Reentry vehicle. Everybody knows what it is, right . Lets look at it. Thats the bus. Thats on top of the rocket. Thats on top of the missile. Stage one, stage two, stage three. And now whats left is that. And each one of those groovy looking machines there is a one Megaton Nuclear warhead. There are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven warheads on the top of that particular missile. Thats an american missile. A mirv now allows you to put anywhere from three to as many as 12 warheads on the tip of a single missile. In the nose cone, and to drive that bus over target, and either send them out in a spread of independently targeted detonations or to fly over areas and drop one or two and continue to fly and drop one or two. Making any attempts to shoot down the missiles much less effective and making any attempt to wipe out our ability for second strike pretty ineffective. Imagine one, one u. S. Attack submarine surfacing with 18 missiles, each one tipped with seven 300 kiloton warheads. End game. All i need is a sub. And ive got a dozen. All i need is a couple icbms, and ive got thousands. We deploy mirvs first, and the soviets are nervous, but we dont win anything because they then deploy mirvs, and they take them from ten permissal to 12 per missile, and were now really locked. Its the 1970s. What are we going to do . We can destroy each other 10, 12, 15 times. And were not the only countries with the weapons by this point. Now we have to deal with other states and we also have to deal with by the 1970s the fact that we know we can destroy each other multiple times over. And both states looking ahead o go, i guess, i guess we can talk about slowing this down a little bit. Which is where we will begin on monday, last class before the exam. That you should already be studying for. Study guides are on blackboards. Please, please start this weekend. Also, by the way, remember, both of the sis have posted when those review sessions are. First one is sunday. Have a nice weekend. With the senate in its august break, well feature book tv programming week noits in primetime on cspan2 starting at 8 00 p. M. Eastern and for the weekends here are a few book tv special programs. Saturday, august 22nd, were live from jackson, mississippi frrx the inaugural mississippi book festival, beginning at 11 30 a. M. Eastern, with discussions on harper lee, civil rights, and the civil war. On saturday, september 5th, were live from our Nations Capital for the 15th annual National Book festival followed on sand with our live in Depth Program with senior fellow at the American Enterprise institute lynne cheney. Book tv on cspan2, television for serious readers. First Lady Helen Taft called nelly, made several notable changes to the white house. The most obvious was replacing the white male ushers with africanamerican staff, also while in washington, she led an effort to raise funds to create a memorial for victims of the titanic, but her greatest legacy was bringing thousands of japanese Cherry Blossom trees to the Nations Capital. Helen taft, this sunday night on cspans original series first ladies, influence and image. Their influence on the presidency. From Martha Washington to michelle obama. Sundays at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on American History tv. On cspan3. Up next, masuda hamiju, author of cold war crucible, the curkorean conflict and the post world. National university of singapore history professor hamiju argues that the cold war was not only a global conflict between the u. S. And soviet union but also led many countries in the west and east to crack down on perceived threats within. The Wilson Center hosted this 90minute event. Welcome to the Wilson Center. My name is charles krauss, and im a Program Associate with the Centers History and Public Policy program working with the wellknown Cold War International history project. Im very pleased to have our speakers here today for a discussion of cold war crucible, the korean conflict and the postwar world. Before i introduce our main speaker, dr. Masuda hamiju, let me get in a quick word about the Centers History and Public Policy program. The history and Public Policy program focuses on the relationship between history and policy making and seeks to foster open, informed, and nonpartisan dialogue on historically relevant issues. The program is a hub for a wide network of scholars, journalists, policymakers, archivists and teachers focused on the uses and lessons of history in decisionmaking. Through informed dialogue, the Program Seeks to explore the advantages as well as the dangers of using historical lessons and making current policy decisions. Our main activity is to obtain and make available historical documentation on contemporary history from international archives. The goal of our work is to further internationalize the study of contemporary history and especially the history of the cold war and to provide Global Perspectives on major historical events and issues. Our digital archive accessible at www. Digitalarchive. Org, contains over 8,000 Historical Records from all over the world. In all of these records, freely available to you from anywhere. So i hope you will take the time to browse the digital archive, digitalarchives. Org for your research or just for fun. A lot of good stuff on there. I say all of this because our mission and our core activity connects well to what professor masuda has accomplished in the new book, cold war crucible. If you read the book, i think youll be absolutely stunned by the amount of research that professor masuda has done around the world. United states, great britain, china, japan, korea, basically you name the country and he has done research there or he has gathered documents from that country. Its quite impressive. And this is very much in line with what we do here at the history and Public Policy program. But more importantly, masuda is using these new archival materials to ask bold questions and to challenge what we think we know about the cold war era. The cold war crucible is an important book which merits discussion and thats what i think well accomplish today. With that, i am pleased to introduce professor masuda, who is a historian who has worked with social and global history of the cold war, and the modern history of east asia. He received his ph. D. From Cornell University in 2012, and is currently an assistant professor in the department of history at the National University of singapore. Where he teaches courses on the modern history of japan, student movements in asia, decolonization and the cold war. In addition to his new book, cold war crucible, dr. Masuda has published a number of articles which is be found in journals such as diplomatic history, the journal official contemporary history, the journal of cold war studies and east asian relations. We have two other speakers who will provide comment on professor masudas presentation and his new book. But i will introduce them directly prior to their speaking. I strongly encourage all of our speakers to stick to the designated time