Transcripts For CSPAN2 Joint House Hearing On Biological Security 20240712

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This joint subcommittee hearing with the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on asia, the pacific and on proliferation of the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence and emerging threats and capabilities will come to order. Without objection the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any point at all members want five days is a bit statements, extremist vitriol and questions for the record. Subject to the length, limitation in the rules. To insert something into the record please have your staff email either subcommittee clerk. As a reminder to members please keep your video function on at all times, even when youre not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with h. Res. 965 and accompanying regulation staff only mute members and with us as appropriate when youre not under recognition to eliminate background noise. We have a quarrel and we will not recognize myself for opening remarks that i will then be followed by acting Ranking Member, chairman lankford been and didnt Ranking Member slavonic. I will didnt recognize members in order of seniority alternating between democrats and republicans and four affairs and Armed Services members. Before we get started and before i do it Opening Statement i think it would be remiss for us not to mention the president and the first lady, and know that they are in our thoughts and prayers and hope for a speedy recovery. And also the tens of thousands of americans that test positive everyday for this virus. They are in our thoughts. This is a virus. This is a final tribute it is noted for democrat or republican. Doesnt know what god we worship, what our country of origin is. Its a virus and it does underscore the importance of this topic there were talking about today, it does underscore, but this is naturally occurring events, but what bad actors may see as, see a threat like this that really has brought the entire world to its knees and certain has wreaked economic affect both massively internationally. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, both having the department of defense and the state department, again underscores the importance of this. My focus as subcommittee chairman, under the guise of proliferation we spend time target Nuclear Threats of what were seeing right now is the real vulnerability the biologic threats. Just to put that in context, you know, we have not had an Aircraft Carrier brought to its knees by a genetic or ms. Lowey things like that, but we just saw the pastor an Aircraft Carrier brought to port because of a virus. That really does underscore what i worry about. And what to think about this i think about it in a couple different ways. Its very difficult to obtain Nuclear Capabilities and nuclear technology. The capabilities are rapidly increasing and that is something that keeps me awake at night. Again we know there are bad actors out there. Certainly post 911. We saw other threats and we worried about smallpox and so forth. That something in a bipartisan way that Congress Working with the administration should really think about what are the things that we have to do to move ahead. I look forward to the witness testimony and there are several areas i think about and get to be curious about from the witnesses as we defeat covid and spend the billions of dollars and build an infrastructure to defeat this virus i also think we should be thinking about how we use those resources to office prepare for bio surveillance and be ready for the next naturally occurring virus. And how we have the dual use capabilities as we build the infrastructure to do bio surveillance for me and manmade threats. As we move forward we have the biological d wc but i think we need to see stronger multilateral organizations that we can work with. Im curious how they are thinking about creating those institutions and then lastly when i think about the ethics of gene editing and where that is going in the technology we havent created the standards and the norms that say this is appropriate for advancing the sciences. We are creating those standards in norms and what we will look like. The congress again working with the administrations not just for the United States but for the International Community. Our thoughts and prayers are with them. And those thousands of americans and i would be remiss if i didnt put my dr. Hat on for a second as we enter the fall and winter lets you everything we can keep people safe. Continue to wash her hands and practice good hygiene. Lets avoid large indoor gatherings that we have seen with the shredding events. And the most important thing we can do right now as we enter the fall as everyone go out there and get your flu shot. With that let me recognize the Ranking Member. Thank you chairman. Thank you to our distinguished panel for offering your counsel today. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for increased security threats and what can happen when irresponsible actors disregard International Agreements for the safe sake of self intervention. The regime only works when it agrees to make it work. We need to assess the shortcomings of the u. S. Multilateral engagements in determining where improvements need to be made. The 2005 International Health regulations away into the forest in 2007 and called on all nations to be compliant by 2012. By 2012 only about 20 of all countries were compliant this administration has taken a significant amount of criticism for questioning u. S. Engagements like the world health World Health Organization. Let me be clear about this the World Health Organization complicity in spreading the virus should not be rewarded with the United States indifferent to the failures. With the gs a. There is an obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the International Community Different Levels of investment in bio security lends itself to a permanent condition of moral hazard. They are compensating for the lack of investment from other states. Despite our best efforts there is only so much we can do alone. Key programs like the state Department Bio security Engagement Program cannot use funds in countries like china, cuba iran and north korea sudan or syria. Despite the fact that several of these countries have experimented with biological weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses. Countries like north korea had a clearly offensive biological weapons program. And the fact that we have an unreliable International Biological weapons control regime. What exactly does success look like when china dominates several key institutions. As it stands they have provided a gift to nonstate actors. The impact that the potential weapon can have on the American Economy as well as our society. Threats to our way of life had multiplied as a result of the coronavirus. And this timely hearing will be confronting the uncomfortable truth. Im grateful to have our witnesses before us today as a speak more about Synthetic Biology and gene manipulation. We need to find out more about the National Security implications that they can post to the United States several countries are working with pathogens. That being said to hope hicks and anybody that has been affected. Whether they had contracted it or occurred with the family members and loved ones. We are all dealing with it one way or another. Let me now recognize. The subcommittee of the Armed Services committee. Thank you. Also acknowledging and saying that the president and the first lady and family are in my thoughts and prayers. They may also be experiencing effects of the virus. We played it pray that they have a full recovery. I want to thank my colleagues in the subcommittee on asia and the pacific. In the corporation. And particularly you chairman barrett. I know that he is in as a Ranking Member right now. I recognize the Ranking Member as well as my colleagues. That goes right over to our Nation Security and very pleased that we are holding an important joint here. The techniques within gene sequencing. In Synthetic Biology. They are rapidly changing the scale of biological threats and could we increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge they are easy to create than other weapons of mass destruction. They enable them to inflict major damage. Just last month. The republic of Georgia Health ministry. That stores medical documents and National Management information. We know that Russian Hackers targeted organizations and is involved in that research. Including those in the u. S. , the uk and canada. These attacks in the current global underscore the impact of the Scientific Research prepared in the agency. And with our allies. In the national and Economic Security when the time that the United States is struggling. With a highly effective pathogen. We must ensure that its working its working together to respond to the current pandemic and advance the collective effort. To the Threat Reduction agency. Through the execution. With the reduction in the biological threat. As it has been receiving the bond type of request for preparedness including providing biosafety. And in aid to detection. Diagnosis and reporting related to the covid outbreak. There been many good examples. In countries. Siberia. Jordan and thailand. The first case of entry into in the country. In the impact that it can have on the National Security. And as a pandemic that could present single biggest threat to our country was starting to spread across the globe with the president s budget request was delivered to the hill in february with a 36 cut. With the time that its struggling to respond to the spread of highly infectious new virus. We are alarmed by the reduction in the budget request. For a mission of detecting. In biological threats. Added back 135 million to the ctr program. 89million of that was additional funding with the cooperative Engagement Program. In the fight against covid. With a the common measures. With the therapeutics and pre treatments. With the physical programs. With the development. The diagnostic and the personal protective agreement. To prepare against the potential unknown threats cd bp built the capabilities to address novel pathogens and making it an ideal program to deal with the emergence of Novel Coronavirus. We are interested today whether the program was quickly and efficiently known. And the National Response to the covid pandemic. These are obviously challenging times and we need to double down on these programs and we need to make sure that we are in fact there for the next biological or chemical event that could affect the country. And make sure that we have all of the tools and resources in place. We look forward to hearing more what we can do today to ensure your organizations have the ability and the resource needed. Today and tomorrow and how you can ensure that they are ready and able to act quickly. I join a host in thinking all of you especially our witnesses for joining us today. I yelled back. Thank you chairman. Let me now recognize the Ranking Member. With the subcommittee of the. I also want to echo my colleagues. And send on behalf of the Congressional District our thoughts and prayers with our first family. And all of the American People that have been impacted by the covid virus. I would like to express my appreciation to you. As well as chairman lanterman. For hosting this hearing. And thank you for the members of the two sub committees. Thank you for being here today. The issue of bio security is one of national importance. As i had stated previously while the department of defense faces urgent challenges daily we can never afford to lose sight of the critically Important Mission of mass destruction and in particular biological threats. The unpredictable nature of these threats require that we continue to adapt our approach and inner great art response. We must adjust the strategy to more proactively detect and respond to the next event. This will surely not be the last biological crisis that this nation and world faces. That they can more effectively use new data sets. To truly modernize our bio surveillance efforts. When and where it may occur. Either naturally occurring or man made is likely to spread. This obviously must be a global effort. And the department of defense. They had developed it will be critical Early Warning to have a collective response. Programs like the cooperative Threat Reduction and the biological Threat Reduction program are essential to maintaining a global footprint in the building of the relationships that protect our National Interest. The Current Crisis has served as an affirmation that biological threats have the biological response. With the health and Human Services Homeland Security and our state and local official. The strength of the partnership and the quality of these relationships you develop with our foreign partners and domestic agencies will underpin the effectiveness of our future efforts. Thank you again for our witnesses. I go back into the chair. Before i introduced the witnesses. I ask unanimous consent. After all Committee Members had have an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objections . Without objection we will recognize them at the appropriate time. Let me reduce reintroduce our witnesses. Mr. David laster. Overseas all of the policy issues at that. The. And this includes preventing the materials to the Defense Department materials. Defense department materials. And Chemical Biological radiological. Next we will hear from the director of defense mister dale oxford. It leads the mission to safeguard the u. S. In its allies from wow weapons of mass destruction. With the biological Threat Reduction. From the state department we will first hear from the acting secretary. Mister jonathan moore. And finally we will hear from the Deputy Assistant therapy. At the bureau of interNational Security. Mister philippa dollars. He oversees a range of the state state department. Including cooperative Threat Reduction. Which works to reduce that worldwide. I will recognize each witness for five minutes. Written statements will be made part of the record. I will call on Mister Lasser first met with the Ranking Members. And all Committee Members. I too want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the president and first lady. I just want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the president and first lady and all of those impacted by covid 19. With my opportunity to present on behalf of the defense. And the critical work we are doing to counter biological threats. I also want to acknowledge the sincere appreciation to the city s ear support that they land. As a deputy s distant secretary. For the weapons of mass destruction i have the privilege to work alongside my colleagues here today. Our Strong Partnership enables the broad u. S. Government effort to reduce the threats including biological threats. The bio Threat Mission aligns with the objection. With the Defense Strategies as well as the secretarys priorities. Mainly to increase the legality of the u. S. Military built alliances and improve the decisions. We also draw guidance from strategies such as the National Bio Defense strategy in and the Global Health security strategy. The focus on protecting the health and readiness of u. S. Forces countering the destabilizing effects. And the outbreaks on u. S. Interest. In ensuring that they remain focused on priority defense objective to meet Emergency Needs during an outbreak makes as a complementary tool in the u. S. Threat reduction arsenal. We work daily to ensure that they are positioned to address the full range of the threats to include the constantly changing biological Threat Landscape. The shifting dynamic includes naturally occurring outbreaks in accidental or deliberate release of biological agents. The threats posed by state and nonstate actors international and domestic incidents. And with the emerging technologies. Covid in the 19 and a stabilizing influence has further altered the threat in landscape. With them to replicate with a biological agent. My team developed strategic guidance. For activities spanning the prevent detect continuum to mitigate the impacts of such threats regardless of origin. We work closely with other fake holders. And coordinate through groups such as the effort counsel. And the covid task