Transcripts For CSPAN2 The 20240704

Welcome to todays im steve cohen. I am a nonresident senior fellow with the Miller Center, the scholar in residence at the History Channel and a of history at the university of oklahoma. Many of us, whene think people like lincoln and tr and fdr and we think about the 20th century as being the defining century and defining and determining the president ial power. But Stephen Rockwell in this provocative new book turnstc■b t all that on its head. His book is called the presidency and the american state leadership and decision in the adams grant and Taft Administrations. The book is published by the Center Studies on the presidency with the university of virginia press. So here to these topics are, first of all, the author of the book, steven rockwell. Steven is a of Political Science ataint university in new york. He earlier worked as a Senior Research analyst at the Brookings Institution and■ as an assistant professor in the Political Science and Public Administration programs at the university. Michigan at flint. Steven is the author of indian and the Administrative State in 19th century, which was published in 2010. How government won the west published 2013 and the presidency and the american state. Stephens has been very, as you can tell, im also thrilled to have with one of the finest of the new generation of president ial historiinchervinsk. Lindsay is a senior fellow at the center for president ial history at Southern Methodist university. She is also the of the Award Winning boo t George Washington and the creation of the American Institution and. The coeditor of morning the president s loss and legacy in american culture. And shes working on a new book that will be coming out. Published by Oxford University press titled making the president s john adams and the precedents that forged the republic. Welcome to both of you. Im really looking forward to our conversation today. But before we get started just a quick note to our audience. Weso if you look at the bottom f your screen theres a a q a function. If you would send your i will do my best to either work them in the course of the conversation or save them until the end of the show. So lets get started. Stephen so for the past 40 years, i have been telling my students that if you want to understand the presidency in exponential federal power, state power, you look at Abraham Lincoln who used the powers of the presidency, help fight and win the civil, primarily Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, who brought the effervescence of the Progressive Movement from the local level up to the national level. And then, of course, roosevelt, who dramatically president ial power to fight the depression and world war two. But youre telling me, is that everything been saying is wrong. So sfille in. Help me understand why why that wrong and why we really should be looking at John Quincy Adams Ulysses Grant and william. All right, ill try. Thanks for the question. I dont think president ial powe[ haex i know those the regular touchstones, but put more positively. My main argument in the book is that an active, independent and l presidency has been a core element of american governance since the George Washington administration and throho what i wanted to do with this book was to link presidency studies with the now robust on american state development and american political development. We now know thanks to a lot of rece r doing much more in the 19th century than we used to think. There have been tremendous studies on westward expansion policy, disaster relief, infrastructure development, Indian Affairs, wars, diplomacy, Customs Enforcement enforcement, all of these various aspects of policy were overly or many of them were overlooked for many years, as we used to cover 19th century history and[[ studies have focused on policy areas, land policy and Indian Affairs and so on. What i wanted to do with this book was see how our new understand of the 19th century might affect our traditional understandings of Political Institutions like theand what ie are years and years and years of extensive, influential exercise of president ial power, oftentimes by president s that, weve overlooked in policy areas that weve overlooked. And the way that i tried to catf analysis that presidency studies have outlined over the years as critical to understanding generally the office. And what i find that 19th century presidencies and into progressive era withafpresident e categories of president ial power that we characteristically associate with the modern presidency. And these are specifically the president ial efforts at legislative initiatives and buildingrship of administration and departments and agencies, the use of unilateral executive action tools like executive orders and signing statements, of course, authority in war and diplomacy. And finally, communications. Each of my case studies John Quincy Adams, Ulysses Grant and william taft use tools in all five of these categories to try to get done what they want to get a large and influential federal state. And these three president s make for great case studies in something this because first of all, the scope of their lives extends throughout the first part of american history. John quincy adams as a child witnesses, the american revolution. Herites ofof witneine battle of bunker hill and, william taft serves as chief justice into the 1920s. Ulysses has in the middle of those two John Quincy Adams son, one of John Quincy Adams sons, and William Howard taft, father, are in grants administration. And so with three president s, we get a that runs from the earliest days of the revolution right through the 1920s more over each of these president s was witness to exercises of presidenal by. So adams is in congress