Conversation, two years and three months after jcpoa. Before the conventional arms embargo, two months from President Trump urging iran to quote, making the big deal, saying they would get better terms if they negotiated, and the leader rejected that offer saying no negotiations that would help President Trumps reelection and regional issues which the beirut explosion and what that says about lebanese government. So, brian, give us a very quick, you know, answer to the fundamental question, has the maximum strategy has the maximum pressure strategy worked . Well, first of all, let me thank nick byrnes and anya and you for having me on virtually. Were two and a half years into the strategy of postleaving the iran deal. It was approved by principals back in may of 2017 and weve been executing against that strategy now for the entire administration. The president ordered a reassessment, a policy review when we came into office and what we concluded is that if you want to make progress against this regime, you need to have a combination of economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and the credible threat of military force to defend our interests. So thats where thats our theory of the case, you might say. And what weve done on the pressure side has been historically significant. On december 31st president rouhani admitted that our sanctions have cost the regime 200 billion. Our Oil Sanctions alone, we have collapsed irans oil sector and thats where the rigc gets most of its money. So if you want to get serious about drying up the revenue for the guards and for the forces you have to get serious about the oil. As long as we were in the iran deal we couldnt touch the energy sector. Weve gone after the irans energy sector, mineral sector, petro chem, a number of areas. And rouhani is right. We have deprived this regime from a lot of money and its the epicenter for terror finance, money laundering, but then they have been organizing, training and equipping these proxies. In 2014 one the iranian officials bragged that they owned three capitals. Today we see iran losing its grip in a lot of the places where only a few years ago they were bragging. The New York Times and the Washington Post have run a number of stories over the last couple of years documenting how irans proxies are weaker and thats a consequence of our maximum pressure. We have dried up the revenue that the regime would otherwise have had. Consider this statistic. Since 2012, the regime spent over 12 billion in iraq and syria and lebanon and there was a shia fighter in syria who said the golden days are gone and theyre never coming back. Iran doesnt have the money that it used to. These are the sort of headlines we ought to be want to go see. Irans proxy is weaker, the regime having to choose between guns and damascus and tehran. We have to make hard decisions. Yes, wed like to new deal, but dont lose sight of what we have been able to accomplish by putting this regime on its back foot and restoring military deterrents and retaining it and were pleased with our strategy and the door continues to be wide open for diplomacy. The Supreme Leader has chosen resistance over diplomacy and secretary pompeo warned him two and a half years ago, you can come to the table or you can manage economic collapse. Im going 15 minutes here and go through the conventional weapons ban and going through covid and explosions in iran and some regional tensions. Just a remind, when i open this up, hopefully at about 12 20 or a couple of minutes afterward, please raise your hand and i will be able to call on you and you can ask brian your questions. So, brian, there are critics, obviously, of the strategy and i want to posit big criticisms to you in terms of the overall approach. Since the administrations left jcpoa iran has increased stockpiles of fuel and uranium. Those are things that iran would be able to do after the deal expired. We had the date so we wouldnt have to deal with iran much richer and approximaties richer and retained most of the nuclear infrastructure. And you didnt pull forward the expiration date, you left and the sunsets were a few years from now, right, rather than today. Well, the sunsets start in about two months. This deal is going to continue expiring. The missile restrictions expire in 2023 and its going to keep expiring until theres no deal left. And so, what we would like to do is get a permanent deal. Certainly we could talk about this, but no enrichment. I think, nick, your question illustrates the problem. For as long as iran is allowed to enrich, were going to be having the discussion. How close is iran to a nuclear breakout. How close are they to weaponizing a bomb . We need to restore the u. N. Security Council Standard of no enrichment and when i was in from 06 to 08 when nick byrnes was undersecretary, i remember this and the bush administration, we were able to negotiate a prohibition on no enrichment. Thats Binding International law. And china and russia voted for it. That is the standard that we have to restore, and if you look at secretary pompeos list of 12 demands, there at the top is no enrichment. Its going to get us out of this debate of how close iran is. Iran does use nuclear blackmail in order to win concessions, and so, were out of the deal. They are regularly threatening the europeans with theyve now broken their nuclear commitments, no fewer than five times. We would like to weve now put in place, i think, the leverage necessary in terms of pressure and isolation, and all of that, in order to get the kind of deal that will be necessary. Its going to take a lot of leverage to get a comprehensive deal, but weve got to get no enrichment. Were going to leave this program to take you to a live event. You can watch the rest on cspan. Org. We take you to a discussion on developmentnd