Transcripts For CSPAN2 Fmr. 20240702

At 6 30 p. M. Eastern, New York University professor shares her book my hijacking where she recounts being taken as a 12yearold in 1970 by a Palestinian Resistance group during a flight from israel to new york city. Then at 8 00 p. M. Eastern, a founder argues that america is a more progressive country and offers his thoughts on how to advance a liberal agenda with his book justice is coming. Watch book tv every sunday on cspan 2. Find a full schedule on your Program Guide or watch online any time at book tv. Org. Defense policy experts and former government Officials Join the Atlantic Council for discussions on the United States Nuclear Strategy and the challenges posed by china and russia. Good afternoon. Welcome to the Atlantic Council for todays event, a strategic posture for a new era introducing the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report. Im Vice President at the Atlantic Council and senior director of the councils for strategy and security. This comes at a time of significant deterioration in the International Security environment. For decades russia was the only nuclear peer competitor to the United States, but in recent years china has launched a Nuclear Buildup and is on pace to have 1500 nuclears weapons by 2035. This means for the time in its history, the United States will need to contend with two nuclear competitors russia and china at the same time. Moreover, the risk of conflict with these revisionist powers is growing. To address this unprecedented challenge, congress established a Strategic Posture Commission in the 2022 National Defense authorization act. Congress charged the commission to, quote, conduct a review of the strategic posture of the United States, including a strategic threat assessment and a detailed review of Nuclear Weapons policy, strategy, and structure and factors affecting the ability of near peer competitors of the United States. Todays event will examine the major findings and recommendations from the final report of the Strategic Posture Commission. This is central to the mission of developing sustainable nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenge facing the United States and the world. The center also honors generals legacy of service. 40 years ago in 83, a commission of the Strategic Forces. In many ways this 1983 report set the basis for the bipartisan consensus and Strategic Forces policy that continues to this day. The center is proud to carry on this legacy, among other events and publications on Strategic Forces we were proud to host an official rollout of the Biden Administrations Nuclear Posture review in 2022. Within the center our Strategic Forces work is run through our defense program. It generates ideas and connects stake holders in the defense ecosystem to promote ebb during military enduring military advantage for the United States its al lice and partners. Its allies and partners. Im pleased to welcome the chair and vice chair of the commission and fellow commissioner. I was honored to serve as commissioner, and i will also join this panel which will be moderated by Michael Gordon, National Security correspondent with the wall street journal. Before serving as chair of this commission, madelyn was previously deputy administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration at the department of energy and assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs. Senator kyle represented arizona in 95 to 2013 in the senate and served on the Armed Services committee for many years and was an influential voice for nuclear modernization. Bob share served as assistant secretary of defense for strategy plans and capabilities in the pentagon and is now head of International Affairs for bp america. We will then proceed to a second panel in which we seek reactions to the report from outside experts. Our outside experts will include a senior fellow here at the Atlantic Council and former Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for Nuclear Missile defense policy, Vice President of the Global Nuclear policy program at the Nuclear Threat initiative, and the honorable, Board Director here at the Atlantic Council and former undersecretary of defense for policy. This session will be moderated by pentagon correspondent at the associated press. Were grateful and excited for you to be here with us today. Both panels will include audience questionandanswer, in which attendees both in person and virtually will be able to participate. To submit a question, please go to ask ac. Org. This event is public and on the record. Thank you again very much for joining. I hope you enjoy the conversation. Now i would like to turn it over to Michael Gordon to moderate our first panel. I think we have a very important event here, and this report that was done by the commission has already gotten a lot of attention in washington among the people who follow these sorts of developments, but i think in the broader country, at large, im not sure Everybody Knows that much about it really. They only testified to the Congress Really just this week, so this is an opportunity for me to ask some specific questions about the report, but also for the commissioners to introduce some of their important findings and explain the logic behind them. Im going to ask some questions, get a discussion going for about 40 minutes or so, and then turn it to the audience who are submitting questions and give them an opportunity to ask their own very specific questions. First off, were all informal here. Madelyn, can you whats the you think the main message of the report . Its a very it oohs very detailed report its a very detailed report of, oh, well over 100 pages. But whats the main message . What do you think the American Public really needs to take away from this document at this particular point in time . Thanks, michael. I guess i should also add that yes, it is a long report. It does have 81 some recommendations. But the key, the key important parts of this report are that over the last several years, we have evolved the threat has evolved to a condition where the u. S. Is not really