Transcripts For CSPAN3 Politics And Public Policy Today 20240622

So i wanted to also ask about this idea, weve heard a lot about sanctions. And sanctions as i understand, iran has written the United Nations on july 20th about the sanctions regime. And one of the issues that has concerned me about this agreement is that once the sanctions, the long list of mainly congressally mandated sanctions that will be lifted under this agreement are undertaken if iran for example, engaged in terrorist activity, which is known to do, separate from the Nuclear Program, iran seems to have taken the position in its letter to the u. N. And ive actually read the agreement, and ive been concerned that the agreement provides the same that in fact, iran says it has understood that reintroduction or reimposition including through extension of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute significant nonperformance which would relieve iran from its commitments in part or in whole. So my question is as i read this, im deeply concerned that if we want to reimpose the toughest sanctions on issues related to their terrorist activities and support for terrorism, which is another tool in the toolbox, general, aside from our military options that iran can then walk away from this agreement. And if the answer is you disagree with this characterization, please tell me where in the plain language of this agreement am i wrong. Senator the language says we cant reimpose the Nuclear Sanctions if iran complies with the Nuclear Agreement. We have never given away any of our ability to use other sanctions, regimes. Terrorism or human rights or secretary lew, with all due respect, the Nuclear Sanctions are the toughest sanctions that we would impose in other contexts, too, including on crude oil, oil and gas senator. On revenues. We reserve the right if theres a financial sfugs thats engaging in financing terrorism to put sanctions back on that institution, that is not a violation of the agreement. It is not a nuclear sanction. But iran seems to take a different position. Well, what iran does believe is that we can take the Nuclear Sanctions, put a different label on them and put them right into place. And what we would have to do is make the case, as we have on many occasions that institutions should be sanctioned for their behavior on terrorism, human rights and regional destabilization. We will continue to do that vigilantly and all of the sanctions that apply in that area still stand. Theres no restraint. Thank you mr. Chairman and general dempsey, thank you also. Of every time we say goodbye to you, you come back in another week on another panel. I know its not by choice but were thrilled to have you here again. Thank you very much for your service. Mr. Secretary, secretary of energy, if a year from now we have suspicions that something is going on does the iaea have access to go inside that building and see it or not . Well, again we certainly have, through the initial protocol and this agreement, access anywhere that there is suspicious of nuclear activity. The protocols, again i would have to see with the iaea. It is certainly a different forwardlooking its very different from revolving the possible military dimensions. We need to know forward looking on this whether it is parchin or other military facilities, does the iaea have access to go inside those . They certainly must have the access granted to, again resolve the issues that they need to resolve, and they must have integrity in the process. And if they do not, senator they would be in material breach of the agreement. Okay. So this is different moving forward than what has gone in the past. Its not only yes, it is different, and theres a different mechanism to bring it to a close for the 15 years. But even under the Additional Protocols, speaking to senator mccains concern about north korea, the lesson of north korea produced the Additional Protocol. Secretary lew and maybe secretary kerry on this one of the proposals thats been put forward is to say no to this deal and then to tell the other countries who are involved in regards to sanctions that a viable alternative is to simply say to france germany britain and others, choose us or choose them as you move forward economically that, you know, if youre going to continue to do business with iran, then you cant do business with us. Do you see that as viable moving forward . Senator, we do have powerful tools that make it very dangerous for foreign business to violate u. S. Laws. And if they do business and violate our sanctions, we will enforce. Whether we can do that against the whole world effectively without doing damage to our own economy is simple that we have to have serious considerations about. It is one thing when were taking action in concert with the world. Its another thing if were standing on our own. So the ability of a technical sanction to work is not the same as it being effective or necessarily adding up to what we would like to accomplish. Okay. Secretary carter, have you i know youre talking to the gcc countries. You have been in the region there. It seems to me that one of the challenges here is confidence. Confidence that theyll be safe, that israel be safe. Thats what this comes from is making sure that your child can be safe and sleep safe that night. And thats what mr. Netanyahu was trying to ensure and thats what were trying to ensure. So as you look at it when you talk to our gcc friends and others is there any putting together of a plan that says to iran not one more inch . That as we move forward, youll see from year to year to year that in yemen, not one more inch that against hezbollah, there will be massive retaliation if theres actions, that well stand with the sunni tribal leaders in anbar to make sure they have success and will be viable and strong against whatever, you know, efforts iran has in iraq to lay out the plan, let people know, let iran know in advance it would help create, i think, a better sense of confidence that theres a reason that theres a reason to stand with us. I think thats extremely important, and that is what the gcc countries are looking for in my conversations with them, namely the continued commitment of the United States to help them protect themselves so they can sleep well at night maintain our regional role counter irans maligned influence and activities. At the same time, they recognize perfectly well what has been said up here, which is an iran with Nuclear Weapons would be an enormous problem, and are supportive of an agreement that heads that off. But at the same time they want to make sure that were there. Thats what the gcc countries were told at camp david by the president. And my trip was in part to solidify all of the things were doing were just about out of time. I just want to say i think its important to publicly state and not one inch more policy and then additionally, i am not at all comfortable with our people who are still in iran. They have to come home. I wish they had come home as part of this agreement. I know you do, too. But this cannot rest because we dont leave anybody behind. And we dont intend to leave them behind either. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator fisher. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Secretary muniz, id like to follow up a little bit on what senator blumenthal was asking you about with regards to the breakout time. What are some of the main factors that you consider when you calculate that breakout time . Well the key factors are the enrichment capacity and the stockpile of enriched uranium but there are many other factors as well which come in such as the rate at which additional capacity could be built in during a breakout time. So all of this comes into our National Laboratory evaluation. That would include the number of centrifuges as well, is that correct . Correct. After 15 years of this agreement, what limits do you think will be in place on those things that you just mentioned . Well after 15 years, they will probably expand their capacity after those restraints. And thats why such a key element are the verification measures that we put in place for all time basically. So were talking about tracking the Nuclear Material to make sure its not diverted from a civilian program correct . And thats 25 years, right. Correct. We are basically just checking irans math, correct . Checking the math. No, were checking our math, if you like. So the idea is to follow sfroo were were checking our math. And for 20 years weve followed all the manufacturing. So its the supply chain that we follow. Making a and our intelligence people will tell you that to actually reproduce the entire supply chain covertly probably in multiple places would be very, very difficult to conceal. And were just looking at of course the declared facilities is that correct . No we have we have, of course, strong measures in the declared facilities, but key is the undeclared facilities, which by definition ultimately rests on the actions of our and our allies and friends intelligence capacity. And do you believe well, do you have confidence in that capacity that we will be able to locate any undeclared facilities and pressure iran to allow us to make sure that we have verification in those as well . Well again, i would go back to the statements of general clapper and cardillo and cohen. Again, clapper said specifically that this will give us much greater insight into what theyre doing. That, then, leads us and other intelligence agencies that we work with to point iaea in the right place, and now we have a unique new tool of a finite time to get access to that place or they are in material breach. Are you concerned at all on what i view as the discrepancies between statements made by our administration and compare those to what is being statements being made by the adviser to the Supreme Leader when it comes to access to allowing the iaea to look at the military centers in iran, where i think i believe ive heard our administration say that we do have access to those. They are declared facilities. But yet the adviser to the Supreme Leader says the access of inspectors from the iaea or from any other body to irans military centers is forbidden. Whos correct on that . I think we are correct. First of all, i just might point out that there were many statements made before luzon, before vienna this one was made july 21st. Yes, maam, but im saying there were many statements made before then, and you can check those statements against the agreement. They dont square up all the time, shall we say. Now, in terms of the how are you reconciling those . Those statements were very clear. First of all, the aim is not to go to military sites. And by the way its not us its iaea, of course. The aim is to go to where there is is there suspicious or suspicion of nuclear relevant activities . If they are in a military site, it doesnt matter. Theres still the iaea access to those sites. I only have a few seconds left. But i would hope that you would reconcile those statements for the public. We cannot control their statements. Youve stated that the 24day waiting period for International Inspectors wont allow the regime to conceal any illegal activity, but as i read the agreement and many other people have pointed out, the inspectors request to visit those sites could be delayed much longer than 24 days. I know that youre not concerned about the 24day period. Do you believe that we would or the iaea would be able to handle that, but if you look at different parts in section q of annex 1 of the agreement, i think we have the potential that were looking at an 89day delay. Do you think that would be possible, and how confident are you about us being able to inform them . We certainly cannot allow for that. I might say i did not say any illegal activity. I focused specifically or especially on activity with Nuclear Material as my real focus, number one. Number two is the iaea has and any sign of lack of cooperation, they have to launch the process with their request for access. Then comes the 24 days. As i