limit so we have enough time for q a. But with that, i will turn the floor over to you. Okay. Thank you for your very, very kind introduction. So this is my take here at the Wilson Center. I think when i first came here in 2008, i was a student. I have been hoping to come up here to do research or to give a talk, something. I am very, very pleased to be here this morning to talk about my book. So first, i appreciate jack up here, for setting up this talk. I thank you. Thank you very much. And of course, thank you, all, for coming to this talk. So early this morning. Okay. So, this is my first book, and i just realized last week, how difficult it is to talk about ones own book in such a short amount of time. So here, let me talk about just the main questions and the main arguments of my book. We focus on why it looks at why my book looks at the curkorean period and the examination of the korean war, change, challenge and change our conception, our understanding of the cold war. So, now the korean war is important for understanding, for the war, and i think it is. When i say this, i usually am misundersto misunderstood. Yes, thats right. The korean war changed the course of the cold war. Military started, and it spread it all over the world. So, korean war, indeed of the cold war. So this is first off, right . And the other is more like this. No, no, no. The tension between the soviet union and the United States is how it began, already, the events due to the decisive events in europe. Lo look, for instance. So what the korean war did was inspiration, what it presented was an escalation of an existing threat. Nothing is particularly new. So in other words, people assume that im entering these questioquestio questions on the cold war and talking about how important the korean war was in the construction, in the making of the cold war. But however, in my book, i question what i question in this book, cold war crucible, is actually assumption that we usually share or take for granted. Over the cold war, the u. S. , the confrontation. Well, indeed, the cold war was a war in the first war period, thats right. However, however, when i say that it korean war was a crucible of the cold war, i mean that we should broaden our understanding of it. The moment of the korean war is important and the war of examining, not just because of the intensification of the existing threat, but we can see metamorphos metamorphosis, transformation of the cold war. So to begin from my conclusion, i have argued in my book that at the time of the korean war, the cold war transformed from a discourse among policymakers to a war among ordinary people. And from a diplomatic standoff in europe to a gigantic social mechanism that operated in many parts of the war the situation through ending conflict. So here, here, i would like to talk about the metamorphosis of the cold war by focusing on three characteristics. Just three of them. Which i think make up the essence of the cold war. But these, imagined global war, real social warfare on the ground, and ordinary peoples war. So, first, let me talk about this point. The first point, the cold war is imagined global war. So here, the korean war played Important Role. However, to be more precise, it was not the korean war itself, but the perception, popular perception of it. Today, we might see the korean war as a limited war in korea. But in 1950, the particularly following chinas entry into the world in 1950, many people viewed it as the beginning of world war iii. Carefully laid a scheme by moscow. So it was widely rumored that north korea and chinas entry into the korean war would cut into the order of stalin, and that there could be or must be similar and larger attack in europe. So in short, korea the operation. But looking back, the view is quite your ocentric from the out set. There was a logical leap, leading to studies including my own book, show that it was not the korean war and the local leaders had their own considerations. So, nevertheless, something became clear, more evident, only in hindsight. Was not considered particularly persuasive in 1950. So why not . Let me provide a quick answer. So first, the timing. It was significant, world war ii ending only five years earlier. For many people at the time, world war ii was not a merry event. It was rather an image of the future which could bring the ways in which people observed their future of the war. Simply put, to put it simply, memories of the war drove many people to interpret the korean war as the beginning of world war iii. And this specific belief, the moment was at the moratorium, a transitional period before the event of world war iii. The era of the cold war. So in part, this was reality in otation marks of the cold war obtained its highest level in europe, east asia, and the United States. That is area that were involved in the world war ii. But it didnt seem such a degree of plausibility, the other area, at least at this point. In places like africa or latin america. Which are not relatively speaking not pleased over world war iii. In short, popular image over the global cold war was based on the fear of world war iii, which was constructed in the shuttle of world war ii. So therefore, the reality of the cold war as a global confrontation, not just as a diplomatic stumble for europe, but the cold war as a global confrontation was a local understanding of the war. However shared wide ly. We also cannot ignore the issue of preconception. Prejudice, at the time, about asia, particularly, about the chinese. Of being helpless, superstitious, for one. But after all, north korea and china entreinto the war was seen as based on their own decisions, the logical world war iii couldnt be maintained. However, because of this common preconception, their entry, chinas entry in particular, couldnt be seen as being made under their own decisions. Instead, a common logic of the time maintained like this, there must have been a significant push from outside, mainly, the communist soviet union. And yet, this kind of image, this kind of narrative, whether its actually true or not, was used to power an illusion. Once us imagine, it became commonsense knowledge of the war. So in this way, the global cold war was imagined reality, product of social construction based on the local preconception. And the korean war played an Important Role in providing a logic, the logic of the fantasy that the cold war was built. What is more interesting, what is more interesting in the cold wars transformation in this period is underneath the cold war logic, underneath such a cold war logic, it had grown warfare on the ground. This is my second point. This is my second point. That the cold war as a social warfare. For instance, lets think about mccarthyism. We usually, we usually think of mccarthyism as an anticommunist politic in cold war america. But these very, very unusual period of doubt and of fear under extreme fear over the cold war, right . However, in looking at this, actually we miss variety of other local and or social separation that are involved, for