Transcripts For CSPAN2 Ian Toll Twilight Of The Gods 20240711

For those watching on zoom some housekeeping remarks. You are an attendee of our zoom event tonight, that means you do not have video or audio privileges but you can interact with our moderator and guest by writing your question in the q and a box. The moderator will be reviewing those during the question and answer session which will conclude tonights program and to introduce the moderator it is my pleasure to pass the program over to doctor robert citino. Doctor robert citino, Senior Historian at the National World War Ii Museum in louisiana, we have a special guest with us tonight. A friend of the museum. My friend and a wonderful writer and author, ian toll, one of those people who doesnt need an introduction as we like to say. The introduction, he is extremely accomplished scholar and writer. He is the author of the epic story of the founding of the u. S. Navy as well as a trilogy called the pacic war, the third volume of which has just been released called twilight twilight of the gods war in the wester pacific, 19441945. He won the Elliott Morrison awarfrom the naval order of the United States, he won the William Colby military writers award. He won the other award given by the uss constitution museum. If there are any more awards out there i expect to see you winninone. Thanks so much for agreeing to spend time with us and talking about twilight of the gods war in the wester pacific, 19441945. My pleasure and honor. Im always struck, it is a big story, more on the western pacific 4445, with action, valor, heroism of have resource but in the realm of politics, nicely done. Especially fdr and douglas macarthur. Why wasnt the book that way . I will expand on the question. You have to know people opening up, why open with a survey of the us political scene . Military history, an expectation that there will be lead in the air in the Second Chapter and you have to wait until the third almost 100 pages into the book and it is an unconventional way to begin a military history. I thought i had a little bit of latitude in this case, the preferred volume of the trilogy, a lot of people reading it read the first two, committed to read it or not but basically my observation looking at the pacific war was that there was a lot of literature about fdr, a lot about macarthur. I like to say there was a pickup truck, i dont think that is an exaggeration. There is a large wheelbarrow of macarthur biographies and these are two of the most fascinating figures in 20thcentury American History. Love them for obvious reasons so the story of the Pacific Command conference which took place in oahu in hawaii through july of 1944 that story has been told over and over again because how frequently new biographies coming out of fdr and macarthur and that is a feature incidents in any biography of either of those two because of the dramatic meeting that took place, two of the most colorful figures of that period of American History. For that reason, the started during the war with the way the press covered this event we tended to look at the meeting through the prism of american politics before leaving on history that took him to hawaii, fdr announced to nobodys surprise that he was going to and unprecedented fourth term of office as president and the Democratic National convention on his way to the west coast so the way the press observed or the country saw this trip was it was a campaign stop. A publicity event and it was much more than that. It was a substantive command conference at fdr did something we would expect any commander in chief to do which is to visit the pacific theater, the only time he did it and millions of men and women fighting under a flag in the pacific that visit told them they had not been forgotten and that was important. Beginning with that long town, that visit, it was important to try to unite what had become these two separate strands of this biographical political view of this meeting between macarthur and fdr and what was a very substantive and historically important military planning conference that involved fdr, macarthur, nimitz and admiral leahy who is almost always forgotten but is chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, local figure who was immensely important in this period of American History. The greatest number of the pacific war and roosevelt memory. Get to the strategic talks. Before we move away from the politics, tell us about macarthur, there was a move to make them president. How badly did he wants to get to the oval office in 1944 . Macarthur flirted with the presidency many times beginning in 1920s, his name had been floated and as you say in 1944 he allowed supporters in the states, powerful members of congress in the republican party, media owners and various other figures on the american right who saw macarthur as their only chance to defeat fdr in a wartime election so they started this Dark Horse Campaign with macarthurs implicit the reason is essentially the governor of new york locked up the nomination early in the primary process but yes, the question has been asked and they have debated did macarthur want to run for president and would he have liked to become president or was this a way of exerting pressure on the president and joint chiefs to do what he wanted to do in the pacific which involved sending more military assets to macarthurs command, the pacific was divided, the northern half, with control of the navy, chester nimitz was the Theater Commander, and semiautonomous Theater Commands was very controversial, regarded as a way of settling this rivalry between the army and navy satisfying macarthur, leaving the navy in charge of the naval war and so the