I want to welcome you and thank you all for coming to this Conference Today on north korea. As we think about what might be coming down the road on the Korean Peninsula and the broader region it is very easy, i think, to succumb to the temptation to be pessimistic. In fact, as we sit here in washington today it seems like there is all kinds of reason to be pessimistic. We seem to be facing on the home front a variety of challenges and we are in the midst of renting president ial impeachment process and the broader country seems to have deep cleavages societally and we have a big problem with mutual distrust in the country and when we look abroad internationally the headlines we are reading this morning suggest we might be on the brink of a very dangerous war with iran and last week we read about the element of Hypersonic Weapons in russia and coupled with the demise of arms control and the return of Great Power Competition it looks like the world is getting ever more dangerous. Even American Relations with some of our longstanding allies seem to be strained to the breaking point. I need hardly tell you all experts on korea that the news out of the peninsula is hardly encouraging these days. But if there is one lesson i think we can take from the past several decades it is that wise leaders and creative experts can manage and reduce the dangers that we are facing internationally. Here in the United States we overcame domestic vitriol and violence that we faced in the 1960s during the vietnam era. We managed to avoid Nuclear Catastrophe with the soviet union and in the cold war peacefully. We helped germany to pivot from being a potential nuclear battleground into a united regional leader and we transformed our relations with vietnam fundamentally. None of these problems at the time seemed any less daunting than the challenges we seem to face today in the world. Even though its tempting to stand aghast at the dangers that we are facing to marvel at the problems that confront us. We need to remind ourselves that its not our job to contemplate the problem just for the sake of being scared. Our challenge as experts is to think creatively about these problems and to understand the opportunities that are hidden amidst the dangers that appear so obvious. And to use our expertise in our understanding of these problems and to identify and take advantage of opportunities that are there even if they are not evident on the surface and so i look forward to hearing your ideas today about these challenges. I want to thank harry our senior director for korean studies and for putting together such an impressive agenda today for discussion and for gathering such an Impressive Group of experts today. I look forward to hearing your ideas and i want to introduce harry who will talk more about the specifics of todays events. Harry, thank you. Good morning everyone. Thank you all for coming. Welcome back to dc if you are just coming back and i know everybody this is the type of year where everybody takes extended break and comes back and we have congress in session today so thank you for spending your money and may be your afternoon with us. I will keep my comments very brief. Im just getting over bronchitis i promise im not contagious. But i do after about speaking for about five minutes lose my voice and i want to give these guys a great panel and moderate that. I will keep it brief and short. Welcome to all of you. Welcome to those watching is now on cspan2. Our event north korea in 2020, fire and fairy or path towards peace. Very important. This event is cohosted and sponsored by a generous grant by the Korean Foundation and i wish to thank them for all the support and great efforts in this area. Great to work with them and we appreciate that partnership. What we want to do today i think is very straightforward. Over the course of three different panels in a lot of different speakers and different perspectives and different ideas to get a sense of where things are going to go with north korea in 2020. Look, its an open question of where this goes and obviously the International Arena moves with events outside of the Korean Peninsula and as george indicated we have a lot of problems that are in the middle east with that death of the general and people have questions about where trump Foreign Policy is going at the moment so those are things that will factor into issues on the insula peninsula. I think i was at the scene for a moment and talk about things where they stand on the peninsula right now and then i think we can move forward into the keynote address. At the moment we have north korea that continues to build material and they may have enough to sell material from anywhere 3065 Nuclear Warheads and i think thats up for dispute and we have a u. S. North korea policy that unfortunately is essentially stagnant and we dont have a clear understanding of where the Trump Administration wants to go in the next couple of weeks and months and as many of you know we are under a situation where the president has been impeached and there will be a trial in the senate and its hard to understand where trumps Foreign Policy will go because of this. Lets stay stagnant for the month or next two months and its tough to save it on the other hand we have to factor in what kim jongun will do. Will he for the next six, eight, nine months hold back missile testing or new clear testing and try to gauge will trump be reelected but we dont no, these are open questions that i think we have to sort of factor in. Also we have other events happening in south korea we have elections that are coming up and does this limit president s ability to try engage more with north korea and does eat pivot to more domestic issues with the south korean economy and looking to grow more in the coming year. I think these are all very much open questions. With that let me get to the procedural things that will happen today but all of you are pretty much think tank events experts but i will lay these things out anyway. Obviously with the amount of cameras in the room