It is normal for cdc to do investigative work on its own before it would refer a matter to us and that actually helps us because the evidence is more developed when he receive it. So you think 60 days is reasonable before youre notified to do your investigation . Yes. Okay. And as a part of that theyre doing their investigations and so forth. But dont you think its kind of interesting that you got notified yesterday . Do you think that our hearing might have sped that time up a little bit . I have no information about that. But when you filed your testimony, you said to date oig has not received a referral for any more recent potential violations involving dugway which was in reference to the 2008 and 2010 incidents. Thats right. We submitted the testimony on friday. At that time we had not received it. I would say my opinion is that yor sight by this committee is a very effective way at spurring attention to this matter within the government. Just wish we didnt have to do it so often. Dr. Sosin, youre the acting director at the National Center for injury prevention and control. I noticed in the report referred to by the chairman earlier that stefan moore is the acting director of his department. What is the relationship between your two areas and why is everybody over there acting and nobody is permanent . Im sorry the information you have about my acting director is old. Good. I was previously for nine months acting director there. I have been nearly for over a decade actually the Deputy Director for the office of Public Health preparedness and response. Dr. Monroe i think youre referring to is the acting director for the laboratory. An Outstanding Laboratory scientist. And an acting role because were trying to hire a topnotch Laboratory Scientist to lead the Laboratory Safety and science effort. Do you answer to hum or do you just work with him . I work with him. I field back. Thank you, mr. Chairman. You mr. Pallone, youre now recognized for five minutes. Thank you. As the investigation into the dugway incident continues were learning that more and mer labs received the live anthrax shipments in addition to the 88 labs that the d. O. D. Directly sent the shipments. So were talking about nearly 200 labs. And as more labs are involved, the opportunities only increase. So i do want to understand whether its necessary to have so many different labs involved with dangerous biological agents. I know ms. Degette mentioned this in her Opening Statements. Do you have an opinion op the number of labs working with anthrax . I dont we know the number of labs that are working with anthrax. Thats one of the issues. Well we have information of where are you talking about just an answer please. We do not know all of the high containment laboratories that exist. We have controls for a subset of dangerous pathogens. There are other highly infectious path yenogens that require a laboratory. Dr. Crosse, its been recommended of the establishment to conduct the government wide strategicover site, including developing National Standard for designing, instructing and operating such labs. Can you elaborate on this recommendation . Yes. We think its important that there be a more comprehensive set of plans for how many labs are needed. You know there have been theres been a great increase in the number of labs over the last decade, since the anthrax attacks in 2001. A number of different federal agencies have expanded the number of labs that they have. Academic institutions have built labs. Some states have built labs. And a lot of private entities have built labs. And theyre very expensive. We dont know what really is needed. They as weve heard today, they are developing their own validation procedures. And theres not necessarily an assurance of consistency. And so while inspections can be performed of these laboratories the kinds of reporting of problems have only typically been going to a level above the laboratory. So theyre not going up to the top of departments or to organizations. And so i think that were concerned that there hasnt been kind of a consistent set of standards in place, a consistent understanding of what the needs are, a consistent plan developed for where these laboratories ought to be built and maintained and what the costs are going to be over the long term for maintaining this kind of infrastructure and whether it is in line with the needs. Well, have you gotten feedback from the federal Government Agencies who operate the high containment labs with regard to the recommendation to establish a single federal entity . I know you mentioned some obstacles to that. But what other obstacles would there be to implement it . I think that its not clear where that organization should be located. As we heard today its difficult to retrofit this kind of control on top of an existing enterprise, different departments want to have control over what their own needs are Different Companies want to be able to compete for contracts from the federal government. And so going back and retrofitting that kind of control is complicated. We have not gotten traction on the concept of moving forward to try to centralize this control. Let me just then ask again, do you believe that this establishment of these National Standards and oversight might address some of the gaps that led to the recent i accidents at d. O. D. And cdc and how could Congress Help in establishing uniform standards and procedures . We do believe that having more consistent lines of authority would be helpful. D. O. D. I think in its report in the dugway incidents pointed out that the different laboratories handling anthrax were in different chains of command and never came together. There wasnt a shark of information and they didnt have top level knowledge of what was going on in the laboratories and how the procedures were being conducted. Thats the type of thing we think would be helpful and well be happy to work with you and members of the committee to try to develop some kind of proposals proposals. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. To me this hearing is astounding honestly. I hate to admit but in the four and a half years that ive been here, this is not the only Government Agencies that were hearing testifying in front of congress saying theyre establishing new policies, sorry, we messed up sorry we did this, sorry we did that. You know why . Because theres in accountability. Theres no accountability across the federal government, in any view. No one is responsible. People are in their jobs for short periods of time. Dr. Hassell, youve been in your job for a year. If we really pressed you, youd say i dont know i have only been in any job a year. I dont know what they did before me. This is a decade long process. I get tired of hearing were establishing new policies. This is anthrax. We should have had policies for decades. Its ridiculous. Thats the problem. And theres almost contempt against congressional oversight. Every hearing i go. Almost people walk out of the room and go, well they didnt get us this time. Theres nothing they can do to us. I mean this is just ridiculous. So dr. Hassell, how can there not be standardized protocols for this in the federal government after decades and decades of this . How can that not happen . I mean thats just the question i have. Dr. Hassell, you made the statement, you know were standardizing how we deal with this. How can it not be standardized . So i can answer for d. O. D. Part of as was noted earlier, the different chains of command has been one of the fundamental problems here because each Laboratory Reports up to a different chain. They meet too high up in the organization. So yes, ive been in place for a year but i take this very personally. Im not criticizing you. In fairness, youve only been there a year. You cant be accountable for what happened ten years ago. But i own it now. So i take personal responsibility to work with other people in the department to make sure these things are standardized and i will not recommend to the undersecretary that we lift the moratorium until im confident that we have proper scientific basis for our operations and that weve achieved the right level of standardization. I appreciate that. The reality is that people are losing their jobs. That would be standardized. And dr. Sosin you said asked how do you solve this problem. You said i dont know how we solve the problem, essentially is what you said in your earlier testimony. I mean, i know how to solve it. How many people across the government have been fired over this problem . Who has lost their job at cdc, at d. O. D. . Who is still doing the same thing . Even though they literally sent a National Security risk of anthrax around the world and, as mr. Griffith found out not d. O. D. Properties. I dont care if theyre allies. That doesnt matter. Not the mention the fact, how many people are protected from being fired because theyre part of a federal Government Union that does not allow them to be held accountable . I want to know answers. I would love to have you come business cdc and see how accountable the scientists and professional staff are at cdc. We take this incredibly seriously. Im not saying you dont. But who lost their job . There are regulations and rules around the use and transfer of anthrax, live anthrax. This particular incident was about an exempted material which was not considered a select agent. And new actions will be taken to address it. What, youre going to put in some more policies . I mean by action, what do you mean . So that means for example for me what it means to me is the people responsible for doing this lose their job. For example before a material can be considered killed we need to have a validated procedure within the Lab Experience but to my question how come you havent had that . In hindsight we should have had it. This decades. With the organism and the vurn about here we should have done it before. The federal government doesnt know what constitutes dead anthrax until this came up . Theyre testing the material in the laboratory to see if there is growth. And that process in this instance failed. I yield back mr. Chairman. I now recognize mr. Flores for five minutes. Thank you mr. Chairman. Its unfortunate we have to have another oversight hearing like this. Continue i along the theme, there was a quote in usa today, and the article that came out yesterday that says the root cause of all of this is a lack of accountability. Incidents dont get reported and consequences dont occur. And i think that many of us have expressed that frustration. Not only in the agencies represented here, the two agencies that are the subject of the problems. But across the government. In the v. A. , for instance. It has allowed for coverups on waiting lists and only three people have been fired in the va. 300,000 people in the va and only three have been fired. It gets back to the root causes. Its too hard to fire a federal union employee. Dr. Hassell of the individuals at the dugway ground, what are the proven productions at that facility . I dont have that information, sir. It can get it to you. Its mostly civilian. And of the civilian what percentage are unionized . Im not sure. I would appreciate if you could get us responses for both of those. And if thats the case, have you taken action against any of those employees any civilian employee or any uniformed employee . To date no. There is an investigating looking into this. If we do take action we want to make sure its taken at the right place to make sure that the person who is truly accountable is held accountable. Thats all real nice. But how many mistakes are happening right now because theres in accountability . I mean, do you know today that were not shipping other live agents around right now . Do you know that . How can you know . As we pointed out, just because the anthrax itself is so hard to kill and presents such a challenge, thats been stopped. So that i can assure you is not happening. Anything else . Whats the next one though . Where are the other vulnerabilities . We had ebola last year not from you, but from the cdc. I mean dr. Sosin . I mean, how can you be sure that we dont have any other incidents like this going on right today . Certainty is hard to provide. As we understand the organism and the process of assuring its sterility, theres no evidence that these materials that are presumed enact vated are not activated. Weve seen in evidence of a signal event growth or disease or injury. That doesnt mean we dont take this seriously and we dont consider whether additional procedures need to be implemented on an activation of select agents. This is certainly going on now with respect to anthrax and will apply and be considered in a broader context for other select agents. Just for the committees sake, walk through the ownership of the different elements of the federal select process. As respects your two agencies. Who owns what part . Ive just got a minute. Just give me the highlights, dr. Sosin. What parts do you own and where do you hand off to. The federal select program is an oversight program. So the main activities that are involved improvements that have been made through the execution of this program over the last 12 years includes screening and assessing staff. That means the facility is an appropriate facility, has Good Laboratory practice and rule to work with that material. It includes the fbis review of personnel reliability of all of those who will be using it. Includes a set of requirements to elevate biosafety and biosecurity, Access Controls those kind of measures. And it includes a process and ability to detect and respond, including the notification of jurisdictions that have these facilities in site, including what with we did here with the anthrax response, being able to go in investigate identify whether people are at risk secure the samples and look into what caused the problem. This process involves not only private Sector Institutions as well as public Sector Institutions is that correct . . Thats correct for the select agents. Where are you finding the best practices coming from today . I mean dr. Hassell was talking about going to the private sector to find best practices. So dr. Hassell where are we finding the best practices today . Private sector or Public Sector . Its a combination of both. Were kwing to look at the private sector. That often doesnt happen in government as a first reaction. You need to look at both. The department of defense, the centers for Disease Control the nih, these are outstanding facilities doing cutting edge critical work which has some risk. These are places where best practices and not best practices will occur because of the broad range of practices that do occur. Ill have additional questions. Ill submit them for the record later on. Thank you, mr. Chairman. The gentlemen from oklahoma, mr. Mullins is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I appreciate you guys being here. Im sure youre having a blast and enjoying your time here. But it is very frustrating for me to see what has taken place. To hear you guys say you have protocols, protocols youre looking into it, how long does it take to look into this . Its really hard for me to follow this. Dr. Hassell is it the practice of the d. O. D. , the labs to send out a death certificate with select agents when they leave . Is that correct . It has been yes. It has been . How long has that been going on . I believe for i apologize. What kind of activation is on the death certificate. Im not sure how long thats been part of the process. Weve been looking at the overall activation looking at that back 12 years. Im not sure at what point the death certificate was initiated. Ill find out. Well this dates back to five years ago. So we know its been going on for at least five years, right . Right. Then why is it that the private lab that found the active anthrax why didnt it have a death certificate with it . Because when it was originally tested they didnt see growth. One of the things were looking into if its shipped out, you just said its the practice of d. O. D. With any shipment thats leaving to have a death certificate. Why wasnt there one that was shipped to a private lab . Im sorry. So for that particular operation we were sending out blind tests. People were seeing whether or not they could detect with anthrax in it . It was a sweep to see if people could detect the presence of these. This was to identify some performers. So we knowingly shipped anthrax . Im sorry . You said you shipped it to them to see if they could find it. It didnt have a death certificate. So i assume you knowingly shipped anthrax to this lab. We did not provide the certificate because that would indicate what the shipment was. We did not knowingly ship live agent. Absolutely not. Did it have at your place or some other place the death certificate . Yes. Who produced the death certificate. The originate. What is the difference between the test that the private lab showed that it was rive . They were very similar. They couldnt be. One showed it dead and one showed it live. Thats what were looking at. Who is responsible for that . Is that dr. Sosin . Is that his group . Who is responsible for showing that the procedures to find out that its dead . Going forward no. Who is responsible for it at the time. Not going forward. If it wasnt your group, whose group was it . It was dugway. They developed who is over dugway . Who do they fall underneath, mr. Hassell, mr. Sosin, dr. Dempske. Who oversees dugway. The army. Help me figure out who is responsible fb whos the chain of command thats responsible for the death certificate for the procedures to show that the agents leaving is truly dead . Are you talking about the chain of command at the laboratory im talking about the chain in command to find out that the anthrax that is shipping out this isnt is hard question. Who is over finding out for sure the procedures to find that the agent is dead . It would be you dont know . It would be the scientist at dugway. Dr. Sosin can you answer that question . I cant answer dr. Sempski b edempske can you answer that question . Not specifically. I couldnt figure it out either. There is so many people that touch this there is no clear line of chain of command. This goes back to a line of questions that was already asked. No one can be fired because no one takes responsibility because no one has responsibility for it. We just assume that everybody is doing their job. And yet were shipping out live anthrax . And no one takes responsibility for it . Dr. Hassell you said that you were going to leave you were going to leave it locked down where they couldnt be shipped, nothing could be shipped until you declared a line of command and proocedures, right . Yes. How long is that going to take . Its going to take a minimum of six months, we believe. A minimum . If you can find out the players in it you ought to be able to lay it out. I was talking about to put the procedures were the scientific studies that need to identify the gaps. We had live anthrax shipped out no one takes responsibility for it. When i asked the question to find out whos responsible for it, no one can answer it. I think weve identified the problem. Its time for someone to take responsibility. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you. We have collins from new york for five minutes. Thank you mr. Chairman. Maybe i should help us all step back a second. Clearly a bacteria grown agent such as anthrax with spores completely different than a virus, right . Easy to kill a virus. So part of the concern ive heard is one of the last questioners is we node theres a lot of biological agents a lot of potential weapon issues going on. And i think the concern of the committee is if we have this with anthrax, might we have it with something else, like sars, like smallpox, like whatever. Thats where maybe not to give you suggestions in your testimony you might want to help the committee differentiate bacteria from virus just to give them the confidence level theres a different ball game going on. Now, when were you use radiation because youre trying to penetrate the spore correct . You want to penetrate the spore which is very hard. So the way that you prove its dead, the death certificate is you take a sample and put it in culture and try to grow it correct . I mean you really didnt make that real clear here. Im guessing the problem is they put it in culture for a month and it should have been in culture for sixth months. Is that safe to assume that they didnt run the culture test long enough. We cant identify for certain whether that is an issue but sit a possibility. Anthrax grows in culture within two days generally. So. Can but it can last six months. And this is where you take Something Like anthrax or c dif which is a spore it can pop up in five months time. It can survive as a spore. Thats right. If its surviving as spore for five months and somebody is creating a death certificate after two months theyre saying its dead when you put a spore in a further l environment it germinates and grows. That happens within 48 hours, generally 24 hours. In a fur till environment, you expect it to grow. Ive seen it whether it wasnt grow in a month, doesnt grow in two months and all of the sudden in five months it shows up. I would suggest respectfully that i believe the big issue here was it wasnt radiated with enough intensity so it wasnt killed. But to validate that it was dead, they put it in culture to see if it was grow. And if it was in culture for 48 hours and that didnt grow and they gay it a death certificate ki tell you what the problem is now. You didnt put it in the culture long enough. In best practices, in industry best practices youre going to see the batch sit in the refrigerator or the freezer for six months and youre going to have that culture that spore in culture for six month not 48 hours. You would have to agree if its in that sul chur for six months, its deader than a door nail and you would have more assurance than if its only in culture for 48 hours. This is different than a virus. So i just think some of the confusion is going on here as to when is because you do the death certificate at the lab after its been radiated. And held in isolation until the culture test is run. And then you say, okay, i didnt see anything, its dead. Now that entire batch is good to go as dead virus. Thats what happened. It was shipped out exempt because it had the death certificate. But the issue would be im assuming thats up to the lab to decide how long theyre going to grow it in culture. Thats a lab proveered, not a cdc. At this point in time the sterility testing is a laboratory feature but there be be additional requirements. Thats what ill encourage you to do. Thats where it falls apart. You trust the labs to all be at the top op of their game. But in best practices, i can assure you best practice in private industry on anthrax is six months. It is six months of testing. So you know its dead. Its not 48 hours. Thats best practice coming out of private industry. I yield back. Thank you. And we now recognize the congresswoman from indiana, ms. Brookes for five minutes. Thank you plrmt chairman and thank you for holding this important hearing. And i have to say in my prior role before joining the committee i was chair of the subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness response and communications for Homeland Security and it really opened my eyes to the vital need to better protect the American People and your country from bioattacks and from biodefense incidents. I will say at that time i learned that this administration did away with a possessionition that had been in place under the Clinton Administration under the Bush Administration called the special assistant to the presidei pc and i think we learned about that position being eliminated when this when the 0ebola hit this country. And i think it kind of goes to the point of i think what dr. Crosse is talking about that as a government we are not there is no central line of authority, there is no person who all of these issues bubble up to that as a government we have a massive enterprise with so many different wellintentioned hardworking scientists and government workers, but yet there is when it comes to biodefense for this country its not organized. And were not doing a good enough job. I have to tell you that later this week were going to be introducing legislation. So dr. Sosin, i have a question. If lab workers or other medical professionals had been exposed to live anthrax samples are you confident as to whether or not we would have had proper vaccines and near puttherapeutics in place to save lives yes i do. Are you confident, dr. Hassle . Yes, maam. Are you confident that we have enough proper vaccines and therapeutics in place to save lives. I dont have have sufficient information to answer that question. Neither do i. Would that be for the workers that aring with exposed or how about with respect to the community, building on congressman burgesss question about one of these individuals if they had been exposed and presented to an er. Can you explain to me what your view is, if you have one, about our National Strategic stockpile and the coordination within the government enterprise with respect to the National Stockpile . Thank you for that question. The strategic National Stockpile actually did provide vaccine for the state who had workers receiving prof lax sis. Im confidence we have the ability to do it. The nature of the event that you might be trying to prepare for always determines whether you have enough. But there have been a variety of processes and procedures to review, the requirements that have been set by the federal government for this threat. And we meet those current requirements. Dr. Hassell any comments on our stockpile and how we can ensure we have the medical Counter Measures in place . Nom. Thats really my colleagues purview. Dr. Crosse and mr. Dempske, this event, going back to what this event shows us is that while were trying to respond at a managerial level are you familiar with the private sectors involvement with the medical Counter Measures, development and procurement . Are either of you involved in that at all . I have done some past work looking at how the government built the flexible manufacturing facilities to be able to respond and those are private sector entities. Dr. Dempske . Im sorry i have nothing to add. I might have a little bit of time with respect to the death certificate. Is it building on congressman mull lynns question about the death certificate, could both of you please explain with a little more detail how that process works and how that process works, what is required to be placed on the death certificate. And if you are sending these spores to another lab, what is it that the one lab should have that the other lab then what is common in looking at the death certificate . Is the organism required to be listed or its not listed when youre doing this sample blind test . Can you please go into a bit more detail . Im sorry my time is up. But i would ask if we might have just a couple of more minutes. One more minute. And then if you could please submit any further explanation in writing. So that might be, if i may we could submit our fuller explanation of how thats used. I will say, though, were considering not using the death certificates in our current operation. At least were reevaluating that because it may send the wrong message. Thats one thing i was going to work more with my colleagues about that very issue because we have concern about what message that sends. Dr. Sosin . The laboratory itself makes the determination about death certificates. That is not a select agent regulation or requirement. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Last word. Weve got one more on this. The chair now recognize congressman from North Carolina mr. Hudson. Sorry. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you panel for bearing with us here until the end. Would you like to expand on the answer at all of my colleagues question about the death certificates and the practice . Were you able to fully answer that . For myself i need to get more detail on that and give a better answer to that for all three of you that were interested in that issue. Okay. Ill offer you some time. I know that cdc does issue a death certificate with enact vated materials that it sends out. On the occasions when it needs to. I do not know the particular details of that death certificate. Id appreciate if youd follow up with that. My understanding is d. O. D. , its common practice to send a death certificate when youre doing a blind sample and in in case it wasnt sent until much later. Wed loof to see a thorough answer on that. Thank you for that. Overall, if anyone on the panel wants to im trying to grasp just the mission of the federal select Agent Program. Your understanding of the mission of the program and do you think its being fulfilled. Id open that up to anybody. Well, clearly the incidents that youve seen are serious, are the kinds of indicators that we need to do more. And i think the Important Message from us is that over the history of this Program Since the regulations, the authorization in 2002 and the new regs in 2003 this program continued to receive input and advice from a Broad Spectrum which is needed, advice from federal and nonfederal entities to improve the program. And the program has changed and improved over time. That said, this incident and these accidents have elevated the importance of some procedures requiring more direct oversight and review. And we will address that. So there is a broad question. Many of those questions about yes, questions about how many labs. These are important critical policy questions congress has an Important Role to play. The federal agency has an important roll. Cdc will contribute to the debate of the pros and cons of the intentions. But when direction is given, we will follow the directions. So in your opinion the mission is worthy and salvageable, i guess to try to use laymans terms . Absolutely. Were committed to this work. Dr. Hassell you know, dugway has had problems in the past, continues to have problems. Its been referenced plenty of times here today. Just in some how does this continue to keep happening and how do you see us getting out of this cycle . I mentioned earlier that this falls under the army. So speaking on their behalf i can tell you that the army takes this very serious at the high level. It sounds easy to say but i can assure you in my interactions with this is taken very personally and seriously at the highest level. Secretary of the army and on down is taking actions on this. Theyre going to look at the chain of command across the board. And its not just so this could be a better reporting chain up. There may be opportunities that arise from this before better interaction across from them the laboratory may have some capabilities that perhaps the organizational structure was preventing the free flow of information. Im not sure thats the case but im hoping thats some of the outfall from this. You know just getting all of the laboratories working Better Together standardizing whether its appropriate and moving forward. I appreciate that. I guess i would offer this up to the oig. What existing tools does cdc have that its currently not using that would allow it to better oversee and take corrective actions against labs that commit violations . Either one of you. Well, we have a concern that the reporting when incidents occur is really just one level up from the laboratory. And that more Senior Management and organization is not necessarily informed. That the select Agent Program is really focused, you know, within that laboratory. But not necessarily ensuring that accountability up the chain of command over that laboratory is occurring. You know, we also are just undertaking work at the request of this committee to look at enact vegas procedures and to the extent there are scientific questions how that should be done, best practices, what types of methods are being used, how that information is shared, what the current scientific issues are and how the methods are validated and whether that information is being shared across this enterprise. And thats a concern that clearly labs have been operating on their own and the information has not been being shared across the enterprise. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman im out of time. If you wouldnt mind answering in writing in you have a summary of the tools. Id appreciate your testimony as well. Before we conclude you had a question . Thank you, mr. Chairman. I just wanted to thank the witnesses for coming and also relay aing conversation i had with chairman murphy which is im really urging him to have a hearing later this fall towards the end of the year, after you all have figured out what your improvements in the standardization and oversight are going to be. What i have found during my many years on this committee is when we have a crisis like this, the witnesses come in, say we need to do better oig and gio come in and say theres things that can be done and another year goes by and we have another breach. Ive urged the chairman and i think hes in agreement to really hold your feet to the fire to make sure that these improvements, these gaps that youve identified are filled that the standard and coordination are the plans are completed. And i believe he will