Speaker who we aree so honored o have with us, senator tammy duckworth. Senator duckworth probably needs no introduction to most of you watching. She is an iraq war veteran, a purple heart recipient, former assistant secretary of the u. S. Department of Veterans Affairs and napa yes, senator for the state of illinois. For both of us working in our security, certainly for those of us who are women in National Security, when you think about people who are breaking down barriers ahead of you, store duckworth is the top of the list when the first handful of women in the army to fly combat missions during Operation Iraqi freedom cup first u. S. Senator to give birth while in office, and particularly relevant to todays event the firsts member of congress was born in thailand and the first asianamerican who was elected to congress from the state of illinois. In addition to the work shes done of defense and Veterans Affairs, senator duckworth spent a lot of time thinking about the military challenges we face in the pacific. Shes really been an advocate for the alliances and partnerships we have in the region, especially in the part of the world she knows very well from time in Southeast Asia when she was growing up. From the time shes been serving and u. S. Military she understands firsthand why it is so important to have our friends and partners working and fighting alongside of us. Im thrilled we will have thiss conversation. Senator duckworth will offer a few words at the top and then we will talk a bit for about 30 minutes. When thats done i will turn the floor over to my colleague russian rush doshi will moderate an excellent panel on indopacific. With that, senatorec duckworth, welcome. We are thrilled to have you and want to turn the floor over to. Thank you so much, lindsay. I first i want to apologize to everyone hoping its late because of me. We had votes called wright at 2 00 and had to go vote. I do apologize to everyone. Thank you for waiting in the to go cast my vote in order to start this event. Lindsay come thank you for the very kind introduction in thank you for inviting me to speak today. Im looking forward to our discussions on just going to say just a few words to kick things off because you said im an american before in Southeast Asia to an american dad and of high mother. I think my heritage makes the living example ofes the friendsp between the two nations. For t centuries now united stats and thailand have learned and leaned on each other a telecom diplomatically economically, culturally. Whether its Law Enforcement or education, National Security or are respected economist the two nations atop one another to grow and evolve, adapting to world that is ever more connected and adapting to an error in technology that allows allies have world way to be there for each other and instant. States t just hold true between u. S. And tylan. Its the same with many other countries were fortunate to call our allies throughout the Indo Pacific Region. They Work Together over the years and even decades even centuries in the name of common sense and for the sake of common good. And now after four years avenue with the administration the use of Term Alliance is a dirty word here at home for the strength of these bonds is more important than ever. You know as well as i though the indo Pacific Place houses and the greatest security challenges of our time. Nos tensions with iran and to the north russia is determined to find its way back to dominance it ignoring International Norms and moving forward no matter what the cost is per into the northeast , north Korea Remains dangerously erratic. Send that amongst the chaos. Between us and our friends. From the economy to cyber warfare to Maritime Security the United States council nations big and small throughout the indo pacific reason to be our partners, our friends working together to ensure the safety and prosperity. To ensure all charges are free to trade and travel on the high seas and make sure all parties adhere to the rule of International Law. Most shangrila dialogue im going to quote perhaps the greatest longterm threat regio regions to seek to undermine rather than undermine the rules based order. Trend exploit militarily. They destabilize the region towards exclusive advantage. We, the United States must stay vigilant against the request within the erosion of sites. Anything but resolute economies falter. Prosperity are threatened and it rains theres no easy fix. No simple way to backtrack. Those are just some of the reasons im so grateful to be speaking with everyone here today. Im so grateful that you have all taken interest not only whats exclusively americas interest but in the allies interest as well. Theyre often one and the same. With that im going to turn over and look forward to the discussion. Thank you so much for those remarks senator. Take us off. Had a couple of administrations now i think this will be consistent with the incoming biden have tried to emphasize focusing on our interest in the pacific region. I think a common complaint name you heard their partners in the region over the last couple of years as we in the United States is not always put our money where our mouth is. At times we talk a really big game about the pacific but looks like resources like the middle east. Congress i think has really been out in front on this issue in the last few years. More recently the pacific dothan budgetary resources for the pacific. From your view diplomatically as well as on the defense side what are some of the key investments of the u. S. Needs to be focusing on over the next several years to really demonstrate their walking the walk. Back one of the things we can do is renegotiate a trade agreement, multilateral trade agreement in the region. I did not vote for the ppp. That imparts the time as a congresswoman i have specific issues with country of origin rules as well as rules that had to do the environmental damage. The languages should not shall in that agreement. I end up voting against it. I think when you ppp type of agreement. Left the United States out. We dont have it we cannot shall commit to the region. Multilateral trade agreement is critically important on the agenda of things to follow through on. The nbs, the dods National Defense strategy that came out a couple of years ago specifically talked about National Security and the Indo Pacific Region as critical to our National Security. We need to go back to that and really reengage with friends and partners and basically restore u. S. Presence in the region. That does not mean we have to be there in a purely defensive posture. We can be in a