instance, racial, labor, in america. In part, victims of the socalled mccarthy period included not just the communists, the compnist sympathizers, but like africanamericans, civil rights activists, labor activists, feminist activists, working women, over various programs such as Public Housing progras s and other programs. So what this group represented was not really necessarily communist ideology. But social change, embodiment of a social change in large through the experiences of the greater depression and world war ii. So therefore, taking a social point of view, we can force the following hypothesis, true nature over the mccarthyism, true nature over mccarthyism, which is considered a corridor of reform but the waves of the grassroots back lash, under the name of communism, which it functions to pacify social upheaval in first world america. So, when i first noted this point, i realized that it was not only a matter of American History. Not only that, this was a moment when a wave of domestic parties left. For instance, separation with the revolutionaries in china, in taiwan, in japan, in the philippines. Anticommunists and antileftist movements in western societies, in the uk, and of course, mccarthyism in the u. S. Yeah, so if anyone is interested in the research, im happy to talk about it later. I will not talk about it here. Anyway, so conventionally, this event, these events how they are examined separately, issues, with good reason, of course, however, however, through my examination of each instance over several years, i have come to view them all as a silealtaneous global sentiment. To be sure, of course, that the real views differ widely and each had a different context, of course, but there are a number of commonalities. First, all of these varieties experienced world war ii and went through a profound social changes that unleashed a number of changes, social, political, and cultural conflicts. And second, the outbreak of the korean war, evoked many peoples memories of world war ii, producing fear over world war iii, which in time created war time fear in their societies. And the third and finally, cold war logic, the logic of cold war provided, proved the futility in tamping down social and political conflict. In the name of public security. So, thus, therefore, taken together, the waves of domestic parties in the korean war can be seen as a global phenomena with backlash full of social conservatism that operated to contain and silence this agreement in first world societies. This connects to my third point, the cold war equals war. So here, what became what becomes clear, i think, in the actuality of local conflict and the nature of global cold war, the social need to overcome a war at home. So thats why i have argued in this book that the actual divide over the cold war that clearly merged the end of the korean war, less bickering in the east, within each society, which we reached in term, requiring continuation over the cold war, to maintain harmony, harmony as order at home. So from this angle, from this angle, each instance of localan instance or local question was not so much and result of the cold war but of itself part of an engine, like a component of the cold war that contributed to the making and maintenance of a gigantic imagined reality in the post world war. So in each instance thing a ticks and response in this reality were not only power ffu policy makers but also millions of ordinary people who engaged in the maintenance of the social order and the fewfication of the society. So in this sense the crux of the cold war was not just so much about east west confrontation or balance of power but of local struggles within society in many parts of the world. Thats why it was an ordinary peoples war. So before finishing my talk. Let me come back to the original questions here. So why focus on korean war period . Why is there a reexamination of this era. Why for our understanding of the cold war . My simple answer is that the cold war obtained new characteristics during the korean war with a change in its stage actors and issues in dispute. So when we say for instance that berlin was the crucible of the cold war, that itself was the stage, a pie kro come of the cold war over which powerful policymakers as actors engaged in diplomatic bargaining, maneuvering confrontation so the audience outside of berlin had to tremble in suspense. But what we can see during and after the korean war was different. The audience no longer quietly sat and watched policymakers they were now participating and making cold war dramas of their own with multitude of locally specific realities. The stage was not just korea itself. The entire auditorium, i mean the world outside korea now became a stage for the development of the fantasy cold war world. So looking back at exiting literature, is during the cold war, the large majority of literature developed with or gins, questions at its core. So the main focus, of course, involved questions about when it began and who was responsible. Of course thats the important questions. And in the past decade or so after the end of the cold war, in the past two decades or so, we have seen a surge in various approaches to the cold war. Namely like social, cultural approaches so with the development of the sociocultural approach, we have learned quite a lot about the impact of the cold war on society and cultures. As we realized cold wars impacts on labor, race, gender relations. Especially in the cases of the United States. At the same time, with progress of the international approach, we have learned quite a lot about stories of the other side of the war with specific focus on policy making and on the leadership. And with the development of the international approach we also learned that socalled small states were not necessarily simply puppets or victims over the cold war, but they often took advantage of superpowers rivalry. And with the logical extension of this international approach we have learned more about local contexts in other societies, whether their aspiration for dekohlization, development, needs for nation building and so on and so on which have often concealed underneath the cold war narrative. So these recent studies have indirectly challenged our common sincing of the cold war and opened up ways to see the cold war from a Long Duration perspective instead as a peculiar postwar phenomenon. So in this way we have learned to see the cold war in a more pluralistic and diversified manner and yet very few have tried to make connections between these new approaches and new insights and i dont think there is work concentrating on the roles played by ordinary people in the making of the cold war. Here i add hastily that we do have stud studies that looks at ordinary peoples lives under the cold war, during the cold war. And we also have studies of people who are victims of the cold war. But we still dont have a study concentrating on ordinary peoples participation, adaptation and the making of their cold war world. So in order we plight have learned a lot about everyday life under the cold