have that hearing and i think on both sides of the aisle we would agree that need to be done. Thank you very much. And i would also ask that we also have some accountability. Several of the questions have been about how many people are going to lose their job over having failed over the last ten years. Thats something were going to be looking for is to see how many people have lost their job as a result of this in accountability. With that innen collusion i would like to thank the witnesses and members that participated in todays hearing. You have ten Business Days to submit questions for the record and i ask that all witnesses all agree to respond promptly to those questions. With that the subcommittee is adjourned. And this is live from capitol hill this morning. Senate Services Agreement is meeting. We expect to hear testimony from secretary of state john kerry along with defense secretary ashton carter, earnest moniz and were learning that jack lieu will also be at the witness table as he was yesterday wng along with secretaries kerry and moniz. Three of them testified before the House Foreign Affairs committee. And this would be thash third appearance, all three of them their third appearance on capitol hill discussing the nuclear deal. Were planning to open our phone lines to get your comments and also to read some of your remarks on facebook and twitter. This is live coverage on cspan3. It should get under way in just a moment. Since the time is here and our two witnesses that we requested to appear are here, ill go ahead and begin with my Opening Statement. As i have mentioned hey. That was your Opening Statement time. Good morning. The Committee Meets today to begin a series of oversight hearings on the joint comprehensive plan of action which the United States and other major powers have signed with iran. We welcome our distinguished witness and thaij them for joining us, secretary kerry moniz and secretary lew. I did not request the presence of secretary kerry or moniz or secretary lew. I am glad theyre here at their desire to do so since this focuses of todays hearing is on the strategic and millitary implications of the iran agreement. What we want to know is how this agreement will affect Regional Security proliferation and the balance of pow ner the middle east, what impact it may have on irans malign activities and hedge monic ambitions in the region. What it means for perceptions of american credibility and resolve among or allies and partners. And what the consequences are for u. S. Defense policy military planning and force structure. When we consider these broader strategic consequences of the agreement, the second order effects, what is already a bad deal only looks that much worse. Do this committee perhaps of most concern about the agreement itself pertains to the verification and monitoring mechanisms has its been publicly reported that the inspections of irans facilities will be conduct bdty National Atomic agency or iaea. There will be no americans allowed on the ground and the details of how these monitoring activities will occur in certain important instances are contained in a separate agreement between the iaea and iran, which the u. S. Government and the congress have not seen. Furthermore, the resolve the longstanding International Concerns about the possible military dimensions of irans program is contained in another Side Agreement between iran and the iaea. Which the u. S. Government and the congress have also not seen. To be sure much is known about irans past weaponization activities. But we can never know what we do not know. Which is why the director of the iaea has said that effective verification depends on resolution of the pmd issue. How that will occur we do not know. This presents a major problem. All of us will soon vote on the iran agreement and the merits of this agreement hinges on its verifiability and yet we cannot even read key documents per ss ss pertaining to these verification measures and our own partycountry is not even a party to those agreements i find troubling. Iran is not just an arms control challenge. It is a geopolitical challenge. For years we have urged the administration to adopt a strategy to counter irans malign activities in the middle east. Unfortunately that has not happened. We have watched with alarm as irans military and intelligence optdives have stepped up activities and increases influence and control in places like syria yemen, iraq bahrain and gaza. They have done all of this turned full pressure of sanctions. Now they will receive sanctions relief estimated at 60 billion, or possibly as much as twice that. Yeah good amount are go to irans domestics priorities. It is only right to assume money will flow to the money to boost arms supplies to iran easter risk proxies to sew chaos across the region and double down assad when he needs it most. This will present a new host of challenges for the department of defense. Whats worse, not only could this strengthen irans malign activities in the region. Also likely to enhance the military capabilities. For nearly a Decade International arms embargo has significantly hurt their ability to build up and modernize its aging military. Throughout the Nuclear Negotiations the administration insisted that its diplomas was limited to the nuclear file. Indeed just a few weeks ago general dempsey told this committee that quote under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran relative to Ballistic Missile capabilities and arms trafficking. And yet thanks to last minute concessions by the administration that is exactly what