today we are on the record so keep that in mind. As you can see by the itinerary doctor moon will open up everything and i will introduce him in a second but then we will go into our panels. Three panels today in each one of our panelists starting off with jessica they will speak ten15 minutes and then we will go into the classic q a. One thing i asked during q a is while we may know each other our Live Audience on species cspan does not know you. If you can give your name and affiliation that is important so everyone has an understanding of where you are coming from. Your news outlet or whatever. And after our panel we will have coffee breaks and a one hour lunch break and move into the afternoon session for it with that i will introduce doctor moon. Many of you know him quite well and over the last year, 18 months ive gotten a chance to know him myself. Hes been one of the architects of south koreas sunshine policy in a previous progressive government and out in the government of and special advisor to president moon. I will have to ask him if he speaking under his personal capacity and im sure he will clarify that but its great to have you here, doctor moon. We look forward to your remarks. Thank you, harry. I speak for myself not for the government. Let me clarify that. Harry, you made the topic of my talk as president moons piece challenges and opportunities. I will try to sum up these policies and challenges. His what is government is facing in lesson 20 minutes and then we can have an open discussion. President moon was inaugurated on may 92017, 1st year 2017 was nightmarish year. It was worst for him but in 2019 he opened a new horizon of peace by holding three summit talks with german kim jongun in. Then 2019 [inaudible] he is facing major stalemate with ups and downs. If you look at the korean history it was a history of a roller coaster. One year good, other year bad and we have constant living under uncertainty. Going through the ups and downs he made it clear that his goal is to make Nuclear Weapons free peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula. In doing that he set the four major principles. First principle is [inaudible] that has been the fundamental pieces of his policy line. Obviously hes a refugee from north korea during the korean war and he himself witnessed the tragedy of the war. He wanted to avoid war for whatever that means. Second, no nukes. He wanted Nuclear Weapons free of Korean Peninsula and supported peaceful use of Atomic Energy but opposed the transfer, testing of Nuclear Weapons. He speak to 1991 joint declaration of the creation of the Korean Peninsula. Weve been abiding by that declaration of north korea and it has not been abiding by that declaration. Therefore that leads to a second principle. Third visible is that the new regime change north korea and he wants to build confidence with north korea. Once you have new ways of communicating with north korea. He made it very clear when he gave a speech at that [inaudible] he still abide by that principle. Finally he want to come and they believe the economy believed on the economy and they if we incorporate together we can really seek, and prosperity those are the four principles. Then he has laid out for major strategies. First strategy is the strategy of peacekeeping. Peace keeping that surpassing the possibility of war through military deterrence and strengthening of our alliance. This idea of peacekeeping really erodes out of the crises in 2017. It was kind of past dependency for government but he strongly believed that one way of presenting more is having a defense capability. He believes in the utility of alliance with the United States. Second strategy is the peacemaking strategy. He wants to reduce tension with north korea and wants to build confidence with north korea and he wants to adopt an end of war declaration. He wants to transform the armistice agreement into some sort of Peace Agreement or treaty. He wants to sustain a viable peace regime under the Korean Peninsula. In fact, that has been one of the most important policy strategies of the moon governments. Third, hes interested in peace building. Peace building refers to the elimination of codes of war under the Korean Peninsula but he believes the piece economy can lead to peace building. If north of south korea make a corporation and if they agree to come up with some kind of arrangement through which peop people, goods and services can move freely across the tmz and north and south korea can pursue common prosperity president moon strongly believes there wont be any more on the Korean Peninsula. In a sense it is like hes [inaudible] trading states do not fight each other. Finally, he emphasized proactive diplomacy. Korea has been sandwiched between china and the u. S. And between dpr k and the United States and he wants to pursue more proactive diplomacy. He wants to be a mediator, facilitator, arbitrator, or pacesetter. Therefore he does not want to be a passive dictator to changing external [inaudible] but he did it in 2018. When there was a complete between the u. S. And pyongyang he played a crucial facilitator between washington and pyongyang. Those are the four major strategies of the government peace initiative. Then other challenges and opportunities that you clearly saw and witnessed the new horizon peace particularly april last year. I was there and saw the great positive piece under north and south korea but they adopted a military agreement on september 19 and pyongyang and there was article one of that decoration and since then there was no conflict. Last year chairman king showed up in west coast and ordered the test exercise of missiles that was perhaps the only violation of military agreement adopted [inaudible] there has been a sense of progress but overall the government is facing several llamas and challenges. First is the drama of peacekeeping. Of a way of enhancing peacekeeper ability he was strengthening deterrent capability and then our government has been purchasing f35 fighter from the United States and we have