Transcripts For CSPAN3 North Korea Russia And Venezuela Sanctions 20170911

To the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council has been our partner in helping to org somewheres this event. Helping to do a lot of the important work with not only other regulators but also some of our foreign partners and friends at embassies across the city. I also wanted to just give a word or two on the institute of International Economic loss. I see a good number of students here. The institute of International Economic law was focused on john jackson. The focus was on international trade. But over the last decade or so, the institute has grown to cover a number of other issues as well, including economic sanctions, financial regulations, monetary affairs. And international tax. And we have here one of the largest faculties focusing on these issues. And we like to do things in an interdisciplinary that takes an interesting take on International Economic and global affairs. That is to integrate an interdiscipliny analysis into real World Affairs talking to many of our leaders here in washington who are on the front lines of managing and navigating issues that have global import. And we have just been very fortunate to have many of these leaders here. And todays q a will be a continuation of our series of conversations. Throughout the changes at the institute of International Economic law, our dean bill traynor has been at the helm, side by side, helping the International Law faculty and the larger washington, d. C. Community think through how our academic programming as a law school can help to inform policymakers, Market Participants, diplomats, ceos, regulators and others, and its been a pleasure working with them. Bill also has a particular interest in todays talk. Bill was before becoming a law professor, he was vausked in government. And he served as the Deputy Assistant general in the office of Legal Council of the u. S. Department of justice and before that, he was the associate Council Counsel of the office of independent council in the iran contra investigation. A gift that kept giving for a while. I want, as a result, i really did want to have bill here, have the honors of doing the introductions for david and to help shepherd us into our discussion today. So bill traynor. [ applause ] i want to thank you, chris, for that kind and generous introduction and to welcome you all to georgetown law and to this very important discussion. Let me begin by thanking the institute of International Economic law for having put together todays event. Under chriss leadership, it has grown to become one of the premier forums for policy discussions. And i really want to recognize him for having conceptualized the role i can play and making it a reality. Over the last two years, and with the active participation of nearly a dozen renowned faculty members in finance, tax and trade, we have enjoyed cuttingedge programming with ambassadors, general council, regulators and ceos and were delighted to welcome reporters, cspan, students and leaders of the washington policy making community. And echoing chris, i also want to say how pleased we are to be cosponsoring todays events with the Atlantic Council. Georgetown, the ial and the Atlantic Council share a goal of promoting constructive leadership and engagement in international affairs. In todays increasingly complex world, its imperative that we do all we can to promote just that. Constructive leadership and engagement in International Law and policy. And thats what ial is about and its just a delight to have the Atlantic Council join with us today. Now david, were particularly honored to have you here with us today. Before getting into our q a, first of all, let me begin by thanking you for the Government Service you have rendered. Thats something that we particularly value at georgetown law. And we value it always, but particularly on this very significant day. Today is the anniversary of september 11th. September 11th, 2001. And that date always gives one pause to reflect on where we are as a nation, what we value, and what we stand for. Today provides a collective moment of introspection. And this has never been truer than it is today. And its never been more necessary than it is today. As we face enormous National Security and other challenges that will shape Global Economic governance, the international order, and perhaps the very future of our democracy. So its therefore fitting that we gather together today on the anniversary of 9 11 with this discussions to examine the current and evolving u. S. Sanctions regimes. As they pertain to russia, venezuela, and north korea. All nations that are the subject of potentially serious geopolitical discussions. And while russia, venezuela, and north kree are in the news quite a bit these days, there seems to be less than optimal public understanding of the different sanction regimes. They are likely success and the National Security issues that drive the background. And thats why were so honored and were just lucky to welcome david here today. David cohen served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence agency from 2015 to 2017. As the agencys second in command, he managed the cias domestic and worldwide operation and oversaw its strategic modernization. He also led the agencys performance of its five core missions. Foreign intelligence correction, all source analysis, covert action, counterintelligence and foreign liaison relationships. In addition, david led special projects focusing on the impact of new technologies on the agencies. And how best to work with u. S. Companies to advance the cias mission. And notably, in light of our conversation today, david served as the cias second most senior official during the russia hacking investigation. At the conclusion of his tenure, david was awarded the directors award and the distinguished intelligence medal. Which is the agencys highest honor. Before becoming Deputy Director, david already had a remarkable record of Public Service. He served for six years in the u. S. Department of treasury in two key positions responsible for following the money. From 2011 to 2015, he was the Senate Confirmed undersecretary for terrorism and Financial Intelligence. As undersecretary, he directed the Treasury Departments policy enforcement and intelligence functions. Aimed at identifying and disrupting Financial Support to nations, organizations, and individuals posing a threat to National Security. And he also directed two key regulatory agencies. The office of foreign assets control and the finance crimes enforcement network. He was also instrumental in developing and implementing the financial sanctions regime that brought iran to