell do you talk to them if you throw them out . The more engagement, the better. Every time they send over an icbm, i would engage more. Keep it quick. Just to be clear, i just want to point out the differences in evaluations. After ten months, people want to declare sanctions dont work. But after decades of engagement with north korea, that have not produced the type of regime that we want, the answer is more engagement. So i think we have to be consistent in how we evaluate our approach to north korea. 64 years of sanctions. No, we actually havent. 64 years of sanctions. We can have that conversation. Every time we have new tougher sanctions, nobody says this isnt going to work because were just playing. Every set of sanctions is going to be the one that works. Happy to send you my work. We can have that conversation. Im going to declare sanctions on this part of the debate to make sure that the audience has more questions. This gentleman on the end. Garrett redfield. I work at the institute for defense analyses. My question is for frank. Given you have been removed from government and no longer under the bureaucratic thumb, so to speak and able to speak your mind and be a little bit candid, im hoping you can provide insight into how much care and consideration was given to past policy towards north korea under clinton and bush. And i ask that because an individual who you may know who i had atlength discussions with evans revere, was paid to be at the time the first u. S. Ambassador to north korea. And he mentioned at the time state did have that on the table, all the things north korea wanted, the peace treaty, lifting of sanctions, and it didnt work. Thats why im curious to know how much under the Obama Administration there was that care and consideration to what the u. S. Had done in the past. Thats a great question. Yeah, i could talk for a while on that. First of all, i would say that u. S. Institute of peace is funded by congress. Technically, were an independent organization, but were also mindful, so i wouldnt say that i feel completely free in saying things. Oh, slithering out of this one. That being said, so youre right. I think theres some discussions. I think the late 90s about developing a special interest section in pyongyang, and people at the state department were studying korean to eventually go and serve in that special interest section. I will say that the Obama Administration gave careful consideration to its policies and obviously, i was a member of the administration, so i may sound biased, but i would argue that certainly, it tried diplomacy early on in the first term. And we saw that leading to two deals. One is the deal in february 2012, which was a moratorium on Nuclear Missile Testing Exchange for 240,000 tons of food aid. There was also a deal that people dont know much about, which is on remains. There was a deal for u. S. Soldiers to go into north korea and help recover the remains of over 5,000 sets of u. S. Servicemen from the korean war. That fell by the wayside when north korea conducted a satellite launch in april 2012. I think in the second path of the Obama Administration, that was basically, thats the same policy that trump is using right now. So the Trump Administration policy is an extension of what obama did, which is maximize pressure and build a coalition of the International Community to put pressure and isolate north korea. I think anthony would agree that the Trump Administration has probably done they have really emphasized the maximize part, so you may see some differences, but i think the strategy is basically the same. I think the Trump Administration, to its credit, has done a great job in pressuring not just north korea but china, and im sure anthony can list all the things china is doing over the last year that suggest that the pressure is working. Satisfied . Good question. Theres a man in the back with his hand held high. Thank you. My name is kevin grave, based at the wilson center. I have a question, again, on sanctions. So i guess this is directed at anthony. But i think theres an assumption in what you say and what many people say about sanctions. In that the more strong they are, the more successful theyre likely to be. But im not sure thats necessarily the case historically, if you look when sanctions have been applied. I mean, i think the strongest sanctions were not against iran but against iraq in the 1990s, which went on for years. And led to, you know, by some accounts, to the death of half a million premature death of half a million children. Theres a huge human cost. I think the reason for that is that sanctions work through very specific its not just about how strong they are, but its about the political and socioeconomic mechanisms through which they actually induce change. If you look at north korea, i think its one of the countries that is least susceptible to sanctions because of the nature of its politics and its economy, as well, which is very selfsufficient. North korea, its not only authoritarian, but its almost totalitarian. It doesnt have splits between elites like iran did. It doesnt have a Civil Society like south africa did. So you know, all these things make me very skeptical about the capability of sanctions to induce policy change in north korea. Why dont we keep it there. Thats a really fine place to stop and get an answer. From anthony. Sure. Yeah, i mean, i have heard a lot of these arguments. I think that, you know, i think we have to look at what is north korea spending its money on. And thats what i mentioned earlier. I think that the comparison i made with iran is more that iran was targeted financial sanctions. I think the iraq example was more during the time when we had more of a broadbased, countrybased sanctions program, which i think if you look at the end of the iran program, we were probably closest to that. But the rampup was whats considered targeted financial sanctions. I think were somewhere in the middle, maybe toward the end of that process with north korea in the sense of whats already been implemented. But yeah, i agree. I think the issue here is that this is not a regime that cares a lot about its people. And so i have heard this many times as a criticism of sanctions, that the north Korean People will just continue to suffer, and that sanctions wont. When it really is the north korean regimes fault. The issue here is how do you restrict the revenue that is going to the three levers that theyre using for regime survival and that they dont have to make that determination now . The elites, the military, and the Weapons Programs. The one thing that the North Koreans have helped out