Transcripts For CSPAN2 Colin Dueck Age Of Iron 20240713

Discussion of colin dueck, age of iron. Which is a marvelous analysis of conservative nationalism. I see a couple of things about the book in the moment but before i do i want to extend on your behalf in mine a warm welcome to colin dueck and to distinguish commentators. As you probably know colin dueck is a professor at george mason esiversity and is also a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise institute next door. Literally. Colin dueck has made his mark thinking deeply about american politics. And this book is trademark direct. It examines the concept of conservative nationalism that has been brought to public attention conspicuously to the rise of President Trump. In terms of both the history of ideas and how these ideas have found manifestation in the history. Especially in the debates in the world. So the book is both encompassing and granular simultaneously. And despite the gravity of the subject, i assure you its a delightful read. I read the book over the last ten and i commended to your attention. So welcome colin it is a pleasure to have you with us. I am also very grateful that they have consented to join us for this discussion. We could not have asked for better commentators, given both their intellectual interest in conservativism in their own practical contribution to the making and implementing of domestic policy in the United States. Daniel had a long career on capitol hill whereto she workedt the Firm Relations committee. She has also written extensively in Foreign Policy especially on the middle east. Appears widely on television and until recently Vice President for domestic Foreign Policy studies. Where she continues to remain a senior fellow in foreign defense policy studies. Richard has had a long career. He is now the chief executive officer, the center for new american security, which i say with some jealousy is doing incredibly Creative Work on issues relating to u. S. National security. Richard wrote for many years for john mccains policy advisor in the state department, National Security council and also the senate committee. So the warm welcome to both of you danielle and richard, its wonderful to have you both here again. Without further ado, let me invite colin to present the key teams of his book before i yield the floor for their comments, we have a brief conversation that will open the i conversation to the floor and i look forward to your interaction during that time. Thank you colin and welcome. Thank you ray much for this invitation. It just so happens that this mipanel includes three people al of whoms experience and expertise in views i really respect so it is a real pleasure to be here with Danny Richard as well without danny this book probably would not of happened. She may regret that but thats the truth. So i am glad to be here. Let me say a few words about the centerpieces of the book. What motivated me among other things was a common argument over the last five years that the trump a administration represents something completely unprecedented in American History and the striking rise of populist nationalism on the right, both sides of the atlantic is a cause for comparisons back in 1930s. Without downplaying the genuine causes for concern, i think thatst overstated. I think it misunderstands the nature of american populism, american nationalism in the administration Foreign Policy. Is not one weight or another not pro or anything and broader or Historical Context for its missing amidst of the day. And what i argue, american nationalism, there is american Foreign Policy nationalism going back to the factory which is not undemocratic at all, its the opposite. In the american case at least, there is a nationalism which involves an american creed with powerful Classical Liberal elements, role block, sovereignty, that has been within american sense of nationalism from the beginning so incensed they have sought to conserve literally that tradition. At the same time, when it comes to Foreign Policy, the founders had a couple of keep principles and you can see a new order of the ages. The idea within the United States will stand for something in the government spreads, that is emerging hope pointing back to the founding, thats been the element of Foreign Policy nationalism. It does not mean you can always do it by force but least is an example the second element and no change as jefferson, and the alliances, no permanent alliance. That was a key element in Foreign Policy nationalism from the beginning, the founder had a contradiction between the two things. That was really a dominant what we would call bipartisan tradition, well into the 20 century. What really shifted was Woodward Wilsons innovation during world war i. He believed not only that you needed to tie a new Foreign Policy paradigm which we call liberal internationalism or globalism, you try that to domestic regressive reforms including theo united t states,u need to be willing to intervene on the ground militarily in europe to vindicate democracy overseas you need to be willing to make global binding multilateral commitments, worldwide. As he intended with the league of nations vertically under article 10. So thats a paradigm shift, thats an alternative to the founders and Woodward Wilson understood as such. From the beginning republicans and conservatives of the United States cannot agree on how to nntackle or counter or accommode the liberal internationalist tradition. There had been internal divisions in debates and we see this over and over again and we will probably keep saying it. I say there are three main groups of conservatives over time in the past century, one conservative internationalist are skeptical of some of the overkill when it comes to multilateral commitments. But they basically believe that you should have alliances overseas with a robust american presence overseas. That is over who faced off wilson during the treaty debate. He wanted an alliance with written defens prints, but he tt that wilson was overly optimistic and unrealistic. Then theres a second group on the other end of the spectrum. Libertarians, some paleo conservatives the say the u. S. Should avoid going through commitments altogether, alliances, interventions, with peaceful other countries but not have a military role, outside of the western hemisphere. That is a tradition that goes back to the period as well. Often populist from west of the mississippi. That is. A strain that runs through. Then theres a third string in the middle which is a hawkish unilateralism which does not give much attention in an elite discourse, its been missed under representative but a lot of conservatives over time had a fairly strong willingness to spend on the military, willing to counter concrete adversaries of the soviet union, alqaeda, but theyre unenthusiastic about broader international projects. If you cannot,de convince them t there is an enemy that requires a response, they tend to shy away from a more active role, thats a Pivotal Group over time. What you see, they pivot back and a forth between activism and disengagement depending on the circumstances. In that moment of the treaty debate, all three agree that wilson was wrong but they did not agree toe why. In the 20s and 30s, conservatives for the most part agreed the u. S. Should be attached from military affairs in europe right. Pearl harbor settled the debate for some time and then the rise of soviet union they were anticommunist. The plot to the soviet union as welcome as it was led to the question to what now orr conservatives. In the 90s it was wide open, yet pappy cannon, ron paul, conservative internationalist, everything in between. George w bush settled that debate with a comfortable war on terror and most republican supported on him for much of his demonstration. And during the obama years your back to the. Where conservatives are asking what now. The big surprise in my opinion of 2016 2015 and 2016 during the republican primary was a candidate could win the republicanan nomination and presidency campaigning against that conservative International Tradition going back to the 40s. Donald trump really led a aontal assault on the conservative internationalist tradition going back decades and he won which was astonishing. He turn things upside down. Groups that have been marginalized for they were better represented. Groups that had been in charge were deeply concerned. But i think what trump was doing hain a way, im not suggesting e personally read these older documents, that is not my argument, my suggestion is he instinctively is american nationalist who drawls from older tradition to maintain