humanitarian posture. We dont need giant basis we dont teacher recreate a base for example. But certainly having a presence when it comes to cybersecurity based out of singapore is important. The initiative right now thats in the current that would establish Cybersecurity Partnership between United States and indonesia were that looks like its going to stay in. Hopefully that will sign into law create a new initiative. First and foremost is going to be the economic reengage my has to happen a really real way. In addition to whats happening. Thank you so much senator. Cybersecurity is an important one. But another issue talked a lot about, think president obama did too. I would imagine this conversation will probably continue may be in a different form under president elect biden. This issue of burden sharing. President trump is probably taken with the very narrow slice of this conversation and has focused mainly on the support costs in places like japan and korea. Theres a broader conversation to be had when you talk about burden sharing. How we modernize and partner relationships. Where the areas are what may be partners have more to contribute. And where partners to what more so they work alongside us. What are some of the opportunities that we can think about burden sharing in our respective goals and missions in our life its may be it a little more strategic way in the coming years . I think we should have this discussion wears a burden sharing not purely on monetary terms. I mean you can have that discussion more with nato where alliances and allies are wealthier. Them greater financial capabilities. In the Indo Pacific Region in particular you talk about burden sharing you have to recognize some of the burdens that can only be shouldered by some of the allies are those who are not our allies. Those were in the region per you have to recognize a portion of burden sharing that is just as important. And encourage other nations to step up. What theyve been doing in terms of resisting the chinese expansion into the region. And then into territorial waters on the oceans or even indonesia you see the same thing. Really give a standing up to their waters. That is not necessary on Monetary Base but a commitment based type of burden sharing. It will continue to Grow Partnership with the same share priorities. That is with navigation in the region and adherence to the International Law regimes. It was a role space as opposed to strict dollar space. Host excellent points. On the treaty, what would you say in terms of the United States is diagnosed in the near term . Switch it you know i dont know. [laughter] im very interested in moving in that direction. But again we do not even have a named nominee to be defense secretary yet. It is certainly something i will be having in my conversations with whoever the nominee is as we move forward. Sue had let me followup as of the points you made about vietnam, indonesia, on the last several years the United States is obviously focus a lot on our partnerships in Southeast Asia. Its economically important countries with young vibrant economies. Theres a lot of shared interest have their own sovereignty while president elect biden has talked a lot about the importance of strengthening our alliances and partnerships, that also affects tonys refrain importance of Democratic Values and human rights back into u. S. Foreign policy. Theres some Difficult Conversations to be had there with partners. Im wanting from your perspective how we balance those two foals in the alliance conversations that we have especially with Southeast Asia. Guest first and foremost we have to be consistent in our approach. We have to consistently stand up for Democratic Values and for those who are championing true democracy, representative democracy. And be approved authoritarianis authoritarianism. That is who we are at the nation those are the values we are founded on. Knows what we have must adhere to. Whenever we strayed away from those values and has never worked out well for us. Another might be an instant to do that that is not the way to go. And frankly its a different world now than the 50s or 60s. And we have to recognize the move for these democracy movements. Theyre only going to grow. We need to oppose those whether its insurgents terrorist groups, just as much as we need to talk to those who may be empower who are trying to oppress demonstrations. And people are just asking for with their own political proces process. I think we can do both spray think we can have blunt upfront conversations especially with her allies and friends. But listen, we stand for democracy. We want to work with you but cannot come at the expense of our democratic expense. Host you talked a lot about norms and values. One of the more notable things about the past year has been we have seen a lot of our partners in asia speaking up on issues like they problems in hong kong, taiwan, and pushing back against chinese actions in some of those areas. And in return, have paid a pretty steep price. In particular id point most recently into a trade agreement between australia and china over chinas rest take a jump frustration on covid or hong kong or in the South China Sea. That step impacting Something Like 20 billion of straight exports. They would to see in this situation because im sure its on the First Partners this is happened to, it will not be the last. The u. S. Has their back. What would you like to see the u. S. Taking to be more proactive about backing up partners like australia when they get into these kinds of situations where they are suffering really direct Economic Force in beijing . Me too i think this was back to the first Economic Engagement. We sort of dealt with this part of the world as an afterthought almost. And when President Trump begot the ppp that negatively affected Economic Engagement in the region. Lingua should certainly looking at increasing her engagement to the Indo Pacific Region. Especially working to it in advance a multilateral agreement. But having a stronger Bilateral Agreement with specific partners like austria for example. In order to support and show them we do have their back. For the last four years you had a president who is not wanted to engage internationally. Whether its National Security wiser economically. I think you see the Biden Administration, especially when you look nominees he is already announced, they are going to be much more engaged. We commit both economically and security wise. But he certainly would support, i support our Armed Services and commerce committee. Im uniquely positioned to talk to both sides of this with economic