secured the global hope High Altitude on the drone surveillance and devise and we will be spending almost 50,000,000,000,001 there is a slightly larger than defense spending of japan in this year. Most koreans are angry about it and most say we agreed to view the constant north korean is saying that the south korea not sick in the military buildup. But because of what happened in 2017 there was the decision made by the previous government he had to follow in defense capability strengthening in the line. Therefore the idea of peacekeeping is self defensive but north korea does not put that in the way and they think its offensive which is well orchestrated with the United States. Therefore peacekeeping has been backfiring and peacemaking is proposed of parallel approach of peacemaking but we are not making any progress in recommendation and they have become stalled. Of course, we are maintaining september 19 military agreement to some extent. However, we are not able to adopt the end of war adoption and no discussion about the transformation of the armistice agreement into some sort of peace treaty along major stakeholders and we talked about peace regime but we havent really touched peace regime therefore peacemaking is undergoing major difficulties. Peace building in order to have a peace building we got to have what this economy is working and in order to make it work then they got to have north korea but International Sanctions prevent south korea from engaging with north korea. For example, president moon strongly desired to have Railroad Connection reconnected between north and south and even he had groundbreaking ceremony in january last year but Nothing Happened after words. He wanted to reopen and mount a project again, because International Sanction regime he could not do. The North Koreans argued that the south korea has not done anything to north korea. Therefore hes having a hard time pushing for the idea of peace building through piece economy. Proactive diplomacy, contrary to what conservatives and south korea have been criticizing we have been [inaudible] we have been 100 coordinating with the United States. We have shown 100 transparency to the u. S. With regard to exchanges and corporations. As a result of that relations have become completely frozen and we now have a dilemma that what should we do if the United States cannot make breakthrough in its talk with north korea . I do not know what will take but [inaudible] if the u. S. Fails to reopen negotiations with north korea and come up with some kind of settlement with north korea the supporters and south korea should take independent action and if i would say we are now going through critical time. South korea is a democracy and we need to continue with his supporters and if president moon cannot deliver to his supporters that he will face political dilemma. [inaudible] even he will give you your speech that in washington i will say that he emphasized will rely on the night states in the north korea problem but i dont know to accent he can really go along that line. In conclusion i will say that is Korean Peninsula has been bold, ambitious and timely but hes encountering an almost challenges and facing numerous impediments. Can he overcome them . I dont know but hes already can communicate with the United States and come up with a common strategy to solve the problem. But i really hope north korea will come back to the negotiating table. North korean grievances have been heard sufficiently and now it is time for north korea to come back to the negotiation table and try to find out some kind of negotiating settlement with the United States need to be more realistic. You cannot pursue the strategy of [inaudible] that wont work. He responded by saying you permanently and irreversibly withdrawal hostile policies then i will come back to negotiating table. There is a complete power between washington and pyongyang and both sides need to come up with some kind of come from eyes to approach and they need to be more bold. [inaudible] he was arguing that yes we can set the goal of the denuclearization but in the operator station we might consider adopting Nuclear Arms Control paradigm therefore the United States needs to think about, okay, assigning peace treaty with north korea. Force reduction for denuclearization and push for the cooperative Reduction Fund where American Funds or International Funds so that we can fund a clear signal to north korea that we seriously interested in denuclearization of north korea with the scent of incentives and we could think about sanction relief and also if we propose some kind of working group with north korea and snap sanction relief may be it could stop north korean behavior but we may not agree with ben jacksons idea but we must have to think about it. Also, we got to think about china, russian with the revolution proposal. Its very onesided. The resolution talk about what kind of incentive and it did not talk about what kinds of [inaudible] however, the u. S. And the United Kingdom can come with more Creative Ideas and demand the proposal open up new breakthroughs to the stalemate but we have things to think about but what i want to emphasize is let us not be too rigid but be flexible and let us not be have inertia but have accretive idea going beyond past dependencies. Thank you. [applause] thank you, doctor moon. Its best now that we will move right into our panel discussion. I think first i will go to doug who was a featured columnist in our National Interest magazine and many of you know the center for the National Interest public the National Interest which is the Largest International affairs publication website on the world that we regularly get 5 million page abuse a month and we are read interesting fact in north korea from time to time. Something to consider. Doug, quick introduction. Many of you know him, senior fellow at the cato institute. Interesting fact about doug he spent two north korea not once, but twice. Doug. Thank you, harry. Great pleasure to be here but i suspect when harry planned