question of macarthur gaining supreme command of the pacific which was his goal and could he ensure our route back to tokyo went through the philippines and he would get the green right to liberate the northern ireland, these were his goals and this kind of Dark Horse Campaign forresident may have been a way of exerng pressure to fulfill those. You wrote that the war changed him. A happy warrior type. Early in his presidency he would be joshing with reporters, he knew his birthday was, children grabbing a birthday that day, by this point of the war fdr, this was the longest presidency in American History and i remember at the outset of the current president s administration, in the washington post, it was about fdrs relationship with the press, how clever he was at using the charm tactic he was famous for to get the press on his side. That is an accurate depiction of how fdr dealt with the press in his first term in office. By his third term, 1941, he had essentially had it with the press. He was deeply offended in general at the way the press was covering politics. A number of his bitterest enemies were major media owners, and his twiceweekly press conferences were pretty cantankerous and he was on the campaign trail, attacking the press constantly so i thought that was an important perspective and i wanted to get into the way Different Military services developed policies, how the army and navy and different approaches to this and i thought that was an important way to introduce a larger dimension of what was happening in the pacific and the kinds of environment in which military leaders had to make the decisions and do their jobs during this bloodied war. Host you mentioned the conference, big Strategic Decisions had to be made. The way you write, as i was reading your chapter on it, we came to a fork in the road. A big decision had to be made it you could break it down, luzon versus poor mose a. Break it down for our participants. To make a long story short by june of 1944, july 1944 we had taken the mariana islands, we were about to take one, islands that were within bombing distance of japanese industrial heartland in tokyo, the Japanese Striking arm of the japanese fleet had been annihilated, naval battle took place in that campaign so essentially the japanese were finished in terms of any hopes they had of winning this war. Those were gone. This last stage of the war, how do you force the japanese to capitulate . It was going to be Unconditional Surrender. It was the right policy to say we occupy and disarm japan, supervise the reconstruction of democratic japan and the japanese regime was very far away from that. How do you force them to surrender . Macarthur really had the philippines as the centerpiece of his conception. Many said he wanted to philip liberate the philippines, winning the war and the navy in many powerful internal planners for chief of Staff Organization in washington saw a major role for china at this last stage of the campaign and wanted a foothold on the coast of china, they also wanted potential to draw upon chinese infantry manpower, the invasion of japan if it were to take place, the district and japanese armies and so that pointed to formosa. By mid1944 it is fair to say we were going to take one of those two islands first either northern ireland, the philippines, the capital city or formosa or taiwan, one of these two islands and that was the immediate decision fdr and his military chiefs faced in mid1944. Beyond that was the question can we force the japanese to surrender without invading their homeland and that played very much into what they were confronting at this time as well. Let me pin you down to a what if. I think our listeners or our viewers know luzon was the choice. How might the pacific war and asiapacific war been different if we had landed a big titanic force, turned it into a major air base for b29s, maybe intervened in the fighting in the mainland, the civil war breaking out at the end of this war. I know it is a big. If we had landed at formosa we would still have troops there today. The nature of the conflict would be that much more intense, a major American Military presence there. It is somewhat speculative, really interesting, question for the world is had we taken formosa in 1944 with the then have led to a larger involvement of american troops on the asian mainland and might that have led to a different result in the chinese civil war . It is speculative, hard to make persuasive arguments but im not an expert of what happened in the chinese civil war but 1949 four years after the Second World War, taking control of china and the significance of that event for World History including today is incalculable. Ernest king, the chief of naval operations, in 1949 looking back he raised the question, if we had done what i wanted to do, this might have led to a different results. That would have divergent World History. A fascinating what if. It changes the course of our historical timeline, dramatic changes across the board. One reason the Second World War is so unique and important and fascinating it really has shaped in asia and europe, choices that were being made by generals and admirals in how to prosecute thear had major downstream implications we are still living with today. Let me shift years on you a little bit. I would describe your book as an expert, my bread and butter is to read Operational History and as good as it gets. You know what you are talking about, appreciate that. Much of what you deal with is something i think is necessary and the personalities of the us commander, there are unforgettable folks. Let me read you a quote from the book by feiss admiral, to our audience. There are so many japanese planes