for the Louisiana Purchase and jeffersons embargo. Adams, of course, writes Monroe Doctrine for james monroe. Ulysses grant is a player notably in the civil war, but also a direct in the tenure of office act fight between president Andrew Johnson and congress after the civil war. And taft was Theodore Roosevelts secretary of war and right hand man and. Its important to remember that taft earlier on in his careerne. Theres a tendency to think of taft primarily as judge, but his work in the philippines suggests a deep experience in executive authory that then translates into the presidency and to put this all together, i think the new state was doing gives us a t of issue areas to look for president ial power and looking for president ial power throughout the 1800s reveals president ial power by numerous president s. The this fascinating is histori, we love ranking president s, right with every year theres a you know, a new ranking and things dont change all that much. Stephen is talking about so usually ranked very high on that list of president s. So to if stephen is right and and and i think he is too we need to rethink the way we rank our president s. Well thank you so much for that question. And thank you to the center for having us. And its such a joy to be in conversation with both of you and to be talking about these pridts of whom i have great affection for at least two and maybe need to include taft in that list. After reading the book i think that youre right, you have also participated. Ive been involved in the cspan rankings that come out every couple of years and communicati, working with congress wartime leadership. And you know how a president does in civil rights, president do managing the bureaucracy all of these different things, a lot of which steven included, is sort of the big factors that we think abou. And we do see some change over time. It generally is fairly gradual. I think grant has benefited a little bit from a lot of the scholarship in the last ten years to sort of boost his legacy. But i think one of the real takeaways that i from reading this book was so much of John Quincy Adams vision, so much of vision came to, if not by their successor. So adopts so many of jacobs policies and really is a man through bee congress. And so what does that tell about their legacy . And i think that maybe we need to do a better job as were thinking president ial legacy, which is, of course, a sort of nebulous anyway. And its hard to always its really hard to ■0sometimes. I think one of the key factors to be how is their long term vision and to what extent has their long term vision proven to be accurate . Or was was validated by the people that came after them. And sometimes its really clear, you know, with lincoln his long term on civil rights and slavery is pretty obvious and we give him credit for that with John Quincy Adams, not so much. And so i think that definily grd with as i think as were were studying things to what extent right one for the nation and even if they didnt accomplish it have we embraced it since then. So do you have a different esidents based on what stephen has written . Yeah. I mean, i think taft is probably the one, ironicall that you know, changed for me the most. I well should actually let me let me back that up. Im a huge John Quincy Adams fan. My dogs name is john quincy■[ adams. Love the man. He is so interesting when ask me who are your favorite president s . I say, well, the best president s, in my opinion, are washington, lincoln. But the most interesting men are Theodore Roosevelt and John Quincy Adams. But even i was susceptiblesort s Political Service career. And it certainly flashy than, you know,which he gets a lot of credit, especially fighting the gag rule or, you know, his secretary of state tenure, which i think is probably among the, best of all secretaries of states. So i definitely sort of added additional ammunition to my enjoyment of John Quincy Adams, admiration for his Public Service career. But i generally thought that taft was kind of boring and thought that taft had personalio be a justice that made sense and he actually got a fairmount of done, you know, in terms of the Progressive Agenda but doesnt get credit for it. But this book, i think really shifted my appreciation for jes ■hng is actually good and boring get stuff done. So i assume there will be no dogs in your household named William Howardno no, that probt quite have same ring to it, but maybe if i while i probably should not say that sentence if i got a newfoundland thats some point, youd be that would be a really good name for for a new the month so you know i want to get into each of the president s and some of the nuances of stevens but you know all this for me brings up this issue of ethanol are the different ways that historians and political scientists go about looking at s a old expression that theres bumpers, theres splitters right there, bumpers or. Those are looking for broad trends, generalizations, splinters, those who always point out the exception and historians are some bumpers. But we tend to be splitters. Political scientist or lovers by definition. Right, steven . I mean, what you have done is looked at these patterns over. So the bigger picture, larger themes over a longer period of time. But is there so i think the downside of the way that go about it is we all the times those trends over time, we all think we dont see the broader picture because we focus president sext of their times and often, you know, historians love nuance and complexity and contingency. These are all the terms we use or when were writing history, recapture the nuance of it all, the complexities of it all the doubt. But is there a downside and and in being a member by so, for example taft so a lot of the things that you attribute