in this regard is keeping some of that money or in some cases maybe all of that money in china. And so the issue here for north korea is going to be if china starts to restrict that, voluntarily or involuntarily how will they react . And then the question you raise of how will that react amongst the elites . And then within it Civil Society. Those are certainly open questions. The way we went wrong but eventually we got to a point where there were severe pressures on their economy. And in the case of iran, one of their commodities in the sale of oil that was restricted overseas and that they got to a point where thet leverage, they had had to release that pressure. I think theres one other way to look at sanctions and thats to look at it as a possible tool to diplomacy. You also want to have if youre on the other side of the eventual negotiating table. If you walked into negotiations today, we dont have a lot of leverage and when i talked about deterrent not preventing proliferation, if were not getting to denuclearization, rilts its a. And they could be hurting ordinary north korean men and women and children and not the elite. We have just four or five minutes before were going to wrap up. The places i want to wrap up before you leave us today with what i think is the bottom line of this discussion. Were going to go to each of you. Youre going to get the last word on this. Ill give you the last word slot. How urgent is this problem . This problem we spent the last 90 minutes talking about . Are we closer to war than we were 20 years ago . Absolutely. Quite how close we are i dont know. But the bulletin of atomic scientists used to have the famous clock advancing towards midnight which is when the next nuclear war would happen. Now i would say were one minute away from midnight now. If you talk to people in washington about what the possibilities are, they talk 10, 20, 30 . Those are incredibly high numbers because if you ask someone 10 years ago, we were down around zero. Were in a worrying position and it seems to me the only way you get out of that, there are three roads to war. One is to take military action, one is covert action, the u. S. Policy of change regime, the third one is sanctions. Do we think kim jongun is going to engage in military adventurism and the fourth one, the only peaceful solution is through negotiations and the sooner we get there, the better. Tweeting and increasingly sophisticated tests. Are we actually closer to confrontation than we were . Theres so much potential to be drawn into some sort of conflict. We have 80,000 troops in the region. How many more from north korea, south korea poised and ready. Braced. I mean with this last missile test, it was not long after that the south korean army conducted its missile test. Im not as concerned about the prospect of nuclear war but i am concerned about every test and the dangers posed not only in terms of safety. Theres an entire mountain in north korea that collapsed after the last nuclear test. Think of all the radiation that was transmitted into the air. The next one might be above ground. Hugely dangerous and i want to mention the cost to the north Korean People. This is an expensive program and they are diverting resources away from basic infrastructure. So normally in the past this is the time of year i was in north korea, freezing. They dont have heat, they dont have electricity. Clean water. Running water, toilet. I mean its a difficult place to live and by allowing this program to continue were taking food out of the mouths of average North Koreans. So i just want to remind you that the people of the Korean Peninsula are also paying a price. Your final thoughts if were actually closer to war than we were. You know i dont think were closer to a military conflict or war. I am concerned that north korea will engage in a military action like they did seven years ago. To sink a south korean naval vessel and kill over 40,000 north korean sailers. Concerned that the North Koreans will interpret really our inaction in 2010 as an ability to do Something Like that. I think thats really the danger i see that something happens and that it escalates quickly. I would also say that we have be to careful about creating these creating these mind sets that we can just have some talks with north korea and that we will magically be able to wave a magic wand and solve this issue. I think we need to be very careful about the drive by beijing, in particular, to drive up the danger and say that were going to have a military conflict and the only solution is a flawed nuclear deal, a freeze for freeze. I think that makes us more dangerous. I think the 70 day over 70day pause clarifies that north korea continues these programs even when we think that theyre already stopped. So the only solution, the only peaceful solution right now continue with sanctions to create the leverage for denuclearization talks. I think at the current trajectory, the situation is very urgent. Either President Trump is serious about what hes saying. So when he says fire and fury, when he says the calm before the stof storm, the window is closing. He either means it, in which case the situation is urgent. Or hes bluffing where we continue to contain north korea, continue to turn north korea but at the same time we open ourselves up to a situation that anthony mentioned which is where we stumble into a conflict because of a provocation. I dont want to leave it on a pessimistic note. I think again the situation is fluid. I believe in sanctions. I believe in the saying that sanctions dont work until they work. I think theyre necessary but also theyre not sufficient. It same applies for diplomacy. Diplomacy doesnt work until it works. The grief framework working for eight years. It prevented the plutonium processing at young gun for eight years. So i think theres always a potential but the situation has to change from both the north korean side and the United States side. I want to thank all of you for joining us for this program today. Its been a pleasure for me. I want to thank our host here. Thank you so much. Glen, thanks to you. Its been a pleasure and thanks for having me as part of this. Its been a lot of fun. Have a great weekend, everybody. [ applause ] thank you all so much. Thank you for those good questions. Hold on one sec. You could just say frank, gene, for editing purposes. If you want to watch, youre welcome to watch it. It doesnt look like much, i promise you. Three, two, one. Glen, frank, gene, anthony. Its magic. When you hear it on the radio, i remember that part. Works great on tape. Thank you all. You need an outro . Read the first clip