and security wise. I think more trade agreements are necessary. And looking at what we can do perhaps in a bilateral basis. Negative pushback from the chinese. Thank you. You know when we look at what happens in places like hong kong over the last year or two, i think something that has been a concern for a lot of people is that perhaps taiwan could be next. And as they wrap up some of the military, political and economic pressure that has been deployed against taipei over the past few years. How concerned are you about that problem . And what steps do you think . In addition to the other issue of arms sales, can be other likeminded partners as well preserves International States for taiwan. Guest this goes back to one thing i been pleasantly surprised by the administration. They have been engaging significantly with taiwan both economically and on measures related to covid19. The administration has taken a number of steps that signals investment in the relationship including something senior officials visited the island earlier this year. Hhs secretary is there the under secretary for growth environment was there. These are the highest ranking members of the u. S. Government to visit taiwan and literally decades. I think that while it has been an unprecedented, those visits are in line with the established u. S. Policy. I think we need to continue this type of visits. And to raise up the level of engagement with more secretary or cabinet level business as well. Think the administration has continued to build on this agreement, these engagements. Last month the state department did host a delegation from taiwan for the inaugural taiwan u. S. Prosperity dialogue pretty think we can push that a little bit more. Its basically continued to engage even more frequently and at a higher level that we can bring to our friends and allies from around the world to participate in those thats even better. Host im glad to hear say that. I think this is an area we think about the taiwan policy were bipartisanship is very importan important. I think its an Important Message of continuity that you are making. That question i had for you you mentioned partners from elsewhere in the world. And something that is been really interesting over the last few years is the european allies and partners have become more interested in engaging with us as well. I am curious rethink their particular opportunities to think about ways that our European Partners could be more engaged in the pacific. And having more support for asian allies . Speech i think the Indo Pacific Region is a region that is a growing middle class. Thats a whole big marketplace for everyone. The allies and the United States. I think that Economic Engagement is just as critical to our National Security. And really having a much more presence in the region and having much more in terms of formal economic agreements is critically important. And i think it is actually beneficial to our european allies. Because this is a whole new market. I see over the last ten years the growth of disposable income in the middle class that isnt growing in places like indonesia and malaysia for example. We long thought about singapore as being a developed nation. We look at places like indonesia and malaysia you see this exponential growth in the middle class. And thailand to in a marketplace that is hungry for goods and services coming out of the United States and out of europe. If we dont fill that void, the prc, they are moving in and providing some of the goods and services. We just need to engage in. That is the way to pool our allies into the security discussion to the economic discussions first. Host that is an excellent point. Everything youve said today emphasizes how much we talk about the indo pacific not just about the military challenges we may face in the region. But we really have to think about the region from a whole of government context that is so true. Because we have economic interest there that you do not also think about the conversation about norms and values as being connected to this economic and security interests. You are not looking at the full puzzle. So senator duckworth i want to thank you so much for taking the time to join us today. It has been an absolute pressure to have you. And with that rest im going to turn it over to you and our panelists for the rest of the conversation. And i thank you. Thank you everyone. Thank you so much older members of the audience for joining us today. My name is rush i am the director of the Initiative Im a fellow at the institution. Im glad to be joined by three stellar colleagues of the institution is going to help us think of the future of the u. S. Elides the indo pacific. In many ways these individuals represent precise of the people he went on the stage for allies and partners and Southeast Asia and northeast asia and europe. Let me tell you a little bit about our panelists we have with us. Senior fellow the Brookings Institute of our products. Im also joined by jonathan who is the chair in Southeast Asian studies. At brookings a senior fellow bird also joined by senior fellow here at the center on u. S. And europe. So, to get us started i like to turn first to how u. S. Ally partners are thinking at the indo pacific and the incoming Biden Administration. Either way, for all for audience members were going to be continuing with the special its about 3 30 p. M. The stick with this right until then. So maybe biggest begin with you. How is india thinking about the u. S. Role in the region. If you couldnt answer that question, maybe you could address the question he got from her audience from the national war college. He is wondering what changes you perceive under a Biden Administration . I think you might be muted. Thanks much. Thanks rush. Im going to try to address that in a sustained way. Take a quick terms of the indo pacific i think the idea that was really a japanese idea with the australians for it and then and india could have adopted. Over the last few years youve seen india, mostly because it changes due to the realities on the ground. Including some things that the u. S. Is also concerned about which is chinas increase into the indian ocean. I think the recognition that happens in the pacific does not stay in the pacific. Or is it said you cannot deal the indian ocean and the Pacific Ocean a separate watertight theaters. The region itself is crucial for india. In some ways it sees the challenges in the region, particularly to the rule in that region is fairly similar theres a lot of overlap between the challenges of the u. S. In the india c. And prime amongst them in