the negotiating table, that imposed costs on russia and president putin for the invasion of crimea and the fomenting of unrest in Eastern Ukraine and deprived al qaeda of funding. He also led the Treasury Departments effort to combat International Money laundering and financial terrorism. So its really and before that, he was the Treasury Departments assistant secretary for terrorist financing. Its a remarkable record of Public Service. He has hes really a unique person to be able to have this conversation today. Hes got an unmatched knowledge of terrorism, money laundering, and Nuclear Programs and a deep sense of where these issues intersect in the most dangerous corners of the globe. So although hes returned, this is the infomercial segment. Hes returned to wilmer hail to focus on cybersecurity issues. I just have to say, im so grateful that hes here today. Again, i want to thank him again for his Public Service. And i have to say, i feel like we have a protagonist in a novel joining us onstage. Let me turn matters over to david and chris. Thank you so much. [ applause ] okay. Well, i guess its good to sort of jump right into things, david. As an introductory question, i think we should have a bit of a framing conversation. What right now would you say is the state of play when it relates to sanctions . And how would you see the Trump Administrations conduct and use and deployment of sanctions as being different from that of the Obama Administration . Well, first of all, thank you, chris, for inviting me. Very excited to be here, have the opportunity to talk about what i think are some of the most fascinating issues, which is the interplay of Foreign Policy, National Security, and the tools that we have developed over the years to try and advance u. S. Interests, and its great to be here at georgetown to do that. I dont know if bill is still here, but that was a ridiculous introduction. You must never, ever do that again. So the state of play of sanctions is that i think as we sit here on 9 11 2017, again, bill is right, its appropriate to take a moment to reflect on what todays anniversary means. And it means something ing the sanctions world. It means much more as a country. Im actually delighted to talk about how sanctions can be a part of our counterterrorism effort. On this anniversary. But let me, to answer your question, i think as we sit here today, finance sanctions in particular have become an accepted and embedded tool of our National Security and Foreign Policy. That has been an evolution over time. I think it was something that during the Obama Administration and going back to the bush administration, a lot of effort was put into trying to change the landscape of the sanctions, the sanctions law and sanctions tools so we could have something thats much more nimble, much more effective. And so i think today, you pick up the paper, and whatever the National Security issue is, whether its north korea, venezuela, russia, terrorism. You know, name your issue, sanctions is a component of the conversation. And i think one sort of very interesting, its a small point, but its an interesting reflection of this, is there was legislation enacted earlier this year, i think it was actually part of the big russia iran north korea legislation. A provision in there that made the secretary of the treasury a statutory member of the National Security council. When the nsc was established in 1950 youll know the answer to that, several decades ago, there was a list of cabinet officials who were statutory members of the nsc. Secretary of the treasury was not. As a matter of practice over the years, secretary of the treasury and his its always been his, designee has always been present for deputies meetings and what have you, but its now reflected in law that treasury is in the nsc, and i think that is because theres an appreciation that the sanctions rule is a key part of what we do. Now, in terms of what has changed between the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration, one of the things we tried very hard to do in the Obama Administration was to use sanctions as a tool for a broader policy objective. You know, we were very cog znlt of the fact that sanctions are not a policy unto themselves. You dont just apply sanctions and hope that something good will happen. You apply sanctions principally to try to do one of two things. Either to affect behavior, to try to persuade whoever is on the receiving end of the sanctions to change what theyre doing. Whether its a policy or a conduct. And then the other objective is to disrupt and disable. And in particular, if you look at the counterterrorism financing sanctions, the principal objective there was to cut off the lines of financing. So the best example, in the Obama Administration of how we tried to do this was with iran. The sanctions that we imposed on iran and continue to ratchet up and expand and i think raise and we should talk about, was all part of what we call the one hand, to continue to apply increasing pressure on iran. But to always on the other side of the track, offer the opportunity for engagement. And as everybody knows, we got to a point where the iranians said, okay. Were ready to talk, after a number of fits and starts where i think the sanctions were not intense enough to get them over that hump, they got to the point where they understood that it was in their interest to negotiate rather than to continue to defy the international community. So we tried to merge sanctions with a policy objective. Now, in the Trump Administration, and its still early, and this may change as they sort of find their footing a little bit more. There is clearly a continued reliance on sanctions. You have seen it in venezuela where they have issued, you know, two different types of sanctions. So the standard additional sanctions that are designed to disable and disrupt, but then recently, just a few weeks ago, some very interesting financial sanctions aimed at the venezuelan governments ability to finance itself. Theres a lot of continued use of sanctions. Venezuela, a lot of talk in north korea. Theres some discussion, of course, of whether to relieve the sanctions on russia. What we dont see, i think, quite yet is a close tie between the use of sanctions and a policy objective. I have tried to figure out what our policy is in venezuela. I think its interesting. And other than as an expression of revulsion of whats going on there, which is you know, worthy and inappropriate reaction, its not clear to me that the sanction were applying are designed to achieve a particular outcome. Likewise, and we should talk about north korea as well. Sort of unclear how the sanctions that have been discussed with north korea