on any island, we will swap punches with them. I know about losses but i am stronger than they are. If they do spot me i can go anywhere and no one can stop me. If i destroy all your craft on their island they are no good to them anyhow. What does that stand up today in your analysis of the pacific war 19441945 . It was accurate statement of the capabilitof our Carrier Task Forces. The first year of the war i covered pacific crucible we see carrier duels where you had battles between small carrier sk forces involving 3 or 4 carriers at most, not merely a qution of hit and run is getting your planes over your enemies first, hide your ships anweather fronts if you can. If you are attackingn air base on an isld and a complete surprise, you recover your plane or your carriers and then g the hell out of there before the landbased air can counterattack. By 1944 the size of our Carrier Task Force in the pacic, task force 58 when hollhad it, you are talking about 1216 aircraft criers, later independence class carriers, these are fleet carriers operating in semi autonomous task groups operating in shoung distance of each other. They are launching 10001200 planes in a single integrated strike that is desnding on the japanese airbase in some islands in the pacific a they are just wiping us guys clean of the japanese fighte and bombing the living daylights out of their airbases deroying planes on the ground they are saying the carriers had gotten powerful ough at thistage that the hit and run approach was no long necessary, just bring your rrier task force in range of a major japanese airbase and just destroy it, overpower it with airpower and confidently fight off any counterstrike on the American Fleet and that is how carrier warfare changed in the late stages of the war. One of my favorite characters admiral spruill, he is not so colorful, wearable organization man. The commander must be a gamble, one of the professional varieties. He wanted his own i could get snapped in my favor. He was a black shoe in navy parlance meaning he was unable warfare officer, not an aviator, he had never skippered a carrier and had this phlegmatic style, very much an organization man, you could see a Major Company today, a cool character, cerebral, very smart by everybodys account but didnt believe in the blood and thunder style command so he is often contrasted with bill halsey for that reason and he had ascended to the top seagoing command in the navy by a series of accidents. He was accidentally thrust in the position of Commanding Task forces at the battle of midway and credited for winning that battle and shore duty to nimitzs chief of staff, they became very close professionally and personally and nimitz said i trust this guy to make the same decisions if i was commanding at sea and nimitz never commanded at sea during the civil war, just for bound headquarters for the entire war. So his guide to take the fleet to see. By 1944, we have overwhelmingly superiority, we are going to win this war. Lets not take unnecessary chances that may allow the japanese to score a Lucky Victory against us. Lets play by the numbers and that was the correct approach. That has generally been the judgment of historians, in the pacific. You reference to bill halsey, a lot of this is about bill hsey, all over the action in the period othe pacific war. First, his abilitiess operational commander, the question asked itself, not one but two, a black mark on the first. In the pacific war. The typhoons have often been mentioned. A number of influential bordinates, junior admirals served under them were harshly critical of major decisions was at the battle of lte gulf he made one of the most interesting miss infamous commander errors in naval history which could have led to disaster, e japanese commander retreated at a critical moment. The lists of indictments against bill halsey in terms of his magement of the fleet in the last year is pretty long and pretty damning. Looking at halsey he was the senior Carrier Task Force commander when the japanese hit pearl harb in 1941, the caiers at sea, that was fortunate ando halsey was the carrr admiral, the commander at sea who had what s left of the navy striking capability in the first month of thewar, a period in which our forces have not been ready r war, to get up to speed and learn to fight by fighting and halsey was the ader in critical early months of the war. He gets a lot of cdit for that. The style i mentioned earlier was halseys style, he had a foot forward approach to talking to the forces under his command through the media, because hes tking through the mea hes talking to the american people, becomesery famous in the face of the u. S. Navy during the war, often compared tgeneral patton in europe and it is an apt comparison. The middle years of the war, the South Pacific Theater Commander, surbound in headquarters in necaledonia, losing touch with the daytoday job of running the fleet and whenes brought back to take over the fleet in 44 it is a totally different animal. He hasnt kept up. He insists on bringing his loyal Staff Officers who we sure bound pacific headquarters for two years with him and they werent up to speed. You had a Large Organization coming in to take over the fiftfleet which became the third fleet when holly had it and they werent ready to do that, so it was a mistake you can attribute up thchain of command to admiral king and admiral limits and that was not a good choice to bring halsey back and put him into that role in 1944. You write about one of the most complex military actions in Human History and i read it all, the battle of leyte gulf, it requires a deaf dodge to make up an account the reader can follow, it is a naval bonsai charge among the