In a moment, the rules and regulations, the house will other than the chairman. [inaudible]. All participantshe are asked to give the funds muted and not actively engaging in the discussion which should help eliminate distractions. Numbers, yelled back or otherwise are speaking but do not remember to unmute themselves. This will h do so to have background audio. And responsible for meeting themselves in a time. It may take a few seconds to unmute brightest of please keep that in mind. [inaudible]. Rated time keeper will monitor the times for this hearing. You can view the timer by switching to the first of you in the upper righthand corner of your screen to active speaker with a thumbnail. You can rightclick are having your cursor of the timer and press the thumbtack icon. With that, youre ready too begin. Chairman. [inaudible]. Then please pause for five additional secondsfo went the tn start the proceedings. Five four three two one. This joint subcommittee hearing without sworn Affairs Subcommittee on asia, pacific and on corporations in the house on Armed Services committee on intelligence and urging threats and capabilities will come to order. Erthout objection from the chair is authorized recess of the tcommittee any point in all members will have five days to submit statements, extremes materials and questions for the record. Subject to the length of limitations in the rules. To his or something into the record, please have your staff email other subcommittee. As a reminder to members, please keep your video function on at all times even when youre not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for music then meeting themselves and please remember to mute yourselves after you finish speaking. Consistent with 965 in the regulations. The sample only unmute members and witnesses but appropriate when theyre recognition to eliminate background noise. It we have a quorum and will not recognize myself for opening remarks. It will then beor followed by te acting Ranking Member mr. Perry. Chairman and then breaking members. And i will then recognize members in the order of sonority. En between vets republicans in Foreign Affairs and Armed Services. Members. Get started before i do my opening statement. I think it would be remiss for us not to mention the president and the first lady and no there are in our thoughts and prayers and hope for a speedy recovery oread and also the tens of thousands of americans the test positive every day for this virus. They are in our thoughts read and underscore, that this is a virus. Its a mile threat. He know if we are democrat or republican. And does not know what god we worship are, it is a virus. It underscores the importance of this topic that were talking about today. That does underscore this is naturally occurring. These events, and with the bad actors macy as they see a threat like this. Its really brought the entire world to its knees and certainly as we have seen economic havoc parted and i want to thank the witnesses for being here today. And those having the department of defense in the state department again. Underscores the importance of this. My focus and subcommittee chairman, under thee guidance of non for inflation. We spent a lot of time talking about nuclear threats. But what we are seeing right now, the real vulnerability to biologic threats. And just to put that into context, we have not had an Aircraft Carrier process by kinetic force missile. Missile. With that, we just saw an Aircraft Carrier brought to port because of the virus. It really does underscore what i worry about. When i think about this, think about it in a couple of different ways hundred is very difficult to change Nuclear Capabilities andnd technologies. We dedicate hundreds of personnel and International Organizations like the iea. And others to reduce the nuclear threats. That is totally appropriate. We want to make sure the Nuclear Technology and what bernie does not end up in the hands of bad actors. And if it went dahlgren scientists have found, the availability of technology to alter the viruses into genetic editing. They are rapidly increasing and that is something that keeps me awake at night. We know thereap are bad actors t there. And certainly post 911 and any of us prepared we saw anthrax and we saw other threats. We worry about smallpox and so forth. That is something that iat i thk in a bipartisan way Congress Working with the administration should really think about. What are the things that we have to do to move ahead. I look forward to the witness testimony. There are several areas that i think about and i will be curious about some of the witnesses. As we defeat covid19 and spend billions of dollars and build an infrastructure to the defeat this virus i also think we should be strategically be thinking about how we use those resources to also prepare for bio surveillance to be ready for the next one is naturally occurring virus or biological threat. But also think about how we have those capabilities to rebuild that infrastructure. And to do bio surveys for manmade threats. I also as we move forward, we do not, we have the biological, the beat wc but i think that we need stronger multilateral organizations with likeminded allies that we can work with. I would be curious how they are thinking about creating this multilateral institutions. And then lastly, when you think about the ethics of gene editi editing. And also storing of the technology. We really not created the standards and norms and say, this is appropriate for downplaying science. But thisng is really a little bt dangerous not not to be playing around with jeans in this particular way in creating the standards and norms. I think that is an appropriate place for it. In the Scientific Community in Congress Working the administration. It not just for the United States but the international communities. So again, our thoughts and prayers are with the president and the first lady in those thousands of americans. Id be remiss if i didnt put my doctor had on for a second as we enter the fall in the winter. As to what we can to keep everyone safe. Lets wear face coverings and continue to practice physical distancing and continue to wash her hands and practice good hygiene. Lets avoid large indoor gatherings that we have seen that these super sporting events. The most important thing we can do right now is as we enter into the balls everyone got their faith get your flu shot. These get your flu shot. Withoutet limiting recognize the Ranking Member mr. Perry for five minutes. Thank you chairman. Thank you chairman. Thank you to the distinguished panel for offering your information today. The coronavirus pandemic is highlighted the potential for increased bio security threats and what can happen when irresponsible actors disregard International Agreements for the sake of self prevention part of the Strong International bio security regime only works when its constituent members agree to make it work. We need to assess the shortcomings of the u. S. Multilateral engagement to determine where improvements need to be made. The 2005 International Health regulations went into force in 2007. And all nations to ben compliant by 2012. However by 2012, only about 20 percent of both countries were compliant. O o anyone today most countries have still not complied with the 2005 regulations. This administration has taken a significant amount of criticism for questioning engagement with institution like the World Health Organization parted them to be clear about this bring the World Health Organizations complicity in spreading the virus should not be rewarded with a United States indifference to its failures. The who strong affiliation the Global Health security agenda also raises significant questions about ghth as a longterm efficacy. There is no obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the International Community. Different levels of investments bio security lends itself to a permanent condition of moral hazard. Select communities like the United States are compensating for the lack of investment from other states. Despite her best efforts to stymie the spread of bio threats, theres only so much we can do alone. Key programs like the state department of bio security Engagement Program cannotur use funds in countries like china, cuba, iran, north korea, sudan or syria. Despite the fact that several of these countries have experimented with biological weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses. Countries like north korea have been clearly offensive biological weapons and programs with no end in sight. How do we confront the fact that we have an unreliable International Bio logical weapons control t regime. Most importantly, a measuring success against the spread about bio threats, what exactly does success look like when china dominates several key institutions. At the stands, china has provided nonstate actors that which is formed. They have shown us and the world impact the potential bio weapon can have on the American Economy as well as our society. Let your way of life because multiplied exponentially as a result of the coronavirus and this timeed the hearing will be confronting that uncomfortable truth. Im also grateful to have her witnesses before us today as they speak more about Synthetic Biology and gene manipulation. Made to find out