to taft are really a part of this effervescence that the progressive that begins on the ground level bubbles up to the top■ ■n and and finds expressiod tr and taft and Woodrow Wilson a lot of the initiatives, the 16th amendment, for example, mean that was twa up. Well part of the aggressive period to to deal with the growing. It was sponsored by and obviously signed into law under taft. So how do you take someone a president out of the context their times and and and in doin. Well its its difficult obviously. And i think im not so sure about the the word lumbers but i think i agree with your basic point. I mean the two disciplines approach things differently and sadly dont talk to each other enough. I think political scientists have tendency not to fully utilize the extensive histories that are available on pretty much everything. At this point, i, i was shocked when i started doing the taft research. Find o just how deep historians have gone into conservation and within conservation, historical approaches to water power sites and different of using land. The different bureaucratic regulations and Interest Group diviprogressive era over what to on conservation that is often not tapped by political scientists conclusions and lump along category and look for trends over time. And as you mentioned, i think historians have tendency, at least in my experience, just to want to stay. Theyre comfortable in their field of expertise and are encouraged oftentimes not to comment much or too far and draw conclusions that havent been really, really evaluated. The two together, its difficult to separate them out and things lost, but theres also a benefit i mean, one of the things with tr and one of the toughest things about this book me as a primarily political scientist, sometime historian was to try to keep roosevelt out of it and to try to keep the focus on taft and Taft Administration and what taft was able to accomplish 7■l■nth sort of seductive desire to link him always to theodore similarly. When i was working on John Quincy Adams, its hard to talk about adams without talking about andrew jackson, but to appreciate a lot of what adams does as. President , its important to separate those two out and to split them. And so this book, i think your question is really intriguing to me. I think my in this book was a at times too split. I mean taft chapters are aimed at taft and theres some comparisons with Theodore Roosevelt and some effort to look at the broader trends of the progressive era. But a lot of this is about taft and what he was able to accomplish. And similarly with Andrew Andrew jackson and john quincy■ob■ ada, adams has a vision, i think as lindsay mentioned, that has sometimes obscured a lot of what adams asks for. And talks about comes to fruition later on under the jacksonian. He also has a tremendous track record as president with internal. We may talk about his efforts perpetuate the federal role expansion in indian treaties and that treaty relationship. So the effort i think in this book that i tried to make was was to do the best both if i could, to split when it was going to help amplify the contributions of people like, adams and taft in particular. And then the lumping is important because again, the theme here is to think about the presidency as, an office over more than two centuries of time cupi by of dt with similar categories of analysis for how different individuals wield that power. Thats what i found fascinating about book is you really are trying to find that Common Ground between two methodologies that rarely speak to each other, younow, i mean, itd be great if you a Political Science and Historical Convention all taking place at the same time so we can listen to the work that we do. I primarily books. I dont read many Political Science books. And i, i appreciate you have a, i think a Political Science methodology, but an historian sets. So you deal i think you deal sensitively with history. And that■ onjoined about your y how do you feel about this whole issue about what are the strengths limitations of the Political Science approach and the history approach . Yeah, i know i agree with a lot what has been said. I think i might im going to kind of make up a different way, distinguish the two. I think that what political scientists do that historians tend not to is they tend to come up with sort of process categorizations. So you know i think in the beginning of the steven does a great job of talking about like how the three president s make theirision and there are three different types of processes that he comes up with. And thats not something that typically do all much because its sort of a systems oriented analysis. And i think that there are, you know, there are sort of strengths and weaknesses to not dointhe strengths are that sometimes if we focus too much on the process we miss the individual nuance and what a person can bring to a spac but i think the risk that historians often miss the opportunity to draw really interesting parallels and to draw really interesting by going outside of the one persons life and. Thats not to say that we have to compare to everything, but i think that when we d us see important patterns in american history. We know that it does not repeat, but it often rhymes. And so there are things that comeamerican history. There are different ebbs and, flows to president ial power and to the president s relationship withAmerican People and. I think by not drawing those comparisons, we we miss a lot of that. And we actually weaken our argument because we weaken we ve the ability to say in a broader context, always why it matters that. So what historians sometimes have trouble addressing if theyre not willing to go outside of their little bubble of chronology. And so i think that there is a real