japanese, what are the japanese chances of winning the battle of leyte gulf . By that time the japanese were desperate, they were losing the war on all fronts and realized their problem was if the americans took the philippines they would be cut off from their fuel supply so the japanese to back up launched the war in the first place, the most productive oilfields in asia, indonesia, east indies, they wanted those oilfields, took them in the first months of the war but then bring the oil back to japan in tankers which were vulnerable so they foresaw the critical order the japanese empire was about to be cut and once it was cut, they are not in position to get battle, might be immobilized so their decision to throw the entire remaining fleet against us sprung from this awareness that they had that this might be their only chance to fight a naval battle at all let alone winning. And the driving motive was to be sure the fleet did put up a fight, that it didnt end the war swinging at anchor or to be destroyed by carrier planes. It had to go out with a bang rather than a whimper and the japanese given the significant disadvantages they had came up with a good plan, to bring the main Striking Force of the American Carrier a way to allow two japanese fleets to get at this vulnerable amphibious fleet and they very nearly succeeded in doing so and it was an extraordinary series of deceptions that put them in position and the significant commander we talked about earlier by admiral halsey. Im struck by a fleet in military establishment that is so outclassed in terms of number and power by 1945 and yet still manages to come close to landing out of an Amphibious Landing by that point of the war. There was a military philosopher who says war is the domain of chance. You are never sure what is going to happen and leyte gulf, a classic example. Thank you. Lets talk if you dont mind, lets go to the japanese home islands. By now and bnow im in late 1944 it must have been clear to every Clear Thinking japanese that the war had been lost, there was no real position japan could defend or that the United States could not take if it was willing to accept the losses. You write for example of the japanese economy in which there were six principal concrete factories in the entire country. Any time the air force wished they could destroy the japanese concrete industry and they did this repeatedly in the course of the war, almost no redundancy. What kept japan and japanese people going through this level of devastation . An interesting book to be written, maybe you could write it yourself, to take nazi germanys propaganda techniques in terms of controlling information to their own public, contrast, compare and contrast to what the japanese it. In each case youll find the axis nations like totalitarian countries throughout history have attempted to have total control over what their own public actually knows outside the world and beyond so probably in no country has that ever been done as early as it was done in japan during the Second World War. The regime had total control over japanese media, told the newspapers what to tell the japanese people about what was happening so the average japanese person had very limited understanding of what was happening and as you say by the late stage of the war, the japanese people more or less commiserating, starvation, in the last year of the war, would have hit japan, Major Regions of japan in a big way but the japanese people, the ordinary japanese people did not know just how dire things were until the emperor came on the radio and said this is it. I tried to weave into these books and appreciation of what life was like for the japanese man or woman on the street and to try to present through their eyes what they saw with the limited information that was available to them and how thoroughly deceived they were by the malevolent regime. You write about the fighting in the philippines in great detail and i came away, fighting in the philippines was horrible. But a climax in a particularly horrific way, the worst path apology of military culture. Inculcated this idea that you can Never Surrender any or any circumstances. You have to fight to the death or if necessary take your own life rather than be captured. This is a new and radical idea in Japanese Military culture, the succumb through the samurai tradition, the samurai era of warfare in japan the japanese warrior had only fought his fellow japanese and if he had done his duty and the battle turned against him he could surrender and so surrender was not an act of traditional japanese culture, this was something the Japanese Army in the period after the russell japanese war decided this will make us invincible if we order our soldiers never to surrender it will make us a formidable army. Again and again in the pacific, the single best example of it, when you tell an army of 18, 19, 20yearold farm boys that they are going to die no matter what, they have to fight to the death, take their own lives if necessary, that puts pressure on them and the results can be pretty severe. The sack of manila, is in part, an outbreak of this kind of distortion of Japanese Military tradition and cultures and it was one of the darkest chapters of the pacific war which was one of the darkest warplanes in our history. It ever claimed the things he told germans to do were historic german traditions dating back 600 years and it strikes me, a new radicalization of warfare touted with dating back to the 1300s. I found those portions of the book and lightning. There is another issue that had to be dealt with in any book on this period, you certainly write about it in twilight of the gods war in the wester pacific, 19441945. Is it possible