are tied to what our north korea policy is. And i think thats in large part because we dont know what our north korea policy is. I think thats a distinction, as i said, it may cure itself over time as the Trump Administration refines and defines its policies to a greater extent than these variousfo various fora, but thats an area where i think theres a difference. We certainly do see at the moment an effort just today over in new york at the united nations, the Trump Administration is speaking to in effect stiffen sanctions, internationally. I guess tied to your earlier question, number one, how important is the multilateralization of sanctions in order to achieve policy objectives and does it defer dramatically across Different Countries and number two, does that process inherently require more Strategic Thinking when it comes to policy objectives . The multilateralization of sanctions is essential. For them to be truly effective. One of the reasons that financial sanctions have worked, just to be totally candid, is that we have the worlds most important economy, the worlds most important financial sector, the u. S. Dollar is the currency of choice for a huge proportion of International Transactions. The dollar transactions, whether youre the transaction is between belgium and ozer bujohn, its going to come through new york. So we have an enormous positional advantage in developing financial sanctions here in the United States because we have jurisdiction that expands around the world. That being said, for sanctions to truly be effective, you need international b buyin. You need other countries not just to be forced to have their businesses and their people subject in some respect to our sanctions and some instances, but you want those countries to embrace the policy objective. That was critical in the iran context, and you can see it as an important part of the discussions with north korea. So going back repeatedly to the u. N. Security council to get resolutions that impose sanctions and that also, importantly, these resolutions dont just impose sanctions. They also establish the international communitys uniform judgment on what north korea is doing. And that is, you know, an important aspect of developing this policy consensus that you have countries around the world magnifying what were doing domestically with what they can do under their own laws. I dont want to put certainly words into your mouth, but what im getting a sense of is number one, when youre trying to impose and persecute your international strategy, number one, you should have a strategy. But then i get the question as to what that strategy is. So on the one hand, it can be to achieve a certain Foreign Policy objective, but then youre implying that economic sanctions may not necessarily be the best tool to use if what youre trying to do is not necessarily change behavior but to either express a program or to punish just for the sake of the punishing. Right, and one of the fundamental preseptember emberps is theyre not punitive. The idea underlying sanctions is theyre an administrate frb action. Were in a law school. We can do 30 seconds on the law part here. When the basic governing statute is the International Economic Emergency Powers act that gives the president the authority to issue an executive order that then delegates the authority to impose sanctions, its an administrative process. The office of foreign assets control and the Treasury Department is an Administrative Agency that actually applies the sanctions based on the executive order that the president signed that sets out the criteria. But the idea is that if the person who is subject to the sanctions changes their behavior and is no longer doing whatever it is that got them sanctions, that they will be the sanctions will be lifted. And ofac every year delists hundreds and hundreds of people and companies because they have made the case that they are no longer doing what it is that got them sanctioned. So bearing in mind that the idea behind sanctions is to change behavior, it isnt a great tool to punish. And frankly, i think it confuses the use of sanctions and in some respects impairs the ability to get International Consensus around the use of sanctions if it is viewed as purely a punitive tool. To that end, and this gets back to our initial question because i think theres a lot more to flesh out. What is it about the sanctions, and i guess we can go country by country, but do you see any limitations in the sanctions strategy in terms of achieving even the objectives that you sought and your colleagues sought in the Obama Administration. Do you see any deployment of the sanctions strategy now that would at least undermine some of the u. S. Policy interest and strategy that you had six to nine months ago . Beginning, i should start, with north korea. So north korea is, you know, a really interesting case. North korea has been subject to sanctions for many years. And there is some view among those who follow this that sanctions have been totally ineffective and sanctions cannot be part of the solution to the north korea problem. My view is that is not right. That if you allow for the possibility that there is a negotiated resolution of some sort with north korea that will tamp down the danger of a basically uncontrolled north Korean Nuclear and Ballistic Missile program, which is i think a very small possibility, and i think today kim jongun is not so interested in negotiating about his Nuclear Program, and it may be that hes never interested in negotiating about his Nuclear Program, but my view is that we should test that proposition. But to test it, we need to have a qualitatively different approach to sanctions on north korea. Not the sort of continued additional designations of this person or that entity or hes in this bank, but to really significantly ramp up the pressure on north korea. We can talk about how to do this, but it is doable. It is not the case that north korea is sanctioned out or the most sanctioned country in the world or anything close to it. Theres a lot that is left on the table. I think a lot of people are very curious now. At least what kinds of additional measures could be taken. So we could essentially let me back up. Okay. What north korea needs is the ability to sell arms, labor, and some textiles to earn cash around the world. Okay. It needs to then take that cash, put it into Foreign Bank Accounts, use it from those accounts to purchase things to then ship back to north korea because the north korean economy is not selfsufficient. North korea is relatively isolated. It cannot sustain itself on what it has domestically. It needs to bring in both material from overseas to make its economy run, and