more of the National Security applications that Synthetic Biology can post to the United States. Especially in light of the fact that several countries are working with extremely hazardous pathogens and corrections, subpar laboratory settings. With all that being said, i do also offer my prayers and best wishes to the first family, and to anybody thats been affected by the virus whether they have contracted it or whether it is according and their family members loved ones are community. We are all dealing with in one way orit another. I certainly think the chairman for the time and i yelled balance. Thank you mr. Perry. Let me know recognize the chairman of the intelligence emergent threats and subcommittee of the Armed Services committee. Thank you. And i want to begin by also acknowledging and saying that the president and the first lady and the first family are in my thoughts and prayers. And the administration as well. We pray they all have a quick and full recovery. I want to thank my colleagues on the house and Foreign Affairs committee on asia pacific and particularly the Ranking Members and others. In another mr. Perry is getting into the Ranking Members right now thank you for all for hosting the timely joint hearing on the bio security. A recognize Ranking Members as well as my colleagues. This is a topic which as we have seen, duration security. Im very pleased thater were holding this very important joint hearing. Biological techniques such as gene sequencing and editing and Synthetic Biology. Weet changing in the scope and scale of the biological threat parted and it could lead to an increased and biological weapons. Adding to the challenge, biological threats are easy to create an ultimately with mass destruction and used in concert with biological weapons. Enabling a bad actor to create major damage on a military power. In the republic of georges Health Ministry suffered a cyber attack from abroad on the database the stars medical documents and national covid19 pandemic. We know that Russian Hackers are targeted organizations and it involved in covid19s research and Vaccine Development including those in the u. S. , the uk, and in canada. Ith our allies. In the national and Economic Security when the time that the United States is struggling. With a highly effective pathogen. We must ensure that its working its working together to respond to the current pandemic and advance the collective effort. To the Threat Reduction agency. Through the execution. The defense Threat Reduction agency through its execution through the reduction biological Threat Reduction program, and its technical reach back has been receiving by popular request for preparedness and detection including providing bio safety, bio security equipment to aid in detection, diagnosis reporting and modeling related to the covenant teen outbreak. There are many good examples of the ptr fee trained local professionals like in countries like liberia, jordan, and tylan they can diagnose and confirm the existence of covid19 in theirir country. Yet, in the face of known and emergence risks. The impact it could havet in our National Security and could arguably present the single biggest threat to the country was starting to spread across the globe. For the Reduction Program funded the last years active level. At time of the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a highly infectious environment. We are loved by the department significant reduction in budget request and confronting biological threats in fiscal year 2021 added back 135 million to the ctr program. 89million of that was additional funding with the Engagement Program. Additionally the department of defense in chemical and biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in the fight against covid19. Its medical Program Funds and manages common measures, vaccines, therapeutics and pretreatments. The physical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop surveillance and detection technologies, diagnostic, personal protective equipment and decontamination systems like bout potential unknown threats. Theres expertise capabilities to address pathogens making it ideal program to deal with the emergence were interested to see if the program was efficiently directed to participate in the National Response to the covenant teen pandemic. These are challenging times we need to make sure we are in fact prepared for the next biological or chemical event that could affect the country and make sure we have all of the resources in place to respond for the key country and perhaps the world. Well be hearing more about the many efforts of the problems today, we can do to help ensure your organizations have the authorities and resources needed the demurrage while divergent threats of today and how we can ensure the department is ready to act quickly and decide decisively. I think all of you, especially our witnesses for joining us today. And i yield back. Thank you chairman, let me know recognize Ranking Member of the intelligence and emerging threats and intelligence subcommittee Ranking Member stuff on it. Thank you chairman. I also want to echo my colleagues and on behalf of norths 21st Congressional District our thoughts andlsy prayers, the first family, the white house staff, and all the American People have been infected by the covid virus. I like to express my appreciation to you, chairman and rankings member, and for hosting this hearing. And thank you for membersrs of the two subcommittees. Thanks to the witnesses of the department of defense and state for being here today. The issue of bio security is one of national importance. As i have stated previously, or the department of defense faces urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose sight of the critically Important Mission of countering weapons of mass destruction and inly particular biological threat sprayed the unpredictable nature of these threats requires that we continue to adapt approach and iterate our response. We must learn from the Current Crisis and adjust our strategy to more effectively and proactively detect and respond to the next event. Thisl will surely not be the last biological crisis this nation and this world faces. And am particular interested in how your organization and the federal government at large can more effectively use new data sets and Artificial Intelligence to truly modernize our bio surveillance. We must anticipate and monitor when and where a biological events may occur. And model how a pathogen either naturally occurring or manmade is likely to spread. This obviously must be a global effort. And the partnership with defense has developed to be critical Early Warning beacons to inform a domestic response. Programs like the cooperative Threat Reduction ms specifically biological Threat Reduction are essential to maintaining a global footprint in the building of the Forward DeployedService Efforts in national interest. Its anve affirmation that biological threats require a whole of government response but not just the two departments represented here today but inclusive of health and Human ServicesHomeland Security and our state and local officials. The strength of the partnership between your organization and the quality of these relationshipse you develop with our foreign partners and domestic agencies will underpin the effectiveness of future bio security efforts for thank you can tour witnesses and yield back to the chair. Thank you Ranking Member stephani. And before i introduce the witnesses, i ask unanimous consent for non Committee Members if any be allowed to participate in todays hearing after all Committee Members have had an opportunity to ask questions is their objection . Without a check should not Committee Members will be recognized at the appropriate time. Let me now go ahead and introduce our witnesses. Versus Deputy Assistant of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, mr. Laughter oversees all cw md policy issues at the department. That prevents mg related materials the Defense Department cooperative Threat Reduction program in Chemical Biological radiologic and nuclear defense. Next build the of the director of defense mr. Dale oxford rate mr. Oxford leaves that dtr as mission to safeguard the u. S. And its allies from weapons of mass destruction. It spearheads that defense biological Threat Reduction program. From the state department we will first hear from acting assistant secretary and the bureau of oceans at International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, mr. Jonathan moore. And finally we will hear from the Deputy Assistant secretary at the non corporation at the bureau of interNational Security, mr. Philip dallas brady oversees a range of state departments including cooperative Threat Reduction, export control programs, which work to reduce corporations that are worldwide what i will know recognize eat witness for five minutes without checking to prepared written statements were made part of the written statement. I will first call mr. Lasser for his testimony. Good morning chairman and Ranking Members and all Committee Members. I too enjoy extend my thoughts and prayers to the president , first lady. Snack could your microphone on . Two yes, sir. It is on. You hear me better now . I first want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the