mentioned also there is in the unclassified literature an example in iran of a sixmonth delay, an attempt to conceal, which did not work. They were caught redhanded. You said you wouldnt allow the 89day, you just couldnt allow that. What how many days after 24 days would you allow . No not after 24 days, its that the process to launch the formal request for access from iaea has got to be prompt. That launches the 24day clock, and thats the end. You would not allow anything past that . I would not. Thank you. Thank you mr. Chairman and thank you all for joining us. Thank you for your intense work on this. Obviously, we all care about the National Security of the United States and our allies. Secretary muniz, you and i had a very long conversation about nuclear details. And what id like you to discuss with the committee specifically, is the Nuclear Capabilities that iran has today are considerable. And most experts have given it a two to threemonth time frame to have enough enriched uranium for one bomb. Id like you to talk a little bit about their nuclear expertise, and if left unchecked, how quickly can they ramp up to greater production, to more highly enriched uranium excluding this deal arrangement . And then after you describe that, i would like you to describe what the rampup time would look like post8, 10 15 years. Because what i understand from reading the agreement is that youve spent a lot of time identifying what can be changed and modified in the three existing facilities so that they dont run a military risk. And so id like that more fully described. And obviously, and the last point i want you to address is my constituents are very concerned about clandestine operations. To the extent you can talk about it in this setting, i would like you to address how you detect a clandestine ebbnrichment facility during at greemt. Quite a few questions, senator. In terms of their current capacity, well they have again, demonstrated the capacity to rehn itch uranium, thats clear. But i do want to emphasize that theyve also demonstrated they have enriched to 20 enrichment. 20 is the cutoff that the iaea uses for low enriched and high enriched uranium. But the point here is that the amount of work needed to get to 20 is nearly all the work you need to get to 90 , which would be weapons grade. So they have the capability. And as ive already mentioned they are already have full cascades running of the next generation five times more powerful. This agreement will have those dismantled at the time of implementation. So whats critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. Now, in terms of the breakout time, again, the president was very clear and our p5 1 partners were very clear. The quantitative criterium for the negotiation was there had to be at least a oneyear breakout time in terms of fissile material it ten years. Weve accomplished this. Our Lab Scientists are fully behind this, as are those of other countries. Then that will roll off. And after 15 years at some point, fendingdepending upon what they do, then we may revert to the current kinds of breakout times for fissionable material. We still need to keep the lid on weaponization activities and make sure those are not taken. And that was a notable improvement from luzon to vienna. Right. So the agreement says they cant ever make the steps towards weaponization . And thats the point where we will be much better off at that time than today because we will still have enhanced verification procedures that can point our and other intelligence agencies to any violations. And after modifications at iraq, is there any way that you can reverse those modifications and make it a heavy water plutonium facility again . The iraq reactor, in its redesign would provide us, in this language, a breakout time of years. Right. But to unwind, it would be significant. Because once its online they would have they would need years of operation to get enough plutonium to be relevant. And the iaea would detect their change of the operation within one or two months. And with regard to forta whats the assess am there . After modifications, if they wanted to breach the agreement and try to get up and running again, and that take a significant amount of time in well, first of all yes. First of all, most of the centrifuges and infrastructure will not only be stripped out completely, but they will not even be stored. They must be taken up to natanz. Secondly, we will have a Major International not only iaea daily presence but an international presence, the russians working with them on stable icesotopes. If they kick everybody out you know the alarm bells will go off. Secretary carter with my last few seconds do our military options become marginally better or worse before or after the agreement . If the agreement is implemented, they become marginally better for the reason that the agreement the facilities are we learn more about them many of them are dismantled. And so in that sense, that purely technical military sense becomes somebodys ear. Senator cotton. Thank you. I want to discuss the two secret side deals between the iaea and iran. I had to travel to vienna last weekend. The administration has now confirmed their existence. Theres still some lack of clarity about their content. Secretary kerry have you read either of these two side deals between the iaea and iran . No, i havent read it. Have you read any previous drafts . No i havent. On any form paper, tablet, computer . I have been briefed ive been briefed through our team that met with the iaea. Did anyone on your team read the text of these agreements . I believe one person may have read it at the facility but doesnt have it they dont possess it. What is that persons name . I its possible i dont know for sure but its possible Wendy Sherman but i dont know that for sure. Secretary moniz, have you read the text of these agreements . No, sir. I have not seen them. Have you read any prior version . No, sir. On any medium computer, tablet, phone . Nope. Has anyone on your team at the department of energy . Not im not sure. I dont know. I think not, but i am not sure about that. I can ask in terms of the technical team, maybe saw something. Please do and get back to us. Okay. Secretary kerry, besides potentially undersecretary sherman, has, to your knowledge anyone else in the United States reviewed the text of these agreements . Not that im aware of. I dont know. I dont think so. If undersecretary sherman has read the text of these agreements, even if they are not in her possession does that not undercut the claims of confidentiality between the iaea and iran . I dont know whether she read a summary or a draft, i have no idea. I said i think and im not sure but i know shes briefing the senate very shortly, senator. So shell be briefing in classified. I have received several classified briefings about the deal. And i look forward to another one. But what congress would like is the text of these agreements as required by u. S. Law. Certain published reports starting or most recently with the Associated Press yesterday say that the content of the side deal that discusses parchine the military base for detonators where Nuclear Devices have been tested will allow iran to collect samples and submit those samples to the iaea much like an nfl player taking his own urine sample and sending it to Roger Goodell for a drug test. Can you confirm or deny that thats the content of those side deals . I cant here in this session, but what i can confirm is that secretary moniz, in his discussions both with the iaea and with the team, made recommendations to them, and i believe is satisfied that this can whatever the process is, that the process will be able to provide the answers we need. I dont know secretary moniz, if you want to add anything to that. Actually, id like to stick with you secretary kerry. Why cant we confirm or deny the content of these agreements in public . Why is this classified . Its not a sensitive u. S. Government document. The ayatollahs know what they agreed to. Because we respect the process of the iaea and we dont have their authorization to reveal what is a confidential agreement between them and another country. So the ayatollahs will know what they agreed to but not the American People . Well, the no, not exactly. Because we will share with you in the classified briefing what we understand the contents to be. But they negotiated the agreement with the iaea. The iaea is an independent entity under the United Nations, senator, as i know you know. And i dont know even at this point what the law says about the United States requiring something which another entitys laws prohibit. So we have to see whether thats a conflict of law or not. U. S. Law requires any deal between any party, not just the United States, to be submitted to congress before the 60day clock begins to tick. To the extent the iaea which i respect for the very admirable work they do which is often not supported by their member states, i would say this deal is without precedence and countries like south africa cannot be cited. Id like to move on to the second topic. Specifically irans support for terrorism. Could i have chart 1, please . General dempsey, this chart describes a particularly powerful kind of roadside bomb known as an explosively foreign penetrator. Are you familiar with what it shows . I, senator. Could you explain exactly what the bottom diagram shows of how an explosively formed penetrator works . I acopper cone is melted at super high temperatures and projected and essentially burns its way through armor plate. The copper disc travels at about 6,000 feet per second. Could i have chart 2, please so we can see what happens . 1,000 feet per second. General dempsey, is that familiar to you . Yes, senator it is. Do you know how Many American troops were killed by such explosively formed penetrators . That plr incident or in general . No, in general. Several hundred. Was iran a main supplier of these . Yes. Yes. Was the qods force and the revolutionary guard corps of main perpetrators in iran . Yes. Secretary kerry those entities and sulemani will ultimately receive sanctions relief not necessarily from the United States government but from the United Nations and the European Union. What should we say to the gulf star moms and dads of the over 500 american troops who were killed by an iranian ball of fire traveling 6,000 feet per second . Well, we should tell them, obviously, first of all how extraordinarily grateful we are for the service of their loved ones. We should also make it very very clear that under the United States initiative suleimani will never be relieved of any sanctions. It would also tell them and lay out to them what we intend to do, which has not been done yet sufficiently, to push back against irans behavior, that we have a number of laws in place requirements, by which we will be able to prevent them from transferring these weapons. And we have already engaged, senator, in very forwardleaning initiatives to do that. We specifically turned around a convoy recently over the last months that was bringing weapons to yemen, and weve been crystal clear, and i will be even more clear when i meet with the gulf states about our united efforts to hold them accountable for these kinds of activities. Thank you all. My time is expired. Senator . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Id like to ask this question of all of the witnesses but id like to start with secretary carter and chairman dempsey. In your assessment and without getting into specifics which cannot be discussed in this open setting, is there any military strategy or response that would achieve the same goals as the agreement before us without embroiling the United States and our allies in a potentially devastating longterm or in the region. And i would like a yes or no answer given the setting. Starting with secretary carter. Im sorry to be difficult on that but i just need to understand the question a little bit more. Do you mean if there is no deal iran gets a Nuclear Weapon, then we have a serious issue. We dont give up atta that point, but we would have to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies in the face of reality. Is that responsishe ishive to your question . The reality is without this agreement iran could produce a nuclear bomb within two to three months. So without this agreement, is there any military ill reiterate the question. Is there any military strategy or response that would achieve the same goals as this agreement . More . Yes . More no . Im going to have to say that there is a military response maybe this is responsive to your question, senator. There is a military option which i know youve been briefed on which has the effect as ive said earlier, of setting back the Iranian Nuclear program. It doesnt stop it forever but it substantially sets it back. Weve talked about that publicly for quite a while. We work on that. And so if thats responsive to your question, that exists. The other part of my question is, yes, we can have a military response that would set them back, but with that military response involve us in basically a longterm war in that region. Would that be highly likely outcome of any military act . Iran would surely respond to such an attack. So in a hypothetical situation in which that occurred, which this deal is intended to make unnecessary, iran could respond for sure. Chairman dempsey . One of my jobs, senators, never let the nation run out of options. So we would not run out of options, but they would become increasingly costly, to be sure. And long term. And long term. Yes. Secretary kerry would you care to respond . Well i think general dempsey answered the question earlier when he said that the deal is far more durable and provides a more durable option longer term a period of time where it would be much more durable than the military option. I mean, look. I think its pretty clear that if iran were to start enriching or move back to its program, we have no inspectors. We have no sanctions that are universal. The United States can have them, but weve already seen sanctions dont get them to give up the program. So youre stuck with a situation of what will change the dynamic of their program, and the fact is that you are in, as secretary carter and general dempsey have said, theyll respond and then well respond and then its back and forth. The question is where does that end and how does it end. And does it accomplish the goal of getting rid of their program . We dont believe so. We believe this agreement accomplishes the goal and provides us with the support on a continuing basis at the international community. Thank you. Let me go on to another question because i am running out of time. This is for secretary carter and, again, chairman dempsey. Are you contemplating any changes in our force posture assuming this agreement goes into effect and stays into effect . Yes. Thats a yes or no answer, yes. If i could say more if i could say more senator, yes, we are doing a great deal in the gulf. Thats what i was there talking to our Gulf Partners about. Thats what we talked about at the gcc summit a few months ago. They were doing a great deal with israel. I mentioned Missile Defense the f35 qualitative military edge. So this is a dynamic region with or without a deal. And one that has iran and other problems to boot. And so we have to and are doing a lot to strengthen our posture and our alliances and partnerships in the region. And we will continue to do so. General dempsey would you like to weigh in . With israel, were working on ballistic Missile Defense, maritime security, counterterrorism and countertunnelling, which is a new and emergeing challenge for israel and its ballistic special maritime counterterror and cyber. Thank you. And id like to tell the committee that the witnesses have to leave at 12 45. So the order will be senator rounds, senator king, senator tillis, senator sullivan lee and graham. And no one else, im sorry. So senator rounds. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your service. Today, youve gone through 15 different interrogators. I get to be number 16. One of the things that happens when youre number 16 is a lot of the questions that youve got have been asked, but it also gives you an opportunity to try to analyze and see just exactly what its all about and what the real issues are. And i would like to just begin with this. It seems to me that one of the concerns that we have is is we assume that we have a rogue nation who is a threshold state today with regard to Nuclear Weapons, the goal of this was to eliminate them from having Nuclear Weapons, or in the second position to delay the implementation or their capabilities with regard to Nuclear Weapons. Id like to know from the panel, very simple, are we stopping them from getting Nuclear Weapons, or are we delaying them for a period of 10 to 15 years from getting Nuclear Weapons, in your opinion . General . Well, my opinion, sir our governments policy has been they will not get a Nuclear Weapon. And nothing were talking about here today should change that policy. Mr. Moniz . I agree with general dempsey. And in terms of our capabilities to make sure that theyre not pursuing a Nuclear Weapon, this agroemt will leave us better off with the agreement than without the agreement forever. Mr. Carter . I concur with those two. Senator ive worn many hats in this administration, and each one ive said iran will not be permitted to get a Nuclear Weapon. I believe that deeply. Senator kerry. And i agree. The president s policy is they wont get it. Theres no if they were to try to not implement this agreement or the implementation is not full, the other options are Still Available to us. They will for the get a weapon. If i may add just one note just to say that in addition i think its significant that the agreement codifies with the p5 1 that iran will never get a Nuclear Weapon. Heres my question then, gentlemen. It appears to me each time ive heard the discussion it comes back down to a period of ten years, we have something in terms of the agreement that restricts them. But somewhere between 10 and 15 years, we change. And that during that time period, they can begin, because there is nothing in the agreement which stops them from moving back into and adding to their Nuclear Capabilities. If they are a threshold state today and if we have delayed them, thats one thing. But if at the end of this time period they may freely pursue Nuclear Options then i think thats really the gist that were trying to decide. Along that line and general dempsey, i appreciated your thoughts here earlier when you said that you were pragmatic with regards to your comments. It seems to me that we had an embargo which was in place which many of us were relying on when it came to an arms embargo. And also with regard to icbms. You indicated that as a matter of fact, just on july 7th of this year, you heard it earlier, your quote was under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran relative to Ballistic Missiles capability and arms trafficking. Secretary carter said the reason that we want to stop iran from having an icbm program is that the i stands for intercontinental which means having the kamt to fly from iran to the United States, and we dont want that. Secretary kerry indicated that there were other ways in which we could handle the situation. If we had an embargo in place and we had concerns about this whats the purpose for the embargo if we have other means in the first place . General clearly this seems to me that you were pretty clear that this was not exactly the kind of advice that you were suggesting that they allow this to come out. Well, as ive said, for i would have been happy to see the embargoes maintained in perpetuity. I think the question would have to be asked, were they likely to be sustained in perpetuity,son tuperson. And sanctions are only one way to keep pressure on those activities. We have other instruments and other military options to pursue. Senator, if i could add to that, we obviously all of us would prefer have it there forever and forever. The problem is were dealing with a u. N. Resolution the nuclear resolution, 1929, which said that the iranians, if they come to negotiate and suspend, then all the sanctions would be lifted. That is what was contemplated by the empowering resolution here. Now, the arms embargo was slid in at the very last minute by thenu. N. Permanent representative susan rice, so it slid into the Nuclear Provision itself. But under the Nuclear Position when the iaea would draw its broad conclusion, this would have been lifted completely anyway, and we had no power to stop that. So in effect our getting the eight years was a victory. Our getting the eight five years was a victory. But we have these tools that strengthen me the ability to do it in perpetuity. Secretary carter, would you say that today iran does not have the capability of getting icbm and that ten years from now, based upon the provisions in place without the embargo that they would still not be able to have an icbm . They dont have an icbm today. I wouldnt rule out that in ten years iran could produce to an icbm. Weve seen in north korea, develop and test missiles of increasing range. And they can do that on their own as the North Koreans have done without a lot of external help. That doesnt mean they wouldnt and thats not a crystal ball of the future. But judging from principally the experience with north korea, you cant rule that out. And thats why we theyd to protect ourselves. Whatever happens with the Nuclear Agreement, protect ourselves with Missile Defenses, with the other statutory and other International Agreement protections. That we have, deterrents and everything else. Senator, your time has expired, senator. Senator king and i would ask the senators to respect the time limit. You heard the chairman. Were going to try to go through some of these questions as quickly as possible. Secretary lew what would the allies reaction be in terms of the sanctions if the u. S. Rejected this agreement . Senator i think that they have made clear that they think the agreement should be put into force. Kropt to speak for any of them. But theyre already taking packses so show theyre dealing with it a different way. The vice chancellor of germany was over there with a group of businesspeople. Theres a french dell additionegation over there. I think they are going to take a very dim few of us. Oerpd, i do feel they respect our decisions they fear them, but i dont think we will have as much capacity to bring the community and the world together in that situation as we have had up until to you now. I expect china might have a different reaction. Yeah, the developing countries, countries like india theyre not in the p 55 1p5 1. Theyre a big economy dependent upon oil exports. We have had a sustained diplomatic agreement with countries to keep them in line. That will be harder and harder if they see the rest of the world going another way. Theyre going to look and ask how much capacity do we have to take Enforcement Actions . Can they find ways around him. And ultimately theyll be doing more. Would it be fair to say the sanctions regime would fray if not unravel . I think thats fair. Road i believe it to be measured because i dont believe its black and white. Appreciate that. Secretary carter, you just visited the middle east. Is the danger of proliferation greater or lesser as a result of this agreement. In other words. Some of our allies in that region who may think about their own weapon, are they less likely to acquire a weapon because of this agreement or more likely . Well i think logic would seg if the agreement is implemented, meaning that iran doesnt havethen less likely that iran get a Nuclear Weapon. Mr. Moniz theres been all this discussion about the secret agreement. Its true is it for the, that this agreement between the iaea and iran applies to the past the past actions of iran with regard to Nuclear Weapons at marchin and other places but does not apply to future inspections. We know what the future ones are going to be. Thats correct. Again, with the jcp 08 accomplished was forcing iran to cooperate with iaea to finish to finish the examination of past behavior. So this socalled secret agreement is a small part of this dole but is not the essence from today forward. That is correct. Yes. And finally, in 28 seconds the is there any way that they could clean up a facility where they had been processing fissile material sufficiently so that it could not be discovered if the inspection took place after 24 days . I can never say 0. 