importantly, kim jongun needs to bring in luxury goods to keep the elite and his party, you know, seniors happy with him. To essentially bride them. About a 5 billion economy that theyre running annually. All of those transactions require access to International Finance system. North korean wan is not accepted by anyone in the world. If you want to buy a mercedes to impact into pyongyang, theres no economy in the world thats going to take the wan. They want thedollars. They need to sell what they can sell, whether its labor, arms, coal, whatever it may be. Earn foreign currency in a Foreign Bank Account. Spend that of that Foreign Bank Account and bring that material into north korea. All of that is vulnerable to sanctions in a way that we have not tried heretofore to go after. The the use of secondary sanctions. Secondary sanctions are designed to affect transactions that dont directly touch the United States. So the best example going back to iran again is we designated a business in iran for supporting the iran Nuclear Program. That entity is cut off from the u. S. Any bank account they have is frozen. They are cut out of the u. S. Financial system. The secondary sanction says to a foreign business or foreign bank if you do business with that designated entity doesnt have to involve u. S. In any way. If you do business with that designated entity we will cut you off from the United States. Very powerful tool. We use it to a great effect in the iran context. We can use it in the north korea context. The rub and what makes it difficult and frankly the reason that it hasnt been done yet is unlike iran which had sort of a network of banks and businesses that they dealt with around the world, north koreas financial and business relationships are highly concentrated in china. 90 plus percent. That is their outlet for Financial Transactions, as well. So if we were to really try to squeeze north korea by imposing secondary sanctions on those entities that are facilitating the activities of designated entities in north korea we would be taking action against chinese entities. Again, my view is that we need to bite the bullet and start doing some of that to persuade the chinese to be more aligned with us in trying to bring to bear the really intense pressure on north korea that will then put kim jongun into the choice of does he want to continue with his Nuclear Program, Ballistic Missile program, at the risk of essentially the stability of his regime or like the leaders in iran. Does he want to explore the possibility of some kind of negotiated resolution where the sanctions get relieved in exchange for real serious constraints on his nuclear and Ballistic Missile program. Certainly along those lines. Sorry it was a long answer. It was a fantastic and very comprehensive answer which raises a number of larger issues and also questions that are specific to china. One of the larger issues is the question given the prevailance of the popularity, the reliance of the u. S. Dollar to what extend would the United States or should the United States consider more muscular approaches that leverage strengths in the Banking System as well as perhaps access to swift and Payment Systems . I know that generated a lot of controversy certainly with our european friends and then related to that issue is chinas efforts to build up its own International Financial infrastructure for its currency and at what point in time does that provide an alternative outlet for Financial Transactions parallel to the United States. That is one of the real interesting questions about the longterm utility of financial sanctions is does it spur the development of alternative systems for International Transactions . Does it reduce the use of the u. S. Dollar as the worlds reserve currency . There was a period where we thought that the euro would. That seems not to be much of a risk today. But it is both currency and clearing and Settlement Systems that can grow up that exclude the United States. I think its a super interesting question. It is one that i think economists have debated. I think there is a real risk to it. But the way to reduce that risk is to go back to something we were talking about earlier which is to ensure that you have policy agreements internationally, Multi Lateral policy agreements about the objective that they use in sanctions to achieve. If you have that then the incentive to find a way to protect yourself and protect your businesses and your Financial Institutions from the reach of u. S. Sanctions is reduced because theyre not just u. S. Sanctions, they are international sanctions. And the institutions that are on the receiving end of a sanction are ones that you, the foreign country, agree have earned that penalty. So but there is a real risk there and i think one that we need to be mindful of as a country. It is part of the larger dialogue and one of the strategic questions with sanctions and north korea. The United States points to more that china can do. China points to what it thinks the United States can be doing a little bit more. It sounds like what you are really doing is saying they both perhaps have a point in the sense of the United States in terms of its position of sanctions but also working with the chinese in their own backyard. The chinese have a very legitimate perspective on north korea. They have concern about the north Korean Society such as it is collapsing, refugee flows. I think they have a concern about the collapse in north korean government and loose nukes. We share some of those concerns. Chinese are also worried about what comes next. Is there a unified Korean Peninsula under seouls leadership . Something they are not terribly interested in. I think what we need to do with the chinese and the lack of personnel in key positions in our government makes it more difficult. What we need to do with the chinese is to work the diplomatic angle with the chinese and say we understand your concerns. You need to understand our concerns, how seriously we are taking this. We feel compelled to do more here. We dont relish putting sanctions on chinese entities, but we are going to have to do this if you dont help us with an approach to north korean problem that puts us in control. It aint easy. Even if the chinese were to say to us we are on board 100 lets do it, there is a lot of work that needs to get done there. The relation to the chinese and north koreans is not great. But we cant solve this problem without the chinese coming along with us. I think there is a combination of carrots and sticks for the chinese that we need to deploy. Moving a little further to russia and returning to the question about strategy as well as the actual instrument, your observation that the tactic