president and first lady and all those impacted by covid19. Thank you for the opportunity to present on behalf of the department of defense and highlights of the critical work were doing to to counter biological threats. I also went to acknowledge the sincere appreciation for the continued support that Congress Lends our Threat Reduction mission. As a Deputy Assistant and countering weapons of mass destruction i have the privilege to work alongside my colleagues here today. Our Strong Partnership enables the broad u. S. Government effort to reduce threats including biological threats worldwide. Dods bio Threat Mission aligns with the objections of the National Security and Defense Strategies as well as secretary espers priorities, namely to increase the legalityty of the u. S. Military, build alliances and improve dods efficiency. We also draw guidance from strategies such as the National Bio Defense strategy and the Global Health security strategy. Dods focus on protecting the health and readiness of u. S. Forces, countering the destabilizing effects of outbreaks on u. S. Interests and ensuring the dod remain focused on priority defense objectives to meet Emergency Needs during an outbreak makes us a complementary tool in the u. S. Threat reduction arsenal we work daily for the dod position to address the full range of threats to include the constantly changing biological Threat Landscape. This shifting dynamic includes naturally occurring outbreaks and accidental or deliberate release of biological agents. Threats posed by state and nonstate actors, international and domestic incidents and concerns with existing and emerging technologies. Covid19s global reach and destabilizing influence has further alter the Threat Landscape, potentially inspiring nefarious actors to replicate coverts impacts through a deliberate use of a biological agent. My team develop strategic guidance for cw md activities, spanning the prevent, detect, respond continuum to mitigate the impacts of such threats regardless of origin. We were closely with other dod stakeholders and coordinate through groups such as our effort count in the covid19 task force. Dod also works with key interagency and International Partners as we develop priorities for encountering biological threats. These partnerships allow us to leverage each others capabilities and lessen the security burden onn dod. Pooling resources and working towards common objectives is vital to ensuring the greatest Threat Reduction impacts are achieved. Since 2004, ctrs biological Threat Reduction program has provided equipment and training for over 30 countries to improve their ability to t detect, diagnose biological d incidents. The current environment, we know that partner nations have leverage previously provided ctr capabilities to detect and diagnose covid19. To close i want to thank the subcommittees again and look forward to your questions. Thank you mr. Lasser. Oui will know recognize mr. Oxford for his opening statement. Chairman, Ranking Member, and mr. Perry sent again in the distinguished members of the subcommittees thank you for your continued to sport to dtr a. Im proud to be appear today with my colleagues about dod as well as a state of orbitz update you on the collective efforts to protect the u. S. National interest in a rapidly evolving globalized threat environment. His commitment and strong relationships for partners today makes our organization successful. Today we find ourselves in unprecedented times as we respond to the global pandemic. Assp a reflect over two and a thousand of our fellow citizens, we must think about the future Threat Landscape or gene editing, dna w sequencing and Synthetic Biology offer our adversaries the opportunity to capitalize on observed Lessons Learned from our response. And they potentially could launch future tax with little retribution. We have to accept the fact that others will beth learning and the very nature of the biological Threat Landscape has changed forever. One of the lessons partner nations have benefited greatly by the training and equipping theyed received through the dod ctr program and specifically btr b. Facilitates the detection and reporting of diseases caused by dangerous pathogens whether deliberately released or naturally occurring. Including diseases such as covid19. Btr p works with over 34 partners to reducel biological threats by managing a bio security, biosafety and mobile surveillance capabilities. Now going pandemic with Health Security is a critical part of National Security. They need to detect, diagnose report outbreaks of dangerous pathogens by the u. S. Relies on a bio Surveillance Systems of other nations to provide Early Warning of outbreak before it reaches the homeland. Recenten examples of the success and responding to w the pandemic, in partnership with the u. S. , usaid, efforts enabled local officials in thailand to detect the first case of a Novel Coronavirus outside of china on 13, january 2020 only days after its initial discovery in china. Within a month of a request in the u. S. Ambassador in morocco, transferred a supply of ppe to the National Institute of health and hygiene in morocco. The equipment went directly to protect moroccos frontline healthcare workers in the fight against covid. Bassett or fisher say the equipment transfers part of over seven years of close cooperation between dtr a and the governor of morocco the partnerships focuses on saving lives, and mitigating threat steven sure the National Security both countries bird report to date has reported 126,000 cases of 2200 deaths. In georgia, btr scientists in the btr p develop the diagnostic testing capability for covid bread this enabled georgia to an implement testing for outbreak control paid the center was lauded by the georgia government is being interval in controlling the covid outbreak. Within georgia they reported 7100 cases with only 46 deaths. Btr p c continues to receive partner request for support with covid. As of september 18, fulfilled 40 requests from 18 countries plus the African UnionDisease Control part in summary by building a partner nations capacity and capabilities builds her sense of national pride. And increases their willingness to work with the u. S. And other ways. By providing partners with better self sustaining solutions, the u. S. Demonstrates that we are the partner of choice rather than our strategic competitors for these Partnerships Act as force multipliers in the competition for influence and reinforced the strategic messaging that the u. S. And their nations interest in mind. Thank you for your time, i look for it your questions respect thank you mr. Oxford. Good morning chairman barrett to be here with distinguished colleagues in the department of defense, i look forward to discussingur our normal portfolio with the vastness of states, we also host the state departments office. Mr. Market i have you have the microphone a little closer . Cement thank you. We also host the state departments of International Health and bio defense. And that is the capacity which i am here today. I will focus o my remarks on our efforts to prevent, detect even on the president and the first lady and millions of americans the importance of u. S. Leadership this is crucialir to stop outbreaks at their source in protecting u. S. Health and safety, permitting prosperity and defending National Security interest. Our team and oes is working through and o on covid19. Together with interagency partners, advancing u. S. Government priorities through public diplomacy. Beyond covid19, oes combats other Public Health threats including a bullet, and loose ends, dengue and other micro resistance. Its a Global Challenge of the department of state remains committed to working closely with our partners as part of the collective global response. We are using all of our means to slow and stop the pandemic. U. S. Health diplomacy has two primary areas of effort. Promoting Transparency Information sharing and disease surveillance. And a multi sexual content including other nations, nongovernmental organizations International Organizations of the private sector. We deeply appreciate congresses appropriation over 1. 6 billion u. S. Dollars in covid19 supplemental funding for the state department into the u. S. Agency for national development. We have used these funds for adbroad range of assistance helping governments, International Organizations and nongovernmental organizations fight the pandemic. The assistance of saving lives by strengthening Public Health information improving the quality and cleanliness of facilities and increasing more than 120 countries as well as providing humanitarian economic support to mitigate impacts of the pandemic. Additionally the United States is invested more than 10 million to bring safe and effective vaccines to the Global Market faster. We has hopes to develop messaging is the first to know about the coronavirus the Chinese Communist party having special responsibility to inform the rest of the world about their withheld information and censored medical information scientists and journalists. The ccpnd has since he is the pandemic to further its geopolitical agenda by highlighting its donations of masks and other supplies to reshape the narrative and distraction its role in the crisis. Both russia and the ccp make grandiose and irresponsible claims about the creation of vaccines, raising serious questions about quality and efficacy that we are addressing to act in public diplomacy. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is a cproverb that is familiar as it is true if we prioritize Health Security investments we can contain outbreaks before they become pandemics. An mitigate and prevent second and third impacts but oes plays a key role in endemic reprevention including through support for the Global Health agenda. Ghs a which is still a work in progress is a partnership of nearly 70 organizations nongovernmental stakeholders and multisector approach to provide carefully targeted programming and priority countries his approach to combating outbreaks in 2018 National Bio Defense strategy and the 2019 Global Health strategy. Oes leadership is been fully engaged in coordinated enter agency investments helping 19 countriess prevent detect and respond to range of Infectious Disease threats at their source. These are few examples of oes wideranging engagement to counter them biological threats from a greatly appreciate your interest and look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Will recognize doctor dollars for his opening statement. The morning chairman, Ranking Members and honorable represent us we appreciate the leadership you have shown on these important issues, thank you for inviting me here today to share how the department of state, bureau of interNational Security incorporation, works to address some of the most urgent to u. S. National security. I am honored to appear before you alongside my colleagues forer the oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs bureau and by my colleagues from the department of defense. Through diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, the interNational Security and noncooperation bro works to prevent rogue states, tariffs and other malign actors from obtaining and using weapons of mass distraction. The interNational Security and noncooperation bureau has been working hard for nearly 20 years to addressm challenges posed by the full spectrum of these threats. Whether they are deliberately spread, accidentally released or naturally occurring. The covid19 pandemic is a grim reminder of how much damage a single pathogen can cause the u. S. National and interNational Security. Through diplomacy our interNational Security and bureau strengthens multilateral frameworks including the biological Weapons Convention and the australia group. And i notes the chairman made remarks on this very issue. This year is the president of the g7, we are leading the International Community and making significant progress on biologicalal issues, including issuing g7 statements on the international covid19 pandemic. And response. Similarly, in the Global Partnership we have let efforts to launch a dedicated bio security Capacity Building initiative. For decades, isn has invested significant resources in the combating of the full range of wmd and related delivery systemg threats. Including over 450 million over the past 15 years toward negating biological threats. We have Capacity Building and over 30 can these Threat Reduction long preceded the pandemic we recognize early on the threat the post of the interNational Security and we began to quickly incorporate topics in our trading managing remote and distancelearning platforms have critically needed help in a timely manner ross in the process of l programming an additional 18 million via our noncooperation andin disarmament funds in preventing future catastrophic biological events as well ass adding additional experts to our efforts in expanding the offices we have working on these issues. Represent a pay rate noted moments ago that there are limitations to our authorities. I will notes that we did propose Broader Authority to address these limitations. Of course we are not alone and we are deeply grateful for the decades of very Close Partnership we have enjoyed with our department offense colleagues to coordinate art mutually reinforcing efforts. And looking to the future we are also working hard to keep pacete with the rapidly evolving changes in biotechnology. And i note that several of the members indicated concern about this very issue. Let me assure you, the full range of u. S. National security departments and agencies are focusing on and analyzing thesets efforts. Our interNational Security and nonproliferation bro is using the diplomatic and Capacity Building tools to prevent the application of dual use technologies to do harm such as the development of biological weapons. For example, chairman bera noted moments ago the importance of standards and norms to address this issue. We are indeed working in this area and have had multilateral dialogues on this very issue. In conclusion, we are very proud of the work we do to combat Infectious Disease threats using our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools and support of u. S. National security. We deeply appreciate the support of the congress to provide us with the necessary resources to carry out our Threat Reduction mission and we recognize that our work iss far from over. I look forward to your questions. Thank you for your testimony i will now recognize members for five minutes each and pursuant to house rules all time healed it is for the purposes of questioning our witnesses. Because of the hybrid format of this sharing, i will recognize members by committee seniority alternate between democrats and republicans in between both subcommittees but if you miss your term please enter staff know it will circle back to you. If you seek recognition you must unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally. I will start by recognizing myself for five minutes. Both mr. Oxford and mr. Dollars, talked about advances in technology. As a doctor i look at what we have been able to do with biologics. Conditions, cancers that we would have two treat pallets of lee, we now actually have therapies and Precision Medicine too often cure some of these cancers. And other ailments. I think the vast majority of scientists are pursuing an using the technology for the advancement of common good. But i also know those same gene editing techniques and so forth can certainly be used to cause us harm as well as inadvertently a scientist who may be looking for a cure may inadvertently create something that is unintentionally causes harm. How do we create these norms and standards for my ethical use of this technology . An eight multilateral way. And then also, working with our corporate sectors. So obviously the Pharmaceuticals Sector and others are not looking for novel therapies. Right now i get the sense that there really isnt the standard norm maybe you could start off from the dod perspective. How do we do this in a multilateral way . So thank you chairman for raising this important set of questions. First i take your points. Medical technology is indeed advancing very quickly. Especially in some parts of the bio sector. We face this challenge across the board with technology. For an enormous good and can cause substantial harm for it we have been working on the issue of norms and standards for over a decade. And what we have done isha tried to work through amongst other academieser and cooperation with other academies and weve also worked in partnership with other governments. We have included working with the corporate sector. For example, we worked closely with partners in india. And in those outreach and trainings that we do in india, we include both the government sector and the corporate sector as well as ngos as we try to build a bio security including through building norms. I will notes at building norms is always challenging. But its probably at least as challenging at the moment in the midst of the pandemic. But i take the chairmans point this is a particularly important area. We will continue to increase our efforts in this area. Great. Mr. Moore, touched on the billions we have already provided in Global Health hesecurity funding in the covid19 supplementals. No doubt as we look to defeat this virus here domestically through Vaccine Distribution and Development Comments also globally inmate look at some of the dod callings as we are spending that, how can we do that in a very strategic way that allows us to Start Building these surveillance tools . Which of those tools look like what is the best practice . Thank you, mr. Chairman, very important bird i would just add on thehe biotechnology front that we view it as a promise and peril scenario. There is a whole lot of promise in the u. S. Bio economy is strong. There is a lot of peril. From the vaccine standpoints as you ask, it is vitally important to work as an inter agency together. Weve also got to provide information across International Organizations those have been mentioned previously. It is incumbent upon us to share the information. So we work with our partners and allies if youre not sharing information effectively and clearly, for severe h outbreaks in a globalized economy increases. Thank you, mr. Chairman partisan implementing organization we are in a position to help train, educate in and for some of the normse that would be created. I point out in todays biological threat world, hard to distinguish between nationstate, non nationstate and proxies in response to who is responsible for these actions forgetting to norms is a much more complicated issue at a pastor we had mostly nationstates that would worry about this. Now have a much bigger Playing Field to try to figure out that complicate subtly norms and standards it contributes accountability for these kind of things. I think it is a noble goal but its much more complicated and the kind of diverse world we are facing. Great, thank you. I see my time is up or let me recognize the Ranking Member, and acting Ranking Member. Thank you, mr. Chairman tour panel, thank you. My question to mr. Oxford just mention some of the nonstate actors in a talk about some the nonstate and state actors. 