some way is the rising china behavio behavior. Including the actual changes to the status quo. Whether that is on the South China Sea in 2017 of the ongoing crisis between china and india this year. For india, the u. S. As part of the response it sees is necessary in the region. Indias response is said to be up its own game in the region including adjusted approach to its neighbors as its extended neighborhood so out include Southeast Asia as well. There is a real recognition largely because capacity constraints, capability constraints they cannot deal the challenge alone. So what has done is made india more willing to deepen cooperation with the u. S. Including in ways that would have been hesitant to do otherwise. So for example india has had sort of been informal doctrine in the region about the south asian neighborhood be simply welcome the u. S. Defense agreement. Youve not seen the action from india in the past. Providing an up dating and the u. S. Finding a range of agreements, enabling agreements to make the u. S. And Indian Military more able to operate together in the future. Nuc indium probably welcomes the free and open indo pacific that comes out of the Trump Administration and has assigned india to like the competitive view of china even though it has some problems with some parts of the approach including the heated rhetoric. I think they look at the Biden Administration, the u. S. For india it remains the most crucial partner of its various partners in the region. Its not just the u. S. That deepens times with japan, good thing for the u. S. Is these are all American Allies as well. But even amongst these, i think the u. S. , theyve called the u. S. And indispensable partner. Theyve been looking for opportunities to move the ball forward and number of areas including security, regional connectivity, building resilience the community fairly broadly. And then cooperation and national and suggestion i think they will watch the biden approach to the region very carefully. It will particular watch the Biden Administration approach to and to have questions, will the u. S. Continue with strategic competition and even the nuances of that competition, will it limit competition with china because of domestic priorities or desire to kind of get chinas cooperation and i think these questions will shape the answer of the question, what the u. S. And india might be willing to do together. I think broadly and briefly, that indian will be quite pleased with a set of people thats quite familiar with, they will probably look for some rebalancing in the relationship, its not a relationship that needs repair unlike some others. Even with the china approach i think theyll be pleased with working with allies and partners not importing unilateral tariffs on partners. And very concerned about growing chinese influence. So, i think to sort of round that up, what id like to see with the Biden Administration is the continuation of the trend weve seen between the bush, obama, Trump Administration, that the u. S. Has seen that indian played an Important Role in the region and administration called it a linchpin and the Obama Administration called it a dedemocratic anchor. I think that the u. S. Has essentially seen india maybe not explicitly, but a counter balance and economic alternative and a democratic contrast to china and on that basis has supported indias rise and while deli would expect some kind of adjustments, it would hold the administration would continue that and also will not throw the baby out with the bath water in terms of some of the things that the Trump Administration has done that theyve liked. Thank you so much. I want to turn to jonathan, youve written how Southeast Asia doesnt want to choose between washington and beijing and weve seen on the india side, basically ties that are close between the u. S. And india. What do we see in Southeast Asia . What is the picture there . Welcome, its a complex and diverse picture. One of the first thing i always say about Southeast Asia is its very diverse. Theres 11 countries, 10 that make up the association of Southeast Asia nation. But broadly speaking if youre asking about the indopacific, for instance and out of washington, japan, australia and so on, theyre generally, i would say uncomfortable with it, and i would say they have some specific issues with the Trump Administrations approach to that contest in particular. On general terms, you know, theyre concerned that it is kind of an antichina coalition that dismisses and they say that or they feel that way, i think, because in an ideal world, they want to have constructive relations with both the United States and china and given the geography of the region and chinas growing economic strengths and their integration with china, in some ways they cant afford to choose and thats where you get the problem with the trump policy the last three, four years, it has hardedged rhetoric and talks about a choice between free and repressive visions of the region. It has labeled china an economic predator that practices death trap diplomacy, for instance. And this is in a context where Southeast Asian countries are desperate for infrastructure. If they want to meet their Economic Needs and there are some debt problems they would for some theyve learned how to manage and negotiation with china its not about opposing china, but managing chinas rise and they would like to do that in concert with the United States in general, but i think they also recognize that the indopacific policy or program strategy, want you want to call it, concept is here to stay and so they have tried in fact to issue their own kind of language on the indopacific. Last year, a document, the asian outlook on the indopacific and it was a more centered approach and centrality which tried to make it be the anchor or the kind of foundation for regional institution. And the main emphasis is inclusiveness, in other words, this isnt or shouldnt be about excluding china and theres a lot more emphasis to pick up on some of the themes of senator duckworth on economic development, for instance. Now, turning to the Biden Administration as its coming in in january, you know, i think theres a sense of relief, a sense that experienced diplomates, a sure pair of hands, you hear this in some of the opeast winds opeds in the region, and rebuild ties. One of the most important thing theyll show up at regional summits for a high levelments and for Southeast Asian countries thats important, just as important as that, they want the Biden Administration to know that the region has changed. I think, i think the incoming diplomates know