Serving. Watch booktv this weekend on cspan2. So welcome. The scheduling of this book and panel is certainly timely given the rising crisis with iran. Look into that subject eventually, but the point of the book, entitled seven pillars, and the discussion is to look more broadly and more deeply at the drivers of instability in the middle east. From yemen to syria to iraq, and now with iran, the region more than ever seems in a permanent state of turmoil. Its become a land of endless wars. Tragically, despite decades of intense and often wellmeaning american attention and the expenditure billions of dollars, u. S. Policy has more often than not been a failure. Maybe the caveat more often than not is, its been absolute failure, if one accepts the basic aim was to foster stability and better life for the people of the region. Of course the ones ultimately responsible for a countries success or failure of the people who live there, but the catastrophe in todays middle east raises questions about whether the United States should continue to be engaged in the region, and if so, how. In this regard the editors of seven pillars, Michael Ruppert and Brian Katulis, and their cocontributors have given us a gift. Identify seven factors that affect stability or not and examine what they mean and the role they play. The pillars to identify our legitimacy, islam, arab ideology, the military, education, economy and governance. I personally found many of the authors perspectives to be unique and a useful basis to begin looking at all problems. Whether they can serve as a basis for a new bipartisan approach in the current poisonous political environment here is anyones guess, but at least the authors are trying to provide some factbased reality and analysis to encourage debate. So with us today, starting with my left, is Michael Rubin was a resident scholar here at aei, a veteran of the Bush Administrations iran and iraq team and has a phd and iranian history. He contributed to the chapter on legitimacy in the region. Next, Brian Katulis was a Clinton Administration veteran now at the center for American Progress with extensive experience in the arab world. Prior to joining c. A. P. He lived in egypt and palestine where he worked on governance issues for the National Democratic institute. He contributed to chapter on governance. And then we have Kadir Yildirim whos a a fellow for the middle east at the Baker Institute at Rice University picky research is both pluralism in the middle east and the interplay between religious authorities and Foreign Policy. He contributed to chapter on islam. We will try to keep the conversation lively and i will interrupt to keep everybody from not just going on and on and on. We will talk for a while and then open it up to questions from the audience. So to start im going to start with michael, and ask you, whats special about this book . What did you think was lacking in the scholarship or the analysis that required this kind of approach . If we look at the last half century of american interaction in middle east, by any metric like you said in your introduction the u. S. Hasnt been successful and is not democrat or republican thing. What we wanted to do was number one getaway for analysis based on use political calendar. Thats too easy and it doesnt work. But more broadly do a fundamental rethink of some of the issues and drivers in the region. In terms of legitimacy, for example, theres common core assumptions that its all about Good Governance. Thats what builds legitimacy but when were in iraq, people are willing to forgo in some cases Good Governance just so they can have Kurdish National flag or she had occurred flag over certain buildings. We also wanted to identify and look at the impact of things we hardly ever talk about in the United States. Sorry come in the region. Disruptive technology, hows that going to change things . How is foreign aid impact if legitimacy is in Good Governance . Then is foreign aid the right thing . Another conclusion, one of the rot issues most surprising to me personally when brian and i traveled across the region was many people if we asked the question, what represents the most legitimate government in the middle east . People tend to do Something Like lebanon and yet lebanon is often thought about in the United States and, frankly, many parts of the middle east as an abject disaster. We were trying to grapple with some of these issues from a much more academic and less political partisan approach. So what is legitimacy and why is lebanon seen as more legitimate than other places . We need to abandon this notion that one size fits all. Thats that easy for american policymakers to do. But ultimately people wanted legitimacy for whatever there they wanted representation for whatever their identity was the problem is of course identity changes with time. What was clear, however, is that people were increasingly finding themselves disenfranchised. This isnt just an issue of the arab spring. Its not just an issue of the antiiranian protest but there seems to be a failure of the traditionalism in the middle east which is why the chapter reimagining or reconsidering all ideology at play because take example of iraq. 40 of iraqis were born after the 2003 war. More than 60 of iraqis were born after the 1991 war which means no one has functional memory of what life was like under Saddam Hussein among the broad swath of the youth. Therefore, they are no longer willing to accept what we might have problems from some of the Islamist Groups but at least were not Saddam Hussein. People are looking at this generation which seceded many of these other ideologues and dictators in the region in saying is that the represent us. We have in the United States as much as we complain about politics, usually a 9095 incumbency rate in congress. In places like iraq its around 1216 . People are adrift and that makes it a dangerous moment. Sobriety, he wrote about governance. The form of governance that has evolved been imposed on iraq saddam was overthrown, is it working . Do you see it working . Dead iraqis have to come up with Something Else . Doesnt try to have to help iraq come up with Something Else . Great question and ill answer that in the second. I first want to highlight the subtitle of the book is what really causes instability in the middle east, and my simple after spending nearly two two years h Michael Rubin on this project is, its Michael Rubin and neocon who are more wandering warmongering. [laughing] its a joke. Before this latest episode, if you would see whats happening in the last week and then what was happening just a few months before that, young people in the streets of baghdad and in major cities and iraq questioning the very old order, the political order that is in iraq. Protesting corruption, Poor Services and a bunch of things that quite frankly go rent the region like we do and we get together and regularly, are the sorts of things that impact every country in the middle east. This sort of crushing demographic, social, economic pressures. Inside of iraq, quite clearly despite multiple elections the Current System of governance and government is not helping the people. One of the point of this book, and is not a new point because if you go back to the air of you in Human Development report 16, 17 years ago is the structural factors that contribute to stability are quite weak and in those 15, 16, 17 years since they have gotten weaker. In a place like iraq, quite clearly, and this is where i joke about michael, for do have our differences. He was in favor of the iraq war. I was in. He was against the iran nuclear deal. I was. But the one thing we agree upon is to dig deeper and wife who wanted to this book and in the chapter on governance, i talked a bit about iraq is not about its National Governments. I talked about this experiment that urged under the Islamic State, spend a couple of pages on it and it shows you responsive governance and discontent with the government that is not responding, plants the seed for the sorts of instability that we saw under, happen and are back under the previous prime minister, that groups like the Islamic State exploited. We should have learned by now, many years after the iraq war, that the United States get fix these factors but its important to factor these fundamental Building Blocks for stability in our analysis. As we say today the hot take somebody going to do next at the cycle of isolation which is quite dangerous. Isis was a new phenomenon, and there has been failure of governance, failure of leaders in the middle east for a long time. So why at this moment did a group like isis have an opportunity to rise and at such a profound impact . Multiplicity factors in some of it is tied to this generational transition where you just simply have you crushing. If the government in place like iraq are not responding to people will rise up in various different forms. The isis model which again was shortlived and i dont think as much legitimacy in the long run was created in response to an ineffective government. There are more tools now in a place like iraq under saddam sitting it was a dictatorship. There wasnt as much open space for people to produce change. I think that theory behind the iraq war, 2003, and we dont want to go back and debate that, the theory behind it was flawed in that we just topple regimes and eliminate or decapitate the top, then some of freedom will spread. We know that didnt happen. Like it et cetera in the Islamic State in particular is that you have multiple fight going on inside iraq, civil war first and then a system of governance that simply was responding. Thats the main point is those conditions are still there. Iraqis are still looking at the National Government with a caretaker government. Carol, i would challenge the notion Islamic State was all that new because if we go back in history theres any number of millennial, whether it was the future of the grand mosque in a concern not or go back a century before that, the sudan. What i do want to draw out from what brightest talk about any number of issues on governance, beyond simply this, monarchy versus republican so forth, but what does this mean for the nature of american diplomacy if we are still in many ways limiting ourselves to interactions with representatives of government who are under siege whether those governments know it or not, are we missing the broader picture both in terms of diplomacy and intelligence when it comes to the middle east . Obviously, whats the remedy to that . The United States has to do with the government that are in power, no . To some extent. We have to do with the the government who are in power but, for example, how much time to diplomats spent outside the walls of embassies versus, talking and just interacting on a local market as opposed to simply interacting with government . We dont do want to bring in u. Policy too much but one of the aftermaths of benghazi, putting the root of that crisis the side, is just locked out upon which american diplomats find themselves. When you go to beirut and both brian and i went to beirut together, the u. S. Embassy in beirut is basically living under the same security parameters they did during the civil war. Its a tactical point. Their sister gigi point which i think for u. S. Policy in the middle east we are quite likely at the end of a 40 year period that began with events in 1979, the Islamic Revolution in iran, soviet invasion of afghanistan and the number of things that led to the u. S. Come having its engagement primarily be focus on what our military does. Look at where we are today and discussing and worrying about whats the next move and what will or military do. To me this point that michael makes which is tactical but its important that our diplomats and the Diplomatic Service has been decimated in the last couple of years. They are our eyes and ears and understand societal trends and we are flying more blunt. The last point is i think it opens up question of whether the United States should actually be spending aid money and other things in countries that simply lack the capacity to do this, that maybe theres a strategy for thinking more modestly about our engagement, thinking about those beacons or outposts where the relative progress in places like tunisia. Maybe a dollar spent in tunisia and time spent in tunisia may ultimately be a lot better than other parts of the middle east. But we dont even have that discussion because we are reacting to mostly military moves and military centric moves and not thinking about how to do we diversify the portfolio. I want to bring kadir into the conversation. Is religion more important in the middle east today than it was before . It is. It is very much so, but one of the fundamental misconceptions about middle east in terms of religion, politics, we tend to assume that this has been the case all the time. But if you go back 40, 50 years ago what we will see is the dominance of secular governance, secular ideologies and how islam parties and groups, they were existent many of them but theyre much slower, much less influential in terms of policymaking, in terms of the able to affect other groups in the society or how governments were acting in terms of Foreign Policy or domestic policy but over the last 50 years things have changed dramatically a thing. Iranian revolution was a big turning point, but also more important, something that brian mentioned, secular ideologists have failed throughout the middle east at threat the 1960s and 70s and early 80s. Failed as leaders . In terms of policy. The fundamental issues were political and economic come and they failed to deliver on their promises, on what people were expecting. This is what chris anticipated. The rising come significance of these religious groups, later on, fundamentalist groups and later on more violent extremist groups throughout the region. They key problem here, they re was not just in terms of their own popularity, within their borders. The Muslim Brotherhood in 2011, 12, 3040 of the vote, but more importantly i think they were able to dictate the parameters of the discussion in terms of the policy issues that were ongoing. They arise, influenced secular groups, nonreligious groups, political groups, so much so that they felt the need to bring in religion to the own discussions, to their own sort of policy proposals so to speak. One good example is whats happened in turkey today. Erdogan and akp have come to power in 2002, and hes a massive politician like he has been so successful in terms of changing the political system in turkey, in such a way that the secular parties are unable to determine the agenda, political agenda. They are unable to discuss issues in a way outside of the parameters set by erdogan himself. And one problem here is that if you think about this in terms of religious competition on the framework of religious competition, that means you or political, both religious and nonreligious, will try to cater to the demands, religious demands because people will want more of that, that it carries currency and lyrical debate. But erdogan has not been uniformly successful. He was successful in growing the economy in the early years, and but he has run into more trouble now and he has run into political pushback. So, i mean, islam, do you see them using islam in his religious police more as a Political Tool to advance his political career or do you think that this is just so indigenous to the people of turkey that every politician Going Forward is going to have to encompass religious beliefs more into their way of right. I cant speak to his personal belief. Thats beyond my sort of focus as a political scientist. What i can tell you, religion is an important element of his political discourse. When we look at overtime, changes in terms of the intensity that emphasizes religion in the political discourse. If you look at the time until 2011, 12, 13, from 2001 when the party was first established, religion differently as significant a role. But once his political prospects were i think receiving as a result of the Corruption Scandal first and then later on the other issues that have come up, losing elections to some degree, then he started actually using more religion, partly because he wanted to bring in some of the more conducive element especially among the kurdish voters in turkey and some of the nationalist vote. What we see is depending on the time he has used religious discourse. This is really important. This is also for other leaders in the region. Going back to the issue brian mentioned about tunisia, i fully agree. A dollar spent in tunisia is going to go much further compared other parts of the world in terms of Foreign Policy. Because its a newly democratize contacts and what is underline overall support for a lot of these political groups is economic and political issues. Once those issues are addressed first and foremost, i think were most likely going to see a decrease in their support that thats really picky. So are the tunisians, did you want to follow up on tunisia . Used this phrase repeatedly and its pretty smart from using the religion. You talk about mostly in the domestic context of turkey. The point i wanted to make, twoo points. This is about power. Its not necessarily about faith as a right interpretation of religion if there is such a thing but its about power. Secondly, in addition to the domestic use of religion, what i see in the middle east are multifaceted multidimensional competition for power and influence. The use of islam by turkey, say versus saudi arabia which has its own sort of definition and it uses islam as the birthplace of it. And then the main point is the first point is that this is about power, not about some sort of ancient hatred and some sort of essentialist interpretation of religion. Its about leaders trying to stay in power eye appealing to sort of different means and then also trying to compete with what they see as their adversaries or their competitors in the region through the use of decimals and analyze an interesting aspect of it because its built over into media fights and all sorts of things, and its something that frank did the book doesnt cover itself is part of the thing that america wants a better Foreign Policy approach, you need to understand that this is in addition to military moves and the use of terrorism and other things, a key part of the struggle in competition for power. Wonder the things i wanted to actually asked kadir about the book is how rapidly things are changing. If we look for use in the future and you have a complete, new set of the majority of population hasnt even been born yet, his s religion, is a major influence for religion going to be the mosque or social media . Is it going to be legitimacy of theological ruler or is it going to be popular leaders . If so, how are traditional muslim populist looking at this rise of populism and do you really think the way in which people consume religion is going to change, putting aside whether the United States can keep up with that . Great question. What some of my research actually directly trying to address this question, a couple of years ago we started the project trying to look into how religious authority is distributed across the middle east among religious leaders, primarily muslim leaders. What we found is there was a couple major findings. One of them is islam is political groups, political islamist actors have great popularity. People do look up to them as religious figures, religious leaders. This is something really important that is been rising, changing a lot. In terms of social media or mosques, thats a change that was precipitated at the turn of the 20th century more than a century ago. Islam is a bit different. It has a free market of religion, very much like protestantism and christianity. It doesnt have a central authority, doesnt have hierarchy here what this means is everyone can be a religious leader as long as people willingly support or follow these people. A group of collective class of islamic scholars dig for almost a millennial, to the end of ninth, tenth century up until the turn of the 20th century. So they were the class as they were imminent religious authority but once they started waning, once they all started die, so to speak, there was a big void in terms of who was the imminent religious authority. This is when you see the rise of political islamists and sophists in the muslim world. This is a process thats evolving with the rise of social media. I dont know whats going to happen in four years but definitely not the mosques, i dont think. Things are changing fast and quick, and less there emerges some central hierarchical authority, things will be pretty sort of distributed. Is islam a force of stability or not in the region . It depends on what you mean by stability. Like a turkey, is it a force for stability . Its an authoritarian way but its a force for stability. If you look at some of the context, lets say early 2000s 1990s in turkey again, it would be a force for instability because it was stirring up the opposition. It was pushing them into trying to get more political space and the parliament tatian or change policy. It totally depends on the context. I dont think islam by itself is different than many other religions. It depends on the political context, depends on actors, depends on the overall circumstances in terms of what kind of a role it fills in these countries. It depends on the context it and iraq, for example, or in syria it can be force for stability but in say tunisia, this point in time it can be force for stability because we weve seea commitment for democracy in terms of muslim democracy. One of the major issues where what is enough inside iraq although its not being framed that way in immediate in that when you look at the most prominent shared religious figure, he is apparently extremely cognizant of what the popular thing is and instead of simply leading it yesterday about following get because it because too far out in any of his friday sermon he risks being exposed as he emperor who still was close at the young People Choose not to follow him and, therefore, we see a caution that really hasnt been there, if i will, since he lived under Saddam Hussein. Thats exactly religious competition. These religious leaders are not blind whats going on around them. They know whats going on. They follow him and they just the discourse. Whether these are traditional religious authorities or more publicly oriented religious figures, they know whats going on and they will cater to those needs. Ultimately, what religion does for them, they may be faithful believers, but islam, religion is a tool, a political resource that you want to make use of and you want to make sure it helps you in terms of your power struggle. This is a key point. From time to time this talk about reforming islam. Does that have any value . Is that something, and i would throw this out to all of you. Is that something the west should be encouraging . What does it evening . Its happening. Its an organic process that i see as happening, and my own view is when you say the west, im taking that has mostly governments and things like this. I dont think necessarily we need to play a role in that. I look back, right now we have a president who when he ran as candidate he said i think islam hates us. He used sort of an interpretation of islam which is quite dangerous but tailoring to political constituency. Deeply unhelpful. Im not making a comparison. When used to things like a point special envoys to the organization of islamic conference, it caddis anywhere from a relevant to may be slightly unhelpful because i dont think it should be u. S. Policy to encourage a reform of islam. Its a religion. Its going to have strands that a more extremist and more reformist and its organic and is playing out. Im not a muslim but my friends who live in america or europe there are different i just got it on faith and religion. I would stay away from that as the use of engagement. When president obama spoke in cairo there was an idea of muslim engagement, that a lot of my friends in the arab world handled it offensive, especially those friends who were sick christian or were not muslims of tradition but not of faith and wanted to be engaged in egyptians or Something Else. Let me approach is a slightly different way, not surprisingly. I think one of the issues where american policy is caught in the trap is due to our own navelgazing. One of the most interesting experiment which is occurring in the region is in morocco. When it comes to the program in which women are educated to thee Community Prayer leaders alongside men, and morocco of course has a theological and intellectual history that goes back with over a millennia. When you talk to american officials about what morocco is doing in the moroccan model, oftentimes what you hear is that well, morocco is a referral. Morocco is irrelevant to the broader islamic world. But intellectual and theologically what happened in morocco traditional is much more sophisticated than what happened in saudi arabia. Saudi arabia of course has the advantage of oil which is why a much more minority interpretation spread your we seem to be doing saudi arabia is work for the when were so dismissive of other trends. Because we see from our vantage point, sometimes i would argue looks like kadir may disagree with me a little bit, but our own perspective from washington can actually get in the way. I agree with bright dress to be a limit what we do in terms of the sort of religious debate, although we cant ignore it completely. But on the other hand, our first rule should be first do no harm. I dont this is a agree with you but i have a bit of a different take i think. I dont disagree with you but i disagree. [laughing] i do think that islam is in great need of cash but i dont think theres any denying that the muslim world has a great problem in terms of underdevelopment with violence. Im not saying religion causes violence but there is pervasive case of violence throughout the muslim world. If you look at the muslim world today, i cant remember the figures, like eight or nine muslims are being killed today are being killed by other muslims. That i think is a very important statistic. We have to resist underdevelopment, and education in the muslim world. A lot of issues and problems in one great book that addresses the issues recently published highly important book i think. I looked into these issues very critically, but the point is there is a great need for reform. Religion, when it was like it not, is being used, justified or used to justify ongoing trends, issues and problems in the middle east. I great problem of gender inequality. In tunisia recently just last year there was debate about introducing legislation for equal inheritance, and the most progressive was islamist party, did not oppose this legislation. What are you going to do with it . This is really important issue. I do think theres a great need for reform in islam because i think islam or muslims rather are still trying to come in my opinion, trying to come are struggling kind to come to terms with majority. This is a big issue. This is a very deepseated issue that needs to be addressed, but with the current state of affairs its difficult to come to terms with that part of the problem. Something i tried to emphasize about how islamism has been so fundamental. They have been able to change the mindset that only of those who are considered but also on the secular side. A lot of these issues, if you look at issue of lgbt issues, for example. The muslim world was much more progressive on this particular issue, for example. On many other issues, ethnic religious diversity, i will argue the muslim world was much more progressive a century or two centuries ago. This is i think really the crux of the issue. This is what i said its so important, not so much because they have 30 or 40 support, but because they were able to shape, reshape the mindset of a lot of people in their society. We are going to make the same point i think and you mention lgbt and its a story from one of our trips, and he can correct me if im wrong. We went out and met with officials and talk to people but we went to universities. We were in morocco. Mom at the fifth university. We asked to do serve townhome mohammed the fifth. As one of these given takes. We said look, we hear from america and you might find this alarming or interesting that a lot of people are puzzled about america today. The students were asking us whats going on in whats happening. We asked, whats different about your generation from your parents generation . One women went ahead come race seven pillars what really causes instability in the middle east said some of us are lgbt, lesbian, we talk about it openly. And then they debated or at least ten or 15 minutes whether they could bring someone home to the parents, for example,. And you point out in other countries iraq, its not necessarily the case. Its taboo. The Younger Generation starting to shift back the question is whether the generations weve had over the last 50 years are the outlier or the signifier of the continuing trend. I mean, its not just about individual level but Public Policy level. I think there was much more tolerance about many of these issues that it is right now. Thats fair. How many muslim majority countries is there definitely or these are important issues. Can you build a mosque in the saudi arabia . Why not . I understand that you want to exclude, but what about the rest of the country . Thats a big problem. Does this change have to come organically or is there a role for, i dont know, government leaders . How does reform can you say reform is needed. How does this reform come about . Its a taboo subject right now. Its difficult to editors the subject or in several countries those people, individuals, whether they were scholars are just prominent figures who wanted to introduce debate and discussion about islamic reform have been essentially castigated. Some of them were penalized for other reasons but it was a pushback from government officials are others in terms of their official stance being critical of islam. This is what they understand from introducing debates about the islamic people. The fundamental issues they can going back to socioeconomic development, you have good education where you able to introduce critical thinking, analytical thinking. You improve the quality in the country. You improve socioeconomic development, wellbeing of a lot of people in these countries. I think its very difficult. We are in a think tank so well be policy prescriptive for a second. During the bush of administration about 2002 theres a case of the egyptianamerican sociologist who was imprisoned in part for what he is talking about in terms of reform. The Bush Administration held up like 120 million worth of aid. If the go further back to the Reagan Administration administk at the issue of abrogation in islam. There was a student sudanese scholar, im forgetting his name [inaudible] actually someone else. He talked about how reform should include the need for reverse, putting the early versus of carranza had some of the later verses. He was executed by the regime. The point of this is, while the United States, with separation of church and state, does that mean we ignore religion in other countries . Use the leverage of our purse and order to create some sort of space so that people are being most bold on the course of reform dont end up in prison or worse . This is an important point. Number one, listening and understanding. What were saying before, getting governments outside the weather the tragedy advisor Chris Stevenson was killed in benghazi he was adept at doing this. And as powerful as some elements in a military. To understand what of the social dynamics i think is important. Number two, keeping this issue of democracy governance and freedom of the euros postage and i think its really important. Obviously its been downgraded under President Trump and i wod submit thats a preexisting condition, at that actually started, the process of having as much sort of focus in terms of what our diplomats do, it started under the Obama Administration for a number of reasons, because it wanted to pull back. Theres this distorted debate about democracy equating it with an interference of the sort that russia did the own economy and its totally, and own government things like this. Do you think democracy something to turn it still what michael was saying, when someone is in prison whether its in saudi arabia or other partners, we need to raise our voice and make it part of the conversation be serious about it. Theres no reason what cant be a bipartisan issue. Thats human rights issue. Thats a necessary promotion of democracy. It creates the safe space for the reform to happen and thats the main point. If you dont, this is what im skeptical of the top that attempts to reform the place like saudi arabia, because if you do that while maintaining your position as an absolute monarchy and dont give organic space for people to debate religion or other issues, its likely to filter theres a third point and a somewhat relates to what you said at the top, carol, is dont do harm. Wars are one of the worst things and flawed wars, unnecessary wars that enhance the hardliners and hardline interpretations of religion. So sort of extremists their feed off of this and this is where we have to have new style of engagement in the middle east. As sizing earlier try to trying to learn the lessons from the last 40 years and especially the last 15 years or so and then talk about what the right level of engagement is and is mostly in this diplomatic, political and social space. What to clarify one thing brian says brad to it. Im not contradicting you. Ill do that later. When come straight from oftentimes we talk about reform and a wooden middle east cox road reform its apple and oranges. Take for example, saudi arabia. A reformed absolute monarchy is a reformed absolute monarchy. Not a democracy. It seems our conversations in congress cost the political spectrum and in usaid and so forth with regard to what is reform versus what is understood by people in the region are two different things. And when the class occurs between the two different definitions they can make things a lot worse. Im going to ask could i in terms of what role does, can the United States play, i think its very important to understand that any kind of intervention, i think those spaces should be treated but the way they are treated is very important because antiwesternism is so much ingrained in clinical islam or fundamentalist interpretation, or even a month secularist. Any kind of intervention by the u. S. , by European Union are by European Countries is going to be deemed as problematic. Thats why those kinds of interventions in terms of creating those spaces should be done very carefully. Because its going to undermine you are going to basically make the issue very toxic. Whatever that person says or does after that point onward is going to be a problem. What happened in the case of iran when iranians will say even when were not touching someone, it when were not supporting someone so that there supported by the american it is sort of damned if you do and damned if you dont. So shouldnt we use our ability to compel governments not to arrest certain people . Not necessarily find them but compelled enough to rest since they will be slandered to matter what they do. All im saying is i think it should be done in a way thats going, thats not good undermine the bigger goal. Im going to ask one more question didnt and then open e audience. Theres a whole chapter in this book on the military. Which i actually found very interesting. A big point the was made is that the militaries in the region have attempted 73 coups since 1932 and succeeded in 39 of them. The point being the militaries are often a a force for instability, not stability. It also hammers the point that a lot of these militaries suffer from lack of training, for lack of equipment. The United States has spent decades Training Officer corps whether its in turkey or egypt or whatever, here it is sold billions of dollars worth of weapons to a lot of these countries. Was that for not . And how can you say so many of these are underresourced when it seems like all we do is spend military aid . A couple points on this. Consider the class of the Iraqi Military in 2014 we had invested 25 billion in debt. Of course we also invested a great deal in afghanistan as well. Now, one chapter was not sitting so im glad that you highlighted it. A couple things that come into play. One of the reasons why, aside from perhaps being destabilizing in their own countries, milton military should have a big question mark over them. They seldom profess to do what they say theyre going to do. Audit that has to do with differences in culture with regard to shame. When a sergeant, drill sergeant breaks down a new recruit, the idea isnt something to break them down. Its to make them better soldiers. Likewise, in the navy when a cheap rates than someone is to make him a better sailor or pilot. But if honor is wrapped wrath w your perceived rather than what you do, then this can have an application on your ability to correct mistakes here and outside and bring this to what brian was talking about, rightly so, in having diplomats be the front and center pic if you look at a country like pakistan, pakistan, i think it was 