2020 has been quite a challenging and tumultuous year across the globe. Especially, weve seen some devastating effects. Coronavirus across the world and in our region in latin america and in venezuela. In venezuela, as well, we have an internationally recognized interim government that marked its first year, we have a growing humanitarian crisis that entered a new phase and the pandemic with a crippling Health Care System that has already been unable to provide even the most basic medicine to venezuelan people and at the same time an economy thats in hyper inflationary collapse and social unrest across the country. And we also have, as we look to the end of this year, an election in venezuela, in december, that theyre all set to be a sham parliamentary election among increasing opposition. A top priority for International Allies of venezuelan Democratic Forces should be deterring the global web list of activities and external and nonstate partners that help to sustain maduro and his backers. This requires coordinated action to further open the pathway for the restoration of democracy in venezuela. Id like to reiterate the Atlantic Councils bringing International Attention and action to achieve democratic stability in venezuela. Today were going to focus on nicola maduros network and synergies and strategies to combat the activities and secure democratic restoration in venezuela. This conversation is launching a Latin American Center policy brief and it investigates the origins of the result of international players. As well this discussion is marking, im very excited to announce this, the formal launch of the new body of work in connection with the setup for strategies and securities around venezuela. This is focused on the International Allies of the interim government, with the activity and support that Nicholas Nicholas madura. Im going to turn to the executive vice chair of the council and the founder and visionary of the center and the introducing the admiral. Thank you, i might mention although im setting in my office in washington d. C. My background is my home in miami, florida and thats where interim president guaidos wife stayed for the day while she received many people in miami to talk about the situation in venezuela and she received the key to the city of miami from the mayor. As you can imagine, this was precovid. Over the years, the center has brought awareness to latin americas most pressing challenges, embracing my longstanding vision and view that the center would focus on the worlds perception of the region as a core partner and ally and yet, venezuela, once a thriving democracy, today is in one of its darkest times. With the complications of covid19 and parliamentary elections soon to be held, this is a desizive moment for the restoration of venezuela. I want to kick off todays conversation by saying how very pleased i am to welcome to this Virtual Meeting a friend of the center and a friend of mine, admiral craig fowler. Hes the commander of the United StatesSouthern Command based in miami. And with his naval leadership and his extensive background throughout the military, hes been our best leader for the critical operations that are now necessary in latin america. And now, i turn it over to you. Thank you very much, adrian. Admiral fowler, first as adrian said. Admiral, thank you so much for your service and for being with us here today. Admiral, a couple of questions for you. First off, in april south com launched an enhanced counter narcotics operation in the caribbean with drugs flowing from regime partnerships with critical groups in venezuela being a focus of those efforts. Of course, those are major security challenge to the United States, but lets start out by asking you, why in particular are the elicit flows coming out of venezuela such a great threat to the United States interest. Thank you adrian for the warm introduction and your friendship and jason, thanks for moderating this conversation and what the Atlantic Council does to have facilitate these important conversations about policies that affects the security of the United States, the region and the world. And when we look at this region, there is so much promise and so much potential to look at it as a beacon of freedom, the numbers of democracies and what we all shared really makes it a neighborhood and upping about what constitutes the neighborhood, the proximity to all of us, particularly the United States, the values and democracies that we share, the famia piece of it, the people, and of course, the huge intellectual Human Capital that constitutes those people, the resources. Were a resource rich neighborhood. And all of that is under assault. Its under assault by a vicious circle of threats, the city of which, as you characterized, jason, venezuela. But to get at venezuela, to march around that circle, its young democracies and emerging institutions and we need institutions, its key to getting after the elicit flows. This corruption which eats at the democracies and the institutions and its an environment that the transnational and criminals have thrived on corruption. External actors thrive on those same conditions, corruption, emerging institutions and young democracies, weak democracies in some cases and we see cuba, russia, china, iran, nicaragua, venezuela, all of these countries mixing it up in that space. Covid has complicated the ability to do anything for all of these nations and also has really exasperated the problems as you mentioned. So venezuela, it all comes together in venezuela and just stepping back and we look at what the impact has been, 5. 