this they thought they had a hold of the hottest topic in washington at the time. That was the case through thursday afternoon but at the moment certainly some of our policymakers have other things on their minds. Nevertheless korea is extraordinarily important and indeed if one thanks about the potential dangers that i think north korea is far more dangerous than iran for lots of reasons. Its an issue we do need to take on. There are a lot of what ifs as we look into 2020. One can certainly imagine things going badly. One can imagine the north been quite ambitious and angry and restarting tests and one can imagine a president reacting weather badly towards that and moving us to fire and fury. In the middle of a president ial Campaign Criticism from democrats and publicans et cetera it could become quite interesting and messy. I think the challenge for us then is how to move forward. Momentum he had finished we had a president who thought the peculiarities it would be a challenging time especially its going to be quite challenging. The first member of us believe whenever he says its never really had a plan. I would argue iindia did there are plenty of reasons he wont do that one could imagine domestically in terms of domestic politics no one on earth could Pay Attention to this country absinthe effect it is awaiting Nuclear Weapons. The president thought this was going to be almost instantaneous. Not sure if he thought they were show up in air force one and fighithem back but never the lef we take him at his word there is a danger in this but if we believe he is a negotiating partner, the statement was structured and they want a per domestic peace regime and the peninsula and its a sensible way of looking at things once youve given up and then you would like evidence along the way you probably want a little more. I do think the president deserves credit any of the field think its foolish and didnt want him to take the idea of not talked to your adversaries is stupid. Imagine the cuban missile crisis we are trying perhaps not enough indefinite but there have been direct communication but the failure to communicate to the adversaries especially potentially in the state but i think the way the president looks at this is another problem that we have. He uses this as a matter of relationship and beliefs he made a promise to him. I would like to take the contract into court but i would probably lose that case. Looking at this in personal terms especially in the motion of book that yo would you do ife running north korea and what are the interests even if you happen to like the president in certain ways it is the relative impetus with the most of what goes on you for a. Of it might help dealing with north korea. So it is a dangerous moment set aside the middle east it is very easy to see how this could go badly. He is got a problem and the democrats are concerned he could start a war but they are afraid he will give everything away facing potential humiliation of the new testament north korea intensified by democratic criticism and the political pressures to respond and rather dangerous ways. I think you will imagine one can playoff scenarios that could be very ugly. The question is what is the future relationship with north korea. It goes back to where we were or worse. It wasnt very satisfying to accurately target the American Homeland to start a war into telling the Diplomatic Community it would be a big deal yo even o pass the International Population that would come back and they have a big population they said things like this. Weve dealt with these people before but none of us want to be in that world i so the alternate to that is the cold war intensified sanctions this administration thinks there is a panacea and everywhere we look they are failed. Still in power in venezuela and raul castro the retirement in cuba and russians occupy crimea they have caused trouble. This is a new cold war because they will have new weapons and probably view giving up on diplomacy as opposed to looking forward to be possibility and to my mind that is madness and not assume the regime change was next. I think it requires us to move forward diplomatically with skepticism. Im skeptical about the outcome and the Nuclear Arsenal is a different creature than the limited ambitions in the future and we should look forward to try to capture the program and maintain the ultimatitmaintainee objective of the denuclearization but nevertheless we should take steps to reduce the threat and how much they think this is a game to them whether or not this Congressional Authority we can argue whether those are good policy. But if youre on the money list you are not going to be very comfortable. In that world and someone has to take steps to create assurances and i would suggest liaison offices should be a top priority is and we should talk about human rights. And its important to be useful ending the ban on trying to get travel we would like to have North Koreans coming here and i think the notion of trying to formalize moratoriums we should be looking for mechanisms to go forward and longterm coming up with larger proposals in terms of decommissioning but should never argue to take u. S. Troops away to have the Nuclear Armed north korea then to get rid of the truths that get the denuclearization. Ultimately it i is you live in Interesting Times and we have that domestic politics, look at the middle east, northeast asia but i indicated at the start i think they are far more important than the damage of the catastrophic consequences if it goes back and the impact of other nations, china, russia, japan involved the United States and u. S. Territories even if they cant get the United States today presumably a. We want to keep that. That requires us to move ahead and taking chances i think that he write flexibility, taking chances, these are things that are necessary and id like to see support on both sides of the aisle for him doing it. Thank you. I appreciate those comments. Lets move to jessica. You may not know jessica but she has been doing