to fathom the phenomenon of the, khasi . By the, khasi. Can we hope to understand what was going through the minds of young janese pilots more or le strapped into an airplane and told to hurdle themselves into the us Aircraft Carrier . Wcan certainly try. It helps that so many of the, khasis kamikaze theres a whole literary genre in japan, for someeason these books are like crazy and keep cong out so they actually have quite a bit even in english translaon telling us about the psychology of these pilots were dedicated to give their lives in battle and we have the more recent resonance of suicide tacks across much of the islamic world and the psychology i think is fascinating. Many of the kamikaze pots particularly in later stages of the war, the Okinawa Campaign was the largest kamikaze campaign, you had young men recruited into flight traini being told they asked to give their lives and were pressured to, quote, volunteer and many of them were deeply reluctant and made that clear in their writgs and indeed often they would take off from their bases and turn back saying they had engi problems and were not able to find the fleet from the amerins point of view seeing hundreds, literally hundreds and hundreds of enemy planes come in behaving like man guided missiles was unique sort of horror, somethg many of our forces never thought they would see, hard to understand and it contributed to the sense that many people on our side, the japane were fundamentally different. They we fanatics in a way that made it difficult to understand. That probably contributed to the context of the Strategic Bombing and the atomic bombs as well. Host from twilight of the gods war in the wester pacific, 19441945, the kamikaze hit bunker hill and moved to t enterprise guided by a kamike and then the flagship, new mexico, all in the same guest about three days. Host astonishing story. You write about the wartime conferences where the japanese were warned of prompt and utter destruction if they did not agree to Unconditional Surrender. I was haunted by this passage of the japanese Prime Ministers response. He used a japanese word that can mean a lot of things. Im no expert at japanese but it can mean a lot of things and we interpret it one day, may have meant something different. Is that possible . What was happening there was the japanese tiny circle of military leaders around here, deeply divided at this point and part of the japanese regime was essentially ready to recognize the necessity of surrender. The germans had been defeated, they were on the verge of their homeland being totally destroyed and yet you had the hardliner faction in the Japanese Army in particular that was determined to fight to the end or at least to fight off invasion of the japanese homeland for any discussion of the truth so the Prime Minister in that case they received a decoration demanding Unconditional Surrender and the Prime Minister is trying to essentially sort of articulate a vague enough policy to satisfy both of these deadlocked elements within the regime. So what do you do . We see with politicians today if you cant articulate a clear policy you use vague language that might satisfy both sides. Really what he is doing is talking to the hardliners of his own regime saying essentially using the idiomatic term we are going to ignore this, no comment, we will not respond to the declaration, we will not reject it, not accept it, simply not we are going to pretend it doesnt exist. When our translators get a hold of that, trying to understand what it means, the conclusion that our government makes is the japanese have rejected the declaration and it was a case in which perhaps the language barrier may have contributed not necessarily to a misunderstanding but to the confusion crowded into the last weeks of the pacific war. Host the need for precision in diplomatic interplay, diplomatic communication one has to be very careful what one says. You Say Something interesting at the end. Let me say to folks out there, when you get to the question. You have an interesting analysis at the end of the book. If the pacific war had been a game of chess there would have been no end game, when playing chess it is pretty clear when one side gets the upper hand, no reason to play you have taken my queen. Lets just try again. If it is a chess game, and and how many died in the last day of the year. Any thought on that . Guest the best estimates, there were 1. 5 million Japanese Service men and civilians who died in the last year of the war which represents close to one half of all japanese who died in the wars invasion of the pacific beginning with china in 1937. This is a ruinous year for the japanese in terms of their forces with the Strategic Bombing of japanese cities, firebombing, Something Like 800,000 japanese civilians giving their lives in the last year of the war as well so it was so clear that looking at the situation from the top levels of the japanese government beginning in mid1944 they saw this, the way this was going, they realized they lost this war and they were going to lose control of overseas resources, they were going to run out of oil, have no source of oil and be cut off from their armies overseas, be completely blockaded, nothing coming into japan, nothing going out, their economy was going to seize up, their cities were going to be burned to the ground, they foresaw all of that and yet the conditions in japan, political conditions in japan simply did not allow for any sort of concerted peace and it is a great tragedy because there were elements in the japanese leadership that foresaw that this was going to happen. They were unable to establish a baseline consensus that they needed to say weve got to acknowledge