The Senior Historian at the National World War Ii Museum in beautiful new orleans, louisiana. We have a really superb guest with us tonight, a friend of the museum, my friend and a wonderful writer and ahor, ian toll. Ian, welcome. Thank you, rob. Ian probably is one of those people who with, you know, doesnt really need an introduction, as we like to say. You all know what that means, the introduction should be really long. Ians an extremely accomplished scholar and writer. Hes the author of six [inaudible] the founding of the u. S. Navy as well as a trilogy called the pacific war, the third volume of which has just been released called twilight of the gods. Hes won the Samuel Elliot morrisonward from the naval orr of the United States, hes won the william e. Colby militaryriters award, hes won the other morrison award given by the uss constitutio museum. If theres any more morrison awards out there, i fully expect to see you winning one in the not too distant future. But thanks so much for spending some time talking with us about twilight of the gods. Its my pleasure and honor. Im always struck by how an author chooses the story. This is a big story, in the pacific 44, 45, the biggest naval battle of all time. Jam packed with action of every sort. But you begin this bk in an interesting way, in the realm of politics. I thought it was really nice lu done you nicely. You look especially at fdr and Douglas Macthur . Ill even expand on my question, a lot of people a opening up ians old book because they want to get [inaudible] so [inaudible] military history, theres an expectation that theres going to be lead in the air at least by the Second Chapter and, you know, in this case you really have to wait until the third, almost 100 pages into the book. You know, it is an unconventional way to begin a work of military history. My thought was id had a little bit of latitude in this case because its the third volume of the trilogy, and and a lot of people who are reading it have already read the first two, to theyre either committed to read it or not. But, you know, basically my observation was looking at the pacific war was that there was a lot of literature about fdr, a lot about macarthur. I like to say theres a pickup truck full of fdr biographies, you know, and i dont think thats an exaggeration. Theres a large wheel wheelbarrow full of macarthur biographies. These are two of the most fascinating figures of 20th century history. And biographers love them for obvious reasons. So the story of the Pacific Command conference which took place in oahu, the island of oahu in july of 1944, that story has just been told over and over and over again because of how frequently new biographies are coming out of both fdr and mcarthur and, of course, thats a featured incident, either of those two, because it was a dramatic meeting that took place. First time they had met in seven years. And two of, as i said, two of the most colorful figures of that period of American History. For that reason, and i think this actually started during the war in the way that the press covered this event, we have tended to look at that meeting through the prism of more than politics. Of american politics. Immediately before leaving on his trip that took him to hawaii, fdr had announced to nobodys surprise that he was going to run for an unprecedented fourth term of office for president and had been to the Democratic National convention on his way out to the west coast. So the way the press observed essentially, the way the country saw this trupp to hawaii was that it was a campaign stop, it was a publicity event. In fact, it was much more than that. It was a very substantive command conference, and fdr or was doing something which, i think, we would have expected any commander in chief to do, which is to visit the pacific theater. Its the only time he dud it. And for the he did it. And for the millions of men and women who were fighting under our flag in the pacific, that visit told them that they had not been forgotten, and i think that was important. So, you know, why begin it with a long account of press and that visit, i think that it was important to try to unite what had become these two, you know, very separate kind of strands in literature of this biographical and political kind of view of this meeting between macarthur and fdr and what was a very substantive and historically important military planning conference that involved fdr, macarthur, nimitz and also admiral leahy whos almost always forgotten, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, a very low profile figure who was immensely important in this part of history. [inaudible] indeed. So well get to the [inaudible] before we sort of move away from the politics, tell us about macarthur in 1944. There was a move to make him president , wasnt there . How badly did he want to get to the al office in 1944 . Well, you know, mac arthur flirted with the presidency many times throughout his career beginning in the 1920s. His name had been sort of float in replican circles. And as you say in 1944, he alwed his supporters in the states these were powerful members of congress in th republican par, certainly conservative media owners and various other figures on the american right who saw macarthur as pentially their only chae do do feet fdr in a to defeat fdr in a wartime election. They essentially started this Dark Horse Campaign with macarthurs implicit connivance. The governor of new york, tom dewey, locked up the nomination early in the primary process. But, yes, the question has been asked can, and historians did marthur actually want to run