2 million migrants, human suffering, the increase, drastic increase in narco trafficking coming out of venezuela, which is killing lives, killing people here in the United States, whether its miami, pittsburgh and the same Central America and throughout the hemisphere. So at the heart of the threat, its the lives that were losing unnecessarily and its the undermining of democracy and that was a choice maduro made to take the once thriving state into the current dictatorship that it is. Covid has allowed them to lock down further on the power and we see distance, eln, actually having tear tore cal expansion within the state. So, all of those threat factors are headed in a negative direction which is a significant reason why we have upped the amount of engagement were doing with our partners and enhanced our narcotics operation. Admiral, thank you very much. You describe this cocktail of security threats that we have emanating out of venezuela, the trafficking of course, the elicit gold mining in which criminal groups are heavily involved, weapons trafficking, massive corruption. You were just referencing the enhanced narcotics operations an and working with regional allies in that regard and id like to pick up on that point and ask you how is south com working with regional allies to do something to elicit trafficking coming from venezuela and the second part of the squestion is, what is the partners have allowed us to adapt to the covid environment and allowed us to adapt to the increase in the threats. So, everything in those military to military realm and the security dimension starts with intelligence sharing and we do that and weve increased that as a result of the crisis in venezuela. One of our principal commands is to Interagency Task force south in key west where we have 22 partner nations. Theyre all aligned there under the Common Threat of narco trafficking and the next to maduro is his complicity in that threat. The nations that go there, working for the good of the hemisphere. Thats a success and weve seen the increase in partner involvement year to year and last year, this year, currently 50 of all of our counter narcotic operations have some involvement of a partner nation and thats indicative of the importance in investing in partnerships over time and Security Cooperation funds and those source elements played heavily in there. The challenges, of course, Going Forward are the center of gravity for the maduro regimes illicit activities are cuba, russia, increasingly iran and to a lesser extent, but an important extent, china. So, in order to get the True International unity that we need, and ill leave this to the diplomates that are on the calls here to talk later, in order to get the True International union, we need to have the unity in that space as well and we dont. And the longstanding involvement of cuba, essentially, maduros president ial guard or cuban control, its his pretorian guard, hes essentially a puppet. So to break that center of gravity is more than cutting off the little illicit flow. And its part of the end of u. S. Government and whole nation approach. So, well talk about this next conversation like how to moderate, but when we look at how the International Committee can really ramp up coordinated action to isolate the maduro regime is what im hearing, its really the action against some of the state actors, the russians, cubens and others that are helping to keep these illicit flows moving. Would you agree with that . I think that the center, as we look at things, what keeps maduro in power, what allows him to operate unchecked, what allows him to continue the strangle hold on his population, why has venezuela turned into a virtual paradise for narco terrorists and thugs of all types and theres interests that are running counter to the interests of human rights, democracy, and i think that those one of the keys is to shift that center of gravity away from maduro. And theres a lot of people working in this space and i think the u. S. Whole government efforts have been quite wellknitted. Certainly the results havent gotten to where we want them to be, but theres been great partnerships, with the folks that are on the screen here today. Well, admiral, with that ill actually transition over to our panel and thank you very much for those points and as you know, the Atlantic Council has also been very committed to the efforts and thats why were launching the new effort on count erring venezuelas elicit flows and the center for strategies and securities, because as youre saying disrupting those flows are going to be critical for ramping up the pressure on maduros stranglehold on venezuelan society. Im going to now, admiral, introduce the other speakers to round out the panel conversation. First, Denise Natoli is joining us, denise serves as assistant secretary for bureau of conflict at the state department. And she previously served at the director for Strategic Research at the institute of national skraek studies and the National Defense university. She has also had a number of experiences across the world on countering conflict and moving forward with the operations more broadly, so, it was great to have you with us today. Always a pleasure to welcome you and today to welcome you to the virtual Atlantic Council. And also, joined today by carrie who serves as the deputy in venezuela and cuba and the state department. And she was previously senior policy advisor for the missions to the United Nations where she advised Ambassador Nikki Haley and related to counterterrorism in the middle east and western hemisphere. Great to have you today. Thanks for joining us. And always a pleasure, again, to welcome you to the Atlantic Council. Doug is the president of National SecurityConsulting Firm idi consultants and a senior visiting fellow, and add to his title Atlantic