prepared, and we hadnt planned for the situation that we find ourselves in, and so the idea behind the report is that we need to get serious about this threat, and we need to take actions now so that we can prepare and have the flexibility to be able to address the threat as it evolves over the next several years. Even though were informal, im going to address you as senator kyl because it is in my dna, one of the big themes in the report is that the United States is not sufficiently prepared to deal with an environment in which it will confront two nuclear peers. Were not there yet. The report on China Military power says there are about 500 operational war heads, but were headed in that direction. I think a lot of ordinary americans and normal people would say well, what do you mean were not prepared . We have 1550 new start accountable Strategic Nuclear war heads. We have a nuclear triad. We have all sorts of a manner of forces that would seem to have some deterrence value. What in what way are we not prepared for this new era . Thank you, michael. The simple way to approach the answer is we have prepared a force structure to deal with the one country that we thought we might have to deal with with Nuclear Weapons. Thats russia. And the two countries russia and the United States basically negotiated a force structure for each country that set limits on how many Nuclear Weapons we could deploy. Thats how many we thought were necessary. Now we have another party entering the game here, and china says that it wants to be in parity with both russia and the United States, which means that no longer will there be only one country with the war heads that the russians have, but now there will be two, and its troublesome because we know that russia and china desire to act in concert. They have acted in concert to some extent, and with respect to a potential confrontation with the United States, we cant ignore the possibility that either those two countries acting together planning to act together in concert, or if one starts something, and we have to deal with it in one part of the world, the other could see it as an opportunity for that second country to get involved, in which case we would then be faced with the prospect of not having one war on our hands, but potentially two, and we are not prepared to fight a twowar scenario simultaneously. So i dont know which panelist wants to take this, maybe bob, but one criticism thats been made or observation thats been made of this report by some in the arms control community is that it could further fuel the arms race, and if the u. S. Feels that it is imperative to build up above current levels, surely the chinese and the russians might add even further to their holdings. Is there is that a fair critique . How can you reinforce deterrence without leading to an unending arms race . I think Jake Sullivan gave a speech last june where he said the future Nuclear Force doesnt need to be equivalent to the combined total of what russia and china has in order to have a deterrence value. I think many if not all commissioners would agree with that, that this is not a simple additive problem. We have two as senator kyl pointed out, we have two threats, two arsenals that were looking at into the future, but that doesnt mean that the answer is necessarily just doubling what we have now. In terms of the arms control piece, i think all of us spent a lot of time thinking about this as commissioners, but to me one of the important pieces is to look at we had a structure that we have been thats been fairly consistent for decades. We have a structure that we have set through treaty that we kept to and our Modernization Program in fact was looking at a one for one replacement. During that time, russia has looked to get new and novel and increase its strategic Nuclear Posture and its weapons. China has clear plans to increase and has increased. To some extent saying that were fuelling an arms race because we are looking at the new reality thats coming into the near future and saying we must do more i think is missing the point that we were actually fairly consistent and concerned about that maintained the levels that in fact we thought were appropriate, and the things we were trying to not spark in russia and china, theyre doing anyway. So i would like to push back a little bit on that critique, which is is it fuelling an arms race . It was happening without us doing anything, and at this point, it would be irresponsible for us to assume that they wont continue on the path they have clearly laid forward. I would like to ask about one particular formulation in the report, and going down the line, matt, in the actual document, theres a very carefully written sentence that says the u. S. Defense strategy to address the two nuclear peer threat requires the u. S. Nuclear force that is either larger in size, different in composition, or both, and then it says therefore decisions must be made now. So the commission didnt quite go so far as to say we have to increase our forces. Although all of the recommendations about having a plan larger b 21 force or more submarines or more long range Cruise Missiles seem to point in that direction. Can you explain that formulation to me . What are you really saying . Is the commission really saying we need to have more forces, or is it stopping just short of that . Yeah, well, thanks very much, michael, and so i will just quote directly from the report, and, you know, one thing i would like to highlight is the strategy for people who havent read the report. We do say that the United States needs a Defense Strategy that can deter and if necessary defeat russia and china simultaneously. Second, we say that americas traditional Nuclear Strategy fundamentals are sound. We dont need a fundamental rethink of the strategy, but we just need to adjust our posture to deal with this new twopeer reality. And so what we say is that the program of record that we planned in 2010 is necessary and should be pursued with urgency, but its not sufficient. We need to do more. And so some of the specific recommendations, we say prepare to up [inaudible] war