this. But they really want to make the point that china has gotten stronger and in particular, china has gotten stronger in the economic realm, and is practicing economic statecraft in a way thats really expanded not just its economic power, but its overall power and helping to achieve its strategic goals along the way. And i think even before the pandemic, there was a Regional Survey that showed that policy leitz in Southeast Asia felt that among when they were asked what country or institution is the most strong in asia, or in Southeast Asia, china was rated at 79 , the u. S. Was only 8 , japan at about 4 . And obviously, i think there are strategic gains that flow from these economic realities and i could tell that senator duckworth also was pointing this out. I think its a very interesting point to consider for the incoming administration. Thanks, jonathan. And over to you, and the picture in europe, one of our audience members says that the u. K. Is thinking about military presence in asia. What does all of this mean for transatlantic cooperation on the indopacific and what do you think that, you know, that european allies and partners specifically would want to see from a Biden Administration within that region . Thank you very much, first of all, for inviting me to speak with these great colleagues and i also thought that listening to senator duckworth was fascinating. Theres a great deal to look at here. I want to bounce off the paper that senator duckworth write in late september called sustaining the indoe defense strategies, and makes some points that in fact, our view that makes the case why there is a role for european allies here. And the key point that she makes is that there is a that the u. S. And the incoming Biden Administration needs to find the appropriate balance between deterring high end conflict and in other words, what its role should be in hybrid and gray conflict. Now, her emphasis was allies in the indopacific theater and on the role of the american diplomatic and economic agencies to play here, but you can tend that argument to the europeans, but that is in my view not where it ends. So, what would be the role for europeans here . I see four things. One military, second political signaling, thirdly, diplomatic leverage, and fourthly and probably key point is the economic heft. We europeans have tradition will i thought of ourselves as essential essentially trade partners of china and its really only the u. K. And france that have had a traditional, you know, decades old military presence in the pacific that they think of as essential to their global role as nuclear power. But, and whereas the germans were extremely reluctant to think of their alliances in the indoe pacific region, including with china, as any way security related. That has changed particularly in germany, but its changed across europe i would say and theres now recognition that a, what the chinese aggressiveness, assertiveness in its region has an impact on our trade. In other words, na as the defense minister said recently freedom of navigations in the indopacific theres a recognition that the chinese strategy is very strategic and global and is highly active in the european theater. In essentially acquiring physical and digital real estate, which not just serves immediate chinese strategic purposes in case they are developing when they threaten to undercut the strategic partners. And so the europeans are now in the in the very, very difficult situation of looking at a Biden Administration whose capability who act, they think, will be significantly constrained by domestic by domestic conflict and a china which they increasingly see as a strategic rival and as a Security Threat to them, and they are trying to figure theyre both traumatized by trump wouldnt embrace the Biden Administration, but look at american decoupling that would force them to choose. This is what the europeans are having to navigate. Now, interestingly, theres two papers that came out this week that tell you a little where the europeans are going. One is this. The nato reflection group, nato 2030, which has an extend chapter on china which nato has been wrapping its mind around, but does not mention the indopacific at all. Literally zero. Its all about nato and china. Whereas this weeks paper by the european commission, the joint communications on a new agenda for global change, interestingly, does embed the transatlantic policy on china in a larger indopacific context and as has been pointed out by people who have read it, its ambiguous. It both recognizes the american analysis that the that china is we agree on the strategic challenge presented by chinese growing international assertiveness, even if we dont agree on the way to address them. There you go. This is, in other words, and theyre proposing, a new eu dialog to address these issues. Whats interesting and ill end on this, a number of these new european policy players, including the guidelines that you mention do focus on the military aspect of this and it is particularly interesting that the go germans have moved n this direction. I wont go into detail, but the german minister has been forthright on this and suggested a Bilateral Navy relationship operations with the australians, first with naval officers on ships and also next year, deploying a german frigate to australia to deploy with them an operation. Thats an enormous change in german printing. And obviously, you know, the pentagon is going to the dod is going to smile at the thought of a german frigate, but from the country thats an economic power in europe its a huge political signal. And the question is whether the europeans and the germans are willing to put their economic heft under a comprehensive atlantic strategy because thats the biggest leverage they have to bring and that brings a huge amount of tricky questions we can discuss later. Thank you, thats an exceptionally thorough answer for the first round and one question is changing your perceptions of china and thats one of the questions, particularly postcovid and china around the world and the politics of each country and eep region, theres been a lot written about the india border clash and the casualties and chinas on india on social media and mixed degrees of success there. Can you tell us about how all of that is shaping not only Indian Strategic thinking and Public Opinion locking in the strategic periods ahead . Thank you. I just want to say to the point on the various countries and china, i think were going to see kind of more of this interaction between european and indopacific countries not just because they have shared