Council authors since he authored the policy brief were releasing today. Maduros Illicit Activity a threat to democracy in venezuela and security to lat tip latin america. And diego was forced to leave venezuela among other things, he was director of social in the municipality. Over to you diego. Thank you, jason and thank you for your insightful comments on the critical work in the region. I want to kick off this discussion with this distinguished panel. Thank you for participating in this discussion, i would like to start with you. Last february right before the escalation of covid19 case is in the u. S. To travel to miami, to discuss the issues with Civil Military coordinations with senior south com leaders and later, to colombia to support the peace process. What is this for us is to promote democratic stability in the region and taking place in venezuela, specifically given the threat of operating within venezuelan territoryments thank you diego. Thank you, jason for moderating and adrian for your leadership and the Latin American Center at the Latin American Council and my colleagues and fellow analysts, its an honor to be here this morning. And the answer to your question, were planning for stablization in the region. The long answer is my bureau in coordination with our colleagues at the special abrams office. The western hemisphere bureau, south com and others, we are convening u. S. Interagency Security Sector planning for venezuela. We are conducting advanced Data Analytics to understand the operating environment and to improve our plan and one aspect that you mentioned that were focusing on specifically is the nonstate armed groups. As you know, the illegitimate Maduro Administration relies on the autocratic tools on nonstate armed groups, to conduct these activities. Venezuelas nonstate arm presents a unique challenge as they compose a complex state supported network of gangs, transnationalist terrorist networks and including the eln as you just mentioned. Where the regime lacks the will and capacity to govern venezuela, hollowed out by years of corruption and abuse, it instead enabled the growth of these nonstate armed groups, creating an illicit Patronage Network and the weakening legitimate institutions. These groups serve as a key tool of power and pose a threat to the future stability of venezuela and the region. By providing the safe harbor to the groups, maduro still dates the economies, trafficking people and goods. But the important point is that this challenge is not insurmountable. We know that these groups are not monolithic. We know that they have a diverse agendas, allegiances and interests. The qualities that maduro uses to keep them in line. Now, my advanced Data Analytics and what were supporting have shown that the nonstate armed groups have an active presence in the capital and to out every state. We to that twothirds of these groups received at least some kind of political and Logistical Support from the maduro regime. So, these diverse activities and tactics and motivations demand a nuanced and sophisticated approach that we want to see to weaken them strategically. We recognize that nonstate arms cannot be managed by the United States alone. The United States is committed to helping the venezuelan people counter the threat of these groups and my bureau is proud of the longstanding partnerships with venezuelas president of guaido and they understand the threat as we prepare for a political future. Thank you. Assistant secretary. Deputy, first of all, thank you again for joining us today. Now i would like to bring you into the conversation. As we know, the support of International Actors is furthering the regimes positions, and as mentioned, russia, china, turkey and cuba have provided support nor maduro. And concerning for the International Community. Two weeks ago secretary of state mike pompeo announced special representative for venezuela will be also serving as special representative for eye iraq. What does this mean to thank you, and of course, its great to see my colleagues. I havent seen them in a very long time because of covid. So its nice to be in the same room, so to speak, together. And mentioning the nonstate actors and diego mentioning the state actors. On one hand when we see the relationship between iran and venezuela. It signals Something Interesting for the United States. Far from relying on more traditional allies like russia, cuba, china, were looking to undertake the same relationship with those countries now with iran. It makes us think that the space between venezuela and the more traditional, more capable allies is decreasing. So in some sense, i think seeing this expansion is reflective of an opportunity. But what it reflects, really, is kind of the basis of this discussion, which is that u. S. Sanctions and International Sanctions have strained the maduro regimes ability to finance itself through income. Were seeing them move through illicit sources, whether thats illegal gold mining or narco trafficking or coordination with states like iran. So were seeing that iran is supplying materials to venezuela and were working closely with our International Partners to try to limit irans ability to supply the illegitimate maduro regime. In terms of the relationship between the two, what weve seen is that maduro has illegally stolen about nine tons of gold bars more or less the equivalent of 500 million and sent them to tehran in exchange for irans assistance. Its not clear what type of assistance iran is providing which is a concern for us as well although we know they have offered to assist in boosting Venezuelas Oil production and had it been successful with the areas a day, 350,000 barrels a day under ma dudurmaduro. I