force. They also work with key enter agencies and International Partners as we develop priorities for countering biological threats. These partnerships allow us to leverage each others capabilities and lessen the security burden on dod. Pooling resources and working towards common objectives is vital to ensuring the greatest Threat Reduction impacts are achieved. In 2004, the biological Threat Reduction program has provided equipment and training to over 30 countries to improve their ability to detect and diagnose and report the instances. In the current environment we know the nations had leverage previously provided ctr capabilities to bolster their ability to detect and diagnose covid. I look forward to your questions. Think you Mister Lasser. I will now recognize mr. Lasser. The distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your continued support. Im proud to up here today. My colleagues here. On the collective act first to efforts to protect the National Interest in a rapidly and the strong relationships with the partners here today. We find ourselves in unprecedented times as we respond to the Global Pandemic. As we reflect on the loss of over 200,000 of our fellow citizens we must think about the future Threat Landscape. In that Synthetic Biology. They offer us the opportunities to capitalize on the Lessons Learned from our response. In the potentially could launch future attacks with little warning or attribution. As we caption the Lessons Learned we have to accept the fact that others will also be learning in the very nature of the biological Threat Landscape has changed forever. One of the lessons we have learned over the course of the last six months is that the nations had benefited greatly by the training and equipping they have received through the dod program specifically. They facilitate the detection and reporting of diseases caused by dangerous pathogens. Whether it was delivery released or naturally occurring. They work with over 34 partners to reduce biological threat. With the bio surveillance capabilities. They have demonstrated to the Global Community that how security is Health Security is a critical part of National Security. Countries need effectiveness significant force. They rely on the Surveillance Systems of other nation. Some recent examples in response to the pandemic in the partnership with the u. S. 80. They enabled them to detect the first case of a Novel Coronavirus outside of china. On 13 of january. Within a month of a request from the u. S. Ambassador. They transferred as supply to the National Institute of health and hygiene. The equipment went directly to protect at the Frontline Health care workers in the fight against covid. Ambassador fisher stated that it is part of over seven years of close cooperation. This partnership is on saving lives and mitigating threat. They had reported a hundred 26,000 cases with 2200 deaths. In georgia they change trained scientists and they developed diagnostic testing capability for covid. They implement extensive testing. The senate was lauded center was lauded by the georgia government as being inter goal. With that covid outbreak. They had reported 7100 cases with only 46 deaths. They continue to receive a foreign partner request. As of september 18. With 18 countries plus the African Union for disease control. In summary it builds their sense of National Pride and increases the willingness to work with the u. S. And other ways. They have better self sustaining solutions. They demonstrate that we are the partner of choice rather than our strategic competitors. They act as multipliers in the competition. And the strategic method. Thank you for your time, i look forward to your questions. I will now recognize mr. Moore for his Opening Statement. Good morning. With the link Ranking Member. It is an honor to be here with you today together with the distinguished colleagues. As well as dp ra. Dpr a. I look forward to discussing how our bureau plays a role in this process are normal portfolio ranges from the depths of the ocean to the vastness of the state. Can you please have the microphone a little bit closer. We also host the state Department Office International Health and bio defense and that is the capacity in which i am here today. I will focus my remarks on the efforts to prevent end of tact. Covid which as we see has have an impact even on the president in the first lady and millions of americans it highlights the important of u. S. Leadership to advance Global Health security. This is crucial to stopping outbreaks at their source in protecting u. S. Health and safety and providing economic prosperity. In defending National Security interests. Our team is working through and on covid 19 with the partners. Beyond covid. They have a range of other health threats. With the resistance. The pandemic is a Global Challenge and the department of state remains committed to working with our partners as part as the collective global response. The u. S. Health diplomacy. Promoting transparent information and disease surveillance. With the nongovernmental associations. We deeply appreciate the appropriation of over 1. 6 billion in supplemental funding to the state department into the u. S. Agency. We had used these funds to provide a broad range of assistance. Aimed at helping helping governments fight the pandemic. The assistance is saving lives by strengthening Public Health education and improving the quality and health with the Rapid Response capacity and more than 120 countries as well as providing economic support from the pandemic. United states has invested more than 10 million to bring safe and effective vaccines to the global market. They helped to develop the state department including global Public Health. As the first to know about the coronavirus they have a special responsibility to inform the rest of the world about the threat they withheld information and censored medical professionals. The ccp has since used the pandemic by highlighting its donations of masks and other supplies to reshape the narrative and distract from the role in this crisis. Both russia in the ccp. Have made claims about the creation of vaccines. We are addressing through active public diplomacy. A pound of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We can contain outbreaks before they become pandemics. They play a key role in pandemic prevention. Including the support for the Global Health security agenda. Its still a work in progress and at the partnership is a partnership of nearly 70 nations and International Organizations and nongovernmental stakeholders. They annually coordinate the implemented agency to provide carefully targeted programming to make it with improvements along the way. It is is approached. Is reflected in the United States 2017 strategy. The leadership has been fully engaged helping 19 u. S. Partnership Companies Respond to a range of Infectious Disease at their source. These are just a few examples of the wide range infection. Its crucial to countering biological effects. We look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Thank you mr. Moore. Let me recommend mister doll. Good morning. We appreciate the leadership you have shown on these important issues. Thank you for inviting me here today to share how the department of state bureau of interNational Security works to address some of the most urgent and challenging threat to u. S. National security. Im honored to appear before you alongside my colleague. With the international and Environmental Affairs bureau and by my colleagues from the department of defense. Through diplomatic efforts in foreign assistance, with the nonproliferation bureau. It works to creates those and not let them had mass destruction. It has been working hard for nearly 20 years to address challenges opposed by the full vector of these threats. Whether they are spread. Naturally occurring. It is a grim reminder of how much damage a single pathogen can cause the u. S. National and interNational Security. Through diplomacy are interNational Security bureau strengthens multilateral framework including the biological Weapon Convention and the australia group. They made remarks on this very issue. We are leading the International