is not the end, what do you see number one, i think that from an outside observer that the russia sanctions issue is complicated because you have on one hand issues tied to ukraine while at the same time here domestically we have questions about the hacking during the election. I guess for the record was there hacking during the election . Yeah. Okay. Im trying to establish facts. I will say one of the i would encourage everybody if they havent done it to read the declassified version of the intelligence assessment issued. It is having seen the highly claclassified version. I can tell you declassified version is really good. It has the essence of the report that was provided to then athlet president elect trump and president obama. It concludes with high confidence this was the cia, nsa, fbi and dni, that putin himself set out to interfere in our election and did so im not going to get the language precisely right but did so through the use of infoops. The objective was the first objective was to undermine our democracy. It was not a clinton trump thing. The number one thing was to undermine our democracy. The number two objective was to harm clinton and help trump. That objective of undermining our democracy is still the russians objective. They are still at it. They are at it here. They are at it overseas. They have been doing it overseas previously. It is a hugely important National Security issue for this country. And i get sort of pissed off frankly when i talk about this. The fact that this country and this government and this administration hasnt gone after this issue like the National Security threat that it is deeply disturbing because what the russians want more than anything is to destabilize this country. And we saw it in the last election. We are going to see it again in the 2018 election. We see it in europe. This is the russians m. O. They are very good at it. If we continue to sort of think that we can ignore this and not take it seriously and to some extent there are those who are taking it quite seriously it is going to get worse. And we as a country need to recognize that. Certainly there were some steps taken by the congress. You had a question . In light of the National Security threat posed by not just past interference and National Dialogue in terms of moving through that interference but also preparing ourselves for a potential second or third wave of interference, i guess number one and i think im trying to the extent possible and you can tell me whether or not it is a correct way, i am going to try to disentangle ukraine from the hacking. You can tell me if that is a wise way of taking it. I will focus on the hacking for a moment. How would you view the steps that have been taken if not through the executive branch at least through the Congressional Branch . On the hacking in particular . I think it has been its a work in progress, i would say. You have got both the senate and the house intelligence committees in the course of inquiries. I think the senate is probably further along than the house on this. I would be interested to see what they come up at the end for recommendations. One good recommendation is out there right now is for there to be an obligation on the Intelligence Community to report out if there is intelligence showing that any Foreign Government is interfering in the election through the use of cyber or other means. One thing we confronted was there was no play book for this. And we saw this. We wanted to working with the policy makers in the white house we wanted to alert the American People to what was going on. But we were hugely cognizant of the risk that doing so could be viewed in the context of an election as a political move. And we were absolutely dead set that we were not going to let this that the Intelligence Community and our assessment about what the russians were doing be viewed as a political step because it wasnt. So we there was the october 6 statement or october 7 statement from the dni and dhs. But it was but there was a lot of difficulty in figuring out how to do this. One thing that congress has been thinking about is a requirement to report out so that my successors dont have this difficult decision about whether to speak or not. Legislatively and i think this is where the cyber and the ukraine issue come together. Congress did in the legislation that was passed a month and a half ago, have some provisions in there on cyber hacking. There were mostly existing executive orders. They didnt do much to get new tools essentially or to impose any sanctions. Can i use this as digression on to the legislative side of things . One of the trends in sanctions right now that i think is worrisome is the role that congress is playing. Let me be really clear about this. Congress has a hugely Important Role in Foreign Policy and in sanctions policy in particular. Legislation that congress has enacted has been enormously helpful whether it is what was talked about earlier or laws passed in the Obama Administration that gave us new tools to particularly in the iran context to go after iranian oil sales and go after the ability of the iranians to earn revenue from the oil that they were able to sell. That legislation was crafted in a way with a lot of interchanging back and forth that allowed there to be some flexible application of the tools. It gave the executive the ability to turn up, turn down, modify within the parameters that congress set which is entirely appropriate but it allowed the executive to execute the laws and to be able to have some nuance in how this played out. The russia legislation that congress enacted earlier this year that the president signed because he had no choice, hugely veto proof majority it was passed, moved congress into a place where they are much more prescriptive in what the executive needed to do. Still a little bit of play in the joints but its much narrowed down and it is both substantively and procedurally. Substantively congress codified a series of executive orders that had previously had sort of Discretionary Authority and tried to make it mandatory. And i think really in a worrisome way Congress Took on the role of checking the executive and treasury on either licenses that may grant to relieve a little bit of the way the sanctions would apply or on delistings. Congress felt the need to do that, i think, for good and valid reason. There was a real fear that President Trump was going to relieve a bunch of the sanctions on russia without having seen the change in policy that we were looking for with respect to ukraine and crimea. It is an unfortunate consequence of the Trump Administration and the president in particular in his approach to russia that congress felt the need