would say its not exactly worth the 500 million that venezuela provided, but it does show increasing cooperation. I think going to your question about the special representatives, first and foremost, we have iran and venezuela as two of the Top Priorities of the Trump Administration, so the fact that theyre now handled by the same individual, i think, highlights this growing symbiotic relationship. Special representative abrams deeply understands that relationship between venezuela and iran and he deeply understands venezuela and iran separate and apart from the relationship. And so, i as we seek to couldnt of confront this problem, enduring that this is all kind of under the same purview of the same individual will help with us that internal coordination. I think its a fantastic addition to special representative abrams portfolio and we know that hes very wellpositioned to ensure that u. S. Policy is taking this more holistic approach to disrupting the illicit flows in support of our policy strategies for each country. Thank you very much. Now its time to bring in or id like to ask you, in the policy were launching today, the leader of a regional, quote, unquote, joint criminal enterprise. Could you please explain the regional and Global Nature of the regimes activity and thank you, its nice to see assistant secretary, i researched at the National Defense university for a few years and worked closely with admiral fowler and other for a few years. I appreciate the opportunity. I think the point of what were trying to outline in this paper and another work weve done and supported the Deputy Assistant for narcotics and Global Defense department is analyzing that its not its a consortium of states with crime i think thats what weve seen with others in the region and beginning with chavez and the castro brothers in cuba to intentionally knit together a community of criminal enterprises that allow them in the objective to get the United States from the region and bring in actors like russia, iran, turkey, as much as possible into the region. I think you have to understand it as an intentional setup from the beginning. Under chavez they were designed to launder money, the primary purpose of the influx of billions of dollars that they could move so could you see nicaragua laundering tens of billions of dollars. And in el salvador laundering. And you see bolivia, and ecuador under correia. So you have the ability to adopt different strategies and others that the United States were carrying out by immediately turning to your network of outside support and having them fill in the gaps. So what were seeing now in our research is a lot of the gold from venezuela going to nicaragua, and as nicaragua gold, avoiding where the criminal activity is viewed as a necessary support for state functions. And i think a few years ago when i was addressing nato for ndu, one of the speakers said that the problem dealing with russia, we think were playing soccer and we think a yellow card makes, will slow down the game, a red card youre expelled and what the general said at the time, russia is not playing soccer, theyre playing polo on the same field. They dont care about yellow cards, red cards, dont care about any of that stuff. I think for a long time we treated venezuela, as if they were playing the same game on the same field we were, not realizing they had an entirely different game going on and traditional rules and ways at getting at them were not viable. So you have them directly supporting a criminal enterprise, because they are criminal enterprises and it spreads to the state. So i think that what the paper is doing, i greatly appreciate the council giving the opportunity to publish the paper there in an attempt to help understand the magnitude of what the network is as opposed to being a venezuela specific threat. Thank you very much douglas. And its a pleasure to share this virtual floor with you today. I would like to ask you, you and Foreign Policy have made expansive use of sanctions to put pressure on maduro. And he continues to serve in venezuela. What tactics are you see on the ground na maduro is taking to avoid sanctions and also what actions is taken and other measures can be taken to combat it . So, id like to just pivot back to dougs comments about the Extensive Network which is broader than venezuela. I couldnt i agree 100 with that assessment and its been pa generation in building this network back to chavez. So that web, that complex web which i characterize as this vicious circle is strangling democracy and undermining Citizen Security across this neighborhood, this hemisphere. Its alarming the extent to which actors, and mine actors in the region and out are advantaging themselves of this is extensive. So when you look at the sanctions, i believe that that pressure is working and that the whole of government pressure that the u. S. Applied, diplomatic and economic, has worked. The International Unity has set conditions to work up to a point. Up to the point where the u. N. Wouldnt be able to get on the same page because of involvement of the actors that weve discussed and others have articulated here from colleagues at state. The sanctions, the evading sanctions is a natural extension of the types of tactics, techniques, that maduro has use today launder money, make money, whether its gold, diamonds, agriculture, the Business Enterprises that they use to buy off military loyalty and keep themselves in power. So the same types of the interrelated evasion tactics, thats what theyre using, second country, second, third countries and Front Companies, cryptocurrency, Money Laundering and so the key to putting more pressure on is in the financial realm and getting in after