00 , but with very, very high confidence, i think we could we would find Nuclear Material utilization evidence. Certainly the risk of getting caught would be extremely high. Senator tillis. Thank you, mr. Chair. I want to get back to and chairman dempsey, well start with you. But i want to go back to what you said in one of your responses to the malign activities that i believe secretary carter, in response to a question, says he has no reason to believe that they will change. Thats the iran terror network. Thats their increasing threat in terms of cyber terrorist. It is the home of their weapon program, trafficking we could get into an ayatollah sending a tweet out with an image. These people are evil people. And theyre going to continue to expand if the areas they think they can. They have violated 27 agreements or treaties. They have violated some of the terms of the nonproliferation treaty. Some of the language is similar to the agreement we have here today. So theyre dangerous. I understand why you would be concerned with the options if it existed. So my question is that this deal go through. What does the middle east look like along with our partners over the next two years . What looks measurably different to make us look like were in a position . Senator, i want to highlight the fact that when we talk about iran, its really the regime. And i know you know that. Theres no doubt about that. Its the iranian people theres some reason the hope that this would but how does our posture change . Our posture changes on the basis of these areas which. Both israel and the gcc nations. And were very muscular. We have a we pave to shift these activities a bit. Secretary carter chairman dempsey. Im trying to get my hands around the thought process that would make the saudis less likely to acquire a Nuclear Weapon most likely from pakistan thats capable of pakistanly warhead. And then as a result of that, you why on either, if were talking about a nation that has violated a number of treaties and agreements, the possibility that that could occur and a nation having to be prepared to be their own deterrent, there is the logic of in this agreement than having that capability themselves . The agreement. Im saying why wouldnt they. The logic i cant but knowledgic is that if iran is prevented from having a Nuclear Weapon, which is the purpose of this, then that cause, at least for a saudi arabia or an egypt or turkey to get their own Nuclear Weapon and i cant speak for the psychology, but thats what logic would suggest. With respect to the behavior this comes down to manageing that chisk , they say at least what the leadership is thinking. And the if they dont have a Nuclear Weapon than if they do this is an effective tool. It does not eliminate all risk. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chair. Some have been both quick and negative about consequences and wrists that that might entail. Can you talk about the pry mere risk to both us and our allies would be if we had to take that course of action. And would you speak to what would set Irans Nuclear program back further . A military strike or this accord . In terms of time line. Well, speaking now, just very generally and not specifically, the two things that make the successful implementation in the agreement preferable from that point of view to a strike is that the effects of a strike are temporary. And secondly, that iran would, as i said earlier that iran would respond to money American Military strike upon iran and one needs to think through what the subsequent steps are including the possibility that iran at that point would be become committed to getting a Nuclear Weapon. Now i say that is predicated on the effective implementation of this agreement. And effectively implemented, the agreement stops iran from getting a Nuclear Weapon not just for ten or 15 years but by dent of the provisions sect moniz was talking about way beyond that. So were comparing that situation, which is effective implementation, complete implementation of this agreement, to the military option. Now we also have to recognize that there may not be effective implementation of this agreement and there may not be any agreement and so forth and that is why we are under instructions to the president to preserve and indeed we are improving and i cant do into that here the military option because as temporary as it is and so forth it needs to be there because that is our fallback if the other path left. Since were pursuing this accord, under this accord do you think that omgs gets option gets less or more effective over the course of this deal. As i indicated earlier from a purely technical and Military Point of view, it gets margally more effective and the reason is we have a more complete understanding of where everything is that could be associated with our Nuclear Program that we might strike and have more detail about the nature of those things. And so that makes perfect sense. Secretary moniz i want to get to you because i dont have a lot of time left but can you talk from the point of view of a Nuclear Physicist why it is so difficult if you have a covert facility where enrichment occurs, why it is so hard to sort of clean up the signs of having uranium or for that matter plutonium at a facility like that and would you answer the question, would an undeclared facility itself but violation of the jcpoa . Well, on the second part, absolutely. An undeclared facility would be a violation and i think frank lee was stern a stern response would be in order. With regard to the cover up there is not too much we can say in public but dealing with Nuclear Materials whether it is enrichment or looking at the characteristics of uranium in an explosive situation, for example, would tend to leave lots of very, very small particle difficult to clean up but beyond that we could talk in a classified environment. Thank you both very much. Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen. One of the frustrations that you are seeing here with the congress is we are reading it and were digging into it and when we have questions looking into the language we get spin answers that dont seem to comport with the answers of the language. So i want to go back to the snapback provision. There is a term called the snapback provision in the agreement. No, there isnt. The word snapback is not in the agreement. No it isnt but i think it would be helpful if you didnt use that term much. It is not in the agreement. I think in some ways it is deceitful because it is an illusion. And i think that in many ways the provision in in the agreement, and ill have my question, the snapback is actually more focused on the United States than it is iran. And as you know, mr. Secretary those of us who are involved and i was in bush vags, to get countries to economically isolate iran we used a lot of leverage and we did use leverage with countries saying you are either in their market or ours and that was effective. But if there is a snapback, that was a slog. That took years to divest out of the iran economy and it will take years to do it again. Let me ask a hypothetical, a question asked during the closed hearing and a number of senators and democrats were not satisfied with the answer and it focuses a little bit on what senator ayotte said. So lets assume sanctions are lifted and we get the 60 or the iranians are looking for additional 120 billion in investment on top of the 59 or 60. The economic is humming along and there is an act of terrorism. And by the way, the sanctions are annexed too which is essentially all of our bullets, this is a lot of American Power including the unilateral sanctions you mentioned secretary lew, an act of terrorism happens, it is big and they kill american troops and they blow up a consulate and i think it is likely theyll do that in the next ten years, the congress and the new president is upset and we impose we reimpose and annex sanctions and this is our pour and secretary lew im glad you talked about how this is power and we do have unilateral power with regard to sanctions. So then iran cited paragraph 26 of the agreement and im going to read it. It says iran will treat such a reintroduction, a reimposition of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments. Deal is over. They are cranking, their economy is cranking we just sanctioned them for terrorism and they can walk they can legally walk from this agreement. So let me ask you this, if we ever, ever impose socalled snapback sanctions isnt the deal over. Where am i wrong on that question . Senator we would snap back sanctions once they violated the agreement. Im not talking about the violation of the agreement. Lets talk about two different worlds youre not answering the question. You didnt answer it in the closed session and youre not answering it now. Im answering them in order. If they snapback. They can work. I have the authority to butt those back into place. The u. N. Sanctions were structured so they can go back into place. And they can walk. If they violate the Nuclear Agreement. Scenario one is they violate the agreement. Scenario two, they blow up a facility or take an act of terrorism or do something nonnuclear, we have the right to put these kind of measures in place these are terrorism sanctions. Iran has stated they will treat such reintroduction of the sanctions in annex to [ overlapping speakers ] as grounds to cease performing commitments. How am i not reading that correctly. Annex lists the Nuclear Sanctions. Senators time is expired. And im happy to pursue this in greater detail but we have not given away our ability to put these kind of measures in place for nonnuclear purposes provided they provide with the agreement. I think the iranians have a different view. Senator lee. Thank you mr. Chairman. I have a number of questions regarding the military implications of this deal. There is one other issue i want to follow up on though. Secretary kerry, why isnt this a treaty and as treaty why isnt it subject to advice and consent of the congress concurring. There are a number of reasons. None of the least is we dont have democratic relations with iran. This is a Multi Lateral agreement with many countries and you dont normally negotiate a treaty in that kind of context so it is a political agreement and we believe that the leverages that are in it through the snap back of sarvegss and the over site are very powerful for the iran compliance. There is nothing in article 2 section 2 that limits the section of treaty along the lines you just stated and nothing in your definition of the term treaty on the state departments own website defines it that way and it is a agreement between sovereign states or International Organizations and doesnt limit it between two. I dont think that is an adequate answer but well move on. General dempsey, presumably, one of the Weapons Systems that iran is likely to acquire and russia has indicated a willingness to sell would be an advanced air defense system. Can you describe for us what kind of impact this might have on u. S. Military operations, for example, hostage rescue operation and recognition and so forth. There is no question senator, it would make application of the military option to reduce the Nuclear Capability more difficult but not impossible. But more difficult. Thank you. Now, Wendy Sherman, the chief negotiator for the United States during the talks stated in february of last year of 2014, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that iranian Ballistic Missiles were, quote indeed going to be part of something that would have to