this agreement would do. At year five the International Arms embargo will disappear and iran will be free to acquire advanced military capabilityies, such as fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and antierr craft weapons. Year eight. Ballistic missile sanctions disappear and they will be free to acquire the material for ever more sophisticated Ballistic Missiles including icbms and in all of this iran are not only have billions of dollars with which to go on a shopping spree in the International Arms market but it is sure to find plenty of states that are eager to sell those weapon, especially russia and china. In this way the iran agreement not only paves irans path to a nuclear capability, it will further irans emergence as a dominate military power in the mideast. This has a direct and dangerous implications for u. S. Armed forces. The ultimate guarantee that iran will not get a Nuclear Weapon is not 109 page document. It is the capability of the u. S. Military to do what is necessary if all else fails and yet this agreement would enable iran to construct the kind of advanced military arsenal that could make our military option far costlier to employ. Instead of enhancing our deterrence of iran this agreement seems to enhance irans deterrence of us. In short if this agreement fails the u. S. Service members are called upon the take action against iran. Their lives could be at greater risk because of this agreement. And that is perhaps the most troubling aspect of all about this agreement. What it means for americas credibility in the mideast. Since 1979 republican and democratic administrations have sought to contain the Islamic Republic of iran and prevent it from acquiring Nuclear Weapons capabilities. Our allies and partners have entrusted much of their own security to the United States because they have believed that our commitment were credible in this way americas role in the region has been to express security competition between states with long histories of mistrust and to prevent that competition from breaking into to open war. I fear this agreement will further undermine our ability and willingness to play a this vital and stabilizing role. Our allied partners in the mideast have increasingly come to believe that america is withdrawing and doing so at a time when iran is aggressively seek seeking to increase its hegemonic ambitions. Not only did we reach a agreement with an industrial enrichment capability but will also unshackle this regime in its long held pursue of the conventional military power and may actually consolidate the Islamic Republics control in iran for years to come. After turning three decades of u. S. Foreign policy on its hwcgio; is it any wonder this agreement may lead our allies and partners to question this countrys commitment to their security . As that happens these states are increasingly likely to take matters into their own hands and indeed we already see evidence of that. These faithful decisions may well manifest in Regional Security competition, new arms races, Nuclear Proliferation and possibly conflict. All of which would demand more not less u. S. Leadership and presence in the region. It would be ironic but not historically unprecedented that a diplomatic agreement intended to decrease risk of conflict actually increased those risks instead. All of us hope that will not be the case now. But it is the job of the Defense Department to be ready when our highest hopes fail us and i fear there is much work to do. I welcome the witnesses, senator reed. Thank you mr. Chairman, good morning secretary kerry, secretary moniz, secretary lew general dempsey. Your at the 20 months of negotiations the p 45 1 and iran agreed on the terms. The agreement no matter your position on is historic and if implemented scrupulous low could serve as the strategic Inflection Point in the worlds relations with iran for International Non proliferation efforts and for dynamics in the mideast. I commend the president his negotiating team from cabinet officials and nations scientists for their hard work. In the weeks ahead congress has a solemn agreement to carefully review the details and independently evaluate the agreement will reach our goal of stopping iran from acquiring a Nuclear Weapon. This is part of todays scope. And i welcome you. Secretary kerry your work is to be commended. I hope unyou will help us understand why this is a good deal and. Secretary moniz you played an Important Role in the negotiations and you too have been a strong advocate for the comprehensive plan of action throughout. During your testimony i hope you will help us understand what gives you confidence in the technical safeguards built into this agreement. Particularly with regard to, one, the dutycutting off of irans pathways. Two, the access of the supply chain, three the dedicated channel to manage the trigger list and dual use items and four the iaea Additional Protocol for enhanced inspections and it is designed for detecting elements of a convert weapons program. And finally the limitation irans enrichment program. Secretary carter your a unique to the secretary of defense with a ph. D. In physics and i look for your insights as well. During your meetings you undoubtedly heard the assessments of o you are partners and allies on a range of issues including how iran may use sanctions to expand support to terrorist proxies and invest more heavily in its military. These are serious concerns and ones which i share. Our partners in israel see iran as the significant and ongoing threat to their National Security interest. While