heads. Increase the planned number of deployed long range stand off weapons. Increase the planned number of b 21 bombers and tankers. Increase the planned production of columbia ssbns and their Ballistic Missile systems and plan to put the bomber fleet on strip alert. So none of those things we dont need an increase in the size of the arsenal immediately, but we do need to take steps now that would give us flexibility in future, and i think thats where theres unanimous consent among the commission that if we dont take those steps now, we wont have the option in the future. We also call for just some things that are notable, we call for additional theater Nuclear Weapons in the indo pacific and in europe. Also for the first time, we call for a Missile Defense homeland Missile Defense for russia and china to deter and defeat their so called coercive attacks. I think there are some notable changes from what we were thinking would be necessary when we planned the program of record back in 2010. Let me ask you about those. It was very hep pful for you to helpful for you to go down that list. Let me ask you about some of the specific recommendations, the recommendation that the u. S. Needs to have an air and Missile Defense against russia and china is a bit of a departure. I mean the previous concept would be we needed a very limited defense against so called rogue states like north korea, but there was not real utility in having Mission Defense against russia and china, could easily overwhelm it. Now you are saying we do need Something Like that because of coercive scenarios. I noted in the recent China Military power report released yesterday at the pentagon, they talk about a possible Chinese Program to develop an intercontinental range potentially armed Ballistic Missile. What are the coercive scenarios you are worried about, and how would an air Missile Defense protect against that . Who wants to take that here . I think we all have a view on this. I will start. Needless to say, amongst our many robust discussions, this was one of them. Uhhuh. But one of the things that is very important, and i dont want to leave the impression that weve changed the nature of the groundbased interceptors. Those groundbased interceptors are not what were talking about here. What were talking about here are looking at where there is key Critical Infrastructure, where there are key bases, those sorts of things, and to think about how we would protect those with integrated air and Missile Defense systems, point defenses, theater defenses those sorts of things so if russia or china were trying to keep us out of something, right, they want to do something over here, they want to keep the u. S. Out, that that coercive attack to keep us out, to prevent us from doing anything would not be effective. In other words, we would have a deterrent capability so that we just want to take that off the table. I mean, so thats part of what we were thinking. It is not as stark as reversing decades of Missile Defense policy with respect to defending against russia. It is a very focused and very limited. If i could add one more thing, one of the reasons we were able to discuss this is because of the advances in technology from the time, 20 or 30 years ago when we were first thinking about Missile Defenses, and it was such a daunting task because of what the offense from a then soviet union could throw at us, and it would be very costly. Now, with the cost of boosting satellites much much less than it ever was before, the commercial sector putting literally thousands of satellites into orbit, for example, we see opportunities for using all domains potentially including the space domain for developing a system which really could be effective, at least against a limited or coercive kind of attack. Therefore what we urge is for the Defense Department do a full effort not Just Research and development, if they find a system feasible to do this to urgently. I would like to add on to this, that certainly this is one of the more meaty discussions that we had, but also looking at a couple of things i wanted to just foot stop and add to. One is there are a lot of people who think Missile Defense systems thats destabilizing that creates these problems. I guess i would argue if you look around moscow, the air and Missile Defense protections around moscow have always been quite strong. Russia doesnt think it is necessarily to have a problem to have that. Looking at us and figuring out are there Critical Infrastructure pieces that we should be looking to make sure to protect where you couldnt have a limited attack and then prompt a larger war or have a limited attack and have your adversary think it is limited enough, they wont have a full scale war because of this. Those are the kind of things were looking to do. And the technology piece i think that senator kyl said is also critical for this, which is were not saying what we have is exactly right for every Missile Defense purpose that were looking at in the future. Were not looking at more. Theres a big problem with some parts of our Missile Defense, where its a lot more expensive to have an interceptor than it is to have a missile. You dont want to be on the wrong side of that cost curve. Lets look at technology. Lets look at other things to potentially help with this problem which in fact is only getting worse. I would like to ask among the other recommendations, and its been noted by the panel already, is that the u. S. Should have a Theater Nuclear capability in asia pacific. But i would like to ask the logic of that, to explain that a little more because in the Trump Administration, it called for a sealaunched Cruise Missile nuclear capability, but it certainly wasnt treated as an urgent priority during the Trump Administration. My recollection is it was a good decade away before that kind of capability would have been fielded. And also, in the Trump Administration, National Defense strategy, it was even suggested that it could be traded away if the russians made certain concessions on inf. Of course that treaty is now gone. More recently, a general said there should be at least