Community in making significant progress on biological issues including issuing g7 statements on the international pandemic. And response. In the Global Partnership we have led efforts i have invested in the significant resources in the four full range of the system threat. Including over 450 Million Dollars over the past 15 years towards mitigating biological threats. We have a long and rich history of bio security capacity where we have trained thousands of foreign partners and bio on bio security in over 50 countries. These Threat Reductions they are can slowing the thread. We understand that threat to the interNational Security and we begin to quickly incorporate topics in our training leveraging remote and Distance Learning platforms to deliver critically needed help in a timely manner. We are also in the process of programming an additional 18 million via our non liberation find towards controlling this pandemic and preventing future biological events as well as adding additional experts to our efforts and explaining the representative noted moments ago that there are limitations to our authority and i will note that we did propose the Broader Authority to prevent these limitations. We are not alone and we are deeply grateful for the decades im very Close Partnership we have enjoyed with our department of defense colleagues. In looking to the future we are also working hard to keep pace with the rapidly evolving changes in biotechnology and i note several of them members have concerns about this concern about this very issue. Let me assure you the full range of u. S. National security departments and agencies are focusing on and analyzing these efforts. Our interNational Security. Is using our diplomatic incapacity building tool to prevent the application of dual use technology to do harm such as the development of biological weapons. For example they noted moments ago that the standards and norms to address this issue and we are a deed working on this area. We had had issues with this. In conclusion we are very proud of the work that we do to combat Infectious Disease threats using our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools and support of u. S. National security. We deeply appreciate the support of the congress to provide us with the necessary resources to carry out our Threat Reduction mission and we recognize that our work is far from over. Thank you for your testimony. Pursuant to the house rules. As for the purposes of questioning the witnesses. I will recognize members. If you miss your turn please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. I will start by recognizing myself. With the conditions and cancers. And other elements. I think the vast majority of scientists are using this technology. I also know that the same gene editing techniques and so forth can certainly be used to cause us harm. As well as inadvertently a scientist that may be looking for a career a cure. Something that unintentionally causes harm. How do you create these norms for standard of ethical use. In a multilateral way. And does this have any impact when we are working with our corporate sectors as well. They are looking for novel therapies. I get the sense that there isnt the normal. How do we do this in a multilateral way. Select thank you chairman. They are advancing very quickly especially in some parts of the bio sector. We face this challenge across the board with technologies almost all technologies have applications as you point out for in normas good and can cause substantial harm. We had been working on the issue of norms and standards for over a decade and what we have done is try to work through amongst other mentalities the National Academies in cooperation with national ways. We have engaged other International Organizations. We have included working with the corporate sector and for example we work closely with partners in india. And in those outreach and training that we do. We clued the government sector in the corporate center. As we try to build bio security including through building norms. Building norms is also with all the challenging. Is probably at least as talented in the moment. Take the chairmans point. This is a particularly important area. With the funding and some of the look to defeat the virus both here domestically through Vaccine Distribution and development. I will look at some of the dod callings. It will allow us to Start Building the surveillance tools and what do they look like and what is the best path. Very important. I would just add on the biotechnology front we view it as a promise and so there is a whole lot of promise in the bio economy. We must keep it number one. There is a live apparel. From a vaccine simply as you ask. It is vitally important that we continue to work as an inner agency together. Weve also got to provide information across International Organizations it is and comment upon us to share the information. We work with our partners and allies and we expect dependable clear information to come back and that is vital if were for not sharing information and for not doing it effectively and clearly that we run the risk of having more severe outbreaks as the Technology Advances in the globalized economy. We are in a position to help train and educate and help enforce and for some of the norms. In todays biological threat world its really hard to distinguish between nationstate and non nationstate in terms of who is responsible for these actions. Getting those norms is a much more complicated issue. Now we have a much bigger playing plainfield to try to figure it out. A complicates attribution. I think it is a noble glow dash my goal but is compensated. I think my times up. Let me recognize the Ranking Member. Thank you again. To your panel. Mr. Oxnard just mentioned some of the nonstate actors. As you know in 2018 russia and the agents used the soviet development. In an attempt to assassinate the former russian spy. With the savior. Its hard to prove were pretty sure but its hard to prove. Kinda like the coronavirus. We have some pretty strong opinions about it. How can the International Community enforce accountability. That is a really tough question as you know. Thats why a mention in my previous comment. A lot of it can be denied. The actual Scientific Evidence wasnt necessarily shared immediately with us. They had been provided some of the samples and actually do some of the assessments. A lot of it is about agreements. We actually came together as allies. To put the blame where it is necessary. With the bio attribution. We spent years on nuclear attribution. Watching what happened and now devol me and others quite honestly we tend to think that it happens over there so to speak. Obviously a close friend and an ally. I find that exceptionally concerning. At enough i didnt know if you have any answers to that. Did you have something to add there. I would just say, the further use and acceptability has to be confronted. There is significant effort being put into this particular incident across the u. S. Government and across the International Community. They will work on the International Norm piece. I you mentioned threats from the biological threat perspective much information would be required at a higher level. The state department has said there is no way to confirm their adherence pretty certain that china is not is not adhering to. It grows and grows in concern. Its vital to get after this. I appreciate. I know its difficult. On the nonstate actor side. They get anything from a recently arrested canadian woman crossing into the United States and mailing the president of the United States and the mayor of texas ricin. It was fairly prevalent. It should be no surprise how they found that. Im just wondering what the status of the illicit chemical weapons trade and availability. And how you guys are working with you either overseas counterparts maybe not even overseas. It goes across the border. What are you guys doing with those types of things. What we see with the counterterrorism activity. Theyve tried to resurrect peer radically. As a matter of expertise. They had been used several times but never to weapon grade. The terrorist groups had have this intention. We need to make sure