for predent and would he have liked thave become president , was this just a withdraw of exerting pressure on the president and the joint chiefs to do what he wanted to do in the pacific which essentially involveed sending more assets. The pacific was divided, as you know, the northern half was essentially under the control of the navy, and then in the southwest pacific you had mcarthur whose divion of the macarthur, awe than mouse theater commanding was very controversial and was regarded as, essentially, a way of settling this rivalry between the army and the navy, satisfying macarthur i but leaving the navy in charge of [inaudible] and so this question of, you know, would macarthur entually gain supreme command of the pacific which was his goal, and secondly are, could he insure that our route back to tokyo e went tough the philippis and that he would get the green light to liberate the philippines including, critically, the northn island. So these were his goals. And this kind of Dark Horse Campaign for predent may simply have been a way of exerting pressure in order to fulfill those goals. How about fdr . You write marvelously early on in the book that the war has changed him. The happy warrior tube, his press conferences used to be one for the ages, earlier in his presidency, hed be joshing with the reporters, he knew whose birthday it was, whose children were having a birthday that day, making jokes back and forth. Its not really fdr by this point of the war,s it . No. Fdr of course, this was the longest esidency in American History andften i remember at the outset it of our current presidts administration there was a story, i believe it was in the washiton post, but it was about fdrs relationship with the press. And it was aut how clever he was at, essentially, using the sort of crm tactics that he was famous for to get the press on his side. And, you know, thats an accurate depicon of how fdr dealt with the press in his first term in office. By his third term, 1941 is, he had essentially had it with the press. He really was deeply offended, i think, in general at the way the press was covering politics. A number of husband bitterest his bitterest enemies were major media owners. And his, his twiceweekly press conferences were pretty cantankerous. He really had actually out on the campaign trail attacking the press constantly. And so i thought that was an important part of the perspective, and i wanted to get into the way the Different Military Services Also developed publicity policies, how the army, the navy and mc macarthur and nimitz had their ways of dealing with and a larger dimension of what was happening in the pacific and the kinds of the environment in which militar leaders had to make their decisions and do their jobs during this bloody war. So you mentioned, again, at the oahu conference the b strategic decions have to be ma. Yes. I guess the way you writ, as i was reading you chapter on it, wed come to a fork in thed road, hadnt we . There was a big decision that had to be made, and i guess you could break it down and say lausanne versus formow e saw. Could you break it down . Yeah. To make a long story short, by june 1944, certainly july 1944 we had taken the mariana islands, we had taken sigh e pan, we were about to take guam. We were within bombing distance of the japanese industrl heartland of tokyo we the new b29 bomber, the Japanese Striking arm of the japanese fleehad been annihilated and the accompanying navalattle that took place during that campaign. So essentially, the japanese were finished. In terms of any hopes they might havead of winning this war, those wereone. And so this last stage of the war was, you know, how do you force the japanese to capitulate . And, you know, itas going to be unconditional surrender. Thatas our policy. I believe it was the right policyhat we were going to occupy and disarm japan, supervise the reconstruction of a democtic japan. An obvious, the japanese regime was very far away from that. So the question became in the last year how do you force them to surrender. Macarthur really had the philpines as the centerpiece of his conception. Of many said he wants to liberate the philippines more even than winning the war, and the navy in many of the powerful internal plaers of the chiefs of staff organation in washington saw a major role for china in thisast stage of the campaign. They wanted a foothold close the china. They wanted that for bases for the b29s, they also wanted the potential to draw upon chinese infantry manpower in the invasion of japan if that were to take place and the destruction of japanese armies on the mainland. So that pointed to formosa. So by mid 1944, i think its fair to say that we were going to takene of those two islands first. Even lausanne, Northern Island of the philippines where t capital cityas or formota, today we call formow e saw, today we call it taiwan, one of these two islands. And it was that and that was the immediate decision they faced in 1944. Beyond that, there was t question of can weorce the japanese to surrender without actually invading their homeland. And that played very much into the thinking that they were confroing at this time as well. Let me,et me try to pin you down for a what if. We le what ifs, dont we . I think our listeners know, our viewers know that, of crse, lausanne was the choice. How might it have been difrent if wed landed on formo e saw, turned it into a major formosa, turned itnto a major base, an air be, a base for b29s, maybe intervened in the fighting in the mainland . Of course, theres a civ war thats about to break out at the end of this