element of that approach that we can we can and we should embrace, that i want to move on and talk about individual president s. But before i do we have a question from one of our viewers. The question, how is splitting task from tr different bush 41 and reagan . Thats a great question. Is the question. Can you give us like a couple of days to think about thatefore■w . I should also say, steven, while youre thinking through that, Theodore Roosevelt would have loved that had trouble separating taft from him. And i think he wlde insisted on being involved. So i think that that is very fitting for historical legacy. Yeah. Have left it off. And i think the the question about bush 41 and reagan, i, i think this was exact on point. r political scientists and historians of that to separate out the First Administration frs as Vice President in a very influential administration under Ronald Reagan in. To appreciate george h. W. Bush as a president o be some splitting, there has to be an ability to get bush out of reagans shadow to get bush out of the sense that what he does might merely be tack tacking on to what happens during the Reagan Administration and to look at things like the americans with disabilities act and other things as, as always bubbling up over time, but things that a particular president actually gets done. And so for bush and his achievements as president , similarly for taft and his the achievements are theirs when they taft approach to the presidency was to point to things done is one of the quotations from from theto point to actual achievement not building awareness, not moving things through. Although thats also of his model and part of his legacy, but also to actually land legislation and pass legislation having influence on things. And so i think you get to bush 41, its a similar equation. And it also makes me think of the earlier discussion about the president ialeres a tendency, in those to look at president s who were not reelected as getting an initial strike against their legacy. ■eon John Quincy Adams am howard taft. They are often criticized for not being popular enough to get and grant often benefits being popular enough to get reelected without deeper analysis of the policy legacy, ey lea. Im sure bush 41 suffers from that as well, that the failure to getn 1992 is a strike against him when electorally and popularly that might be important if youre trying to look at achievements and policy successes or defeats, you need to look at four years and split them off and see how he did. I love that. Y. Ev i in on real quick. Yes thats such a good point and i think is really is one that we have to as an american reject a one term presidency is inherently a failed and the number of like various sophisticated, ssful scholars who have said that type of thing to me is is astounding because it to me to be totally discordant, what we know actually can shift elections likenoconditions and circumstances. The one other thing that i thought i wanted to kind of build on your tr and taft is trr and reagan were brilliant communicators. They were÷s that often a quality that we overvalue you as American People, as as scholars, that after them that maybe get some of the stuff done. For bush 41 actually ending cold war peacefully, that credit often goes to reagan, en though he so far from office. And so i think that we we also need to definitely consider as werecies to what extent is showmanship something that be valued . Is early. Always everything. I would that but i think theres no as a store a historian you emphasize change its difficult to like pull bush away reagan in some ways there are things that define the bush esidency and certainly the end of the cold war, the epitome of that and that was completely his doing. And it demonstrated considerable skill. But certainly the context for his presidency is set by by reagan massive budget deficits. I mean one of the reasons why bush lost in 1992 was because he took that in credibly courageous decision in 1990 to work with democrats to agree to a tax hike by which he thought was necessary because of the deficits that that Ronald Reagan had left behind. ■ its that we to understand, but we have to understand how. George h. W. Significant achievements that were solely his own, but also understand that context within which his presidency took place was shaped by a lot of the decision that were made by Ronald Reagan. Right. D questions as needed to interpret one thought on that, because i think the the point you make the taxes is is important. I mean, important to understand with some of the president s who only had one term, sometimes its important to take seriously the idea that they are what they seis in thpuknowing full well g to be popular. And i think have a tendency, especially political scientists, to take politicians at t thinks a good skepticism, have. But one can also look at bushs decision on that andadams efforn quincy was was adamant that he was not really concerned about getting reelected, was not concerned about beingut a four year term with effect benefits for the country. And that shows up in cases where he has to make decisions. For example, in york, adams refuses to deliver to the senate a very controversial,v fraudulet signed with the seneca knowing full well that that opposition and the investigation the Adams Administrations runs into that treaty. Its going to hurt him in new york in the 1828 election and it does d georgia conflict, which i write about in the book, where adams is prevensurveying lands that haveo be ceded by great nation. Georgia to go in in violation of a federal treaty. And theres a tremendous up that adams and others think might actually lead to civil war in the 1820s because the u. Sd betws and georgia surveyors and georgia to go in the on adams to let georgia