that they dont gain those expertise. If i could add to that a little bit. On the diplomatic side we had worked very closely with International Partners i consist particular threat. We have them working in key states. The specific set of non threats. Diplomatic efforts weve integrated our concerns to the broader emblematic concerns. With regard to your question about trade we do is strengthen International Control on chemical and biological precursors. I will say in general i believe the evidence is that much of the efforts used they have the chemicals that are procured within the state. We will continue to tighten up within the area. Most of it appears homegrown. Thank you mister chairman. Can you hear me okay . Very good. I want to go back in my Opening Statement and talked about the secured concerns i have with the reduction program. Compared to the 2020 levels. It was cut by 135 million in the budget request this year. Within that program the threat and the agent was cut the most i by over 55 million the so given the pandemic in which we find ourselves were allowing the department a significant cut to this mission of detecting biological threats to the United States. I want to begin with director oxford. This is a program that congress clearly supports what additional work would you be able to perform if congress is in fact able to restore the funding to the enacted level. In what other work would you be able to do with the bio Threat Reduction program which was cut the most i want to know how the departments expected evolves over the past six months of the pandemic and how the department surges to support the covid 19 fight. We have looked at the programs and we are able to restore the activities and 22 countries. We can provide the committees with the specific examples of what will be restored. Being able to reintroduce. We can also had that. We have some regional interests in this area. We would be able to restore activities. With the senate. We still have that appropriation. It is our intent to restore that. With the question of the six months of the pandemic and how it will evolve. We do have appreciation. For the longstanding support that this committee and both sides of the health and both sides of the aisle have given towards our reduction program. I would say the biological Threat Reduction program has been operating for over 16 years and over 30 countries doing great work and as far as a last 16 months. The effort an International Effort is led by our colleagues. From a dod perspective and they manage the humanitarian affairs office, over the course of the last six months and about a hundred Million Dollars in dod support. As it relates specifically most of the support is historical in nature. A lot of the lab support has been over the course of the years the willing partners. In the information flow is what is most vital. Specifically for bt rp the direct funding in response to covid much of it is ppe. A lot of it is trading. And it goes back to the historical relationships with this country. We provide robust training and information flow. Making sure that the partner countries know they have a reach back resource you can provide that information to the partner nations. We appreciate all of the efforts to go forward on this covid fight. Can you tell us about the work that they been doing to help with the effort in the bio defense effort. Early on they were using to meet the challenge of crisis. Can you explain how you have done that with the lack of support. I think a lot of people have made comparisons between our response to ebola versus the covid threat. The ebola pathogen was declared as a threat by cdc. They could defend the resources against the threat. As they condemned that pandemic. With that produce money. Theyve actually been able to benefit in this. It is looking at the rapid assessment. Using Wearable Technology and identifying the onset of symptoms and illnesses. The appropriate testing can take place. The expertise has been taken. With the are r d fund and the time like this. Thank you mister chairman. Let me now recognize your chairman. So the first question i think it is probably for Mister Oxford i was just wondering if you could help us understand with regards to biological threats kind of what that role is for the response and what the role is in contributing to the future thinking about what to do. Are you strictly responding to requests or do you have a role in planning ahead. With the information about what to do. We actually play two roles. Its not really a response role. But in the covid environment. The years worth of work that we have done to prepare some of those nations they were able to rapidly respond. They needed some confusion in the capabilities. Hundred 99 trained physicians. With a hundred thousand dollars. We can have a situation where they can start doing the response. We are able to benefit from what we have done over the decades or so. We are actually on the cuttingedge cutting edge of all the research and development. We are looking forward to as we made reference to things like six synthetic bio. Based on the Technical Expertise what the nefarious ways could be used. We are also looking for the advantage we might gain by understanding this. And making them better. Able to resolve things faster. We do have the forward look. Mr. Laster. On that point. I noticed in your testimony you talked about how you are organize in your role. In the cooperation with the defense are any. Can you discuss that a little bit. I dont know if this would be for mister laster mr. Oxford. The combination of technologies and where it meets. I think the discussion about joint technology. Maybe you could touch on that what we should be thinking about in the future. Thank you congressman. We are spending quite a bit of time and resources across the department so i mentioned Research Engineering they are vital to the efforts to ensure we have what are white war fighters need. With the defense program. It is vital in that. With respect to some of these technologies they are concerning the department though is right size and fitted to respond to them. The way we are organized across the cw md enterprising quite robust. A number of organizations as you can imagine from the joint staff in our policy perspective to combat and command services. We come together fairly regularly in an effort that i think would be the highlight. With the unity of effort counsel. In the form we are able to slow these issues up for discussion indecision. It is an area that we can get full information across the department and make decisions at the highest level. Obviously in the setting a lot of a little harder to get into those areas. We are resourced properly and we are right size to go after this. If i can as follow up on part of that. You dont obviously run the division. Has already come to recognize this as a higher priority now or is this something you are having to battle out with Research Engineering in their list of priorities that they already had . I speak fairly regularly a lot of tremendous talent across the Intelligence Committee that flows the information. On a daily basis if not hourly basis. Thats something that they are very agile. If we need to adjust to go after a threat we can do it. But we do welcome interest in support of congress. So i wanted to ask as the covid19 pandemic progressed, the military intelligence followed it and saw that escalation. Give us a timeframe. Whatkinds of levels of alert occurred in january and february during that period . Was there a change in the level of alert based on military intelligence during that period and did it occur in januaryand february . Or before february . Thank you for that question. What i can tell you is in february terry esper identified three priorities to combat covid. First to protect our people, next to maintain Mission Readiness and third to ensure we were supporting the whole of governmentefforts. With that came internally within dod Different Health protection levels so pretty early as youll probably recall in march at least as it relates to the department of defense we were put in and situation that reduced the number of folks present at their jobs so with that information flow did