2018, russian agents use the soviet developments, the class nerve agent is an attempt to assassinate russians by the United Kingdom early this year it was used again against opposition let satan nevada. Its hard to prove, right . We are pretty sure but it is pretty p hard to prove. Kind of like the p coronavirus. In the institute of technology we have some pretty strong opinions about it. Its hard to prove them how can the Inter National lienforce accountability who do such things. That is a really tough question. As you know getting to accountability on this case in my part previous comment a lot of this can be denied the actual scientific evidence. It was not necessarily shared immediately with us. We do people in this country been provided to get in there and do some assessments as mr. Lasser said a lot of this is on agreement survey rapidly come together as allies people can put the blame where it is necessary. Its a very hard problem, given that we have spent enough time and effort in this country on bio attribution but we spent years on nuclear retribution but not on bio. Watching what happened and others quite honestly that happens over there so to speak. The uk is obviously close friend and an ally. I find that exceptionally concerning part i understand, im sure youre thinking about it just didnt know if you had any answers to impart just a thing to j add . The further uses a chemical weapon, the further use and acceptability across the world has to be confronted. As the director said there is significant effort being put into this particular incident across the u. S. Government and across the International Community. So efforts are underway to at least work on the International Norm peace or response. I would say you mentioned threats and from the dialogical threat perspective, much information would be required at a higher level part we can say it in unclassified level that russia or the state department d has said from an article one and article two perspective so it grows and grows i and concern with the help of crosses in the inter agency is vital to get after these threats. Okay so i appreciate look i know it is difficult. That is why we are here. We appreciate your efforts in this guard. On the nonstate actors side crossing into the United States it letter containing rice and the similar things in the past. We also see the Islamic State procure should be no surprise how a valve the elite bio weapons trade or availability and how you guys are working right across the board appeared what are you guys doing and what is the status of that . I can tell you in the middle east scenario what we have seen in the counterterrorism activities weve been taking most of the chemical off the battlefield so to speak. Theyve t tried to resurrect periodically but they have not been successful. Its a matter of the expertise, ricin has been attempted multiple times its usually not gotten to weapons grade, maybe we dodged a bullet. Theres a need to look across the spectrum and the terrorist group is had this expansion. They have not had this expertise we need to make sure they do not gain it. If i could add to that a little bit. On the diplomatic side we have worked very close of International Partners with this particular threat poorly also work with problematic elements in key states to work on the specific state the specific set of nonstate threat. We have diplomatic efforts, we have integrated our concerns into broader International Diplomatic discussions abouteg counterterrorism. With regard to your question about trade, we do strengthen international and chemical and biological precursors. But i will say that in general i believe the evidence is that much of these efforts uses chemical and precursors that are procured within the state. So we will continue to tighten up in that area. But most of it appears to be homegrown. Thank you my time is expired i yield. Clinical had an out recognize the chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman can hear meha okay . I want to thank our witnesses again for their testimony but we do in this area on behalf of thet country. I will go back to my statement i talked about the concerns i had about the significant cuts to the corporate Reduction Program. So compared to the 2020 levels the cooperation Reduction Program was cut by wonder to 35 million with the president s budget request this year. Its within that program the corporate threat of biological engagement effort was cut at the most by 55 million. So giveni the pandemic which we find ourselves we are alarmed by thell Department Defense is significantly cut of detecting and confronting biological threats in the United States. So i want to begin this clearly supports, what additional work would be able to perform if congress is in fact able to restore the funding the enacted level. And especially what other work would you be able to do under the bio Threat Reduction program which cut the most . And i want to know how the i departments perspective of the importance of the biological Threat Program involves with the a past six months of the pandemic. And how is the department to support the covenant to fight. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Again, based on the programs we were able to restore activities in 22 countries in addition 15 of those would be with in the program. We can provide the committees with these specific examples of what counters to be restored print plus to be able to restore on a regional basis. As well as africa. So well be able to restore some of the regional emphasis in this area which gives us a broader coverage across those regions in question. We would be able to restore in 15 countries as well as the regions i mentioned. Or. [inaudible] i have the question with the pandemic. Mr. Chairman if i could add we do want to give appreciation, no the witnesses have for the long standing support, these committees part of me and both sides of the hill, both sides of the aisle have given towards proper Threat Reduction program. I would say the biological Threat Reduction program as you know has been operating for over 16 years and over 30 countries doing great work. As far as the last 16 months, the dod effort, obviously the International Effort is led by her colleagues. From a a dod perspective manage the stability and humanitarian affairs office. They managed it over a course of the last six months. In nearly 100 million in dod support in over a hundred countries. Most of the support is historical in nature. A lot of the training, a lot of the lab support has been over the course of these willing partners. That work, that information flow is was a vital part i can say specifically for btr be, direct funding to an response to covid it is around 7 million, much of it is ppe. A lot of it is trading. Because back to the historical relationship with these countries were we provide to that is been the focus making sure these partner countries know they have the reach back resource. And we can provide that information to this partner atformations. Can you tells about the work that youre doing to help help with the covid effort there. [inaudible] their use their Energy Funding to meet the challenge of the crisis. Describe what or have you been hamstrung because of the lack . So mr. Chairman think a lot of people made comparisons between our response to a bullet versus the covid threat. Which allowed dod to expand the resources through the threat. Covid19 has considered a pandemic and a disease that preventedwi us from using Defense Program money appeared we have user expertise in several ways using carriers active money to actually benefit from that bird we have a Program Underway this look at the Rapid Assessment of environments we call the rate program. Were looking identifying the onset of symptoms and illnesses, not specifically for covid the illness may be on 48 hours earlier projected our expertise has been applied but not specifically defense funding. My time is expired. We defined at a time like this. We will make sure that happens. Thank you and i yield back. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Let me know recognize my good friend and gentleman from washington mr. Larson. Thank you, mr. Chairman. So, first question is probably for mr. Oxford. I was just wondering if you can help us understand with regard to the biological threats, kind of what that role is for response . And what that f role is for contributing to the future thinking about what to do. Are you strictly thinking to respond to requests . Or do you have a role in planning ahead and proliferating that information about what to do when you plan ahead . Thank you mr. Larson. We actually played to rosalie ctr program. Not really in a responsible but in the covid environment as mr. Lasser set a years worth of work weve done to prepare some of those nations, they were able to use rapidly response. They need infusion of ppe, test kits and those type of things. There were 190 Trained Laboratory technicians we train to the ctr program. So with 100,000 worth of ppe, we were able to get them in a situation where they can start doing. Their response. Were not really a Response Program in that regards. But we are able to benefit from what was done over the decade or so working with them. The Defense Program we are x on thehe cutting edge of all the research and development. We are looking forward as we made reference to things like synthetic bio. We fully understand based on the Technical Expertise what the nefarious ways synthetic bio could be used for on the flipside were also looking for the advantage weai might gain by understanding synthetic bio by making detectors better able to resolve things faster. So we do have that forward look through the science and Technology Program that we operate rates. Mr. Lasser on that point theres two approaches. One i know in your testimony or written testimony, you talk about how you are organized in cooperation with the department of defense, rnd, research and engineering can you discuss that a little bit . And second, this be for mr. Lasser mr. Oxford. The combination of emergingg technologies meets, i think its mr. Lassers written testimony about Drone Technology and dissemination of biological agents could you touch onho that . What we ought to be thinking about in the future . Thank you congressman i push at the question very much. Its very important we are spending quite a bit of time and resources across the department. I mentioned research and engineering, they are vital to the efforts to ensure we have Going Forward what we need what are war fighters need to fight and win a contaminated environment for it is director oxford noted the kim bio program is vital in that. With respect to some of these technologies they are concerning. The department though is right size and fitted toht respond. Thew way we respond organized at least to the cw md enterprise quite robust a number of organizations as you can imagine from theio joint staff are policy j perspective, the command services we come together fairly regularly in an effort i think would be highlighted and its important for you to note about the cw md unity of effort counsel threestar level counsel, director oxford and i participate in that. And in that form we are able to slow the issues up for discussion and decision it is an area that we can get full information across the department and make decisions at the highest level. And so we think that is vital to some of these issues that you highlights. Ng now obviously in this setting a little harder to get into some of those issues but i know you recognize that. But we are resourced properly. And we are right size to go after those threats are buried. If i could just follow up on art part of that. Obviously you dont run Dods Research and engineering, that is another division its pretty high up obviously in the organizational chart of the pentagon. Do you have the opportunity, not the opportunity common has r and d come to recognize this as a highers priority now or is this something you are having to battle out with Research Engineering and their list of priorities that they have already had . I speak fairly regularly with doctor michele rosa who covers down on this issue set. As you recognize, a lot of tremendous talent at the Intelligence Committee that flows us information on a daily basis if not hourly basis. So if we need to flex, and that is one thing mr. Oxford, director oxfords, they are very agile. If we need to adjust to go after a threat we can do it. But we do welcome the interest in support of congress in doing i so. We welcome giving you the support and more important he the interest in doing so. Thanks so much. Thank you, let me recognize a judgment for the commonwealth of massachusetts, mr. Keating. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I think our witnesses, as a member of both arm services and Foreign Affairs, i want to thank you both at this joint hearing. But i wanted to address how, the sharing that was mentioned by the witnesses before, is critical. And so ian want to ask is the covid19 pan deming progressed in military intelligence followed it, and saw that escalation purchase from a timeframe, what kinds of levels of alert occurred in january and february during that period . Was there a change in the level of work based on military intelligence during that period . And did it occur in january and february . Or february . Thank yous or for that question. What i can tell you is in february secretary esper priorities toee combat covid. First, being to protect our people. Second to maintain mission readiness. And three, to ensure we are supporting the whole government effort. With that, at least internally and dod Different Health protection levels. And so pretty early as you will probably recall in march at least with the department of defense we were put in hp con reduce the number of folks at present at their jobs. So with that information flow did happen and does happen, i think we pointed out all of us here today that information flow is vital while the Intelligence Community can collect and does collect information, analyze it get that out to policy makers to include congress, there must be a flow of information across the entire globe. Andun it must happen from all parties in all countries. We cannot expect just the United States. Select yes or . Was there a level of alert change that corresponded with that . As early as february . Will serve as early as february in march was when i believe i would have to go back with the exact date, that is when the hp con changed. Obviously over the course of those months before information was continuing to flow in the proper resources applied to analyzing that information. Was there a change to a level one alert in february . That wouldve been the first time in our history that a pandemic raised itself to that level, did that occur . Civics or i cannot t say the exact date. I would need to go back and get that and provide that information to you and the committee please lets assume that it might have. Which you transfer that information immediately to our state agency . Agency of state, state department . And congress . s come as you know the Intelligence Community is quite large. And so all of the organizations today have an intelligence portion to them. So that information is shared across the Intelligence Committee. I was eight information is generally shared across the committee. So wee do that on a daily basis and we that information back and forth. My concern is that congress was not notified in a timely fashion to those changes. So if you can get back to the respective committees, tied down that date and what the significant was . Because it is my understanding its publicly accessible there was a change. It was historic in terms of the first time a pandemic the sharing of information that was slow to congress and other department agencies. And agencies appear before the committee here today. Because indeed if we are going to do this, he said as witnesses taking the equivalence on sharing that information, it is critical. Ites is my concern that is not being done in a timely fashion. So i would appreciate that and with that mr. Chairman a yield back. Thank you mr. Keating for a let me recognize my good friend from the state of california, mr. Chairman. Thank you, there has been discussion i believe by the first Ranking Member to the quote complicity of the w. H. O. For the w. H. O. Is a coordinating organization. It is not an intel. It has noot way to know whether what china is saying is complete and true, transparent or not. You know who does have an intel organization, the United Statesun government. An hour intelligence is designed to note when china is not telling the truth. And fact, the president was informed this was a breaking out in wuhan far more than the Chinese Government indicated. He chose to ignore that intelligence. Just has he seems too have ignored much to the unfortunate harm to himself and his wife, ignored the best advice on how to avoid getting this disease. And unfortunately misled millions of americans as well into not wearing masks. We spent many hundreds of millions of dollars defending ourselves from threats and very little on defending ourselves from anything else. We did not have Civil Defense designed for either a deliberate or naturally occurring plague. We did not have stockpiles of ppe. We did not have the education, w did not have the ventilators although he quickly made some. And we did not have the capacity to do tracings. This all in spite of the fact that the National Security strategy recognized biological incidents this was in 2017, the potential to cause catastrophic loss of life. The threats are growing as a result of deliberate attack, accident or natural outbreak. Which raises the question i know we are not in a classified setting. What is the administrations operating assumptions or likelihood, how would we assign percentage