media with everything going on in north korea and i think on friday she is a Senior Research fellow which is a new think tank in washington that focuses on realism and restraint. Thank you very much. Its great to be here. I thought i would give a quick and go lay out my key ideas for the day. It was founded a few months ago in washington but our philosophy extends from John Quincy Adams almost 200 years ago a in their tens should go abroad and i think that sentiment is all the more appropriate at this moment when we are considering matters of war and peace. To talk about it almost as a footnote and what we can learn from the Peace Process and diplomacy because i think it is instructive for folks in washington. You know as well as i do how serious the situation really is. It doesnt hit you quite well in washington to monitor potential north korea propagation in the 60s when he was 18yearsold. All these thoughts came into my mind. I do want to start off by saying it is so grave a want to cite one survey that i read as an example of the type of lessons we can learn from the public when it comes to the north korean issue. The unification from last april found that even two months after the summit broke out between the u. S. And north korea people supported diplomacy and dialogue and compromise and i find striking. It was at its low point within the south korean public it is an incredibly important point again for washington to take into account. In this particular survey from last april, they discussed how when you talk about the regime is lower than when you talk about north koreas regime and the Public Perception of the issue. Its important because the way we talk about this issue could be unnecessarily antagonistic and unconstructive and so i just want to point that out and i highly recommend you read this up. I want to turn to some of the recent polling and a shift thats happening in washington. They tend to talk about it in very monolithic terms but its preciselthatsprecisely why thes founded as to the cost of war or the projection projects the United States is on track to spend 6. 4 chilean dollars on the war on terror by the end of this year and 2020 and unless you in Foreign Policy unless it stops tomorrow this projection is assuredly going to increase in the coming years but interestingly, the Public Perception and sentiment on foreignpolicy is shifting towards a less aggressive ones of the data for progress for example in its recent survey found the majority want a demilitarized Foreign Policy based on cooperation, peace building and what was most significant what does this all mean. For a long time to foreignpolicy establishment in both the United States and south korea has been quite antidemocratic in the way that it makes policies, the way that it explains the rationale for the policies and i think that its time to change that. I think that the American People intand the afghanistan papers ae seeing our government has a role explaining how the resources into troops old things over time have gone unquestioned and i think that this capacity with which it is deeply problematic and should be changed. I want to know i would like to kind of talk about the notion of the u. S. Kind of narrative on north korea and more broadly. Its driven by the threat centered overly militarized posture that doesnt deal with much flexibility and has resulted in the policy stance that are out of sequence and has been detrimental and counterproductive to the goal for the Korean Peninsula. One of the first papers at the Quincy Institute was on the possibility of a shortterm deal. Can there be in agreement over 12 months. How where they begin dismantling in exchange for the partial sanctions relief on the offices and declaring before i last wore that would take away the powers in blaming the United States and the world for all of its challenges. Thinking in smaller terms and piecemeal some things in the foreignpolicy take a long time at diplomacy that sometimes it happens very quickly so this isnt an issue that deserves to be on the back burner should be pursued and focused especially now that there is a former special representative for in charge of the state department and so there is no reason for this issue to be languishing theyve already declared a something that needs to happen and the question now becomes what is the United States willing to do to provide clarity for steps towards denuclearization which theyve estimated will take about 15 years so this isnt something that could happen overnight. I shouldnt be in ie you can do to problem finally i want to go back to opening up the fork in d prophecy kind of process by showing you and providing a specific example of how folks in the community and a sort of the broad Expert Community have dealt with this issue in the Nuclear Threat so from 2016 to 2019, i worked for the National Organization that was to educate those in this country about what is at stake for the community and the Korean Peninsula there was a lot of curiosity in the Mainstream Media about how to create a response to the attack. Theres been a lot of work done in a number of think tanks. Womens organizations, Community Leaders across the country. And when you see that kind of things they rally around for example, 152 come asking the president to declare the end of the korean war, you look at that and say why is their public support for h. 152 and what do people in the United States wants because you want the beat go have people my age, im 36, if you ask folks my age in the army or the marines do they want war with north korea were a more sensible policy that will take this away from the standard is path towards peace, and i think again as a democracy, the United States and south korea we should listen to the public on this issue and the public is always going to support a sensible pragmatic approach rather than an openended conflict. But the firsone of the first thd this morning was by then emergency room doctor who served in iraq and he was recounting the kind of people that came into his tent in iraq as