happen and does happen, i think weve pointed out all of us here today information flow is vital. While the Intelligence Community can collect and does collect information, analyze and get it out the policymakers to include congress, there must be flow of information across the entire globe and it must happen from all parties in all countries. We can expect just the United States. Sorry. Was there a level of alert change to correspond with that . As early as february, as early as february, in march was when i believe i have to go back for the exact date but thats when the hp cant change. Over the course of those months for information was continuing to flow and the proper resources applied to analyzing that. But was there a change to a level one alert in february . That would have been the first time in history that a pandemic raised itself to that level, did that occur . I cant tell you the exact date. I need to go back andprovide that information to you in the committee. Lets assume it might have. Would you transfer that information immediately to our states agencies and our agencies of state,state department . And congress . As you know the Intelligence Community is quite large so all the organizations today and intelligence portion to them. So that information is shared across the Intelligence Committee. I say that but information generally is shared across the Intelligence Community so we do that on a daily basis and we plug information back andforth. My concern is that congress was not notified in as timely a fashion to those changes. So if you can get back to our respective committees, tiedown dates and what the significance was because its my understanding in terms of whats publicly accessible that there was a change. Its my understanding it was historic in terms of the first time a pandemic was addressed with that level of change and im concerned about the sharing of information which was slow to congress whether it was also slow to our other state Department Agencies and relevant agencies and agencies appearing before the committee here today because indeed, if we are going to do this, what you said as witnesses. Placing a focus on sharing that information, its critical and its my concern was not being done in a timely fashion so if youd get back to us i would appreciate that and with that mister chairman i yield back. Let me recognize mygood friend from the state of california mister sherman. Thank you. Theres been discussion i believe by the first Ranking Member to the full complicity of the who. The who is a coordinating organization, its not an intel organization. It has no way to know whether what chinas saying is complete and true and transparent or not. You know who does have an ill intel organization, the United States government and our intelligence is designed to know when china is not telling the truth. In fact, the president was informed that this was breaking out in wuhan far more than the Chinese Government indicated. He chose to ignore that intelligence. Just as he seems to have ignored much to the unfortunate harm to himself and his wife, ignored the best advice on how to avoid getting this disease and unfortunately misled millions of americans as well into not wearing masks. We spend many hundreds of billions of dollars defending our self from kinetic threats and very little on defending ourselves from anything else. We have, did not have Civil Defense designed for either a deliberate or a naturally occurring plate. We had not have stockpiles of ppe. We did not have the education. We did not have the ventilators although we quickly made some and we did not have the capacity to do tracing. This all in spite of the fact that the National Security strategy recognized that biological incidents, this was in 2017 have the potential to cause catastrophic loss of life and the threats are growing whether as a result of deliberate attack, accident or natural outbreak. Which raises the question and i know were not in a classified setting, what is the administrations operating assumptions or likelihood or how would we assign percentage likelihoods to afford possibilities as to how this plague began . Were told perhaps it came from the wet market and it may have come from the wuhan lab which might have been engaged in entirely peaceful activity that had a tragic release. It could have come from a wuhan lab that was engaged in military activities but had an unintentional release and least likely of all itcould have come deliberately from a wuhan lab. Do we have any operating assumptions or are all of those possible although i think the deliberate release is highly unlikely. What is the administration, where does the administration think is the cause of this . Thank you congressman sherman. Its in an important question. I do think we are, we as an International Community but the Us Government are working right now presently to respond to this crisis. So youre saying any one of those possibilities is possible and the government doesnt have much of an opinion on which is the cause . Do the other witnesses agree with that . Grossman sherman, thank you for the question. Youve mentioned or possible scenarios and certainly in discussions in an open forum, theres, there are varying levels of possibility what we do know is that the virus described as covid19 was described in Academic Research that was published several years ago including in the peoples republic of china identified as existing in animals. It is a disease that is a virus of zoo not origin but exactly as you say sir. The idea it was engineered is probably dismissed by that and ill probably ask normally when there is a catastrophe first thing anybody does is you close the barn door. Mine has said this has come from a wet market. There are wet markets all over china. Has there been a massive change in how exotic animals are sold for humanconsumption throughout china . Thats an important point and something under the purview of the oes euro of state. The peoples republic of china continues to be the largest market. Has there been a big change from early 2019 to now late 2020 and how these markets operate . There has not been a fundamental permanent change in blogging with wildlife trade including its sale at wet markets. Its a practice that does exist in other countries and we are working to end it. Thank you. Not me right now recognize the gentleman frommichigan mister levin. Thank you so much mister chairman for convening this important hearing. Its no secret to the rest of the world that this pandemic was allowed tospiral out of control in the United States. [inaudible] the New York Times reported around the same state as when new york city cases were skyrocketing backin march. The whole world can see it happening including those who wish to do harm to our country. So let me pose this question to Mister Oxford andmister north. Do you believe there will be heightened interest on the part of state and nonstate actors in developing weapons against americans and if yes how will the departments of state and defense prepare for that possibility . I apologize sir, the transmission was a little imprecise. Question would you like me to respond to sir . Sorry about that. My question is do you think there will be a heightened interest on the part of stated and unstated actors in developing defenses against americans and if yes how will the departments of state and defense repair for that possibility . With regard to development of biological weapons that would be better addressed to my colleague from the iso and bureau. Okay. This is a difficult question to address in an unclassified context. I guess what i can say is that we continually review these issues. We had a discussion two days ago with ourcolleagues who are experts on these issues. I think i take your point that the pandemic as i testified to moses a substantial, in normas challenge to interNational Security and its must inherently be the case that our adversaries, whether they are terrorists or a state will take that into account in considering how to giveall their weapons. Let me field another question. January 2017, the cdcs presence in china decreased about 40 personnel to 14. Without Health Professionals getting caught. The National