the money flows and were working that space hard, but its a complicated space to work in. Its dod supported. And were supporting our colleagues across the interagency and International Partners were increased intelligence hearing. So, passing what we know about all of the illicit activities, including sanctions evasions are very important and where we can, and where we want to, we put that out through our diplomates into public space to call out the what maduro is doing with the complicity of International Actors to mortgage the future of not just venezuela, but the hemisphere. That strain is being felt across the hemisphere and we see it, we see it with the what its done to the economys precovid and accelerated the trend. Its a great question and it points back to the larger web, this vicious circle and the key Going Forward is how we can better share intelligence and how the International Community can better leverage that to force and change the behavior of maduro and the external state actors. Thank you. A quick reminder to our audience that you can submit questions through the zoom q a future and well take one or two. Would you like to add any comments on sanctions . Sure, thanks very much, diego. I also want to go back to something that doug said, he said that we assumed that they were playing soccer, but they were playing a totally different game and i think that this is really relevant when we think about sanctions evasion inside venezuela because i think a huge part of the resilien resilience, so to speak, of the maduro regime he was trying to run a government and needed a certain amount of money to return that government. As it turns out. He wasnt trying to run that government. He was trying to give largess to assure that he would stay in power. How much he money he needs to stay in power because he doesnt care about providing essential services to the people of venezuela. We see that most clearly in Corruption Cases involving the program and other things that were created in an effort to provide to the people of venezuela. I do partially want to quibble with the idea that the sanctions division has kind of been successful because i think weve seen the sanctions have an enormous impact on the resources. Once again, he really needs less money when he doesnt pretend to spend the money on people. I think theres a second reason why maduro has proven in front of the sanctions that the u. S. Government imposed on country and this, again is, going back to this discussion that hes doubling down where sanctions have less of an impact because theyre more focused on what would otherwise be legal courses of income. So hes always been involved in drug and gold smuggling, but hes now dependent on those proceeds and on the criminal terrorist network and partners. Third going back to our discussion about iran, hes really doubling down on these alliance was autocratic reseems, cuba, iran, russia and others. Its ironic because as we all know, venezuela was cubans patron when cuban fell into disrepair following the collapse of the soviet union. And now they need a patron and resumebly looking to iran, but its limited the candidates who will provide that support because of how illegitimate this regime really is. So a country once supporting another country is now really looking for others to boost it up and i think thats a reflection, as well, the of the significance of u. S. Sanctions. Of the significance of the policies involved bringing in other actors whether its the region through the treaty to impose sanctions on individuals, who are close to the maduro regime and enabling them to repress the people of venezuela. So i think our sanctions will continue to be effective in their objective of really putting enough pressure on the maduro regime so it will come to the table to have a genuine and good faith conversation about how we can get a Transitional Government in place inside of venezuela. Thank you very much. I want to go back to you, lets pick up the conversation and now center on the role of europe. Could you please explain to the audience how the regime is using european banking to move and hide billions and billions of dollars in assets. Thank you, diego. I think, first, its important to distinguish the europeans are not part of the joint criminal enterprise and state in that sense. If you look at the history of the criminal enterprise theyre drawing on years of experience with el salvador running their contraband weapons, nicaragua, and north korea now, the president s son spends an enormous amount of time there in the last few months. They have learned over time that europe is much more tolerant and much less willing to clamp down on Financial Institutions over things that they do not view as a particular problem in their particular area of influence. So, i think what weve seen is particularly in spain where theres primary relations between the Spanish Government and maduro regime than the eu as a whole. Weve tracked and others have looked at enormous amounts of money that flow into portugal because its relatively an easy place to get to. We see in our work on the networks enormous amount of Front Companies set up in luxembourg, in switzerland, the famous case in honduras. And these folks that dealt with this know where the cracks are, if you read the history of the north koreas European Network to do that. The and elements of those networks survive and some of the same players one of the i think so this that an i sound me because im old and have been doing this for a long time, you see a lot of the same players turning up again and again. Some of the people helping the sandonis sandonistas, and others running billions through the same structures that they used in the