war. I just wonder, any thoughts on that . I knowst its big. Well, i think if wead landed on formosa, it would be a good bet that we wouldtill have troops there today. And so the natur of the conflict between today the independent natn of taiwan and china would be that much more intense with a major American Military presence there. Of course, that is somewhat speculative. Its a what if, as you say. Theeally interesting and enormous question f the world is had we taken formosa in 1944, would that have led to a large or involvent of american troopsn the asian mainland, and might that have led to differt result in the chinese civiwar. Agn, its so speculati, its really har to make really persuasive arguments, and im noan accident on what happened in the chinese civil war. But 1949, y know, four years after the end of the secon world war mo had taken mao had taken control of i chew at, and the significance of that event for World History including day is just incalculable. So it is, you know, earst king who washe of chief of naval operations, the senior officer in theandahal during the Second World War, in 1949 looking back he raised this question. If we had done wt i wanted to do, he said, take formosa and bypass lieu san, this might have led to a different result. Perhaps mao wouldnt have gotten the upper hand in china and, of coursethat would have diverted the course of asian andorld history. Thas one of the fascinating what ifs. The pacific is was so large that almost any change you make it, changes theourse of our timeline, dramatically changes the course of war. It true. Its true in europe as well. Its one of the reasons the Second World War is so unique, so fascinating. It really has shaped the postworld really in asia and europe. And choices that were being made by the gerals and admirals in how to prosecute the war, those had major downstream for the postwar world, implications were still living with today. Definitely so. Leapt me so much of your book, and i would describe your book as an expertly written operation. Its my bread and butter to read operational history, and this is as good as it gets. You know what youre talking about when you say that, so i appreciate that. Well, thank you but, you know, much of what you de with here is somethinglse i think necessary, and its the personalities of the u. S. Commanders. Eyre unforgettable. Let me read you, ifou dont mind, a quote by viced miller mark mitcher in talking about admiral by mark mitcher. Theres just so many japanese planes on any island, well take it on the chin, well swap punchewith them. I know il have losses, but im stronger than they are. I dont give a damn if theyo spot me. If i desoy all their aircraft, their damn island is no better than any island. How does that stand up today in your analysis of a pacific war of 1944, 1945 . Well, it was certainly an accurate statement of the capabilities of our Carrier Task Forces by 1944. In the first year of the war, which i covered in pacific crucible, you had these carrier duels where you had battles between, you know, small Carrier Task Forces involving maybe three or four carriers at most in which really it was a question of hit and run, you know, try to attack, get your planes over your enemys fleet first, hide your ships in weather fronts if you can. If youre attacking an air base on an island, you know, you did it with complete surprise. You attack, you recover your planes aboard your carriers, and then you get the hell out of it before the landbased air can counterattack. By 1944 the size of our Carrier Task Force in the pacific, to this was task force 58, task force 38 when halsey had it, you know, youre talking about 1216 aircraft carriers, essex class and later independent class carriers, operating in semiautonomous task groups which are operating kind of within shouting distance of each other. And i i mean, theyre launching 1,000,1,2300 planes in a strike that is descending on the japanese air base on some island in the pacific marianas, for example and theyre just, theyre just wiping the skies clean of the japanese defending fighters and then going in there and bombing the living daylights out of their air bases, destroying their planes on the ground. Finish so what michener is saying there is that the carriers had gotten powerful enough by this stage of the war that the hit and run approach was no longer necessary. You could simply bring your Carrier Task Force into range of a major japanese air base and essential i essentially just destroy it, overpower it with their power and confidently fought off any counterstrike on the american fleet. So thats how carrier warfare changed in the late stages of the wa lets move over to admiral [inaudible] whos for some reason one of my favorite characters precisely because hes not so colorful, hesore the organization man. Every commander, he said, must be a exam brother. But he gambler. But he wanted to be the professional varian few. Right. So he wanted all the odds, i could get stacked in my favor. A little bit different than michener. Yeah. He was a black shoe in navy parlance which meant that he was a circus Naval Warfare officer. Ooh not an aviator, he had never skippered a carrier. And he wants this very pragmatic style, very much, as you say, organization man. Just the kind of guy you could see being the ceo of a Major Company today. A cool character. Cerebral, very, very smart by everyones account. But really didnt believe in the kind of blood and thunder sort of style of command. So hes often contrasted to halsey for that reason. And sperling had sort of ascended to the top seagoing command of the u. S. Navy