Science Foundation Also closed their beijing offices during this time and on top of that, the department of agriculture transfer the manager of this program out of china in 2018. So over the past four years weve gotten rid of a bunch of people it seems to me would have been helpful to have in place as covid19 was emerging area at the very least i think it would be helpful to have reliable sources of information about what wasreally happening on the ground. Mister oxford and mister moore, in general why does the us experts epidemiologists state stationed in other countries and how does this help defend us against biologicalthreats. Again, from a distant defense this department perspective, were not responsible for where cdc and others operate though i have to yield to either the state department or go back to those other departments and do those kind of things. Lets hear the state perspective. Thank you sir, we be pleased to offer more detail timeline of who was assigned under the authority of the chief of mission in beijing area at that time i think the context for individual agencies sending staff there or reducing their staff there is a lot to do with both their needs, their budgets and of course the viability of the work that they can actually do. One of the constraints we face with regard to the peoples republic of china is that we still have not received all of the data we would need to receive initial samples. Of the virus that had been sought since the beginning of the pandemic even at the end of last year. That is extremely problematic as is the work of the peoples republic of china to prevent the World Health Organization from declaring covid19 a Health Concern of International Concern and that topic came up for discussion at the who in geneva with regard to the specific agencies with the policies that haveto take that question. Let me close by saying i think its extremely problematic for us to talk about what the who should do when we withdraw from it. I think its extremely problematic for us to reduce our capability, scientific and diplomatic and Public Health expertise in china and around the world during a Global Pandemic and with great thanks i yelled back mister chairman. Very good, thank youmister levin. Since there are no republicans in the right now i give the chair to mister stan berger for five minutes. I think miss amber is having some technical issues. Okay. Im told that there are other members in the rightnow. So i would suggest chairman barracks come back after voting and should we recess right now . Im waiting to hear back from our committee staff. s is representative larson, im the only member in the room right now and representative barrett is voting and were trying toget staff to answer your question about his return. We want recess right now, perhaps give us a few minutes. Asked another question that i have and i want to get to a second round now until we get that clarified when miss danbury comes back on i will certainly yield to her but in the meantime, let me go to Mister Oxford. Weve heard that they might have been directed not to spend funding on the covid19 site which troubles me is true. Even a program specialized in developing countermeasures in that scene in therapeutics and treatments, what do you need from us to ensure that you have the authorities and resources needed to give rise to the challenge of emerging threats both today and tomorrow and is there work you could be doing now to help the country in the covid19 fight that you dont currently have the permission to do. Iq mister chairman. For your first question or your statement that there is no department for provisional exclusion, l say the primary focus on statutory requirements to develop and deliver capabilities and ensure the war fighters ability to fight and win a chemical or biological contaminated environment, covid19 support provided to the services and interagency is a combination of subject matter expertise, leveraging existing contracts to expedite delivery of capabilities. As an example assisting with testing and evaluation from helping to create detection diagnostics and treatment methods to investigating vaccines. The Program Continues to collaborate with the whole of government partners, industry and academia. Its important to note that the Bio Defense Program is a Research Development and Acquisition Program and not necessarily a response capability but i will say to your followup questions are the congress has been exceptionally helpful to the cooperative reduction program. Historically as i referenced earlier, support that we asked for hiscontinued support for the program. We appreciate the information flow between our departments and i think i can say the same for the state department. And between our staff, its exceptional and we look forward to continuing that information flow. I know the Additional Authority that youre asking for right now that you would enhance yourwork. I think at the momentwhere good. I know that our staff have communicated historically and i hope that they can continue to do that, and if we do identify an issue or an authority that is necessary we will be absolutely certain to bringthat to you and your team. Okay, thank you area that concludes my question for right now. Has the gentleman from the minority returned yet or miss danbury has she returned . This is rick larson again. Still the only member in the room. Iq Mister Larson area i yield now to miss andorder if shes returned. Okay. Im seeing she is not on. Can you hear me . Yes, i have you now, youre recognized for five minutes. Thank you very much to the witnesses for being here. I appreciate your time and your presence. I have a question about staffing related issues. As a former cia case officer unaware of the importance of detecting threats before they harm americans and that must be our approach when it comes to biologicalsecurity as well. We have to in front of biological and Health Security risks before they can do damage like weve seen with covid19 and wehave to work with our partners so no matter where brett arises we can contain. We see offices in charge of presenting to the threat ours understaffed its hard to get have that program so i open this up to members of the panel, National Security agencies have suffered from rates in the past two years and given how long federal hiring and take are likely to see rebel effects of this for years. Our vacancies affecting your work currently and in your view how can state and dod reform hiring practices to ramp up to the needed efforts more quickly . And in a specific call out on there, do your offices have trouble finding and recruiting staff with the specialized skills needed to focus on reducingbiological security threats and i open up to the panelists. Thank you congresswoman. Its a great question. Its an ageold issue employing the right staff. I can say from the cw and the perspective we have a talented team of professionals from career civilians to the uniformed personnel to Government Contractors so it would be hard to speak across the entire department. Me personally doing that but i can tell you we are the right size. We obviously always are on the lookout for talent and so we will continue to do that and continue to if we can find talent to bring them in the doors. Ill defer to my other colleagues. Miss span berger from a district point of view we operate a highly Technical Organization similar to some of the core fields youre referring to. Our recruitment strategy is healthy that we continue to look for additional talent as necessary but so far our attribution rates are rates are going steady so i think in chem bio defense area that we operate as well as the rest of rr and the organization, our health and welfare, the r and the community is verysound. Thank you. Miss benberger, im pleased to report we have an expert teamof Civil Service , longterm polys and Foreign Service colleagues on to your assignments. Im pleased to say in recent months weve been able to add to our staffing and bring on permanently a number of colleagues including fellows from the American Association for the advancement of science area it has a longstanding cooperation with aaa s so that we benefit from their technical and