to sort of tighten down the sanctions legislation in such a way that i think it becomes very difficult for the administration now to use that tool in the flexible way that i think welldesigned sanctions authorities can be used. So in other words, by keeping a check on being able to unwind the pressure, it also at the same time was a tool for economic diplomacy that when you are trying to figure out a way to change that behavior there is really not a lot on the table that the president can offer. Absolutely. So in the iran in sort of the macro sense, in the iran negotiations the basic trade was we will relieve sanctions if you change your behavior. In a much more microsense i had any number of conversations with Financial Institutions and others where i made very clear that if you proceed down this path, sanctions will result. If you proceed down this path we will be able to relieve them. If my successor doesnt have that flexibility to use sanctions in a way that they were designed which is to change behavior, if it sort of locks in what is essentially a punishment, then you fundamentally alterred the sanctions tool in a way that i think makes it much less useful for us going forward. I guess in with one last series of questions tied together. When we were discussing north korea and north korea sanctions we talked about how important it was to have the chinese on our side even though they are effectively a third part and certainly the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has global implications. But when it comes to russia the europeans are very much involved and they have their own interests and there are challenges when it comes to Multi Lateralizing sanctions in a way that gets some of our European Partners on board. Maybe if you can just offer one or two comments or observations as to how that can be implemented and then finally even as you return to private practice, lots of private Market Participants have questions both about the evolution of sanctions, the clarity of policy that would allow them to sort of stay ahead of the regulatory curb. How do you go about dealing with that particular those two things are closely tied. The Market Participants and how the europeans look at sanctions. As a rule, the europeans tend to be much more responsive, i think, to the concerns of their Business Community than we have been here. And so in the russia sanctions we spend a lot of time working with eu to try to have as much parity between what we were doing on russia sanctions and what we europeans were doing. And we got basically there. And to some extent what the europeans were willing to do was a governor of what we were prepared to do because we didnt want to get out ahead of the europeans and if you look at comparative economic exposure europeans are way more exposed than we were. If they werent prepared to take a certain step it didnt make sense for us to do it. In that context we worked very hard to try to have an ongoing dialogue with european counter parts at the eu level or member state level to ensure that we were walking more or less in lock step. Again, that was in part because europeans were hearing from businesses that had much more exposure to russia about the impact there. Another sort of interesting side effect of the evolution of sanctions from broad sort of trade embargoes to what we have today which are much more tailored and specific and much more complex is for businesses operating in the International Environment it is a much more difficult environment to navigate. I mean, if it was a cuba embargo which thou shalt not sell anything to cuba, pretty easy to figure out what you are supposed to do. The russia sanctions are what the Administration Just did in venezuela which were a series of sanctions on the venzellen government and oil companys access to the u. S. Capital markets. Thats a really sort of complex application of the sanctions tool that i think is smart. It was a sort of cut and paste job from the russia sanctions to the venezuela sanctions. I mean that actually in a positive sense because i think that the russia sanctions were pretty innovative and smart and using it in the venezuela is smart, as well. Its a complex environment particularly for u. S. Financial institutions to navigate. With that i know that we have a good number of folks here from the press as well as students. We have two microphones that we really ask that you go to the microphones to ask questions that you may have and to identify yourself. And we already have someone up to bat. Thank you so much. Washington post. Thank you for your time today. Thank you for your service. I want to ask you about the Iran Nuclear Deal and the sanctions related to that. You may have of course, we can never know what President Trump is going to do until he does it. When we read the tea leaves seems clear they are heading towards the policy somewhere between just tanking the v. O. And endorsing it. They call it waive the sanctions, decertify the deal, kick it to congress. Congress can put on sanctions or do nothing or put on different sanctions. This is what is going on. Any of that make sense to you . And does this seem like from the perspective of someone who was instrumental in sort of how the sanctions does that seem like it is going to work a middle road approach where we like, where the Trump Administration disparages the deal and then tries to save it and then kicks it to congress . How do you see that playing out . I think the short answer that if the administration wants to tank the deal and give it to congress to figure out how whether to reimpose sanctions, it doesnt get them away from the problem that the rest of the world is not prepared to back away from this deal and doesnt see any reason to do so. You had last week or the week before last the iaea come out with the latest report on the compliance with the deal and the iaeas that iran is complying. That is going to be persuasive to the europeans and russians and chinese and others who are not participants in the negotiation. In the Trump Administration, particularly as it was written, concluding based on the president s preordained request that iran is not complying with the deal is going to will persuade no one around the world. So the difficulty is we can then this goes back to what we were talking about earlier. We can then reimpose sanctions. Congress has shown over the years a great interest in imposing sanctions on iran. For all i know they will do so again. But its not going to bring the world along with us. And what worked previously is that we have the world with us. That created the pressure that led to negotiations. If the Trump Administrations idea is that we will somehow get a better deal and