war to go back to the 1980s. So, you have this wealth of experience. Theyre not inventing anything new. Theyre simply exploiting and going down the road they already know is forward and pushing further. Theyre creative and innovative and they understand the cracks, but i think that what we underestimate a lot of times, with the cubans, theyve been doing this for 20 years. Theyre very experienced and they know the core players are willing to do a lot of money and theyre willing to pay that money. I think that europe has to be aware of the regional threat that the network poses in latin america which will directly impact them on the amount of gold, and crashing their markets, the real estate boom in spain is in part due to the gross inflation of prices due to venezuelan corruption. So, it doesnt impact them and i think that helping them understand that and getting much more complas complacent and with the existing laws, and that could go a long way. Any thoughts on the potential role of europe to combat a maduro regime as douglas just described for us . Yes, i think that europe is essential. As doug mentioned, we have really been focused on coordinating with these countries, whether its spain, portugal, whether its the u. K. I think the recent bank of england ruling is sort of a testament to the importance of country and guaido is policy and practices as well. In that case, billions of dollars were at stake as the maduro regime was trying to feel for itself were not the property of the maduro regime. When we talk about almost 60 countries recognizing guaido, theres a reason that that matters, not purely symbolic. I think when it comes to combatting other illicit gold, when you look at how the International Community combatted things like blood diamonds, for example, required a comprehensive approach in order to help identify the best Due Diligence practices, the best ways of combatting the supply chain there. You know, unfortunately, gold is very distinct from diamond. Its not as easy. Its almost impossible to identify the original oregon of gold. What i think we can do is by building strong relationships with european countries, we can have ensure appropriate Due Diligence for the Global Supply chain of gold by monitoring the experts of gold mining or material by promoting best practices in the jewelry to prevent the types of mining practices that keeps the maduro regime in power. So, again, i think this really requires, a major priority of the Trump Administration now, which is a comprehensive, international approach to addressing maduros continued use, and its not something that the United States can do alone, or the people can do alone. We really need our European Partners to step up to the plate to increase the number of inks is as to make sure that theyre protecting assets for the venezuelan people and not fall through the tricks that the maduro regime tries to play. Actually i have a followup question for you, talking about europe. As we all know, the european commune, released a statement saying, and i quote, conditions are not met at this stage for transpiring. And how do you see the response from the International Community following the legitimate elections, especially even while increasingly know about the criminal nature of the maduro regime. The partnership with regular arms groups and activity, narco trafficking and illegal gold mining just to name a few. Yeah, i think the most important thing is for us, as an International Community, to not fall for the maduro regimes tricks. These elections are fraudulent. You know, thats clear in the statement. But its been clear for months, prior to know. You know, they declared individual illegitimate for running for elections. Theyve completely ignored the constitution and appointed an Electoral Council outside of the boundaries thats legal for them. Theyve declared opposition Political Parties as being terrorist groups. Their censorship. They have almost no Voting Machines and throw people in prison for indicating dissent. Its not just that they havent met the conditions. They havent hit many of the positions. Theres Something Else that needs to be said here, you cannot have a partially free election. You either have an election thats free or you have an election thats not free. Theres really no ability to take a look at, you know, all of the International Standards for minimum conditions and say, well, the maduro regime met one or two of these. Even if they meet one or two, they have to meet all of the conditions. The reason those are the minimum conditions is that thats the absolute floor for what would be considered a free election and when you have this complete censorship of all of these parties. When you have the people fearing for their lives for advocating or campaigning, this is why the opposition made the determination and issued a statement. I think it was a few days, noting that they are not going to participate in these elections because theyre not elections and we need to stop calling them that. We, as an International Community, need to first be very, very clear and unified that this is not a free election. We also need to do more to support the interim government and the opposition in its fight. Theyre not running, but theyre doing something much more important which is theyre putting their lives on the line on a daily basis. The International Community need to do more to stand by them and needs to pledge transition support, which is important for the Security Assistance in a transition. Maduro regime has built up the capacity to cause chaos even if theres a Transitional Government. So we all as an International Community need to pledge to be with the venezuelans when that moment comes and we need to make