professionalexpertise. The team is doing an outstanding job of dealing with covid on the home front and working on it professionally. This is phil dobbs from state. I think i echo the remarks of my colleagues. I think vacancies have not been a substantial challenge and are part of the department on this issue. As i testified we have also been increasing our staff. Weve added experts using the special authority the department has provided in this regard. Adding that to the staffing offices that deal with biological issues so i think in general, we dont have staffing challenges. We do have a great partnership. And fellowships to bring us Technical Expertise but i think recruiting a technical specialist is sometimes a challenge and that is probably the one area where at times it has been a bit of a challenge for us. Thank you for sharing that and i hope the committee can be involved to whateverend is appropriate in ensuring that you all can into the future recruit to the Staffing Levels that are necessary. Im going to ask for the next portion if youll indulge me because itwill direct what my followup question is. By a show of hands, to your teams participate in a war game exercise to train and prepare potential but biological security risks . Its an awkward circumstance with virtual and present, if you could raise your hands if you do because my followup questiondepends very much on if its decided. I see two and two from here. Okay. So im curious then with the majority of you anticipating in wargames, do you and your colleagues draw upon the modeling and simulation analysis to think through what quickly changing threats could look like and how to respond or are you using this for biological threats and what have you learned from these tabletop exercises recently . As it relates to covid19 and my time is limited so if one of you wants to take this one i welcome you all to choose who goes next. Congresswoman, this is Mister Oxford and one of the things we do is the same capability overseas with people we trained over the course of time and bio responses. We do exercises periodically to make sure theyre maintaining readiness and the standards theyve been trained to. Its one of the ways we transfer theresponsibility of the programto those nations. Exercises in training are one of the key aspects of us understanding that the retention is there. Thank you very much and mister chairman thanks for the extra time. I yield back. Thank you miss benberger. It seemed there are no additional members who have questions and obviously its always difficult in this virtual hybrid in person format and then toss on top of that netscape so im going to use the chairs prerogative and make a closing statement and see if chairman langford and would like to make a statement as well. But actually maybe a closing question. The issue of buyer surveillance is something i thought thought a lot about and thinking about how we use of the naturally occurring technologies that are out there reedit social media, search words, google. All of a sudden you see a jump in people searching incidence of fever or flulike symptoms. Some of that can be Early Warning systems for us to pay close attention. I know wireless thermometers etc. , thinking about how both in the midst of the pandemic but also what are our Early Warning systems for naturally occurring threats and that are already likely in use. I know folks from dod or state could comment on how we should be thinking about that. German, its an exceptional question and its an old approach and weve all talked today about information sharing. Thats absolutely vital its fundamental if were going to ensure that we are detecting , predicting specifically on this issue detecting threats and flowing that informationreally at this point globally. So its working with our interagency colleagues like we do on a daily basis here is also working with our International Friends and partners and as phil had mentioned, the Global Partnership for spread against weapons ofmass destruction, thats a perfect organization. As aGlobal Health. The agenda is another effort that can provide information flow to dozens of countries around the world. So the all of the above approach is necessary and it has to requireinformation flow. Mister chairman, as you recall in one of my earlier answers i talk about regional approaches and when we started the cdr program it was mostly nationstate specific, one program one country and the regional approach allows for this information sharing across regional boundaries it enhances protection within regions as opposed to looking at this solely by country so it really does help in the broader understanding. I think that the chairman raises a good point that we have a whole set of emerging tools that can greatly add to information sharing and bio surveillance. Weve learned during the pandemic how to expand the toolset that we have to additional tools. For example, in uganda and in africa there are a whole set of telephonebased tools that we had not previously used to the degree we use now so were trying to take advantage of the whole new toolset that is out there and i think that the Global Pandemic, the chairman noted that theres great infrastructure being built to deal with this pandemic. And theres new technologies that are being integrated into while surveillance and this is a good example of how we need to build up our capabilities and our data flows after all the informationthats available. Great, i certainly want to thank all four of our witnesses for their service to our countryand again , make sure everyones safe and we will get through this. Lets get through this in a more resilient way and in a stronger way and in a way that we can protect the next pandemic working for bio i know chairman lanterman is still on and if you want to make any closing statements. I am here mister chairman. Thank you for your joint collaboration and putting this hearing together. Im enjoying working with you on this and certainly it was important here and very timely right now. I want back our witnesses and obviously were working portfolios whether its coming weapons of mass destruction or working with other witnesses. These are obviously, the potential capabilities you take that are important to the nation and so we have continued work that were going to continue to do together and making sure that we get properly resourced and about the plans and procedures are in place to respond effectively and we can rest assured that we will be at future events that we will have to confront and we want to make sure that we are as prepared as possible to respond with speed and agility that is necessary to save lives. Keep people healthyand protect the country. So with that we thank you for the work youre doing. I know members may have additional questions and i asked that they respond in writing as expeditiously. With that i have no further questions and i yield back misterchairman. Thank you chairman langford. And again, our thoughts and prayers are with every buddy around the world is impacted by covid19. So with that, again i want to thank witnesses for being here this morning and they hearing is adjourned. Class. [inaudible]. [inaudible] tonight on the communicators, freedom found her parents free press coceo Jessica Gonzales on issues that may play a rolein campaign 2020. What it ministration is trying to do is narrow the protection for moderation so that websites would no longer be protected at a drivethrough content was a false work perhaps racist. Im no fan of big tech platforms and how they abused their workers and how they have abused the privacy rights of their users. But frankly, going after section 230 is not the right approach to the very real problem that we are seeing with online platforms. Baron socha and Jessica Gonzales tonight at eight eastern on the communicators on cspan2. Watch live coverage of the Senate Confirmation hearings for judge amy barrett with Opening Statements by judiciary Committee Members and judge barrett. Live coverage on cspan and cspan. Org. Listen live on the cspan radio app. Next, a hearing on preventing fraud and abuse in the Paycheck Protection Program reedit the Inspector General of the Small Business administration along with a representi