in is extensive and a lot of it is based on politics. At one point theres a Cabinet Meeting where hes told, you know, why are we making a fight over this. We know or so they thought that the creeks will ultimeltheyree going to be removed. Adams is told. Why should we fight with our fr outcome . Why dont we just let them go . And by the way, john coward the from georgia is if you■, block theyre going to go with jackson in the 1828 election and adams is response is basically i dont care about the 1828 election thats not what were here for we have a federal treaty in place has been signed and ratified and my job as president is to different treaty. And thats what im going to do. And that i think when adams writes about taking his duties seriously and not being concerned about popularity and reelection he means the literate on john adams becomes much more clear if you take him at his word you understand his decision king with that in mind that he just doesnt seem to care about being popular. So i we we have some great questions, by the way, coming in from our audience and lets see, this was going to for you because i know president ial cabinets are your jam right so heres the question what are some concrete examples of how these president s manage their cabinets, especially with regard to administrative action . Oh, its a great question. Im going to want stephen to jump in, too, because he hes still going to the taft cabinet. Lot better than than i am. So, you know, one of the things that i think is so interesting about, the way that grant manages his least in my studies how how military he is and his approach to leadership. Hehierarchy he has a very clear sense of delegation and the importance of trusting your subordinates to get the job done and trusting them that can do the task that laid out for them. And if not, you step in, but the most part you really try and surround yourself with successful pthink his foreign py approach is where this is most clearly demonstrate it. And so secretary hamilton fish, who has one of the all time greathis secretary of state ands just uelief, whuthings that he g the grant administration, most notably, however, being the treaty of washington, which ended the tensions with the United States and great leading or remaining from the civil war and sort of set the precedent for International Arbitration when there is a conflict among nations. And this is an area where grant really understood strengths and weaknesses and understood that to be one of them. And so he delegate did it to fish, but kept a very close eye. He would walk over to fishs home almost every night to check on how the negotiations were going. And so i think that is a really clear example of his his military background coming int playnd shaping leadership style and how he managed cabinet. Stephen even will jump in there. Yeah, ill j■;ump in. Grants, cr management, i would agree with lindsay. Its very much in tune with what you would expect from a military leader, especially one who doesnt have a long career in Public Service, has no career elected office. And hes hes smart so he knows his weaknesses. He is particularly to fish on foreign delegating down through the bureaucracy and what happens with grants cabinet more widely understood is he stocks it with a lot like mindedok. I call them principled innovators people who are not as concerned with tradition, rules and protocols as john quincy doesnt the traditions and rules and protocols of being president and of running the governmentapproach is to do what he thinks is going to be right at any given and that has made for a lot of scholarship because it changes a he changes his mind he cuts advisor to lose if they become problematic hes he his administration are involved in a in a host of controversial issues reconstruction to Indian Affairs to economic and finance oftentimes. He is listening to his cabinet members sometimes hes making his own decisions as he does discuss his grants, veto of the inflation bi. Book where grant a a message to a Company Signature on this very controversial message accompany a veto and it almost seems as though at that point, grant heard from his cabinet, hes heard from congress and other experts, and he is trying to work out in his own mind what he thinks he ought to do and when he vetoes that inflation bill. Its think about public communication and again, its delivered with that message that explains to the public and very clear terms what hes doing, why hes doing it. And its actually reminiscent to me of Franklin Roosevelts message on the bank holiday in 1933. It is a clear expna making. And so grant with cabinet, you know hes hes got a lot reformers. Hes got a lot of people who i delegates a lot listens a lot makes his own a lot depends the issue and how confident he feels fordams is me businesslike. I think it is much more regularized. One author, mary hargreaves, a historian, the Adams Administration talks about adams as a modern day chairman of the board, that he is there to, make big decisions. He is there to also to delegate, to listen, to be consulted when necessary. But he has stocked his administration in the cabinet on down with. Basically james and rose cabinet ople who are seen as competent administrators. And for taft, tafts cabinet and lindsay may want to jump in on one to taft cabinet, sort of falls apart from the cabinet model after a little while that taft seems to have decided that what he needs do he can do individually or with one or two cabinet levelecretary is oftentimes not informing cabinet secretaries of whats about to happen or what has happened. As tafts cabinet becomes dominated by lawyers and famously dominated by the Roosevelt Team that theodore import into the new administration. I would go back to grant for a second thing, one of the phrases