it clear what the consequences will be for the maduro regime once the elections take place. The first step making sure that the conditions havent been met very, very clear and we need to remain united and that there are actual actions and consequences for this behavior. Because if theyre not maduro regime will continue with impunit impunity. Thank you. You have extensive experience in pakistan, and in other locations. What makes does that experience offer for the administration in venezuela. What is the u. S. Doing to coordinate with partners in a post maduro venezuela . Ill make this quick. One of the points that wering on at cso. I point to the fragility act that President Trump signed in 2019, this is a very important piece of legislation and this is the way that the United States is moving forward in the way that we approach fragile states and the way that were going to approach the lessons that we learned in the past specifically countries such as venezuela. As i mentioned, we are coordinating the interagency planning so that we can look at the stablization needs in venezuela as they prepare for a transition. Now, we believe that the best pathway forward is outlined in the democratic transition framework which calls for an administering free and Fair Elections as the Department Deputy need. Really free elections, not just partly. And one of the ways we approach you in iraq, and i and i want to talk about my colleagues need for an international coalition. This is not just venezuela, but iran, china, russia, cuba. We were able to bring together over 50 countries. There was the funding facility for stablization so with the United States and 27 other countries contributed 1. 2 billion dollars. That worked. This helped centralize stablization funding and all of our efforts in iraq. To date, we have more than 4,300 stablization programs in iraq that are planned, underway or completed. One of the Lessons Learned and one of the ways that we can look at venezuela is through this prism. Again, we also have similar objectives. We want the venezuelan people to lead which is our approach to venezuela and stablization and the final point is about working with our European Partners in particular. Now, again, to better coordinate we work really closely, my bureau with our counterpart in seven or eight other countries that have stablization countries, australia, denmark, germany, netherlands and united kingdom. And this group, is committed to international cooperation. Weve linked these stablization units to the interim government so they can absolutely coordinate, not only Security Sector assistance, but who is doing what so we can fill the gaps. We continue to work with and encourage and enforce burden sharing as we approach transition for venezuela. So this is the approach, our approach to stablization, learning from some of the positives and negative lessons from the past. Thanks. Thank you very much, assistant secretary. Back to you. The cooperation in the caribbean had the support of 22 nations. Why is it increasingly important to partner with allies to combat narco trafficking originating from the maduro regime and a regular arm group while on continued security in the hemisphere . I cant stress enough the urgency of the threat. I think every speaker has pressed this threat to democracy. The threat to economic stability at covid and i think well see second and third order impacts that have me deeply troubled in terms of undermining stability of other nation states. And so, the driver of that threat has coalesced the people to Work Together against it. The 22 a nations is one example you cite. I think as we look at this, and we look at important investments weve made as a nation in the past, you know, the u. S. Colombia action plan is still moving forward where colombians are training partners to operations against narco trafficking and terrorists, its extremely beneficial. We look at the Central American security initial, the Caribbean Security initiative. These are important investments where the United States time and Financial Resources will pay forward for enhanced stability and thats part of the solution set here is making sure we have it right in those investment areas to keep the democracy that have made progress in Central America and south america and the caribbean, keep them moving forward against this vicious circle of threats, this network that doug owe aptally characterized it. Thank you. And thank you everyone. Now, i will turn the mic over to jason who will take questions from the audience. Back to you, jason. Thank you very much diego and thank you for the panel. Two, three questions im trying to put together. First question, can the panel are more specific how colombia can crack down on the regime. And how do they look at trafficking of gold through colombia and others. And the question from diana and then from ambassador patterson who asked more specifically about russia in venezuela and mentioned its a strategic issue to the United States. And that the pullback and asked, what is the current extent of russian presence . Ill turn to you first for addressing either one of those questions. Ill take the russia, because it gets right to the heart of this. Whats the center of gravity, what keeps maduro in power and the russia influence is front and center, whether its helping in evading sanctions and oil. The list goes on, whether it helps whether its in the information space, spreading disinformation and lies about the extent of their complicity and keeping maduro in power, the extent to which maduro has wrecked the country. So i watch with alarm what russia is doing globally and particularly in venezuela in terms of the numbers of personnel, the back and