he was in charge of the American Service members serving their in into fixing their injuries and so forth and it was very sobering and eyeopening to see what it does and this particular one said its not about what happens up there in iraq. Its about what we carry back home and the fact that we cant ever see and experience joy again after the horrors of the war i think this is the stake we have to think about and its a great but this panel has come up with a lot of Creative Solutions they are all personified on this panel does it make sense to wait until after the president ial election because i think there is motivation for donald trump after the impeachment may be coming out with proposals when it comes to north korea but considering the situation with the fact they pulled out of quite a few treaty is the last year or two so i want your thoughts on that and then we can go to the qanda to move down the line a lot of the political consideration there is a trust issue thats all the more reason they need to address north korea and make it a part of the address before the joint session of congress because there are so many other things that make it very challenging for observers to believe the United States is going to prioritize north korea to say heres what my administration has done and here is they expect to happen in the next 12 months. So there is an opportunity but he has to seize it. You read a speech to the plenary it is an important one it is a big chunk of the talk and the things they are trying to do because he wants Economic Development. The role in the north Korean Society of the biggest change tr me visiting north korea 1992 which was a long time ago in 2017 is the fact that women come to the you see them in singapore walking the waterfront so i think that there is a hope and that is advantageous you might want to deal with them on the series trumpets a little desperate and will say everything is working but nothing has worked. If they want to sell success to the people korea would be the obvious one. They might think youll get more out of it and their friends at least once be trumps deal mocked obama and they think better of his own efforts. The interesting question is if you wait and a democrat wins, who knows what he faces and it isnt clear to whether the democrats would go with this so you might be nervous. You talk about uncertainty. They talk about do everything from did. There is a way you face the trust issue they are small deals. You do something you promised and get some snapback relief on sanctions. The point is you dont get what you thought you were going to get and you stop what youre doing. It makes it much harder to do the old wore nothing. You dont have trust you will not give up your nuclear program. If you have a process by which you could establish trust, i am not overly optimistic but i do think you could make progress in that way that you cant in the all or nothing. How do you utilize the process in the United States . Look at the north korean media talks and whatever. What north koreas concern is how the american political stakeholders take that back for the domestic property to gain if north korea thinks the United States has been politically of using and misusing them for their petitions personal gains. Second, if you read the recent report, you can clearly see why they are angry about the United States and of the Trump Administration. Theyve been pushing for the maximum pressures and nothing but containing and strangulated north korea. Theyve shown the overt criticism despite the United States and the second point on the issue of the asymmetric report says okay weve suspended the tests and the nuclear testing. We have unleashed the society and we get nothing we do not get anything for what we have done on the part of the United States. There have been reasons that outline what they are saying and the answers can be found due to trust and to come up with a jazz i pointed out in my talk its been denuclearized. That was in hanoi saying it was completely and irreversibly. We havent been paying attention to it and they say the hostile policy is a statement by north korea to analyze. Did they so david i dont think so. We will open up to qanda now. Please state your name and affiliation and i will get to as many people as we can. I was going to ask that very question a lot of americans dont completely ignore year after year but they keep saying hostile policy. We spent a long time saying they dont understand what we mean by denuclearization. How do they view hostile policy because they keep saying over and over again what do they mean if we withdraw that hostile policy what are they talking about. Sanctions are the most important indicator and second political matters normalize and that is the most important indicator signing a lasting peace treaty into the joint military exercise and training not only lifting sanctions but surrounding north korea to be members of imf and engaging with normal trade. Im a big fan of the proposal of maintaining and having arms control in north korea in the interim however recently i had the chance to speak with a few academics about the idea and they were resistant to it because they viewed this as essentially you would accept it as a Nuclear Power in order to have arms control with it and for the panel i want to ask what is the perception in south korea and japan if the United States moves to this agreement focusing on what you can get done does that create certain problems if they fear you are going to walk in a capability for the time being. That is a great question. Having the maximum ambiguity strategy has been an intentional part because of the very question of the potential Nuclear Arms Race or the question of what the state would do to the regional actors including our allies. I think its hard to argue north korea isnt a Nuclear State and the resistance to talk about arms control is real and what you pointed out from the academic circle doesnt surprise me there is a perception that needs to be taken into account that we cannot move him to