every hand forns example. When trump ran for president , he had a particular nationalism of his own and if you go back he can see he said the same thing for 30 years and his own unusual way 32 men 35 years and he said over and over again thatt he viewed them as free riders, that is his view. Primarily as free riders rather than assets, its not mine is his. He was quite consistent about that. He said they were taking a vantage of the United States economically and taken advantage militarily, politically. And he aimed to somehow fix this through his own negotiating skills, it was a complaint, it was not a plan or what the policy alternative but it was a complaint with some popular residents as we saw in the 2016 primary particular when you tie into frustration over military interventions in iraq and afghanistan, not to mention libya, frustration with pattern of economic globalization the benefit the welloff and chinas middle class as opposed to working americans, frustration over sessions of National Sovereignty to organizations. But he bundled together a sense of frustration and turned it into a platform. So its an older version of american nationalism, his own particular version that i think weve seen the research. That is part of the Historical Context. Once he had to transition unexpectedly to government because i think his election came as a surprise probably to a lot of people in this room, it came to a surprise as me, then the question is now, whats a plan and what the policy. Theres been a lot of uncertainty from the beginning, severe personal challenges and in reality, the trump Foreign Policy is more of a mixture of nonintervention, highlighting i laterals of and continued u. S. For up policy engagement, that is partly because of personnel around him, that is partly because of his own adaptations over time, hespt very flexible, flexible to a fault, unpredictable day today. There does seem to be a pattern and how he handles Foreign Policy and thats an argument i make as well, therecy is somethg that if you indulge me too sound like a political scientist, i would picture a two by two grid. And he launches per campaigns against allies as well as adversaries and he launches pressure campaigns on Economic Issues as well as security ones. In other ways security adversaries in north korea, iran, isis, taliban, thats pretty straightforward, another president mightve done the same thing and somewhat different way. But that is part of what youre seeing, National Pressure campaigns in case of iran and north korea for example prethen you see n pressure campaigns agt u. S. Allies for defense spending. Not entirely new but he is blunt and away. You see pressure campaigns on the economic front against china, u. S. Competitor, that is a trump innovation i think, that was not nearly as highpriority for previous president s to push china on the commercial side and finally pressure campaigns against u. S. Allies on trade, that is new and that is very trump, i dont think any other candidate wouldve done that, pressure canada, mexico, japan, south korea, that you looking for trading arrangements. And what he does, he goes up and down the ladder of escalation in ways that can be sudden and unexpected, he will raise the temperature and lower it, he will make threats and be willing to settle or talk to almost anybody. This tends to unnerve people. It unnerves allies, it unnerves adversaries, and probably even some of his own staff. But what i do find striking, if you look over times, we try to turn down the volume with tends to be high, it is not obvious that he himself knows the endpoint which is interesting, im not sure he himself knows the reservation weight on every one of these friends, he keeps his options open. That is different from saying he is hellbent on dismantling what we call rulesbased international order, immvi not convinced he has that as a reference. 1 way or another. In fact i doubt he could describe it to you. He is interested in renegotiating existing arrangement consisting with his promises, is a portfolio assessment of u. S. Commitments overseas, commercial diplomatic military, he is reserving the right to walk away from some commitments, renegotiate others, maintain and maybe bolster some their u. S. Troops in poland more under obama. So the outcome is not predetermined, a significant amount of the presence is still there and in some cases may be increased, and that seems to be the Foreign Policy, now we can talk id be happy to talk and discussion of assessments of each of those fronts. Just a few final thoughts, how am i doing on time . I also talk a little bit about Public Opinion in the relationship of conservative opinion to the Trump Administration. I found to my surprise that the distribution of opinion has not changed that much over the last five or ten years, in other words trump took advantage of the one end of the spectrum, the less intervention, the more protectionist and he managed to turn that into a winning argument politically but the distribution has not changed that much. The average voter in the Republican Party has mixed feelings about u. S. Foreign policy activism but no left support for then there was five or ten or 15 years ago. That is interesting, he has not changed voters mine as much as you might think, he himself has made a difference on capturing a certain segment of opinion. For example, most republicans had a negative opinion of prudent ten years ago, most republicans have a opinion of him today. There is mixed feeling about globalization ten years in a mixed feeling today. Most republicans supported nato ten years ago, most republicans support nato today. So you go down the list, thats reality politically. Having said that, i do think there has been a longterm shift by the Republican Party becoming more populist culturally conservative, white workingclass voters have become more and more porton overtime av the base of the party and that is going to have an effect on your Foreign Policy including your trade policy, there is a no getting around it. He is as much a symptom as a cause. He has accelerated that and also represents longterm shifts. So i would not assume that just because he asked that these longterm shifts disappear, we cannot assume he is a one off and as soon as he is gone everything was not back to 2014. I am a little bit skeptical about that. Conclusion would be in the future most trump conservative leaders would have the opportunity to make Foreign Policy cases that they believe in and think they make sense to play a leading role, the public is open to it, there is still a fair amount of support among conservatives for u. S. Activism in the world. But some of the longterm shifts are reale and create and will outlast him. So there is going out to be coalition building, more than one type of conservative, and they will have to figure out how to live within the same party. Not to mention with other independents and democrats. So one way or another my conclusion would be that conservative american nationalism is here to stay. Thank you. [applause] can i ask you to say a few words. Sure. Thank you so much for being here. I love the fact that i did not need to put on a coat to come over from my office. And i appreciated your words of thanks, feeling very kindly saying that he would not have done this because hes already working on, but he was the first cohort of a program that we have that were really proud which we named after kirkpatrick which was our first scholar. People come from academia to a think tank to try and work on policy related issues and move away from the Academic Work that they have been doing. And we wanted you because we knew you would be productive and indeed you were and this is fine work and i know everybody is super happy about it. Of course sitting next to richard is nice for me too, i feel like im in the fulcrum because richard was my legislative assistant when he was a wee little thing. That was a long time ago. He has not changed a bit. [laughter] but onto the substance. So this is i think every sober and fine treatment of the questions that confront us all. And the thing that i like best about it it dives in to the origins of various different types of american conservatism in our National Security but it does so in a way that is hysteria that characterizes as every conversation about the issues that go on today in washington, its good to have a sober serious conversation that does not reference twitter in any d way. And i actually bookmarked one little part of this because i thought i know who youre talking about. And you go back to in the title and then in your final chapter called age of iron and its a gorgeous quote in