be addressed as part of the comprehensive agreement, closed quote. Now secretary kerry, at the time was secretary sherman referring to lifting the u. N. Embargo on Ballistic Technology when she made the statement to the Foreign Relations committee or did the United States tend to include restrictions on Ballistic Missiles on this agreement. Well it does include in fact it is under chapter 7 and enforceable article 41. And there are restrictions within this agreement. And i would also comment on the earlier question that the defensive weapons are not covered by the embargo so the s300 from russia is not covered any way. I do have to ask you another question secretary kerry. Given the fact that one of the problems that weve got with iran and one of the reasons were so concerned about iran getting Nuclear Weapons has to fact to do with the fact this is a roguish state and taken threats against the United States and allies and made threats to wipe israel off the map and there are real reasons why we dont want them getting nuclear arms in light of the fact that is the biggest reason why we are so concerned and were willing to enter into negotiations to lift sanctions against iran and giving them a big economic benefit why on earth didnt we exist as a Condition Precedent to getting any deal at all that iran for the love of god cease and desist from the terrorist ambitions, cease and desist from making comments like it wants to wipe israel off the map and cease and desist from funding acts of terrorist against the United States and its allies. As we said, it would be great and ideal if one could negotiate that. Im not sure how long it would take. And given the imperatives that we had with respect to irans 19,000 centrifuges, 12,000 kilometers of weapons fissile material equal to 1012 bombs already, mastering of the fuel cycle and the near imminent finishing of the iraq reactor which would have produced weapons grade plutonium at the rate of two weapons per year, we felt we had to keep this targeted on the greatest weapon you just defined which the potential of them having a Nuclear Weapon. And if indeed, they are translating their slogans into policy of death to america and death to israel, then getting the Nuclear Weapon is everybodys first imperative here. That is what we focused on. Because we knew you could get tangled up one mans Freedom Fighter is another mans terrorist. You could be fighting forever on the issue of sunni, shia, definitions of who is protecting whom and you wont get anywhere. You will literally not get there. And that is why we separated those activities. That does not reduce our commitm as weve defined here again and again to push back on every one of those activities. But it is easier to push back an iran that doesnt have a Nuclear Weapon than one that doesnt. Senator manchin has one question i believe. Just one question very quick. And i read and i want to go over this and any reaction you may have far hed zachary and i rode this back home. Lets imagine the opponents of the Nuclear Agreement with iran get their way. The United States Congress Kills it. What is the most likely consequence. Within one year iran would have 25,000 centrifuges and the breakout time would shrink to weeks and the breakout would crumble and how is this in the International Best interest, of saudi arabia or anyone in that area and they say it is not a plausible scenario. Three powers rejected the deal with iran with two years of negotiation. So i would ask if this does collapse does that put them on an accelerated their intentions already been shown, does it put them on an accelerated path . Well we believe so. Our in Tell Community believes it and our in Tell Community has made it clear there is no return to negotiations with this ayatollah, and that they will then believe weve given them the reason that they have to develop a Nuclear Weapon. Because we wont deal in good faith. Im sorry, secretary. Between november 2012 and 2013, even when we had the noose around their neck, they still produced 6000 more centrifuges so their determination is to do it how much we have them strangled, correct, secretary moniz. That is quite correct, yes. They are determined. They are going to move forward. They have declared they will go to hundreds of thousands versus the 20,000. And you believe in the heart of hearts your one question is now expired senator graham. Thank you sir. General dem sirks dove believe the iranians have been building a bomb for possessful purposes all of these years . I believe they have a militarization aspiration. Who is the commander and chief of the Iranian Armed forces, secretary carter . Who calls the shots . The Supreme Leader. Who decides if iran goes to war . The Supreme Leader right . I believe so yes. Who decides if they try to break out . The Supreme Leader . Yes. Does the Supreme Leaders religious views compel him over time to destroy israel and attack america . I dont know. I dont know the man. Well let me tell you i do. I read what he says but i dont know. I know the man. I know what he wants. And if you dont know that this is not a good deal. Could we win a war with iran . Who wins the war between us and iran . Who wins . Do you have any doubt who wins . No. The United States wins. We win. Is it your testimony here that saudi arabia is okay with this deal and theyve committed to you they are not going to feel compelled to get a bomb because of this deal . No. My testimony is i cant speak for saudi arabia. Well you have spoken for saudi arabia all over the american media, reassuring everybody in this committee they are okay. I reported what they said so do you think they were lying to you . Of course not. [ overlapping speakers ] this is a little bit like what is the ayatollah thinking. I dont know what he is taking. What is your counterpart, mr. Moniz, what is his name . Mr. Sull ahi. Did he read what he said on july 22nd according to the Research Institute about the deal. He said lets see, we have reached an understanding with the iaea, god willing, there will be very positive results. We do not accept the pmd arrangement. We dont agree with that. And we reject the concept. What kind of arrangement has he made to make him feel so positive . First of all, i had not read it. Im going to give it to you. You dont have to answer. Would it be surprising to you that hes telling the iranian people dont worry about this idea, were going to get a good outcome . I assume what he is suggesting well if you didnt know about it is that there were no Nuclear Deals and that remains to be seen. That is my assumption. Weve reached an arrangement that were okay with. But the difference does matter. I would read it differently just from hearing it. Well we dont know what he means and apparently we dont know what the ayatollah wants. I know what he means. It means theyve reached an agreement so they dont have to worry about an inspection and i think the ayatollah will reach a weapon. Do all sides across the aisle believe this is a bad deal, secretary kerry . No. Name one Political Party, people actually governing the country, name one Political Party in israel that is i didnt hear you say Political Party. Political parties are opposed. Every Political Party in israel is opposed to this deal. So when you speak about israel and this deal, it is not b. B. , it is everybody. No. Senator, it is not everybody. The time is expired. The former head of shin bet. Not a Political Party. But you said everybody in israel. The time is expired. I dont think senator cruz. Thank you mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here, i ask that your answers be brief because my time is limited. General soleimani, the head of the quds forces has more blood of American Service members on his hands than any living terrorist. Under his agreement the sanctions under the general are lifted. Now secretary kerry said to the family of those men and women who gave their lives and were killed by general soleimani, we should apologize. Secretary secretaryker cart carter, i understand that there is a classified list of roughly 500 american soldiers who were murdered by iranian ieds. I would ask secretary carter so we can do what secretary kerry suggested, that the defense defendant release that list to every member of this committee declassify that list and release it to the Service Member families that were murdered by general soleimani. Let me look into that and ill get back to you senator. Senator i never said the word apology or apologize. I said we should thank them for their extraordinary service. Please dont extort my words. Secretary kerry, it is duly noted you do not apologize. That is not what i said. Do you apologize or not . I dont want to put words in your mouth. I thanked them for their service and i reminded them that the United States of america will not take the sanctions off the soleimani. And i want clarity. Do you want to apologize or not because you wanted to clarify that point. I said we thank them for their service but we will not take the sanctions off of cassman soleimani. I want to turn to a different question. The single greatest threat to the United States if iran acquires a Nuclear Weapon is that of an electromagnetic pulse, a Nuclear Weapon detonated could kill tens of millions of americans. On july 23rd in testimony before congress you told the United States senate you hadnt read the commission on emp and you didnt know what it was. That issin correct. I said i didnt know the 2008 report recommendations. I said i was familiar with the issue and we know about e mef ps [ overlapping speakers ] let me read the testimony verbatim. Sir, let me read what you said. Are you familiar with the commissions 2008 report. No, im not, sir. No, im not. Do you know what an emp is. Youll have to explain it to me please. What . I find that stunning. That was about the report. If you read further in the testimony youll see my explicit statement. Of course i know about the issue. I happen to know something about Nuclear Weapons and i know about emps and various and do you agree that an emp detonated by iran in the atmosphere will kill tens of millions of americans. It is a potent americans. It could kill tens of millions of americans. That would depend on the specifics. But do you agree it could. It depends on the specifics . Does that mean yes it could . I said it could you are refusing to answer the question. Secretary carter, is it correct that iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Ib was asked before and i believe that is true yes. Do you have any doubt whatsoever if in excess of 100 billion goes to iran that some of the money will go to jihadist that will use it murder americans . I cant say that. I can say that there malign activity about which were extremely concerned are quite well funded today. Okay. Finally, because i just have a second and the rest of the conduct makes it important that they not only have a Nuclear Weapon. And finally because i second left. Secretary kerry you told soermt lee this was not a treaty because we dont have diplomatic relations with iran and that is contrary to the testimony you gave yesterday to the house when you were asked when you were asked why is this not considered a treaty and ill read your answer verbatim. I know what i youre not reading my whole answer because i also said what i just said. Senators time. I apologize. The senators time has expired and i promised the witnesses that i would get them out as every member that wanted to is able to ask a question. I would appreciate i want to tell the witnesses, i appreciate their patience i know it has been a very long morning for them. I also know that they appreciate the gravity of this issue and the importance of allowing every member of the committee to at least ask questions and be informed by your testimony. So mr. Soernlt, could we keep the record open in case there are senators that have written questions. Im sure senator manchin will have a written question for you as will senator nelson. So i want to thank the witnesses and this very important issue and the testimony has been