the possibility of a theater system and not necessarily a sea launch Cruise Missile. Why do we need a Theater Nuclear system in the asia pacific at this time . And how could we achieve it since the Biden Administration has said they dont want to do a sea launch Cruise Missile, and you would be asking to reverse that policy, and how important and urgent is this . Yeah, so i will start with kind of the deterrence theory and the history and then get to the current day and our recommendation. Flexible response has been a part of u. S. Nuclear strategy for many decades, starting in the cold war. The logic is we dont want to put ourselves in a position where choices are suicide or surrender, if the adversary conducts a limited nuclear attack, we want options other than surrendering and launching a full Scale Nuclear attack. By having those flexible options, we can threaten to respond in a limited way, if an adversary were to conduct a limited attack. The purpose of course is not to fight the limited nuclear war, but for the adversary to see that we have Response Options and be deterred in the first place. So we had a lot of these theater Nuclear Weapons during the cold war. At the end of the cold war, we got rid of almost all of them, but russia and china havent. Russia and china have retained and are building more nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. China has hundreds or thousands of short and intermediate medium range Nuclear Capable missiles in asia. Russia has 2,000 or so nonStrategic Nuclear weapon. They have this escalate to deescalate doctrine that we have seen him threaten nuclear use in ukraine. He could do the same thing in nato. We want to deter that kind of attack against a nato ally. Same thing in the asia theater. China could have incentives to use Nuclear Coercion or limited Nuclear Threats, and we want to have an Effective Response to that. And so the commission calls for theaterbased Nuclear Weapons in europe and the indo pacific. We have a number of characteristics we think those capabilities should have, lo e yield, survivability low yield, survivability, etc. , but we dont pick winner answer pick winners and losers. There might be other answers. What might those be . Other answers might be if you go back to the cold war, we had a lot of different systems. There could be a lot of Different Things. I know some people have talked about having a ground launch capability now that the United States is out of the intermediate range Nuclear Forces treaty. That could be an option. I think some experts might say that some of the systems that we have planned may be bombers or Fighter Aircraft with gravity bombs or Cruise Missiles could maybe fit that description. So again, we didnt want to pick winners and losers. We wanted to describe the capabilities that we thought we needed for a deterrence in those regions. An important feature of this report is its not merely about Nuclear Weapon systems. It is really about strategic posture. It is about conventional capabilities as well. And in that respect, the report is very critical of the pentagons one more framework which has now been embraced in two National Defense strategies, one during the Trump Administration in 2018 and then one by the Biden Administration in 2022. And there was a reason that they embraced it. They were well aware that things could happen simultaneously in different areas, but they just thought it was if youre really going to fully fund the twowar strategy with all the logistics and the transport that would be involved, it would eat into the cuttingedge capabilities that one really needs to stay ahead of our competitors. I would like to ask you, bob, you said a two war strategy doesnt mean twice the spending, but what does a two conventional war capability really mean when you spell it out in terms of programs, spending, capability, what does that really entail . what you do for scenarios to develop those forces so these are separate although often conflated. The two mg strategy you dont have to care about book or the department of defense to set, they know there are adversaries going on in they may not affect that workbook building structure, what can you fund successfully in terms of setting up conditions and separately, we do a process, how do you use the forces we have . One thing we talked about is never been, we have never planned that so what charges a is if you are not willing to invest in you recognize a Greater Alliance its not something we want to do, would like it to be important this strategy. If you dont make the investments on the conventional five, you have more on the nuclear side and that is the message we were trying to send, he cant disentangle these pieces difficult challenge his coffee you have a large Defense Budget agreed to go out this has to be both against the threat and that is why it is born highlight it is also on the nuclear side. In the past Strategic Nuclear modernization armscontrol linked politically and it was ratified because of the nuclear Modernization Program and the connections are important to maintain public support. And impression i have details and recommendations that are very specific are more expensive than the discussion of Diplomatic Options and armscontrol that the u. S. Might take recognizing when you have this going on and the chinese unwilling to engage in these discussions but how might the u. S. Approach armscontrol and diplomacy to negate threats but also reestablish the link that is so important you can say modernizing arsenal the threat to diplomacy, how did they go together . Confidence building interest. I do want to say in the report, there is an entire chapter on that. Part of the discussion, how you look at armscontrol in the future, you think more creatively . We have to look at the broad range of things so is competent only measures the way they work with russia years ago. Anything that has opportunity we should explore all of this. One thing is to be ready for the verifiable agreement. What it is that they would need to have this agreement and verify how they do the inspections and will help for what you would work to do. Its challenge because everybody wants to see and be meaningful, it might work if you multiple they are terribly confused but we have to do this. Maybe with the about strategic its not just nuclear, maybe there will come a time where they are. If i just add, armscontrol requires partner and china has to be willing to engage. Russia has compliance with the treaty so in the report, armscontrol would be terrific, just hard to imagine anything from. Risk reduction measures as a launching of other things with the relationship what we thought in the past several decades numerical limits difficult in the near future for an idea for uncivil arrangement montana conducted this bombardment a rising so United States should negotiate on these systems. Quote tenant. Starting with limits they made the end but they are doing recently the gratification they are not adequate, they dont appear at this time to move toward testing so the entire framework at this time, theres one question a lot of people have, the value of the report and recommendations for their number of areas infrastructure and Strategic Forces on specific recommendations, conventional forces there how many recommendations . Anyone a lot of them have to do with things we can do in the infrastructure but a question i am sure you get you have done a good job laying out a threat, a full menu of ways to address the threat but in an environment of constraint resources it appears unlikely these things will be funded for priorities here from a priorities . How should we proceed . Are the poor is a consensus report, people appointed by the leadership of the congress on both sides of the aisle, this is remarkable opposition we were given was to answer a series of questions and give recommendations on what should be done. It did not include listing all things in order in which they should be done. Let us congress is prerogative and thats what they will do so all approach was to ask what we think we ought to do from here it is. I would argue there is nothing and what we recommend we cant afford so it is up to congress decide the number one priority of the United States is secretaries of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs for the last couple decades at least all testified the number one priority for the defense of the country is this Strategic Deterrent and Nuclear Alternatives and a key component of. They described that as a foundation for everything else. That is the number one priority. I definition, it tells you hes of the things you need to find first and do other things than do that. I would argue that is the principal and second, understanding we only spent about half as much we did in the 1980s defense, just around 3 were gross dependent. Clearly we cant afford these things so is the change from a book can be cramped in it we need to deter war particularly with nuclear capabilities. The report really is for the long game so its not everything in two years or five years or ten years. A lot of things we recommend because they just started like the 21, heres down the road before you go beyond, it is years before you get the other one. This is a long game in terms of these requirements or deterrent and the executive branch could take all in the longterm, nearterm and think about how they that. One concern is in some number of years when they are on the same course, if we dont take steps now then those decisions cant be made because there will not be anything to decide and we just want to make sure the research has started and funding has started so whoever makes the decision can actually make a decision so we dont want to foreclose options that might be needed in the future. We dont like russia and china to change, of course. We want to be prepared. I should have said the time. You are addressing is 202722035 be prepared for that later perhaps that will be necessary for the environment changes so you braved the Biden Administration, they must have heard, what is their response to these recommendations . They obviously have a lot on their plates these days. We have not heard but we only rolled this out last week and we just did hearing yesterday. We did pretty well so they knew they had an inkling of what was coming. They knew it was coming. We have a lot of testing. You have been on the field yesterday, right . What was the response there . They had a lot of specific questions you asked and i thought they got right to the. , i think it was well received but majority of the members there and it is my perception there is a possibility for bipartisan agreement. I think perhaps these people could render a consensus report specificity here, maybe we can get together and come up with a consensus. One of our recommendations was the congress and the administration to arrive at a consensus on these things and take the case to the American People because they will need the support of the American People particularly if we spend more money on these things so that has been a lot, happy to see the president speak to the nation lastly and justify ask he was making and that is important for the president to do. I was one of the specific recommendations. It did enable it, can you explain these . He explain the input you received, i think this was in about a year. We had the first meeting in the summer of 20. More than a year end enormous number of briefings, the Intelligence Community Cap Department of energy the first the chair for anything they would like to say but the administration was cooperative with the information to carry out. That is another important aspect, really good conversations. I think im going to turn to audience questions because im sure there will be a few. So here is a question, how much emphasis should command and control range and strengthening strategic posture . Russia and china are kazakh vehicles exposing potential albums, but recommendations does the report make if anything to deal with. Russia and china those in the near future. One thing we did was is it commands. We were briefed on ill be careful here. There are annexed to our report and discussions in their would go to this but we talk about modernization of the