interest, but everybody has been kind of a little the uncertainty factor about the u. S. Has increased and so there will always be this at the back of the various partners and allies minds, what happens if this happens again in four years . I think for india, which has kind of seen china has a challenge for almost since i would say mid to late 50s. Its the i think that the onetwo punch for the chinaindia relationship, its been the chinese handling of covid19 and the boundary crisis and thats the onetwo punch and i think among the public and you saw this even with the boundary crisis again in may, in the first few months of covid you saw among the india public antichina sentiment go amend stream is usually reserved for india sort of other adversary, pakistan. And if you think about the community, which would particular form india diplomates, the dominant among them says this isnt an Inflection Point of the indiachina relationship, the trust has fallen further if it exists at all and almost all of them have called for china india ties with china to be reassessed. And you had a foreign secretary in india say that chinas actions, the plas, what india see as the plas unilateral attempt to change the status quo at the boundaries have left the agreement that the two countries tried to manage the boundary dispute. Those lie in a heap of rubble as he put it. So, i think that what that resulted also in is that the government, as foreign minister reiterated again just this week, sees it similarly. That those agreements between the two countries were violated and those were the basis for all the cooperation and the expansion of the broader china and india relationship, including the economic ties, and he essentially said, you cannot expect to violate those agreements and have the relationship remain undisturbed. I think that these, the covid crisis has weakened the arguments of those in government calling for india to do more with china, to do less with the u. S. All of those arguing as we saw in the u. S. A few years ago, the deeper economic ties and broader connectivity with china would alleviate political strain. So, i think broadly these two things have brought to the fore, existing concerns about chinas lack of transparency, the rulesbased order and its growing influence in the indopacific and the International Institution and it is particularly of concern, i think a new concern that india is seen as china actually pointing to democracies and saying, look, we do better than them. So, this idea of the ideological accomplishment, i think youre just starting to hear that. And all would be well if there wasnt specific policy concerns. And concerns in india that resulted in specific policy actions and i dont mean at the boundary, but economically in particular and the concerns have been about overdependence on china, about inroads of Chinese Companies with certain sectors and in some cases, using them for propaganda or disinformation. So weve seen a slew of indian policy measures, not just the afghan that got a lot of attention and scrutinize chinese activity, economic, technology, telecom, Public Diplomacy, educational experiences and thats been kind of a big move. Second, i think, area where theres been a lot of focus on building resilience. Military resilience, economic resilience, either by bringing production home or diversifying suppliers. And finally, i would say, working and circle back to where we started, which is india has decided that it needs to work with likeminded partners far more than it has and ways that its reluctant to in the past. Thanks, so jonathan, im curious if you could talk about Southeast Asias relationship with china. Its a diverse collection of states in that direction so go through as many as youre able. In particular, what about the South China Sea sort of heating up the last year. Has that affected the way that Southeast Asia looks at china and then the fact that this was recent signed what does it tell us what the region is thinking about china as well . Now, again, youre right to point the diversity factor in Southeast Asia. You know, 10 states individually trying to hedge and balance as china rises and they keep with the u. S. China rivalry, depending on geography, threat perceptions, history, and other factors. And this includes our allies in thailand and in the philippines and importantly, just as importantly, emerging partners like vietnam and indonesia. The philippines over the last three, four years, has tried to, under president due arte. Theyve kept an eye on the partnership and relationship with the United States. Meanwhile, vietnam in some ways has been more assertive in pushing back against china on the South China Sea, but theyre also perhaps the most vulnerable so they know theres a line they cant cross, basically having a long border and being, you know, right on chinas doorstep and i think that this gets to a key point that we all need to remember, that broadly speaking, the region does remain distrustful of china. The same survey i mentioned earlier made that very clear, policy at least throughout Southeast Asia are distrustful of chinas longterm strategic intention. This provides, i should say, you know, a real opportunity for the u. S. , security concerns will continue to resonate. And theres an opening, as china continues to be more assertive or has been plenty assertive in the south china see as you mentioned. And china has also been occasionally hamhanded in way that maybe we saw a few years ago, not so much recently. There was this music video, for instance, in the philippines that the china released, the covid relief on one hand, but legitimized their claims to waters that manila sees as their own territory on the other. And there obviously was quite a social media reaction in the philippines. China is facing trip wires. I think it knows it has a trust deficit in the region. But whats interesting and in kind of getting to the pandemic is in Southeast Asia, leaders, i think, have been particularly hesitant to criticize china over the pandemic. We havent seen, you know, what inbound ma maybe what weve seen out of australia or europe, for instance, and i think thats because they see chinas economic recovery as the potential engine for their own way out economically from, you know, the real stressful situation theyre seeing economically in their own country. And here, i think, one thing im concerned about is how the sequencing of economic recovery could have some potentially long lasting effects. So as china comes out of the gate first. The region is looking obviously at this moment much more to them than to the United States. The