by really a series of accidents. He had accidentally been thrust into the position of commanding one of the task forces at the battle of mud and was credited mid and was credited for winning midway. And then he had been recalled to shore duty, mihms chief of staff nimitzs chief of staff. And he said i trust this guy to take the fleet out and make the same decisions i would do if i was commanding at sea. Of course, nimitz never commanded at sea during the Second World War. He was shorebound at headquarters for the entire world. By 1944, i think what hes getting at in the quote is we have overwhelming naval superiority, we are going to win this war. Lets not take any unnecessary if chances that may allow the enterprising japanese to get in and kind of score a lucky evictly against us Lucky Victory against us. Lets play by the numbers. And i think that was the correct by correct approach by that late stage of the war, and that has certainly been the judgment of historians w have rated him as the best of the wartime commanders in the pacific. You reference hall su, and theres a lot halsey, and and theres a lot of [inaudible] following the action, of course, in this period of the pacific war. How would you rate him . And let me ask you that in two ways. First, his abilities as an operational commander and then to Say Something about his seamanship because the question is asked itself, this is a man who led his fleet into not one, but two horrible typhoons, definitely a kind of black mark. So, first of all, as an operational commander. And then if you could say a word about some of the problems he ran into as well. Well, halsey made a series of significant errors in the last year of the pacific war. The two typhoons have often been mentioned. A number of influential subordinates, the Task Group Commanders these were the junior admirals who served under him were harshly critical of his major decisions. And the battle of [inaudible] he made perhaps one of the most infamous command errors in naval history which could have led to disaster but didnt because the japanese commander retreated at kind of the critical moment. So, you know, the list of do you wants against bull halsey simply in terms of his management of the fleet in the last year pretty long and pretty damning. More broadly looking at halsey, he was the senior task Carrier Task Force commander in the pacific who ran the japanese to pearl harbor in 1941. He had the carriers at sea, that was fortunate, because they werent in port. So halsey was not carrier admiral, he was the commander at sea who had what was left of the navys striking capability in the first months of the war. And that was a period in which, essentially, our forces had not been ready for war and had to very quickly kind of get up to speed and learn to fight by fighting, essentially. Halsey was the leader in those critical early months of the war. And i think he gets a lot of credit for that. He had a colorful style, you know, thed blood and thunder style which i mentioned earlier, that was hallty e halseys style. He had a very footforward approach to talking to his command through the media. And, of course, because hes talking through the media, he also ends up talking to the American People and becomes very famous. In some ways, the face of the u. S. Navy during the war. Hes often compared to general patton in europe, and i think its an apt comparison on many accounts. But in the muddle years of the war, hes shorebound at a headquarters in new caledonia. So he really loses touch with the day to day kind of job of running the fleet. And when hes brought back to take over the fleet in 1944, its a totally different animal that hes commanding. He hasnt really kept up. He insists on bringing his longserving, loyal Staff Officers who had all been in that shorebound South Pacific headquarters for two years with him. You know, and they werent up to speed. And so you had, essentially, a Large Organization coming in to take over the fifth fleet which became the third fleet when halsey had it, and they werent really ready to do that. And so they were, it was, i think, a mistake that you can attribute, you know, up the chain of command to admiral king and admiral nimitz. Maybe that was not a good choice, to bring halsey back and put him into that role in 1944. You wte beautifully about one of the most complex mility actions in human hisry, and ive prey much read them all, and its the battle of leyte gulf. There is so much going on, it really required [inaudible] an account that the reader can follow. You do tha marveloly. You refer to battle as basically a naval bonn say charge on the part of the japanese. What are the japanese chances of winning in any realense the battle ofeyte gulf . Welsh you know, b that time well, you know, by that time the japanese were dperate really. They were l losing the war on ol fronts and, essentially, they realized that their problem was that if th americans took the philippis, they would be cut off from their fuel supply which was inhe dutch east indie so the japanese, to back up, had launched the war in the first placerimarily because they wanted their on source of oil. And the most productive oil fields in asia at that point were i indonesia, bn ya, sumatra born ya. D so they wanted those owl fields. Oil field they went and took them in the first months of the war. But then the had to, you know, bring that oil back to japan in tankers which were vulnerable. So,ssentially, they foresaw that critical artery of the japanese empire was about to be cut, and once it was cut, their fleet, you know, might not even be automobile to get