guys, we conclude that to be modernized. Plan of record, the plan that will probably extend out on the vacatur so to me for advice. That includes a lot of commandandcontrol components. We recommend strengthening for new threats because monster developing a Hypersonic Weapons you have far less warning deal with that will and can be generous, how to deal with that all who ability to see things like that to get u. S. Leaders situational awareness. Also important is the idea of having redundancy so youre not always relying on those warning systems. It is hard to go into a lot of detail but the other piece is really looking at technology and how these technologies in. Another question from international the affairs. In our panelists elaborate from Nuclear Planning and how they envision forces. The possibility for the nato nuclear plant. The first thing to emphasize, who want to know and understand what they thought was important and it is very clear the importance. As you get to the nuclear piece, we have a strong longstanding approach, we plan to new Nuclear Weapons in nato and some countries states when it comes to participating and we have other countries that have a role and almost every country of the Planning Group look at how we look forward to inform Nuclear Pieces of integrated into broader defense and that is always important to be able to walk, featuring for what in the first place. The only thing to increase his foot or not there is a role for data, i think that is a difficult question and the first thing look at nato and see what we can do to increase the Nuclear Understanding alliance deteriorated and we built that and understand the role and then be part of a. Heres an interesting question. The report says the problem can be addressed in the quantity of Nuclear Forces for the composition out to those supporting composition, adjustment need, and the deterrence you have to have infrastructure in place to produce whatever it is we need so it may just be Different Things but we need the ability to address whatever it is that comes our way so if it is something that is a one off, a small number of systems lets find we lose capability across the board. To be able to address this so that is a little bit on what we talked about. I will also add thats not a direct answer. What modifications would you like to see, maybe none of this group but what modifications might be satisfied for this Nuclear Threat . One thing i think it is important despite all of us long history realize telling us around the table, able to answer specific questions need a clear different times they had maybe think we could but it is not our job. It is in place elsewhere for those who are sitting out these permits and conditions in our job is so the solution to was on the future made decisions that enable decisions and choices to be made to make if youre looking for a part answer. Edward is looking for one. Think about pacific capabilities you might want. A hard target, one of the capabilities of systems to think about specific things . The mexican armscontrol position in the question i asked earlier, i like the technologies trying to develop, the bombardment systems, is there any possibility for negotiating technology in which the u. S. Has episodic if we tried to get them, what are we willing to put on the table . We have spent a lot of time lamenting the fact that there are opportunities working with the chinese leadership and military are virtually no and we dont see that changing the future and under current circumstances to go to because of ukraine, they seemed disinterested in this as well. As a result you have to go in to this planning for the possibility that there will not be element brought in and we say this in the report. With or without armscontrol. That doesnt mean all possibilities are enclosed in terms of talking to reduce risk. There are a lot of ways to reduce risk but interestingly, the chinese leadership does appear interested in me that way in the the accommodations and whether we can reach these in the future are not work to do now. One thing determine and in armscontrol. Historically this report we are not where we need to be and once we have done but we can design and during the Clinton Administration states but they may be multilateral. In regards to peter, how do we convince allies and while the political leaders may welcome this and our militaries. If you contemplate these systems in the Biden Administration to do that, how do you address this . One interesting tidbit, in the obama mgr there was a statement about exercising ability for this so we have not done that. It is an option so its something gradual and it would be received or located by these exercises so there are ways supported for the reader an adult will disconnect but be there extorting among these are just our recommendations. Twenty china initiated looking at this one of states might assess the nations how active was this nurse. One of the things is we live that is fundamentally important. We recognize that is not a concept people understand what it is often viewed as something we do for our allies will benefit. There is a section in the report on the effort to stop the spread around the world and they continue to play the important role. Persuading our allies because they are competent to rely on the nuclear umbrella. Where might it play a role in this . How that is important for a variety of ways and maintains this is also potentially stabilizing and we need to focus on the and import armscontrol using technologies or technology. A Good Opportunity to talk about the integrating and it used to be that they were in the Defense Sector but thats not what we see in a lot of places. A. I. Is a good example now because of other ways we have technology from commercial side. The departments of energy and how we can better make that make sense. Okay. According to the magic ipod, im down to 13 seconds. That means we are out of questions and ready to move on. I would like to thank everyone for interesting collegial discussions among very difficult issues we have conclusion in a few minutes. [applause] [inaudible conversations]