likelihoods to the possibilities as to how this plague began . We are told perhaps it came from the wet markets. Andd may have come from the wuhan lab which might have been engaged entirely peaceful activities that had a tragic release. It could have come from a wuhan lab that was engaged in military activities but had an unintentional release. And i think least likely at all could have come deliberately from a wuhan lab. Do we have any operating assumptions . Or all of those possible . I think thehe deliberate release is highly, highly unlikely. Where does the administration think is the cause of this . Thank you congressman sherma sherman. It is an important question. I think wed come as an International Committee obviously the u. S. Government we are still working right now presently to respond to this crisis as you are aware. Are using any one of the possibilities ashe possible . In the u. S. Government does not have much ofe an opinion on which is the cause was marked to other witnesses agree to that . Congressman sherman, thank you for thean question. You have mentioned for possible scenarios. And certainly in discussions in anop open forum, they are varying levels of possibility. What we do now is the virus described as covid19 was described in Academic Research that was published several years agove including in the peoples republic of china. Identifieded as existing in animals. It is a disease, et cetera virus of zoo and not a core say sir, there are multiple. The ideas engineered is probably dismissed by that. I will quickly ask, normally when there is a catastrophe the first thing anybody does is you close the barn door. China has said this has come from a wet market. There are wet markets all over china. Has there been a massive change in how exotic animals are sold for human consumption throughout china . That is an extremely important point sprayed and also something under the purview of the state, wildlife traffic is is a huge problem for the peoples republic of cochina continues to be the largest market. Has there been a change in early 2019 until now, late 2020 and how these markets operate . Not a fundamental purge change in walking illegal wildlife change including at wet markets in the peoplesle republic of china its a practice it exists in other countries and well we are working to end it. Thank you. We now recognize the gentleman from michigan. Thank you so much mr. Chairman were convening the super important hearing. It is no secret to us. [inaudible] [inaudible] the New York Times report. [inaudible] , is when new york city cases skyrocketed way back in march. The whole world can see this happen including those who wish to do harm to our country. Let me pose this question, do you believe therell be a heightened interest on the part of state andnd nonstate actors. [inaudible] e i was the department of state in defense respectively prepared for that possibility . I apologize sir, the transmission was a little imprecise. What exact question would you like me to it respond to serve . Sorry about that. My question is do you think there will be a heightened interest on the part of state actors in developing the virus against americans . And how do the state and defense prepare for the possibility . Guest in regard to the biological weapons ob that are addressed to my colleague from the isn bureau. Subic okay. This is a difficult question to address in its unclassified contexts. I guess what i can say is that we continue to review these issues. We had a discussion two days ago with our colleagues who are experts on thesese issues. I think, i takeas your point that the pandemic as i testified to, poses a stamp show enormous challenge to interNational Security. And it must inherently be the case that our adversaries whether they are terrorists or states will take that into account in considering how to evolve their weapons systems. Alright let me pose another question. January 2017, the cdcs presence in china has decreased from about 47 personnel to 14. With professionals getting cut. The National Foundation also closed their beijing offices during this time for it and on top of that the department of agriculture transferred the managers out of china in 2018. So the past four years weve gotten rid of a bunch of people who it seems to me would have been helpful to have been in place as covid19 eawas emerging. At the very least, i think it would be helpful to have rival sources of information about what was really happening on the ground. Mr. Oxford and mr. Moore, in general why are there experts like epidemiologist stationed in other countries . And how does this help defend us against biological threats . Again from a Defense Department perspective is that implementing organization, we are not responsible for their cdc in others operate overseas but i have to yield to the state department or go back to those other departments that do those kind of things. Lets hear the state perspectives. Will be pleased to offer more detailed timeline of who was assigned under the authority of the chief admission and beijing at what time. I think the context for individual agencies sending staff there or reducing their staff there has a r lot to do with the both of their needs, their budgets and the viability of the work they can actually do. One of the constraints we face to the re peoples republic of china is that we still not received the data we need to receive initial samples of the virus that have been sought since the beginning of the pandemic, even at the end of last year. That is extremely problematic as is the work of the peoples republic of china to prevent of international concerned with topic initially come up foronn discussion at the w. H. O. In geneva with regard to specific agencies with apologies have to take that question. Its extremely problematic for us to talk about what the w. H. O. Shouldwh do, whether we withdraw from my think its extremely problematic for us to reduce our capability of scientific and diplomatic with experts. In china and around the world during a global pandemic. So with that i yield back mr. Chairman. Thank you. The republicans the chair recognizes for five minutes. [inaudible] think there are some technical issues. I am told there are members right now i would suggest. [inaudible] should be recess right now . Im waiting to hear back from committee staff. This is larson im the only member in the room right now. He is voting were trying to get staff to answer your question about his return. N. So folks we what to back may be recess right now and perhaps give us a few minutes . I will do that, i will ask another question i have onto a get that clarified and they come back on. On the meantime, let me go weve heard there might have been direction to not spend Defense Program spending on the covid19 fights, which troubles me if true. We specializes in developing counter member measuresngea and vaccines and therapeutics. And free treatments. What do you need from us to ensure that you have theo authority and resources from the department is in fact to rise to the challenge of emerging threats today and tomorrow. And is there more you could be doing now to help the country fight that you do not currently have the authority or permission to do . Thank you, mr. Chairman. For your first question, or your statement, there is no department preclusion i will say with the Defense Programs primary is on statutory requirements the develop capabilities the covid19 support provided to the services and enter agency is a combination of subject matter expertise, leveraging existing contracts, texts, delivery of capabilities as an example assisting with assisting an evaluation. From helping to create detection, diagnosticslimp and treatment and methods to investigating vaccines. The Defense Program continues to collaborate with the whole of government partners industry and academia. Its important to note the Defense Program is a Research Development and Acquisition Program and not necessarily a response capability. I will say to your followup question sir, the congress has been exceptionally helpful to the program, historically as i referenced earlier and over the last number of years. And so support wed asked for is really continued support for the program. We appreciate the information flow between our department and i think i can say the same for the state department. In between our staff it is exceptional and we look forward to continuing that communication flow, thank you sir. No additional authorities you have right now. [inaudible] subics think at the moment we are good. I know our staff has communicated historically and i hope they continue to do that, pardon me. And if we do identify an issue or an authority that is necessary, we will be absolute certainty bring that to you and your team. Thank you. That concludes my questions for right now. Hase returned yet or is she return . Mr. Chairman this is rick larsonic again. I am still the only member in the room. Alright thank you mr. Larson. I yield now if she has returned. Okay, he said she is not on. Cement can you hear me . Yes i have a now, go ahead you are recognized for. Alright thats fine. Thank you so much for the witnesses for being here. Appreciate your time and your presence. I have a question about staffing related issues. As a former cia officer, i am aware of the