war, but we havent learned so much about everyday politics of the cold war itself so when we learn such a topic, i think we can learn to other developing discussions that examines the lives of grassroots conservatism in the u. S. In the early postwar period. So in my book, too, i look at elements of social backlash and ordinary peoples conservatism in the korean war era in societies such as like china, taiwan, japan and the philippines as well as the uk and the United States. And i think the inclusion with such everyday people, their thoughts and actions as a part of analysts has important consequence for how we see the cold war. This is because if we challenge and change our view of what the cold war really was. So in conclusion, the bottom line, as i suggested in my book, is that its time to change our ways of asking questions about the cold war and about this period, about this postwar period in general. So instead of assuming the nature of the cold war just simply as u. S. Confrontation in the postwar era, we can raise questions about it and more seriously think about its essence, its nature, as well as its meanings in the postwar societies. We can ask, for instance, why this image of a global cold war materialize in this early postwar era, particularly the korean war period . Why did so many people across the world join in its formulation and awaken us. What were the social needs or everyday politics of the cold war. And finally, what was the cold war of all and through asking and thinking about these questions we can think about much broader social and cultural understandings of the cold war, i think and then we can contemplate, i think, new meanings and implications of the cold war for us today so this is basically a summary of the questions and the argument of my book if anyone is interested in hearing more, of course, well, im happy to visit your college or institutions or talks and im located in singapore but i come to the u. S. Quite often for my research so it wouldnt be difficult to talk about my book in the u. S. Or if you are really, really interested in details of the [ laughter ] the book is available for purchase at major book stores like this. And actually we have books on sale outside our room today thank you very much for listening to my talk. [ applause ] ill now introduce our first discussant, ryan irwin, who writes about the intersection of International Law and global power during the 20th century. His first book apartheid and the unmaking of the liberal world order examined this intersection against the backdrop of african decolonization. Hes won several writing and Research Prizes from the society of American Foreign relations and hes currently writing a book about legal realisms influence on american liberal internationalism during the early cold war. He is an assistant professor at the university at albany at the State University of new york. So one place to begin unpacking professor masudas book is its research question, which was meaty. What was the cold war . His answer, as youve just heard, is that the cold war was an imagined reality. A gigantic social mechanism that operated to tranquilize chaotic postwar situations worldwide by putting an end to social conflicts and culture wars at home. Whose home . Well, professor masuda is interested in east asia and north america specifically and hes focused on this period between world war iis end and the korean war which he explains is when this imagined reality started to feel more and more real to more and more people in these various locales. Now, its not easy to Say Something original about the 1940s and the early 1950s but cold war crucible pulls it off and ill do two things. First, ill make a pair of observations about the book and second ill ask professor masuda some questions which will hopefully get our q a rolling. So opt separation one is that the book is simultaneously original and very familiar. If you are a political scientist, one label to toss at professor masudas work is constructivism. If youre a historian, it probably makes a little more sense to cite someone like Benedict Anderson and Michele Foucault but cold wars starting point is instantly recognizable, that power makes reality. What does this mean . Well, professor masuda is inviting us to think about the cold war not simply as a series of events, a blockade here, a war there, events that build logically on each other, events with selfevident meaning. No, for professor masuda, the cold war was a man made reality. Method logically, hes nudging us to see this man made reality through the prism of social and culture history but his bigger claim is that the process of reality making can be historicised. You can actually look at how more and more people in this case americans, chinese, japanese, korean people, accepted the cold war as something that was real. So this is a very capacious starting point for a book folks have used some of these tropes to criticize special cold warrior, mark silverstones examined a comparable dynamic in the Anglo American context but very few monographs on my radar begin im going to show you how the cold war became real. Or how it became imagined as real in several places over a tenyear period. And my favorite part of the book is that professor masuda tell this is story in a very tangible way. The conceit here is that no one is driving this realitymaking process. Which makes professor masudas actual narrative more straightforward than you might expect. Cold war crucible basically explores how Different Actors or ordinary people came to explain their own claims in their local worlds visavis communism and antikrichl. These folks were not necessarily communists or anticommunists but they invoked the cold war for their own reasons, mostly to get ahead, which resulted eventually in the creation of this shared nativist fantasy world with transnational purchase. So observation number one is that professor masuda is arguing a familiar point, a point as old as richard hoffsteader, in a new way, which sets up a second observation because the research, as chuck said, is very, very good. Ten countries, lots of archives, lots and lots of languages. Some International History tends to repackage old stories with new footnotes but professor masuda is writing about people you have never heard of and hes telling stories that you probably dont know. Ill admit i assumed that the books narrative would be disconnected. That there could be too many people saying too many things but the three sections hang together well and the chapters are divided in a logical way. This is a story that could have been too complex and tidy yet professor masuda to his credit delivers something unexpected, something very hard which is a beautifully written messy story that actually make sense. Now, if i had to critique the book, the jargon is probably the lowest hanging fruit. The word reality is in quotation marks a lot. So much so that some of the passages give you flash backs to that famous scene in the movie matrix with the pills and the rabbit holes and all the rest and throughout the book