we lost this war and try to cut the best deal that we can. And so we had this horror story which was the last year of the civil war. Highly informed audience, so lets see what we can take from our friends out there. Trent asks a good question. A newly released diary from general richardson, the highestranking army officer in some specific. How did this affect the story that you told in your book . I would ask let me expand them what other interesting sources perhaps that is not been touched before . Im sure you read across a a bh of them. But if you could address the diary. General richardson was the commanding general of army forces in nimitzs theater, the north half of the pacific, Theater Command by nimitz. Richardson was a armies top general in the theater. He left a detailed and very insightful diary which was absolutely essential source really to understanding particularly Understanding Service rivalries in the pacific, the struggle between the army and the navy from someone who is in direct contact with nimitz virtue on a daytoday basis and knew what was happening. General richardson left his diary to his descendents who said keep it private until the year 2015, when im sure everybody i know will be gone. I was fortunate enough to be contacted by the family and 2015 and said would you like the diary . I said, would i like this diary . Thank you so much. Its really an important new source, and it provided a of insight in many different aspects of this but most importantly returning to the first chapter, the conference when fdr visited oahu and macarthur flew from australia. Macarthur stayed with richardson in his house on oahu. They were old friends. He debriefs general richardson after each of the strategy conferences. He told them exactly what he had told fdr. This was a vital, new source because those conferences, four guys in the room, there were no minutes cap, no official minutes, no staff were permitted to remain in the room. Historians have been forced to rely essential on the first and second hand accounts of those four participants. Macarthur left a vivid account in his memoir published in the mid1960s but many of the particulars, he quotes himself at length, many of the particulars i think evan called into question. And so richardsons diaries something that gives us the essentially a new anchor to understand exactly what was said. Nothing quite like having someone contact you in six would you like to see some source that no one has ever looked at before. Makes it all worthwhile, doesnt . It helps come once you publish a couple books and people rea them, some of tt stuff starts coming in over t transom, to use old naval term. Didnt happen in my early career. There were aumber of other, i could go through, a long list but a nberf these case where ople would reach out to me and say m father left the diary, my grandfather left a series of letters and he was servingith the third fleet in this and that, thi campaign, which you look to loo at them . Absolutely. I would le to look at them. Asou know there is no shortage of these kinds of sources available. They are in our guy the National Archive has any more than anyone ofs could read and a lifetime. And yet when you get contacted by the family that says would you like t look at this thing at no one else has seen, you have that extra sort of special experience of looking at an important histical source tt you know has a been used by someone else. Fascinating. There is a question about before i ask, a good question about leadership. Let me as you directly. Was it a mistake . I believe hallelujah to say was a mistake i think is a bit bold because at first the decision to go in was made without the hindsight we have today. I would say looking back from the perspective we have now, we should have bypassed peleliu. We should a bypassed it. Peleliu is it i havent in, remote even by pacific standard. It laying your the scene between macarthur and nimitzs respective two command areas and itd been ordered initially as a way to essentially so to protect macarthur senator thune flight as he returned to the philippines. As events developed it became clear we essentially could neutralize the airfield on tragic and on other island all up and down the chain. It wouldnt be necessary to take the islands, just make sure the airfield were essentially visited routinely by our bombers, air force bombers and carrier bombers. And then they wouldnt be a thorn in the side of macarthur is and so yes, the could of canceled that operation. It a bloody battle, terrible ballot, about many marines gave their life fighting. Looking back its clear we could a bypassed peleliu without any loss of momentum in the campaign. As a result, a a bloodbath f epic proportion for both the americans and the japanese here could you comment on their leadership on peleliu what he received criticism causing excessive casualties. I think it was both of those. He didnt have to be one or the other. Was he too aggressive . Perhaps. Words order to aggressive . Yes. Essentially what had happened on peleliu, for those who are not as familiar is, the japanese had very cleverly decided they would essentially develop a a subterranean network of bunkers and tunnels in the high ground on peleliu and essentially a sort of network of hills north of the airfield. Rather than fouling out in these banzai charges which have been very common in the earlier island battles of the South Pacific, they were built using subterranean fortifications to neutralize americas advantages and airpower, artillery, naval power, firepower offshore. The marine tradition and doctrine had been rapid attack, take territory quickly, take losses if necessary to try to force your opponent back quickly. Against