vaccine diplomacy is going to be very interesting because theyve also been much more assertive on that front. And yet, at least the news ive been seeing about, you know, this test in china for their Vaccine Development at least so far, hasnt been quite as positive as what weve been seeing for pfizer or moderna here. And getting to our step that we mentioned, this is seen as a real triumph of the middle power diplomacy in the region, a lot of them see this as an agreement and it was pushed along, but china is a key signatory and is japan and i think well see interasia, Southeast Asia and more between china and Southeast Asian and the trends that im discussing. For Southeast Asia, trying to get back to your core question on perceptions, while they have a distrust of china longterm, theyre realists and look to the future and try to estimate chinas footprint 20, 30 years from now and what their opportunities are going to be and i think that even though they have concerns about the South China Sea which theyll continue to voice, somehow that sort of tempers things Going Forward and thats a dynamic that we are going to see for years to come. And something that i want to ask you about, mentioned within the diplomacy may have had less an effect in india and more effect in europe. And for the audience, referring to some of the more assertive and nationalistic Public Diplomacy engaged in by chinas diplomates, and have you seen that effect, of Public Opinion . Theres a pew poll that its changed, but does that shape european strategy at all or driving the readjustment you mentioned earlier, the european perspective is much deeper than this sort of public elements . Thank you for that excellent question and as you layout is a very complex one and theres Different Levels of this. I would say theres a distinct sense that the chinese warrior diplomacy has generated enormous blow back against chinese and european Public Opinion. Its amazing. I was sneaking a peek at twitter and theres a comment about one of the senior editors at the global times in response to remarks by senator marsha blackburn. Twitter is a vehicle for spreading that kind of stuff and i do think that it is quite central in shaping how Public Opinion changes. Certainly, one of the more notable developments in recent months was the what seemed to be like a goodwill tour for the chinese minister to european capitals where the German Foreign minister made a point of standing next to him and rebuking him for the mass incarceration of the uighurs, and hong kong, and that they share american concern about taiwan. There is none of this can make folks in beijing very happy. I dont think this is where they thought this was going to go. And frankly, they have only themselves to blame for it. This has been an astoundingly if this was supposed to put the fear of god into European Public and politicians, i would say it has the reverse effect. And then theres the business level, in some ways, there is what happened to europeanrussian trade relations a decade earlier, which is the recognition that the benefits come with high costs and there is a distinct lack of reciprocity and that the ultimate purpose of what thought to be a hugely profitable trade relationship in ways that that seemed to be directed at subordinating, and thats moved the needle in europe. Again, the europeans think mostly that interdependence is their destiny and that openness is their destiny, so after that exploit that and weaponize it against europe, as the russians have done, as the Trump Administration has done, but as the Chinese Government is also doing, create huge concerns and i think theyve all been drivers of this debate in europe about how we can about how to achieve some measure of autonomy without decoupling. Thanks. I want to turn to an audience question quickly, a question that weve surely addressed to some degree and thats on multilateralism. And from chatham house, the question is basically about what might a u. S. Strategy look like or what should it look like for multilateral engagement particular will particularly in key issues, how should we think about it. Would it be separate in asia and europe. Should it be combined. Should we look at different arrangements and constellations for different issues. We often talk about multilateralism. Can we help folks think more about what it would look like. Well start and work to you jonath jonathan. This is a great question and i think its something that well be talking about a lot because i think, you know, the biden team has made clear theyd like to get back to thinking about multilateralism without necessarily only doing that in multilateral organizations. And i think that is partly speaking from the experience of their own experience, a lot of them served in the Obama Administration, in some ways the ppp stemmed out of that with the wto not kind of moving forward. And i think we see our colleague don wright called it multiflexible lateralism. And you here commitment in some sense from the u. S. And international organizations. Better coordination in those organizations perhaps with likeminded partners to ensure that certain principles and standards are maintained and followed. Certain rules are enforced and that those institutions arent undermined for certain countrys interest. But i think youll also see on different issues, different groups of whether its coalitions of democratic countries, but i think, you know, on some issues youll see, yes,s it will make sense to have a Certain Group of democr democratic asians, european and u. S. Come in, but i suspect the u. S. Will also have to find ways to bring in countries that are likeminded, but not necessarily democracies. So, you know, how do you fit in a country like a vietnam, which on many things has kind of shared views with the u. S. , but doesnt quite fit that metric. And i think then youre going to have a set of thinking about multilateralism on issues where even if a Biden Administration says that, you know, were going to treat china like a strategic competitive there are some issues that cannot be solved without china on the table. How do you then cooperate and bring them in or work with them in those formats and i think the way to do it is to ensure that you dont link you dont let china link their cooperation and their interests on these global issues, public health, Climate Change to basically throwing your allies and partners under the bus. And so, you know, i think along with resilience, i think the other word we hopefully will hear a lot about is solidarity. Something, i think that lindsey brought up. Lindsey brought up with senator duckworth