renegotiate and get a better one, you need leverage to get a better deal. That leverage is coming from sanctions pressure. We are able to regenerate effective sanctions pressure on iran. In the meantime we create friction with allies and not so much allies around the world. So i am not excited about this move. Im sorry. Hi. Thank you for coming. You mentioned towards the beginning of your remarks that you think it is time to sort of turn up the heat on north korea specifically with regards to china. We sort of tried Everything Else and there is a lot more that you mentioned towards the beginning of your remarks that we should turn up the heat on china with relation to north korea and that we can do through secondary sanctions. Can you describe what the thinking was during the Obama Administration on this . I mean, they obviously did not do this and obviously there is a lot of talk on this. What was the hesitance . Where was it coming from . What was the reason that that policy ultimately was not taken . Sure. To some extent. The debate about what to do to try to bring china more into the game on north korea has to be considered in light of all that we have going on with china. And that means trade issues. It means south china sea. It means cyber issues. It means chinas relation with its neighbors in the region, the one belt, one road initiative. We have a huge number of really important issues with china. And you cant put pressure on all of those issues simultaneously. You have to pick and choose a little bit. And the that was the debate then. That is the debate now. It ought to be the debate now. But im sure that these other considerations are being brought to the floor. So my personal view is that we need to prioritize the north Korean Nuclear issue. That means we are going to have to let other stuff go. You can try to thread those needles as best you can but you cant do everything. And i think that is the fundamental conundrum in this is that we have a lot of things with china that matter a lot to us but we just have to take a sort of clear eyed view of what the north korean threat is and what we want to do about it. Can i say one other thing about the north korean threat . For sure a north korea with a Nuclear Capable icbm that can range the u. S. Is a serious problem. We as we sort of figure out what to do about this in the near term need to avoid taking what is an urgent and important National Security problem and turning it into a crisis. And the best way to do that is to make kim jongun think that we are about to invade and overthrow his regime. So as we were talking earlier about there being policy churn on the north korea issue you see some talk about sanctions and then you see other people in the administration talking about locked and loaded and fire and fury, those tend to be people who dont have experience with military matters. And i think we need to be kairl that we dont in this period trying to figure out if there is a way to try to reduce the risk of north Korean Nuclear Ballistic Missile program we dont inadvertently get ourselves into a shooting war with north korea. Freelance journalist. Go ahead. We have to get some students. Could you tell me, your appointment as Deputy Director, sanctions guy as Deputy Director cia, did that reflect some sort of shift in intelligence . If it did do you think that shift has continued . This is going to be really uncertifyiu unsatisfying answer. I think the answer is no. It wasnt to bring sort of financial sanctions into thegency. I think it was a whole host of other reasons that director brennan reached out to me. It wasnt that there was a view i dont think. I never asked him this question. I dont think it was we have this hole we need to fill in the agency on Financial Intelligence or financial sanctions and it has been this guiding hill. My name is freddie. Im an Administrative Assistant here. My question is with regards to the threat to russia you see a very troubling trend in the Trump Administration of several. Russia in particular, everything from a passive oh shucks, its just putin to going all the way back to the Election Campaign with bannen, flynn, so on. Thankfully several have been shown the door now. At what point is the administration in particular going to actually start addressing the russian threat up front . You see the statements from mattis who is completely contrary to the kind of passive nature. At what point or what will it take for the United States to quit playing defense and start going on the offense and start make tg clear there is going to be a very steep price for meddling in our affairs and meddling in the affairs of our allies . I dont know the answer to that question. I left on january 20 a 00 at 119 a. M. And so having not been part of this Current Administration and as i said earlier i do think that there is a need in particular on the cyber enabled Information Operation front for a more robust response and equally importantly to get ourselves into a position to defend ourselves better. One of the things that i have heard people say which i disagree with which is that the russians have been at this for a long time. In some respects this is nothing new. I just think that fundamentally misses the point. This is for sure the russians have done information ops in the past. They used to try to infiltrate student groups or whatever. This was an attack on our democracy. It was very sophisticated and it was using tools and means that didnt exist previously. And thats something that i think we need to come to grips with as a country. To answer your question, i dont know when or if this administration is going to take a more aggressive posture. I think we have about four more minutes. So perhaps we can take all three questions and bring them your way. Thanks. This is ellen with the washington post. Not to doubleteam you here. Following up on this question staying in the russian theme. You said earlier that you found it deeply disturbing that this administration had not gone after this issue on russia. What more would you like to see them do . Do you think they can do . And why didnt the Obama Administration do so or perhaps you didnt consider it and if so can you let us know that . Im just going to have all three. My question deals with north korea. Im susan and im an alum. My question is dealing with north korea and pressure on china. If chinas interests are against a unified korea in the south, what do you believe that sanctions will accomplish as opposed to a carrot and what are some carrots that might exist . It is constantly pressuring china to do something that they dont want to do. Maybe the opposite would be more helpful. That is just my question. I am from saudi arabia and i am