very important, i think, not only to members of the committee but the entire senate. I thank the witnesses. Were adjourned. [ hearing adjourned ] weve been asking today whether you support the iran Nuclear Agreement. And among your comments this from susan. Absolutely not. Sanctions should have been doubled down. Now, in 15 years, iran will be free to do whatever it wishes. Kerry doesnt even know what the side deals are with iran. And dominiqua posts, agreement and dislope assy are the only choice forward. Unless you prefer mutually assured destruction. This weekend on the cspan networks politics books and American History. Saturday night at 8 00 eastern on cspan, net roots hosted a discussion on Illegal Immigrants and the enforcement of arizona immigration laws. And on saturday at 6 30, Chris Christie on National Security. He speaks at the university of New Hampshire at manchester. On cspan 2 on saturday night at 150k eastern on book tv afterwards, Michael Tanner talks about the growing National Debt and looks at restructuring entitlement as a solution. And on sunday at 3 00, islamic extremism. And on sunday morning at 10 00. We commemorate the president Lyndon Johnson Voting Rights act. We include white house phone conversations between johnson and his aides and congressional members about strategy on how to enact and enforce the law and lbj 1965 speech at the capitol and the signing of the bill. Also this weekend, on saturday night at 7 10, university of california at berkeley history professor brian delay looks at the history of gun production in europe and how arms trading ended in a victory during the american revolution. Get a complete schedule at cspan. Org. When congress is in session, cspan 3 brings you more of the best access to congress with live coverage of hearings, news conferences and key Public Affairs events. And every weekend it is American History tv traveling to historic sites, discussions with authors and historians and eyewitness accounts of events that define the nation. Cspan 3 coverage of congress and American History tv. Former government and Security Officials discuss the potential challenges of the iran Nuclear Agreement. They agree that if iran takes steps to comply with the deal, then it could lead to positive International Partnerships in the future. The Arms Control Association hosted this event. Good morning everyone. Welcome to the Arms Control Associations briefing today on the p5 1 Iran Nuclear Deal. The outcomes em pleamentation and verification. Im Daryl Kimball and were an in deposit nonpartisan association. We are addressing the theys posed by the worlds most dangerous weapons and weve organized todays event to discuss the recently concluded p5 1 and Iran Nuclear Deal which is mong the most most complex and consequential of the nuclear age which began 70 years ago today with the first atomic bomb which was detonated in new mexico. This agreement follows over two years of diplomatic machinations intense negotiations involving seven nations including long time adversaries. The Arms Control Association has intensively followed the iran program and the diplomatic efforts to rein it in. And over this period of time weve sought to identify practical technical and policy solutions to address the many different challenges on this issue so that the negotiators can help arrive at an agreement that prevents a Nuclear Armed iran. And our analysis after looking at the document, which is over 100 pages quite substantial, is that it can effectively and verifiably block irans potential uranium and plutonium pathways to nuclear ways and guard against a Weapons Program for more than a generation and that is a view shared by a wide variety of nonproliferation experts. And we believe it will be a net plus for Nuclear Nonproliferation, the effort to stop the spread of Nuclear Weapons and for u. S. And Regional Security. Congress now has 60 days to review this complex agreement and we believe each and every member needs to take a serious look at this agreement and get the answers to their questions and there are many questions and consider the benefits and the alternatives. And so to help contribute to this debate we have gathered three topnotch experts who are going to discuss the agreement, how it works, what the impact will be. And well start with the Arms Control Association director for nonproliferation kelsey davenport. She is the author of the policy report and policy briefs on this issue and shes been very closely monitoring the talks for more than four years or so. And i think shes still recovering from her latest tour of duty, 2 1 2 weeks in vienna the site of the final rounds of the talks. And next well hear from richard nephew who is coordinator for sanctions at the policy of state and director for iran on the National Security Council Staff so he was one of the negotiators up until about the beginning of this year. He is now the Program Director for economic state craft and Energy Markets at the center on Global Policy at Columbia University in new york and nonresidence senior fellow at the Foreign Policy center at brookings. And then well hear from Ilan Goldenberg from middle east security programs at the center for new American Security and Foreign Policy and defense expert with extensive government experience covering irans program. So after their opening comments and remarks about the agreement and the impacts well take your questions. And i just want to maca final observation and thought before i ask kelsey to talk about the Nuclear Nonproliferation elements of the agreement. Like any diplomatic agreement, this one is the product of give and take. It is not perfect. But if you look at it as a whole, we think it is very strong and is in many ways stronger than the framework reached in early april by the p5 1 in iran. It is clear just a couple of days after this agreement was concluded that the many critics believe that by rejecting the agreement, by increasing sanctions pressure on iran the u. S. Can somehow coerce, convince the leaders of iran to dismantle the Nuclear Program or agree to better terms. I think many people think, i think the president thinks because we heard him say this yesterday, this is a dangerous illusion. There isnt a better deal on the horizon. And if congress somehow blocks this agreement they are going to be very tough, negative consequences. We will have broken with our europe an allys the necessary International Support for iran related sanctions will dissipate. Iran will not be subject to limited on the Nuclear Program and could expand the program. We would lose out on enhanced inspections and the risk of a nuclear arms iran in a conflict would grow. It wouldnt be inevitable but it would grow. In the next coming weeks we Hope Congress would look at the agreement and what it does and the alternatives with that let me turn it over to kelsey dochb port and then directly on to our other speakers. Thank you daryl and thank you for being here this morning. I think it is morning. Im still not quite sure what time zone im in. I want to talk about the Nuclear Elements of the deal. I cant touch on all 158 pages of the agreement during the questionandanswer we can explore the areas i dont touch on and happy to take any questions. But from the presective of the Arms Control Association this is a strong agreement from a nonproliferation perspective. In many ways it exceeds the expectations of what we thought a good agreement would need to achieve to block irans pathways to Nuclear Weapons and put in place a intrusive monitoring and verification regime that would ensure quick detection of any covert activity. No, this deal is not perfect but it is good enough and meet u. S. Nonproliferation goals and safeguards u. S. National security and good for Regional Security as well. So to get into first some of the details. The parameters agreed to in april in loosen were details and strong and from our assessment, with these parameters in place it would take iran more than 12 months to produce enough material for one Nuclear Weapon. That is about 25 kilometers of uranium enriched to above 90 . And that will be achieved by reducing irans centrifuges from 19,000 down to 6,000 of which 5,000 will be operating. Around stockpile will also be capped at 300 kilometers. So all of that we knew. But what we get from the final deal are a number of details that strengthen this assessment that iran cannot quickly move toward Nuclear Weapons. One of the things that becomes clear in this deal is that all of the excess centrifuge machines will be removed and all of the infrastructure, the piping the vacuums will be taken out and stored under iaea seal. And the seals will feed directly to the agency so we have greater assurance that if iran were to try to access these machines the iaea would immediately know. Also it is important to note that iran will be using these machines to replace and repair any broken machines. And iran will not be producing any additional centrifuges unless the stockpile of machines reduces to under 500. So this idea that iran is going to use time to build up the centrifuges to quickly deploy them later is false. And it will be these machines will be counted and inventoried under the deal. So again these are provisions that add a greater level of confidence. Also we have more information about the stockpile. In laosan, iran agreed to reduce the stockpile of low enriched uranium to 3. 67 or reactor grade to the Carbon Monoxides it has now down to 3000 kilometers. Iran cannot convert the gas into oxide. Oxide can be converted back to gas and further enriched so this is the entire stockpile capped at 300 kilometers. Any scrap material that is in process, that is enriched to 3. 67 or up to 20 will be turned into fuel plates for the tau ran Research Reactor and the material that cant be turned into fuel plates will either be shipped out of the country, diluted, or mixed in a form that cannot be enriched further. So again, additional steps that iran will take to ensure that there is not scrap material lying around that can be enriched further providing more assurance that iran cannot obtain the material necessary for a bomb within under 12 months. Now there have been some concern about the fact that the agreement leaves about 1,000 centrifuges at the fordow facility which iran began to build in secret. That is deep in the mountain near the city of qualm. Now the 1,000 centrifuges there, 350 will be used for stable isotope production. Now these machines cannot then be transitioned back to uranium enrichment. So that leaves about 600 machines that are idle. The rest of the centrifuges and the associated infrastructure will be removed and it will be placed under seal back at the natantz facility which is where the 5000 facilities will continue to produce enriched uranium. So they cant take the machines back to fordow and Begin Operating them quickly and use this facility to produce enrich uranium. The iaea would be able to detect those moves because the centrifuges are stored off site and because the iwill have access on a daily basis if it wants it to the fordow facility. So the facility does not pose a threat for the duration of the limitations there which is 15 years. So very strong on the fordow facility. Now one of the criticisms that frequently has been levered against the deal is what will happen after ten years because in ten years iran iran committed for ten years to operate 5060 of the ir 1 centrifuges. Iran is not going over a cliff in ten years and this agreement makes clear that the work on advanced centrifuge machines will be limited and they will be phased in in such a way that one day after ten years iran cannot deploy thousands of ir centrifuges and weeks away from obtaining material for a Nuclear Weapon. So to look a little bit more closely at the r d, iran currently has about 1000 advanced centrifuge machines in various states at its pilot production facility. Iran will have a few months to finish up the testing with some of those cascades and then it will remove nearly all of the advanced machines and store them under