the talks of arms control yet because we are still debating. I would say it is something i heard in washington and it goes to whether the United States is willing to accept north korea as a Nuclear State and the potential consequences by south korea and japan. The reality is they have Nuclear Weapons and it is and should they have them or not, they do. We live in a world in which multiple u. S. President s have said they cannot have Nuclear Weapons. Okay. Thank you very much. They have them. The reality is they adapt to the reality. Is it was the Nixon Administration we wanted. Guess what it is a far more dangerous place in many ways we tried sanctions and it didnt work. The greatest was pakistan sending planeloads of stuff all over and we allowed it because what was the alternative. That is our challenge we can huff and puff we can try to come up with something to prevent that i am not optimistic that will ever happen but the reality is they do have them so its silly to say they cant have them, they do so the question is what do you do in the world they have them for denuclearization paradigm seems to be artificial and misleading. Not the idea is that he suggested a gu tie could be very dangerous for us but for us it is clear it could be complementary. I want to ask about an episode from past history and ask to what degree it might provide insight into how we might get creative dealing with the problem in the Korean Peninsula today and that is europe in the 1960s. We had a situation we had a divided continent and hostile military blocs, Nuclear Weapons and conventional forces deployed against one another and they wanted a couple of big things. One, if wanted recognition of soviet control we wanted to talk about things the soviet leadership didnt want to talk about it was a very artful bargain in creating what has been called this of Security Cooperation to deliver some things and compromise forms to satisfy that the kremlin wanted in the principles that in effect recognized the fact of the soviet borders in the east but we also enable the discussion about broad issues that critics in the United States said were in effect an meaningful and peace with paper agreements that would have no affect on the human rights situation, freedom of the press, democratic governance in that part of the world. In retrospect however this have a transformative effect in not only enabled the talk of confidence building measures, arms control measures could also begin processes that lead to peaceful evolution in the region. It contains economic recipients and both human and social contextbased therefore the liberal government and they all support the process and have been trying to emulate particularly 1992 the classic example. We do talk to the soviets and a lot of times it was a conversation that was important and i do think the discussion about human rights within a point it turned out they were embarrassed that th these sort f things matter to them. I think thats why you could imagine trying the norms on the idea that we want regular conversations but everything is on the table that is we dont only talk about what you want, we talk about what we want. I think that is basically the uk and we get. Anything we can do to try to open in them up more one of the differences of crist is in the eastern block some of the countries are more open than others, east germans and muslims. The Knowledge Based in east germany was in some degree with hungary and given differences within their access in the way north korea is much more isolated we should do things and that is one reason the travel ban is stupid not to say that they will transform, but we want more people, we should want to try to kind of find any way we can to open things up a bit and get more ideas to have contact. I think that is a useful model. Its difficult with the states with complexity there but i think thats right this office tried. But i think that we have a better chance of it because i do think that it is more open and the idea of inviting them to things and bringing them into things give us something if he has agreed to some of these and be Economic Development we have leverage in a way i dont think we had. I dont think they care. They were not interested in that they were more willing as opposed to try to open up some. Just to add to that, i would Say Something that came to my mind as you were talking to the degree to which the state department hasnt gotten it in a recent years we dont have senior officials and really an army of diplomats whose only job is to come up with smart nuanced strategies for tackling issues like north korea and to do it with the diplomacy and skills required to tackle the challenge. We just dont have that. We have instead a massive Defense Department that is being asked to do all kind of things related that should be left to the state department and so i do think that whether it is the example that you provided in the case of europe and the soviet union or perhaps vietnam and normalization process between vietnam and the 90s that were led by smart thoughtful people in the state department who said this is what i would look like k like and here are the steps we can take a and you have really pushed it forward i think that is the kind of expertise that we need, and i wonder if we have that and if we are up to the challenge in the current configuration state. We have a few more minutes for a few other questions. Please, sir. George washington university. I think that the washington consensus if you will is trying to adopt a package of policy ranging from sanctions and deterrence and diplomacy. No denuclearization in the near future but when it comes to the policy prescription, we are very diverse views and limited short term goal as we discussed today also maximum pressure. I think one of the reasons for that is a different understanding of where he wants to lead his country especially after completing his socalled Nuclear Deterrence and my question is dont we have enough of a debate on this especially when it comes to the north korean economy . This is one of the more impenetrable countries in understanding fully. We dont have a real winner in the way we would have if it were 70 years of diplomatic presence. This is and on what you call up your local contacts and to say what were we talking about in the bureau last week. So i think it is a very difficult one. I think that we try to attract change and there is some reform processes going on and we can argue how serious this is and where its going. We shouldnt have illusions. This is and gorbachev and waiting. This is a man willing to execute anybody. As of again, we should approach this with skepticism but also the sense that there is an opportunity and we should have the amount of skepticism for past policy. Show me an example where maximum pressures work. I dont see it. It strikes me as useful and part of a process if you give them options in getting rid of it which seems serious, get rid of your new sand sanctions and if i were there absolutely not. But come up with a process with the sanctions to become useful as opposed to we are going to force you to do what you want, no matter what. I think the policy doesnt strike me as being very helpful. We must look at the last 20 or 30 years. We tried a lot of Different Things and none of them worked. Its just something we are struggling with. I dont claim what i proposed works. Its just what we tried to pass it strikes Something Different i do think that hes given some hope and the criticism i think there is an opportunity that we have not had and we dont want to lose it and give it away without doing everything we can to explain it. I go to vote in the washington debate but obviously if you look at the Plenary Session coming up to the party, they come up with three basic lines. One is we should expect protecting the United States and second we should come up with a third, there will be major tradeoffs between the selfreliance and sanction by continue and will be intensified if we wait for the selfreliance of selfsufficiency in order that we should make investments in science and technology and resources. Even though the report doesnt mention it i could see them attempt to penny coming ties with china and russia and it would be the most important part in the speech and 2018 she is shifting to the simultaneous pursuit of Nuclear Weapons we have time for one or two more questions and about ten minutes. It could claim to be the primary threat of north korea and south korea coming and it also offers a tremendous opportunities since the United States shifted away from militarism and military budgets infested in the response of both mitigation and adaptation it could transform the concept of security and open up a window for dialogue with north korea and actually also in a more important issue which is a Regional Peace regime architecture including japan and china. To come up with concrete actionable ways to address Climate Change with your cooperation to china that is much more vital it is easier said than done and will require a concerted effort and thoughtful leadership with the beijing and washingtons part to make a real difference on the issue of Climate Change. As i noted in my remarks there are data points that show those that care about Climate Change that the young people here that we authorized 100 billion to the pentagon and, they are appalled because we will be living and paying off the debt. And the borrowing of the money to address these problems. So of course this is an issue that matters more to us and my daughter et cetera so maybe tackle Climate Change and in the midcareer stage because guess what we feel that more urgently than anyone else. I think in general talking about Climate Change you know this but it is a functional issue that was regional issues miss so theres not a lot of coordination and cross pollen cross pollination attending conferences and to coordinate the whole of government with Climate Change and that needs to include china with the north korea issue so this isnt a problem they can solve and get out all of these issues are far more complex than we admit imagined here in dc. It is an important issue and it will be hard to address especially like north korea absent deal with the Security Issues for i never had a conversation where they brought this up to suggest it was a major concern. In many ways regime preservation that kim is looking at military versus environmental and giving that stage of development he does care about science and technology but it strikes me that this would be useful to bring in if you start making progress and you talk about expanded cooperation if you look at military deployments especially in the Regional Cooperative way that would be the one to take the lead not the pentagon but i dont think were quite there year but its a useful idea to have a breakthrough. In a way i disagree because to use Climate Change of those ecological issues and with that environment especially and then to sustain those confidentiality sources. So to have that Nuclear Power plant. There has been a complete change to sustain any sufficiency and kim shown and deforestation of north korea that was the number one project but there was enormous effort with the sanctions and in north korea. The sanction blocks deforestation and the plantation and they were broke by sanctions. So there is no hope for Climate Change in north korea. If thats the way we are thinking about the distinction. I think we are out of time we will see you back at our next panel thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] quorum call be dispensed with. The presiding officer without objection. Mr. Mcconnell as the senate mr. Mcconnell as the senate as the senate convenes this afternoon our nation is facing to gray and serious choices. One concerns our unity at home in the future of our constitution, the other is our strength abroad and the security of our homeland. Demand serious treatment from congress to put in during National Interest ahead of the shortterm the Founding Fathers warned us about but unfortunately this is in short supply