importance of detecting threats before they actually harm americans. And that must be our choice when it comes to biological security as well. We have to get in front of biological and Health Security risks before they can do significant damage. Like we have seen with covid19 but we have to work with our partners so that no matter where a threat arrives, we can contain it. And if the officers in charge of preventing and responding to these threats are understaffed it is hard for us to get ahead of that problem. So i open this up to all members of the panel, u. S. National security agencies have long suffered from high for the past years. In giving how long hiring can take, see the effects of this for years. Arent they conceived with limited staffing affecting your work currently and in your view of the state in dod with hiring practices can ramp up more quickly . In a specific call out of there, two offices have trouble finding a recruiting staff with the specialized skills needed to focus on reducing biological security threats . And i open that up to the panel. Thank you congresswoman, it is are great question. It is an age oldit issue employing the right staff. I can say from ac wnd perspective we have immensely talented team of professionals from career civilians to the uniform personnel, to government contractors. It would be hard to speak across the entire department. Me personally doing that. But i can tell you we are right sized, we are obviously always onfo the lookout for talent. So we will continue to do that and continue, if we can find talent to bring them in the doors. I will defer to my other colleagues. From a point of view we operate a highly Technical Organization similar to those you refer to printer equipment strategy is healthy, retention rates are healthy. Webu continue to look for additional talent as necessary. So far attribution rates, our rates are going steady. So i think in a cam bio defense area we operate as well as the other r d organizations are health and welfare arent in our communities example. Thank you. On behalf of the oes and bureau at the state Department Im very pleased to report we have an outstanding very active in extremely expert team of both civil service, longterm colleagues in Foreign Service colleagues on assignments. I am pleased to say that in have beenths we able to add to our staffing. And bring on permanently a number of colleagues including fellows of the American Association for the advancement of science. The longstanding cooperation with aaa s. So we benefitloat from their technical and professional expertise for the team is doing an outstanding job dealing with covid on the homefront. And of course working on it professionally. Thank you. So i think i echoed the remarks of my colleagues. I think vacancies have not been a substantial challenge in our part of the department on this issue. As i testified, we have also been increasing our staff. We have at it experts using a special authority that the department has provided in this regard. And we havee added to the staffing of theha offices that deal of biological issues. So i think in general, we dont have staffing challenges. We too have a greatat partnership and fellowships that bring us Technical Expertise. But i think recruiting the technical specialist is sometimes a challenge and that is probably the one area where at times, it has been a bit of a challenge for us. Thank you very much for sharing that i hope the committee can be involved to ever and is appropriate in ensuring into the future recruit to the Staffing Levels that are necessary. Im going to ask for the next portion if youll indulge me because it will direct my followup question is. By a show of hands, do your teams participate in war game exercise to train and prepare for potential biological Security Risk . To ease the awkward circumstance with virtual, if raise your hand if you do . Does my followup question very much depends on that if its divided. I see two into from here. Okay. There how to respond, argue using this for biological threat . And what have you learned from these tabletop exercises . More recently . As it relates to covid19 . And my time is limited so if one of you wants to take this one i welcome you all to choose who goesd next. Soap congresswoman mrs. Mr. Oxford, one of the things reduced to sustain capability overseas of the people weve trained over the course of time and bile response as we do exercises sure their maintaining readiness and the standards they have been trained to. One of the ways we start to transfer this thank you, seeing that there are no additionalma members who have questions its always a difficult and most virtual hybrid in person format. And then on top of that. Ill make a closing statement and see if the chairman would like to make a statement as well. Perhaps maybe a closing question. The issue of bio surveillance, something ive thought a lot about in terms of pandemic preparedness and how we use some of the naturally occurring technologies that are out there, social media, search words, google, et cetera. All the said you see a jump in people searching incident fever flulike symptoms et cetera. Some of that can be Early Warning symptoms for us to play kos intern close attention for wireless thermometers etrm cetera. We think about both the midst of the pandemic. But also what our Early Warning systems for natural occurring threats. That are already widely in use. The folks from dod can perhaps comment on how we should be thinking about that. Chairman, it is an exceptional question. It is an approach that we have all talk today about the information sharing. That is absolutely vital. It is fundamental if we are going to ensure that we are detecting, specifically on this issue detecting threats and flowing that information really at this point globally. And so it is working with our inter agency colleagues like we do on a daily basis here. Its also working using the Global Partnership for spread against weapons of mass destruction as a perfect organization. They have security agendas that and has to require information flow mr. Chairman she recall what are my earlier answersan i talked about a regional approach would be started the program its mostly nation nastate specific, one program one country. It allows for that kind of information sharing. It enhances the overall protection and regions as opposed to just looking at this solely by country. So it really does help in the broader understanding. The chairman raises a very good point. Theres a whole set of emerging tools that can greatly add to information sharing and bio surveillance. We are wondering with the pandemic additional tools for example in uganda and africa there are a whole set of cell phone based tools that we had not previously used to the degree we usese now. So we are trying to take advantage of the whole new toolset. This great infrastructure being built to deal with thisuc pandemi pandemic. This is a good example of how we can build out our capabilities and data flows to capture all the information thats available. I want to thank all four of our witnesses for their service to our country. Es again, make sure everyonene is safe. We will get through this. But lets get through this in a more resilient wearing in a stronger way. And in a way that protects against the next pandemic future bio threat. I know chairman is still on, dois you want to make some closing statements . I am again, mr. Chairman thank you for your collaboration bring us here together. With your work on this and certainly the timing right now. I want to thank our witnesses this evening and working with their portfolios with weapons of mass destruction and other witnesses, these are obviously essential capabilities you bring to the table for the nation. We continue to work we continued to be together going to be properly resourced and the plans and procedures in place to respond effectively. You can be rest assured it will be some future event we want to make sure we are as prepared as possible. And we respond to s the majority necessary to save lives. So with that, i deeply thank you for the work you do. And the members they have questions i would ask that they respond expeditiously. With that, i have no further question. And i yield back mr. Chairman great thank you, and again our thoughts and prayers are with every buddy around the world who is impacted by covid19 and certainly with our president and first lady and the first family. And with that again i want to thank the witnesses for being here this morning. In the hearing is adjourned. [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] [background noises] you are watching cspan2, your unfiltered view of government. Created by americas Cable Television company as a Public Service and brought to you today by your television provider. I honestly would tell you, i dont think when the dust settles in this election its going to be whether america becomes more republican or democrat. Whether we are more liberal or more conservative, more red or more blue. I think the choice in this election is whether america remains america. And as joe biden has said from the moment he entered this race is about the soul of our nation. Who we are. What we stand for. And maybe, most importantly, who we want to be. 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