into position able to get into position, might be immobiliz for lack of fuel. So their decision to throw, essentially, tir entire remaining fleet against us in th battle of leyte gulf sprung from this awareness they had that this mit be their only chance the fig a battle at all, let alone win it. And in the driving motive there was just to be sure that the fleet d put up a fight, that it didnt end the war kind of swinging at anchor or to be destroyed but carrierlanes in rt. It had to go outith a bang rather tn a whimper. And the japanese, given the significant sadvantages they had, they actuall came up with a very good plan. Their plan waso lure the mn Striking Force of the american carriers, t third fleet, away from the beachhead at leyte to allow two japanese surface fleets to get at this result potential amphibious fleet that lay off the beachhead. And they very nearly e suceded in doing that. And it was really an extraordinary sor of series of deceptions that put them in position and the significant commander, which we talked about earlie by admirable halsey admiral halsey. Im struck by a fleet and a litary establishment that was so outclassed in terms of numbers and power by october 1945, and yet still manages to come close to landing a major hurt on a u. S. Amphibious land arg by that point in the war landing by that point in the r. There was a great german prusan, actually said war is the doe remain of chance. Your never quite youre never quite sure whats going to happen, and ihink leyte gulf is a classic example. Well, thanks. Thank you. Lets talk, if you dont min for a moment, ian, lets get out of hay today and go to the japs own island. By now, and i mean up to 1944, it must have been clear to every clearthinking japanese that the war had been lost, that the war was over, that there was no real position that japan would defend, there was no real position that the United States could not take if it was willing to accept the losses. You write, for example, of a japanese economy which there were six principle, concrete factories in the entire country. There are people going through incredibl level of devastation. Annteresting book yet to be written would be to take the nazi germany technique. And they compare and contrast to what t janese did. I think the access nations like to have total control over what their own public tually knows. In no country has there ever been done as thoroughlys it was in japan in the Second World War. The regime had total control over the japanese media. The average person have very limited understanding of what was happening. You start to see b29s coming in. They are more or less verging on starvation andamine. If it have gone on for a few nths longer i think famine would have hit the Major Regions of japan and a big way. But the japanese peoe did not know just how dire things workntil the emperor came on the radio and said this is it. Are throwing in the towel. I tried to weave intohese three books and appreciion of what life was like for the japanese man or woman on the street. What they saw with the limited information that wasvailable to them. And how thoroughly deceived they we. You are right about fighting in the philippines. I a very glad that i wasnt there the fighting in the philippines was bad. The worst military culture and ideology. What you mean by that. The Japanese Army in particular has infiltrated this idea that you can Never Surrender under any circumstances. You have to fight to the deh. Or take your own le rather than be captured. I dont think it has generally been wil understood. It is a new and radical idea. This have not been something that have come down through the same rightradition. In thisra of warfare in japan. They have fought only his fellow japanese and if h have done his duty in the battle clearly turned against him. He could lay down hisrms with a surrender in tack. This is something that the japane army. In the 1905. Had decided this will make us invincle if we order our soldiers never to surrender. Agn and again in the pacific they are gonna die no matter what. They were good have to fight to the death andake their own lives if necessary. That puts pressure on them and the results can be pretty severe. In part it is an outgrowth of is distortion of what the Japanese Military trations and cultures were. It was one of the darkest chapters. The horrible things they wer telling them. They were dating back four or 500 years. Somehow i was dating all the way back to the 13 hundreds. Found that portion to the book extremely enligening. There is another issue. That has to be dealtith. You certainly write about it in twilight of the gods. If possible to fathom the phenomenon by which i mean, if they ever hope to understd what is going throu the mind into the first u. S. Aircraft carrier. We can certainly try. It helps that some of the kamikazes left diaries and other writings and many of them had been published in japan. They sell like crazy. You can tell them about the psychology of patients. And of course we have a more recent residence of a Suicide Attack for us with much of the islamic world. I think the psychology is fascinating. Many of the pilots particularly in the later stages of the war it was the largest Kamikaze Campaign of the war you have young men who have been recruited into flight training. But they might be asked to give their lives. And then they are pressured to volunteer and many of them were deeply reluctant. And they made that clear in the writings. They would take off in their bases. They werent able to find the fleet. From the americans point of view of course they are seen hundreds it