as well visavis australia. I think youll see different formats. I think it will be a lot more flexible and i think that we are really moving into that era of kind of coalition. Sometimes it will be in institutions and sometimes outside. Outside. Would you like me to chime in on this . Yes, sorry, i dont know if you heard that, may have cut or for a moment. Id love you to jump in and my question, what is the dawn of coalitional approaches maybe around democracy mean for Southeast Asia and some states might find themselves to be able to participate freely and others might be more concerned. Ill touch on that and if i could also respond to the audience question a little in a different way. But you know, i think its true, it will be interesting to see how the coalition of democracies approach or how perhaps a summit of democracies in the first year of the Biden Administration will be perceived in the region because there are some, you know, political challenges on that fro front. Already mentioned vietnam and here you have a country that has a lot of strategic overlap in some ways with the United States. It may be the Fastest Growing economy this year in the world. Not just the region. Because its been so successful in the way through governance and economic reform, it has managed to respond. But obviously, to covid. But obviously, its not a democracy. And other countries are challenged, whether its the philippines or thailand at the current time. So typically in the past, in the Clinton Administration or other times, when the u. S. Has had a strong democracy promotion approach, at least at the leadership level, it has not been wellreceived. So i think that that could be quite challenging. The perception could be quite different of course in a Civil Society level in the region. If i could just address the other sort of broader multilateral question as well, and also, kind of picking up on the point that senator duckworth mentioned, i was quite pleased to see her mention about Something Like a tpp. Some kind of multilateral reengagement with the region and i think thats so critical. The Trump Administration has talked for three or four years about reciprocal, free Bilateral Agreements, but really, there hasnt been a lot of interest as the region itself has gone forward with tpp or the cptpp and now, rcep. One thing interesting to see and what the region most wants is whether or not the u. S. Can somehow come back to a multilateral engaged trade agreement with the region and then how do we get there . Do there have to be congressional hearings, kind of National Discussion about how we can make Foreign Policy, would, you know, for the American Workers and the middle class, and reconnect both the domestic and the Foreign Policy approaches of this country . I think that will be a real challenge, but its really what the region is hoping to see. Thanks, jonathan, and if you could give us a perspective from europe . What is the perspective on a tech center, the sort of ad hoc coalition, multilateral approaches . So, obviously, the europeans think this is where theyre the world champions. And this is where they can rope in power larger than they are and make them behave. But i do think, and im charact caricaturing slightly here. I think there have been in recent years a somewhat sobering recognition that theres only so much here thats possible. So i think i want to pick up both what they said and say, look, the perception in europe is not just what if there is this all flips again in four years, but the perception is wait, what if the house flips in two years . And this administration will be even more constrained than it already looks now. So, i think the emphasis is very much on doing things on not, you know, taking the usual european decades long, you know, lets have a decade of dialog and then you start exchanging papers approach. But on quickly harvesting low hanging fruit and sort of i find this is a horribly mixed metaphor, but hammering the two by fours that will help make the whole that will salvage pragmatic flexible multilateralism for a future. And i think one of those focuses has to be the wto and its adjudicating mechanism. Thats crucial. I think that rather than have a jo he ever all comprehensive trade approach youre going to look at sectoral approaches or mini lateral or finetoothed whatever works. And on the class what lindsey asked senator duckworth about, and i had to write my exam thesis on, im uncomfortable how old that is now, and it codifies customary maritime law at the time, but in many areas things have really moved on, particularly in exploitation of scarce resources on the sea bed and also, frankly, in cables and listening devices on the sea bed. There is real work to be done here that is not covered at all by the clause, and where its worth having conversations the europeans with their new securityminded approach would be much more minded to engage than they were more than 30 years ago, when it was finally tabled at the u. N. Well, thanks to all of you, i think were approaching our 3 30 end point here so id like to take a moment to thank our audience and those who stuck with us to 3 30. Thanks for thosewell and the questions, thank you, i hope they found them interesting and worthwhile. Thanks for joining, and from our early panel and of course to senator duckworth for taking time out of her busy day and speaking about an important issue. With that i wish you all a good afternoon and good evening. Can i just say its 1 30 in the morning in delhi. Thank you, doubly thanks to you, thanks to all. Tonight, on the communicators, chief policy officer for parler. We believe that it is the best approach when youre talking about hate speech, socalled misinformation, anything else, to address those problems with more speech, not with any types offen could tent restrictions and we act accordingly. Watch the communicators, tonight at 8 00 eastern, tonight on cspan2. Joe biden as president elect, stay with cspan for live coverage. Election process and transition of power. Cspan your unfiltered view of politics. Politics. Next, political reporters talk about covering the 2020 president ial campaign during the coronavirus pandemic, hosted by rice universitys baker institute. Ins an hour, 0 10 minutes. Im john williams, codirector of the program. Today we have two panels, youll enjoy, i know i will. Frankly my first one is comes out with political reporter more than 25 years who i took a job with secretary baker more nan 16 years ago. The title of the first panel, adm admittedly ironic, a view if the campaign bus. It was ironic because there was no campaign bus and covid