a student. We have classes so it was a bit thanks for being here. Im writing a paper on sanction s. Just the data i have that sanctions on iran and north korea havent prevented them from getting to their goals, ultimate goals of getting nuclear power. I dont see sanctions being as effective as you would imagine them to be. So should policy change on sanctions or should there be more engagement . How effective are sanctions . Thank you. So let me try to do these in reverse order. The question about the effectiveness of sanctions is a complicated one because i think you need to control for a number of different variables. You can control for the type of sanction that is being applied. So you cant i dont think you can compare the iran sanctions to the cuba sanctions because they are both called sanctions. The analogy i have is we have the book that is a history of cancer. It is a great book. Cancer covers like a huge range of different problems. In calling something a sanction covers a huge range of different policy tools. So i think you need to control for that. We need to control for what the policy objective is. What are you trying to have the sanctions accomplish . If what you are trying to do is to end the Nuclear Program thats one thing. If what you are trying to do is to disable someones ability to Fund Terrorism that is a different problem. So you sort of go down the list. I think there is no sort of one answer to whether sanctions are effective or can be effective. I think properly tailored sanctions used in an appropriate Foreign Policy or National Security context with sort of enough flexibility given to the Treasury Department and administration to apply them in a way that is flexible. I think that i am a believer that sanctions can be quite effective. But you can also make a hash of it. And i think you just got to figure out how to do it the right way. North korean and china, if i understood the question, i think for the chinese to have them be more part of the effort here and to put some constraints on north koreas Nuclear Program and ultimately get to the complete and verifiable denuclearization, we are not going to get the chinese to work with us purely by imposing sanctions on their businesses and their Financial Institutions and nor frankly should we want to do that. It would be enormously disruptive to the United States, as well, if we went sort of up the chain to some of the bigger chinese institutions. So i said this earlier. We need a comprehensive diplomatic approach to china and that includes both carrots and sticks to bring them along on this effort. And it will involve tradeoffs and other issues. What more can be done . And what more could the Obama Administration have done . Look, it was getting towards the end and we took some steps but we were also mindful that there was a new administration coming in and we were hopeful that they would recognize the significance of this issue and wanted to leave some opportunity for the new president and his team to demonstrate that they, too, found the russian interference in the election to be intolerable. I think there is a lot more that can be done. There are a lot of things that can be done. There are things in the sanctions realm and in the policy realm there things if you think across the tools of American Power that we can do. Im not prepared to give a description of the specific steps that this administration can do today, but there is a lot that is left in the chamber that hasnt been used. And one thing that cannot be done is an extension of our time. Thank you so very much for coming. Thank you all. This was a wonderful conversation. [ applause ] the u. N. Security council to discuss north korea and its Nuclear Program. We will have that live at 6 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan. You can watch at cspan. Org and listen using the free radio app. Today is the 16th anniversary of the 9 11 attacks. The Homeland Security committee has been tweeting pictures of that day and the timeline of the attack that killed more than 3,000 people. This showed flight 377 hitting the pentagon. And the collapse of the World Trade Centers north tower, 102 minutes after being struck by flight 11. Senate Arms Services Committee Chair john mccain put out this video. My office and i happen to have one of the cable news shows on and obviously it was a startling bit of information that came across. Report in that there has been some sort of explosion at the World Trade Center in new york. Shortly after there was an alarm that we should evacuate the capital since it was pretty obvious that with these attacks that there would have been that attempt on the capital which we now know was probably the case that was prevented by a brave young men and women who caused the plane to crash in pennsylvania. When the passengers won the first victory in the war on terror. I remember most the shock, anger, awe and especially sorrow. The sorrow for those brave some 3,000 who lost their lives. It was a terrible tragedy and we will never forget and we will always mourn their loss but it was also coming together. It was a coming together to make sure that that kind of tragedy could never happen again and im proud of the men and women who are serving who have been out there for now all these years far away from home, many of them as much as four or five times or more. They are the best of america and we thank them. New york congressman says the anniversary of september 11 is a reminder that when the chips are down americans are unstoppable when we stand together. Youll find todays commemoration ceremonies at cspan. Org. Cspan, where history unfolds daily. In 1979, considerspan was created as a Public Service by americas Cable Television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. Tonight on the communicators, mark jameson, a visiting scholar on net ne neutrality. He is interviewed by david shepherdson. Take for example fifth generation wireless. It is a technology that will start being rolled out next year and it will be in place for about a decade or so. It very specifically has built into it what they call slices. Each slice can be customized to a particular service or. It is designed to do that. That violates the idea of same treatment of bits. Watch the communicators tonight at 8 00 eastern on cspan 2. Funding for the Childrens Health Insurance Program or chip is set to expire at the end of this month. It serves 9 million who are not eligible for medicaid. The Senate Finance committee is looking into reauthorizing the program and heard testimony from a motherer of a chip recipient. The hearing began with orin hatch who cosponsored the legislation that created the program with the late senator ted kennedy