your and he writes he was hardly optimistic about the new era in which scoundrels will be honored in fame will vanish. And i thought i know who you are talking about. And it is true but the reality is that if you set aside everything that goes along todays conversation about whether will abandon nato or the United States will honor article five or walking away from our global commitments orng the liberal international, the reality is that this is a very typical version to the mean. And we can all debate whether in fact now is different as almost everybody has at every turn when there has been this. We had ahi project at aei which was in the action to what we found a rather nervous making rise of m libertarian ideas ando the forefront of what i would call isolationism, i dont think of him as a realist, i think of him of the isolationist and theres plenty of people who represent the viewpoint on the left as well as you saw that in last nights debate. You have that. We started the project in one of them that we looked at was pulling over the years about American Public interest in Global Engagement and what you see is a very engagement goal, and if you go back to pretty much every president ial campaign, we can pick the century or go back further to bill clinton, every single one of these campaigns, republican and democrat has been about turning. It is the economy stupid, george w. Bush, that was down the gulf war, you could go on and on, nationbuilding, here at home it was barack obama slogan but it could have easily been donald trump and of course in each instance what we find is they run on the slogans and everybodys like oh my god its terrible and then we end up as a middle each specialist i tried to return to focus on my end of the world and we end up in the middle east, donald trump has been no different than that. I think the other point to make, is that the t American Public is fairly constant. The only thing that really changes is interest and engagement on particular issues so for example do the American People think its great to be in afghanistan in the i longrunnig and obviously not hugely successful work. Very low numbers of support. During the Obama Administration when obama decided we need to get up troops just as we are drawing down troops in iraq, he gave a relatively rare speech to george w bush. A relatively rare speech talking about the importance of this. And then got back up again. The American People are game to be led. Ironically that is true in most democracies. He want their leaders to make a persuasive case and when they make a persuasive case, whether for engagement, greater engagement, military equipment or maybe disengagement, moving away, nationbuilding here at home, avoiding foreign intake omits, whatever cliche they choose for the moment, the republic asked to that as well. And i would not call that part of the public, i would call that a general normal lack of interest in the daytoday of National Security. I triedhe underscore that we he in washington aresh weird. We pay a lot of attention to this. Most people dont. And thats just the reality. And thats not a bad thing. Where i think you pinpoint something, i would call it an open question for the future, this populist trend, this really my mind much more in a tectonic shift within society. Rather than in the sudden appeal of the Donald Trumps of this world. So we havee Political Parties that have remained relatively static over the years especially in the United States without a parliamentary system that we dont get up and decide that im losing and going to create a new political party, that does not happen here. You have these relatively static parties even though they find s themselves slightly over the a public thathave has changed and feels rightly as so many do aroundn the world tht the parties no longer represent the interest. And this is where youts see the upstart coming from. Not just in the United States and someone like donald trump but all over europe as well in asia and elsewhere. And that should not be a surprise but the underpinnings of that, the loss of faith in Political Parties, the loss of faith in the establishment is a National Security phone almond on and more phenomenon. I condemn the work to Charles Murray who wrote a book a couple of years ago called coming apart which is a wonderful work. And he details the fact that 50 years ago there were enormous cross relationships in the United States and people were not isolated in their bubbles and therefore there was a lot of crosspollination. The poor could marry the rich, the rich convey the poor, the university educated would marry the nonuniversity educated, that does not happen anymore. There is a result we become more fragmented and i think that has fed into this populist phenomenonhi, the sense particur of one groupup of people who are donald trump constituents. Whitecollar less educated men who feels like society has left them behind. What those people think about these sorts of things are hugely important and could be a transformative driver. Just arent but put it crudely arent about article 5. Theyre not about the commitments of the moment. Theyre not about weather poland its paying 2 or groce is paying 2 . These are broader ideas that are flexible, but that shift over time, and that may in the long term have an impact if we, those who care about this, are not vigilant. So, with that let me turn things over to richard. All right. Thank you. Thank you for bringing us together. Collin, congratulations on the book and danny, you dont need new glasses yet but if you do let me know and i can pick them up on the way home. I thought id give a few thoughts on some of the thing that struck me in the book and then maybe a few areas of difference with some of the conclusions. The first is i think colin and danny laid out are right in the cyclical nature of the american politics truman is a maximalist and then eisenhower retrenches and jfk and will be bj are marks malises and then nixon and ford have to pull back commitments in vietnam and other places and pursue detente and everything. So you can see the waxing and waning of maximal american exertion around the world and then retrench; and the think that is the biggest driver is at the end of really long wars, americans become realists or real affair indiana doughs, exhaustion sets in and sense of cost, and people say we have to constrain the definition of national some and then it starts to expand again after a while. The Trump Administration is of a piece of that but only partly a piece of that. Colin framed the sort of reaction the intellectual reaction among conservatives thinking about Foreign Policy in reaction to wilson. And i think you could make an argument also that an Inflection Point was there in 1898 and the assumes of overseas territories and that significantly changed the way that really everyone, including conservatives at the time, thought about american responsibility in the world and american activity in the world. But actually think the more salient turning point is 1945. If you look heres where i think the Trump Administration is of the piece of this sort of cyclical thing much more than donald trump and this instincts are more of an outlier than the rest of his administration with whom they just dont agree many times with a lot of his institchings. If you look post 1945, theres three broad assumptions build into u. S. Fern policy, or principles. One is that to maintain the peace, we would have strong alliances underwritten by the toward deemployment of american troops. Troops never came hem and we had seen the alternative. They come home and we have so send them over the ocean again to end big war so wont do that again. Another was that you maintain prosperity and increase that we would sport an open International Economic system unwritten by free trade and then the third was the support the forces of freedom and safeguard it at home when possible, we would have a bias in favor of democratic systems as opposed to autocracies and the debate among conservatives and liberals and democrats and republicans and different president s and different public, was how you do this. So what do you dive we friendly autocrat or promote democraticcracy, what trait deals with whom, who does it help, who dogs it hurt, but there wasnt a lot of mook among the president s in post1945 questioning the fundamental assumption because that was reaction to the third half of the 20th century where we saw the first world wars in human history, the rice of auto thats who could cake over the world and this devastating depression in history and nobody wants to repeat that history. So, donald trump comes in and i really think his instincts are in the reverse on those three things. Now, as colin pointed out, not exactly a model of consistency on these things so you can find all these exceptions, but rather than seeing the forward deployment of american troops and american alliances been the sin quo unanimous of not having to return to the this is a really bad deal nor United States because allies have been getting retch under u. S. Appreciation and not paying theyre fair share and troops cost a lot of money and should come home. International economic agreements some free trade, if hes been consistent on anything, its opposition to trade agreement and a belief that trade deficits have hallowed out or Manufacturing Base and hurt the little guy. And seems not interested in the promotion of democracy and human rights. Theres and exceptions like venezuela and other things. But its just not a top priority, and some of these are trends. Obama, you can see a similar trend in this direction. Obama was want ted dial back American Military commitments overseas. All over the place in terms of the democracy and human rights thing but clearly was not a chestnut of his Foreign Policy but trump in that sense is a very stark difference in what american Foreign Policy had assumed to be the fundamental principles, whether it was republican, democratic,crest, liberal but its clique indicate because is a hard to think of the people in they, whos has a dire a view of or allies a the president does and closes view of what International Economics should look, indifferent as the president seems to have about democracy and human rights and it kind of nets out to be something more in terms of the administration more in this broad sort of cyclical up and down here. And i think part of this is new because we just have never theres the nationalist part which we have seen before in president s. Havent seen a populist president. Didnt elect William Jennings brian or pat buchanan or bernie sanders. This populism, this starting point, one, that the good common sense of the American People, when appropriately applied, and can sort of resolve really entrenched problems that the country faces, and that theres a corrupt elite that has been sort of distorting things for its own purposes and things like that. We havent seen that as articulated and it is by no means only on the republican side. You look through the front runner then democratic side, very strong echos of big institutions are run by elites and theyre out to get you and only by applying the common sense of the real American People, however defined, can we sort of overcome the challenges we face as a country. That then gets back into which is even a little more philosophical, how do we identity this america whose interests were trying to protect and pursue. Republicans as recently as i think mitt romney, john mccain, george w. Bush, probably would have been comfortable generally with the idea that america is this idea, its this place that people from around the world can come and buy into this notion of fundment. Rights and freedoms and the hardline nationalist view is its not an idea. Its a particular set of people that live in a particular geography which is the United States, and that geeing aography has to be protected and so that raises issues that can harm the physical security of the Economic Security of the American People living in their traditional homeland much higher than thinking about the rights of others to live in peace or democracy, or even americans living overseas. So, you saw this with President Trump quite obviously was much more concerned about north koreaian missiles that can reach the United States than kill people on the peninsula. That may be straightforward but thats a difference in the way publicly articulated american president s have thought but these things, including on the right side. I guess i would say, two final things. One, on the polling and he popular opinion, its important to distinguish between issues that resonate and issues people vote on. It would be an interesting thing to so of all of the people who voted for donald trump, how many of them did so on the basis of they were really issued by insufficient host nation sport by japan for American Force deployed there certainly on the democratic side now or a trump rally, this commitment to end the forever wars. It resonate like getting tough with the allies resonate. But its not clear at all to me these are definitive in any way shape or form is that a president couldnt take a very different position on this, including the ending the socalled forever wars, theres not marches in the streets. This is not vietnam or even 2003. But there are other issues that people will vote on that i think a president cant walk away from on immigration and trade and these other things, so i think you can get people to express an opinion but actually think the president , whether its a republican or democrat, will he much more room for maneuver, maybe than they enthink. I just dont think theres bound to theyre base or things that resonate for these issues they dont that are not drivers of a vote. And then finally, the book concludes with the interesting reflections on what will be and should be the future of conservative Foreign Policy and apart tase it in groups where groups get together and talk but the security sometimes it feels like the white russians meet michigan helsinki in 1920 saying we have to plan, the bolsheviks wont be there forever and we and and then it all the white russians were again so who the hell knows what is coming next and a lot of this will turn on who wins the election Going Forward, but this is a contribution to that debate. So thank you, colin, for writing it and thank you ashley for inviting to us talk about it. Thank you, richard. I love books with a simple theme that actually make things clear in ways that when you read them, you think, gee, i knew that all along, i just didnt have the conceptual apparatus to capture the intuition and this is really one of those books. As you read it, you end up agreeing with a lot and you end up thinking, gee, i knew that but yet we didnt. I want to come back to some of the mechanics you unpack in the book, because i know we come back to trump in some way or form in the open discussion. You make the argument that the substructure of the conservative movement consists of three groups. Theyve isolationists, ewan hall rattists and internationalists, and that for much of americas postwar engage; it was the coalition between the nationalists and the internationalists that allowed to us maintain Foreign Policy that was activist and expansive. And as this coalition has fragmented, giving way to a new alternative of isolationist and nationalists, thats right what explains in some ways the advent of donald trump. Thats the broad structure on which the analysis on the book is based and that seems telephones us something that going beyond the headlines at the level of deep structure. I have two questions. Nationalist and internationalist coalition, produces the world order that we have seen post1945. Yet today that is now the inheritance we have to deal with. The out is no longer the old republic set apart from the rest of the international system. The manage. The order is the everyday bread and butter business of the United States. In this environment, what is the future of the isolationists, nationalists coalition that brings trump to power . We dont have the luxury now sort of sitting apart. You had that luxury before 1945. You condemned to manage a world whether we like it or not or want it or not because our interests are inextricably tied to this world we created and yet its a world which is a product of the nationalist internationalist coalition, not the product of the isolationist nationalist could even if you have an isolationistnationalist cools presented by trump, theres world out there that is different from the expectations and at the prefer reins of the preferences of the trump coalition. What do you think of the future of the coalition that brings trump into office. Theres more than one possibility. One possibility is its not managed or not managed very well. Thats entirely possible. It may be that the domestic plate coalitions run up against Foreign Policy legacies in candidate that are extremely disruptive. So, i think a lot of people feel thats what were seeing right now. So, thats one possibility. However, i did like the point that came up both following danny and richard which is the sheer role of president ial leadership and persuasion. I think president s have a lot of leeway and i say this in the book. I show how past republican president s have cobbled together coalitions very skillfully. Eisenhower had to deal with a powerful midwestern nationalist wing and he handled it very effectively. Not by actually confronting them by by kind of coopting them and recognizing their val lit concerns. You can imagine a future conservative republican president who skillfully bridges gaps and understands that the average voter is not voting on, last say the exact amount of money that south korea or japan pays the United States with its bases. You have leeway on those thingsful however where i think you are seeing a real shift thats going to have to demand some respect is on immigration, maybe to some extent trade. As it turns out, there are lot of blue collar republicans that feel that musty lateral free trade agreements have hurt them and their families and communities over time thats just a fact. So got to be recognized. Whether or not economists like it or not. Thick youre going to see some in coalition that wont exactly like bush or reagan, not going to look exactly like trump and a lot will depend on the specific leadership their president. So its possible that these things can be managed in the way you describe. I actually think a lot of it depends on president ial leadership. What is the role of distributional effects on the survival of these coalitions . If, for example, we move interest a phase where there was a better distribution of the economy, better distribution of our International Trade relations in terms of incomes for americans, in different groupings, would the convictions change . How much of this is really a response to simply losses of globalization the question im getting at is when you talk of the groupings, are these convictions pry modal or convictions in some sense of function of circumstances . The circumstances change, can people move from one group to the other. I think its more door number two. The nonintervention gist strain never completely different appeared during the cold war but wasnt politically relevant. The reality was you had the soviet union and it was an understood threat. So, events matter. Circumstances matter. I think trump recognized politically, turn out to have uncanny political sensitivity in 2015 at that moment to the fact that what we didnt realize on other campaigns the potential appeal of a protectionist platform. But itself his supporterred feel coming up to november that he has represented them well and i think many do that hey is renegotiated trade agreements then he has leeway politically to say if he chooses, lets not completely walk away from afghanistan. Lets not completely not disband nato in my second term. He can do that. There arent going to be mass demonstrations depending on his exact decisions over syria. He has that thats not because of a cult of personality. Its because partisans tend to support president s of their party. The same thing happened with obama. So i actually think if youre more, lets say, conservative internationalist tendency, that is possible, even under donald trump. So events make a big difference. If theres some shocking military event, some crisis, if war breaks out we might see a second trump term look radically different than the firm this its not unusual historically. Woe could have a Foreign Policy that changes quite a bit if war occurs whether the president liked it or not some regional theater. Danny, any thoughts on this . I think part of the problem that we have and that is becoming more and more common as we look inward is that we deny agency to everybody else. The truth is there are two huge factors that we havent talked about that have had a very, very meaningful influence on the fluctuations over the last century that first is financial crises. Talked about the depression, but the financial crisis of 2008, incredibly impactful. Really had a huge, huge affect on what i described as these tech topic shifts in american tectonic shifts in american politics and without it would not have the propelled donald trump to the presidency. Thats part one. The second part is part officer this cyclical it in tour when we disengage, use the vernacular, shit happens overseas and so what happens, when me take our eye off the ball, understand that this sort of global order that the United States has underwritten since the end of basically sinned the end of world war ii but to a certain extent prayer to that, that when we cease to do so, bad things happen and those bad things suck us back in because they are the kind of events that colin described. If war breaks out. 9 11, i still remember one of my favorite conversations with a girlfriend where i was marveling how much i couldnt stand the second term of the bush administration, rather different than the conventional view but still, and that she said, no, because in the second term, george bush is the president he would have been had 9 11 not happened. And i didnt like him and thats exactly right. Im a good interventionist. And thats the reality is that there was that reversion to the mean. There was that event that drew us back in and if we stop for a second, dont gaze at owl belly buttons quite the enthusiastic way we have been over the last couple of years were looking at world in n which there are very serious threats to not just the global order that has maded all pretty reach, even the people who feel like they werent, but also that there are also other factors out there that we dont talk pout as much, but that have huge potential for disruption. We dont talk about nonproliferation anymore at all but the prolive rigs of missiles and weapon of malls destruction. Very, very serious thing and any one of those can cause that exstrip sick event that colin talk about. If you look historically its still true fear changes the ideological preference people will subsume that are ideological preferences if theyre photographed enough but an external threat. Thats the key driver. So, in 1945, you still had robert taft and all of these guys who not only were at least quasiisolationists and the cant want to main socalled National Security state this, broad standing army, a huge federal bureaucracy that collected taxes from everybody because they were small Government Conservatives. A few holdouted but mostly as the cold war picked up strength, those concerns were relegated to a second tier kind of thing because the big fear was communism and you may prefer a small government, may prefer not to have a standing army, may prefer not to have government in your face, but theres something bigger to worry about. And then same thing was true after 9 11, in part because of we saw terrorism connected to so many different thing the. The amount of democracy in a country would bearing on how radicalized people were and militarism was necessary to kill people and stabilize countries and so suddenly the small Government Conservatives in the 1990s were really trying to chip away at what they thought was a vestige of the National Security state that had kind of grown up over the cold war and was no longer necessary, suddenly were back in bans and thats subsumed again. So the real whether thats a war or it could be china as the big kind of major perceived i had the worth exextension shall deafblind but existential sense in it challenges core things we enjoy here in the United States, and so the question is, a future president may have all of the preference that go with the hardline unilateralist or isolationist because theyre small Government Conservative and think we be in war but if the fear is great enough its reduced to a very small group of people and the more expansive view of american Foreign Policy will obtain. Im going to open the discussion to the floor in a minute. I have one question that was triggered by what richard said in his initial remarks. How do the three groups you have identified as significant for conservativism and its manifestation in politics how do this group map on the questions of citizenship and the view of citizenship as a matter of political belonging and commitment to a constitution, both as citizenship which is more nativist and connected to certain identities . Is there any obvious mapping of notions of citizenship in these groups . There have been research in Political Science to try to answer that. Goes back to Richards Point is the u. S. An idea or a place . I think youre a little more likely to find the sort of hardline nationalist, ewan lattallists have a view of the United States as a place. Its a place with particular people and not only that, maybe more than that, particular religious and ethnic background. The late Sam Huntington talk but a civic definition of mental nationalism verse ethnic he tragedy is ang anglo protestant core and that can be compatible with being muscular if you think that al qaeda or the soviet union is a problem but youre not as likely to have a cost cosmopolitan Foreign Policy at large. Theres a relationship in that way. The only thing i would add to that is, people have looked at drivers of populism right now and then the nationalism that gets linked to the populism, and theres the economic drivers of the crisis and groel inequality and the fedupness and nonrepresentation at that time just the elites never felt spoken to the needs of those, but theres also a cultural aspect because the percentage of foreignborn americans today is higher than it has been in over 100 years, and it crest evidence around cretz evidence around world war i and the legislation passed to close the spigot of people able to come in and then opened up again in the 60s and how its stressed again and in elite circles that kind of diversity and cosmopolitan is embraced on the right and left and seen as a great virtue of the country and a culturally renewing phenomenon and things like that. Its felt differently in other parts of the country particular live i you tack on the economic difficulties and you see a resonance here with the president s kind of, look, we have been dog a lot of stuff for a lot of people that arent american ford a long time its time for us to get ours now. Time put america first. So, depending on howl you define that noun in america first, i think that that can be a driver of some of this. But youre right, and its i think its very hard to know because there are sort of ebbs and flows in attitudes towards immigration and also demographic reality. One of my favorite interviews from back around the time of whether the would the controversy whether our european allies were going to do more to support is in the wake of 9 11, and we were all arguing about what it was and dick cheney was on some sunday show and asked why it was that the europeans wouldnt do more and he said, well, because they cant. And can is actually an important factor. Its an important factor not just for us. Its ant important factor nor the chinese. As you start so spend more on social policy and more on social welfare as you disinvest in defense, as we have been doing now for quite some time, then you end up in a situation and cant do things. If you have a population in which you have more old people thang young people and the job of the young people is to sustain and pay for and work so that the old people have benefits, they dont want to join the military. And their parents dont want them sent off to do these things. This is something that actually one of the thing that our friend and colleague predicts boat touchdown which is a population where there are more elderly people and not enough children to sustain them. If in fact we become a nation that is not a nation of immigrants, which we history historically have been thats our origin and sees and if we stop and rely on americans having kid well have the same problems. Im going to open the discussion if you want to make an intervention, just identify yourself and ask as pointed a comment or question, please. Im retired u. S. Government official. Thats a very stimulating and reassuring discussion so thank you to all awe you. Trade sovereignty is not only not going to go away anytime soon but most probably going to intensify not only in the u. S. But throughout the world. So, the question is, dont we need now as people who are concerned about interNational Security and u. S. National interests, dont we need now to start thinking about how the intensification of trade sovereignty in all quarters begins to affect the overall environment, how that affects the behavior and calculations of allies, adversaries, rivals, whatever you like . Sure. This to me was really one of the most striking and unexpected changes of the last five years, and in the book i lay out some recommendations in the end. This is one thing identity moment critical of the administration is trade policy. Give him credit on china. I really think that needed that issue needed to be addressed and ratessed and i think the president deserves some credit. That underappreciated. The economic side, not just the military. On u. S. Trade dispute width allies doesnt really make sense on the merits of it. Strategically or economically. We should be cooperating with our allies to coordinate in real estate to china. So, trump has some kernel of truth. The wto could use reform. Dont city a wellcoordinated toast do that. What i see is picking fights with allies and then resolving to the fights and saying, we got a deal, and we may see the same thing with the eu. Theyre threats out auto tariffs. The german are very worried. So, i agree that there is a trend toward trade sovereignty, trend toward protectionism, a sort of historic shift were seeing and seems to have some domestic Political Support in different countries, and that also seems to be one of the single biggest areas where at lo of Congressional Republicans really have a problem with the administration, even though they dont always put their foot down, but thats a sore spot for a lot of Congressional Republicans because they hear pout it. If youre in a farm state youll have your local constituent maining this is hurting me. So this has to be ideally you would coordinate with allies against china. Two things, i think. One, i actually dent see this as a historic a shift as i think youre describing because i think theres always been a really vast gulf between elites and by that i also mean members of congress who are voting on these matter and the public, and the difference is that the elites were far more willing in the past to ignore their constituents. Having sat through god knows how many msn debates china and remembering howl i shifted defending on who the president was and at the constituent si would, that was a pure sign of how big a gulf the was between the leaders and the people, and there was always a lot of hesitation about this because people think differently about it. Theyre not leader. The mentality of the elected leaders was we were elected to lead, not to be in the front of a mob. Now as confusion has deepened about what it is that people really want, nobody really unders what this is all about. People are still kind of confused holiday donald trump got elected and who really voted for him and what those people want. Those people. Thats washington for you. I think thats why theyre paying moyer attention to this. Its not theres been a narrowing of the gulf. I really believe tthe second pos really important that we never, ever talk about, is age. Im sorry. Im not a spry as i once was. Why is it that we believe that organizations that were created in the wake of world war ii are somehow spry . They dont require reform, whether its nato or the United Nations or the wto or world bank or the imf. All of these organizations have become hugely have not evolved to meet the challenges of digital a digital economy, intellectual property competition, climate change, whatever it is. They havent evolved. And thats a huge problem and yet nobody talked about these reform issues. I guess the only thing i can add is well irthink youre right the trade stuff, the skepticism of trade is not going away because the skepticism of trade and because trade agreements become a proxy for discomfort with what globalization as brow. Dont get to to boat record shipping or Financial Markets or Broadband Access that allows services to be exported across border. Trade agreements are up for a vote and you dont get to vote on automation. I think its a severe challenge because theres sort of two remedies to this. Theres the ignore everybody who is hurt, harmed by whatever economic phenomenon is at issue. Which used to be the remedy. And theres the other conceptuality attractive one which is we are going retrain the people in manufacturing and get higher paid service jobs or work as programmers in seattle of whatever. Which is is conceptually attractive to those as far ake tell think thank jobs not tradeable goods or odd [loss of audio] automated away by Artificial Intelligence so when you have people making decisions who are 99 secure that the effects of these economic phenomenon will be in their economic selfinterest because it lowers prices and, it is hard to say, what really is the solution . Are we really going to have a that effectively takes the man or the woman who has been working in manufacturing in North Carolina for 30 years and now is going to either find the same sense of purpose and everything by working at the strip mall can even if they get paid 50cents more an hour or ideally become a programmer in seattle or silicon valley. Very, very hard to see how that works. Which i think raises the larger question, which is you have a collision between the logics of. The market and the logics of. The state. Move now towards production across national brians boundarid the consequence to the shift and those transform makeses or ayton mouse of state choices autonomous of state choi and we have to manage the consequences without easy solutions. And you can make everything worse if you just sale the answer is to protect all thats industries. That also is the wrong answer. So you can recognize the alcohol den. Worked great in the 1920s. You can recognize the challenge, you can have empathy with those who are affected and then come out making matters even worse if you adopt on a back of that the wrong economic policies. Just one quick followup. Politically trump showed you can have a narrowly Winning Coalition at the Electoral College level with a protectionist platform and outflank the democratics and and that may have been a voting issue with vote. So politics copy success when i see a debate like last night the one obvious free trader Michael Bloomberg didnt have a good night. Seems leak the Democratic Party is not going to take the lead in standing up for free trade. So you may get a convergence. Yes, sir. My name is formerly with raidey liberty. You mentioned that conservative nationalism is here to stay. Do you see the same trend, the same shift, in europe . The first part of my question. Secondly, are your views on definitions of nationalism compatible or not compatible with the view put forward in his book, virtue of nationalism . So, the book is a very important book. I like much of it. We have a slight live different view on some things. This offers a stauch defense of National Sovereignty. Hi suggest theres a benign element to nationalism historically. There is a western political tradition that says, we havent found anything better than the nation state to allow for experiments with constitutional selfgovernment. I think hes right about that. By the way, faces dont come caught out of abstract they come together out of coercive situations, external challenges. So i actually think he has point. Where were a little different is i think i dont know if you can have a global temporary theory of national. The american version is a civic version, best understood which is bound up with clays Classical Liberal ideas. That affected Foreign Policy. Very american to think a u. S. President has the right to go to the u. N. And give a speech as donald trump did initially criticizing the north korean regime for internal human rights abuses. I i dont nowhere you fine a framework if you ear strict nationalist, across the board, i dont know why a u. S. President would have the right to do that. Why is it americas business but the internal affairs of north korea . I think if i read the book i dont see where i dont see the basis for a u. S. President to do that so the thats a difference ump think hes a brilliant plate tall theorist. On the eu, the short answer is, questions, its their stay and its not really mainly bit Foreign Policy. Immigration is issue number one. Theres a book i recommend called white shift. It might sound like an imposing title but its a calm, thoughtful he goes through cases and suggests that the single biggest cause of the rise of populism, particularly in europe, is the issue of mass migration, and the fact that this is causing a feeling that traditional ethnic major jihad will no longer be majorities and theres not getting around it. Thats encouraging the rise of new populist nationalist part odd to right some since the mass migratory movements are not going to end and theres been going to continue to be migration from africa across the mediterranean in the coming century and thats going to force european governments to decide what to do about it. Given that you already have a large percentage of foreign born population in a lot of European Countries. So those parties are not going away. The underlying factors are. Those parties as you now tend to be much more skeptical of the eu. Dont want to exit from the eu but more skeptical assert National Sovereignty. Theres a little left of center on the domestic welfare issues. Not necessary hi right wing on deck issues but on immigration, that is a clear thats the top issue and then Foreign Policy is interesting because some of them are very pro putin, some of them arent. If youre polish youre not pro putin so you can have polish nationalist who is culturally conservative and hat no use for putins russia whatsoever. Is it true to say its trend that is their stay about migration, africa to european version is the american version. What the future of the nation state . What is the nation state . Well have accommodations and make adjustments on the margin but whats longterm viability of the nation state as the political operator . The small question. I love ashley. I think there is such a thing one reason i defend the word nationalism. Some people want to si he hsieh patriotism and theres a thing as an american nation and an american nation state. There is a state and a nation. Now, we like the fact that in america it tends to be bottom up, not authoritarian, its democratic and wed like to keep it that but there is historically an american nation state if talk in the book the example of the u. S. Civil war. Probably heard the line that before the u. S. Civil war it was these United States, multiple. One of the things the war revealed it was a single United States and he insisted on that. There was going to about such a thing as an american nation state with the ability to defend itself territory and integrity by force if is necessary. So its an idea but also a place so theres a forceful element to it. I dont think that we should assume there have been for decades a tendency to say the nation state its fading disappearing because of maybe and enter depend tense, traps national governans. Really . You think so . I would say the nation state has come back with a vengeance in many parts of the world and theres large parts where nation state dont have control over. The territory. Subsaharan africa as an example. Dont count in the nation states out. As a american cow shouldnt. See the United States as a difficult nation that has responsibilities to itself citizens and i take it thats part of what were seeing, is a hopefully a restored sense there is such a thing as a nation, a nation, called the United States. We have obligations to each other. Thank you. Anybody else out there . I want to follow up [inaudible] ashley at one point i think you sort of asked the question of how described how Global Trends are running up against the existence of states, et cetera, the knack kwesi of states. And danny rightly point it out we have multilatll institutions, interstate institutions which are sheerly clear rottic i think you clear rottic. You look at europe and migration. Its not that europe as an entity has not tried to find a response to migration, a rational realistic response. Its simply they dont have the constitutional framework to do that e on the they have a Multilateral Institution that puts most others to shame as a Multilateral Institution. The fact that even europe has not been able to do that gets back to your observation we have this inadequacy of the state, the nation state, to address the global problems we have, but then that does sort of ultimately come back to dannys on sir which we really need to start addressing the question at a multilateral level and thats where the indiana quick si of nationalism really is glaring. It is going to be very difficult to convince genuine nationalist selfdescribed of the virtue of multilateral, muscle multinational initiatives and ceding of some sovereignty. My view was the original american regime was the exact solution to the problem because it defined nationhood not the term of egg knight the or blood or soil but in terms of constitutional commitment. So in that sense it became irrelevant in favor of a new mended political personality. And if that becomes the definition of nation, then the United States can survive and prosper as a nation state because there is no particular definition of nation in this case. Everyone who becomes american becomes part of this american nation. Its when you start i think settling for alternative conception of nationhood you begin to see these the competition within countries becoming difficult and then so is there a multilateral dim mention dimension to it but thats heave to be resolved within certain countries themselves and that will impact on their definition and their conceptions of nationhood. Its a catch22, though. It really is. You are talk us about two Different Things in a lot of ways. Why does europe have a problem with migration . Why does europe have a problem with immigrants in because when immigrants only to European Countries they dont like to say hereto what our country stands for. Because that was that sounds too much like you cant have that. So, as a result you have these people who come and dont get a sense of civic nationalism. Theyre denied that sense of ethnic nationalism and so they are forever outside. That causes europe problems. We have not had that but increasingly i would say theres an element of conservative, i call them the tuckunder karlson conservative cho who think of out is white anglosaxon protestants and that makes america and therefore all of you immigrants, no matter whether you believe in the American Dream or not or the constitution, really are never going to be part of it. Heat exacerbated by the left and people who feel the ooh neil during kneel during the playing of the National Anthem to theyre not wholly american i they refer as to american is polling some hive nateed attachment. So we have these factors that are all, as as as sir baiting problem and exacerbating problems and can agree thank you prioritize any fix to any of them because we cant decide where those people belong or if they belong and how to manage it. Its a real trap that were in. I want to ask you how do you think the change of a shift in demographics specially towards more millenials and more generation z coming into the mix who are growing up in a completely connect world, affect the thought process of nationalism Going Forward and even now, that more millenials shaping Public Opinion towards that front. I can just comment. One this he Public Opinion research and an next totally. If a been teaching 30 years and over time you see shifts which are really interesting in hundreds of students, undergrad and graduate students. The evidence seems to be that millenials are more skeptical of military intervention than older generation. Theyve grope up with, none has been a very positive experience, looking at this isnt even the 9 11 generation anytime. I have undergrads who have no memory of 9 11. If 9 11 was a formative experience youve might say this is shocking, we need do something but thats not their experience, this lived experience is war is dragging on in the greater middle east. And of course they have no memory of the successful conclusion of the cold war, which for my generation was a big formative moment. So, that matters and that is across party lines sol you find some republicans actually who share that view. So i think that is not to say that views cant change because of events. People age and develop different views as well but die think it is striking that millenials tend to be more skeptical of military intervention. Not the same thing is a isolationist. What i often have students say why do we need to intervene after all, it will work out anyway. So they believe theres a peaceful solution. Some element of cultural technological enter dependence which will cause a positive outcome which i always find interesting. I am sometime a little more skeptical of that. Maybe aim a natural pessimist but i noticed that change over time. That would be my short take on how millenials are changing u. S. Opinion on Foreign Policy. My general sense, maybe specifically respoke to nationalism, but in the notion oft. The nation state as at the primary act Glory International affairs, that notion is more widely shared, including among millenials today than it was back when i was in college in the late 90s, when it was all about multinational corporations and super empowered individuals and multilateral organizations and the eclipse of the nation state as the Building Block of international affairs, and networks of nongovernmentat organizations and activists and things like that. And certainly if you republic at Something Like i dont know isis, took a nation state leading other nation states to put an end to the isis caliphate and look at the global from cries. The banks turn on the monetary spigot and governments had to use fiscal policy to pull out of the financial crisis. There was really very little that you could do the governments role from our economies went significantly up rather than down. Right at this moment when the nation state is being eclipses and all ways economics more than anything else so theres this kind of reducktivist reality that all of the desire for multilateral framework and the reality of big corporations that have ceos that can move opinion and technology that connects people around the world issue it this nation state that is the primary actor in international affairs, and to the degree that its not in terms of multilateral framework is a also because the very nation states made a conscious decision to cede some particular element of their sovereignty or constrain their decisionmaking some way so as to get some perceived better outcome at a different level. One quick. The issue of the rise of china i think is an issue that can unite a lot of different factions, right and center right. Youve get heated debate over new military intervention, syria, but when it comes to china, thankfully even some of the more nonenter generalizationists votes are down with the notion you have to do something. That could i think can be a unifying argument. One of the thing that struck me is a paradoxical of the store from the book you have trump the primeact for for isolationist nationalist and declare thing return of Great Power Competition which in a very different direction from what the political roots of his own ascendancy are. On that note i want to thank all of you for coming to the endowment this morning. Want to extend a special thanks to colin for give us the opportunity to host him. To danny and to richard for spending time with us. I look forward to seeing you back here at some point in the future. We do have colins book on sale outside the room. If you have an interest you can entice him to sign a copy for you but we have a few copies out there, and you are welcome to pick up a copy. Thank you very much. See you soon. Bye. [applause] heres a look at some books being publish evidence this week. Former Charlottesville Virginia mayor offer is his accounted of the unite the right rally in, cry havoc. In capital and ideology, french economist weighs in on how to correct wealth inequality. And in, in our prime, university of michigan communication and media professor susan doug loss larses the the neglect at the pore trails of older women. Also being published this week, investigative journalist report on the pharmaceutical industry with pharma, greed, lies and the poisoning of america. To in smartphone society, exploring how new technology has empowered community organizing. New York Times Beirut Bureau chief ben hubbard examines to the rise of Saudi Arabian crown press and in pursuit of disobeepent women, the New York Times reporter three. S on her tomorrow as the papers west Africa Bureau chief. Look for title inside book stores this coming week and watch for many of the authors in near future on booktv on cspan2. And youre watching booktv on cspan2. Every weekend, 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books. Coming up this evening, on our Author Interview program, after words, the two party system is damaging americalines democracy. Also this weekend, Columbia University professor looks at the social roots of Sexual Assault on college campuses. Former chicago mayor and chief of staff to president obama, rahm emanuel, provides a first hand account of how innovation is taking place in cities across the country, and attorney Jill Wine Banks reflect hones legal contrary that included her whole in the watergate case as one of the three assistant special prosecutors. Check your program. Guide or visit booktv doeringer to for me information. As the coronavirus continues to spread we want to share another related program from the booktv archives in 2082018 Rosemary Gibson discussed the risks of the u. S. Depending on china to supply essential ingredient forts maybe of the most widely used drugs. Heres her talk from George Washington university in washington, dc. Rosemary gibson, her book explores the topic of a dramatic shift in where our medicines come from as china looks to position itself as the pharmacy of the world. I think many of us in the medical Public Health profession have been unaware of this shift. You may notice at times that there are shortages, there are contamination issues, other problems, but i think we have not