was a unique sort of horror very hard to understand. I think it contributed to the sense that many of our people on our side they were just fundamentally different. They were fanatics in a way that made it very difficult for us to understand. They probably contributed to the context. Did it have the bunker hill. That will happen in the space of about three days. You wri about the wartime conferences of course. When they were warned of a promptnd utter destruction. I was haunted by this passage of the response. Used the japanese word that can mean a lot of things i am no expert a japanese. What was happening there. The rolling circle. Of military leaders aroun her. Th hold the fate in their hands were deeply divided at this point. And part of the japanese regime was ready to recognize this. They were on the vergef the homeland. You have the hard liner fraction. They were determined to fight to the end or at least to t fight it off. The Prime Minister in the case uncoitional surrender. And the Prime Minister is trying a policy that would satisfy both of these elements in the regime. With politicians tod. You try to use vague language tests satisfy both sides. Hes talking to the hardliners in their own regime. Using this term that say morgan is simply ignore this. We are not going to respond at all. We are neck and rejected or accepted. Are to pretend it does not exist. Andhen our translators get a hold of that we are trying to understand what it means and essentiallyhe conclusion th our government makes is that the government has rejected them. It was a case in which the lauage barrier may have contributed not necessarily to a misunderstanding but t the confusion that was crowded into tse last weeks of the pacific war. Itshocking to me the need for precision. One has to be very careful of what oneays. You Say Something very interesting at the end. Then we will get to the questions. Youve a very interesting alysis at the end of the book. If itad been a game of chess you write. The wouldve been no endgame you mean when youre playing chess its pretty clear one side and gothe upper hand. You have taken my queen lets just try again. Ill play again tomorrow of course. Because of the decision to fight beyond the other end. How many personnel would you head at the end of the war i think the best estimates are there were 1. 5 million japanese servicemen close to one half of all japanese that died in the war. Beginning with the chi incident in 1937. It was a ruinous yea for the japanese in the fighting rces and wh the strategic bombing. You have Something Like 800,000 panese civilians given their lives in the last year as well. It was so clear from theop levels of the japanese governme they saw this they realized theyave lost this war. Ey were going to lose control of all of their overseas resources. They were to have no source of oil. They were gonna sit cut off from the armys overseas. There would be nothing coming into japan nothing going out. The economy was can seize up. They foresaw all of at. Th simply did not allow for any sort of peace i is a great tragedy they fesaw that this is can happen and yet they were unable to essentiay have the beline consensus that was needed to y we he to acknowledge that we lost this war. And quite possibly cut t best deal that we can. I would simply add to what was going on in europe. They came in to aoaring climax. They just had burnt themselves out in a flare. On that note. I have some good questns here. They are a highly iormed audience. Lets see what we can take on our friends out there. The highest ranking army officer in the central pacific. Howid this affect the story. I would also ask. What other interesting sources have not been toued before. If you can just get general richardson. The commanding general ofhe army forces. This is the north half of the pafic. The armyop general. A very deep detailed and insightf diary. It is an essential srce to understand the Service Rivalries in the pacific. From somne who was in a direct contact there. And really kw what was happening. General richardson left his diary to his desceents and said keep it private until the year 2015 and im sure that everybody i know will be gone. I was fortunate enough to be contacted by the familyn 2015 and said would you like the diary. It is a really important new source. A lot of insight in many different aspects of this narrative. Most importantly in returning to the first chapter. They stayed with richardson in his house. And he debriefed general richardson after each of the strategy conferences. This was a vital new source because those conferences have four guys in the room. There was no official minutes kept. The historians had been forced to rely on a first and second hand it was a vivid account. They point themselves at length. I think they had been called into question and so richardsons diaries is something that gives us a new anchor to understand exactly what we said. It makes it all worthwhile. When she published a couple of books. And people read them. Some of that stuff comes over there. There are a number of other in the long list. People would reach out to me and say my grandfather left a series of leers. Would you like to look at it. As you know. There is no shortage of these kind of sources available. They are in the national archives. More than anyone of any one of us could read in a lifetime. And yet when you get contacted by the family to say would you like to look at this thing that no one else has seen. You have the extra special experience of looking at an important historical source. It is a good question there. I believe to say it was a mistake