forth, the rotations of the personnel whether special Operations Force or technicians. Im completely aligned with ambassador patterson how we view that. In the interest of time ill kick it back. Thank you. Thank you so much. Ill address the issue on colombia. When i talked about the group, one of the key players here is colombia because these nonstate groups are moving back and forth. Coming from colombia as well we work very closely with our colombian partners in the government. Theyve been addressing the nonstate armed groups. One of the things were doing is enhance the role of the state in some of the rural areas, whether thats true. You know, narco traffic, whether its the Security Sector, for us its the peace accord as well and getting the role of the state and strengthening that in some of the rural areas to address some of the nonstate armed groups. So we recognize fully that colombia is critical to this effort. Thank you. Assistant secretary. Sure, so, to diana and christinas question on colombia. I think one of the most important things that weve been working on when it comes to the illicit threat network, with respect to gold, whether its respect to narco trafficking, its really ensuring the coordination within the u. S. Government. That is sort of first and foremost because we had so many different experts and different fields within the u. S. System that its really important that all of them be sort of cohesive and approaching this in a holistic way. When it comes to gold, we have established an interagency Gold Working Group and the purpose is to have all the experts, whether its from the regional bureau, whether its from narcotics and Law Enforcement and whether its the Law Enforcement agencies within doj. Whether its south com and dod. All of them coordinating together to make sure were identifying the various mechanisms that we can deploy in order to confront the illicit gold trafficking. Making sure were working with our partners on Border Security issues. This is something that weve been working with them on for a while now, especially this light of also the huge refugee crisis in the region. And the largest refugee crisis, that the western hemisphere experienced. So making sure that we are really addressing Border Security is hyper important because what happens is, the cold will make its way to bras still and colombia and then its exported as if its colombian gold. Thats important. I would say thats something major we can do at the border to try to prevent that, in addition to this sort of broader discussions that we had about making sure that theyre not able to mine the gold illegally in the first place by not having the equipment and so on. To ambassador pattersons question on russia, you know, russias role has changed a bit. Certainly, russia provides probably the largest amount of International Support to venezuela in terms of its role on the Security Council and so on and so forth. But we have seen the financial relationship decline a little bit. I think, what ambassador fowler mentioned about the disinformation, ins a key tactic that both the cubans and the russians used, thats something we need to be especially on the lookout for because that kind of propaganda can unfortunately be quite effective so we need to be on our toes to make sure where the sources of information is coming from and not intentional misinformation on the russians and cubans. I think its a really key part of understanding the goal that environmental degradation, all of those things together. Secondly present rush i would say wanted things which extend or look at what rush is doing in venezuela out of venezuela. Most of the propaganda and stuff happening during the unrest at the end of 2019 by the russians came out of nicaragua and cuba. Thats whether operating out of when they cant be in there. They have a network, strong presence in chile and argentina whether producing all kinds of internet content of things we have are very little aware of and things to give them platforms when we look at venezuela only in venezuela and not as broader networks. Thank you. There was a question we didnt get a a chance to whichs asked about russia in the q a but i guess we will leave that for the next conversation. I want to end by thanking all of you for joining us today. Admiral faller as always fantastic to see you. Thank you very much for your time and your service. Assistant secretary, great to have you. Thank you all for joining us today. Wish we could all be together in the same room but at least being together in the virtual room is a step in the right direction. And also reminder todays conversation is an important reminder of the persistent need for coordinated action against the madura regime and support for democracy in venezuela. The probing and i to invite the audience to read the policy brief that doug authored and we released this morning on our website and i will share get this as part of a series of programming on venezuela and venezuela is illicit activities specifically of course the Latin America Center has had many programs last year but under the series on venezuela is Illicit Activity. We will look specifically next at the issue of iran and hezbollah. With that again thank you. I want to thank domingo and my team up with this whole thing together, diego, thank you for moderating and adrian wonderful you could join us today. With that hope of you has a great rest of the day and thank you very much for joining us. Thursday democratic attorneys general from several states discuss racial inequities at the Netroots NationVirtual Conference live coverage at 2 p. M. Eastern on cspan2. Weeknights this month with aging booktv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan2