Weve also got the bug in a moment before i do, i want to extend on your behalf and mine a warm welcome to call colin himself and a dani pletka and Richard Fontaine. Im George Mason University and also a nonresident of what the American Enterprise institute nextdoor, literally. Colin hast made his mark thinkg deeply about politics and this book is a trademark that examines the concept of conservative nationalism a phenomenon that has been brought to the attention conspicuously to the rise of president of trump in terms of both the history of ideas and how these ideas have found manifestation especially in the debates about the role in the world. So, the book is both encompassing and granular simultaneously and despite the gravity of the subject i can assure you it is also a delightful read. I read the book over the last weekend and commend it to your attention so it is a pleasure to have you with us. Im also very grateful dani pletka and Richard Fontaine have joined us. We couldnt have asked for better commentators giv given bh their intellectual interest in conservatism and their own practical contributions to making the domestic policy in the United States. Dani pletka has had a long career on capitol hill where she worked in the Senate Foreign relations committee. W shes also written extensively on the u. S. Foreign policy especially the middle east and appears widely on television and until recently was the Senior Vice President for foreign and domestic studies at aei where she continues on foreign and defense policy studies. Richard fontaine has had a long career in Public Service and is now the chief executive officer of the center for new American Security which i say with some is doing incredibly Creative Work on issues relating to National Security. Richard worked for many years as senator john mccains Foreign Policy adviser and prior to that workwork for the state departmet National Security council and also the Senate Foreign relations committee. A very warm welcome to both of you it i which is wonderful to e you here again. Without further ado but we invite dan colin to present evey move to the floor for comments. We will have a brief conversation and then i will open up the conversation to the floor and i look forward to your interaction duringfo which time. Thank you and welcome. Thank you very much for this invitation. It just so happens this Panel Includes three people all of whose experience and expertise interviews i really respect so its a pleasure to be here. In fact without dani pletka this book may not have happened. She may regret that that is the truth the American Enterprise institute. Glad to be here. Let me say a few words about the central thesis of the book. What motivated me among othersi things was a common argument over the last five years that the Trump Administration represents something completely unprecedented in American History and that this striking rise of populist nationalism on both sides of the atlantic is a close for comparisons back in the 1930s. Without downplaying some of the causes for concern i think that is overstated. I think it misunderstands the nature of american populism, and american nationalism and the administrations Foreign Policy. It is an attempt to situateot ts moment in a broad Historical Context which i think is often missing in its today. But i argue is that american nationalism. They kind of american Foreign Policy going back to the founding of which is quite the opposite. In the american case at least, there is a civic nationalism which involves an american creed with powerful classical elements rule of law, with a government, sovereignty and that has been bound up in the sense of nationalism from the beginning. Succumb in a sense conservatives ndom the beginning of. At the same time when it comes to Foreign Policy, all the founders had a couple of key principles that were really a consistent paradigm for generations. If you have a dollar bill in your pocket you can see the new world of the agents. The hope going back to the founding has been an element of the u. S. Foreig u. S. Foreignpoy nationalism doesnt mean you can do it by force but at least as an example. The second element and this is in washingtons federal undress you maintain a a free hand. In the american foreignpolicy nationalism they saw no contradiction between the two things and that was a dominant bipartisan tradition well into the 20th century. Whats shifted was i argue Woodrow Wilsons innovation during world war i. Wilson believed not w only that you needed to tie a new Foreign Policy paradigm of liberal globalism, you have to type the possibility of domestic progressive reforms and be willing to intervene on the ground militarily in europe to indicate democracy overseas, but you also need to be willing to make the global multilateral commitments. So that is a paradigm shift to the founders of. Theyve never quite agreed on how to tackle or counter that liberal internationalist tradition. Thereve been internal divisions and debates and we see this over and over again and keep saying it. When it fits into the multilateral commitments, they basically believe that you should have alliances overseas, a robust american prisons and active overseas. He wanted i in alliance with britain and france into the league of nations and thought that it was overly optimistic and unrealistic. Then theres a second group on the other end of the dark bonne interventionists and yononintere this with libertarian, conservatives say they should avoid commitment altogether. Alliances where they can trade peacefully with others but shouldnt have a military role outside of the western hemisphere so that is the tradition that goes back to the period as well. Often populists left of the mississippi that is a strain that runs true and vendors preferred in the middle which is a hard line unilateralism that doesnt get as much attention in and discourse that has been underrepresented that a lot of conservatives over time have had a fairly strong willingness to spend on the military, willing to counter concrete adversaries of the soviet union but they are unenthusiastic about the broad internationalist products and if you cant convince them that there is an enemy that requires response, they tend to shy away from the role. That is the Pivotal Group over time and what you see is they pay this back and forth between activism and disengagement depending on the circumstances, so in that movement of the treaty debate over three factions agree wilson was wrong but they didnt agree why. In the 20s and 30s conservatives for the most t pat agree they should be attached from military affairs in europe. Pearl harbor settled the debate and then the rise of the soviet union led many hardline conservatives to support a more robust military goal overseas. But if you think that to somebody like senator barry goldwater, he actually wasnt enthusiastic about the internationalism as such. The reason most conservatives supported this so they collapsed the soviet union and led to the question of whatst is now. In the 90s it was well hoping. You have pat buchanan, also conservative internationalists and everything in between. George w. Bush settled the debate for some time with the constant war on terror and i think most republicans support him in that for much of his administration, but one bush leaves office during the obama years, you are back to the period that conservatives are asking what now. The big surprise in my opinion of 2016, 2015 and 2016 in the republican primary is that candidate could win the republican nomination and in fact the presidency campaigning against the conservative internationalist tradition going back to the 40s. Donald trump led a frontal assault on the conservative internationalist tradition going back decades and he won, which was astonishing. He turned things upside down. There were groups that had been in charge that were deeply concerned. But i think what trump was doing in a way and im not suggesting that they read these older documents but my suggestion is that he instinctively as a kind of american nationalist who draws from older traditions the idea to maintain a free hand for example. When he ran for president he had a particular nationalism of his own if you go back you can see hthey said the same sort of things in his own unusual way 30 or 35 heirs. He said over and over again he viewed them as free riders. Thats his view merrily rather than assets. Thats not my view, its his view. He was quite consistent about that. They were taking advantage of the states economically and of the United States militarily and politically and he aimed to somehow fix this through his own negotiating skills. It was the complaint, it wasnt at plan of the policy alternative, but it was a complaint with popular resonance as they saw in the 2016 primary particularly when you tie it into the frustration over military intervention in iraq and afghanistan not to mention libya. Frustrations with the economic globalization that seemed to benefit the well off and chinas middle class, as opposed to working americans. Frustrations over sessions of National Sovereignty to the supranational organizations, right. A buddy bundled together a sense of frustration and turned it into a winning platform, so it is an older version of american nationalism and a particular version i think we have seen resurgent and that is a part of the Historical Context. Once they had to transition unexpectedly to the government because the election came as a surprise than the question is what now, what is the plan is the policy. There were severe personnel challenges. In reality the trump foreignpolicy is more of a mixture of nonintervention, hardline unilateralism and in some ways continued u. S. Foreign policy engagement. It is a hybrid that is partly because of personnel in his own adaptations over time he wasse t very flexible. Hes unpredictable day today. But there does seem to be a pattern in how she handles foreignpolicy and thats one of the arguments i handle as well. That is what you are seeing as a maximum pressure campaign. Then you see them against us allies to increase defense spending not entirely new but its in a way that you have not seen before and then on the economic front against china us competitor that is the trump innovation to really push china on the commercial side and then finally the campaign against us allies thats very trump i dont think and you can do what have done thate japan mexico canada to look for renegotiated treaties. So what he does is he goes up and down the ladder of escalation it can be subtle and unexpected he will raise the temperature the lower it. People make cuts and then be willing to settle or talk. With adversaries but what i do find striking if you turn down the volume which turns out to thbe high he keeps his options open that is different from saying he is in fact i doubt that he could but heri is interested and renegotiating with the Campaign Promises with the assessment of commercial diplomatic and military to renegotiate others there are more troops in poland and there were under obama the outcome is not predetermined the significant amount of the forward presences there and in some cases they can be increased and that seems to be the form policy. Know im happy to talk about the assessments of each of those but that is what it looks like to me. I also talk about Public Opinion and i found to my surprise it hadnt changed that much but trump took advantage of one and of thetr spectrum and managed to turn that into a winning argument politically the average voter in the Political Party has feelings about activism but there is no less support from 15 years ago but he hasnt really changed voters minds and then to capture a certain segment of opinion. Most republicans for example have a negative opinion of putin ten years ago and most do today there was mixed feelings about globalization ten years ago there is today. Most republicans supported nato ten years ago most support a today. That is the reality having said that i do think there is a longterm l shift that is become more populist and culturally conservative that will have an effect on the Foreign Policy including trade policy there is no getting around it. It is much a symptom as a cause but also represents longterm shifts. So i would not assume that the longterm shifts disappear you cannot just assume its a oneoffas and as soon as he is gone everything will snap back to 2014 am a little skeptical about that. So my conclusion would be in the future conservative leaders would have the opportunity to make form policy cases theyto believe in the public is open to it for us activism in the world but if they are real there has to be Coalition Building and they have to figure out how to live within the same party. So one way or another my proposal would be conservative nationalism is here to stay. Thank you. H [applause] thank you for being here ashley i didnt even have to put on a coat to come here from my office and i appreciate your words of thanks colon one dash i know of course he would have done this because he was already working onin it. He was part ofe the first cohort from a program of which we are very proud he is one of the first Jean Kirkpatrick scholars to come from act academia to with think tank to work on policy related issues and this is through the Academic Work they have been doing we wanted you because we knew you would be productive and indeed you were and this is fine work we are super happy about it. Richard it is nice to meet you if you like i am the fulcrum so this is a sober and fine treatment of what confronts us all and the thing that i like best is not not simply it delves into the origins of form policy and National Security but that characterizes pretty much every conversation and to have a sober and serious conversation that does not reference twitter in any way. Actually i bookmarked one part of this so talking about the title in the final chapter called the age of iron he writes the was hardly optimistic that scoundrels will be honored and fame will banish i said i know who you are talking about. [laughter] and it is true. But the reality is if you set aside what goes along with todays conversation if we will abandon nato or if United States is on article five or walking away from global commitments the reality is this is a very typical version and we can all debate whether in fact now is in different as everybody has, we had a project at aei in reaction to a rise of libertarian ideas of what i would call isolationism i think there are plenty of people that represent that view on the left as well if you saw the debate last night you saw that on play a little bit with National Security that got a vagueue h oha mentiot one of the things we looked at was pulling about Public Interest and Global Engagement which is very cyclical engagement interest drop. If you go back to every president ial campaign go this century or even further to clinton every Single Campaign republican and democrat has about been turning inward it is the economy stupid. George w. Bush the goal for was stupid that was dumb nationbuilding here at home was barack obama slogan but easily could have been donald trump said of course in each instance they read on these new slogans and then they turn inward and then we focus on my area of the world with a conflict of the middle east and donald trump has been no different. No different than that. The other point to make that is rightly described that the American Public views are fairly constant on these things. The only thing that really changes is interest and engagement so for example the American People think its great to be in afghanistan with the long running but hugely not successful war. Very low numbers of support during the Obama Administration when obama decided we need to have troops , he went out and gave a relatively rare speech talking about the importance and then the numbers went right back up again. The people want to be led they want their leaders to make a persuasive case to them and when they do, whether engagement, military commitment or economic commitment or disengagement , nationbuilding here at home foreign entanglements, whatever they choose for the moment the public reacts to that as well. I would not call that fickleness but the general normal lack of interest. I always try toes underscore here in washington we are weird. Most people dont Pay Attention toof this. That is just the reality of thats not a badth thing. To really pinpoint something i would call that an open question for the future as a populist trend this is rooted to my mind much more of a tectonic shift within society rather than the sudden appeal of the Donald Trumps of the world. We have Political Parties remaining relatively static over the years especially in the unitedic states with a parliamentary system to say i will create a new Political Party so what happens are these relatively static Political Parties that they over the years in the public that has changed. As so many do around the world that the parties no longer represent their interests. This is where you see the upstart not just in the United States with someone like donald trump but all over europe ands asia and elsewhere. That should not be a surprise. But the underpinnings of that loss of faith in Political Parties and the establishment is a National Securityhm phenomenon. When i commend to you another aer aei scholar doing wonderful work and he details the fact that 15 years ago there were enormous relationships in the United States that were not isolated in their bubbles so there was a lot of cross polarization non educated would marry non educated but that doesnt happen anymore so now it is more fragmented and that has been fed into the populist phenomenon particularly with one group of people who were donald trump constituents whitecollar less educated men that feel that society has left the behind with these people think about these sorts of things could be a transformative driver. Could be that might not be in hard to know one way or the other. This is something for all of us to think about. But allbu of these come together and raise questions just to put it crudely are not about article five or the commitment of the moment or whether poland pays 2 percent or greece pays 2 percent these are broader ideas that are flexible but shift over time in the longterm have anib impact for those of us who care about this or not vigilant. So i will turn things over to richard. Thank you ashley for bringing us together congratulations on your mark i dont thank you need my glasses yet. [laughter] i thought i would give a few thoughts on some of the things that struck me in the book and then with some of the conclusions the first thats right in theit cyclical nature with retrenchment you can see this when you get into the korean war with eisenhower in the trenches and jfk and lbj and then ford has to pull backck commitments. You can see the waxing and waning of the maximum american exertion around the world and it is supposed to be the biggest driver the end of what really long wars or for those aficionados then the exhaustion sets in the people say we have to constrain the definition of our National Interest and then the number goes up and then it starts to expand but the Trump Administration is just a piece of that. Call and framed the intellectual reaction of conservative thinking about foreignpolicy as a reaction to wilson. You could make an argument also with the assumption of overseas territories thats what everyone thought about without activity in the world but that more civilian turning point is 1945. Here is where i say the Trump Administration is a piece of the circle coughing i really do think its more of an outlier frankly than the rest of his administration but they just dont agree many times. What i mean if you look at 1945 what was bought brought into form policy are those principles but to maintain the peace there are be have strong lines underwritten from the troops that never came home because of the alternative the probably never come back after the war so the other was that you maintain prosperity with the International Economic system underwritten by free trade and then the freedom and to safeguard your home and then we would have that democratic system and the debate among conservatives and liberals within the parties a lot of it was how you do this. So where do you promote democracy . What is the trade off . What trade deals with whom . But there wasnt a lot requesting about the fundamental assumption in part that was a reaction to the first half of the 20th century where we saw they thought they could take over the world with the most devastating depression. But donald trump comes in and in the reverse as pointed out hes not exactly the model ofn consistency so we could find all these exceptions rather than seeing american troops not having to return to the first half of the 20th century this is a really bad deal for the United States because the allies are getting richer us protection and not paying their fair share in the troops cost a lot of money International Economic freetrade has not been consistent on anything with 30 years with the belief that trade deficits harm the little guy then he genuinely believes the promotion of democracy is the exception like venezuela. But its just not a top priority and some of these are trends. Obama had a similar trend in this direction. Even though he wanted to dialback American Military overseas he was all over place with democracy and human rights and that was a check on his form policy but trump in that sense is a very stark difference. What american foreignpolicy had assumed whether republican or democrat or conservative or liberal. But its complicated because its hard to think of people to have that dire of of you as our allies and then to be in different with the human rights so it needs to be more in this broad cyclical up and down in part of this is because we havent seen a populist we did not elect pat t buchanan yet. So this populism starting point the good common sense of the American People with the entrenched problems that has been distorting things for its ownn purposes we havent seen that as articulated in only by a court one applying the common sense and then to overcome those challenges so that gets back into more philosophical but and republicans would have been comfortable generally with the idea that there is a place that people from around the world with fundamental rights and freedoms in the hardline nationalist view is it is a particular set of people with hya particular geography and that has to be protected so that raises issues that can harm the political andol Economic Security much higher than thinking the rights of others. Or americans living overseas so President Trump quite obviously was muchmp more concerned of north korean missiles that is logical and straightforward the way that is publicly articulated that american president s of thought about these things. So to final things, on the polling a popular opinion is important to distinguish between issues that resonate. Its an interesting thing to kee how many on the basis were really irked from American Forces and on the democratic side. And the commitment to and the forevernd wars. A lot of these things resonate and then it is definitive in any way shape or form and then to take a very different position including the forever wars. This isnt vietnam war 2003. But there are other issues people will vote on that the president cant walk awayre from. You can get people to express an opinion but then will have much more room for maneuver for what resonates for these issues and then finally the book concludes with an interesting reflection on what should be the future of conservative foreignpolicy i participate in some of these groups where they get together and talk about the future sometimes it talks about the meeting to say we have a plan the bolsheviks will not be there forever so who the hell knows what is coming next and with the election Going Forward but this is the contribution to that debate so thank you for writing it. I love books with a simple theme that make things clear that when you read them you think i knew that all along i just didnt know that this is one of those books went up agreeing with a lot but i want to come back to the mechanics that you unpack so we come back to trumpet some wayok or form in an open discussion but you make the argument that the substructure consists of three groups of the isolationist the unilateralist or nationalist and that for much of americas post war engagement the coalition between the nationalist internationalists to maintain foreignpolicy and as his coalition had fragmented there was a new alternative of isolation so that is the broad structure and it tells us something. So i have two questions. Nationalist and internationalist coalition reduces the world order. 1945 but yet today there is now the inheritance the United States is no longer the old republic counterpart. But the management of that order what is the future that brings trump to power . We dont have that luxury to set apart whether we like it or not are wanted or not because the future is inextricably tied. But even that coalition represented by trump as many different from the expectations and those preferences. So what do you see as the future that brings trump into office . One possibility is is not managed very well but is entirely possible to be the best coalition runs up against form policy legacies that are extremely disruptive. Would like to feel thats what we are seeing right now. That is one possibility. However like the point that came up the dishes. Leadership and persuasion and they say how the past president s cobble together a coalition they never had to deal with a powerful midwestern nationalist wing very effectively but now not only confronting them but recognizing their values you can imagineco a future a president who skillfully bridges those gaps to understand thehe average voter is not voting on the amount of money thats out we are japan pays the United States. What you are seeing is a real shift on immigration. Maybe to some extent trad trade, there are a lot of bluecollar republicans they just really feel they have been hurt them in their communities partly that is a fact that has to be recognized it will look exactly like bush or reagan but a lot will depend on the specific leadership. So its possible these things can be managed in the way you describe actually think a lot of it depends on president ial leadership. So with the effects of these coalition for example those failures of the embedded distribution of the economy of International Trade relations and different groupings what the convictions changes is a response from what manifests . So the question im getting at is are these convictions primordial or in some sense a function of circumstance . From one group to the other . Those have completely disappeared thats just not how many conservatives and republicans have felt because it was the understood threat circumstances matter trump recognizes politically the sensitivity at that moment what we did not realize that the supporters feel to renegotiate with these trade lets say nots not completely walk away from afghanistan. He has the ability to do that. And thats not because of the cult of personality but supporting president s of their srty the same thing happened with obama. So more of a conservative internationalist but that is possible if the example there is a shocking military crisis we would like to see a second trump term look radically different. You could have a Foreign Policy if war occurs. Any thoughts. I think part of the problem that we have that is more and more common is we deny agency to everybody else there are huge factors that are not talked about over the last century the financial crisis that of 2008 incredibly impactful. With a huge huge affect as a tectonic shift on american politics without that we would not have someone like trump up to the presidency but the second part of course that part of the cyclical nature is when we disengage that shipped happens overseas. Soen what happens when we take our eye off the ball that we have underwritten since the end of world war ii that when we cease to do so then they suck us back in because that is what colon described. 9 11 i still remember one of my favorite conversations when i couldnt stand the second term of the Bush Administration but she said in the second term he is what he would have been if 9 11 had it happened. That is exactly right. As an interventionist. And there was that reality and then we gazed at our bellybuttons we are in a world where there are very serious threats not just to the global order that we have it is made is all pretty rich even if you feel that you were not. But that there are also other factors out there that have huge potential for disruption. With the proliferation of missiles than any of those is that event that call and talked about if people will assume their ideological preferences if they are afraid of that internal threat so that is the keyat driver. In 1945 you have robert taft and all of these guys youre not cause i isolationist but part of their ideological impulse they didnt want to National Security state of broad Standing Army a bureaucracy collecting taxes a small government conservative. But mostly as the cold war picked up strength the concerns were relegated to a secondtier the big fear was communism you may prefer not to have government in your face but theres something bigger to worry about. So in part connected to so many Different Things so a bearing on how radicalized they were in military intervention in a stabilize country so suddenly in the 19 nineties they were trying to chip away at what they thought was the vestige of the National Security state that was after the cold war and no longer necessary now you are back in business. Whether there was are war or it could be china as the big major existential challenge to challenge the core things that we enjoy here in the United States so the question is a future president may have all the preferences to go with a hard line unilateralist or isolationist. But if the fear is great enough then it will be reduced to a very small group of people and expanding the view of america one american Foreign Policy. I have one question how do the three groups that we identified as significant for conservativism and manifestatio manifestation . Have a master the questions of citizenship . And views citizenship as a matter off political belonging that is more nativist and connected . With the obvious mapping of citizenship in these groups . Yes. And it goes back to the point if the us is an idea but you are more likely to find of you of the United States as a place as a particular religious and ethnic background. And civic definition and he argue there is the anglo protestant core so thats one way to think of it. And that is to bee compatible if you think al qaeda or the soviet union is a problem but you wont have that form policy approach at large. So there is the relationship in that way. The only thing i would add to that is people look to the drivers of populism right now and nationalism linked to populism and those economic drivers there is the qualit quality, the nonrepresentation that the elites have never spoken to their needs. But also cultural aspects the percentage of foreignbornrn americanse today is the highest in over 100 years crusted around world war i then in order to close the spigot of people who were able to come in the now would open again in the sixties now we see it again. So in elite circles that type of diversity is embraced on the right and the left is a great virtue of the country and culturally renewing phenomenon it has been felt differently in other parts of the country and then you tack on the economic difficulties then hear the president thing we been doing a lot of stuff a lot of people that are not americans for a long time is time to put america first. So depending on how you define that now an american first, that could be a driver. You are right. It is very hard to know because there are ebbs and flows of attitudes toward immigration but also their are demographics one of my favorite interviews from back around the time when there was a controversy of european allies would do more to support us in the wake of 9 11 we were arguing what it was and dick cheney was on a sunday show and asked why it was the europeans would not do more and he said because they cant. But that is an important factor for the chinese. As you spend more on social policy or on social welfare and disinvest as we have been doing for quite some time, then you end up in a situation where you cant do things then you have a population more old people than young people and the job of the young people is to sustain and pay for and work so the other people have benefits then they dont want to go to the military. This is something is what we predict about china there are more old people and not enough younger ones to sustain if it is not a nation of immigrants which we have been that is part of the energy of our growth and c innovation. If we stop and rely solely upon americans we will have the sameic problem. I will open the discussion. Identify yourself. I am a retired Us Government official. It is stimulating so trade sovereignty is not only going to go away soon so the question is dont we need now if you are concerned aboutat investment security dont we need now to start thinking about how the intensification of trade sovereignty and all courses begins to affect overall to affect the behavior and calculation of allies . Sure. To me this was striking those unexpected changes one of the things the most critical of of trade policy i actually give credit on china and that issue needed to be addressed. That was underappreciated but on us trade disputes with allies it doesnt really make sense strategically or economically. We should be trying to coordinate in relation with china so the wto needs to be addressed i see a well coordinated effort to do that what i see are picking fights with allies and then resolving athose fights in the same thing with the eu. The germans, i do agree there is a trend toward trade sovereignty and protectionism and a shift we are seeing and if you talk about the Political Support in the country, that also seems to be one of the single biggest areas where Congressional Republicans really have a problem with the administration. They dont always put their foot down but that is a sore spot. Because they hear t about it. If you are a farm state local officials are complaining. So ideally to coordinate with allies against china. Number one i see this as much as a a shift and by members of congress and matters of the public god knows how many msn debates on china to know how that has shifted and what the constituency was it is a sure sign of how big the golf was in there is always a lot of hesitation and then elected to lead and now as confusion has deepened nobody understands what this is about and what those people want. And thats why they are paying more attention. I really believe that. And what we never ever talk about his age. Im sorry. Im not as bright as i was and in the wake of world war ii the United Nations or wto with that intellectual property competition to have not even all. And the agreements with the discomfort ofal globalization. With containerized shipping and the integrated financial markets. Theredi are two remedies to this. T and from that was at issue here. And to retrain the people of those in nor could they be automated away. And those effects of that phenomenon so to say what is the solution that effectively takes the man or the woman . And in the same sensed of purpose and as a programmer and its very hard to see how that works. And there are consequences to the shift. But yet we have to manage those consequences. And then to protect these industries is also the wrong answer. You can recognize the challenge and empathy with those who are affected if you would adopt on the back of that. With that protection is platform. And that may have been the issue pennsylvania and michigan. And to see a democratic debate and the democratic party. And that conservative nationalism do you see that same trend or shift in europe . And are your views with definitions of nationalism compatible with those views put forward . And then to be slightly different with that defense of National Sovereignty that there was a benign element we havent said anything better from theth nationstate and by the way that part of abstract social contract theory and external challenges. I dont know if its a global theory of nationalism but the american version is a civic version for the most part which is bound up with ideas but we are not sure why and with foreignpolicy as well so esthe right to have a speech as donald trump did not know where you find that framework i dont know why they word have the right to do that. And that was a brilliant political theorist. But the short answer is yes. I would see immigration as issue number one white shift is a very calm and thoughtful case from an author that the single biggest cause particularly in europe was mass migration and the fact that those ethnic majorities are no longer in the majorities. And since those migratory movements are not about to end and in the coming century. So those parties are not going away with those underlying factors. Those tend to be much more skeptical of the eu of National Sovereignty or left of center of domestic welfare issues. But immigration is the top issue. Some of them are appropriate and and some are not. So if that is here to stay or the american version. What about the nationstate . He n . I think there is such a thi thing. In the nationstate as a matter of fact but nevertheless there is a state and the nation. We like the fact it tends to be bottomup and we like to keep it that way but it is historically the american nationstate. One of the things the war revealed under the leadership is the single United States but he insisted on and embodied the determination with the ability to defend its territory and integrity so it is an idea but also a place. Thereve been a tendency to say that the nationstate is fading and disappearing because of economic independence, governance. I would say the nationstate has come back with a vengeance and we know there are areas that dont have effective control of the territory like subsaharan africa. But i would not count the nationstate out as a matter of fact if you are american i dont think you should. I think you should see the United States as a nation that has responsibilities to its citizens and that is part of what we are seeing is hopefully the restored since of the nation called the United States we have obligations to each other. At one point i think you should have asked the question of how gore described how Global Trends are running up against the existence of states or however you describe it, and danny rightfully pointed out we have multilateral institution. If we look at europe in migration its not at europe as an entity hasnt tried to find the response to migration or the realistic response. The fact that even europe hasnt been able to do that i think its back to your original observation which is that we do have this inadequacy of the nationstate to address the global problems that we have but then that does ultimately come back to the observation which is we really do need to start addressing the question at the multilateral level and thats where the inadequacy of nationalism really implodes because it is going to be very difficult to convince genuine nationalists of the virtue. Not in terms of ethnicity but in terms of the constitutional commitment so in that sense if it became irrelevant in the political personality. Then the United States can survive and prosper as a nationstate. Its when you start settling for the nationhood that you begin to see the competition within countries becoming difficult so there is a multilateral dimension to it, but i think many of these issues have to be involved within certain countries themselves. We took about two Different Things in the ways. One is migration, why does europe have a problem with immigrant because European Countries dont like to say with the exception perhaps a little bit of england into a small extent than id like to say here is what our country stands for because that sounds like i am right and you cant have that. So you dont get the sense of civic nationalism deny that sense of ethnic nationalism. We have not had that but increasingly i would say there is an element of conservatives dare i call them that Tucker Carlson conservative who think of us as endless protestants and that is what makes america and therefore all of you immigrants no matter what they believe in the American Dream or not in the constitution are never going to be part of it and with the playing of the National Emblem they are not wholly american if they are referred to without some hyphenated attachment so we have these factors that are all exacerbating these problems and because of them we actually come together and agree how to prioritize any multilateral. I want to ask about the change of the shift in demographics especially towards the millennial santa generation in the completely connected world that affect the losses of nationalism Going Forward, and even now that more millennial shaping Public Opinion towards the front. Anecdotally ive been teaching for 30 years so we see the shifts that are interesting and hundreds of students on the ground. It seems to be they are more skeptical than some older generations and what theyve grown up with none of it has been a positive experience. This isnt even the 9 11 generation anymore. I have her graduates with no memory of 9 11 so if it was an experience for you it might be a shocking need to do something. But the lived experiences the war iof thewar is dragging on ie greater middle east. And of course they have memory of the conclusion of the cold war which provides a big formative moment. By the way that is a cross party line. They change because of event and develop different views but i do think that its striking the millennial santa tend to be more skeptical. Its not the same thing as isolation. But i often have the students say to me is why do we intervene after all. Some element of cultural technological interdependence which would cause the outcome. Maybe i am just a natural pessimist, but i noticed that over time so that would be my short take on how millennial search engin changing the u. S. N on policy. That notion is more widely shared including millennial study them back when i was in college in the late 90s when it was all about the multinational corporations and multilateral organizations and the eclipse of the nationstate as sort of the Building Block of International Affairs and networks of the nongovernmental organizations and activists in d things like that. And certainly if you look at Something Like this is, took the nationstate using other nationstates to put an end to the caliphate and even look at the Global Financial crisis and then they had to use fiscal policy to help the financial crisis. It went up rather than down and in this moment it is being eclipsed in economics more than anything else. So theres this kind of reductive reality that for all of the desire for multilateral frameworks and realities of the corporations that could move opinion and technology to connect people around the world, it still is a nationstate that is the primary actor in International Affairs and would agree that its not in terms of the multilateral frameworks. At a particular moment so that it gets a perceived bitter outcome in a different level. This is an issue that can unite it with a different faction right and centerright but i noticed you get a heated debate over the military intervention in syria, retrospective but when it comes to china even some of the more noninterventionist voices are down with the notion that youve got to do something and that can be a unifying argument. One of the things that struck me in this story about was toldd in the book was that you have trump that is the product of an isolationist which pushes us in a different direction from both groups. I want to thank all of you for coming to the endowment this morning and extend a special thanks for giving us an opportunity to host them and for spending time with us. I look forward to seeing you back here at some point in the future. We do have the book on sale outside of the room if you have an interest you could have him sign a copy for you but we have a few copies out there and you are welcome to pick up a copy. R and 20 minutes. Ch. Good evening. Im andrew, the director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the bush school of government here e at texas a and m. University. I would like to welcome our special event this evening with kim ghattas who is going to speak of the recent