seal. During the duration the ten year duration iran will be allowed to operate one ir4 machine, one ir 5 machine, and one ir 6 machine and one ir 8 machine for eight years. If t can test the machines with uranium but cannot use the machines to accumulate enriched uranium. So again we are not going to see a nonproliferation of machines that iran can use to quickly break out. After 8 1 2 years iran will be able to test about 30 ir6 machines and 30 ir8 machines an at that point they can begin producing 200 of each of the models per year but they are not producing the rotors for these machines. So around year ten, when iran begins to transition the machines, it is important to note that the swoop capacity will also remain relatively stable for the next about three years. What is swu capacity. Im getting to swu capacity. That is the measure of efficiency of a centrifuge machine. That means the capacity of the 5060 ir 1 fudges will remain constant as new machines are introduced. So if an ir6 machine has ten times the swu capacity of an ir 1 machine, if iran introduced an ir 6 machine they have to remove ten ir 1s. This ensures we wont see a ramp up in the Iran Nuclear Capacity immediately after sort of the tenyear restrictions on just using ir 1s to enrich uranium expire. It is also important to note that we should not view any of these elements in isolation. So in addition to these restrictions on the number of machines that are being produced irans procurement of materials that can be used for Centrifuge Development will be monitored by the joint commission which is set up through the deal and any changes that iran wants to make to the r d will also have to be approved by the joint commission. So if iran starts to move or try and sort of move away from the r d plan that it will submit to the iaea as part of the additional pror prot protocol it will become clear very quickly to the joint commission. So one of the other areas where there has been a lot of questions relates to the transparency and the monitoring and verification elements of the deal. And this is something that if the Arms Control Association we were very concerned about because of irans Illicit Nuclear activities in the past. But we feel that the Intrusive Inspections and monitoring and verification regime produced under this agreement will provide the highest degree of confidence that iran cannot pursue Nuclear Weapons at the declared facilities or covertly. So first, at the declared facilities, iran will have to expand the Nuclear Declaration under the Additional Protocol which iran has agreed to implement and ratify within eight years of the agreement. Now the Additional Protocol is an agreement between iran and the iaea that expands upon irans safeguards agreement. It expands the number of declared sites. It gives inspectors greater access. And access on short notice to inspect the sites. And on top of this, the agreement lays down a number of provisions that allows for Continuous Monitoring across irans entire fuel supply chain. And that is 25 years at the Uranium Mines and mills and 20 years at the centrifuge production shops and the Continuous Monitoring at natantz and furdo as well. And so if iran wanted to covertly pursue Nuclear Weapons they would have to replicate the entire fuel supply and find a new source of uranium ore and convert it into gas and enrich gas. And these are huge projects. You cant hide this in a basement or at a warehouse in a facility. Now another check against this sort of covert the concern about a covert Nuclear Weapons Program Comes with the increased access that will be granted to inspectors under the Additional Protocol. And it is very clear in the deal that if concerns arise about Illicit Nuclear activities, the iaea will be permitted managed access to sites of concern including military sites. Now managed access means that iran can state some conditions to protect sensitive military information. But it is important to realize that ultimately it will be the iaeas decision about whether or not the conditions iran places on access are adequate. And if the ifeels like they are not adequate, there is an adjudication mechanism in place that will decide if the iaea should be given expanded access. So if they cannot come to a decision within 14 days about access the joint commission which includes members of the p5 1 countries, the European Union and iran will have seven days to decide on access. And that is decided by a consensus vote. So five of the eight members. So that means iran, china and russia together cant block access. And then iran will have an additional three days to comply with the joint commission recommendation. So in total if the iaea wants to access a site, they can only be blocked from doing that for 24 days. 24 days may be time for iran to remove any equipment that it has put in place, but it isnt enough time for iran to eradicate any indication that ill list you the niekt activity had taken place and that is in part due to the sophisticated environmental sampling that the iaea can conduct. So these layers really demonstrate the strength of the monitoring and verification. And i think it is worth noting that we consider monitoring and verification by looking at the iaea. But it isnt just the iaea having the eyes on Irans Nuclear program. The National Intelligence organizations of the United States, of the European Countries and im sure israel will continue to watch iran very closely. In short to sum up, i think the director of National Intelligence James Clapper said this is as solid of a verification regime you can get. No element will provide you 100 guarantee, but together it provides the highest degree of certainty that raub is not iran is not covertly pursuing Nuclear Weapons. I think it is important to note that Irans Nuclear decisionmaking has generally guided by a cost benefit analysis. So with this deal in place, the cost of cheating become exponentially higher because this is an agreement that iran voluntarily signed on to and within the agreement there are further kmimtmentes by commitments by iran not to undertake any experiments related to Nuclear Weapons development. So if iran is found to be violating this deal that it agreed to voluntarily well see an extremely strong reaction by the international community. So it also changes the cost benefit analysis. And there are a few additional elements that i think are important and worth noting that i dont think have gotten much coverage so far. There are concerns where iran cannot export any Nuclear Material or technology unless it is approved by the joint commission. I think that is important, when we think about the spread containing the spread of the technologies. There will be joint work on the fabrication of fuel elements which provides iran the ability then to fuel the iraq reactor using the domestic fuel that it produces. And then also if there are concerns about noncompliance, there will be sort of a timebound sort of 35day period that consists of review by the joint commission, review by the ministers if necessary that ensures if any party is not satisfied with the breach, it can move on and take the case to the Security Council. So there are a number of other provisions in this deal that just add to the strength and amplify the nonproliferation value. So finally, moving forward, congress now has the opportunity to weigh in on this deal. But with the power that congress has to vote on agreement comes a great deal of responsibility. And if they cause or prevent this deal from being implemented, i think they need to buy the consequences which certainly will likely today to escalate on the part of iran, escalate sanctions from the u. S. Side and could increase the chances of a military conflict. So when looking at this deal it is important that congress evaluates the deal on the merits. Does it block irans pathways to Nuclear Weapons . Yes. Does it put in place intrusive monitoring and verification . Yes. Does it provide recourse in the case of violation . Yes. And really also considered against the alternatives there is to better deal out there. Weve heard about the need for any time anywhere inspections. Those arent necessary. The International Atomic Energy Association can do its job with the flexibility granted to it under the Additional Protocol. Weve heard more pressure would perhaps induce iran to make greater concessions. I think a deal like this deal, that allows iran to say it met its strategic objectives of obtaining limited civilian Nuclear Program and receiving sanctions relief gives iran greater buy into the agreement and makes the deal sustainable because iran sees incentives to comply so this idea that more concessions were necessary would not produce necessarily a stronger deal. Also, again, i think it is important that when evaluating this deal we bent miss the forest for the trees. All of these elements need to be viewed together. If we look too closely at any one particular detail we may miss the symbiotic relationship between the entirety of the package. And ultimately, this deal removes the threat of an Iranian Nuclear weapon it is good for u. S. And Regional Security and i think it deserves the support of policymakers here in washington. Thank you very much kelsey for that over view and the details on some of the new elements and you mentioned sanctions. Were going to turn to that issue now and how that relates to this from richard neefu. Thanks for having me and for everybody being here today. I was just going to touch on three points to deal with the sanctions relief issue. First i want to touch on the contents of the relief and the time line and sequence of how it would all be rolled out. Second i want to touch on what is left. Because i think while there is a sense out there that this means the entire u. S. Or International Sanctions regime has been taken away. That is simply not true. And some of the sanctions in place will frankly continue to hamper irans capability to take advance of some of the relief which may be a future problem. And last i want to touch on the impact of sanctions relief and how the iran apparatus may use the benefits of sanctions relieve. So first off, i can say in terms of the contents, i have a much easier job than kelsey because the sanctions package is straightforward and fairly direct and fairly broad. The decision was made very clearly by the negotiating partners to make this an issue of the Nuclear Problem and how to get resolution of the Nuclear Program by incentivizing rapid iranian action. And so the time line that has been established for implementation of relief was configured as such. The iranians have to complete all of the nuclear modifications that kelsey was outlining with a few things that just by their very nature are going to have to continue on for eight or ten years, some instances going on for 25, before any new sanctions relieve will be given. So talk about signing bonuses and billions of dollars flooding into iran about a single centrifuge has been dismantled is all false. The way the deal puts it in place. The the iranians wont see anything until they have done their part, period. Now, when they have done their part the relief is substantial. And in the judgment of myself and the administration, it was worthwhile in order to get the kinds of nuclear cop session concessions kelsey has laid out in play. And so first off, all of the sanctions here are secondary in nature. They do not include the u. S. Primary embargo which is off the table with a very specific licensed things. What the United States has offered to do is provide relief from the sanctions it imposes on foreign companys interactions with iran. So if you are bp if you are total, or any other of other companies that reside out there in the world you are now able to do business with iran. After the iranians have done the nuclear steps they are supposed to do. And it is going to be across a wide range of sectors. The Energy Sector both in terms of the sale and purchase of products, investment financial services, Financial Transactions insurance, transportation, it is