those kinds of fortifications, those with the wrong tactics. Eventually both the marines and the army which was brought in as well lost half the division, understood what was needed was more of a sort of siege tactic approach, a gradual development of sandbag embankments. It essentially had to be more akin to trench warfare. Chesty was a great marine and that was a vicious battle in which he was asked to do something that any commander would have failed to do. I dont think it reflects poorly on him at all. I think it was just one of those things, it was a terrible towel, terrible challenge she was up against and he did what he coul could. Mary has a good qstion. Speed is i lost the for months. Sorry. Mary has a good question for you. You. Would you agree or disagree that he was more of a figurehead . I think thats accurate, hirohito was much more involved as the command of military forces. He was against the war. He certainly resisted the war, and the constitutional arrangements were somewhat ambiguous exactly how much authority did hirohito have is a disputed point even today. And yet he certainly a tremendous and tangible authority over his military leaders. When his military leaders were unanimous in recommending the course of action he always accepted it. It really wasnt until the end of the war when they were hopelessly deadlocked. This was after the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki. His inner circle of leaders, army, navy, civilian leaders said we need you to decide because we cant form a consensus. It was then he intervened to save this work is over, we are surrendering. William would like to know, i have your book in hand and say dedicated to admiral [inaudible] both of whom has used the word dealt a losing hand [inaudible] please expandpon his choice. Admiral campbell, joel shorts the coursef the all know with a commanding offers in hawaii on december 7, 1941, wn the japanese attack. Both were relieved of command and essentially spent the rest of the war answering to a series investitions. The question of to wt degree are they culpable forhe lack, clear lack of readiness which are military fces showed in being blindsided by t japanese drink that attack, to what extent with a culpable . To what exten was our unreadiness essentiallyust a feature of a peacetime nation that did not recognize that japan even had the capability to atck across the distance come such distances, o to what extent were leaders in washingtonulpable . There was a lot of culpability to go around excus me. In my view are you all right . I have to ask. [laughing] i had a lamp fall over. Got it. In my view, whatever you have to say about kimball and schwartz and their command record, it wasnt ranked to essentially make them bear on the blame for something when playing really shouldve been more fairly distributed. And so i thought this was essentially this last year of the war, it was when we settled the score with the japanese and that this was a book that shouldve been dedicated to them in recognition of the fact that i think our country did them wrong. That dan is on facebook and would like to know about this what do i that you actually think of the failure, the soviet invasion of manchuria had a great impact on the japanese decision to surrender on condition rather than the two atom bombs. Some historians argue the japanese surrender than the common soviet union. Any thoughts on that . Well, i would agree with the last part of that. Just a timeline, we had hiroshima on august 6, 1945. We hit nagasaki in august 9. The soviet union suddenly declared war on japan come surprising japan also on august 9. Essentially you had the red army charge incommensurate, one of the largest grand text and history of war. This was a tremendous blow to the japanese not only because of the immediate military emergency it created, but also because really their sole remaining diplomatic exit to the war was to bring stalin, ask stalin to act as the mediator in arranging truce talks between the americans and the japanese. The declaration of war essentially extinguished that last hope of a diplomatic exit to the war. The question is what the relative importance of the atomic bombs and the sudden russian attack in prompting the japanese surrender . Historians have debated this. Its difficult to say precisely what the relative importance of these things were because the timetable was so compressed. It was clear they were both really important, but shocks committee get in a short period of time were important. My view is its impossible to say which was more important. They both were very important together in combination they were important. But, of course, as americans we have tended to receive in other pacific war as two mushroom clouds where the atomic bombs loomed so large and our understanding of how the war ended with often forgotten this i think probably equally important factor that the russians suddenly declared war on the japanese and extinguished that last hope of sort of a diplomatic exit to the war. I think unfortunately we have come to the end of our our right now together, and as always with the conversation is a brilliant it flew by. The author is ian toll, and the book is twilight of the gods. Probably dont have to tell this audience, its the third book in the trilogy so if you have come this far you must read the final and third volume. I want to thank you for spinning this hour with us. We have to get you back down to new orleans when conditions, normal conditions reassert themselves. Also normal conditions is a relative concept in new orleans. I look forward to it. Thanks so much for having me. Thank you. Good night to anyone from the National World War Ii Museum in new orleans