2007 you had the kerrylugar amendment which was a bipartisan approach to say look, the face of american diplomacy shouldnt be the military or the cia even though thats what its been for decades. They put forth a 7 billion aid aid package and make antiamericanism more worse. Why . The military which was about to get cut off from this gravy train started stressing to the rumor mills and so forth this money was meant to christianize pakistan, which is nonsense, and it was also an insult. All the accounting metrics werent insult. As we tried to get diplomats front and center, it does make sense resourcing the state department and say thats when its on the problem if this deck behind walls. When it comes to the military, egypt and pakistan, i think there is what i would call the cycle of extortion, in which we give money in order to have the local militaries fight the islamist insurgents. But at some point the idea, that if we defeat the islamic insurgents in will never be able we will be cut off from the money. When you look at the egyptians and Islamic State and the northern sinai, or example which is a . Egyptian army cant defeat Islamic State because they cant or they dont want to . Its one or the other. When it comes to the military in general its not just the tricky issue. Brian and i were also in egypt again and you could argue perhaps cut out president sisi some slack for making some of the corrections which he knew to make economically were 50 years overdue. Instead of pulling a platform for economic development, what is that is the militaries coming for its own unique interest and is repeating all the mistakes which the military made for the previous 50 years by decades which means with president sisi is doing is cracking down human rights rather than improving the status of egyptian society. If i could add some thoughts because i agree with what michael said. What i was trying to say before, the last 40 last 15 years, we willing to have a strategic questioning of using armed sales and military aid as a tool of engagement with these societies to produce stability in the sorts of things were kind to get at in this book, if that makes sense. Because it has not succeeded in places like egypt which we talked about before. Internally, it again tilted the balance of power against freedom and its corrosive and it doesnt lead it creates, it reinforces what is essentially still a state centric system and also reinforces the authoritarianism which i dont think as a sustainable in the long run. Bigger picture, look across the region come especially the hundreds of billions we have either sold or delivered to all states and others, serious question, in essence when i look at it there is a dangerous and dysfunctional dependency on the u. S. Military approach. Look at it today. Look at it just this past week. A lot of these militaries in the region and self cant defend themselves. Look at what happened in september in saudi arabia. How the hell did that happen if we accept them sort of defensive system and things like this . Thats the main point is you see it in washington theres this episodic and largely tactical and emotional debate that i think in some ways its important. Its a reflection of a lot of americans say what the heck. But its often not strategic. It often assumes the sort of tool of assistance or sales, if we cut it off, then we have read them the riot act and thats it and it will change. I think we need to have some what of a stay back from these tools and emphasize the other aspects. What weve done with all of these arms sales has not produced the stability in the region and inside these countries. Okay. Anybody have any questions . Identify yourself if you do have a question. The gentleman in the back. Association of u. S. Army. I had a question about the arabisraeli conflict. I think for a while especially in the 90s it was disbelief that all roads to middle east stability with resolving the arabisraeli conflict. Do you see kind of realignment especially now between israel and some of the Sunni Arab States in the middle east . And what do you see as the continued importance for regional stability of that conflict today . What i i would answer very briefly is, decades of incitement remain. Even if governments and the diplomat posture of many of the gulf states has altered. That doesnt necessarily trickle down to the very population in egypt, saudi arabia and so forth. What i would say, for example, ryan alluded how we went to mohammed the fifth university. Whenever we travel i will try to do roundtables at universities because they have much less a filtered and diplomat and do here when i i was doing somethg a university in iraq, one of things that were strange isnt a threehour session the one product israel once. People brought up saudi arabia white a bit and what i would argue is problems are looming so great throughout the region that people, people are focusing on their own immediate problem. That doesnt mean the arabisraeli conflict is an important but it would say theres a greater and broader perspective throughout the region that press traditional american diplomats would have. I would say theres a shift not a realignment yet. I used to live in the west bank in the 1990s and lived in the region. Theres a shift in that its not as high priority but i dont see a realignment in that i dont see, what in essence maybe golf officials and other safety we have this relationship thats in the closet underneath the table with israel. Mostly on intel and concerns about iran but we are not going to come out publicly so long as theres this sense of injustice, this sense that theres not a sustainable just resolution to the israelipalestinian conflict which i would at i dont see the pathway there at all. If you look at the reactions to it, of President Trumps initiatives, whether moving te embassy to jerusalem or the Golan Heights decision. It was muted in the streets but an official of saudi arabia and other countries had conferences that condemned this. They issued communiques and thats all you got. My main point is i dont see realignment company like open relations between a lot of these countries, breaking out without any sort of sense of pathway to resolving the conflict between israelis and the palestinians. Anybody else . My name is bill chip here i read a little bit about the middle east but not as much as any of you have. I thought, when you talk about the middle east in your book, im not sure how for east and west you go but i think your discussion today is mostly focus on that little area from lebanon iran, is that speedy we covered come different authors will bring different examples but we cover from morocco to iran, a little of pakistan, the education by muslim faith a university of michigan focus heavily on north africa. Okay. One quick comment and then a question. When you say while we may be here tend to look at all these problems as religious issues, one form of religious extreme against another, we have to remember that in many cases religion has been adopted as a tool to gain power, not the other way around. My comment is maybe the exception to that is afghanistan where religion is whats driving, people are trying to over the country for purely religious reasons, but thats a Comment Period the question is in the area you focused on, there are two engine historic advice. Theres a religious divide between the sunnis and the shiites, and theres the ethnic divide between the persians and the arabs. I think im not wrong that the war between more people died between iraq and iran and died in any other conflict ill put put together in the last 40 years. My question to you is, in the long term how do you see i think we see that now, right . Because in iraq people you have a question . In the long term do you see those two two divides, which gs ultimately creating more stability or overcoming the other . First of all, just one small factoid. The white ethnicity has been considered in the mill is was originally geographic, starting in the 1920s and 30s it shifted shifted to linguistic. The point of this is egypt on over to morocco was not always considered arab. Let me put that aside for another factoid, in a middle east youre right in terms of this sheer skill of the war. If we want to put in what happened in syria, however, that may surpass the iraniraq war, certainly the great lakes region. Region. The reason why sectarianism seems to be so contentious right net in the middle east is only ten or 15 of the muslim world may be shiite. People are going to look at whats most proximate which is otherwise, who is ruining them and whether those are willing to do justly with a sense of effectiveness. Thats what i think we will be a big part of the debate this decade. Other questions . Spent a lot of time in the middle east the last 20 so years. I guess im wondering, i believe everything english and french when hundred years ago when they carved up the Ottoman Empire and you just mentioned nationalism. Seems like thats an unheardof thing until recently. Do you see, do you actually see the nationstate either recombining, i hate to say biden is right on something but iraq really is three places. Do you see, nobody wants to give up their boundaries, their Current International boundaries which to me is one of the issues that the different eccentricities like i say, the kurds are promised kurdistan that they never got, which they are spread over what, four countries and none of those countries want to give up, like whats going on with turkey and syria. I guess do you see a day when like a kurdistan excess, that things happen that the current boundaries get shifted to more natural coherent at the society. Us all respond to that briefly. Generally speaking, i take a look look at an issue because of course youre right. When you look at a map of the middle east and you see a straight line, thats an artificial border. That doesnt mean its an arbitrary country. Most people in the middle east flip traditionally along the coast or along rivers when you consider egypt, and 90 of the population living along the nile, it doesnt necessarily matter where you draw the border. Each of has a sense of being egypt. If i had to go back to any of these countries, iraq alda became independent i think in 1932. But back in 13th century arabic literature people talked about the concept of iraq. People talked about the concept of lebanon or syria long before they formally became independent. When it comes to the artificiality of states, i wod say the most artificial states are jordan, qatar, the emirates, and kuwait. But then many of the others and we see this with have retroactively extend back their national myth, have some basis in legitimacy that really isnt going to change much. If the question is the kurds, the kurds are the largest people who have been, if you will, dispossessed. Its not four countries because the world war i. Because of course the treaty in the 17th century is what created the iraniraq border. But the problem with the kurds is are you going to have one kurdistan or could you have a mac . This notion we will have one, we have two romanians, one which is called mobility of, i think with 22 arab states and so you could see some border adjustments, yes, but i dont think youll see a wholesale revision of the mass of a middle east somehow illegitimate because i think a lot less illegitimate and sometimes the grievance industry would have us accept. Can i just add a little to that . Are we all always sing some adjustment of borders, whether its the turks come over the border into syria and climbing some planned . We have the iranians and the russians playing a a huge rolen syria. Who knows whats going to happen. Assad does not have control of his country. Let me just finish the thought. The israelis have now made formal claim to the goal line. I mean, that we see already seachange in bars . Theres a a difference betwn wholesale adjustment am also not willing to argue when you have an unresolved border issue that separate from existing recognized borders, when it comes to trick i think this is the major challenge which is posing to the world and kadir can comment on this, but one look at the fact that cyprus remains occupied ever since 1974 was, when we look at northern syria, turkish civilian post offices sprouting up i would worry a great deal about erdogan and with the world is going to be in position to sort of respond to that, whatever his true ambition is. But we have an expert here so i will defer to kadir. The real problem is i think the International Context has changed, has moved on from what it was 50, 60, 70 years in terms of legitimacy of changing borders. Everything is by and large and less it is by choice that certain people want to lead and others agree to it. Im not sure what will happen in northern syria. Turkey is expanding. I think theres some University Branches or faculties that are being open. But is the world ever going to see that as legitimate are just a Turkish Occupation . By default its occupation, by definition. But im not sure how party wants to go with that. It may depend on whether he can strike an agreement with assad and russian terms of what kind of autonomy will the kurds get, might threaten turkish kurds so to speak. It remains to be seen but i think the way it goes, it continues this way. I dont think will be a lot of legitimacy. No question. To this point and think its an important point you made. I think the issue is he and will be whether come without putting the factor, what is playing out already rather than where the formal lines are we havent talked at all about yemen on the panel. But to me the real interesting discussion about whats happening in human and whether they can be a resolution to the conflict, if you move beyond the politicized is what was yemen before this conflict and doesnt hang together . I can to try address this and chapman conference about decentralization and i think again if you want to be serious about diplomacy and using these of the tools, understanding how different groups had to find sort of the relationship to the Central Government or how regions to the jill biden tried to do this ten or 15 to do when had the biden plan for iraq. Would you give love this doesnt translate well back to her own politics and its not that meaningful because its got to be organic and the point i would make that this notion those brought up about the colonial powers, yes, they made mistakes but it think it would be a mistake to so to go back to that model and try to redefine borders. As i can say about islam and reform, its organic. We have to watch and see how it develops and been a place like yemen what ashton to get at we wouldnt understand with more texture which it will try to do in the book, what are the factors of government and Political Agency of the different groups . So they themselves can create these new arrangement that have sort of more staying power than what we have now. Of course nationals has evolved over the past when her tears instantly artificial states. Im sure get a complaint from the jordanians up calling them artificial because of that. Thank you so much for these remarks to its been wonderful. You covered a lot of topics and one thing that was mentioned very briefly was on social media. The influence technology and digital diplomacy, influencing conflicts. We saw through both revolutions and surviving military coups in one way or another. In turkey the influence of immediate responsiveness with social media. And you touch upon digital responsiveness and how that may contribute to diplomacy or even intensifying conflicts in the middle east . If i could start with this effort is try to related to the book. I think twitter and facebook revolutions as the recalled in the arab uprisings in 2011, to produce enormous capacity for people to organize against something, to be against something, to carry things done. I see that also in social media here and on policy debate. That is hardly used as a tool to sort of disagree with a lot of people. But its not all that useful and a talking just in these countries can plug into your you was to promise a question. It has not yet i have seen a great test case for case study of building consensus and Building Political movements. You look at our current president or he uses his troll power for effectively to divide and fragment political coalitions at home and keep people off balance. My main point and is so tech campus rock into this, seven or eight years ago these tools to develop were used to expand freedom, to tear down authoritarian role in things like this. Now were in this dangerous moment we see with china, we see with saudi arabia, uae and other countries that are not democracies. Theyre using these tech tools to reimpose control. In very repressive ways to try to squelch dissent and debate, and thats bad. I dont see right now the u. S. Playing any meaningful serious role in all of this including in the test case of iran. Michael, i hope he disagrees with me. I think theyre so much that is wrong about the nonpolicy of donald trump and he knows what he just said at 11 00 at the top, but when the protests started again in iran early last year, i think all we really saw was an oped at a rhetorical approach of this a station to talk about freedom of the iranian people by didnt see maybe there were different moves is no serious mood to talk about how to help iranians help themselves to protect themselves and have sort of vpn and others you are probably more adept at penn state the technology but have space for people to communicate with one another in their van, those who were not in favor of the commission. Talking about military led regime change just tools navigation with societies. We dont even talk about that now because of the nature about our government is it an hour debate because you cant even raise it. If we moved to a more functional space, less dysfunctional here at home it would be interesting to talk about how we can use these tools to engage rotter sectors of society. Back to the point that diplomat should be behind walls. Guess what. None of us really dont have to be behind walls because at this point i can go connect with somebody conceivably and iran or saudi arabia or palestine and have that conversation. But idle see those tools being used in diplomacy very well right now. A few other way to look at this. First of all when it comes to american, when it comes to the model to for every stretch adae meta information military and economic component and the whole is greater than the sum of all parts. The trend hasnt done the model. The basis of our information strategy such as it is, its be truthful and, therefore, through truth you build credibility. The drawback to this is truth is determining what the truth is its slow at which point after three or four days the news cycle is moved on. I have talked to people involved in information strategies in the u. S. Government to say were so afraid of doing anything wrong that we end up doing nothing right especially on the military side of this. That said, if the basis of our counterinsurgency strategy and problem errors is to win hearts and minds, the iranian influence operation strategy has traditionally been to throw stuff at the wall and see what sticks. There is one case in 2007 in which one of the iranian moderate newspapers i think a website affiliate with said the goal of the americans is to convert afghanistan to christianity and create a new okay, absolute nonsense but then there some contractor out in indiana who put biblical citation numbers on a sniper scope. I had a conversation early on in the Trump Administration with someone who was a very high level official and basically said look in the middle east when i talk to people in the middle east, including principles, including prime ministers and so forthment im using whatsapp or turkey signal, or telegram. If were picking up the phone, and dealing with people, its a 20th century solution to a 21st century problem. And that ultimately goes into the practice of diplomacy which i think is hard to change. Now, this has been a very rich discussion and im sure that we could go on for probably another hour. We have to leave it there. Thanks to our speakers to brian, to kadir. And to carol. Oh, thank you for coming. Okay. [applause]. [inaudible conversations]. Youre watching a special edition of book tv airing during the week while members of congress are in their districts due to the coronavirus pandemic. Tonight, the presidency. First u. S. News and World Reports kenneth wall look at how they handle crisis and second Lady Lynn Cheney and charl karl rove reflects on the Trump Administration. And then the vicepresident s who became president due to the death of their predecessors. Enjoy book tv over the weekend on cspan2. This weekend on book tv, saturday, at 6 p. M. Eastern, Richard Cordray of the financial Protection Bureau. Its about consumers and problems they face. Its about Consumer Finance and how its changed and its about the new Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau and the role and importance of the work that it engages in to protect people across america. Sunday, h. R. Mcmaster former donald Trump Administration security advisor. An open and free society ought to do everything we can to protect ourselves against the Chinese Markets who subvert our economic form of government. At 6 20 p. M. , a professor on mass incarceration in the u. S. The fact that most people leave prison, do a little bit of analysis to see if we could be closing prisons already and jails already if we get caught by three weeks, four weeks, much less years, the sentences theyre serving. Watch book tv this weekend on cspan2. The president s, from public affairs. Available now in paper book and ebook. Presents biographies of every president , organized by their ranking, by noted historians from best to worst and features perspectives of the lives of our nations chief executives and leadership styles. Visit our website, cspan. Org the president s to learn more about each president and historian features and order your copy today, wherever books and ebooks are sold. Well, i would like to thank you all for joining us at this bookstore in san francisco. Were very, very delighted to have Charlton Mcillwain at New York University and the culture and communication at university Steinhart School and coauthor of how candidates and race in u. S. Political campaigns. Its the winner of the 2012aps acha award. And with us is david ellington, founder and chairman of the