i find myself wrestlingle with the question of whether or not i was reading a transnational social cultural history of reality making in the early cold war or was a reading a political history of the cold wars or gins told from a multinational grass roots perspective . Now this is pedantic, i admit, and i imagine the choice youd take, professor masuda, is option c, all of the above. But this opens up space for a few questions. To start, walk us through your relationship with the methodology that you take up here. Why tell this story this way . This question has a mechanical side. Why were you drawn to these particular archives and not others . Did the project start small and become really big or was it always scaled as a comparative study . And this question has a slightly abstract side because a few things surprised me. If someone asked me to write a look like this one i think i would have looked at technology or international organizations, im talking about the radio, public diplomacy, about reality making as an intellectual and institutional phenomenon and i would have taken this approach because thats what other scholars who were interested in this process have done already. So what are the stakes of anchoring this story in the experiences of ordinary people . What are the stakes of anchoring this story in the experience of ordinary people . More pointedly, do you think the study of technology in these regions or a history about folks who interfaced with newly built Institution Institutions would undercut the presupposition that this was an evolutionary story that in no one directed this process. Does that claim still stand up if you adjust the frame . After all, some people incented it and others used them. Some people make institutions, others join them. Focusing on technology or institutions nudges us toward a different place, perhaps a distorted place. So this point is probably more compelling as a question. What does cold war crucible reveal about power . This has to be something you wrestled with constantly as you wrote this book. The accomplishment here is the way professor masuda gives agency to people who are often overlooked. So theres a natural tension between this panoramic approach and the asymmetry of global power after world war ii and id love to see you bring your conclusions that you just articulated into dialogue with some of the more classic his store graphical riddles of this time period. Was the u. S. Government weaker than we think . Were peasants and workers in asia stronger than we imagined . If the cold war reality requires quotation marks, what passes for truth when we talk of power in an International Context . Now im getting rhetorical so ill wrap up. My final question is straight forward and selfserving. How should i teach the cold war to my students . What would this story look like in the classroom . In my classroom. Does cold war crucible advance the cold wars decomposition or does it it bring it to midcentury World History . You walk this line with admirable subtlety but i think youre challenging scholars like me who push against the cold wars monopoly of discourse after 1945 and are experimenting with alternative ways to teach midcentury geopolitics. So stretch this story out. Explains what it looks like on a semestersized canvas. What does this story look like if we stretch it into the 1960s . The 1970s . How long did the cold war reality last if defined on your terms . How might the incorporation of alternative regions complicate or affirm the interpretation youve outlined for us today . Does k the dynamic at the heart of your story be replicated in other periods . Regardless, theres no doubt cold war crucible should be on your bookshelf. Buy a copy. It reframes the cold wars origins in an interesting way and it sets a new con start. So congratulations to professor masuda for a thoughtprovoking first book. Thank you. [ applause ] thank you very much. So our second commentator is Andrew Rotter who is the charles a. Dana chair in history at Colgate University where hi has taught since 1988. His most recent book is hiroshima, the worlds bomb and hes at work on a study of two empires, the british and india and the americans and philippines and the five senses. Professor . Thank you. Thank you for coming thank you professor masuda for inviting me to comment on your book. Ill begin by saying that this book is a paradigm rattling study. A couple months ago i had a conversation with a colleague id identify him, David Angerman of Brandeis University in which he said, i thought too casually, that within a generation or less historians would no longer see the cold war as central as a useful category of analysis. I really was stunned to hear him say that and i pushed back and while i think professor masuda would agree with me that the cold war remains an event, a thing with which historians must continue to come to terms, he has so thoroughly problem lem tides it had concept of the cold war as to make it nearly unrecognizable to those of us who are more conventionally trained or inclined. As you have heard, professor masuda renders the cold war a constructed imaginary. Locally generated. In his formulation, the cold war sprang less from ideology or geopolitical contest than from political or social or cultural circumstances within nations the cryian conflict of the books subtitle was an agent, in his word a catalyst rather than a single knowable event. It indicated to all parties that World War Three might be immine imminent. At the same time, as you heard, elites sought to contain or suppress populist movements within nations as diverse as the United States, the peoples republic of china and the philippines in this way did a local story become global or nearly so. Mccarthyism, the antihook campaign in the philippines, all of which followed closely the outbreak of conflict in korea indicated the presence of small cold wars both similar and different that constitutes or constructed the big cold war. In the end, professor masuda concludes people translate it had meaning of the korean conflict through local lenses. And in this way created the entity that we have called the cold war. Listeners and readers will recognize how challenging and even provocative professor masudas interpretation is. He has read everybody. Hes read the usual suspects on the cold war. Hes read gatt thys and melvin lefler. But hes taken to heart the work of people likian a kwan and mary caldor among many others. His debt to those who have insisted on the privacy of domestic politics in the formation of cold war discourse, Thomas Christian son, Jeremy Surrey is obvious. Professor masudas contemplation of cold war epistomology is, however, largely his own and it is remarkably bold. His claims are bus interpreted by a wealth of evidence drawn from a breathtaking array of sources in at least three languages. Many of his sources are local, not in national archives. Professor masuda has gone where few have gone before. The auburn Avenue Research Library in atlanta, the Vermont Historical society. How on earth did he imagine those would be good places to find cherl . And he found it. The book teaches us not to read the cold war backwards. Men and women in 1945 did not know from cold war, as my grandfather might have said. Their most recent and terrible experience of conflict was world war ii, which shaped them profoundly. That the cold war ought to be decentered seems to me an idea whose time has come. Professor masuda decenters the cold war here artfully and confidentbly. This is a wonderfully assured first book. Like ryan, i would raise several questions for professor masudas consideration. First, he argues that the reality of the cold war was less salient in some places than in others. It had low valance, for example, in latin america and africa. This was the result, he says of the relative remoteness of these contin continents of the ravages of the cold war. Yet if you extend the story a few years out, you find critical exceptions to this rule. Think of cuba and the congo where issues concerning decolonization surely shared space with cold war conflict. And one could as easily say that latin america and africa were farther from the strategic front lines of the cold war regardless of their position during world war ii. In short, it isnt clear to me that the relative lack of interest in these areas by the great powers demonstrates that the cold war was locally sourced. I hoped this book expecting a fresh interpretation of the korean war and was delighted to find that it was more than that. Still the centrality of korea, even as a catalyst of social transformation in asia, europe, and the United States seems to me uncertain. Professor masuda argues that et made the cold war real because it reminded people of world war ii. Yet it was unlike that war fundamentally in that it stayed limited in participation and scope. Was it more important as a cold war catalyst than, say, the Nuclear Arms Race which we preceded and followed it . The atomic bomb doesnt make much of an appearance in the book. You saw the wonderful colliers title but this is imagining a future Nuclear Attack and its represented pretty much only in the form of national or local response to the atomic bomb. The sound of axes grinding is audable in the room. Sorry for that. If korea was a watershed, why did social formations look pretty much the same before as after it . Ive fallen into one of the misconceptions that professor masuda located among his crickets before and ill let him answer it again or ignore it if he likes. So in britain, the austerity program, including the devaluation of the pound in 1949 set off what a newspaper described in june of that year of 1949 as a wave of industrial unrest for which the korean conflict cannot claim responsibility. In the United States repression preceded mccarthyism. In the philippines, the battle against the hooks antidated 1950. The assassination of caisson who was assassinated by the hooks took place in 1949. To what extent then did korea solidify or even cattalize the reality of a cold war . It struck me here as it did when reading Jeremy Surreys power and protest and a later period that there is a presumed commence rabbit between the various social protests and repression of them. Thus the suppression of labor strife in japan, the red scare in the United States, the january fan movement in china are rendered morph logically the same. You heard professor masuda in this earlier and what he does in the book very cleverly is allow for the possible objections of critics. Hell say i understand these things are not exactly the same but then hell go on for several pages to prove that in fact they largely were. It seems there is an air of scale here. As bad as the first two, that is the suppression of labor, unrest in japan and the red scare in the United States were, neither resulted in the mass killing that characterized the jan fan movement in china. Japan, the United States and the prc had profoundly different political cultures. Professor masuda ingeniously uses letters to local newspapers to demonstrate that chinese citizens criticized the regime as late as 1950. This is amazing stuff. This is accounts of jan fan rallies suggest to me that the partys orchestration of the executions of nonconformists, ideological and otherwise, were done from the top down. These examples do not seem to be evidence of a common mortarfulology of protest and presentation but of separate and unequal social and political pathologies. In claiming the cold war was at first a thing imagined, professor masuda is granting implicitly poststructuralist argument about the social constructiveness of things. That suggests a preference for representation over causation, though i acknowledge what ryan said is that hes walking very subtly and cleverly a fine line between these. Whatever it is, it may rankle those for whom the cold wars apparent constructedness did not prevent it from wrecking their lives or their societies and its hardly a logically parsimonious argument. Race, jend herb, religion, culture generally, what category of analysis is not socially constructed . If the point is to add geopolitics, strategy and ideology to the list of imaginaries, well and good, though in that case to cold war was hardly unique. Finally i wonder if in trying to establish the novelty of his approach professor masuda has not chucked out the baby with the bath water, or at least has the baby dangling precariously by one leg outside the window. Sorry, thats terrible forget i said that. [ laughter ] i sort of like it. He writes that we should see the cold war world as a eye ban i can social construction of an imagined reality in which many people participated in restoring order and harmony through marginalizing disagreements at home. Might it be instead that the cold war was a dynamic process between the ideological and geopolitical on one hand and social cultural and local on the other . Or, more specifically, is it possible to understand local cold war conflicts as mapped or inscribed on international ones rather than at odds with them or different from them . That may be more of an amendment to his thesis than professor masuda is willing to permit, but if this question if all of my questions are meant to be searching its because the arguments of cold war crucible are so brit yantly unsettling and i must say i look forward eagerly to professor masudas next project, whatever it is. Thank you. Thank you. [ applause ] would you like to take a few minutes to respond. Sure. [ laughter ] then we can open it up. Lots of good questions. Usually im a very slow thinker. I need time and usually im good at coming up with good answers like tonight or tomorrow night. [ laughter ] but ill try to answer questions. So thank you first of all for your questions and points. One is about technology and the second one teach iing and third are long term culpability. The first one, technology. Actually, at the time of this project it has a chapter on technology and cultural stuff, but i didnt do include it in this time in this project for two reasons. One is obviously there has been quite a lot of work done on this topic. And the second, if i focus on technology and the radio, usually scholars focus on maybe i have to focus on their of course creator, sender of information rather than the receiver of the information. But in my book, my focus is more like receiver side so if i can focus on technology and, for instance, the radio stuff, its more to focus on the receiver side. Yeah, this time, yeah, i didnt include. Probably i could have made another border to the argument if i included this because i do think that many of studies are focusing on propaganda, radio europe or stuff foe cushion so much on the produceable propaganda and but that doesnt look at how it works. But i think propaganda, the new Technology Works when only the receiver decides to accept it. So it would be great if i can find more sources on how people used the new technology or how people use the radio but, yeah, that may be my future. How should we teach the cold war . Thats a difficult one, too. But this one, let me slightly change this question more about why study hisry. Because this question, i think, will connect to more fundamental questions about why we study history. And the reason i am saying this is i think we are observing some shift over the this is in my opinion, but a shift over the meaning of the studying of history or teaching of history, that is i think in the 20th century, maybe until the 60s, of course, we can more confidently say we study history because we can listen and learn from the past. But i think this kind of claim is, in my opinion, getting more and more difficult and to me its more important thing to ask why particular sets of fact remain as history and why another particular set of facts are not included in history. So in other words there is always the politics of inclusion and exclusion in history. So i think we are more and more conscious about not just lessons of history but more conscious about the politics of history and the politics of reality making. So thats why i think that connects to my main topic of the book, what is the cold war, what is history and what is reality. So i think what we can teach in the classroom is, well, its kind of undermining our teacher or historian standpoint but i think what we can teach to our students is more like to say do not believe history so much and think about yourself and what kind of history and why particular narrative appears in the books. So i think teaching the cold war is really really Good Opportunity to talk about political reality and politics of history instead of just narrating what happened in the past. I think thats kind of that shift we have been observing in the past several decades in the field of history, i think. And third, whether my approach can be used like other periods or can we take a longer perspective. I think thats another book project probably, i dont know. Hopefully my fourth or fifth project because i already have a second and third project. But saying this is here in cold war crucible i raised sort of the new perspective to look at the cold war, to look at the cold war from a social point of view, political ideological point of view. I think this can be the applicable entire 20th century and of course we usually think of world war ii more like a war between freedom and fascism but i think a reason recent studies have found even though the ideology was different, freedom, totalitarianism, what both societies are doing is quite similar in terms of total war mobile saigizationmobilizat warfare and welfare state in societies. So i think we have a reason to see like world war ii period, not just from political ideological perspective but from the total war perspective and the reason i talked about this is im wonder iing we can look 20th century not just political ideological perspective but as a struggle between globalization and grassroots conservatism in many parts of the world. And i think cold war and this project fit into the middle point of this long story of the early stage of globalization in the early 20th century from the spread of immigrants and the beginning of immigrant movement in many parts of the world and i think this sort of wave of globalization on the one hand and the local grassroots backlash more like social conservative backlash in many parts of the ward can be seen through throughout 20th century. In this way i think maybe we can explain better whats happening since 1990s. The rise of ethnic conflict. Religious wars. So manyover them can be looked at as a wave of globalization and grassroots conservatism. So i think the core perspective i suggested in my book might be applicab applicable to 20th censurery history. Thats my fifth book project. And professor rotter, thank you very much. Yeah, latin america and africa. Of course im more specialist in Southeast Asia a little by but for europe and africa i used secondary sources, of course. The reason i mentioned latin america and africa has less the cold war phenomena is they were fighting like granting has argued, they have argued they have fighting much longer battle, like centuries of revolution so its not really cold war battle but its more like the i think we can explain better in terms of decolonization when we talk about latin america or africa. So thats why i didnt include america and africa as the stage of stage of cold war world in the early 50s but i agree that the people who were there adapt it had cold war narrative in the 1960s, especially after the cuban revolutions i think the mechanism of this adaptation in the late 50s and 60s is probably different from the mechanism of the late 40s and early 50s. Korea, yeah. With korea, the situation is not very clear and thats but maybe i should have thought about the title of the book a little more. But many people think this is the this is a korean war book, which its not. Many people think of this as korean war book and actually amazon. Com categorized this book as military history of korea war history, which is not so much. Not at all. So of course when i say korea, its im not talking about the Korean Military history of korea at itself. I dont talk about korea almost at all. When i say about key yarks its more like korean war period so its the 1950, 1953. So so for me its more of a signifier not geography. So after publishing this book and after seeing some of the reactions for months, i should have put the title of Something Like this maybe this is not a good one but i have another possible title that means cold war fantasy how ordinary people created post war world. This might be much closer to my book rather than korean conflict in the postwar world. But any wway but, yeah, for you other point, the other jgin oh, did you talk about the difference zpsh. The various movements. Right, right. But japan and its a very different political culture. Right, right. Emphasizing the difference rather than commonality. Did you want to speak to that . Sure. Yes, of course, i agree that there were a lot of differencs,s prc, of course, the communist part y party and their regime is so different. But, still, think maybe we are a little bit overemphasizing the differences. I mean, of course prc was strong but not as strong as we imagined today so the communist party, of course become almost the really strong in late 50s. At the time of the korean war there were lots and lots of sort of anti ccd movements or actions in china and is not particularly strong. That forces them to look at their society and to look at popular attitude. So in that sense even communist regime in the sense that even communist regimes looked at popular attitudes, they are similar to what politicians did in japan or u. S. So of course the degree of the degree that politicians Pay Attention to, popular attitude, may be different but what they are doing in essence i think is quite a similar thats why i treated them more like an equal rather than discussing separate. But thank you very much for your very good questions. Lets open it up to the floor for some questions and if you could wait for a microphone to come to you and introduce yourself and keep your questions short and to the point. Well take them in groups of three and you can respond together. So i guess over here . Is. My name is steven shore. I felt somewhat disturbed by the unintentional equivalence between that i found in your thesis between one side of the cold war and the other. For example, mentioning it is an intellectual construct. Any way of looking at the world is by definition an intellectual construct. But i felt it implied that it was a perceptions but that wasnt there in reality when i think in reality of the cold war was that one side was clearly freer than the other and to call repression things as dispirit as opposition to the labor party in the uk and mccarthyism in the United States with the killings of millions of people be the prc and to a lesser extent in vietnam and yugoslavia as equivalent struck me as really torturous. Granted people suffered under mccarthyism but it wasnt like being denounced by ones neighbors and put to death. Any other questions people would like to throw out now that professor masuda could responsibility . Im afraid its not a question, its also a comment. Im milton lightenberg, school of Public Policy. I spent 50 years of my life studying the strategic arms race and the cold war and i just couldnt accept your construct at all from the very base. I wonder what stalin would think of the notion of an imagined reality or everybody in east europe from 1945 to 1950. Thats preposterous. Secondly you began by saying that stalin was not president person who started the war and one doesnt have to use that cartoon. Outside theres the Cold War International history project volume 8. I dont know if thats the one in the papers but i would even criticize charles krausss lines where he says that this was only due to kims pleading and it wasnt an initiative of stalin. Of course he could plead to the end of time unless stalin said okay there would have been no korean war. The soviet command wrote the invasion plan. The soviet union supplied the weapons for five months. Stalin convinced the chinese to supply land support if it would come to that pass. The soviet air force flew. We thought of perhaps in certain circumstances there was extensive discussion whether we would use Tactical Nuclear weapons which in those days were not very tactical. If you dont think thats real, im sorry, i dont live in your world. Just to make it an even three. I just want to ask going on because the idea of the korean war as a catalyst and particularly to the degree that it struck the imagination about a potential world war iii, did the fact that and im saying this because going back to berlin and greece and some of the other early events that we generally consider cold war, there was no contemplation of using atomic weapons and that what im suggesting and would like you to comment on is that in suggesting or contemplating using atomic weapons in korea it really brought back the deepest fears of world war ii. Okay, so, yeah thank you very much for giving me a very candid opini straightforward opinion. The first one. Of course degree i understand degree of violence is different, of course, in prc. More than, like, one Million People, another Million People put in prison. So where mccarthyism maybe you can argue, like one or two died but its not like millions or killing so of course i agree, but im not talking about degree of violence. Im talking about more about pattern which we can see in the development or practice of this phenomena. That is that everyday peoples, ordinary peoples participation and use of this cold war west, east confrontation to solve their own local conflicts so what im looking at here is more about similar pattern which is appear in china and the u. S. Of course we usually think separation will of counterrevolutionary in china as communist parties and political separation. Thats our understanding but when we look at our local documents and when we look at the documents of, for instance, the beijing association they adapted this separation of counterrevolutionaries in their programs. But what they really did in their practice was more like theyre solving their daily programs such as the slogan what they did was do not cheat customers or do not pee inside or outside or Something Like that. So what they really did was more likely used a grand narrative for their own purpose, local purposes and very similar to what we can see, the victims of separation counterrevolutions are very varied, very, very diverse. So if this separation is communist separation over nationalist sympathizers the victims should be more like a a businessman or intellectual and so on. But what we can see in the statistics like in the execution which i found the Shanghai Municipal archives, that is very well, yeah, i shouldnt be happy to find such a list of executions. But there was a list of executions like name, age, occupation, and we can see what kind of people are executed in the separation of counterrevolutionary movements and what we can see in this list of execution is not just land road or bunkers or those people but more like gangs or members of religious sects or members of secret societies or the owner the owner or even prostitutes and so on, so on. So heres when we look at the subject such a diversity in the list of executions, maybe we need it in thinking of just a political separation by communist party. And i think many ordinary people also participated and used this violence in order to make the order at the home. So thats why i compare these very different violence in the u. S. And china. So here, again, what im talking about so here, again, what i am talking about is not the real violence. What i am talking about is more the over these. Thank you. Yeah. We look at the shift very differently. Thats very much the point i am making. There was a famous professor at university of japanese history. Something on i dont remember. Doesnt know anything about japanese history. Their answer, very interestingly. He wants to write history in the way different form of japanese historian. What i want to say is different over here is very different