you used describe grant is a principle innovator. What do you mean by that . The basic the idea the second main theme in the bookyond e scope of government and how president s are influential in this era and throughout the 1800s presidency scholars models of Decision Making where we can try to lump president s together into a category phrase that will help us makeomparisons across different different president s and across eras. And its a its a squishy business ive never been a big fan of it. I dont know for sure that my categories in this book will president s. One thing i learned is that, as you get into the details of a quincy adams or a bush 41, whas going on than. You do from a surface history. But for grant, grant, i call him a principled innovator because. He is again doing what he thinks is right in any given situation. And that a very flexible, fungible eation that he makes, based on his own personal values, based on his understanding of the role of the president based on his understanding of the role of the tact adapting to whatever comes at him. And so during, for example, grant is absolutely to the principles of the civil war amendments. But his efforts to enforce principles in theened variouslyy congress. Drawdowns of the military in the south, whichmilitarily, which s his sort of portfolio. But he is dependent upon more dependent upon civil process and the courts to try to litigate against ku klux klan and to try to protect peoples rights through as department of justice becomes embroiled in partizanship and argument about partizan prosecutions, and as congress looks to remove pressure, some of his attorneys general and other people, grant tries tack again and again and again. Hes constantly shifting. I think this comes out of what we know of grant as a general is that grant very effective. Theres a book where grant says during his time in mexico, in the army, t that few of his men understood that he hadnt read the standard on tactics since he had been. Nevertheless, said, i never had any trouble issuing orders to get people go where i wanted them to go. He is very much in the making decisions and. I distinguish the principled innovator from someone like John Quincy Adams. Adamss long career in and diplomacy and service by the time hes he has been governmen. The policies that exist by the 1820s. He has an insightful repeated knowledge of the laws and, treaties that hes worked on that a lot o on. And when adams makes decisions, he he looks to his cabinet. He also looks the text of laws. He looks to history he looks to treaties. He is what i call a procedural, but he does not freelance. He wants to be constrained by in law and in tradition that will determine his Decision Making. Hes going to go out of the box. Hes a the book president as much as he can be. And test the procedure as grant the principledft becomes a combination of these two models and i call taft synthesis because. What taft is doing in the progressive era is hes addressing and approaching a raft of relative tively new issues campaign finance, personal income tax, a Corporation Tax, antitrade, just the effects of civil war amendments on the constitution and how we see judicial review. Hes approaching a raft of new issues. But rather than just respond to them in the moment, hes also focused on building new law and new rules and new procedures that will be in place long after he leaves. And so he is this very to me, very interesting of somebody who is driven by a lot of his beliefs about whats about his , law and tradition. Jonathan lawrie, the biographer of taft calls him a progressive conservative i think is exactly right. He is dedicated to law. Hes dedicated it to rules and procedure, but he also dedicated to advancing the ball and doing that on new issues, a way that will endure. Lindsay, i want this question to you and i want to to some of the questions that are coming in. I encourage those who are watching to send in your your questions, which are really very thoughtful. Liie, were were looking at a century worth of time. And one of the things that emerges from adams taft are Political Parties and the institutionalization of Political Parties. How do political■s president s g. Yeah. Thank you very much for. This question. So i think one of the things atsabout all three of these moments is they are coming at a time when Political Parties are very much in flux and are undergoing pretty changes. One way or another. And so i think that that has a couple of implications. More broadly, when think about the role of Political Parties, one, of course, and the more the most obvious one is a Strong Political party can help a president achieve their congressional or, their their legislative agenda. And that that makes sense. Strong Political Parties■ td to actually reduce intense partizanship because they give space for a variety of opinions and they allow for moderation and for and then Political Parties often dictate who you know, who the candidate is going to be or can help shape who the candidate is going to be. Think that in these three moments, what i think is particular early notable is that the first two, John Quincy Adams and Ulysses Grant, theirn the in the american imagination at that at the moment in the mind citizens is is really kind of paralleled with a lot their contemporaries. As steven said John Quincy Adams had had every single position including being a spectator when he was eight years old, watching the of lexington aon so, you kno the presidency cannot be beat and his intellect cannot to go e to, toe with him on the details of foreign policy. It would just be an absolute failure of an endeavor. And grant won the civiso know lo beat grant. Whereas taft, of course was coming in tr shadow and was not the the figurehead for the Progressive Movement was