it was a bit bold. The decision to go into their with was made without the hindsight that we have today. Looking back from the perspective that we have now. We should have bypassed that. It was a palau island group. It is remote by pacific standards. With the two respective command areas. And it had been ordered initially to protect macarthurs as the event developed it became clear that we could neutralize the airfield it would not be necessary to take those items. Just make sure that those airfields were visited routinely. And then they would not be a thorn in the side. Yes they couldve canceled that operation. And looking back it is clear that we could have bypassed that without any loss of momentum. The results of course was a bloodbath. With the americans in the japanese. Could you comment on his leadership where he received some leadership. Was he pushing too hard. Did they want to finish that quickly . I think it was both of those it did not had to be one or the other. Was he to aggressive perhaps were his orders to aggressive . Yes. What have happened as the japanese had very cleverly decided that they would develop the sub to subterranean of networks. In the high ground and network of choral hills. Rather than selling out in these charges. With the early and earlier idle. They were using those to neutralize american manages of airpower. And the firepower offshore. The marine tradition and doctrine had been rapid attack. Take losses if necessary. To try to force your opponent back quickly. And against those kind of things. They were the wrong tactics. And the marines and the army. It was brought in as well. They understood that what was needed there was more siege tactic approach. The development sandbag embankments. He was a great marine. That was a vicious battle in which he was asked to do something that any commander would have failed to do. I dont think it reflects poorly on him at all. I think it was just one of those things that it was a terrible battle and terrible challenge that he was up against. That it was a terrible battle and terrible challenge that he was up against. Mary darren has a good question. Ry has a good question for you. He was more of a figurehead. I think thats accurate. As the commander of military forces he certainly resisted the drip towards war. In the constitutional arrangements were somewhat ambiguous exactly how much authority do they have is a disputed point even today. They have tremendous intangible authority. Over his military leaders. It was unanimous. He always excepted their advice. It wasnt until the end of the war when they were hopelessly deadlocked and this is at after the bombing of hiroshima. The inner circle of leaders in the army and navy said we saw we could cannot form a consensus. We are surrendering. William shepard would like to know. I have your book in hand. They were both dealt a losing hand. Please expand upon this choice. Of course general short was the Commanding Officer in hawaii on december 7, 1941. There were both release of the commands and they spent the rest of the war answering to a series of investigations. The question of when there was a clear lack of readiness. They were blindsided by the japanese during the attack. On readiness feature of a peacetime nation that did not recognize that they have the ability to do that. It was a lot of culpability to go around. In my view. In my vie whatever you have to say about kenda and shor and there command record. It wasnt writes to to make them bear a large share of that. When it shouldve been more fairly distributed. I thought, ts was essentially the last year o the war. They settle the score with the japanese. This was a book that shouldve been dedicat to them and the recognition and the fact that our country did them wrong. Tt cannon. He would like to know about this. What do you think of the theory. They argue. Some histoans argue. What the communist soviet union. Any thoughts on that. Thtimeline. We have hiroshima there. The soviet union suddenly declared war on japan surprisingapan on august 9. We have the red army charged there. And this was a tremendous blow to the janese. The immediate military that it created. But also because their sole remaining hope. Of the diplomatic exit to the war. To attack him as a mediator. In arranging peace talks. The declaration of war extinguished that last hope with it diplomatic exi to the war. What was the relative importance. They had debatedhis and i think it is difficult to say precisely whathe relative importance of this things were. The timetable was so compressed. They wer both really important. Those coming together and they were important. Its really impossible to say whats more important. Together in combination they were important. We had tended to really see the end of theacific war as to mushroom clouds. The atomic bombs loom so large. Have often forgotten the equally important ftor that they suddenly declared war on the japanese. And distinguished that last hope of a diplomatic exit to the war. I think unfortunately we have come to the end of our our right now. And always when they are so brilliant. It just flew by. The author is ian whole twilight of the gods. If you have come this far. You must read the finer part. We have to get you back down there to new orleans. Than you so much for having me. Good night to everyone. Have a great night. And now on cspan two book tv. More television for serious readers. I want to welcome everybody this afternoon or this evening. I am with Garden District bookshop. It is our pleasure to welcome our two gas here
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