going to be a wide range of Economic Activity that the iranians are going to be able to do. Again, with Foreign Companies and foreign actors subject to their own laws. Now this will not take place until after the nuclear steps have been taken which is going to take a long time as well. The way the time line has been set up we are in a period that you could loosely call phase one. But leading up to adoption day. And it is in this 90day period in which every country that is part of the p5 1 has to go to the nagt legislatures and get buy in for the deal. Upon expiration of the 90 day clock or sooner if they agree and frankly i dont think that is possible given our own 60 day clock here in the United States then the iranian will take their steps, removal of the centrifuges and modification of the iraq reactor and a variety of other things that kelsey was describing. For the United States European Union there is a requirement to have in place the waivers and legal modifications to sanctions that will start upon iaea verification that the iranians have done what they are supposed to do. So there will be prom you will gags of new regulations and executive orders and thing as long those lines but all tied to a trigger and the trig ser a report by the iaea director general that the things that the iranians are supposed to do have in fact been done. There are a variety of estimates as to how long it could take. My own estimate we can talk about this in questions it would be easily four to six months before the iranians will have achieved the removal of centrifuges. It is theoretically it could go faster but i wouldnt bet on that. Four to six months. And if you add 90 days we are really talking about april, maybe march, when they can achieve sanctions relief and start to see new business start to flow. That is very important because that basically means that for the time being, the iranians are highlien sent vised to do all of the things they are supposed to do. And we are going to see them take the steps they are required to do to see a dollar of the relief they are supposed to get. Back in the action, i remember vividly, the iranians would stop doing the steps before it became implemented. I believe the scope and scale suggests that is not the case here. There is then basically a high ate is in terms of additional sanctions relieve. For eight years or the iaea reaching a broader conclusion of the Nuclear Program whichever one comes first. And during this time, relief will continue to exist and the iranians can take advantage of it but they are under important ones that i want to touch on is the procurement channel and how it relates to the sanctions that still remain. Under this eightyear time period the iranians are going to have to go to the procurement channel established under the joint commission to ask for any Nuclear Related items. Thats because the Nuclear Related Security Councillor restrictions will remain in place. They will remain in place and require iran to describe what it intends to do with the items and to submit itself to end use verification checks and a variety of other checks to ensure theyre going where theyre supposed to be going. In this instance its both a restriction on the iranians as well as still being utilized part of the sanctions regime that will be in place. The procurement channel will extend it another two years beyond this adoption, beyond the eightyear period until the u. N. Security councils requirements themselves are canceled in ten years time. There will be at this year eight period though modification to other parts of the Security Council infrastructure and other legal instruments including the United States and the eu. These primarily deal with proliferation related items, potential sources of concern. Its notable though that if you look at the tax whats put in is not iran will get to import whatever it wants to import from anyone that wants to import. Rather certainly from the u. S. Perspective iran will be treated like anyone else. Subject to controls and subject to u. S. Sanctions if we were to find there were things going on there that we had concerns about. Thats basically it in terms of the sanctions to leave time. The iranians dont get anything until after they have implemented their Nuclear Obligations obligations. That will take four to six months after this 90 day period. Around april of 2016 and nothing really again for a number of years thereafter. The question, therefore becomes whats left . Well, as i said, there are a number of specific restrictions that will remain in place to acquire Nuclear Related items, so on and so forth. Thats not the limit. U. S. Sanctions with respect to terrorism and human rights will remain in place. The u. S. Primary embargo will remain in place with the exception of some very specific licensable transactions involving, for instance, the sale of commercial compliance. Even in that provision its very clearly stated that they have to be used for civil uses so if the United States were to find all of a sudden that a brandnew boeing that arrived in tehran was now funneling arms into assad, assuming were talking about assad still in power many years from now then that would be cause to terminate the license. Thats clearly stated in the text. This also means, therefore, that the iranians are going to have to be on their best behavior with respect to the planes. As weve discovered the United States has the ability to detect what kind of planes are being used for what kind of purposes and to identify them. They have to be loosely described as bad guys squlug the guard force. And theres been a lot of talk about this. Ill take a brief moment to describe it about what is contained in the main deal. Gostham sulihami will be delisted. In the United States he was staying in place as a sanctioned individual until such time as he stops engaging in things we consider to be terrorism. I dont really think thats likely. This is also important because the United States is not removing the infrastructure it uses to make these residual sanctions impactful and that includes very important tool of a sasad act, section 104. Its in this provision that the United States has exerted a lot of pressure on the International Financial system with respect to designated entities. You boil it right down to it, the law provides for the United States to sanction those who conduct transactions on behalf of u. S. Designated people. The list will go down but not away particularly for terrorism or human rights or other related targets they face Financial Sector cutoff for all of the entities or individuals to remain on the list. The u. S. Designated bank for terrorismreal estate terrorismrelated purposes will remain and the Financial Impact will remain as well. By the way, this means any additional targets the u. S. Identifies will be involved in terrorism or Human Rights Violations also are potentially subject to the same sort of cutoff. So the iranians still have to worry about what could potentially happen to their Financial Sector if, in fact, they amp up and start using the banks were d listing now for different purposes. I think its important at this juncture to note that the sanctions relief will not be this end all and be all restoration and renaissance for iran. It will do a lot. The very point that some sanctions remain and the fact that there is going to be reputational and Business Risk attached to doing business in iran means that the sanctions relief is going to take a long time to mature. Now, from one perspective, this is really good, because that means that for those of us who are concerned about irans ability to do awful things in the region, alana will speak to that it means that there is a way of pacing and controlling and modifying iranian behavior because if we continue to identify individuals and entities involved in terrorism, then the iranians have to deal with the consequences of that. This is not unilateral sanctions disarmament, period. This is a step to provide iran palpable, useful relief but they are going to be under the same threat with respect to these institutions that they were yesterday, the day before that, ten years ten years at this point, five years ago once assad first came into effect. When you add that to the fact that a lot of businesses are going to be concerned about the possibility of snap back i think you can see that there is going to take a long time for there to be resurgence. Iranians will see purchases of their oil, things people can do to get out of iran for the initial couple of years. This is simple prudence on the part of international businesses. It doesnt make a whole lot of sense to do multibillion dollars worth of investment in the country when you have the risk of snap back noncompliance finding or some other concern that could get you in hot water both in washington as well as with your stockholders. There may be some businesses that are willing to do this but i would bet that theyre going to build force majure clauses in their contracts allowing them to get out of iran very, very quickly if there were to be sanctions. So the business operating environment in iran will be different than it will be in other countries in the middle east. This would frankly be notwithstanding the presence of sanctions because iran is still a difficult place to do business itself. The bureaucratic red tape in tehran is as cumbersome and difficult to deal with as anywhere else in the world. Its notable that a number of International Oil Companies Said that they dont find the current contract that the iranians are starting to beat about for oil services is all that attractive. Theyre looking for better terms. It speektsaks to the fact that they will have time to overcome resistance and nervousness from other companies to plunge back in. Iran is going to get a benefit and the real threat to i think the longevity of the deal is this benefit is to slow in coming on. There is a very significant risk that the iranians at some point say, were not getting what we need and its at that point that you can see them say, we need to reconsider the terms of this deal. So i think basically the sanctions we picture in iran is favorable to the p 5 plus 1, favorable to the United States. It will provide iran some advantages but it is not something that is going to overnight change the iranian economy. Its going to take time and there are ways to control it still further. Thank you. Thanks a lot richard. That was very helpful. Now were going to turn to elan who will talk about the Regional Security dynamics related to this agreement. Thank you, darryl. Thanks, everybody, for being here, for the association for having me. I thought what id do is talk about the three major actors in the region who are reacting. The first is iran saudi arabia and the gulf states around it and the third being israel. Now i should start from the position that because of the nonproliferation benefits of the agreement, i very much agree with my colleagues up here. This is something that is in the National Interests of the United States and that we need to be pursuing. The regional ramifications will be much more complicated and mixed. There are some negative down sides we have to manage especially with some of our traditional partners over the next few years. It doesnt mean we should be letting the tail wag the dog in americas fundamental National Security risk, but this is something we have to deal with. Starting with how we expect the deal to shake out in iran over the next few years, you sort of hear these two schools of thoughts in theories. One is president rouhani foreign minister zarif, pragmatists inside the iranian system. Not democrats. Men of the revolution. I dont think theyre looking for liberalism western style to break out tomorrow in tehran but they are more pragmatic when they weigh the economic benefits and benefits of International Engagement versus support for terrorism and things like the Nuclear Program and are more interested in those first set of interests for iran. Are they going to gain more influence and then be able to