not the figurehead for the Democratic Party. And we see that reflected, of course, in the election of 1912 and the fracturing in that. But this is also for John Quincy Adams, the party of the era of of good feelings, the one party rule by the Democratic Party splinters during officially splinters during. His administration, i think it s already long on its way, but that that breaks out into the open with the battle over the election of 1824. And then, of ultimate victory in 1828. And grant, while Republican Party was very much ascendant, there were different pieces of the Republican Party that wanted differ things. And perhaps most notably, what to do with all of the southerners and whether or not there was going to be a nDemocratic Party at that time. And so i think the role of these three president s and their relationships to the party are particularly notable in a way assess or perhaps even boost their efficiency, given that they were able get so much done with really the Shifting Sands anything on Political Parties . Yeah, i think i agree with all that. I think to bring this back temporarily to the Political Science side side, political scientists have often that some of the expansion in president ial power, particularly unilateral power, executive orders and signing statements. The is driven sometimes partizanship and polarization and gridlock coming out of the parties disagreeing with other. Think about recent politics in recent decades, the polar for political scientists creates an opportunity for president s to act unilaterally, whether its onmmigti policy or on tariffs or whatever it happens to be. And for me, as a political scientist slash well, isnt that true . In the in the 1800s, we have partizan battles and polarization. In the 1800s. Lindsey is absolutely, of course, about the 1820s and about the fracturing under the grant and Taft Administrations. To me, that opens up the same ■u■ . Opportunity for president s o act unilaterally and to take advantage of a situation. So if partizanship gridlock are one of the factors that we think encourage expansions of president ial power, we need to look at that same dynamic rough0 minutes left, maybe 12 minutes. I want to go to questions that are coming in and then stephen,s you mentioned, but it really develop, which is why we neglected 19th century by looking at the expansion state power. So let me go to this question. Adams and taft served in different branches of government grant only in the executive do you see a difference in the three as to their respect for, the constitutional principle of balance ■3■uof powers. We all read it again. Alison taft the different branches of government grant only in the executive do you see a difference in t concept, principle of balance. Powers what would it take that . its my book. Ill take it first. I want i will. I will offer a giant lump and say, no, i dont a difference. And im sure there are. And to get into it more specifically, im they would appear but i think adams grant and taft dexperiences. One of the things that links them is they are all deeply cognizant of and respectful of separation of powers how that plays out. Any given circumstance, as with any president , is going to be ofnt situation and itll vary depending on whether the president how much the president wants to respect congress at any givent you know to go through tm really briefly. I mean, one of the things that stands out for me from John Quincy Adams is he is inlved level brinksmanship conflict with georgia. He begins as a president with Cabinet Meetings a e and exploring what the president s authorities are, what should be done eventually. He decides this is a big enough issue. He needs. Ss and he asks congress if new legislation is needed, if they want to weigh in on what he should be doing. And he makes it quite clear that this a serious event. Adams writes in his diary that this is most forget the exact quotation, but i think he writes that this is the most momentous he has ever made to congress he the need to Bring Congress in because its such a big issue. Congress doesnt help. Congress sort of gives him some ambiguous responses, leaves it in his hands and he handlesfor. As a as we were just talking about grant tax back and forth and zigzags depending on wh giv. Sometimes gives him power with the enforcement act. Sometimes ckes it away when they defund the military and start mustering people out. Grant doesnt try to go his way. He doesnt try to keep the military in the field. He doesnt try to use funds from another to pay for things he says. All right. Thats the will of the people i to respect that and taft to the same extent is trying to work very carefully with congress and of course with the courts some separation of powers is, of course with the Supreme Court and the 16th amendment, with the personal income tax that congress had initially wanted to check the supreme decision ruling, personal income tax, onal. 1895 congress wanted to respond with a law different law trying to get around that decision and making the personal income tax. That if congress and the Supreme Court get into a cat and mouse battle over. What the constitution means. Thats not good for anybody, and its especially not good for court. Thats when he engineered the move that he lands law and the constitution to make the personal tax part of the constitution through the amendment process and, to slip the Corporation Tax into the place where the personal income tax had been for congress and. All of that gets kind of deep into the weeds. But what we see is that taft is as respectful of separation of powers, i think, as grant and adams are. If you want to comment on that. No, i, i would agree that they all sort of manifest in different ways depending on the moment and i think, you know, interestingly, stephen, about all the ways in which they adhere to it, there are also times where they sort of stick it to congress and the courts depending on the moment. So they also kind of i think, an equal disregard side. My favorite in the grand ministrator ryan is, you know, shortly after he office, the tenure of office had been passed during the Johnson Administration ttry an from fire secretaries that were much more sympathetic to republican the republican agenda. And grant says toonjust becausea bit in its mouth doesnt mean that all do and basically encourage them to repeal. I butchered the quote but you get the ■r■ o was encourage them to repeal it and they do and so it restores pretty important right of the president remove his Department Secretaries a right which interestingly the Supreme Court upheld during Calvin Coolidges administration. So thats w in the executive branch. I think that that is you know, its an interesting thing to acknowledge that even president s who so respectful of the separation and■ push as an impt part of defend in president ial authority. So we have one more qution well be able to get to from our audience and its interesting. Its kind of makes it relevant for today. And the question is interesting that each of these president s policies were brought forward in many cases by their successors today a president upon taking office uses executive orders to reverse many of their predecessors policies. Any thoughts about thissure i tl scientist, again, i think the dynamic is the same. In the 1800s. One of the reasons that taft so bent on legislations of the refs of the progressive era to endure, he understands the principled innovator model symbolized by grant and others where much gets done through. Executive action doesnt last s efforts i mean, one of the reasons grant is such a perennial subject of writing is his efforts to secure the gains of the civil war are not exactly totally successful. So people sometimes want to see grant as a failure. Other times want to see as a near great president who during his term did everything he possibly could to secure equal protection and to secure all sorts of other things. After the civil war, a lot of that fizzles away with the later politics in the south dealing with jim crow and segregation. John adams also understands the question of legacy and he doesnt push the government into new areas much as taft does. But adams is concerned with long term results, and its one of the reasons hes so dedicated to upholding the treaty system. Back to our earlier discussion of not just his vision, but what he does in the moment, his ability to thwart effort to enter creek nation and to uphold treaties that lasts. As legal for sovereign native nations to rest legal arguments on arguments their rightan sove. Without adams efforts in the moment successfully against georgia much of that might easily have beeturned as well. Listen, you want to have quick comment on that . Yeah, just theres a line that steven in his book, its actually one of my all Time Favorite John Quincy Adams. Its the letter that he actually wrote to john when john adams did not win his reelection. And he talks about the importance of being validated by history and understanding that there playing the long game as a president and the American People and books will appreciate their contribution sean and i think that in the case of all three president s even if they didnt articulated such glorious fashion, they in a lot of ways have been validated. Even if there have been executive or their successors overturned lot of what they did. Like grant has climbed up in those rankings is because people have appreciated his really principled stand on behalf of blacks and suffrage in the short reconstruction period. And so if anything, i think that this book is a case that president should have more long term vision, which is one of the themes that i talked about at the beginning, and that theyre not just plain for their laws to last through their rns but theyre really playing for the judgment of the generations that follow right. So we have about 2 minutes left. Stephen, want to go to you for the last and i sort of bring this out again to the bigger picture, the larger contribution of your book. Point out is that we have emphasized too much, the 20th century that you said theres a thin rendering of the 19th century. Can you very quickly tell us what you mean by that, why its important. I think whats happened in scholarship is that the 19th century is being filled in. So rather than the romantic National Myth that i thi americans have had for many, many generations of an open west pioneer made by individual rugged writing building cabins and basically doing things on their own, only to be oppressed by a johnnyom lately government in the 20th century that starts to try to order lives that myth has a lot of endurance with americans what historians have been doing for the last couple of decades is really filling in the details at that thats not really what happened that oftentimes it was the government out west First Signing treaties doing diplomatic negotiation conquering lands at times organizing land titles, surveying plots of land and trying to encourage people to settle that land with a series of complicated laws over settlement. And so the larger argument here is that as we fill in the 19th century governance, we see more particularly more action by president s, right . This has really been fascinating to me as someone who studies the post 1945 to realize that. There was so much going on before that and before fdr. So ive learned a lot. I is, who has been kind enough to tune in, has also learned from this conversation. I want to thank the Miller Center for to steven for his wonderful book and for lindsay as well for your and im thank all of you for